Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item: http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-2047
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dc.contributor.authorAlsmith, Adrian J. T.
dc.date.accessioned2012-07-09T11:45:51Z
dc.date.available2012-07-09T13:45:51Z
dc.date.issued2012
dc.identifier.urihttps://openscience.ub.uni-mainz.de/handle/20.500.12030/2049-
dc.description.abstractThe aims of the dissertation are to find the right description of the structure of perceptual experience and to explore the ways in which the structure of the body might serve to explain it. In the first two parts, I articulate and defend the claim that perceptual experience seems direct and the claim that its objects seem real. I defend these claims as integral parts of a coherent metaphysically neutral conception of perceptual experience. Sense-datum theorists, certain influential perceptual psychologists, and early modern philosophers (most notably Berkeley) all disputed the claim that perceptual experience seems direct. In Part I, I argue that the grounds on which they did so were poor. The aim is then, in Part II, to give a proper appreciation of the distinctive intentionality of perceptual experience whilst remaining metaphysically neutral. I do so by drawing on the early work of Edmund Husserl, providing a characterisation of the perceptual experience of objects as real, qua mind-independent particulars. In Part III, I explore two possible explanations of the structure characterising the intentionality of perceptual experience, both of which accord a distinctive explanatory role to the body. On one account, perceptual experience is structured by an implicit pre-reflective consciousness of oneself as a body engaged in perceptual activity. An alternative account makes no appeal to the metaphysically laden concept of a bodily self. It seeks to explain the structure of perceptual experience by appeal to anticipation of the structural constraints of the body. I develop this alternative by highlighting the conceptual and empirical basis for the idea that a first-order structural affordance relation holds between a bodily agent and certain properties of its body. I then close with a discussion of the shared background assumptions that ought to inform disputes over whether the body itself (in addition to its representation) ought to serve as an explanans in such an account.en_GB
dc.language.isoeng
dc.rightsInCopyrightde_DE
dc.rights.urihttps://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophiede_DE
dc.subject.ddc100 Philosophyen_GB
dc.titleThe structuring body : a critical study in the description & explanation of perceptual experienceen_GB
dc.typeDissertationde_DE
dc.identifier.urnurn:nbn:de:hebis:77-31464
dc.identifier.doihttp://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-2047-
jgu.type.dinitypedoctoralThesis
jgu.type.versionOriginal worken_GB
jgu.type.resourceText
jgu.description.extent354 S.
jgu.organisation.departmentFB 05 Philosophie und Philologie-
jgu.organisation.year2011
jgu.organisation.number7920-
jgu.organisation.nameJohannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz-
jgu.rights.accessrightsopenAccess-
jgu.organisation.placeMainz-
jgu.subject.ddccode100
opus.date.accessioned2012-07-09T11:45:51Z
opus.date.modified2012-07-09T12:10:15Z
opus.date.available2012-07-09T13:45:51
opus.subject.dfgcode00-000
opus.subject.otherEmpfindung, Phänomenologie der Wahrnehmung, Phänomenologie der Wirklichkeit, verkörpert Kognition, kognitive wissenschaftliche Erklärungde_DE
opus.subject.otherSensation, phenomenology of perception, phenomenology of reality, embodied cognition, cognitive scientific explanationen_GB
opus.organisation.stringFB 05: Philosophie und Philologie: Philosophisches Seminarde_DE
opus.identifier.opusid3146
opus.institute.number0508
opus.metadataonlyfalse
opus.type.contenttypeDissertationde_DE
opus.type.contenttypeDissertationen_GB
jgu.organisation.rorhttps://ror.org/023b0x485
Appears in collections:JGU-Publikationen

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