Authors:	Burr, Christopher
Title:	Embodied decisions and the predictive brain
Online publication date:	1-Jun-2017
Year of first publication:	2017
Language:	english
Abstract:	A cognitivist account of decision-making views choice behaviour as a serial process of deliberation and commitment, which is separate from perception and action. By contrast, recent work in embodied decision-making has argued that this account is incompatible with emerging neurophysiological data. We argue that this account has significant overlap with an embodied account of predictive processing, and that both can offer mutual development for the other. However, more importantly, by demonstrating this close connection we uncover an alternative perspective on the nature of decision-making, and the mechanisms that underlie our choice behaviour. This alternative perspective allows us to respond to a challenge for predictive processing, which claims that the satisfaction of distal goal-states is underspecified. Answering this challenge requires the adoption of an embodied perspective.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-630
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566492
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	CC BY-ND
Information on rights of use:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
Citation:	Philosophy and predictive processing Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	109 131
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2017
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573086
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958573086
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen