Authors:	Anderson, Michael L.
Title:	Of Bayes and bullets : an embodied, situated, targeting-based account of predictive processing
Online publication date:	1-Jun-2017
Year of first publication:	2017
Language:	english
Abstract:	Here I argue that Jakob Hohwy’s (Hohwy 2013) cognitivist interpretation of predictive processing (a) does not necessarily follow from the evidence for the importance of Bayesian processing in the brain; (b) is rooted in a misunderstanding of our epistemic position in the world; and (c) is undesirable in that it leads to epistemic internalism or idealism. My claim is that the internalist/idealist conclusions do not follow from predictive processing itself, but instead from the model of perception Hohwy’s adopts, and that there are alternate models of perception that do not lend themselves to idealist conclusions. The position I advocate is similar to Andy Clark’s embodied/embedded interpretation of Bayesian processing (Clark 2015); however, I argue that Clark’s position, as currently stated, also potentially leads to idealist conclusions. I offer a specific emendation to Clark’s view that I believe avoids this pitfall.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-627
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566462
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	CC BY-ND
Information on rights of use:	https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
Citation:	Philosophy and predictive processing Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	60 73
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2017
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573055
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958573055
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen