Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-443
Authors: | Gerrans, Philip |
Title: | Metamisery and bodily inexistence : a reply to Ying-Tung Lin |
Online publication date: | 11-Nov-2016 |
Year of first publication: | 2015 |
Language: | english |
Abstract: | The difference between the Cotard Depersonalisation and Depersonalisation Disorder may consist, not only in the fact that the Cotard delusion is a response to prediction error affective/bodily information, but the level in the predictive processing hierarchy at which predictions about bodily information are violated. |
DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
Place: | Mainz |
ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-443 |
URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-551599 |
Version: | Published version |
Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
License: | In Copyright |
Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
Pages or article number: | Kap. 15(R) |
Publisher: | MIND Group |
Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
Issue date: | 2015 |
Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958570924 |
Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958570924 |
Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |