Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-632
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dc.contributor.authorDewhurst, Joe-
dc.date.accessioned2017-06-01T10:30:39Z-
dc.date.available2017-06-01T12:30:39Z-
dc.date.issued2017-
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/634-
dc.description.abstractWhilst much has been said about the implications of predictive processing for our scientific understanding of cognition, there has been comparatively little discussion of how this new paradigm fits with our everyday understanding of the mind, i.e. folk psychology. This paper aims to assess the relationship between folk psychology and predictive processing, which will first require making a distinction between two ways of understanding folk psychology: as propositional attitude psychology and as a broader folk psychological discourse. It will be argued that folk psychology in this broader sense is compatible with predictive processing, despite the fact that there is an apparent incompatibility between predictive processing and a literalist interpretation of propositional attitude psychology. The distinction between these two kinds of folk psychology allows us to accept that our scientific usage of folk concepts requires revision, whilst rejecting the suggestion that we should eliminate folk psychology entirely. In section 1 I will introduce predictive processing, giving a quick summary of the framework that focuses on the details most relevant for my comparison with folk psychology. I will also introduce folk psychology and define the distinction between propositional attitude psychology and folk psychological discourse. In section 2 I will consider the relationship between predictive processing and propositional attitude psychology, and in section 3 I will consider the relationship between predictive processing and folk psychological discourse. Finally, in section 4 I will argue that the distinction between propositional attitude psychology and folk psychological discourse makes space for us to revise our scientific usage of folk psychological concepts without thereby eliminating folk psychology altogether.en_GB
dc.language.isoeng-
dc.rightsCC BY-NDde_DE
dc.rights.urihttps://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/-
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophiede_DE
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophyen_GB
dc.titleFolk psychology and the Bayesian brainen_GB
dc.typeBuchbeitragde_DE
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566512-
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-632-
jgu.type.dinitypebookPart-
jgu.type.versionPublished versionen_GB
jgu.type.resourceText-
jgu.organisation.departmentFB 05 Philosophie und Philologie-
jgu.organisation.number7920-
jgu.organisation.nameJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz-
jgu.rights.accessrightsopenAccess-
jgu.book.titlePhilosophy and predictive processing-
jgu.book.editorMetzinger, Thomas-
jgu.pages.start148-
jgu.pages.end160-
jgu.publisher.year2017-
jgu.publisher.nameMIND Group-
jgu.publisher.placeFrankfurt am Main-
jgu.publisher.urihttp://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573109-
jgu.organisation.placeMainz-
jgu.subject.ddccode100-
opus.date.accessioned2017-06-01T10:30:39Z-
opus.date.modified2017-06-02T07:45:46Z-
opus.date.available2017-06-01T12:30:39-
opus.subject.dfgcode00-000-
opus.organisation.stringFB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminarde_DE
opus.identifier.opusid56651-
opus.relation.ispartofcollectionPhilosophy and predictive processingde_DE
opus.institute.number0508-
opus.metadataonlyfalse-
opus.type.contenttypeKeinede_DE
opus.type.contenttypeNoneen_GB
jgu.publisher.doi10.15502/9783958573109
jgu.organisation.rorhttps://ror.org/023b0x485
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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