Authors:	Baßler, David H.
Title:	Qualia explained away : a commentary on Daniel C. Dennett
Online publication date:	18-Nov-2016
Year of first publication:	2015
Language:	english
Abstract:	In his paper “Why and how does consciousness seem the way it seems?”, Daniel Dennett argues that philosophers and scientists should abandon Ned Block’s distinction between access consciousness and phenomenal consciousness. First he lays out why the assumption of phenomenal consciousness as a second medium is not a reasonable idea. In a second step he shows why beings like us must be convinced that there are qualia, that is, why we have the strong temptation to believe in their existence. This commentary is exclusively concerned with this second part of the target paper. In particular, I offer a more detailed picture, guided by five questions that are not addressed by Dennett. My proposal, however, still resides within the framework of Dennett’s philosophy in general. In particular I use the notion of intentional systems of different orders to fill in some details. I tell the counterfactual story of some first-order intentional systems evolving to become believers in qualia as building blocks of their world.
DDC:	100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy
Institution:	Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
Department:	FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie
Place:	Mainz
ROR:	https://ror.org/023b0x485
DOI:	http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-457
URN:	urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551928
Version:	Published version
Publication type:	Buchbeitrag
License:	In Copyright
Information on rights of use:	https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
Citation:	Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas
Pages or article number:	Kap. 10(C)
Publisher:	MIND Group
Publisher place:	Frankfurt am Main
Issue date:	2015
Publisher URL:	http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570542
Publisher DOI:	10.15502/9783958570542
Appears in collections:	JGU-Publikationen