Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-664Full metadata record
| DC Field | Value | Language |
|---|---|---|
| dc.contributor.author | Liang, Caleb | |
| dc.date.accessioned | 2016-10-26T08:01:07Z | |
| dc.date.available | 2016-10-26T10:01:07Z | |
| dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
| dc.identifier.uri | https://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/666 | - |
| dc.description.abstract | In what follows, I respond to Haug and Jung’s criticisms of my target paper and defend the following claims: (1) the sense of experiential ownership can misrepresent the fact of experiential ownership; (2) the sense of experiential ownership is eligible to serve as a bearer of IEM; (3) at least some versions of IEM face genuine counterexamples; and (4) as far as the sense of self-as-subject is concerned, IEM is not a trivial property. Finally, I describe a new set of experiments that induced what I call “the self-touching illusion.” The data, I suggest, strengthen the view that both the sense of self-as-subject and IEM are open to empirical as well as philosophical investigation. | en_GB |
| dc.language.iso | eng | |
| dc.rights | InCopyright | de_DE |
| dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie | de_DE |
| dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophy | en_GB |
| dc.title | Can experiential ownership violate the immunity principle? : A reply to Oliver Haug & Marius F. Jung | en_GB |
| dc.type | Buchbeitrag | de_DE |
| dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550266 | |
| dc.identifier.doi | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-664 | - |
| jgu.type.dinitype | bookPart | |
| jgu.type.version | Published version | en_GB |
| jgu.type.resource | Text | |
| jgu.organisation.department | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie | - |
| jgu.organisation.number | 7920 | - |
| jgu.organisation.name | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz | - |
| jgu.rights.accessrights | openAccess | - |
| jgu.book.title | Open MIND | |
| jgu.book.editor | Metzinger, Thomas | |
| jgu.pages.alternative | Kap. 24(R) | |
| jgu.publisher.year | 2015 | |
| jgu.publisher.name | MIND Group | |
| jgu.publisher.place | Frankfurt am Main | |
| jgu.publisher.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570948 | |
| jgu.organisation.place | Mainz | - |
| jgu.subject.ddccode | 100 | |
| opus.date.accessioned | 2016-10-26T08:01:07Z | |
| opus.date.modified | 2016-10-31T11:27:31Z | |
| opus.date.available | 2016-10-26T10:01:07 | |
| opus.subject.dfgcode | 01-108 | |
| opus.organisation.string | FB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminar | de_DE |
| opus.identifier.opusid | 55026 | |
| opus.relation.ispartofcollection | Open Mind | de_DE |
| opus.institute.number | 0508 | |
| opus.metadataonly | false | |
| opus.type.contenttype | Keine | de_DE |
| opus.type.contenttype | None | en_GB |
| jgu.publisher.doi | 10.15502/9783958570948 | |
| jgu.organisation.ror | https://ror.org/023b0x485 | |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen | |
