Authors:	Jacob, Pierre
Title:	Assessing a speaker's reliability falls short of providing an argument : a reply to Marius F. Jung
Online publication date:	24-Oct-2016
Year of first publication:	2015
Language:	english
Abstract:	When confronted with a speaker’s assertion, her addressee can either fulfill the speaker’s informative intention and accept the new belief or not. If he does, he can either accept the new belief on the sole basis of the speaker’s authority or not. If not, then the addressee can examine the reliability of the speaker’s assertion. If he does, then he can either check the content of the speaker’s assertion with the contents of his own beliefs or scrutinize the speaker herself as the source of the novel information. If the latter, then he can either examine the speaker’s epistemic competence in the relevant domain of discourse or the speaker’s moral benevolence (or both). None of the above processes amounts to the addressee producing an argument, let alone an ad hominem argument. Only if the speaker offers an argument to back her assertion could the addressee commit an ad hominem counter-argument in his attempt at rebutting the speaker’s.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-658
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-550056
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	In Copyright
Information on rights of use:	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation:	Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	Kap. 20(R)
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2015
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571013
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958571013
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen