Autoren:	Limanowski, Jakub
Titel:	(Dis-)attending to the body : action and self-experience in the active inference framework
Online-Publikationsdatum:	1-Jun-2017
Erscheinungsdatum:	2017
Sprache des Dokuments:	Englisch
Zusammenfassung/Abstract:	Endogenous attention is crucial and beneficial for learning, selecting, and supervising actions. However, deliberately attending to action execution usually comes at the cost of decreased smoothness and slower performance, often severely impairs normal functioning, and in the worst case may result in pathological behavior and experience as in schizophrenic hyperreflexivity. These ambiguous modulatory effects of self-directed attention have been examined on phenomenological, computational, and implementational levels of description—a recent formalization within an active inference framework aims to accommodate all of these aspects. Here, I examine the active inference account of motor control as enabled by attentional modulation based on expected precisions of prediction errors in a brain’s hierarchical generative model of the environment. The implications of active inference fit well with a range of empirical results, they resonate well with ideomotor accounts of motor control, and they also tentatively reflect many insights from phenomenological analysis of the “lived body”. Thereby a particular strength of active inference is its hierarchical account of motor control in terms of adaptive behavior driven by the imperative to maintain the organism’s states within unsurprising boundaries. Phenomena ranging from the reflex arc to intentional, goal-directed action and the experience of oneself as an embodied agent are are thus proposed to rely on the same mechanisms operating universally throughout the brain’s hierarchical generative model. However, while the explanation of movement production and sensory attenuation in terms of low-level attentional modulation is quite elegant on the active inference view, there are some questions left open by its extension to higher levels of action control and the accompanying phenomenology of for example volition, effort, or agency. I suggest that conceptual guidance from recent accounts of phenomenal self- and world-modeling may help develop active inference into an interdisciplinary framework for investigating embodied agentive self-experience.
DDC-Sachgruppe:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Veröffentlichende Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Organisationseinheit:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Veröffentlichungsort:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-641
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566603
Version:	Published version
Publikationstyp:	Buchbeitrag
Nutzungsrechte:	CC BY-ND
Informationen zu den Nutzungsrechten:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
Quelle:	Philosophy and predictive processing Metzinger, Thomas
Seitenzahl oder Artikelnummer:	283 295
Verlag:	MIND Group
Verlagsort:	Frankfurt am Main
Erscheinungsdatum:	2017
URL der Originalveröffentlichung:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573192
DOI der Originalveröffentlichung:	10.15502/9783958573192
Enthalten in den Sammlungen:	JGU-Publikationen