Please use this identifier to cite or link to this item:
http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-135| Authors: | Block, Ned |
| Title: | Solely generic phenomenology : a reply to Sascha Benjamin Fink |
| Online publication date: | 28-Nov-2016 |
| Year of first publication: | 2015 |
| Language: | english |
| Abstract: | If representationism is true, phenomenal precision is given by representational precision. But what if representationism is false as I claim? Can we make sense of phenomenal precision? Fink argues that there is a danger of trivialization of phenomenal precision and that the one way out may be incompatible with my view that consciousness overflows cognition. I try to say more about how to clarify phenomenal precision and its relation to my views on overflow. |
| DDC: | 100 Philosophie 100 Philosophy |
| Institution: | Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz |
| Department: | FB 05 Philosophie und Philologie |
| Place: | Mainz |
| ROR: | https://ror.org/023b0x485 |
| DOI: | http://doi.org/10.25358/openscience-135 |
| URN: | urn:nbn:de:hebis:77-publ-552845 |
| Version: | Published version |
| Publication type: | Buchbeitrag |
| License: | In Copyright |
| Information on rights of use: | https://rightsstatements.org/vocab/InC/1.0/ |
| Citation: | Open MIND Metzinger, Thomas |
| Pages or article number: | Kap. 5(R) |
| Publisher: | MIND Group |
| Publisher place: | Frankfurt am Main |
| Issue date: | 2015 |
| Publisher URL: | http://dx.doi.org/10.15502/9783958571150 |
| Publisher DOI: | 10.15502/9783958571150 |
| Appears in collections: | JGU-Publikationen |
