Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-445
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DC Field | Value | Language |
---|---|---|
dc.contributor.author | Eliasmith, Chris | |
dc.date.accessioned | 2016-11-11T09:34:45Z | |
dc.date.available | 2016-11-11T10:34:45Z | |
dc.date.issued | 2015 | |
dc.identifier.uri | https://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/447 | - |
dc.description.abstract | In her discussion of my original article, Hill reconstructs an argument I may have been making, argues that the distinction between natural and artificial minds is not exclusive, and suggests that my reliance on behaviour as a determiner of “mindedness” is a dangerous slip back to philosophical behaviourism. In reply, I note that the logical fallacy of which I’m accused (circular reasoning) is not the one present in the reconstruction of my argument (besides the point), and offer a non-fallacious reconstruction. More importantly, I note that logical analysis does not seem appropriate for the discussion in the target article. I then agree that natural and artificial minds do not make up two discrete categories for mindedness. Finally, I note that my research program belies any behaviourist motivations, and reiterate that even though behaviour is typically important for identifying minds, I do not suggest that it is a substitute for theory. However, the target article is not about such theory, but about the near-term likelihood of sophisticated artificial minds | en_GB |
dc.language.iso | eng | |
dc.rights | InCopyright | de_DE |
dc.rights.uri | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ | |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophie | de_DE |
dc.subject.ddc | 100 Philosophy | en_GB |
dc.title | Mind games : a reply to Daniela Hill | en_GB |
dc.type | Buchbeitrag | de_DE |
dc.identifier.urn | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551621 | |
dc.identifier.doi | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-445 | - |
jgu.type.dinitype | bookPart | |
jgu.type.version | Published version | en_GB |
jgu.type.resource | Text | |
jgu.organisation.department | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie | - |
jgu.organisation.number | 7920 | - |
jgu.organisation.name | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz | - |
jgu.rights.accessrights | openAccess | - |
jgu.book.title | Open MIND | |
jgu.book.editor | Metzinger, Thomas | |
jgu.pages.alternative | Kap. 12(R) | |
jgu.publisher.year | 2015 | |
jgu.publisher.name | MIND Group | |
jgu.publisher.place | Frankfurt am Main | |
jgu.publisher.uri | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570788 | |
jgu.organisation.place | Mainz | - |
jgu.subject.ddccode | 100 | |
opus.date.accessioned | 2016-11-11T09:34:45Z | |
opus.date.modified | 2016-11-11T09:34:55Z | |
opus.date.available | 2016-11-11T10:34:45 | |
opus.subject.dfgcode | 00-000 | |
opus.organisation.string | FB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminar | de_DE |
opus.identifier.opusid | 55162 | |
opus.relation.ispartofcollection | Open Mind | de_DE |
opus.institute.number | 0508 | |
opus.metadataonly | false | |
opus.type.contenttype | Keine | de_DE |
opus.type.contenttype | None | en_GB |
jgu.publisher.doi | 10.15502/9783958570788 | |
jgu.organisation.ror | https://ror.org/023b0x485 | |
Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |