Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-625
Authors: Hohwy, Jakob
Title: How to entrain your evil demon
Online publication date: 29-May-2017
Year of first publication: 2017
Language: english
Abstract: The notion that the brain is a prediction error minimizer entails, via the notion of Markov blankets and self-evidencing, a form of global scepticism – an inability to rule out evil demon scenarios. This type of scepticism is viewed by some as a sign of a fatally flawed conception of mind and cognition. Here I discuss whether this scepticism is ameliorated by acknowledging the role of action in the most ambitious approach to prediction error minimization, namely under the free energy principle. I argue that the scepticism remains but that the role of action in the free energy principle constrains the demon’s work. This yields new insights about the free energy principle, epistemology, and the place of mind in nature.
DDC: 100 Philosophie
100 Philosophy
Institution: Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department: FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place: Mainz
ROR: https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-625
URN: urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-566126
Version: Published version
Publication type: Buchbeitrag
License: CC BY-ND
Information on rights of use: https://creativecommons.org/licenses/by-nd/4.0/
Citation: Philosophy and predictive processing
Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number: 26
40
Publisher: MIND Group
Publisher place: Frankfurt am Main
Issue date: 2017
Publisher URL: http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958573048
Publisher DOI: 10.15502/9783958573048
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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