BLACK ISLAM SOUTH AFRICA

Religious Territoriality, Conversion, and the Transgression of Orderly Indigeneity

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Matthias Gebauer
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Abstract

Social alienation and the struggle to belong in the South African society are not only matters of political discourse but touch the practical sphere of everyday life in the respective places of residence. This thesis therefore approaches the entanglements of religion and space within the processes of re-ordering African indigeneity in post-apartheid South Africa. It asks how conversion to Islam constitutes the longing for a post-colonial and post-racialized *African self*. This study specifically engages with dynamics surrounding Black *and* Muslim practices and identity politics in formerly demarcated Black African areas. Here, even after the official end of apartheid, spatial racialization and social inequalities persist. Modes of orderings rooted in colonialism and apartheid still define what orderly belonging and African indigeneity mean. Thus, the inhabitants of those spaces find themselves in situations every day in which their habitat continuously ascribes oppression and racialization. The post-1994 promise for equal citizenship seems to be slowly fading, becoming a broken promise, on whose fulfillment the majority of people who were previously—by official definition and demarcation—only granted the right of being a migratory workforce, sojourners in the White spaces, are still waiting. Against this background, this thesis engages with the attempts to reformulate and recreate African indigeneity on the basis of a counter-hegemonic ideology of being Black *and* Muslim. It pays attention to the emergence and articulation of a *Black Muslim indigeneity* that is based on bringing together a pre-colonial idealization of the *African self* with global ideologies of *Muslim Blackness*. With a regional focus on KwaZulu-Natal and a specific look at the developments in and around the urban and peri-urban areas of eThekwini (Durban), it features particular case studies which highlight religious territorialization on the one hand and attempts to transgress the social and spatial modes of orderings by converting to Islam on the other. Here, South Africans once classified as Black African seek a common modus operandi in *Muslim Blackness* in order to break with *orderly indigeneity* as ascribed, defined, and structured by colonialism and apartheid, even going as far as to out-migrate from the *lived-in places* which continue to be experienced daily as unsettling and uprooting. With preparations being made to create a new settlement and establish a new social order, the unfulfilled promise of post-apartheid will be left behind, once and for all.

This makes the featured case a peculiar, though so far under-researched, example: Throughout the history of colonization and especially during the time of apartheid, the practice of Islam was strongly interwoven with a changing but persistent struggle for identity and belonging. Being Muslim became oppressively obscured as it was directed as an institutional term towards such

politically created population categories as Indian or Coloured. This implied a very structural and spatial effect, as the communal practice of Islam was limited to those respective residential areas. Thus, the former Black African areas of South Africa are important places to engage with: Segregated and socio-spatially ordered over decades of colonialism, racism, and apartheid, these vast areas of relatively high-density living conditions and desolated livelihoods characterize the surroundings of every major city in South Africa. The duality of White urban core and Black outskirts represents a spatial and social pattern whose inequalities persist up until now. But these places also came to manifest a stratification of religious practices and orderly religious belonging, as *orderly African indigeneity* was unquestionably linked to Christianity, while Islamic institutions were almost non-existent within the Black African areas. The case of conversions to Islam among the indigenous African population of South Africa also exemplifies the paradoxical untouchability of religiously territorialized space within the ideology of apartheid, which enabled some to maintain an exclusive sense of belonging to their former places of residence and a practical connection to the land from which they had been forcibly removed. By moving beyond the specific cases, the ideas and practices of *Blackness* and *Muslimness* are discussed in light of diasporic identity formations in relation to their colonial connotations, thereby opening up a perspective on creating an indigeneity transgressive to the conditions of everyday life.

This thesis is informed by an interdisciplinary perspective of cultural geography and Islamic studies and highlights how a racialized Black Islam has been invoked in order to reclaim authority over the religious and political scale of the *African self*. Building on qualitative research and the analysis of religious Black Muslim ideology, it connects the struggle to belong within a post-colonial society to the utopia of a *Black Muslim indigeneity* as part of a global Black *and* Muslim community. It will be argued that South African Muslim Blackness is the result of *global travels* of anti-Western and anti-colonial ideologies with an Islamic framework and their subsequent translation into the realm of social and spatial orderings. The self of the African convert to Islam, culturally inscribed by racialized path dependencies and bodily ascribed by racist social realities, is translated into the Islamic counter-hegemonic narrative. Black Islam becomes a state of exception, a *heterotopia* to the daily lived-in narrative of identity politics, and makes transgression of persisting modes of social and spatial ordering possible.

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Black Islam South Africa: Religion and the Struggle to Belong in an Unsettled Society

Like so many other parts in the manifold mosaic of society and space in South Africa, Islam as a practiced religion, political dimension, and way of life came to the southern tip of the African continent through movement and mobility, traveling along the most intricate influences of global historical forces in this region: colonialism, imperialism, slavery, and crucially apartheid. Islam first arrived in South Africa through the colonial authorities of the Dutch, who had slaves, servants, and political agitators-turned-prisoners transported from the Indonesian archipelago to the outpost of the Dutch East Indian Trading company at the Cape of Good Hope. With them, the Dutch brought not only a considerable number of Muslims but also—through the accompanying Islamic practices and preaching—a realm of alternative orderings, which unfolded a force of attraction for other oppressed groups and individuals as well. Although the colonial administration largely restricted Islam to the private sphere, it was those unanticipated side effects of Europe's conflicting powerhouses, with their territorial claims and proxy conflicts around the globe, that contributed to changing circumstances: With the beginning of the nineteenth century, the British Empire took over as the dominating power at the Cape of Good Hope, igniting a long and violent conflict between the 'new' imperial force and the Dutch *Boer* settler colonialists, which eventually paved the way for a cohesive political identity of Afrikaner nationalism and the grand narrative of the Great Trek as the religiously mythologized foundation of the Afrikaner people (cf. DU TOIT 1983; GILIOMEE 1983). Islam gained a flourishing momentum under the changing circumstances of local and regional government and the new modes of ordering religious matters. Muslim communities at the Cape thrived in social and economic terms, while the newly established passage connecting the British colony of Natal on the eastern coast with the Indian subcontinent led to South Africa's second major site of Muslim migration to South Africa. Without a doubt, these transcontinental mobilities contributed to the stratified development of Islam and Muslims communities, as did the slave trade along both coastal regions of the African continent and last but not least migration by land, especially in the twentieth century, which was strongly linked to the migratory workforce

of the gold mines on the Witwatersrand. Nevertheless, the overall presence and representation of what Islam in South Africa is today, in cultural, political, social, and economic terms, is characterized by those two regional hotspots: the Cape and KwaZulu-Natal.

As is the case for so many social elements, counter to the logics of White[1] European oppression and domination, Islam remained. Muslims found a position within the racialized and segregated conditions of daily life—or rather were assigned to one—in social, political, and spatial terms. All three dimensions are particularly important when looking at cultural developments within the South African sphere of historically evolved, spatially inscribed, and subjectively embodied politics of domination, oppression, exploitation, and segregation. In particular, the rule of apartheid from 1948 to 1994 proved to be a ruthless—though orderly governed—racism based on the cultural-political differentiation which, as a result of the conflict with the British territories, had been inscribed in Afrikaner state policy: "privileging whites *as* whites and exploiting nonwhites *as* nonwhites" (MACDONALD 2006: 38). The socio-spatial path dependencies South Africa inherited—a most questionable 'cultural legacy' of the Europeans, those "unsettled settlers" (BADEROON 2005: 91)—represent a spatial and societal set-up that is still characterized by a constant flux of longing for belonging and contestation of place-making and finding home. For one part of the society, the White minority of colonial descendants, these issues have been and are still being negotiated within the framework of a discursive and performative fluidity of ethnicity. For the other part, the Non-White majority, which was progressively divided into separate groups along the color-line and projected as socially homogenous, the longing for belonging continues to be a monolithic struggle that is defined by race (cf. NASH 2003: 186). And even though the history of colonialism and the racialized regime of apartheid have finally come to an end, the daily lived conditions have only gradually changed. Ultimately, a post-colony, as MALULEKE (2008: 124) puts it, "is still a colony. We find ourselves in a situation in which the colony continues even after the colonial period."

Thus, in the *post-colony* of post-apartheid, the promise of the Rainbow Nation is fading away, while Neville Alexander's vision of the Groot Gariep (cf. HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017; TAYOB 1999b), the one unifying river for all those different streams, remains a distant prospect. A shared idea of belonging and a foundation for a common narrative have failed to materialize,

[1]Making use of racialized population categories in scholarly work always entails the contingency of their reproduction. Nevertheless, ascriptions such as Black, White, Coloured, Indian, Bantu, or African are of crucial importance for the presented discussion, as they have outlived colonialism in South Africa and remained a social and cultural reality beyond the formal end of apartheid.

as have the subsequent aims of a cohesive model of society which broadly integrates the people living in South Africa[2]. Instead, the door seems to be wide open for fractured developments along reinterpreted, reaffirmed and newly founded ethnical lines. As DODSON (2000: 156) writes:

> "[…] South Africans who once rejected state-imposed ethnic classification are now actively reclaiming and reasserting their ethnicity. […] Geographical strategies, such as choosing the community in which one lives, are an important element in such cultural reorientation. Certainly the forces of fragmentation, such as Zulu nationalism, Muslim fundamentalism, and the call for an Afrikaner volkstaat, are at least as strong as the forces of unification, and the future cultural geography of the country will be determined by the ways in which these opposing forces play themselves out."

Islam in the *new* South Africa needs to be assessed along these lines as well. Having been affected by the oppressive politics of apartheid, with its racial classification and spatial segregation, Muslims in South Africa have maintained and even established exclusive positions within the larger structure of society—in spiritual, social, practical and territorial terms. Being Muslim has become a sanction and an opportunity at the same time. And as the positions of the different Muslim groups and Islamic institutions towards the struggle against apartheid differed, so too do their positions towards getting involved in the country's ongoing process of social and cultural transformation. While such debates are mainly situated in those parts of the society in which Muslims are commonly expected to be found—the former categories of "Coloured" and "Indian"—Islam has gained presence in places that were previously solely associated with Christianity, i.e. the areas in the Black African townships and homelands of South Africa once classified and territorialized for the indigenous African population. Here, conversion has taken place, and Islam has been embraced by people who seem to articulate a change in faith, moving beyond the religion of the oppressor into a realm of challenging the modes of order, while striving for an *authentic* and a *liberated African self*. The struggle to belong in South Africa's unsettled society continues to take place within the realm of *Black Islam*.

Now, *Black Islam* is not a socially unifying category, nor are African Muslims in South Africa a homogenous or in any way coherent community. The same applies to Muslims in South African in general (see section "Islam in South Africa: An-*Other* Order?" below). *Black* is understood as a sphere of specific experiences on the level of the individual, as well as of the group, which

[2] JOHNSTON (2014) dedicated a whole (and quite entertaining) chapter to asking: "Do South Africans Have a Shared Life?" In the face of his rather descriptive approach, the facts he presents provide the reader with a broad impression of the diversity that any attempted cohesive politics must address.

combines the particular historical and socio-spatial path dependencies in South Africa with the realities of repeated discrimination, oppression, and a shared history of suffering (cf. OAKES 2007; GILROY 1993). *Islam* is the mode of expression, the self-proclaimed state of exception, which makes resistance to the persistent inequalities and injustices possible—or at least projects the hope of doing so. *Black Islam* is therefore understood as a heuristic opening to shed light onto spiritually and religiously moved and motivated developments happening against the backdrop of the systematic exploitation, oppression, and dispossession of the majority population of South Africa—all those once deemed Non-White by racial classification.

This is not a study about Muslims converts in South Africa but rather about the realm of conversion to Islam as a mode of challenging the social and spatial orderings. The research is therefore located across (a) the fields of colonialism, apartheid, and religion, (b) the distinct sphere of Muslim political identity and historical path dependencies of Islam in South Africa, and (c) the contemporary positionality of Muslim converts among the indigenous African population, with the specific regional focus on KwaZulu-Natal. The central research objectives deal with self-proclaimed empowerment and post-colonial liberation as Black *and* Muslim. Therefore, the historical aspects highlighted throughout this study are important for the overall contextualization, though they are secondary to the specific focus of the research at hand, which concentrates on meaningful cultural practices and political representations of Blackness within the *lived-in places* (cf. TUAN 1991: 105; RELPH 1976) of converts to Islam. Research on conversion entails an epistemological dilemma, which is evident within the word conversion itself. Conversion is a state of in-between-ness, of transgressing orders. Researching conversion reveals the act's means, representations, and purposeful re-orderings, in relation to neither the social field that is left behind nor the one that is embraced. Instead, the focus rests on the cultural significations and social significance of conversion as a prolonged ritual, as meaningful practice in the lived-in places.

In this regard, research on conversion to Islam among the indigenous population of South Africa is not to be understood as a venture into religious aspects but as a confrontation with a unique expression of breaking with the oppressive and brutal history that has long been endured and persists in daily lived experiences. *Black Islam South Africa* is therefore constitutive of modes of differentiation to the racially classified self and, at the same time, of empowerment towards an understanding of indigeneity, of *being* or *becoming* African, beyond colonial categories.

Breaking with White colonialist discrimination, dispossession, and oppression by engaging with the social, spatial, and political ideas of Black *and* Muslim may spur comparative thoughts on

similar developments in the United States since the Civil Rights Movement. Yet, as FREDRICKSON (1995: 298) clarifies in his study of Black ideologies in the U.S. and South Africa:

> "[T]he African-American influences were less important than the local conditions and indigenous currents of thought. The reading of Stokely, Carmichael, Eldridge, Cleaver, Malcolm X, James Cone, and other American Black Power advocates was clearly a stimulus, but the adoption of African-American concepts and slogans was selective rather than wholesale, and the ideas that were appropriated were often reinterpreted to fit South African conditions."

The same applies to Black and Muslim ideas of counter-hegemonic ideology. Here, *Black Islam* could easily be linked to developments on the other side of the Black Atlantic (see GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016), and such *travels of ideas* most definitely took place, as will be presented within the cases of this study. However, it was mainly the da'wah activities of locally established institutions, the influence of African Muslim migrants and, as one of the case studies featured here presents in detail, the ideological influence of global Sufi currents that made Islam in the Black African townships an integral part of the manifold religious landscape of South Africa.

The appropriation and reinterpretation of ideas of Black African resistance, liberation, and empowerment in light of the local, regional, and national struggles for self-proclaimed indigeneity can be seen as a form of *cultural-political bricolage* (LÉVI-STRAUSS 1966; cf. JACKSON 1989b: 175), a *do-it-yourself* attitude that—as will be analyzed in the featured case studies—exemplifies the history of the resistance to South Africa's White supremacy. Such appropriation and reinterpretation can also be found in religious terms within the influence of Black liberation theology on the South African struggle. This is especially interesting as counter-hegemonic Blackness has to be seen in the light of *Black Consciousness*, South Africa's distinct ideological foundation for Non-White resistance. Moving into such a direction, this study engages with Black African modes of challenging the social and spatial order within a South African society that has been influenced by the religion of Islam. Here as well, research is still rare:

> "[I]t is still striking that so little attention is given to conversion in the vast African townships—and that is almost exclusively delegated to Muslims from various parts of Africa. While the world of Islam in South Africa and elsewhere is indeed a universe of debate and contention, the question of how Muslims will fit into a future South Africa has barely been addressed." (HANSEN 2012: 259)

In this regard, this study tries to shed light on a field which is presently dominated by overviews and anecdotes, as well as valuable though less critical accounts by actors from the field, i.e. from an intra-Islamic perspective. TAYOB (1999a: 96f.) points the way when he writes:

> "Africans embraced Islam and founded communities and mosques, but insufficient research exists on the nature of African Muslim communities themselves. Fewer in

> number and less economically successful, their institutions are not as easily visible. […] The new communities, founded on the basis of the past forty years of conversion campaigns, are even less well known. These await greater appreciation from scholars."

The research presented here will be less about specific communities and more about the meaning of conversion as a practice and representation, as well as its implications for the modes of order and ordering in post-apartheid South Africa.

From a cultural geography perspective, religion encompasses both practices and material presence; therefore, it provides a rich and, in the case of South Africa, under-researched field of inquiry (DODSON 2000: 145). Conversion not only points to a shift in terms of religious affiliation and spiritual belonging but also very much to a change in cultural practice, experience, and signification. Yet these identity politics are far more subtle, far more indirect in terms of the ordering of the self, as well as the expression of positionality in society and space, than other culturally stratifying dimensions.

Black Islam South Africa gives voice to Africans for whom conversion to Islam not only offered a measure of hope that something would change but also a means of reconfiguring the self and constituting an orderly social setting within an otherwise disorderly and unjust environment. People made use of their redefined perspectives to move not only beyond *colonial* and apartheid South Africa but partly also beyond the post-apartheid promise, often perceiving that promise as unfulfilled and attempting to move into an unknown but self-defined future. Those who defy the oppressive structures and institutions still surrounding them are often trying to lay out a new set of rules and behaviors for their children, so that they do not have to continue their parents' struggle for a social and spatial order they can call home.

Objectives and Research Questions

By engaging with conversion to Islam among people classified as Black African, this study approaches the role of religion within the framework of challenging social and spatial modes of order and ordering in the post-apartheid society of South Africa. It asks how the struggle to belong is motivated, modified, and enabled by, as well as channeled through the cultural elements offered by an appropriation, adoption, and hybridization of Islam in the realm of Black African cultural self-awareness, conceptually understood as a re-ordered indigeneity. The study therefore pays specific attention to the practical, emotional, symbolic, and territorial spheres, thus relating the material realities of everyday life to socio-historical identity constructions understood as cognitive performances. Central aspects are the *acts of differentiation* within South African society and the *acts of resistance* to South African society through conversion to Islam.

Against the backdrop of South Africa's history of colonial and apartheid oppression, segregation, socio-spatial order, and the un-making and dis-ordering of lived-in places, the study asks: In what ways is the social and spatial order of South Africa's daily lived inequality and uprootedness, which has experienced, produced and re-produced for generations, challenged by the conversion to Islam of people classified as Black African? In what ways is conversion to Islam constitutive for a re-ordered African indigeneity and belonging in South Africa in social, cultural, and spatial terms? Is the societal order challenged in earnest and in such a way that a subjectified break with the persisting structures can be realized? Does conversion in the given case lead to the formation of self-defined belonging and indigeneity or rather an adaptation of an already existing and established set of power relations, based in existing Muslim communities and institutions?

In order to approach these questions and objectives, this study consists of two major parts. One reflects on the dimension of religion in the ordering of indigeneity in South Africa. An empirical case study of a community of indigenous Africans removed during the late days of apartheid serves as the central focus. It illustrates how African indigeneity first became re-ordered under the influence of Christian missionary work, how the respective community could circumvent the spatial effects of apartheid for a certain time under the protective sphere of religious territoriality, and how the dis-orderly effects of being ultimately evicted impacted religious rootedness as well. Having gained a better understanding of the interlinkages of social and spatial modes of ordering, the defining powers of indigeneity, and the role of the religious sphere, the study then moves into the empirical cases of Black Africans in KwaZulu-Natal resisting the embodied and spatially ascribed cultural orders by converting to Islam and the re-ordering of Blackness through religious re-grounding.

Research Design and Applied Methods

> "The power of a country road is different when one is walking along it from when one is flying over it by airplane. […] The airplane passenger sees only how the road pushes through the landscape, how it unfolds according to the same laws as the terrain surrounding it. Only he who walks the road on foot learns of the power it commands […]." (BENJAMIN 1979: 50)

This project did not start in a very well-structured manner but rather based on curiosity and unexpected circumstances. I came upon the topic of conversion to Islam in Black African townships in 2011, while carrying out research for my thesis as a Master of Arts student in geography, Islamic studies and law. My research took me to the Cape Flats of Cape Town and dealt at that time with anything but Islam. Nevertheless, the topic captured my curiosity, and my circumstances enable me to further engage with the topic and finally to pursue it in KwaZulu-Natal and the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality, the former City of Durban[3], in 2012 and 2013. My research engagement there initially had nothing to do with Islam in South Africa either. However, my curiosity led to interest, interest to questions and questions to consultations—with colleagues from different fields, such as geography, religious studies, anthropology, and political science. In order to spare the details for the coming chapters, it is sufficient at this point to note that the result was motivating yet inconclusive: a perfect basis for further research. As noted above, the literature available on conversion to Islam and Muslim activities among those classified as Black African in South Africa is both dominated by anecdotal viewpoints and clearly under-researched. Therefore, my overall aim in terms of methodology is to diversify the perspectives on the researched topic by applying an intensive set of qualitative methods in an explorative way (SAYER 1992: 241ff.; SAYER 2000: 20f.). The focus therefore rests on holding a *conversational* attitude towards the empirical cases while bearing their socio-historical and socio-spatial setting in mind.

The empirical field work of this study encompassed three periods in 2013 and 2015, which comprised qualitative interviews, group interviews and discussions, participant observations, walking interviews, formal and informal meetings, as well as archival research to retrieve written documents and maps. Conceptualizing the study in a qualitative manner and focusing on the micro-scale of the different cases did justice to the explorative and open, though in terms of time

[3]One major aspect—in administrative as well as symbolic terms—of the post-apartheid transition phase was the re-organization and renaming of municipal structures (cf. HARRISON, TODES & WATSON 2008: 83). Through this process, the former City of Durban merged with surrounding municipalities to form the eThekwini Metropolitan Municipality.

restrictions not open-ended, approach of the overall project. The majority of the gathered knowledge was gleaned through what could better be termed conversations and shared experiences. The experiences were *shared* insofar as the researched subjects kindly made my participation in selected group gatherings, celebrations, commemorations, and weekly study circle meetings possible. Therefore, the differentiation between formally and informally gathered data is blurry, and attempting to neatly divide the two sets seems unlikely to be worth the effort. To avoid a pre-classification that falls into the trap of racialized categories such as *Black Muslim* or *African Muslim*, I followed a network approach restricted to the people who were pointed out during the interviews, meetings, and conversations. New participants were either introduced directly, their contact details were forwarded on by other participants, or we met on an occasion such as a group meeting, a dhikr session, or a simple home visit. While this approach most definitely had its pitfalls, it was essentially necessary to avoid a pro-active structuring of the social field that would otherwise have fallen back on pre-existing, colonial categories.

The qualitative interviews were carried out within a narrative and in most cases biographical setting with the highest amount of openness possible, providing impulses to stimulate the narration. An important aspect therein was leaving *control* over and *authorship* of the narration to the interviewed person. CLOKE, COOK, CRANG et al. (2004: 157f.) provide the proper analogy for this in their differentiation between roles that are played during interviews: The researcher should neither try to be an actor within the dialogue, nor a director. Instead, the role of the choreographer seems to be appropriate, always "listening with the third ear" and engaging in the narration in a sensitive, self-aware, and reflective manner. Most importantly, especially if interview sessions led to frequent meetings and discussions, the interviewed persons were offered what GIRTLER (2002: 59ff.) terms an ero-epic dialogue when he or she essentially desired a good, plain conversation.

I met and interviewed all participants more than once, keeping continuous contact with everyone throughout the research periods. Instead of concentrating on a sheer quantity of qualitative data, i.e. number of interviews, discussions were intensified by means of multiple meetings and group discussions. The effects of self-reflection upon the information discussed grew with the number of re-visitations. Issues which were initially presented as highly political in a first round, for example, were later set in a more differentiated light.

Even though it was intended and communicated that the first meetings would be of informal and introductory character, the cornerstones or main emphases of the individual narrations were clearly sketched out during the first encounter. Follow-up sessions deepened several topics

and made links to other participants possible. Again, the most important rule of qualitative research is that one must always be prepared. The meetings and conversations took place either in the homes of the interviewed or in research-related religious places. Others were specifically arranged as walking interviews (see below). I initially intended to assist the interviewing process with a recording device that was properly and openly introduced to the participants. However, the research developed in such a way as to prompt me to question using a recording device. During a specific situation in the second of three major fieldwork stages, the interviewees clearly signaled that the presence of the recorder would interfere with the continuation of the narration. The further the research on conversion to Islam, Islamic practices, and prospective projects aiming at transgressing social and spatial order in post-apartheid South Africa progressed, the more topics arose that were clearly of political sensitivity to the interviewed. I therefore decided to continue on without using a recording device, making minutes from memory instead. The fact that about half of the acquired qualitative material was gleaned without (or even because of the choice to abandon) the recording device reveals how important it is to negotiate between methodical-technical expectations (research 'by the book'), field-ethical sensitivity (research as social responsibility), and fieldwork reality (research as unanticipated endeavor). Research practice has to adhere to its objectives, not 'the book' (WESTERN 1992: xv ff.; cf. also ESCHER & BECKER 2013). Some of the follow-up interviews led to a shared car ride home. It is worth noting that sitting together in a car on a thirty-minute drive sometimes offers more empirical material than hours of coordinated interview sessions. Again, my minutes from memory have been of crucial value; these were either written down directly upon returning to the apartment or spoken onto the recorder while driving home alone in the car. While outside of South Africa, messaging through WhatsApp and e-mail allowed me to maintain established relations. Moreover, conversations that included historic detail, for example, or other material which could not be further elaborated upon during the regular interviewing sessions (either due to time constraints or material that could not be found right away) could continue via messaging, and material such as old photographs or letters could be exchanged. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out that this interferes with an important aspect of qualitative research, i.e. keeping distance to the field and the participants. Thus, more than once, the relationship between *researched* and *researcher* had to be discussed and re-evaluated in order to re-establish a proper positionality (PRZYBORSKI & WOHLRAB-SAHR 2014: 48f.).

For one case study on religious territoriality (see section "The Eviction of Emmaus"), I used a mobile interviewing technique that can be loosely defined as a walking or go-along interview (EVANS & JONES 2011; KUSENBACH 2003). It followed the general idea of what JONES & EVANS

(2012) propose as *rescue geography* (see also EVANS & JONES 2011). Within qualitative research, especially in human geography, there seems to be a recent movement towards interviewing *on the move* (cf. KÜHL 2016). This may indicate an increasing awareness on a methodological level of the influence of place on the process of interviewing. On the other hand, the popularity may also offer nothing substantially new to existing research practices, except that it now has a catchy title. The major distinction of *rescue geographies* as carried out in this regard is two-fold: First, the approach invokes geocoding, and second, it aims at redrawing or reconstructing (i.e. rescuing) places at the intersection of place-relatedness, attachment, and affect. Embedded into a framework that is clearly inspired by the debate on place and placelessness deriving from humanistic geography (RELPH 1976), the technique aims at redrawing, revisiting, and reliving places that do not exist anymore in material terms. Their absence could be the result of urban redevelopment, to use the example brought forward by the authors mentioned above, or, as in the case of this book, of forced removals and the demolition of neighborhoods during apartheid. In contrast to go-along interviews, the focus of the methodical modification is not on stimulating the narration but on bringing together participative mapping and qualitative interviewing. In a narrative-archeological sense, the personal and affective connections of the interviewee to the lost place are captured by walking along the narratives *in* place, even though the material setting now differs. The actual technical realization and methodical implications are discussed in the respective case studies.

Critical Subjectivity: Research in Religious Fields

Before leaving the conceptual and methodological sections behind and finally moving into the research itself, a word needs to be given to the issue of carrying out research in religious fields. As with many other topics in geographical research, the overall access to the settings is generated by a thematic, and in some cases even personal, closeness to the matters at hand. When it comes to religious fields, especially in the South African context (cf. COCHRANE 2004), the questions to be critically posed relate to the religious affiliation and affinity of the researcher as well as his or her rarely defined position as insider or expert within that field. The matter is thus by no means one of credibility nor of any illusory claim of *objective distance.* It is rather a question of positionality, which enables the reader to reflect on the represented knowledge. It is about applying the methods of scientific inquiry to those who themselves apply such methods (for a debate see FLEISCHER & HAFERBURG 2012). With regard to the specific field of conversion to Islam, LUKENS-BULL (2007: 173f.) rightly argues that

> "the researcher who studies Islam has to deal with the question of subject position in particular, if not unique, ways. The first is what religion the researcher holds or claims to hold while in the field. Are they Muslim and if so, of what orientation? This of course affects how they see things. Or are they not Muslim? This leads to its own problems. If they are not Muslims prior to fieldwork, do they convert? Are such conversions real (in terms of the researcher's own subjective religiosity)?"

With the latter aspect, Lukens-Bull points to such cases where researchers have converted in order to gain better access to the field—which must be called ethically questionable. Apart from these extremes, a researcher can also be accepted by the community that he or she is engaging with through the methodical interaction.

This is the case for the featured study. Throughout my research, I disclosed myself to the participants as a researcher with a background in geography, Islamic studies, and law, who is neither a Muslim nor belongs to any particular religion. It is worth noting that I only actively had to deal with this aspect in situations where I was in contact with representatives of established Islamic organizations, and seldom in contexts where I engaged with converts. Throughout the years of research, a form of respect towards each other developed, which included a strong interest in sharing in religious debates. The approach generated a position somewhere in between welcomed visitor, friend, and conversationalist. Nevertheless, I constantly negotiated my position as a researcher. When asked about my own position towards Islam or if I was a Muslim myself, I always tried to make it clear that my research work does not allow me to engage in discussing such matters as I have a position to maintain, not an objective one but, as far as possible, a non-subjective one at least. On some occasions, I was drawn into debates about the role of Islam in Europe and Germany, or in some situations the allegedly dominant position of Jews, which made the constant negotiation difficult. Another question must be posed in relation to religious practices: When it comes to observations, how does one distance oneself from the role of participating subject within practices in religious contexts? I participated in religious events, such as Dhikr sessions or commemorations, on a regular basis but tried to never wholeheartedly engage in them. I was present, and though I sometimes even caught myself chanting, I concentrated on not getting drawn into the recitation that went on for hours. When it came to prayer, I expressed my respect for it but kept my distance, sitting on the side, watching.

Qualitative research always carries a quality of human interaction with it. Some research subjects seem to necessitate a higher degree of reflection and negotiation than others, but in any case, *disclosing the proximity and distance* of the researcher, as a person, to the researched field is obligatory when striving for a critical and self-reflective approach.

Exploration Is Method—in Theory

When it comes to qualitative research, there is a thin and fuzzy line running in between research objectives, theoretical conceptualization, and methodological embeddedness—if there is even a line at all. Might we not be better off talking about a circular relationship, within which positions are sometimes rearranged throughout the process? The textbooks on qualitative methods primarily tell us that theoretical framing is guided by the research objectives and that the selection of methods has to adhere to the overall framework, thus sitting last in line. But what comes first, the question or the theoretical understanding for the knowledge yet to be sought? The pragmatic philosophical perspective (cf. DEWEY 1938; cf. PRZYBORSKI & WOHLRAB-SAHR 2014: 197) reminds us that even an educated guess is an educated one. Therefore, every question asked presupposes an act of abstraction of real-world settings, i.e. conceptualization. And when method starts, theory doesn't end at all. The books may be closed, but the extended knowledge emerging from the empirical data automatically feeds back to the study's concept with sometimes ground-shaking effects.

Theoretical concepts are in place from the very beginning of the first formulation of research objectives, and, as MADISON (2005: 12) argues, critical research relies on theoretical frameworks to shed light onto social phenomena and to enable their interpretation. Moreover, our thoughts and ideas as geographers, gathered through observation of specific phenomena, are seldom if ever carried back home to stay in a 'discussion-free' environment. Embedded within the—too often self-referential—field of academia, findings are put to debate, thoughts are exchanged, and new objectives are formulated. Their degree of specificity is particularly put to a test when the necessity of fundraising arises. Thus, whether we want to or not, we cannot avoid engaging in abstraction before engaging with those elements of everyday life that we, in our idealistic perspective, sought to approach open-mindedly. Moreover, when theory becomes a mode of interpretation, it *is* a method in itself (ibid.).

This perspective allows us to bridge the too often rigid differentiation between those research objectives guided by theory and those guided by phenomena or case. The question of locating theory must be answered more gradually: Does the research imply a conceptual contingency at the point of formulating the research objectives and therefore a narrowing of the theoretical focus and the resulting discussion ex ante, or is the overall process initialized by a wide and rather open set of questions, or better of working hypotheses? Both variations should not be understood as an either/or decision within the qualitative-interpretive paradigm (cf. CLOKE, COOK, CRANG et al. 2004: 327) but as a reminder to locate one's own research on the gradual

continuum that spans between those poles. While overly generalized on both ends, this dichotomization should also remind us that meeting the needs of both ends entails its difficulties. In the first case, the more rigid ex-ante conceptualizations, the research runs the risk of trying to *prove* theories with the material, while ignoring contradictory implications that emerge from within the data or those that move beyond it. In the latter case, i.e. the more wide and open working process, the researcher runs the risk of getting lost within the empirical process and losing focus on central questions being asked. This is most often the case when *open approach* is misunderstood as a romantic perspective of qualitative research as *steered by the field* or *floating with the field*. After all, there are no *fields* without the limitations, basic rules, and prospective outcomes, which are defined by the actors delimitating and producing them, i.e. the actors of the academic world. Even the most explorative approach follows central objectives. In other words, we are reminded once more: even an educated guess is an educated one.

Conceptualizing the Challenging of Order

To understand what "challenging" social and spatial order implies, it is first necessary to illustrate the specific local path dependencies of South African socio-spatial settings that define the analyzed cases and thus frame the agency of the people in the focus of the qualitative research. Furthermore, we must critically consider the concepts of social and spatial order and ordering itself. Therefore, the following section first presents the conceptual framework guiding the study. The idea of order and ordering will be located within the field of cultural geography and the inherent discussion of space and place. After considering the conceptualization of social and spatial order and ordering, I discuss a theoretical understanding of challenging, transgressing, and resisting order. While power relations have always been in the focus of geographical research, only relatively little attention has been given to framing spatial and social modes of resistance and transgression. Therefore, cultural geography approaches that derive from the traditions of Marxist as well as humanist geographic perspectives will be presented. But how shall we gain an analytical understanding of resistance and transgression beyond mere descriptive work? By extending the conceptual idea and answering the analytical invitation to make *maps of cultural orderings* (ESCHER & WEICK 2004), the theoretical setting can be transformed into an applicable analytical framework, which will help us to critically engage with the featured case studies. Next, South Africa's history of oppression, dispossession, and colonial rule will be embedded within the conceptual debate by relating it to specific aspects of colonialism and the racist spatial politics of apartheid. The oppression and dispossession of the indigenous population that became classified as Black or African will be considered in the light of *ordering indigeneity* through spatial, social, and cultural politics and practices, in order to understand how a dominating White minority constructed a dystopian cultural landscape around the *African other*.

Approaching the Conceptual Dimension of Social and Spatial Order and Ordering

> "Order is not something that always exists in a pristine state, fully formed. Nor is it something always intentionally created, it is instead a contingency effect that arises from ongoing social, and some would say technical, processes." (HETHERINGTON 1997: 10)

Order is an enigmatic concept. Its implications for social research can be normative, descriptive, or analytical and can even entail (often unintended though unavoidable) ventures into the terrain of hermeneutics or epistemological contingency. Therefore, more often than not, research agendas touching on issues of order and ordering avoid or circumvent a theoretical debate on the topic by either leaving their concept of order in a rather blurry state or by over-determining its conceptual values (see for example MURRAY 2008; HETHERINGTON 1997). Yet, the questions of modes, regimes, agency, intersubjectivity, locality, practice, scale, and scope of order and ordering are part and parcel of the conceptual apparatus of geographical inquiry (cf. amongst others JACKSON 1989b; DAVIS 2006[1990]; CRESSWELL 1994, 1996; TUAN 1979: 10, 145; BLUNT & DOWLING 2006: 14; for a post-colonial critique, see ROBINSON 2008)—which is presumably far more fundamental than the fetishized quest for and questioning of space (cf. WERLEN 2010: 264)[4]. Moreover, with the paradigmatic interventions brought about by the spatial turn in the social sciences, ongoing debates within the disciplines of sociology, psychology, and philosophy are finally meeting at the spatial table and posing questions about space and place (see for a debate HETHERINGTON 1997). The following section does not claim to deliver a concise theoretical sketch but aims rather at building a solid foundation for exploring how to conceptualize challenging and resisting modes of order and ordering in light of a relational approach to society in space.

Constantly produced by individual actors, groups, societies, organizations, and institutions on a multitude of scales and at various times and places (cf. CRESSWELL 2014b; BOURDIEU 1989), order is of crucial importance for structuring the world that people live in. Without orientation, position, location, affirmation, i.e. without order and modes of ordering, we could not exist as individuals, nor would we be capable of living in communities (ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 253). As DOVEY (1978: 28) writes: "The environment consists of a vast range of potential meanings

[4]Approaching order and ordering from a cultural geographical perspective means touching on the issue of social, cultural, and spatial ordering *through* the academic discipline of geography. This issue would require a book of its own and is, incidentally, relative to its post-colonial magnitude, somewhat under-represented within monographic discussions. For further reading, refer to BONNETT (2005), among others.

from which each culture selects those that constitute its everyday reality […] Our ordering process narrows down an enormous potential world to a real world." These different modes are not limited to spatial dimensions in material terms but can be simultaneously conceptualized within the realm of *orderly* social space and *ordering* spatial practices (HETHERINGTON 1997). Reaching from everyday interactions to macro-institutional networks, a world of social and spatial arrangements unfolds through and within the human experience, which may be perceived and projected as orderly or disorderly, unfolding a dialectic relationality of consensus and contest as the foundation for social history (COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 18). It is as if social life itself finds its basic meaning in unavoidable acts of differentiation and homogenization and the constant necessity to decide between the former and the latter. At the same time, social scientists—themselves orderly subjects within an orderly subfield of society—become agents of ordering by trying to understand, analyze, and deconstruct these sometimes apparently *fixed* but inherently *fluid* realities. We are reminded that the decisions we make as individuals are part of and subject to a constant flux of ordering of society and space.

What is orderly for one person or group of people will be experienced as the total opposite by others: "[T]he questions of 'what is order?' and 'whose order?' are therefore central, since the outcomes of attempts to impose 'order' depend not just on how it is conceptualized but also on who is trying to impose it" (RAKODI 2005: 3). This opens up the realm of hierarchy and order contextualized by subject, structure, and agency, where the intersection of psychic forms, the human body, geographical space, and social order can be seen as the fundamental basis for mechanisms of order and sense-making (STALLYBRASS & WHITE 1986: 3).

Within social and spatial settings, certain people and practices emerge as dominant to others and remain so, with the effect that the enacted authority is expressed as the apparent *order of things* (COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 18), inherently favoring a specific group of people. This does not imply however that an explicit intention underlies the formulation of order.

> "In any society, the pattern of people's lives and their living conditions take the forms which they do, not so much because somebody somewhere makes a series of decisions to that effect; but in large parts because certain social mechanisms, principles, assumptions—call them what you will—are taken for granted." (WESTERGARD & RESLER 1976: 141)

Dominant practices not only provide structure through their enactment but also unfold a structuring momentum through their acceptance, which may render the power that is at work subject to intentional explanation without it necessarily having been intentionally enacted (cf. LUKES 2005: 136; DOWDING 2006: 140). According to BOURDIEU (1997 [1977], 1989), this conceptualization can be further differentiated into analytical categories of consciousness-

producing activities: the structuring structures or *modus operandi* (i.e. *ordering*) on the one hand and the structured structures or *opus operatum* (i.e. *order*) on the other. What follows is an understanding of modes of order and ordering as an intertwined duality of structure and agency: Neither is an individual capable of imposing ordering regimes by his or her own means, nor is an effectively imposed order an 'objective reality.' Societal—and therefore spatial—order is practiced reality, enabled and translated by silent, permanent dispositions that are embodied and incorporated and become reflected within shared social fields (cf. LUKES 2005: 140; BOURDIEU 1990b: 146ff.). The questions posed by RAKODI (2005) of 'what is order' and 'whose order' cited above therefore conflate as each attempt to impose order can only use the means of the existing order.

This logic of power relations combines a relational perspective on power, culture, and society together with an understanding that hegemony in capitalist societies has always been contested and never fully achieved (GRAMSCI 1971; JACKSON 1989b: 53; see also MOUFFE 1979: 178ff.): Power, order, and positionality are constantly produced, reproduced, and 'taken-for-granted' by all actors of the social fields in their relationality (cf. BOURDIEU 1999 [1993]), while social power relations themselves are produced and reproduced not only by their acceptance but through their contestations and resulting reaffirmations. In other words, acting against the order is part of the order.

A Sense of Order?

If the establishment of modes of order and the practices of ordering are understood as reciprocal, how should the capacity to *challenge* social and spatial order be framed? In order to conceptually approach this aspect, the most durable causes that bring about societal power relations and positions need to be brought into focus by asking how order and ordering can become commonsensical or taken-for-granted.

Discussing the conceptual understanding of hegemony offered by GRAMSCI (1971), COMAROFF & COMAROFF (1991: 21f.) provide an understanding of culture as a "shared repertoire of practices, symbols, and meanings from which hegemonic forms are cast—and by extension resisted," which is a necessary precondition for approaching the naturalization of order and ordering. They argue that any conceptual discussion of social and spatial ordering would be lost in the sea of sociological abstraction without introducing the dimension of culture as a basic system, the "semantic ground" of shared beliefs, which makes the intersubjective realization and recognition of power relations translatable and their unquestioned transmission from one

subject to the other possible. Against this background, the authors differentiate between two modes of power: On the one hand is the *agentive mode*, which refers to the *actual* human agency at play in the production, circulation, and consumption of signs and objects, i.e. the human capacity to shape subjectivities and realities by limiting and enabling the actions and perceptions of others. On the other hand, COMAROFF & COMAROFF (1991: 22) argue for the dialectic counterpart, which they call the *nonagentive mode* of power. This can be seen as an attempt to grasp the level of the commonsensical social and spatial order, as it incorporates ordering beyond the realm of institutionalized power relations. It focuses instead on those forms which are hidden within everyday life and therefore perceived as "natural" and "ineffable," and as such beyond human agency. Based on an understanding of culture as a basic system or *semantic foundation*, order and ordering can appear self-evident when the enactment and acceptance of power—its *realization* (with its implicit duality of the meaning) and *recognition*—are seen in their capacity to secure compliance by shaping the very beliefs and desires of subjects, imposing internal constraints under historically changing circumstances (LUKES 2005: 43f., 143f.). Order is a historical product of *wants*, *haves*, and *states of being* in society and space. It does not necessarily need an overtly acting subject but rather a field of intersubjective relations, whose members share an understanding of recognized desires and practices. Indeed, the most subtle modes of order are actually those that never have to be directly acted out; they work on their own as stable dispositions within the social field. Central to this thinking is the theoretical concept of the *habitus*, the conceptual idea of socially incorporated order, which acts as the transmitter or "mediating link" (MATON 2008: 55) between structure and agency, between the objective-material conditions of the social space and their equivalence within the symbolic space (see Figure 1).



Figure 1: Habitus, the mediating link between social space and symbolic space (after BOURDIEU 1989). M. Gebauer.

"The habitus is necessity internalized and converted into a disposition that generates meaningful practices and meaning-giving perceptions" (BOURDIEU 2014 [1984]: 139). Social space is *perceived* by the individual through practices within the settings of everyday life, which leads to a symbolic as well as practical *recognition* of the order of things, of one's own position within social space. Dominant or dominating relations and social positionings therefore do not have to be explicit: They unfold as social reality, as the *common sense* of order, through values, norms, beliefs, and institutions that are reflected and represented in social practices (cf. COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 21).

The ideas above open up the realm of modes of order and ordering with respect to *social space*, an elusive term, which falls somewhere between being a mere metaphorical figure and a heuristic dimension for understanding societal relations, interactions, and those powerful outcomes that are themselves produced by the diverse distances the term points out. But how does this relate to a more ontological spatial perspective? One possibility can be seen in extending the analytical category of the *habitus* by translating its implications from the realm of the *actual* to the *real*, i.e. from the interlinkages of positionality and differentiation to the social and spatial contingency of objects' structures and powers. That is to say: transferring this trail of thought derived from a critical realist perspective (AGNEW 1987; SAYER 2000) into a cultural geographical field focused on the production of meaning through practices and subject interaction, i.e. the *places* and *place-making processes*.

Within his discussion on ideology and the power of place, CRESSWELL (1996: 155ff.) points to the interrelation between powerful ideas, powerful practices, and place-making. Understanding ideologies as "ideas related to practices—ideas connected to what we do" (CRESSWELL 1996: 157), places are not solely reflections of order but are, at the same time, the products and producers of order. Place thus amplifies ideology through it creative capability and the continuation of meaningful practices within a cultural framework (cf. ibid. : 161). *Practices*—social and spatial, performed and imagined, and intrinsically taking place *in* or *out of* place—must lie at the center of our conceptual and analytic attention in this regard, as the "interpretation of place is, in everyday life, a practical interpretation" (CRESSWELL 1996: 157). Whether acted out explicitly or tacitly, practices are linked to the meaningful world of everyday life and lead us to the superimposed facets of power and ideology, the hidden transcripts of intersubjective interactions. Thus, places and place-making processes are the key entry points for understanding maps of meanings and engaging with maps of cultural orderings from a geographical perspective (ESCHER & WEICK 2004; JACKSON 1989b). Calling on the three-fold definition of place and place-making offered by AGNEW (2005, 1987), place is (1) the *location* of

order, providing its specific and relative point in space. It is this dimension that defines the boundaries of order and the scale of ordering practices. Knowing the location of order is essential to *enacting* it or *being enacted* by it. Being inscribed in space as a location may be the most persistent quality of order, as its territoriality constantly unfolds through its spatial and material translatability. Translation implies intersubjective, locally specific contextualization in order to realize, decipher, and acknowledge order. Therefore, place is also (2) the *locale* of ordering (cf. GIDDENS 1984), the structuring moment of social relations, where the modes of order are produced and reproduced through practice and interaction (CRESSWELL 1996: 156). It is in this realm that ideologies, the meaningful ideas of what we do, are demanded and tacitly enacted. The *locale* of order defines codifications of appropriate and inappropriate practices in relation to their location. It is the essential quality of place, as it is constructed and experienced in material artifacts, represented in discourse, used as representations (HUBBARD 2005: 45; HARVEY 1989)— spatial and social at the same time (CRESSWELL 1996: 3). Finally, order and ordering is (3) a *sense of place*, which encompasses two variations: It implies a position within larger fields of power or structural logics of society (BOURDIEU 1977, 1989; GIDDENS 1984) and thus points to direct and indirect mechanisms that bring about a *sense for one's place* embodied and performed within a hierarchical structure of social and spatial power relations. At the same time, according to a humanistic perspective (RELPH 1976; TUAN 1976, 1977), sense of place highlights the bodily and sensual realization and intersubjective affirmation and acceptance of social and spatial relationships, and thus hierarchical positioning within a second mode of order. Both variations are built around the same logic, the relational reciprocity of place-making practices and practices made by places, and each approach points towards a different agenda for the analysis: revealing the *hidden transcripts* on the one hand or engaging with the *zones of interactions* of lived-in place on the other. Nevertheless, as authors such as (HUBBARD 2005) argue, cultural geographical undertakings which look at practices have to entail both Marxist-oriented approaches and humanistic perspectives (see also KOBAYASHI & MACKENZIE 1989). This epistemological path unites the abstract concepts of space and place represented by the trialectic spatiality of cultural practices, representations, and imaginations with a human-centered, emphatically analytical understanding of social space as lived-in place (HUBBARD 2005: 42ff.). Ordering practices are in turn place-making practices, meaningful societal projects constantly being repeated, produced and reproduced through the actions of human beings within a web of intersubjective interactions and significations.

If the modes of order and ordering are brought about by a relational cohesion between structure and structuring, then the dimension of subject interaction must reflect the same reciprocity.

Thus, embodied dispositions not only presuppose a *sense of one's place*, but also a *sense of other's place*, a tacit knowledge of one's own position in relation to the perceived positionality of the other. Again, habitus becomes important as sense of place:

> "The habitus is at once a system of models for the production of practices and a system of models for the perception and appreciation of practices. And in both cases, its operations express the social position in which it was constructed. As a result, the habitus produces practices and representations which are available for classification, which are objectively differentiated; but they are immediately perceived as such only in the case of agents who possess the code, the classificatory models necessary to understand their social meaning. Thus, the habitus implies a 'sense of one's place' but also a 'sense of other's place'. For example, we say of an item of clothing, a piece of furniture or a book: 'that's petty-bourgeois' or 'that's intellectual'." (BOURDIEU 1990a: 131)

The last sentence of the citation exemplifies that—even within the rather abstract conceptualizations of Bourdieu's analytical offerings—the material subjectivity of human beings is central to understanding embodied social and spatial positionalities. Sense of place can therefore be understood as *acting* and *being enacted* through modes of intersubjective practice and experiences in lived-in places. "If the habitat shapes the habitus, the habitus also shapes the habitat, through the more or less adequate social usages that it tends to make of it" (BOURDIEU 1999 [1993]: 128). Dispositions of an established order which, in their embodied relationality, are taken for granted by the agents in a social space are thus simultaneously *naturalized* in space in ontological terms, as they durably inscribe hierarchies and distances and therefore social realities into the material world (ibid.: 124). The location, locale, and sense of place of order and ordering are hence to be understood as subjectified and intersubjectively reified *senses of limits*, which make the social and spatial world appear self-evident:

> "Every established order tends to produce (to very different degrees and with very different means) the naturalization of its own arbitrariness. Of all the mechanisms tending to produce this effect, the most important and the best concealed is undoubtedly the dialectic of the objective chances and agents' aspirations, out of which arises the *sense of limits*, commonly called the *sense of reality*, i.e. the correspondence between the objective classes and the internalized classes, social structures and mental structures, which is the basis of the most ineradicable adherence to the established order. […] when there is a quasi-perfect correspondence between the objective order and the subjective principles of organization (as in ancient societies) the natural and social world appears as self-evident. This experience we shall call *doxa.*" (BOURDIEU 1977: 164)

Within the conceptual framework of social and spatial order and ordering, the idea of *doxa* is crucially linked—via Agnew's definition of the *locale*— to the realm of ideologies, the meaningful ideas of what we do (CRESSWELL 1996: 157), and the meaningful places of ideological production and reproduction (HUBBARD 2005). Regarding geographical work, CRESSWELL (2003: 277f.) offers the useful metaphor of the *doxic landscape*, uniting the idea of *doxa* with the

figure of the landscape, which is understood as a way of ordering the world, i.e. a lived-in representation of order, and therefore a means of ordering the landscape's inhabitants. As the realm of ideology, these *doxic landscapes* encompass the whole symbolic cultural order (PEET 1998: 123), thus referring to the lived relation between people and their world (JACKSON 1989b: 47). The term *landscape* may have its drawbacks given the political contingency it encapsulates; however, as a metaphor with heuristic intention, *doxic landscape* proves a valuable modification and extension of the idea of maps of cultural orderings proposed by ESCHER & WEICK (2004). It shifts the descriptive representation of social and spatial relations implied by a map slightly towards the constructedness of these representations and relations brought about by the actors and institutions, who are themselves being structured by the social and spatial environment which they create. The *doxic landscape* is thus more of a lived-in order than a representation thereof.

Challenging the Sense of Order: Dis-Orderly Places

Order and ordering become taken for granted when the objective-material conditions and their subjectified equivalence as symbolic systems (cf. Figure 1 above) correspond with the everyday realities of lived-in places. They are translated into the sense of the world as well as one's sense of place within the world. Coming back to RAKODI (2005) and the *what* and *whose* of order, we can therefore add the question of *where* order is in terms of location, locale, and sense of place, adding the conceptual dimension of place to the aspects of subject, structure, and agency approached so far. Within an analytical framework, the scale of ordering can be differentiated along the lines of the location of ordering, the orderly locale, as well as the sense of order. The *where* of order is therefore not a third question to be asked but rather the concretization of the aspects of *what* and *whose*.

For their tendency to project modes of social and spatial order as relatively closed systems of relational reference, such conceptualizations are open to critique. Especially when it comes to the idea of *challenging* order, their implied structural rigidity and monolithic stability does not seem to leave scholars with enough room to maneuver, apart from merely accepting that change is already embedded within the overall understanding of how power relations are shared within social field. On the other hand, the perspective is clearly geared towards the subliminal mechanics of how societies work. Challenging order then becomes a question of *challenging the sense of order* and the *orderly sense of place*. Therefore, HETHERINGTON (1997) argues for moving from imagining a static condition of order to viewing ordering as a series of processes, a shift which would reflect the inherent mobility of modes of ordering and the fact that order and

ordering are always "full of uncertainty, heterogeneity and contradiction" (ibid.: 7) and rarely observed in such perfect and orthodox conditions. By referring to FOUCAULT (1983), he presents two principles of ordering: resemblance and similitude (ibid.: 9, 43). The signified order points to a known referent in the case of resemblance, whereas similitude stands for something signified but not so easily attached to a referent. Taken together with the circular relationship of realization and recognition presented above, these principles of ordering call into question unilateral conceptualization of the translatability of social space into symbolic space and vice versa. This offers us alternative versions of the figure of the habitus and thus a set of dispositions which offers more shades to its embodied distinctions.

Consequently, to understand the *challenging* of modes of social and spatial order and ordering, it is necessary to look to those places within the web of actors and institutions where alternatives to the commonsensical order are offered, performed, and maintained. In other words, we must look to the (supposedly) dis-orderly places. Following FOUCAULT (1986), these can be understood as sites of alternative social ordering which emerge from within the orderly fields of society as *heterotopia*, or spaces where an-*other* order can be performed (see also HETHERINGTON 1997). Foucault provides us with examples of these *other-orderly* places on different scales, such as the brothel, the cemetery, or the colony. For the framework of this study on religious conversion, the idea of *heterotopia* is of specific importance, as sacred spaces can be seen particularly well in this light. For example, in his analysis of Muslim spaces, SCHIFFAUER (2010: 43) differentiates heterotopic spaces, distinguishing illusionary *heterotopia* from compensational *heterotopia*. While the former represent an illusionary space that renders real space and all real places of human interactions as an even greater illusion, the latter materialize an alternate space that offers perfect order in contract to the fuzzy disorder of the lived-in places (FOUCAULT 1986). In this regard, *heterotopia* have two directions: inward looking and outward oriented. However, they have but one functionality: to keep everything in order and everyone in his or her orderly place. ESCHER (2003) points to exactly this in his account of a specific sacred geography of Muslim practice-put-into-place. He argues that sacred space must be understood in the light of the "other place" of *heterotopian* conception and that *heterotopia* presuppose

> "a system of openings and closures, which make them both isolated and at the same time possible to penetrate. […] Foucault's concept of 'other places' is the function, or the purpose which the *heterotopian* place, the sacred place for the rest of the area, has for society. It helps preserve the social status quo!" (ESCHER 2003: 66f.)

He thereby reveals a difficult aspect of challenging the sense of social and spatial order and ordering: Disorderly places (or better other-orderly places) enable an alternative mode of ordering to be acted out as meaningful practice—in the case of sacred space in *illo tempore* as

well as in *illo loco* (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 263)—while keeping people profoundly *in place*. This makes a temporally and spatially limited modification of the self and the embodied dispositions possible without necessitating that the status quo positionality within the social field be questioned. Thus, the formation of alternative order has a stabilizing effect on the order taken for granted in society. Heterotopic spaces are not sites of resistance, transgression, or the marginal but rather spaces of alternate ordering, where new ways of ordering emerge that stand in contrast to the existing dispositions of social order in society (HETHERINGTON 1997: 9, 40).

Before approaching orderly indigeneity, religious territoriality, or an understanding of conversion any further, let us shift the focus from structure to the dimension of agency, moving the conceptual debate towards the realm of *deviance* and *resistance*. Here, an introduction to cultural geographies of resistance will center the geographical analysis and the production of geographic knowledge around the task of engaging with the meaningful practices of places and place-making processes in their ideologic, structural, and programmatic settings.

Sense of Change: Understanding Resistance

> "[T]he world is socially and historically constructed and […] in its construction, hierarchies are created and reproduced which result in violence that is symbolically expressed. It is in the very *constructedness* of such hierarchies that political action becomes possible. If worlds are constructed, then they can be re-constructed in other ways and *in other words*." (SCHUBERT 2008: 196)

As argued above, the conceptual approaches discussed so far reveal a tendency towards the question of how modes of order and ordering are maintained and stabilized within society. They shed light—in hermeneutic terms—onto those modes of order and ordering that are in place. However, they fail to engage with the creative forces questioning, destabilizing, undoing, and reconfiguring order, i.e. with the *heterodox* modes of ordering. Despite their theoretical density, they lack a perspective that is progressive and inventive in social and spatial terms, which brings the creation of something new into the picture. Solely following this school of thought could therefore lead into a limbo of perceiving the social and spatial world as a reproduction or reconfiguration of existing social arrangements, or even an intervention into them, which limits the understanding of the human subject's agency to the self-affirming realm of structure and positionality. This would then preclude the possibility of discovering *new thoughts* beyond those thoughts that are just *in other words* (cf. SCHUBERT 2008). The political contingency within the work of Bourdieu as well as his concepts of *nomos* and *doxa* may enable us to move beyond the sole *analysis* of social and spatial ordering. As FOWLER (2011: 50) emphasizes: "[Bourdieu] is indeed one of the streams of great social thinkers concerned fundamentally with justice, with

the mechanisms of how social injustice becomes customary, and with the transformative consequences of this knowledge." However, the concept's limits lie exactly here: in a focus on the transformative consequences of knowledge which fails to fully understand the invention and creative continuation of knowledge and the practices aimed at transformation and change.

This critique reflects a common charge brought against structuralist-Marxist epistemologies and applies in the same way to the concept of *heterotopia*. Foucault's other orderings and other spaces may provide a concept for thinking about deviant modes of ordering, but at the same time, they are situated within the setting of regularities and regulators. Transformation is therefore framed as affirmation of persistent structures and structuring effects of the social field, while alternative modes of ordering seem to be nothing more than an interruption of the ordering routine in lived-in places. Heterodoxy and heretic behavior remain mediated by the ruling *doxa* (DEER 2008: 124).

Working along these conceptualizations and the corresponding critique while also the dealing with socio-spatial differences and the production of power relations has provided the foundation for new pathways in cultural geography. Beginning in the late 1980s, under the direct or indirect influence of key thinkers in cultural studies such as Stuart Hall (cf. MITCHELL 2011), cultural geographical research—at least within an Anglo-American context—became more theory-sensitive. It began moving away from the rather descriptive and partly universalist position of classical cultural geography and opening towards sociological epistemologies on society and space, while still keeping the empirical inquiries on the ground of everyday inequalities and injustices (see JACKSON 1989b: 9ff.). Contributors such as JACKSON (1989b), CRESSWELL (1996), PILE & KEITH (1997), ROUTLEDGE (1997), and HUBBARD (2005), to name a few, strongly advocated an understanding for the formation of society and space as a series of relational processes that are linked to the production and reproduction of structure as well as to intrinsic power relations and their respective representations through symbols, semiotics, and practices within everyday life and lived-in places. Working with their contributions is of essential value for a critical understanding of cultural geography as a discipline that aims to understand human life-worlds as culturally contingent, in between the objective world of materiality and the intersubjective realm of consciousness and experiences (JACKSON 1989b: 48). They demand questioning not only the ways that the social relations are structured, shaped, experienced, and interpreted but also specifically the transformative powers of so-called *subordinate*, counter-hegemonic cultures. Understanding cultural geography as a discipline that is obliged to produce maps of cultural orderings (ESCHER & WEICK 2004) has been of crucial importance in the face of a postmodern and post-structuralist tendency which increasingly renders ontological

questions intangible, or even undesirable, while constantly pushing the production of geographical knowledge into the field of literature studies and empirical undertakings into the realm of textual debates.

Socio-spatial orderings must be understood as *cultural* orders and orderings, because any understanding of difference and differentiation is contingent upon the capacity and capability for cultural knowledge embedded and embodied in the respective subjects (ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 260). Thus, culture is "the medium through which people transform the mundane phenomena of the material world into a world of significant symbols to which they give meaning and attach value" (CLARKE, HALL, JEFFERSON et al. 1976: 10). Through culture, "people's raw experience" is converted into a world of significant symbols against the backdrop of geographical and historical contingency, namely the dynamic processes that produce culture(s) through the agency of "real men and women" (JACKSON 1989b: 48). In this regard, lived-in places are produced by the ideologic underpinnings of culture, while at the same time being the field of meaningful practices of order and ordering, producing positionality, agenda, and power relations. To understand challenging modes of order and ordering, we must first understand place-making processes, the *where* of cultures' negotiations, productions, reproductions, and subversions.

CRESSWELL (1996: 176) makes a strong point in this regard when stating that "any social transformation, to be successful, has to be understood as a spatial transformation." But what is the entry point for inducing change, the starting point for durable social transformation? It is not the modes of domination but rather the underlying patterns of perceived hegemony (ibid.: 16). Such a starting point directly challenges the genesis of social and spatial modes of order and ordering, constituting the *setting one's own agenda* instead of setting something upon the other's agenda, to refer to Steven Luke's differentiations of power dimensions (LUKES 2005). The patterns underlying hegemony are ideological beliefs, i.e. the production and reproduction, the continuation, and interruption of meaningful ideas and related practices, which must be understood as both social *and* spatial at the same time. Ideologies are neither just a system of ideas and representations which dominate the minds of the people (PEET 1998: 122f.) nor a simple set of ideas (CRESSWELL 1996: 16); they are the very basis guiding human practice.

In order to conceptualize the challenging of order and ordering in terms of transformation and change in society and space, CRESSWELL (1996) as well as PILE & KEITH (1997) introduce the theoretical idea of *resistance* to make approaching *heretical geographies* or *geographies of resistance* possible. According to ROUTLEDGE (1997: 69), resistance can be conceptualized as

> "any action, imbued with intent, that attempts to challenge, change, or retain particular circumstances relating to societal relations, processes, and/or institutions. These circumstances may involve domination, exploitation, subjection at the material, symbolic, or psychological level."

Thus, geographies of resistance not only contain counter-reactions to existing modes of order and ordering; they move the formation of new configurations to the foreground of the analysis. Yet, as the relational perspective assert, these configurations do not arise in a socio-spatial setting that is completely uncoupled from the realm of hegemonic order. Instead, they point in two directions. Similar to the dual direction of *heterotopia*, resistance is either inward-looking, pointing the transformation towards the maps of power, or it is outward-oriented, towards something new, which is often based on intangible, invisible, and unconscious desires and beliefs (PILE 1997: 60). It can thus be seen as the *practice heretic* to the *heterodoxic topoi* within the *doxic landscape*.

In his introductory remarks to the edited volume *geographies of resistance*, PILE (1997: 27ff.) defines the spatiality of resistance along four analytical dimensions: *location*, *boundaries*, *movement,* and *territorialization*. The first, (1) *location*, is inspired by the account of MOHANTY (1987) on the politics of location and looks at difference, unity, and positionality within the spatiality of counter-hegemonic struggles. The location of resistance is not permanent or fixed but rather defines the place-making politics of resistance through constant socio-historical experiences of inequality or injustice. "The unity of communities or resistance is formed through the production of location as much as through the uncovering of location within the phantasms of multiple power relations" (PILE 1997: 28ff.). *Location* thus has a spatial-political and socio-political quality to it. It represents the ground on which resistance is carried out as well as the positionality that is taken up in contestations of power relations. Characterized by the same fluidity, (2) *boundaries* define and delineate spaces of resistance. They convey the temporality and spatiality of the struggle and are constitutive of both inner, psychic resistance and outer, political resistance. *Boundaries* mark out locatable formations of difference through resistance. The dimension of (3) *movement* must be understood as a consequence of *location* and *boundaries*. This dimension deals with the actual mobility of a counter-hegemonic, transformative power and explains the practice of confinement as a common social and spatial practice in authoritative and oppressive regimes (e.g. through prisons, ghettos, or segregated lived-in places, as in the example of South African apartheid). This dimension also explains why the aspects of origin, path, and destination are of such importance to so-called *social movements*: they build up their position by spatializing the *location* of injustice and the *boundaries* of resistance on site. *Movement* also points towards the issue of *scale of resistance* by making the exchange, translation, and transformation of meaningful ideas possible. This touches again on the *where* of social order, as

discussed above. If *movement* implies changing *location*, then mobilization is always strategic and never happens in a spontaneous manner, though it may be presented that way. Finally, the spatiality of resistance must be understood through the aspect of (4) *territorialization*, which links all other dimensions to the actual processes of place-making as contested practices. Resistance implies space is territory and transgresses by conquering, administrating, and regulating space. Here, power is most essentially the power to control demarcated space, "to occupy it and guarantee that hegemonic ideas about that space coincide with those which maintain power's authority" (ibid.: 27ff.). In a certain way, the more fixed and undisputed the spatiality of resistance as territory becomes, the less it actually is resistance; at some point, it becomes bounded ordering. *Territorialization* and *re-territorialization* is the mobilization of power through symbols in and of space. Resistance as territory can therefore be understood as the most spatialized dimension: Although it does not necessarily imply a space of exclusion, the process of *territorialization* drastically aims at transforming meaning and enabling territory to become a space of belonging, thereby undermining those modes of order and ordering which rest on the idea of territory as a natural source of power.

Approaching the question of agency and intentionality of change, COMAROFF & COMAROFF (1991: 31) debate the issue of conceptualizing and defining resistance—understood as the nature of protest and symbolic struggle—in the light of consciousness and motivation: "Does an act require *explicit* consciousness and articulation to be properly called 'resistance'? Should the term apply only to the intentions behind social and political acts, or may it refer equally to their consequences?" In their view, the question cannot be addressed with an either/or answer as most historical examples are "extremely murky" in this respect. "Just as technologies of control run the gamut from overt coercion to implicit persuasion, so modes of resistance may extend across a similarly wide spectrum" (ibid.). Still, their study on resistance to specific missionary encounters in Southern Africa points convincingly to an understanding of agency of change as a collective effort to gain "conceptual mastery over a changing world" (ibid.). Viewed through the framework of this study, the agency of change means to bring forward one's own agenda and sense of order instead of placing desires and interests onto an-*other* agenda. Nevertheless, their study also shows that the concept of resistance has its inherent limits and that a further differentiation may be necessary.

Agency of Change: From Resistance to Transgression

Resistance is a meaningful word which covers manifold practices. For BARBALET (1985), it is an irreducible concept in any theory of power and is realized within each specific social characteristic of power relations. Resistance is thus a variation in the modes of order and ordering, an intentionally counter-hegemonic act when expressed and acted out, which remains at the same time intrinsically linked to the orderly and ordering environment. CRESSWELL (1996: 22ff.) vocalizes strong discontent with the concept's scope and scale in his own study on place-making practices of resistance and what he terms *heretical geographies*. He argues that theoretical accounts of resistance have reached such an extreme that almost everything, "from eating to walking to writing books and making films" is cast in the light of the word, while its conceptual value has become lost in an intangible romanticism of the everyday (ibid.: 22). When it comes to power and domination, resistance is one counter-gemenonic aspect. But does it lead to actual changes in lived-in conditions? After all, resistances are meaningful practices which take an oppositional stance to the dominating field. Therefore, the politics of resistance may have intent but lack autonomy, whereas radically transformative ideologies ideally entail the capacity to remove themselves from the sphere of influence of domination.

A more distinctive conceptualization is available in the idea of transgression, which literally means "crossing a boundary" (CRESSWELL 1996: 21). These boundary-crossings, real and symbolic, challenge the bounded territories of social and spatial order and therefore constitute geographies of transformation: "The geographical ordering of society is founded on a multitude of acts of boundary making – of territorialization – whose ambiguity is to simultaneously open up the possibilities for transgression." (CRESSWELL 1996: 149). The commonsensical of the lived-in places is thus questioned in earnest as transgressions break with "normality" and thereby destabilize what is "assumed," "taken for granted," and considered "natural" (ibid.: 26).

> "Just as it is the case that space and place are used to structure a normative world, they are also used (intentionally or otherwise) to question that normative world. There has been a great deal of discussion about marginality, resistance, and the construction of difference recently. Here I wish to delineate the construction of otherness through a spatially sensitive analysis of transgression. Transgression, I shall argue, serves to foreground the mapping of ideology onto space and place, and thus the margins can tell us something about 'normality'." (CRESSWELL 1996: 9)

For CRESSWELL, the major difference between the concept of resistance and that of transgression is the level of intentionality. Acts of transgression do not necessarily rest on intent; instead, they are oriented towards results, towards a particular action *being noticed*. Here again, a proximity to the theoretical roots of structuralist and relational perspectives on society and

space becomes evident. However, when acted intentionally, transgression becomes a "form of resistance that creates a response from the establishment—an act that draws the lines on a battlefield and defines the terrain on which contestation occurs" (CRESSWELL 1996: 23). In terms of spatiality, transgressions do not form their own orders but do allow for alternative territorializations with the inherent contingency of new modes of order and ordering. While acts of resistance are inherently part of the order (HETHERINGTON 1997: 139), transgression moves beyond or causes dis-order within the system. A law, a code of order, an agreed-upon set of rules can be transgressed. It implies a breach, a violation, and defiance. Transgressive acts themselves are acts of nonobservance and disobedience. Transgression implies the quality of irreversible consequences, a boundary-crossing aimed at pushing forward, not to step back again. This contradicts with the perspective offered by CRESSWELL (1996: 166) that transgressions do not form their own order because they critique instead of replacing boundaries. That is true of resistance, which is inherently limited by the fact that every practice of resistance must acknowledge those power structures it means to question. However, transgressions, as they are understood here, can also hold a possibility, a *window of opportunity*, for re-configuring existing modes of order and creating new ones. This argument augments the binary focus on creation vs. critique within the conceptual debate on social and spatial re-ordering (i.e. creating new modes of order vs. critiquing existing modes of order), extended it through a third dimension of facilitation (i.e. facilitating new modes of order and ordering, even if just as ideas). Transgression thus offers two possibilities: either to take a stand against the existing ordering sphere (transgression as a heterotopic act) or to move beyond it, not returning back across the boundary which has been transgressed (transgression as a utopic act). In this regard, CRESSWELL (1996: 166) may be right in arguing that constant transgression entails continuous chaos. According to the perspective on structure, agency, and the reproduction of social and spatial ordering discussed above, this would mean that only constant chaos can facilitate an earnest momentum for re-ordering. The chaos of transgression can generate the momentum for *attempting* a utopic idea.

In light of the objectives of this study, the question arises: Is religious conversion chaos? This could be true to a certain degree, insofar as conversion is understood as an intentional act transgressive to the everyday life led so far. In order to understand resistance to or transgression of persisting inequalities within a cultural landscape that is shaped by a history of oppression, dispossession, devaluation of cultural heritage, and violence, maps of cultural orderings have to be crafted which reveal the interrelations of actors, communities, material structures, and institutions (ESCHER & WEICK 2004). A cultural geography that acknowledges the structuring

effects of positionality as well as the agency of intersubjectivity in the lived-in places has the potential to produce maps that engaging with practices, experiences, and representations of everyday life and thus to disclose the *doxic landscapes* to the analytic eye. As multilayered constructs, such maps include and reflect spatial differences and differentiations. Understanding and engaging with spatial differences in cultural orders means acknowledging the aggregations of cultural knowledge which prevail and their varying and uneven distribution. It also means ascribing the *cultural quality* to these maps of order. (ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 260). Yet, such maps need not be specific *maps of resistance* (nor do they need to solely focus on religious aspects). Analyzing the practices and politics of everyday life, the symbols of differentiation, and the practices of empowerment and social cohesion through maps of cultural orderings can help us understand the acts and aspirations of de- and re-territorialization in the featured case of conversion to Islam by people once classified as Black African under the colonial and apartheid rule of South Africa. As a first layer of such a map, the following section will introduce the particularities, path dependencies, and spatial differences ordering the South African context, exploring its history of ordering indigeneity by means of racialized ideologies on society and space.

South Africa's Orderly Indigeneity: Colonial Roots, Apartheid's Perfection, Post-Apartheid Leeway

Looking at global developments over the twentieth century, South African society is far from the only one that was (and is to some extent still) characterized by racialized injustice and colonial oppression enacted by regimes that defined themselves as White or European supremacist. Nor was it the only society to officially break with its divisive political past to embark on a path of liberation and transformation. In terms of segregative, racist policies and lived realities, the social dynamics in South Africa may justify comparisons with those of the United States (see FREDRICKSON 1981, 1995). Within the field of African independence, South Africa is often be described as the latecomer, the last on the continent to break with its colonial past. It is, however, a problematic misconception that national entities, or better nationally territorialized societies, could free themselves by political declaration and discourse from the structures and effects of intentionally governed and constantly inscribed inequalities, which evolved across multiple colonial genealogies around ideologies of us vs. them, of superiority and inferiority. On the contrary, central to change are the people, living as they do in their respective regions—the *locations* of order—their daily lives imbued with the orderly concepts and ideologies which justify those inequalities long taken for granted. It is they who must question and challenge the embodied dispositions and practiced routines for themselves and for society at large. For this reason, changes in the modes of social and spatial order and ordering and their related processes are, to say the least, difficult to compare. Moreover, such changes unfold on various levels—the *locales* of order—from lived-in places to regional peculiarities and global relations. Different capacities for change exist at each scale, which are complicated by the *inertia* of the materiality of place (CRESSWELL 1996: 159f.), those unavoidable *site effects* that the physical, built up habitat has upon the inhabitants (BOURDIEU 1999 [1993]). Thus, what is declared on a representational level must be translated to, and decidedly accepted and enacted by, diverse actors and institutions within their social and spatial settings, each of whom has their specific, power-related contingencies and positionalities, their modes and rates of converting the symbolic capital of a political act into economic, social, and cultural realities. Change in social

and spatial relations is seldom brought about by those who declare the process; it is more often implemented by specific repercussions within the social and spatial settings. In other words, change has to be attached to meaning, collectively and individually (cf. CRESSWELL 2014a: 5). The logical consequence is the questioning of those meaningful practices that reproduce the existing modes of order, i.e. the *sense of place* as a sense of ordering, a knowing of the ordering logics as well as one's own position within them. This does not always correspond with an officially declared discourse of change, as is the case in the featured study on conversion to Islam.

The South African situation exemplifies the persistence of modes of social and spatial *ordering* and *othering* as a consequence of colonial domination. More than twenty-five years after the end of apartheid, declared by the first free and equal elections in 1994, polarizations along the lines of the former population groups still exist, though they have been slowly translated into corresponding economic lines (HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017). The endurance of these effects, which has up until now rendered South African society one of the most socially unequal on the globe (DE LA FONTAINE, MÜLLER, HOFMANN et al. 2017b: 4), is brought about by the prevailing cultural, economic, social, and political structures, as well as by meaningful practices, the *injustices lived out* in the *lived-in places*.

South Africa carries a dubious uniqueness: Not only did the period of apartheid lead to an anachronistic continuation of colonialism and White supremacy, it did so through a carefully orchestrated, insidious concept of cultural ordering, a radical modernity in social and spatial terms (DODSON 2000: 155). The *doxic landscapes* (CRESSWELL 2003: 277) that evolved led to an orderly continuation of the oppressive dialectics, or bi-polarizations (cf. CHRISTOPHER 2002), by inscribing racial difference and racist differentiation into society and space. On the one hand was the noble conqueror, the progressive colonialist, the devout missionary, the civilized settler. On the other was the primitive native, the underdeveloped tribesperson, the sinful heathen, the *disorderly African*. In order to facilitate this dialectic and the resulting reign of a White minority, practices for differentiating intermediary population groups according to color variations arose within the grand dialectic of White/Non-White, which kept those classified as White on top of the social hierarchy and the indigenous subjects at the very bottom.

The following section will cast light on the question of how racial categories and the resulting cultural hierarchies have been made commonsensical through everyday modes and politics of oppression and segregation on all scales of the society, from benches to trains and from beaches to whole regions of the country. Inequality among the people living in South Africa became

naturalized (COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 28) with the help of imagined origins, projected belongings, far-fetched biologisms, and cultural stereotypes. Moreover, the whole ideology of dividing people according to racialized population groups while keeping them segregated in social as well as spatial terms was deeply influenced and legitimized by religious motivation, namely a politically mythologized belief (and pretext) that it was God's instruction to separate the groups from each other in order to facilitate their development.

The matters of colonial and apartheid rule, the domination of a White minority, their effects on social and spatial configurations as well as ethnicity and political identity, and last but not least, the shift from apartheid to post-apartheid governance are already the focus of a wide array of literature from various fields, including geography, political science, planning, and developmental studies, just to name a few (see amongst others HORRELL 1971; BALDWIN 1974; MABIN 1992; CHRISTOPHER 2001; TUROK 2001; OSMANOVIC 2002; SIHLONGONYANE 2002; HAFERBURG 2013; JOHNSTON 2014; DE LA FONTAINE, MÜLLER, HOFMANN et al. 2017a). To avoid a repetitive recapitulation of these diverse studies, I present here a selection of specific aspects, chosen to provide the reader with an introduction to the cornerstones of these topics and their effects on society, space, and place. Two perspectives therefore make up the focus: ordering as cultural politics and practices of racial classification and ordering as spatial politics and practices of territorial segregation. Both reflect the historical developments of oppression, dispossession, and exploitation that affected—on a very real, subjectively experienced level—the everyday lives of the majority of people living in South Africa. Both perspectives are important to understanding the shared history of suffering that frames the meaning of *Blackness* in the colonial and post-colonial realities of South Africa. In the subsequent chapter, I will explore the question of what roles religion played in this socio-historical narrative as an affiliation, a faith, an ideology, a lived-in place, and a way of life. This I do by locating the dimension of religion within the modes of order and ordering, thereby preparing the ground for a critical and comprehensive debate on conversion to Islam. But first, the ideological foundation of *Whiteness* (cf. WALTER 2001: 22) and the construction of an orderly indigeneity for the *disorderly African* must be discussed.

Putting *Whiteness* on Top: Ideological Foundations for Ordering Indigeneity

> "Southern Africans noticed the 'white man' and the 'black man' from the time whites arrived. But they noticed other things too. Whites thought they were 'white.' They also thought they were 'civilized,' 'Calvinist' 'burgher' 'settlers' from 'Christian' 'Europe' and were more affluent than 'black,' 'savage' 'natives' from 'heathen' 'Africa,' who were poor

> besides. It is anachronistic to assume, therefore, that race necessarily took precedence over lesser identities or that the lesser identities derived from color. The status and the meaning of 'whiteness'—and of color in general—were not given; they were ambiguous, contested, and in flux." (MACDONALD 2006: 40)

Colonial and apartheid modes of order and ordering were established on different scales, in different spheres, and at different points in time in order to keep the European settler and colonialist minority constantly in power while keeping everybody else profoundly in place. These modes devaluing *being African* by placing indigenous people not only at the bottom of the economic spectrum, but also on the spatial fringes and outskirts in both urban and regional terms. Intermediary color groups were placed in between—in terms of governance, as well as spatial zoning—in order to establish a hierarchy through direct as well as indirect rule. Population influx brought about by the dynamics of the colony facilitated the constructing population groups such as Coloureds, Indians, or Asians, who were—in the eyes of the ruling minority—distinct from both the ruling class and the indigenous population. The descendants of early Dutch settlers and Non-European women—enslaved, indigenous, or both—also found themselves classified in this in-between-ness. The Black/White, or African/Non-African polarity became "a variant of the indigenous-immigrant dichotomy, assuming that the Coloured and Indian population would identify with the Whites if offered full political and economic rights" (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 98). The diverse pathways open during the colonial period were succeeded by the apartheid regime, which in its radical modernist approach to state and society holds the dubious honor of uniqueness within the global history of the twentieth century. Apartheid was the institutionalization of an emerging but contested settler-colonial identity that was based on *Whiteness* as an idea of racial inclusion, superiority, and supposedly civilized hegemony (cf. BONDS & INWOOD 2016; MORRELL, WRIGHT & MEINTJES 1996: 53; CASHMORE 1996: 377ff.). The extensive success of this system of segregative policies relied on the enforcement of cultural separation through spatial order across all aspects of daily life, as well as through local, regional, national, and international politics and relations (cf. DODSON 2000: 155). The ordering of space and the production of orderly places produced and re-produced an ideological structure of *orderly indigeneity* by inscribing the logics ordering the indigenous population as the *African other* into the physical habitat, which in turn became the means of structuring the people living there. Invoking the conceptual term indigeneity in a colonial setting like the South African one does not imply that settler and migrant communities have no right to postulate a sense of indigeneity and belonging to the place themselves, as this would obscure the conceptual undertaking in a deterministic way. After all, the essential territorial aim of settler colonialism was to bring about a place-bound sense of belonging, i.e. a

new sense of indigeneity. Nevertheless, as CAMERON, DE LEEUW & GREENWOOD (2009: 356) point out, the specific difference between the settlers' perspective and that of the indigenous population lies the fact that the latter has no "other homeland" to return to. Meanwhile, in the South African context, the settler colonialists' production of belonging to place entailed the dis-ordering and re-ordering of the indigenous other through the politics and practices of enforced uprootings, relocations, and re-groundings at a new place chosen by the intruders. In other words, the creation of the White minority's domination and belonging amounted to the displacement and the ordering of indigeneity. In certain ways, the heuristic category of *African diaspora* therefore applies to the socially and spatially re-ordered indigenous African population of South Africa in the same way it does to the descendants of the slave trade on the American continents. The conceptual difference is first and foremost a geographic one. What unites both sides of the *Black Atlantic*, to draw on the conceptual understanding of shared Blackness proposed by GILROY (1991, 1993, 2000), are the continuous acts of differentiation and politics of difference brought about by the European settlers, which became the central justification for all subsequent aspects of oppression and segregation, be they social or spatial (cf. POSEL 2001b: 62). In South Africa in the nineteenth century, the very European ideas of race and racial differentiation based on phenotypical ascription entered the picture as the primary marker of colonial domination, becoming the ideological foundation for the cultural political dialectic of *Whiteness* and *Blackness*. However, what seems to be a clear-cut dichotomy—at least in semantic terms—reveals a complexity best understood by tracing the historical developments that led to the establishment of the prevailing cultural orderings and the political and ideological construction of the African other, exploring its role in patterns of White domination.

From the establishment of the very first outpost of the Dutch East India Company in 1652, the relations between the European colonialists and the indigenous population were violently confrontational and characterized by the Europeans' perception of their superiority to the peoples already living there. As the settlement which became Cape Town was meant to be a refreshment outpost for ships on their voyage around the Cape, territorial expansionism and the exploitation of resources seemed to be the sole strategies of the colonialists. This quickly led to clashes, first with the Khoikhoi pastoralists and San hunter-gatherers and later, in the course of the colony's expansion, with Bantu-speaking farmers. In a historical-anecdotical way, the planting of a thick hedge east of the intruder's settlement can be seen as be South Africa's first materialization of a demarcated boundary, at least according to the European understanding of a boundary (cf. THOMPSON 2001: 38; CHRISTOPHER 2001: 13). This territorial expansionism should not be understood as a random development but rather as the result of the establishment

of settler community whose autonomy was gradually increasing. In need of more resources, the Dutch semi-migrant farmers called the *trekboers* moved farther inland, originally under the authority of the colony's administration, who mandated and surveyed their movement through a system of land tenure until part of the trekboer population sought independence to form their own sphere of social and territorial governance (THOMPSON 2001: 50f.; DAVENPORT & HUNT 1974: 1). In a socio-political constellation that consisted of dominating Europeans, exploited indigenous people, and a growing number of slaves brought to the Cape as a workforce, land and labor were the means of defining and maintaining an exploitative hegemony (cf. FREUND 1976: 55). The capitalistic idea of European civilization was deemed superior to that of the Non-European others. Yet this self-appointed superiority slowly took hold on different grounds. GUELKE (1989) argues that the progressive formation of a settler community of *free burghers* on the territory of the Dutch East Indian Company's outpost was accompanied by a growing sense of exclusivity, of being a community at home, though away from their places of origin. "This sense of superiority took a variety of forms which had less to do with how Europeans saw non-Europeans than it did with how they saw themselves" (ibid.: 44). It was not solely directed in antagonism to the indigenous population but rather to all Non-European subjects, including slaves from other parts of the African continent as well as from other regions of the world. Racial ascriptions played an increasing role but were secondary to a social hierarchical self-awareness built on belonging—both to the place of origin and the place of arrival at the same time.

This nascent ideology of othering changed with the arrival of British colonial forces at the beginning of the nineteenth century. With war waging in Europe, the British Empire took hold of the strategically important settlement at the Cape. Under their rule, the previously unquestioned supremacy of Dutch settlers came into limbo: The policy of equalization (*gelykstelling* in Afrikaans) proclaimed by the British made it necessary to justify the hegemonic narrative anew:

> "Talk of equalization unveiled the substructure of the social order. Whites, without having thought much about it, had achieved systematic supremacy, but had bothered justifying only slavery. […] Subordinating nonwhites was the linchpin of white society, but whites took the supremacy they had achieved for granted until Britain's talk of reform forced them to clarify what had been implicit all along. […] That is, whites adopted racialization as a strategy to justify the supremacy that had evolved more or less independently of racial feelings." (MACDONALD 2006: 38)

From then on, two interrelated regimes of identity construction and othering, both based on the premise of *Whiteness,* gained momentum. On the one hand was the British imperial colony, with its logics of conquering, classifying, and ruling indirectly, which was granting political franchise in gradual degrees to different parts of the dominated population. On the other hand

was an expansionistic Boer society, which depended heavily on the exploitation of Non-European slave labor. Here, an Afrikaner political identity emerged, based on the *Great Trek*, a religiously biased and heavily mythologized narrative of the exodus of the Boer from British domination, which succeeded the *trekboer* migrations farther inland[5]. It is, however, difficult to speak of *the* Boer or Afrikaner society in terms of a coherent and institutionalized shared realm of ordering and belonging. What became Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid were rooted in a long process of cultural differentiation and defining White citizenship. What became Afrikaner identity started with settlers employed by the Dutch East Indies Company who began to perceive themselves as *burghers*. As MACDONALD (2006: 38) argues, differentiating belonging along the lines of Black and White slowly became an essential aspect of their citizenship.

Boer expansionism, British imperialism, and their conflicting, militarized struggles over the territorial domination of South Africa characterized the establishment of the White/Non-White differentiation (cf. VAN DEN BERGHE 1978: 100). The conflict between the Boer and the British ended with the territorial merging of the two British colonies, Natal and Cape, with the Afrikaner republics of Transvaal and Orange Free State to form the Union of South Africa in 1910. Thus was the turning point for all further developments in the conception of a South African state and society at large (HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017: 57f.).

Along the way, existing African nations such as the Zulu, Ndebele, or Sotho—themselves entrenched in conflict—were effectively stripped of their independent territories in military encounters with Afrikaner and British forces (VAN DEN BERGHE 1978: 100). What came into being was a racialized regime of territorial governance and cultural politics that was comprised of both oppressors' worlds, making use of the imperial logic of division and rule and the ideological influences of social Darwinism on the one hand, while inheriting and incorporating the Afrikaner self-awareness and racist othering on the other. The numerical minority was no longer just defined as European but as White, while the majority of others were divided into subgroups, enabling the minority to wield power over land and labor by converting constructed color differences into policies (MACDONALD 2006: 35). In contrast to the standard British colonial strategies, no attempts were made at state level to Europeanize the *African other*, i.e. to carve out hybrid subjects. On the contrary, what was not classified as White was to be kept aside, in a parallel sphere and parallel space of separate development. White/Non-White

[5]Afrikaner started to appear as a self-description in the second half of the eighteenth century and was related to the settlers' growing independence and differentiation from their motherland of Holland (cf. TIRYAKIAN 1957: 388).

became the basic definitions for the racialized segregation and classification of the people living in South Africa and remains up until now enshrined in the census categories.



Map 1: Political map of South Africa, 1899. Source: (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 16).

Numerical proportions also played another role: The oppressive regimes that ruled over the different phases of colonial and apartheid history were well aware of being in the minority. This aspect was of less importance during the expansionist phases, in part because of the rather weakened state of the African political entities and societies with whom the settlers and colonialist came into contact. This weakened state was the result of decades of brutal militarization and totalitarian conflict brought about by the expansion of the Zulu kingdom throughout the northern and eastern regions of Southern Africa during the nineteenth century (see THOMPSON 2001: 70ff.). In contrast, with an increasing rate of urbanization, the territorial supremacy of the White minority was increasingly being seen as contested at the turn of the twentieth century. The establishment of a rigid segregative regime that kept the other—whether classified as Bantu or Black, Native, Coloured, or Indian—in a constant state of cultural, political, economic, and spatial difference to the White colonialist. This regime's main focus rested on the indigenous population. The rise to power of the Afrikaner National Party after

the 1948 election and the subsequent rule of apartheid with its ordering logics must be seen in this light:

> "Apartheid was underpinned by a hankering for *order* – an orderly society and an orderly state to tame the perceived dissolution and turbulence engendered during the 1940s. For many anxious whites, the fate of white supremacy had grown precarious, endangered by the spectre of *die swart gevaar* (the black danger) threatening to overwhelm the cities." (POSEL 2001b: 57)

Apartheid, therefore, was the culmination of a lengthy process of constructing, defining, delineating, territorializing, and ordering the *native* African at the far end of the social spectrum through classification, legislation, and spatial distribution. With the establishment of the Union of South Africa, Whiteness essentially meant privilege—political, economic, and social. In order to prolong this status in the face of changing circumstances, an *orderly indigeneity* was created, which took "the form of laws, customs and traditions. A *racist ethos*, a deeply embedded racist *habitus* constantly helped to justify whites' loss of feeling for human fellowship with blacks" (MBEMBE 2010: no pagination). POSEL (2001a) provides a vivid summary of the paradoxes and absurdities involved in trying to construct the social and cultural conditions as well as the origins and places of belonging of the indigenous, native African through the force of law (cf. also JACKSON 1989a: 180). This difficulty of this task is also reflected in the discussion offered by CHRISTOPHER (2002) on shifting census categories throughout the twentieth century, a topic which will find room for debate further below in the context of counting Muslims in South Africa (see section "Islam and classification: The questionable representation of census data in South Africa"). Similarly, MACDONALD (2006: 41) points to the rather interesting etymological aspect of the dominating groups' self-categorization as "White," or "Blank" as it was called in Afrikaans: "It was as if whites were saying both that they were lightly colored and that they were without color […]. It was as if their identity was incomplete until contrast with their opposites completed them." This antagonistic othering reflects the intrinsic unsettledness of the different oppressive groups that came from Europe. Despite their diverse and conflicting interests in power over and power through territory, their shared identity converged around a common core of social, political, and partly cultural self-perceptions, which were intrinsically defined in negative comparison to the native other. At the same time, this "other" became constructed as homogenous groups of people in the eyes of the Europeans, leading to the ordering of African indigeneity in social, cultural, economic, and spatial terms. This emphasizes the *dialectic*, not binary, relationship between *Whiteness* and *Blackness* within the South African context and could therefore also point to an aspect less prominent in the attempts to deal with persistant

polarizations after the end of apartheid. Leaving this point aside, the next section will deal with the institutionalization of racial classification and segregation with regard to spatial orderings.

The Spatial Ordering of Indigeneity

Conceptualizing social *and* spatial modes of order and ordering as described above, place as location reflects the bounded orientation of order, and place as locale implies the structured and structuring articulation of ordering, while sense of place offers an analytical view of ordering as belonging, i.e. the incorporated and intersubjectively represented and reproduced dispositions of order. Regarding the socio-historical path dependency of South African society and its particular history of colonization and apartheid, all three dimensions are of crucial importance for understanding the political, ideological, spatial, and practical strategies and logics of ordering indigeneity in the interest of upholding the hegemony of an oppressive minority. The majority, divided and segregated into different color groups, were dominated from without as well as from within. The radical modernity of this orderly racialized and racially ordered society is a result of the deeply ascribed and inscribed positions of actors and institutions within their social fields and physical relations. The systematic dispossession and deprivation of territorial powers through segregation and division and rule, as had already been practiced in so many other colonial contexts, was brought to a dubious perfection in the South African context by manifesting the classification of the majority of the society in spatial terms, producing orderly inhabitants in ordered habitats. For WESTERN (1981: 63), the magnitude of remodeling and reordering society through space on all scales of life finds no real comparison and was only made possible by rendering lived-in places "under virtual tabula rasa conditions." The unwanted subjects and undesired bodies of constructed racial otherness were forcibly uprooted and removed, in order to be re-grounded in a manner that was orderly in the eyes of the dominating group. The spatial ordering of indigeneity led to the creation of *orderly places* for the *African other* in three steps: through racial classification, spatial manifestation, and the subsequent ordering and control of movement through the definition and demarcation of the places of everyday life. The specific feature in terms social *and* spatial modes of ordering is that uniting all three dimensions turned the questions of territorial location, social affiliation, and cultural representation into matters of citizenship, sense of belonging, and bodily experience (MACDONALD 2006). According to (APPIAH 2000), such powers of racism rest on the non-collectivist power of ascription:

> "the body is central to race, gender, and sexuality but not so central to class and ethnicity. [...] [R]acial identification is simply harder to resist than ethnic identification. The

> reason is twofold. First, racial ascription is more socially salient. Second [...] race is taken by so many people to be the basis for treating people differentially."

The following section will highlight the most important developments in this regard by working with examples from what is now the province of KwaZulu-Natal, the regional focus of this study. The discussion will start with a very brief review of the colonial roots of apartheid policies before moving on to the matters of classification and spatial manifestation on the different socio-spatial scales. Then, the spatial-cultural politics of ordering and controlling the *African other* will be highlighted, before closing with some insights into the historical events that created Non-White resistance ideologies. The two latter points are important to look at, as they form the a backdrop for a contextualized understanding of Black *and* Muslim resistance in the featured case studies.

Pre-Apartheid

In assigning the indigenous population to specific areas, the British colonial administrations had put reserves and locations into policy, practice, and place long before apartheid created African homelands and townships out of them. The Shepstone System was a plan, outlined by Secretary of Native Affairs Theophilus Shepstone in 1874, intended to reorder the indigenous population as workers and day laborers within the framework of a European-capitalistic ideology (MAYLAM & EDWARDS 1996: 148). Especially in the Natal colony, it demarcated areas for Africans which were governed by an officially recognized tribal system with customary laws. The British colony of Natal differed from the Cape and the Boer Republics in this regard, as it already had a system of land tenure and taxation in place, which had enabled White settlers and speculators to demand rents and labor from the Africans residing there since the second half of the nineteenth century (ETHERINGTON 1977: 35). The increasing urbanization of South Africa at the turn of the twentieth century—in many regards a result of the system of reserves and land tenure—brought Africans to the expanding metropoles (for a historical account on Durban and Natal, see MAYLAM 1982). This led to an increase in the segregation of urban space as well as racial tensions in the sprawling urban centers (cf. MAYLAM 1995). Thus, in terms of spatial development and planning, the ideology and policies of apartheid perpetuated the political and administrative legacy of the colonial era and the formation of the Union of South Africa. For the rural areas, the legislative element was the Natives Land Act of 1913, which allowed the strict territorialization of the African population while at the same time prohibiting Africans from buying and owning land outside of the reserves. This led to the deprivation of residential rights for African families and households. For the White farmers and settlers, this policy was

understood as the removal of so-called *black spots* in an otherwise White landscape (SMITH 1990: 14f.). In the case of the growing cities, the Natives (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 was the corresponding legislation. Meanwhile, the funding of areas designated for Africans within the colonial cityscape was meant to be generated through a very peculiar system:

> "The search for a self-financing African housing process which would not burden white ratepayers, was partly resolved through the provisions of the Native Beer Act of 1908. The municipality was granted a monopoly over brewing and sale of traditional beer. […]These developments were instrumental also in the establishment of a separate Native Administration Department in the municipality in 1910 to regulate African urbanization. The first in South Africa, the administrative structure and its housing system, largely financed by beer sale profits, became known as the 'Durban System'. It subsequently spread to other centers and was used as a model in the formulation of the Native (Urban Areas) Act of 1923 which, in post-colonial society, was to be the principle instrument in administering, controlling and managing urban Africans." (DAVIES 1991: 76)

Under this so-called Durban system, the construction of houses, as well as the maintenance of infrastructure were to be financed through the sale of indigenous beer. Only very limited resources accumulated from the system, and as a result, the African areas quickly deteriorated (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 36).

Both legislative developments, the Land Act and the Natives Act, are the very roots and preparatory groundwork for the wholesale segregation of Non-White South African society during apartheid. Although both Acts were repealed in 1991, the legacy of the removals brought about by the Land Act of 1913—the most severe and long-lasting uprootings of the indigenous population of South Africa—still impacts the country today. To frame it in numbers, the initial Act and its extensions allocated 12.9% of the South African territory to the African indigenous population, which at that time, as today, constituted the majority of the population (BALDWIN 1974: 8). The underlying policies were based on a strong capitalistic ideology of commodifying and owning territory. At the same time, the locations within the urban areas were meant to supply the growing urban economy with a cheap workforce. However, these areas became a social mirror of the African homestead economy and were therefore the subject of continuous criticism (MESTHRIE 1984: 42), which resulted in the Native Laws Amendment Act of 1937. This piece of legislation regulated the influx of male Africans into the colonial cities and gave each person fourteen days to find work, later reduced to three days during apartheid (WESTERN 1981: 290).

The late colonial period of the Union of South Africa has to be understood as the segregative legacy upon which the institutionalization of apartheid policies grew. It served as blueprint for the subsequent racist and segregationist regime by carving out the cornerstones of territorial

demarcation and forced relocation of the indigenous population, as well as the destruction of livelihoods through urbanization and the ensuing migrant workers system.

Racial Classification

Before removing major parts of the resident population, people first had to be classified and represented as other. Interestingly, "African" was not used as a category during colonialism or early apartheid; instead the terms used were "Kafir," "Bantu," "Native," or since the 1980s, "Black" (see CHRISTOPHER 2002; VERWEY & QUAYLE 2012: 555). Aside from these semantic peculiarities, the "political construction with the force of law" (JACKSON 1989a: 180) of different population groups was a very racist and racialized undertaking. The legislative basis for the classification of the South African society as a whole was the Population Registration Act of 1950, which initially defined four groups: Whites, Natives, Coloureds, and Indians (cf. SMITH 1994: 226). The groups varied slightly over time but essentially reified the four basic groups, which still exist today as terms of the population census and official statistics. The intention of the Group Areas Act was the preservation of racial purity (see POSEL 2001a: 98ff.), but the actual acts of classification were purely arbitrary, based on physical appearance and what was defined by *general acceptance* (POSEL 2001b: 64), i.e. social reality in terms of interaction, language, religion, recent place of residence, and so on.

> "The system of population classification in South Africa is often referred to as 'race' classification. Opponents and supporters of this classification regularly refer uncritically to 'race' as the guiding principle, arguing that the system divides South Africans on the basis of color and other physical features. In fact, while stereotypes are likely to be concerned largely with physical characteristics, in practice both formal and informal classification is on the basis of several factors - appearance, descent, acceptance, language, behavior, and so on. Race classification is therefore not based exclusively on physical features of race." (WEST 1988: 100f.)

Physical appearance was essentially defined by biological aspects with a supposedly scientific background based in a racist discourse stemming from European human biology and anthropology (cf. HAFERBURG 2007: 91; MACDONALD 2006: 33). However, with the second aspect of general acceptance, things became more difficult. Here, race became the result of one's own way of life. "In a tautological denial of the desirability of racial mixing, classifiers tended to read off an individual's race from the dominant racial character of his or her residential area and community of associates" (POSEL 2001b: 66). As a result, schools, workplace, places of leisure—in essence all the places frequented on an everyday basis—became the basis for racial classification beyond the initial ascription through physical appearance. HAFERBURG (2007: 87) convincingly proposes the analytical dimension he terms "ascriptive

capital" as a means to properly frame and acknowledge the everyday politics of difference and practices of differentiation within the South African society. Still today, the practice of intersubjective othering persists among South Africans. Framing this power of positionality as a kind of capital within the social field—i.e. a trait that can be converted into other social relations and hierarchies (cf. HAFERBURG 2007: 92)—recognizes the social ontology of reciprocal stratification within the South African society, which had been inscribed as manifested dispositions through decades of classifying and being classified.

The paradox involved in trying to define differentiated and monolithic population groups on such grounds is reflected in the legislative attempts to define White personage:

> "'White person' means a person who in appearance obviously is, or who is generally accepted as a white person, but does not include a person, who, although in appearance obviously a white person, is generally accepted as a coloured person." (Population Registration Act of 1950 as cited in CHRISTOPHER 2001: 101)

Once enacted, these classifications became a matter of legal contestation, as the resulting population groups were not universally accepted, leading to processes of appeal and in some cases successful reclassification (see Figure 2).



Figure 2: Changes in race classifications from 1983-1990. Source: (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 102).

Aside from these discursive obscurities, the actual practice of classification and its social and spatial contingency made both the act and the result a commonsensical experience. Racial difference became a lived-in as well as lived-out reality, a "self-evident, common-sensical and therefore utterly uncontroversial 'fact' of life in South Africa" (POSEL 2001b: 70; cf. POSEL 2001a). This enforcement and thus inscription of the logics of classification as a relationality among the subjects of the differentiated groups was only possible because the groups were rendered not just racially but essentially culturally different (SHARP 1988: 79). Language, distinctive sets of everyday practices, habits, shared beliefs—all became characteristics of belonging, not to South Africa but to a certain segment of the population living on its territory. In the case of those classified as Black African, the cultural ordering as cultural othering was constructed in such a way that being classified as Native became antithetic to indigeneity. The *orderly African* first and foremost had to be an *orderly alien* to South African society and space. Yet, classification alone could not suffice for such a purpose. The politics of difference had to also be manifested in spatial segregation on all scales of daily life.

Spatial segregation and manifestation

The social and spatial logics of ordering introduced during the colonial period and institutionalized during apartheid took hold on different scales of society and space:

- the macro-scale of national, international, and regional relations
- the meso-scale of segregated municipalities
- the micro-scale of segregation in the lived-in places of daily life.

The latter came to be known as petty apartheid and was legislated by the Reservation of Separate Amenities Act of 1953. Separate premises, separate entrances, hotels for the different population groups (plus for guests with international status), and the racial demarcation of beaches (see Map 2), all were the result of ordering those spaces which could be possibly shared among the population groups.



Map 2: Beach segregation and desegregation in Durban. Source: (SMITH 1990: 28).

The meso-scale of apartheid is the urban scale, represented by the segregated municipalities, which were remodeled to become apartheid cities through the governance, creation, and demolition of the habitat. On the macro-scale, primarily expressed by the demarcation of reserves before apartheid, the African population had been allocated to so-called homelands, or Bantustans, which were supposed to gain autonomy in the long run, thus creating pseudo-federal states with international relations to the Republic of South Africa (EVANS 2012, 2014, 2009; BALDWIN 1975; BUTLER, ROTBERG & ADAMS 1977; FERGUSON 2006: 55ff.). The establishment of a system of social and spatial segregation through policies and planning on the urban and regional scale was founded on the legislation of the Group Areas Act of 1950, as well as the Group Areas Development Act of 1955, which became the Community Development Act in 1966 (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 102f.). The Group Areas Act was the political landmark for apartheid planning. It allowed for and regulated the overall demarcation of areas in relation to population groups.



Map 3: Designated locations for population groups and African reserves before 1948. Cartography: M. Gebauer.



Map 4: Group areas and KwaZulu Homeland in and around Durban in the 1980s. Cartography: M. Gebauer.

Maps 3 and 4 show the different spatializations of the Greater Durban Area before and after 1948, as an example of this process. Reserves from as early as the colonial period represent the territorial approach to ordering in the demarcation of indigenous areas. With apartheid, these segregated zones and cultural boundaries were extended in their intentional orchestration, leading to the forced removals and relocations of the Non-White population groups, thereby influencing the lives of all South Africans. For people classified as Coloured or Indian, these effects unfolded predominantly on the meso-scale of the municipalities. Relocations took place where compliance with the group areas zoning schemes of the apartheid city had been deemed

necessary. However, these groups' right to reside within the White-dominated urban space, and thus a certain sense of belonging, were not disputed. Citizenship was still restricted, but there were no policies in preparation to demarcate reserves or homelands for groups other than the Black African. People classified as Black African were, however, severely limited in their rights to reside freely and permanently outside of the homelands. Exceptions for resident of urban areas were only possible under one of the following conditions: a person had to be born in that area, a person had to have lived there without interruption for fifteen years, a person had to have worked in that area for the same employer for ten years (cf. SMITH 1990: 5). Everyone else practically became a citizen of a tribally designated homeland, the supposedly *natural habitat* and rural home of the *African other*. They could only enter urban areas as a sojourner, a migrant worker with a half-year or one-year contract (SPARKS 1990: 194), and reside in selected locations-turned-townships and new segregated developments. The results were massive, countrywide relocations within the municipalities and from urban to rural areas, which largely took place in the 1960s and 1970s (see CHRISTOPHER 2001: 81ff.). In terms of belonging and citizenship, Africans were driven to the homelands in order to *whiten* the rural areas and eradicate the *black spots* in the countryside and urban areas (see Map 5) (cf. SHARP 1988: 93). "In the consciousness of most white South Africans, these people were merely being sent 'home', in order to participate in the grand exercise of nation-building" (ibid.:: 94). By the 1980s, more than three million people who were classified as Native had been displaced (SMITH 1990: 15). "The removals varied from family displacements by individual White farmers to large-scale forced removals organized and executed by the government, often with police and military coercion" (ibid.: 83f.).



Map 5: Forced removals of Africans to homelands (CHRISTOPHER 2001: 85).

Whiteness became territorialized on a grand scale. The South Africa of the oppressor was constituted in White cities connected by corridors, creating a landscape of racialized orderings and orderly belongings. DODSON (2000: 155) rightly describes the resulting map of cultural orders as a dystopia of the past, whose structured and structuring legacy remains an impediment for any transformative attempts. Although her use of the term seems to serve more as a catchy title than a conceptual approach, dystopia is the *mot juste* for the indigenous population's lived-in realities resulting from the modernist vision of apartheid. Their states of being and senses of place were characterized by inequality, deprivation, and the lack of opportunities for social development and transformation. The difference to the glossarial definition of dystopia by BROWN & DURRHEIM (2009: 125) as "an imagined place or state in which the condition of life is extremely bad, and frequently marked by deprivation, inequality, and an oppressive or repressive social order" is that in South Africa, the dystopia was never just an imagining.

The literature on apartheid cities, their variations and commonalities, as well as their legacy in the transformation process of the post-apartheid society has been the focus of a wide range of publications, including geographical approaches (amongst others SMITH 1992; HINDSON, BYERLEY & MORRIS 1994; MAYLAM 1995; MAHARAJ & LOW 2007; FREUND 2010; SCHENSUL & HELLER 2011). The focus of this study lies on the path dependencies and contingencies at the

intersections of the homeland/White city with its migratory dynamics. The featured cases are situated on those rural-urban outskirts and Black/White fringes. In particular, the ordering logics of frontier townships will be discussed further below (see section "Attempting Muslim Blackness in KwaMashu"). For a contextual understanding of ordering African indigeneity, the socio-spatial history of what is now the region of KwaZulu-Natal is at the hearth of this discussion.

Bantustan: The Orderly Place for the *Orderly African*

As argued above, the peculiarities of the South African modes of social and spatial order and ordering can be seen in the conflation of the British imperial logics of division and rule on the one hand, and the White supremacist self-awareness and subsequent White/Non-White dialectic of Afrikaner nationalism on the other. The transformation of reserves for the indigenous population into homelands, racialized territories for the *African other*, is one of the many spatial-political results of the union of British and Afrikaner territories. Legislated successively to the Group Areas Act through the Natives Resettlement Act of 1954 and the Promotion of Bantu Self-Government of 1959, the homelands or Bantustans represented the ideology of *grand apartheid* (for a concise analysis, see especially BUTLER, ROTBERG & ADAMS 1977). The intention of these legislative acts was threefold (SMITH 1994: 225): First, they were a strategy for territorial purity, with people classified as Native being removed from the White cities and farmlands. Second, they were a capitalistic-generative strategy which located the homelands in close proximity to the White metropoles and industrial nodes and thereby generated a constant influx of cheap labor. And third, they were a strategy to divide and rule by controlling the African nodes of governance indirectly through the promotion of tribalization in the native territories, ascribing tradition to the *African other*, and seeding divisions by influencing the appointment of chiefs to the houses.

> "The Bantu Authorities system amounted to an elaboration of the old British colonial technique of indirect rule […]; its additional divide-and-rule advantages enabled the government to break down the black majority into separate tribal entities—or 'nations' in the making—instead of facing it as a united body, which Western-style political development would have led to." (SPARKS 1990: 194f.)

The latter fact can also be seen in the light of producing an African middle class, a "petty bourgeoisie," positioned as a buffer between the relatively rich and privileged White minority on the hand and the impoverished Black majority on the other (HERMANN 2011: 21f.).

The homelands were established according to the cultural categories of common language and supposed racial homogeneity. The ethno-tribal designations ascribed to them by their names

merely reflected the perspective of the White oppressor rather than socio-historical relations. As in other colonial contexts, African actors and institutions were made to fit into constructed national categories. The political and territorial-ideological background of the homelands' demarcation and the transfer of authority to them was intended to bring about a pseudo-federal system of self-governed and supposedly independent Black Native states within the territory of South Africa (cf. JACKSON 1989a: 181). If successful, the apartheid state would solve once and for all the White/Non-White dialectic and the question of indigeneity on South African territory as "there would *be* no more black South Africans" (FERGUSON 2006: 56). Outside of the homelands, indigeneity would be reordered as defined by Afrikaner nationalism.



Map 6: The homelands of South Africa: 'self-governing territories' and 'independent republics.' Source: (SMITH 1990: 9).

The processes of transforming the homelands into self-governing territories took place between 1963 and 1984, beginning with the Transkei and ending with KaNgwane (see map 6). Out of ten self-governing Bantustans, four declared their independence: Transkei in 1976,

Bophuthatswana in 1977, Venda in 1979, and Ciskei in 1981 (SMITH 1990: 16)[6]. The apartheid government progressed with the territorial decoupling of the homelands through the Department of Bantu Administration and Development. Bantustan governments were supplied with all the insignia necessary in the eyes of the White nationalists: National flags and national crests were designed, unifying mottos declared, and anthems composed, while the new native state apparatus was subsidized to establish government institutions and embassies (SMITH 1990: 18). FERGUSON (2006: 57) correctly points out that the conceptual phrase "the invention of tradition" (HOBSBAWM & RANGER 1983) had never been more appropriate.

The homelands may have been self-governing to a certain degree, but even those which declared their independence lacked true sovereignty. On the one hand, the South African state subsidized the native governments and maintained them militarily (MACDONALD 2006: 15). On the other hand, and far more importantly, the nucleus of the separate homeland identities had been formulated around tribal categories that did not reflect existing social groups and societal relations but fitted the cause of an exploitative system of indirect rule. The ethnic and tribal categories underlying the different Bantustans therefore represented "a particular way of ordering and grouping certain human populations" (SKALNÍK 1988: 75). Within this system, the head of the South African state was the "Supreme Chief of all Blacks" and entitled to appoint chiefs to the homelands. Thus, in terms of indirect rule and political control, tying the governments of the homelands to the administration of the apartheid state continued the Shepstone system put into place in the nineteenth century, making it possible to control the indigenous population while presenting the situation as a process of native independence (cf. MESTHRIE 1984: 42ff.). Another, more important continuation of the colonial predecessor system was the intrinsic meaning of tribal categories as the core identities of each homeland, a cultural ordering which reflected and served the White oppressor's view of the African landscape. In order to sustain the hierarchical structure, the modes of order had to be legitimized in political *and* cultural terms. This was done by inventing tradition and constructing tribes on the basis of simplified and homogenized realities of indigenous peoples' history and social development (cf. SPIEGEL & BOONZAIER 1988; SKALNÍK 1988). In the case of KwaZulu, the conflation of isiZulu-speaking houses under the tribal category of Zulu led to an evolution in Zulu ethnicity, which may have resembled elements of the last Zulu kingdom, but which

[6]An obscure fact in terms of the production of geographical knowledge: Even though none of the bantustans has ever been officially recognized by other states on the globe, the National Geographic's world maps included the Transkei as an independent country, at least from 1976 to 1981 (FERGUSON 2006: 58).

primarily served the ideology of European nationalism by uniting assigned territory with ascribed identity (cf. LAMBERT & MORRELL 1996: 91). Drawing heavily on the construction of native tradition and the persistence of traditional practices within the homelands, this strategy was most definitely in line with apartheid's vision of separate development, which rendered the African subject incompatible with the radical modernity of a White South Africa. By legitimizing territorial differentiation based on cultural difference and othering, the establishment of homelands and their ordering logics of indigeneity did not serve the indigenous population but rather the overall project of Afrikaner nationalism. WAETJEN (1999: 653) appropriately names it a "manipulation of ethnicity" to serve the needs of the White government.

Frontier Commuting: Controlling the Movements of the Indigenous Population

With the establishment of homelands, *being African* became an issue of citizenship. The indigenous population of South Africa was not only forcibly relocated but also stripped of the right to be citizens of the state. Leaving the territory of the homeland thus became an issue of international relations and migration. "Citizens of the Bantustans might, of course, be allowed within 'white South Africa' as workers, with the proper permissions, but they would be no more entitled to political rights there than are foreign workers in other countries" (FERGUSON 2006: 56). As argued above, providing White urban areas with a constant influx of cheap labor from the African areas was one key aspects of the Bantustan policies. As SMITH (1990: 49) points out, the control over a disposable workforce was based on a system of frontier commuters,

> "defined as Blacks who reside in the Homelands but travel daily to work in the cities, industrial districts or rural areas of 'White' South Africa. In apartheid thinking, they thus commute across what is now (in the case of 'independent republics') or what may eventually be (in the case of the remaining 'self-governing territories') an international boundary."

In terms of workforce, the migrant labor system was the backbone of the apartheid economy. By systematically and territorially linking the homelands to White urban centers and development nodes, a landscape of exploitation of the Black workforce evolved for the expansion White prosperity, thus ingraining a racialized dialectical relationship into the macro-scale of apartheid (BALDWIN 1974: 33). JACKSON (1989a: 182) illustrated this development in the case of the KwaZulu homeland in the 1980s (see figure 3).



Figure 3: Frontier commuters of KwaZulu. Source: (JACKSON 1989a: 182).

BALDWIN (1974: 33) notes in this regard that the border areas—the interstitial areas on the territorial outskirts of the White urban areas and corridors—essentially hold the key to an understanding of the ordering logics of apartheid. Controlled by a system of countrywide pass laws that had African men and women always carry their papers with them, the majority of Africans were confined to the status of sojourners (SHARP 1988: 93). Thus, the modes of ordering belonging and indigeneity were constantly reproduced and reified by acts of administrative control, as well as in everyday lived-in reality. Oppression became a matter of daily lived routine.

Persistent Orderly Indigeneity

The historical process of putting segregation into practice on all scales of society and space made new, segregative modes of order and ordering an everyday reality for those classified as Native, Bantu, or Black. Even though categorization along these lines included immigrants from other regions of the African continent, it was essentially designed for the Non-White part of the nationalist and racist dialectic White/Non-White in South Africa. MACDONALD (2006) argues that the reordering of African subjects as foreigners to the South African territory reflects the racism as well as racialism of the segregationist system. Racism implies the naturalized hegemony of a group that deems itself not only superior to another group (in racial terms) but

also more advanced. The distribution of power is defined by this logic: "[…] racists do not regard power as the source of their superiority, but superiority as the source of their power" (ibid.: 6). Racialism, on the other hand, constitutes power relations which are not based solely on the superiority of one side but rather on a race-based understanding of difference: "Racialists regard race as the source of identity and identities as the axes of political institutions, and then urge that government be organized on the basis of race" (ibid.: 7). South Africa's colonial and apartheid White supremacy was comprised of racist and racialist elements. While the oppressor-oppressed relationship was most definitely built on an ideological understanding of White supremacy and Non-White inferiority (the latter being distributed across different groups to stabilize the relationship), the enactment of this understanding on the political, social, economic, and spatial levels entailed a strict segregation of people, amenities, governments, opportunities, and so on. Everything was based on lawful decision-making processes which even included representatives of the oppressed, such as in the demarcation of the group areas. The stratification of society entailed an exploitative relationship as it facilitated a constant supply of cheap labor, which in turn secured the privileged position of the minority. Again, the legitimacy of such macro-scale politics was not justified by racist perspectives but rather through racialized argumentation, which moved beyond the South African situation to formulate a future vision for the whole of Africa. In this regard, MACDONALD (2006: 8f.) cites the author of the segregation policy of apartheid, Jan Smuts as follows:

> "Nothing could be worse for Africa than the application of a policy, the object or tendency of which would be […] to de-Africanize the African and turn him either into a beast of the field or into a pseudo-European. […] Africans had to be kept different, culturally, politically, and religiously."

The differentiation of the constructed population groups rested on deterministic meaning that was more cultural than biological. The construction of such cultural differences was realized in spatial terms by zoning the different groups on different scales, from the micro level of the petty apartheid to the macro level of the homelands. The interaction between spatial zoning and socio-economic stratification led to a form of racialized landscaping in South Africa, which effectuated a lasting segregation of South African society even into the post-apartheid era. Direct and indirect rule were used to inscribe these divisions and establish sustained governance, meaning that even the rule of oppression was sub-divided. The violence of racialized policies thus became symbolically accepted in the establishment of a South African version of division and rule: "With Africans bound by obedience to chiefs and with chiefs bound to the white state, Africans were subordinated indirectly to whites. Whites controlled the chiefs, and the chiefs controlled the people" (MACDONALD 2006: 9).

The longer these modes of order evolved, the more difficult resistance to them became, at least in terms of resistance from within. Two prominent historical examples can aid our understanding of the featured cases on conversion to Islam as a means of resisting and transgressing the ordered indigeneity of the orderly African. The first example is the 1960 Sharpeville massacre, a protest that was crushed with lethal force. It became the turning point from peaceful and non-violent protest against pass laws and segregation to a more proactive resistance which used force. The African National Congress (ANC) and the Pan-African Congress (PAC), two major African movements, formed armed groups called Umkhonto we Sizwe and Poqo, respectively. With that, violent protest against the everyday modes of order and ordering became a viable option and eventually came to characterize the struggle of the younger generation, in particular, in many Black African areas during the 1980s (cf. NAIDOO 1992; for an overview of Non-White political movements worth reading, see HORRELL 1971). The second historical incident was the 1976 Soweto Uprising, named after Johannesburg's Soweto African township from which the protest spread to other cities in the country. It was a reaction to a long line of segregative policies concerning Non-White education, which began with the state taking control of these educational institutions under the Bantu Education Act of 1954. Many of these Non-White schools had been established in the homelands and were run by missionaries, arousing the deeply rooted fear that such schools would produce Black Englishmen who would in the long run undermine the superiority of the White group. Control over education was shifted to the Department of Native Affairs and people classified as Black were prohibited to attend the major universities (SPARKS 1990: 195). The tipping point that stirred unrest in a new generation of young Black South Africans was the decision to make Afrikaans the compulsory language in all schools of South Africa. "To Hell with Afrikaans" became a common slogan in the subsequent protest and increasing boycotts rendered any understanding of normal school life impossible. The protests influenced a whole generation in their political consciousness and became the foundation for contestation of and resistance to the everyday modes of ordering. As one of the participants in this research emphasized, "1976 had been *our* uprising, *our* fight."[7] From that time on, resistance to and transgression of the social and spatial order engineered by colonialism and apartheid took hold on a broad scale in society.

[7]Interview with Solomon Phewa (2015). *(Due to ethical reasons, some references to interviews have been anonymized and appear under pseudonyms instead).*

Apartheid's landscapes of oppressive modernism were "fundamentally and profoundly cultural and geographical" (DODSON 2000: 148). The acts of differentiation and resistance at the center of this study are set against the background of these maps of cultural orderings and historical settings. Perceived challenges to the existing modes of ordering and order were aimed towards the daily lived routines structured by the path dependency of domination and subordination, as well as the dialectic of White/Non-White. Historic contextualization is of crucial importance here, as it facilitates an understanding of the prevailing social and spatial power relations by linking the researched practices to the embodied and represented struggles over place and cultural meaning—over language, religion, or education—which constitute the fields of struggle for societal transformation (cf. DODSON 2000: 155). In the case of South Africa, *Whiteness* is not just an ideology or an epistemological category for dealing with race and racism. It is a historically contingent, lived-in reality. So too does *Blackness* constitute a structured and structuring field of indigeneity and a shared history of suffering under racial oppression.

In order to move this discussion closer to the sphere of religion and conversion, the following section will discuss the role of religion as a structuring factor in the *doxic landscapes* of South Africa's cultural orderings. Then, a first case study will present the interrelations of Christian faith, institutions, and ideologies with the socially and spatially inscribed cultural orders, casting light on the paradoxical realities brought about by colonialism, apartheid, and the social and spatial sphere of religion.

Religion and the Ordering of Indigeneity

With the Afrikaner-dominated territories on the one hand and the British-led colonies on the other, South Africa's political discourse at the turn of the twentieth century was wedged between racist White supremacy and increasing calls for indigenous rights emerging from within a British Empire that had amassed a new cultural diversity *at home* as a result of its colonial politics (NATAL WITNESS (ANONYMOUS CONTRIBUTOR) 1931; THOMPSON & NICHOLLS 1993). Thus in the South African context, ordering the indigenous population in social and spatial terms was not an uncontested, unilateral process among the White minority but rather the political result of a public as well as academic discourse. The so-called Native Question became the overall frame, or ideologically biased label, of a political debate that reflected a looming conflict among the different groups of dominating Europeans over how to deal with the *African other* beyond the existing policies on Native reservations and locations. How could White minority hegemony be consolidated in territorial terms while keeping the indigenous population, the numerical majority of inhabitants, to less than 15% of the land? The spectrum of the debated approaches ranged from draconic repression to calls for the further development of Africans, with the Afrikaner territories tending to the former and the British colonies arguing more often for the latter. A common chord on both sides was the upholding and continuance of White domination, but the Afrikaner perceived any development towards *gelykstelling* (see above) as menacing to their own, still fragile and disputed national identity.

All such processes, prone as they were to shape the political fate of South Africa and ultimately pave the way to apartheid, must be understood by including the religious dimension in the larger picture of territorial hegemony and the ordering of the *African other*. Two aspects are of crucial importance in this regard. First, Afrikaner identity formation and the aversion to *gelykstelling* can only be fully understood by looking at the religious foundation of the emerging Afrikaner identity and the institution of the Dutch Reformed Church. Second, as the Native Question had been intrinsically linked to the question of power over land, all those actors must be taken into consideration who had hegemonic control over territory affecting the indigenous population in the late nineteenth century. These include not only the White governments of the

urban realms and farmers, but also Christian missionary stations situated deep within the indigenous territories. Their sphere of influence over the land was, relative to the others, most closely tied to the indigenous population.

Religious aspects, specifically Christianity, played an important role within the processes of translating the oppressive modes of ordering and the White/Non-White dialectic of domination and subordination into the daily lived realities of the oppressed, as ascribing divine purpose and meaning to subordination render it commonsensical. At the same time, religion became a field of struggle, shifting loyalties, and contestations of the imposed orders. The position of the *Amakholwa*, converted African Christians among the Zulu, is an exemplary representation. The term Amakholwa is difficult to pinpoint as it served not as a self-description but as an ascription towards Christian Zulus. Nevertheless, its homogenizing dimension reflects the emergence of a "Black Elite" (ELPHICK 2012: 121f.) in the second half of the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century, which resulted from the educational work of the different mission stations among the Zulu. In certain parts of KwaZulu, the Christianized population in the areas surrounding the mission stations formed a community distinct from the neighboring population in social, cultural, and especially agricultural ways, as they increasingly adopted the practices of the missionaries. Missionary education involved not only classical school subjects but also the transmission of a European way of life, mostly reflecting the cultural background of the monks at the respective stations, i.e. how to dress, how to construct houses, and especially how to farm. The fact that personalities who later became prominent leaders in the liberation struggle can be linked either directly to the Amakholwa phenomenon or indirectly to the educational work of the missionary stations illustrates the effect these had in bringing about a new elite distinct to the tribal structures of the ruling houses. Among those personalities were leaders of the African National Congress such as Albert Lutuli and Z. K. Mathews, or Clements Kadalie, the first national secretary of the Industrial and Commercial Workers' Union, as well as Steve Biko, the founder of the Black Consciousness Movement. This elitism rested on a social and partly cultural distinction that was an intergenerational result of the missionary work and its subsequent influence on the family structures and modes of social ordering imparted to those described as Amakholwa, which ultimately resulted in changing political and economic aspirations (ELPHICK 2012: 33). Moreover, these shared changes in self-understanding—with regard to cultural orders, political ideas, or the everyday practices of agricultural production—are often described as a conscious process of modernization. Besides the religious inclinations, the missionaries' way of life, with its associated education and craftsmanship skills, was regarded as an opportunity for a transition from a social system increasingly perceived as ancient-

traditional towards a modern life. This also drew criticism, however, as the lifestyle of the *believers* was seen as a blunt adoption of the ways of the Whites and a break with their own cultural history (ERLMANN 1996: 80f.). MUKUKA (2008: 77) sees an opportunistic dimension within the rise of the Amakholwa as the change in social, cultural, and religious modes of order brought with it significant material gain for the individual and the household. To put it more directly: In the nineteenth century, becoming a Christian and joining the territorial sphere of the mission stations offered, in most cases, some form of land ownership unbound from the traditional tribal structure, be it quitrent or actual freehold. Becoming Amakholwa therefore represented not only a shift in cultural ways but also an opting into a slowly but steadily expanding system of territorial governance defined by a westernized understanding of land commercialization. At last, the power of a new elite, with its members from various social and ethnic backgrounds, was undeniably defined by individualized increases in landownership, which served as a form of convertible capital within a changing *doxic landscape* of European-defined territorial hegemony based on capitalistic ideologies (cf. ETHERINGTON 1977: 37).

While the Amakholwa seem initially to have sought the favor of the colonizers by adapting their religion and way of life, their loyalty and political influence shifted strongly towards Zulu unity and against the White rulers. This must be understood as a result of increasing economic pressure and territorial restrictions for Africans. The indigenous population not only found themselves increasingly restricted to the specific territories of the locations but also confronted with rising taxes and annual rent fees, which had to be paid to the government as well as to those who now claimed to own the land on which the indigenous population lived.

While the previous sections already presented the political developments around the landmark Land Act of 1913 and the growing spatial restrictions and social politics of racialization during the first half of the twentieth century, it is worth looking again at the developments ordering society and space at the turn of that century in order to understand the magnitude of the religious dimension's role in them. The following section will link the path dependencies presented so far to religious aspects. First, religion will be discussed as a conceptual dimension within social and spatial modes of ordering. This is followed by a contextualization of the religious dimension within South Africa's *doxic landscapes* of cultural ordering. In a third step, the role religion played as a paradoxical sphere of territoriality and the ordering of indigeneity will be presented. A featured case study will outline the historical and contemporary developments of a selected community living on religiously territorialized land, which was evicted during the late days of apartheid. This case study will thus provide a concrete example for the conditions in the specific area at the focus of this study, the present-day province of KwaZulu-Natal. The

empirical case is an unexpected outcome of the overall research on challenging order by means of conversion to Islam. The analysis of its complex entanglements in the spheres of religion, racism, and spatial orders helps elucidate the formation and manifestation of cultural and social orders at the crossroads of White supremacy, religious territoriality, and the ordering of indigeneity.

Religion in the Framework of Order and Ordering

> "Geography rarely appears in books on religion, and religion rarely appears in books on geography." (PARK 2005: 439)

Although Park's remark is largely accurate concerning academic literature, the production of geographical knowledge related to religion or religious topics has a longstanding history, especially when it comes to spatial visualizations. Geographical designs were instrumental to mapping diverse and conflicting cosmological orders while simultaneously setting the standard for future disputes concerning cartographical representations: What is up and down, and what lies in the center. This long road has its problematic intersections, as KONG (2009a) briefly sketches out with an example from the sixteenth century in which the relation between geography and religion had a literally 'ecclesiastical' connotation—mapping the spatial extension and expansion of Christianity vs. other belief-systems. KONG (2009a: 324) terms it a "biblical geography". Even though the theoretical and conceptual vocabulary around this intersection has become more diverse, the tension between the geography of religion and religious geography persists, and the rift between those who criticize *theologically biased* scholars and those who question the *methodological agnosticism* within human geography still looms over the discipline (see for a discussion worth reading HENKEL 2011).

Nevertheless, religion has increasingly come into the focus of empirical, analytical, and conceptual discussions within the discipline geography over the last decades. Especially in light of far-reaching shifts in the practices, epistemologies, and self-image of cultural geography, religion has been re-conceptualized in a more diverse and critical-reflexive way, leading to contributions which can be seen as inspired by structuralist or post-structuralist perspectives (see for example LEVINE 1986; COOPER 1992; BRACE, BAILEY & HARVEY 2005; AGNEW 2006; IVAKHIV 2006), or which focus on place and place-making, intersubjective experiences, and practices (TUAN 1978; PARK 1994 ; KONG 2004; OLSON 2013). Additionally, partly in reaction to the resurgence of perceiving societies around the globe in a cultural-deterministic light, religion has also been reframed through geo-political perspectives (amongst others AGNEW 2006; REUBER 2015), acknowledging the global distribution of religions as

> "the result of a development that took centuries, characterized by conquest, missionary work, colonialism and migration. It is at the same time, comparable to the distribution of languages, an expression of economic and cultural, historical and recent power relations."[8] (KORF & WAST-WALTER 2016: 97)

AGNEW (2006) goes as far as to propose the term *geo-religious* as a concept for geographical inquiries into a field that—as he argues—would otherwise be left to neighboring disciplines (see also PACIONE 1999).

For cultural geography, KONG (1990, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2010) presents what she calls *new geographies of religion* in a series of contributions which position the topic as a category of geographical analysis alongside such concepts as "race, class and gender" (KONG 2001a: 212). The central question she poses on how to deal with religion from a geographical perspective is whether to understand it as a separate analytical category or as a symbolic qualifier to existing categories or socio-spatial processes. At the same time, KONG (1990, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2010) strongly endorses neighboring disciplines, especially religious studies, paying renewed attention to the field of cultural geography, thereby counteracting the situation described by PARK (2005) in the introductory citation above. Her specific contribution to the conceptual debate of religion and order can be found in the analytical category of the *poetic* in relation to place and community. For KONG (2001a: 218), the "poetics of sacred place, identity and community" differ from the dimension of politics and power and thus shift the perspective towards people's agency by understanding *the religious* in terms of personal and inter-personal experiences. The first aspect, the poetics of place, points towards a dimension of appropriating space through human interaction, which in KONG (1990, 1999, 2001a, 2001b, 2004, 2010)'s opinion has not yet been examined in adequate detail. The poetic dimension of place renders ordinary places extraordinary on a level of specific consciousness, for example through an extraordinary emotional experience that is linked to place and shared by those who ritually inscribe it (KONG (2001a: 218) referring to ELIADE (1959)). A certain postmodern romanticist perception of space and place surfaces in this understanding when KONG (2004: 370) writes that such a place "chooses and is not chosen." Consequently, poetics would ascribe latent agency to place, which can be enacted through ritual interaction—as in the case of sacred places. From the standpoint of a relational understanding of space and place, this

[8]Original: "Die aktuelle weltweite Verbreitung der Religionen ist das Ergebnis einer jahrhundertelangen Entwicklung, die von Eroberungen, Missionierungen, Kolonialisierungen und Migration geprägt war. Sie ist damit ebenso wie die Verbreitung von Sprachen Ausdruck von wirtschaftlichen und kulturellen historischen und aktuellen Machtverhältnissen."

argumentation is difficult to follow. Nevertheless, it helps to facilitate an understanding of religion by differentiating between the locative and the utopian dimensions of space (KONG 2004: 370). The locative requires the maintenance of one's place in order to fix ascribed meaning, its reproduction, and the accessibility of the emotional experience, while the utopian signifies a spatial dimension that transcends particular localities and social orders. These dimensions cannot be separated from each other as together they constitute the relationality of religious place-making. Thus, in terms of analysis, dealing with religion entails being constantly aware of the intertwined scales that are *in place* when people ascribe religious meaning to the social order of their everyday life. Nevertheless, the overdetermination of the aesthetic dimension and the subsequent overemphasis of poetics is a trait of postmodernist geography that is open for critique, as it unnecessarily opens up the possibility of spatial essentialism, ascribing agency to space (cf. JACKSON 1989b: 176).

This point resonates with the take on uncritical borrowings from a postmodern paradigm in the production of geographical thought explored above. In their stead, a relational conceptualization of religion can contribute to the discussion by juxtaposing structuralist and humanistic perspectives within the context of order and ordering. The move is inspired by BURKARD (2011) and his extension of Clifford Geertz's definition of religion, which will be presented here first, as a point of departure. In his original account in *The Interpretation of Cultures*, GEERTZ (1973: 90) defines religion as

> "(1) a system of symbols which acts to (2) establish powerful, pervasive, and long-lasting moods and motivations in men by (3) formulating conceptions of a general order of existence and (4) clothing these conceptions with such an aura of factuality that (5) the moods and motivations seem uniquely realistic."

Based on his elaborate discussion of the anthropology of religion deriving from Tylor, Malinowski, Lévi-Strauss and Geertz, BURKARD (2011: 173) modifies this definition as follows:

> "Religion is (1) a system of symbols that is (2) at the same time model of and model for reality by (3) establishing emotional dispositions, as well as (4) formulating concepts of a general order of existence, while (5) confirming the congruence of both through ritual with (6) the possibility to retrieve their webs of significance in a perspective of the everyday life."[9]

[9] Original: "Religion ist (1) ein Symbolsystem, das (2) zugleich Modell *der* und Modell *für* „Wirklichkeit" ist, (3) indem es emotionale Dispositionen erzeugt und (4) Vorstellungen einer allgemeinen Seinsordnung formuliert, (5) deren Übereinstimmung im Ritual bekräftigt wird, und (6) deren Deutungsmuster in der „Alltags-Perspektive" wieder aufgerufen werden."

This definition is valuable for a renewed understanding of religion in the context of culture and cultural modes of order and ordering, as it maintains Geertz's original emphasis on religion as a symbolic system, while also encompassing the relational perspective of structure and agency (the "model of and model for reality"), as well as the dimension of meaningful practices and shared experiences ("through ritual"). To apply such a relational perspective on religion, two aspects need to be taken into consideration: (1) the understanding of religion as an ideological structure and symbolic system and (2) the understanding of the sacred as experienced through ritual and the interrupting of routine.

To the first point: Viewing religion as a *model for and model of* reality reflects a classical Marxist approach to ideological structures. Here, societies are constitutive of the level of infrastructure (i.e. the economic base) and the level of superstructure, with the latter being divided into the instances of the politico-legal of the state and the ideological. Religion, then, is part of the ideological superstructure (PEET 1998: 122). This represents—within a Gramscian understanding of superstructure as hegemony—the internalizing effects that bring about the common sense of ordering and order and constitute the socialization in the lived-in places of everyday life (cf. ibid.: 129). However, this process is not to be understood as unilateral, i.e. a world being structured in its totality on economic foundations. Even though economic and cultural factors entail the greatest amount of power to differentiate, especially within capitalistic societies, "the fact remains that the potency of economic and social differences is never so great that one cannot organize agents on the basis of other principles of division - ethnic, religious, or national ones, for instance" (BOURDIEU 1989: 19). Thus, there is an overt as well as a subversive aspect to the dimension of religion when it comes to modes of order and ordering in society and space. In this regard, a relational geographical perspective on religion should also pay attention to the classical formulation by ISAAC (1962) that the task of the geography of religion is to "separate the specifically religious from the social, economic and ethnic matrix in which it is embedded, and to determine its relative weight in relation to other forces in transforming the landscape" (PARK 1994: 198). Or, as LEVINE (1986: 437) puts it, a "historical materialist approach will lead to a fuller appreciation of religion as an agent in the cultural landscape. It challenges geographers to seek deeper explanations of the profound phenomenon they are studying." In one way or the other, understanding religion as a mode of expression means framing the cultural dimension of religious and spiritual practices as a *modus operandi* that is simultaneously structuring and structured by society and space.

For the second characteristic of a relational approach on religion, the understanding of the sacred as experienced through ritual and the interrupting of routine, the roles ritual and routine

play in the production of stability and chaos in the lived-in places are of importance. TUAN (1978: 84; 1975) offers the discipline of geography an early and intriguing idea of the sacred space by discussing sacredness on the level of spatial experience. CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL (1995: 32, Fn 36) highlight his approach for paying attention to "the experiential, imaginative, and poetic dynamics of sacred space." By posing the simple question of the meaning of the sacred, TUAN (1978: 84) explores various dimensions of experience, definition, wholeness, order, and power in order to understand the entanglements of sacredness and space beyond traditional, culture-bound images. At first glance, sacred space is nothing more or less than space of apartness and definition—separated, delineated, and cut off from the surrounding homogeneity of space otherwise experienced as profane[10] (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 255; KONG 2009b: 661). "Sacred phenomena are those that stand out from the commonplace and interrupt routine" (TUAN 1978: 84). This concept of sacred experience can be extended in terms of social and spatial ordering by borrowing from the idea of the *carnivalesque* (FOLCH-SERRA 1990; CRESSWELL 1994; COLLINS 1999; HOLLOWAY & KNEALE 2000). While Tuan emphasizes the commonplace, the routine, and their respective interruption, authors like CRESSWELL (1994: 38ff.) understand times and places of "the carnival" as a societal safety valve, an enacted and participatory phase of anti-order, set aside from the normality of everyday life and rendered as contingent, unfinished, and relative through carnivalesque social processes. Nevertheless, this safety valve effect ultimately acknowledges and manifests the order of the everyday and makes it bearable—at least until the next carnivalesque moment. Tuan's understanding of the sacred along the lines of ambiguity, power, and what he terms the polarized pair of structure and anti-structure (1978: 90) can thus be extended by recognizing that the interruptive experience of the sacred legitimizes the interrupted routine, making the commonplace and profane bearable until the next sacred experience (see also ELIADE 1959). It keeps people sane—and profoundly in their place. Sacred space questions the profanity and routine of everyday life and is therefore itself an arena of contestation and struggle in defining the holiness and wholeness of the sacred anti-order (cf. CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995: 6).

Moreover, religion as ordering practices and experiences in the lived-in place is intrinsically linked to the sphere of ritual and routine, as formulated in the definition by GEERTZ (1973: 90). ESCHER & WEICK (2004) can be seen in line with the modifications proposed by BURKARD (2011), where the *aura of factuality* is put into perspective via affirmation *through ritual*. It is the

[10]The literal meaning of profane is the ground before and outside the temple (TUAN 1978: 85).

ritual that brings about the aura of factuality and is so essential to the existence of religions. ESCHER & WEICK (2004: 254, 262) argue that routines—understood as the regular or orderly repetitions in lived-in places—ascribe order and meaning to everyday life, while rituals frame or embed this setting, providing harmony, order, and security. At the same time, it is the ritual which—in case of changing circumstances in the lived-in places—leads to a incongruent relation between known routines and stability, facilitating the transition from one mode of routine to another, or better from one mode of ordering to another one. For it is the ritual that reveals the intrinsic, intersubjective logics of order and ordering enacted, practiced, shared, and experienced in society and space. Vice versa, observing a shift at the level of the ritual most definitely points to a situation where the modes of order and ordering are about to be changed or challenged. This also explains the overall ordering capacity of religion in times of societal instability. Religion's meta-narratives present situations in which modes of order and ordering are threatened, where there is a lack of societal order, or—as in the case of colonialist missionary effort—where an absence of order is imposed. Then, new modes of ordering are presented and legitimized by the mere presence of God, which in turn legitimizes the existence of a divine being (ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 254).

Religion is simultaneously a symbolic system and ideological structure, as well as a dimension of intersubjectivity that provides meaning through practices and experiences. It is, as DODSON (2000: 145) writes, "a cultural practice and a material presence in the cultural landscape." Its ordering capacity enables religion to transcend the scale of lived-in social and spatial order and ordering and therefore interrupt—even if just temporarily—the routine through rituals and territorializations. As previously mentioned, the specific quality of religious order and ordering is that it always takes place in *illo tempore* and in *illo loco* (see section "Approaching the Conceptual Dimension of Social and Spatial Order and Ordering" above). In other words, religion supplies *heterotopia* through constantly promising a *utopic* experience as an interruptive routine. Depending on the quality of the specific religion's meta-narrative, the practices and experiences offering an-*other* order can either stabilize the positionality—despite changing socio-historical circumstances—or allow the formation of resistance to and transgression of the daily lived-in modes of order. Nevertheless, these processes and possibilities do not exist per se but are intersubjectively produced and reproduced, rendering religion an experiential part of the lived-in social word (LEVINE 1986: 431). The necessary knowledge comes in the form of ritualized socio-cultural knowledge, offered by religious institutions or institutionalized personalities. In

the words of LEVINE (1986: 434f.), which take a similar vein as BOURDIEU (1991)[11], these institutions are

> "world-founding, world-maintaining, knowledge-transmitting, legitimizing and controlling entities. They are special because they grapple overtly with the profound desire to comprehend the significance of life. The institutionalization of the comprehension of the sacred cosmos leads to a well-defined doctrine, the differentiation of religious roles and the enforcing of doctrine and ritual by special agents."

At the same time, the existence, outreach, and social influence of institutions always unfold against the backdrop of the particular societal and socio-political situation within which these are positioned. For the South African case, religion as a socio-cultural and cultural-political field must therefore to be cast in the light of European colonialism, the ordering of indigeneity, and the social as well as spatial racialization of society at large. The following section will therefore deal with the religious dimension of the production of South Africa's maps of cultural orderings.

A Piece in the Mosaic: Religion in South Africa's *Doxic Landscapes* of Cultural Ordering

The social and spatial modes of ordering in South Africa's *doxic landscapes* would not have evolved and continued in their dispositional embeddedness were it not for the ideological underpinnings and divine justifications of religious belief systems, Christianity in particular, and the rites thereof. These provided a sense of routine to the settlers' and colonialists' acts and politics of difference. For the first Europeans at the Cape, oppression and enslavement had not merely been an issue of skin color but of "Christians" enslaving "heathens" (MACDONALD 2006). Converting the Khoikhoi, slaves, or prisoners in the Cape Colony therefore became an issue: "If slavery was permissible because Christians were enslaving heathens, it became impermissible if slaves converted to Christianity, as happened not infrequently" (ibid.). For the dominating settlers, who were almost exclusively members of the Calvinist Dutch Reformed Church, the situation became even more complex when the British Empire took hold of the Cape. The British brought with them the gospel of religious and social equality, which the London Missionary Society preached to the oppressed population, as well as the abolition of slavery in 1836 (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 388f.). At the same time, various other missionary societies from Europe and North America started their outreach among the indigenous population in

[11]For a further discussion see especially (REY 2007; SWARTZ 1996), among others.

the cities and especially in the countryside and the established reserves. Moreover, the slave trade, the transport of political prisoners from other colonies, and the global connections of the British Empire brought religions other than Christianity, predominantly Islam and Hinduism, to South Africa. Religion became an aspect of structure and hierarchy for the settlers' and colonialists' claims to permanent hegemony. Therefore, it also became a field of contestation with the social surroundings. It was no longer merely a system of belief or a sphere of rituals attached to a specific group but a social and spatial realm where everyday practices, emotional cohesiveness, and collective identity were constituted and expressed. At the same time, against the background of colonial orderings of society, religion became a field of struggle over those powerful social and spatial relations defining the meaningful practices and place-making processes.

Manifold aspects arose from these interrelations that were relevant to understanding the South African situation, and scholars began putting emphasis on the role of religion when studying the processes of democratization, transformation, and de-racialization in politics and society (see amongst others TAYOB & WEISSE 1999; MITCHELL & MULLEN 2002; CHIDESTER, TAYOB & WEISSE 2004; COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991; COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1997; ELPHICK 2012). These studies bring historical insights on questions on religion, racism, and colonialism together with contemporary accounts of politics, culture, and society from the perspectives of anthropology, political sciences, cultural studies, and geography, among others. This turn towards the importance of religious actors and institutions in South Africa can generally be associated with four aspects:

- Religion and colonialism: The religious landscape of South Africa reflects religious-territorial differences between Afrikaner political ideology and British colonial modes of ordering.
- Religion and racism: The ideologies and politics of racism and racialization and the principles of apartheid were strongly interwoven with Christian theology, Calvinist social thought, and personalities and institutions of the Dutch Reformed Church.
- Religion and plurality: The post-apartheid era saw an enlarged and overt religious pluralism throughout South African society as well as a resurgence of 'traditional' spirituality and belief systems.
- Religion and inequality: With the state's inability to break with the history of social, economic and spatial inequality, religious institutions have gained more influence in the spheres of service delivery and societal order.

The first two aspects are in the primary focus of this section, while issues of plurality and the challenging of inequality will be explored in the chapter on conversions to Islam as transgressions of orderly indigeneity. Here, the segregative policies and racist ideologies of colonialism, Afrikaner nationalism, and apartheid will be discussed in the light of their interrelations with religion. This also touches on the question of reproducing the order of the oppressor within the African homelands and townships through policies and practices aimed at the religious sphere. Moreover, Christian missionary stations in the countryside and on the fringes of urban centers had complex and, in some cases, contradictory relations to the colonial and apartheid regime. This topic will be discussed in detail within the coming section, in which the featured case study presents developments in religious territoriality around a mission station and the micro-processes of ordering the African other through missionary work. First, a contextual overview is provided in order to gain a better understanding of the related cases, which move Islam into the debate around South Africa's *doxic landscapes* in the coming chapters.

Religion and Colonialism

> "Conquerors did not raze a city to the ground simply out of wanton fury; in such destruction they appropriated a people's gods by rendering them homeless, and in appropriating the gods the conquerors acquired a civilization." (TUAN 1977: 150f.)

The diverse interlinkages of White domination and religion in South Africa reflect a common scheme within the history of European colonization. Moving cultural-religious aspects into the realm of social distinction served the overall aim of classifying and conquering, with local religions often being *discovered*, demarcated and devalued to enable the distinguishing of the same and the other (WOODS 2012: 218). Religion therefore played an essential role within colonization processes: In most cases, the indigenous population was first described as lacking true religion, making the *discovery* of supposedly primitive belief systems, such as fetishism, possible. This projected lack of legitimate religiosity first served as a signifier of difference, whereas later on "it was precisely the *presence* of religion that signified that difference" (IVAKHIV 2006: 170). In the South African context, Europeanized religious understanding played an important role from the very beginning of the settler colony. As CHIDESTER (2008: 351f.) puts it:

> "From a South African perspective […] 'religion' did not come from Greco-Roman antiquity or the European Enlightenment. It came from the sea in ships. It was carried as an instrument of denial, reporting that Africans had no religion, but it was eventually deployed as an instrument of colonial containment, making a 'religious system' the spiritual supplement to the colonial magisterial system, action system, or reserve system for keeping people in place."

The *African other*, whether indigenous or enslaved, was viewed as primitive in order to make the religious sphere of the *primitive heathens* accessible for British and Boer imperial ambitions, while justifying the cruelty towards the residing population on the way farther inland (cf. CHIDESTER 2008, 2004). The overall setting is just slightly more complicated due to the fact that, between the Dutch Boers and the British colonialists, there were two different and conflicting regimes of domination present, each with its distinct logics of religiously based and justified modes of ordering. Furthermore, what TUAN (1977: 150f.) ascribes to the scale of the city in the introductory citation applies to a wider territorial perspective in the South African situation, where the conquerors—White settlers, colonialists, and their political descendants—racially territorialized enormous parts of the land on the basis of a religiously mythologized ideology of supremacy. REY (2007: 81ff.) observes that religion particularly facilitates the building of social hierarchy within colonial societies in a two-fold manner: On the one hand, it legitimizes the authority of the dominant group by directing the basis for domination into a realm of indisputable logics of order, while on the other hand, supplying the dominated with meaning for the violence in their life, i.e. enabling them to "make sense of their place in the social order" through religion (REY 2007: 83). Both aspects, legitimizing authority and making sense of domination, are linked to each other and are in most cases facilitated by institutionalized bodies like churches or missionary societies.

In the South African case, the one religious body that predominantly defined this relationship is the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk, or Dutch Reformed Church. As a religious institution rooted in Calvinism, it provided the ideological backing and religious sanction for the policies and practices of segregation during apartheid (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 385). TIRYAKIAN (1957) further argues that the Huguenots, who fled to South Africa in 1688, had a decisive influence on the settlers' Dutch Calvinism. The Huguenots brought with them the religious notion of pre-destination, which could have served as a precursor to the Boers' chosen people narrative and self-perceived superiority. Christianity had long been a firm aspect of the settlers' perception of themselves as inherently different from the enslaved and indigenous populations. This had structural implications as well, particularly concerning the limitation to missionary efforts among the early slaves: If converted to Christianity, the slaves' children could themselves no longer be enslaved. The spread of Islam among the early Cape slave population has to be understood in this regard (see SHELL 1993). Furthermore, Africans encountered by migrant farmers were associated with the sons of Ham and the biblical curse of Cain (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 392). The arrival of the British Empire around 1800 and their subsequent takeover of power confronted the *burghers* of the colony and the *trekboers* of the countryside with Britain's ideology

and policy of full economic and partial social equalization, *gelykstelling* in Afrikaans, which was perceived as a threat to the evolved supremacy of the Dutch settlers (MACDONALD 2006: 37; ELPHICK 2012: 228f.). Together with the historical process of the Great Trek, this strengthened the link between Christianity and superiority. Moreover, religious affiliation became conflated with race defined by skin color, which subsequently led to the ultimate rejection of equality. The constitution of the Boer Republic of Transvaal (the South African Republic) reflected this political ideology very clearly: "The people desire to permit no equality between coloured people and the white inhabitants, either in Church or State" (ELPHICK 2012: 178). The Boers' migrations and expansionism farther inland continuously strengthened their link to the Dutch Reformed Church. As the politically dominant religious institution among the Boers, it introduced segregation in the congregation with a resolution passed by the Cape Synod in 1857, the result of a prolonged dispute over the equal rights of Christian-born White and proselytized Non-White members of the Church to communion (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 390; FREUND 1976: 63; CHRISTOPHER 2001: 145). This move resulted in the founding of four separate congregations with separate institutions and structures: The Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk for Whites, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Sending Kerk for Coloureds, the Nederduits Gereformeerde Kerk in Africa for Africans and the Reformed Church of Africa for Indians. A paradoxical relationship between evolving Afrikanerdom and Christian belief took hold, foreshadowing the situation during apartheid. The *African other* and members of the intermediary groups could be Christian but could not be equal with White Christians, and therefore had to be separated. Thus, the colonizers' Christian beliefs did not condemn their oppression of the *African other*; instead, their domination came to be reflected in and through their Christianity as well.

Afrikaner nationalist ideology built upon a politically constructed mythology of group loyalty and attachment (*groepsgebondenheid*) the premise of an Afrikaner *volk*, which served as the all-uniting narrative of belonging, and beyond that, a firm belief in this Afrikaner *volk* existing and prevailing in God's favor (SHARP 1988: 82f.). While the influence of Calvinism and the Dutch Reformed Church on the Boer National Movement is indisputable, the question remains whether the early *trekboers*' racial ideology actually rested on Calvinism or if the historical narrative was later religiously mythologized. FREDRICKSON (1981: 170ff.) strongly argues for the former, while DU TOIT (1983) comprehensively dismantles the construction of the thesis that he calls the "myth of the calvinist origin." Less disputed is the role of the Dutch Reformed Church within the formation of Afrikaner Nationalism in the late nineteenth and twentieth century, as well as the role of the church in the foundation of apartheid (see GILIOMEE 1983: 85). Besides political mythologies, the importance of religious ritual and sacred space for the

emerging cultural commonality can be retraced along the lines of its development from the Dutch colony to the Boer and finally to Afrikanerdom: "For the Dutch settlers who penetrated the country's interior, the establishment of a *kerk* (church) and the monthly *nagmaal* (Communion service) were important territorial and cultural markers, a claim to space as well as an affirmation of identity and belonging" (DODSON 2000: 146). In the form of the Calvinist Christianity of the Dutch Reformed Church, religion served in its ritual and place-making dimension to generate a sense of order and normality in the unknown social and spatial environments on the way farther inland. Under constantly changing circumstances and necessitated changes in routine, it offered a sense of stability, a raison d'être, and a sacred order to the Boers (cf. TIRYAKIAN 1957). The *kerk* became the homey *heterotopia* within an unsettling topography of lived-in places, a sacred space for an-*other* order, while the *nagmaal* became a facilitator for rites as acts and representations of orderly, civilized, and superior self-awareness. "Being white and being Christian were the distinguishing features of belonging to the superior in-group—it was a cherished privileged status which justified the frontier farmer's attempt to subjugate the barbarians who surrounded him" (ibid.). Afrikaner nationalism was not a result of Calvinist Christianity, but it became enhanced, justified, and mythologized through it. That is because Afrikaner nationalism was rooted in the historical narrative of the Great Trek, understood as an exodus similar to that of the Israelites (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 392), and offered an evolved ideology of belonging based on racial inclusivity and superiority. Aspects of Calvinism such as the doctrine of predestination and an emphasis upon the "community of the elect" (TIRYAKIAN 1957: 291) supported this cause. Under these circumstances, Calvinist Afrikanerdom can be interpreted as almost its own variation of Christianity, a social identity of inherent religious quality with the Dutch Reformed Church as the *volkskerk*, contributing "more to the social history of the Afrikaners than to theology" ELPHICK (2012: 222). Yet, the racist and racialized ideology of apartheid that evolved out of this sphere is not to be understood as a religious racism but rather racism backed by *ex post* religious interpretations and a religious mythology of the Afrikaner *volk* as a chosen people.

Religion and Apartheid's Racial Orderings

Oliver Tambo, the president of the African National Congress exiled during apartheid, saw in the religious-political web of apartheid South Africa a terrain "in which the human was poised between the super-human claims of the apartheid state and the dehumanization suffered by the majority of the people in South Africa within a capitalist economy" (CHIDESTER 2008: 325). The forced removals, migratory implications, enforced routines of racial group classification,

and everyday lived-in injustices brought about by petty apartheid rendered the modes of ordering and order as an almost indisputable reality.

The chosen people narrative became an effective political mythology in the early years of the apartheid government, especially under Prime Minister Verwoerd and during the implementation of the grand apartheid scheme of macro-scale segregations. However, this mythology is less a religious motif and more the product of contemporary nationalism projected onto the preceding historical developments. The religious mythology behind the Afrikanerdom that led to apartheid has other points of reference linking it to the emergence of European nationalism in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century. This is exemplified apartheid's first Prime Minister and minister of the Dutch Reformed Church, D. F. Malan. Malan studied from 1900 to 1905 in the Netherlands, a period when the Calvinist leader Abraham Kuyper headed the government, implementing a policy of segmentation (*verzuiling*) that aimed at ordering the Calvinist, Catholic, and secular parts of society, offering each segment the right to its own newspapers, parties, schools and so on (GILIOMEE 1983: 85). "Kuyper championed the 'little people' […] and thus inspired Afrikaner nationalists' to rescue poor white Afrikaners from 'Anglo-Jewish capital,' cosmopolitanism, and racial equalization, or *gelykstelling*—all, in their view, dangerous twentieth-century manifestations of liberalism" (ELPHICK 2012: 240). The underpinning neo-Calvinist ideological influence, understanding orderly governance as the separation and ordering of society, became visible within Malan's advocacy for the institutionalization of separate nations for separate people, justified by religious obligation: "God had ordained separate nations, each with a unique destiny" (ibid.: 86). This analogy to the Old Testament's Genesis would inevitably pave the political way for the discourse and policy of *separate development* (or *distinct development* as the Dutch Reformed Church would name it), grand apartheid, and the establishment of pseudo-independent homelands within the national territory of South Africa.

With the actual policies of separate development in place and the removals and relocations being orchestrated, apartheid became a more and more controversial issue within the Dutch Reformed Church. The church may have argued in favor of separate development of nations or races, but it did not see the law of God justifying oppression. Nevertheless, it had been fatefully linked to the ideological narrative and historical emergence of Afrikaner nationalism and apartheid. Indeed, the church's own institutional development served as grounds for bringing other denominations in line with apartheid as well. As the segregation of congregations in the nineteenth century became the twentieth century blueprint for apartheid policies, the institutional bodies of other denominations did not comply with the separation. In most cases,

however, the removals brought about by the Group Areas Act led to a de facto segregation of church-goers, as people attended the churches in their respective relocated places of living. Only few made their way from their allocated areas to their original congregational places and houses (cf. CHRISTOPHER 2001: 145). Other religious groupings, such as the Order of Ethiopia, were hardly affected as they had already situated themselves among a rather exclusive group and lacked a certain degree of institutionalization, making them hard for the apartheid administration to grasp.

At the same time, the religious foundations of apartheid led to a paradox when it came to the sacred spaces of those areas demarcated for relocation and subsequent demolition. A political ideology that saw itself fulfilling divine will could not touch the sacred spaces. The religious dimension within apartheid's modes of ordering provided a fuzzy variance to the radical spatial segregation of the people living in South Africa, which is to be understood, as has been argued so far, as a uniquely modernist approach to society and space (DODSON 2000: 155). In scale and scope, it stands without comparison to other nationalist modernist undertakings on the globe, as it developed along an orderly line of remodeling society and space at the same time and in relational reference to each other. The habitat structured the inhabitants, who structured the habitat again, and so on. The cause: to secure the dominance of a numerical minority while creating an orderly territory within which the constructed cultural distinctiveness of the *African other*, above all others, guaranteed a steady stream of cheap labor—initially for the gold and diamond mines in Kimberley and on the Witwatersrand, and later for the growing White urban industrial centers. In self-protective, hegemonic opposition to the *African other* stood the *Afrikaner self*, interwoven with Calvinist religious thought, serving as the ideological roots of the state and the dominating part of White South Africa. In contrast to the other spheres of daily life, only sacred space was handled with reservation, rendering the socio-spatial modernity of South Africa a simultaneously religious one. People may have been removed from their areas of residence and forcefully relocated somewhere else, but due to apartheid's interlinkage with religion, the religious buildings were not to be touched by the bulldozers. Cape Town's District Six stands as such an exemplary place, where up until today the only original buildings left standing are the religious ones. The Methodist church there has been turned into a museum as a reminder of the history of dispossession and relocation. A more socio-cultural example is the well-documented case of the so-called Zanzibari Muslim community of Durban (SEEDAT 1973; OOSTHUIZEN 1982; SICARD 1981; OOSTHUIZEN 1992; KAARSHOLM 2014, 2010). In that case, the relocated community was granted continuous access to their Muslim graveyard, still located on ground that had been demarcated a White area. During apartheid, the graveyard allowed

them a practical connection to their former site of living . It seems as if it was less difficult for apartheid planners and administrators to segregate benches and beaches than religious places and related practices. These cases of *religious territoriality* in South Africa exemplify the paradoxical untouchability of religious places within the spatial ideology of apartheid, which under certain circumstances enabled some oppressed groups to maintain a sense of belonging to their former places of residence and a practical connection to the land from which they had been forcibly removed. In this context, the forced removal not only had spatial, economic, and social effects on people's lives; it also entailed a *ripping away* of one's psychological bonds to place in terms of one's belief (cf. GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016). SOUTHWORTH (1991: 10) cites an inhabitant from Durban who had been affected by removals during apartheid saying: "People form deep and lasting attachment to the places in which they live, and such attachments are rooted in emotional association with homes, temples, churches, mosques, schools, burial places and [years of friendship] with neighbors." The racist modernity of apartheid evolved in all aspects of life in different ways and with different intensities. Apartheid's paradoxical relation to sacred space made the religious sphere a gateway, though a very limited one, for claiming and upholding place-bound identities. Still, the result is what DODSON (2000) calls a dystopian cultural landscape, in which people are left in a constant state of unsettlement and uprooting:

> "South Africa's cultural geography has to be understood in terms of power relations and social constructions, rather than simply maps and material artifacts. Such an understanding provides insight into the struggles over place, space, and meaning, as well as over language, religion, and education, that are part of the country's ongoing post-apartheid cultural transformation." (DODSON 2000: 155)

The struggle to belonging and the challenging of existing modes of social and spatial ordering is therefore a struggle against a background of daily, lived-in dystopic order, a socio-spatial setting that constantly reifies subordinate *Blackness* vis-a-vis dominant *Whiteness* as politics of not-belonging and alienation within the experiences and perceptions of everyday life (cf. WALTER 2001: 22f.). The uprooted self becomes an intrinsic part of the cultural knowledge of the Non-White subject. Resisting those subjectified and institutionalized dystopic orders therefore requires breaking with the incorporated, experiential, and shared cultural knowledge. It requires the questioning of the structuring structures as well as the structured self within the daily constructions of the world in the interplay of realizing and acknowledging the relation between the objective and the symbolic world. To understand the magnitude of such an undertaking, the following chapter will present a case study, in which the religious aspects of the colonial endeavors in South Africa, the British policies towards religious groups, and the socio-spatial logics of Afrikanerdom and apartheid came together, creating a vivid example of

the religious dimension's place within the mosaic of racialized territorializations and the ordering and spatialization of indigeneity.

Apartheid and the Paradox of Religious Territoriality—the Case of the Mariannhill Mission

After 250 years of continuous European presence at the southern tip of the African continent, the public and political arena in the White territories was characterized by agitating changes and contradictory moves regarding the efforts to consolidate White minority rule vis-à-vis the numerical majority of the indigenous population. The position of African societies and communities was no longer just an issue of local conflict and dispute, nor limited to the governmental realm of the colonial administration; it was an issue of territorial dominance and the spatial ordering of Whiteness on a macro-scale. Two major factors contributed to these complexities: One was the increasing pull-effect that the rapidly growing urban centers across South Africa had on the indigenous population (cf. MABIN 1992: 13f.). Restrictive, racialized policies of land acquisition and commodification, such as the Poll Tax introduced in 1906 or the Land Act of 1913, further accelerated this process. The other major factor concerned the countryside, where White farmers demanded policies to protect their spatial and economic interests in their expansive outreach into the indigenous land. The overall discourse reflecting these developments consolidating White minority hegemony by ordering the *African other* thus had an urban/rural dimension, as well as a dimension of dispute around farming territory/indigenous location territory. The two Afrikaner-dominated regions, the Orange Free State and the Republic of Transvaal, tended to deal with these issues with maximum restriction and segregation. Whereas, in the British-controlled areas, such as the Natal colony, the so-called Native Question was at the center of a political debate at the end of the nineteenth century, with far-reaching implications already discussed in the introduction to this study. These discussions and policies were situated in between the local pathways of superiority defined by Whiteness and the expectations formulated by the central British government abroad, emerging as a result of the global British colonial network, which translated into the South African realm a discourse of indigenous rights to self-determination, self-government, and territorial sovereignty. The systematic demarcation of the land in the colonies into farms and the resulting commodification—which transformed the indigenous population already living on the newly

demarcated sections into annual-rent-paying tenants (cf. HUGHES 1996: 300)—brought the Native Question down to a central issue: Should the indigenous African population be granted rights of tenure outside of designated native locations, and if so, how could White supremacy still be maintained? "The 'Native Question' was about control and power. With rare exceptions, black voices were never heard. The African people were spoken about but not listened to" (DENIS 2013: 146). This inevitably led to another question, namely how a steady flow of cheap workforce for the White economy could be maintained, if tenure rights were granted (cf. DENIS 2013: 146; THOMPSON & NICHOLLS 1993: 58f.). Reflecting similar developments in British colonies around the globe, the discourse could also be translated as follows: What would better serve to maintain territorial superiority—restricting the oppressed, subaltern indigenous population from any kind of equalization concerning land rights, or trying to transform, to re-order, the indigeneity at hand to fit the capitalistic model of land ownership?

The Native Question was not at all limited to public or political debates. Instead, model schemes were implemented at various places, and a union of political and academic actors turned these areas into experimental realms for trying to align the *African other* with the White/European cause. At the end of the nineteenth century, a model location in Bloemfontein approached the rural/urban dimension of the debate by making it possible for indigenous people to purchase land or rent sites for indefinite periods (NATAL WITNESS (ANONYMOUS CONTRIBUTOR) 1931). At the same time, the Glen Grey district of the Ciskei (today the area around Lady Frere in the Emalahleni district municipality of the Eastern Cape) came to be known for a similar situation, though its focus was more on the relation between the rural indigenous population and White farmers. The Glen Grey model granted African individuals conditional freeholding or quitrent tenure of four to five morgen (equivalent to four to five acres) for agricultural use (DAVENPORT & HUNT 1974: 75). The central conditions were that the land could not be vacated without notification, that transfer was only possible among the indigenous population, and that the land could only be inherited to the oldest son. That final condition kept the majority of the indigenous population without land ownership and therefore reliant on wage labor, thus guaranteeing the White minority a steady supply of cheap workforce. Importantly, the initial results of this model were amalgamated into the Glen Grey Act of 1894, making it possible to extend the scheme beyond the model district. The Act sought to override the communal territorial land use system of the indigenous African societies of South Africa, introducing a spatialized idea of individualism through tenure instead (THOMPSON & NICHOLLS 1993: 58).

By the 1920s, neither the Bloemfontein experiment nor the Glen Grey Act had gained any momentum, which left the tenure question unresolved, giving way for those arguing for a

continuation and further strengthening of restrictive policies. In the lead up to apartheid, the Land Act of 1913 and the developments and decisions in its wake rendered the indigenous population increasingly immobile. Thus, the different approaches discussed above represented early attempts to solve the political debate around the White/Non-White dialectic by delivering results through spatial planning and territorial administration. Moreover, these different models focused on creating individual ownership or other forms of permanent land appropriation by the indigenous population, thereby moving them towards a European understanding of land commodification.

At the same time, near the harbor city of Durban in the Natal colony, another model in answer to the Native Question discourse formed around a newly founded Catholic mission station. The Trappist abbot Franz Pfanner of Mariannhill Monastery became a prominent religious actor within the discourse on the Native Question. In various newspaper articles as well as his own pamphlet, he published his own ideas regarding an ideal answer for the African population (PFANNER 1894). His concept and the activities of the mission station were not limited solely to discursive terms. Instead, a model for what Pfanner termed ideal African villages developed on the land owned by the Mariannhill Monastery, which resembled the modes of ordering found in Bloemfontein and Glen Grey. The aim was to move the indigenous population away from communal-oriented tenure and land use systems and towards an individualized form of ownership, thereby attempting to break the existing land tenure structures linked to traditional authorities, such as the chiefs. In contrast to the state-run experiments, the approach of the Trappist monks was not limited to land tenure aspects alone but built on a model of social and cultural re-ordering of the indigenous African population which applied idealized European concepts of Christian lifestyle, such as the nuclear family, subsistent agriculture, and westernized layouts for houses and the living spaces therein. The aim was to permanently inscribe the spatial modes of social ordering into the micro-landscape by re-arranging the homesteads and associated plots of land, which would in turn inscribe a new sense of cultural order into those leading their daily lives in those places (cf. DENIS 2010, 2013, 2015). The experiment of creating ideal African villages was aimed not only at the African population already living on the land but also at those willing to move onto the mission's territory under the condition they become Christians.

The empirical and analytical focus of the following section centers on an area that the missionaries had named Emmaus, a section of land southwest of the city of Pinetown, in the hinterland of Durban, as well as on the communities living on that land. Together with the settlements of Nazareth and St. Wendolin's (see map 8 further below), Emmaus became one of

Pfanner's ideal African community areas, consisting of orderly model villages for re-ordered, soon-to-be Christian Africans.

Apartheid and its racial segregation and spatial segmentation of the land through group areas put the experiment to the test and led, in the very late stages of apartheid, to its ultimate failure and the forcing of most of the indigenous population off the land. The eviction of the Amanganga people from Emmaus is exemplary for so many other biographies of eviction and the accompanying loss of home and belonging, in which the combination of material dispossession, symbolic disarray, and territorial uprooting results in an unsettledness that stretches over generations of Black South Africans. The area's specific path—from becoming the homing territory to communities of Amakholwa under the territorial-religious sphere of the Mariannhill Mission station during the first half of the twentieth century to the slow, steady, and heavily contested forced removals in the late 1970s and early 1980s—represents a unique land biography of reordered and disordered indigeneity and belonging. The case of the eviction of Emmaus points to the paradoxical relationship of the racist hyper-modernity of apartheid's politics of spatial ordering to sacred spaces, as discussed above, while at the same time shedding light onto the interlinkages of Christian missionary work and White settler colonialism. The adaptation of the indigenous population to the missionaries' modes of ordering is explored below through a critical perspective on South Africa's racialization of space in the context of the White/Non-White dialectic.

A historical perspective will bring the existing academic literature together with selected texts deriving from the extensive historical material produced by the Mariannhill Mission and its affiliated scholars. In addition, archival documents provided by the Pietermaritzburg Land Surveyor Office are also taken into account. The more contemporary aspects of spatial contestation and eviction during apartheid are illuminated through qualitative interviews with descendants of former Emmaus residents. The cartographical reconstruction of the households and the phases of removal from Emmaus was made possible through a collaborative approach within the interview sessions, which employed historical aerial photography and walking interviews in the former area of living (see section on methods above).

Divine Modernization: Settler Colonialism and the Ordering of African Indigeneity

On December 21, 1882, the Trappists, a reformed Benedictine Catholic order, purchased the property of Farm Zeekoegat, near Pinetown in the hinterland of the city of Durban, from the

Natal Land and Colonisation Company for £7,871 in order to establish a mission station in South Africa(EDLEY 1991: 177; DAHM 1949: 41). For the Trappist monks under the leadership of their prior Franz Pfanner, this was a second attempt to establish such a mission: The first one, at Dunbrody (Cape Colony), failed in 1880 due to an early shortage of funds as well as severe difficulties in applying their known agricultural techniques to the local climatic and soil conditions (SCHIMLEK 1953: 14ff.; cf. DENIS 2013: 137). The location of the new mission station close to a major urban hub of White South Africa was an unusual development. Whereas most mission stations were established within or next to an African location, the Mariannhill Mission Station was not restricted to an allocated mission reserve:

> "In Natal the Trappists, unlike most other mission societies, were able to select and purchase their land in a convenient place and were not dependent on a Government grant which would require them to occupy a mission reserve perhaps far from the urban centers." (BRAIN 1983: no pagination)

Most missionary societies were assigned to specific native reserves by the administration of the colony; however, the Trappists acquired their land through purchase on the regular land market. This positioned them within a development corridor connecting the harbor of Durban via Pinetown to Pietermaritzburg. Such transects were prone to become the spatial lifelines of apartheid South Africa, *corridors of Whiteness* connecting the urbanized White minority, neatly delineated by the group areas (cf. SMITH 1990: 5).

The initial purchase of 6,000 acres for Farm Zeekoegat was extended by the purchase of the neighboring farms of Klaarwater and Stockville (ENGLAND 1996a). By 1894, the land controlled by the mission had grown to an extent of 11,000 acres and was home to about 700 people (DENIS 2015: 278f.). It was then the largest of the four mission stations within the same District, two of which belonged respectively to the American Board of Commissioners for Foreign Mission and the New Germany mission belonging to the Berlin Mission Society (ibid.). In the following years, a network of offshoot missions from the Mariannhill Monastery evolved throughout the region (see map 7).

Map 7: Mission stations of the Mariannhill Monastery in the Natal Colony around 1907. Source: (FREY 1907: Annex).

By 1909, Mariannhill had been made an abbey and had created a network of twenty-eight settlements in native reserves of Zululand, Pondoland, and Tembuland (DENIS 2010: 2), owning

more than 95,000 acres of land. According to DENIS (2013: 138) and DAHM (1949: 149), this network encompassed more than half of all Catholic mission stations within the colonial territory of South Africa, which underpins the outstanding importance of the Mariannhill Abbey and its expansive outreach to the overall position of missionary Catholicism within the religious landscape of South Africa. That overall position was strong despite the numerical marginality of Catholics compared to other Christian denominations, especially among the indigenous African population.

With the beginning of the First World War, the Mariannhill monks (most of whom were of German descent) and the monastery found themselves in a troublesome position relative to the British-dominated government, which instituted large-scale restrictions on the outreach activities of the missionaries and their movements across the country. Reacting to this threat to their existence, in 1916, the Vatican declared all the property of Mariannhill "International Ecclesiastical Property" solely to be used for missionary efforts. This move was intended to prevent the South African government from declaring that the mission property belonged to a hostile power, making it subject to expropriation (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 37). In fact, the declaration produced a *religious territoriality* which proved to be of recurring importance over the course of the subsequent historical developments, particularly concerning the fate of the indigenous population living on the land owned by the mission station. Especially during apartheid, the paradoxical stance of racist policies relative to sacred space was not limited to the micro-scale but touched territoriality at large, thus shifting the planned re-orderings of the socio-cultural landscape. Spoken in legal terms, the intervention of the Vatican was likely reflected in the special clause added to the title deed of the property, which reads as follows:

> "B. This property was transferred to the Superior General on the condition that the same shall be used solely for Religious, Educational and Benevolent purposes, but with the power and authority to the Superior General of the Mariannhill Mission Institute and his successors in office with the written consent of the Senior Councillor and the Procurator General of the said Institute to sell, mortgage or in any other manner to administer the said property as he and they may consider to be in the interests of the said Mariannhill Mission Institute (as set forth in the said Deed of Transfer No. 757/1912 dated 25th April 1912)." (Consolidated Title Deed of Farm Zeekoegat 937 (1929))

Such title deeds are central to understanding the spatial consolidation of White minority rule in South Africa in the early twentieth century. As a formal, institutionalized process for the commodification of the occupied land, the deeds help to retrace the manifold steps of the social and spatial ordering along the White/Non-White dialectic. A graphic example of this can be found in the introduction in 1922 of title deed clauses preventing people classified as Indian from purchasing any land, thereby enabling the White minority to secure economic superiority

through territorial exclusivity (DAVIES 1991: 78). The section quoted above is part of the original 1918 title deed of Farm Zeekoegat (succeeding a deed of transfer from 1912), and it names the Mariannhill Mission Institute as the sole property owner, bound to the religious conditions ascribed by the territorial administration.

The administrative ascription of *religious territoriality* to the land owned by the Mariannhill Mission underscores an approach to re-ordering the indigenous African population in social and cultural terms specific to the missionaries' work. The mission provided not only religious belonging but also an identity redrafted on the basis of shifted modes of material and symbolic order within everyday life. Driven by their firm belief , the Mariannhill missionaries understood themselves as obligated to develop and modernize the pagan African population by removing from them their own social and cultural modes of ordering and shifting them towards a capitalistic, industrial, and Western way of life. The overall undertaking was therefore aimed at different scales, including education, lifestyle, bodily appearance, cultural significations, as well as the practice, spatiality, and materiality of the lived-in places.

Education as Socio-Cultural Ordering of Indigeneity

Looking at Christian missionaries as an element of nineteenth century colonialism, COMAROFF & COMAROFF (1997: 29) describe the work of "colonial evangelists." In the case of the Trappist monks of Mariannhill, a more fitting term might be *pioneer proselytizers*. Strongly driven by an ethos of Catholic settler colonialism as propagated by their religious and administrative leader Franz Pfanner (cf. for example PFANNER 1878), the early work of the Mariannhill missionaries was dedicated to the unconditional modernization of the local population in all their social and cultural ways of life, including their use of the landscape for agricultural intensification. Compared to other missionary societies, the general attitude towards the when and where of proselytism differed (MUKUKA 2006: 52f.): For the Trappist monks under Pfanner's leadership, the development of an operating farm and workshops was to take precedence over any actual missionary work, until the level of self-sufficiency had been reached. The missionary strategy was thus aimed at bringing the local population to the economic space of the mission station, where the propagation of Christianity could take place. Beginning in 1887, different workshops were operated on the grounds of the monastery. These included a printing workshop with a printing press imported from Europe in order to reproduce religious publications and other sociological, geographical, or mission-related texts. These texts were printed in various languages, including German, English, isiZulu, and isiXhosa, among others (DAHM 1949: 190; DENIS 2013: 138). The missionary reports and the newspapers and journals of Mariannhill were

circulated both in South Africa and abroad in order to raise funds. Up until the present day, the major journal *Vergissmeinnicht* attracts people from the European continent to the missionary work of the Mariannhill Mission's institutional successor (cf. DAHM 1949: 187). The general desire to impress upon the surrounding population the technical superiority and agricultural efficiency of the monastery's methods found a lasting expression in the annual agriculture and farming fairs hosted throughout the early twentieth century to demonstrate the missionaries' capacity to modernize the indigenous population.

The agenda of the missionaries of Mariannhill was based on the premises of modernization and rationalization along the lines of Western capitalism and aimed at the social transformation of the *African other* away from their heathenism and ancestral worship. The indigenous way of life was perceived as an inefficient waste of resources. At the beginning of the twentieth century, Bernhard Huss, one of the most politically active priests and missionaries of Mariannhill, express this sentiment during a public lecture in Durban in the follow words:

> "[When] I travel through your Reserves, it is like walking through a huge hospital where one sees only the weak, the sick and the dying. Your fields are weak, sick and dying, and soon you yourselves will be in a similar plight, because in those sick fields of yours lies the root of malnutrition. My friends, this country is like a leaking tank. For thirty years I have been watching this tank, and it is still leaking all over." (SCHIMLEK 1953: 198)

In contrast, the monks' self-perception reflected a conviction that they were the perfect fit for Christianizing and civilizing the indigenous population of South Africa, due to their specific approach focused on agricultural work and craftsmanship (see PFANNER 1886: 9). In the interest of developing the missionaries' more passive, "people-attracting" approach into a pro-active, broadly based transformation of the local society, great importance was laid on the provision of schooling services to the younger generation. The mission's own economic spaces facilitated an educational model that included traditional school teaching in the first half of the day and instruction in industrial craftsmanship and trade in the second half. Schooling was made available in separate schools for the boys and girls of those indigenous families willing to bring their children to the mission station. This educational offer was strongly endorsed by Inkosi Manzini, the chief of the local Amanganga people, who wanted to see the younger generation become able to read and write, though he opposed their Christianization (SCHIMLEK 1953: 57). When an isiZulu-speaking Basuto catechist, Benjamin Makhaba, joined the mission station, the language barrier to the local population was overcome (SCHIMLEK 1953: 56). The curriculum consisted of classical subjects such as reading and writing, taught with the help of religious texts, together with instruction on the practical skills of various trades and agricultural techniques, an element which was extended as more workshops were created. Additionally, the schooling

process also included re-clothing the children, who were disparagingly described as "animal-like," "filthy," and generally uncivilized in the eyes of the European missionary settlers (SIHLOBOSAMI [=FR. DAVID BRYANT] 1887: 48,55). This rendered the school experience less a complement to their everyday life than an intersubjective and spatial experience that was socially and culturally different to the life they had known thus far:

> "But the boys could not be left in the dirty and primitive state in which they came from the kraals. They had to be taught to put away all that was loathsome and disgusting. For this reason a shed of galvanized iron and tarpaulin was erected, and the class was held there. In the meantime white clothes of a light material were prepared, and a new, and very important and necessary, part of education was able to commence. […] The loincloth of tails and rags was removed, and the boys were made to wash the whole body and put on clean clothes — and this was a metamorphosis fit for an Ovid to picture in immortal verse."[12] (SCHIMLEK 1953: 58f.)

In the eyes of the monks, a full-fledged Europeanization could only be achieved if the children were prevented from returning home to their indigenous surroundings each day. Consequently, the educational work became intensified by the opening of a boarding school in 1884, and then a vocational school in 1889 (DAHM 1949: 187). Those enrolling in the boarding school system were to be baptized as soon as possible, leading to conflicts with the parents who in many cases did not want their children to become Christians. The intense ideological influence of the missionaries and their religious message imbued with the fear of hellfire led the children to refuse to return to their parents. The missionaries regarded this development as a success for their approach. It broke the social structures of the indigenous families, however, leaving the children in a state of questioning their belonging and having to choose between the old and the new (PFANNER 1886: 48f.). "It is evident that the monks wanted the schools to be one of the means to convey Christianity and civilisation to children at an early age. The children had to think like the Germans, and at times they became alienated from their own cultural background" (MUKUKA 2006: 54). The overall aim was to create a situation where the new converts would not want to return to their former homes. The boarding school system was meant to disrupt the social, cultural, and bodily inscribed ties to the kraal of the family and

[12]It is worth mentioning here that the writings of SCHIMLEK (1953) bear close resemblance to those of Fr. Bryant (compare for example the given citation to SIHLOBOSAMI [=FR. DAVID BRYANT] 1887: 47f.), though when writing about the indigenous population, Schimlek refrains from using the same derogatory undertone that can be found in the publications of the Mariannhill Mission's self-proclaimed anthropologist David Bryant, who called himself Sihlobosami.

therefore to the overarching ideologies of the larger family and of indigenous African communitarianism.

The agenda for the social and cultural re-ordering of the indigenous population was far from limited to educational work with children. It was geared towards shifting the everyday lives of the adults as well. That included everything from their rites and routines to their clothing, with a specific emphasis placed on the latter:

> "We insist that the Natives on our farm dress decently, and we help them to achieve this object. It is only a short time since we have tried to apply these rules strictly, and one can already observe a great change among our Natives. The main feature of it all is that changing conditions and modern demands are inducing the Bantu to stop their eternal loafing and apply themselves to work, a fact which we consider to be the foundation of all civilization and culture, and even of Christianity." (SCHIMLEK 1953: 114, citing Abbot Franz Pfanner; see also BRAIN 1983)

How the missionaries regarded the use of the Iscoco, a black headband worn by married men, is a vivid example of this processes. Irrespective of the cultural signification, the headband was deemed by Franz Pfanner as heathen, unhygienic, and wholly incompatible with Western-style dress:

> "That's why I ordered those two married men whom I baptized last Sunday to take off the headband and I will order everyone to break with this last remnant of heathen reminiscence. Furthermore, and given that all baptized are obliged to wear European clothes, it would be ridiculous to continue with the use of the headband as it does not allow any head gear. I won't go after the chief in this regard as I am chief on Farm Zeekoegat."[13] (PFANNER 1886: 33)

A far more intrusive effort of the missionaries' work creating an orderly indigenous population can be found within the realm of family politics. For those living on the land of the Mariannhill Mission, family structures based on polygamous relationships were forbidden. An order issued by the monastery in 1885 allowed those already living in a relationship with more than one spouse to continue doing so, but forbade extending the structure, while those households wishing to move onto the Mariannhill farms and those planning to marry had to conform to a monogamous family model (cf. SCHIMLEK 1953: 114). It became necessary to construct an *Altweibertrost* as a home to those women who had been divorced in an effort to fulfill these

[13]The original text in German reads as follows: "Deshalb habe ich die ersten zwei Ehemänner, die ich letzten Sonntag getauft habe, verpflichtet, diesen Ring abzulegen und werde alle verpflichten, auch mit diesem letzten Reste heidnischer Erinnerung zu brechen. Zudem wäre es lächerlich, bei europäischer Kleidung, die ja alle Getauften zu tragen schuldig sind, den Ring zu belassen, der keine Kopfbedeckung zulässt. Dem Chief aber trage ich nichts nach, denn auf dieser Farm Zeekoegat bin ich Chief."

demands of the monestary (BRAIN 1983: no pagination). Breaking with traditional family structures brought with it another side effect: Suddenly the social reality of orphandom arose, a concept previously unknown to the Amanganga people due to their practice of polygamy and the social system of larger families.[14]

Regarding their educational approach, the missionaries of the Mariannhill Institute showed a specific affinity for cultural-religious hybridization, translating African ideas and ideologies into their institution and negotiating themselves and its ordering logics into the socio-spatial surroundings in order to multiply the effects of their missionary efforts. Nevertheless, their promise of modernization entailed breaking the social and cultural modes of ordering on a far wider scale than just providing schooling services to the younger generation and giving rise to an African Catholic clergy. Beyond these dimensions, the undertaking to bring about orderly Africans for a westernized twentieth century South Africa was perfected by spatial inscription into the material landscape of the lived-in places.

Spatialization of Orderly Indigeneity: Ideal African Villages

What started as social, bodily, and material re-orderings through re-clothing and reeducation brought about a new generation of isiZulu-speaking African Christians among the Amanganga, who constructed their places of home along the lines of the ideal images of orderly landscapes projected by the German-speaking missionaries of Mariannhill. This process of place-making was supported, encouraged, and at a certain point required by the missionaries. Not only were the subjects to be re-ordered; their lived-in places were also obliged to comply with European standards of homey, modern, and effective space. The desired pull-effect on the indigenous population could only be produced through an exceptional display of the monastery's own activities and the offer of attractive spaces for new settlements. In this regard, the mission's initial failure at Dunbrody, situated as it was in a sparsely populated part of the Cape Colony, and its subsequent migration to Natal offered the Mariannhill Institute in an indispensable role within the discourses on how to consolidate the territorial hegemony of the White minority through the spatial manifestation of orderly indigeneity. This hegemony stemmed predominantly from two dimensions of power over land: The first was oriented towards other actors among the White minority, while the second was geared towards the indigenous population. The extensive

[14]Group interview with former residents from Emmaus/Mariannhill (2013).

purchases of farms by the Mariannhill Mission therefore reflects a religious-territorial strategy to first create a space large enough to attract people from the surrounding area to the activities of the mission station and to thus become a counterweight to the territorial power of the surrounding chiefs:

> "But I have explicitly explained why I bought such a large piece of land. It is not for us but for the kaffirs in order to get them onto our premises where they can convert to Christianity in a manner that is free and independent from the influence of their chiefs—where they come wholeheartedly into our hands."[15] (PFANNER 1886: 50)

Franz Pfanner's spatial vision of ideal African villages for future Christian communities was meant to be the homey perpetuation of the educational work at the institute. Joining in on the public and political discourse of the so-called Native Question, Pfanner proposed the development of decentralized settlements for the indigenous African population in the Natal colony, which should consist of a plot of land per family sufficient for building a house and pursuing agricultural activities. The lots were to be grouped together to create ideal villages for self-sustaining communities of Christianized Africans, with European-style houses to replacing the round homes of the indigenous population. These ideal villages would apply European techniques in agriculture and trade and feature a modernized infrastructure and social ordering system with schools, churches, public buildings, and a communal commons (cf. ENGLAND 1996a). Pfanner's idea was "to transform his African converts into Austrian farmers" (DENIS 2015: 292). Although the scheme was presented to the colony's administration and discussed, as well as being publicized via articles written by Pfanner for the local newspapers, it was never put into practice beyond the mission station's territory. On the contrary, because the social development vision was coupled with a comparatively inclusive and counter-racist approach uniting the indigenous population with the European colonialists, it provoked anger and dispute among the settlers and farmers in the greater Durban area, who deemed it too revolutionary and unsuitable for the colony's subordinate majority population. Still, it represented an attempt to create a transformative realm of *new spaces of modernization of the African population* and therefore reflected the socio-spatial utopian attitude and approach aimed at creating a better, re-ordered world.

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[15]The original text in German reads as follows: "Aber ich habe schon ausdrücklich erklärt, warum ich so viel Boden gekauft. Es ist ja nichts für uns, sondern für die Kaffern, um sie auf unsere Besitzung zu bekommen, wo sie frei und unabhängig von ihren Häuptlingen zum Christentum übergehen können, wo sie also ganz in unsere Hände kommen und teilweise gekommen sind."

This orderly indigeneity envisaged a landscape strikingly similar to the monks' own rural backgrounds, in particular that of Franz Pfanner (DENIS 2013: 152f.). Modeling ideal African villages onto the landscape reflected an ideology of modernization rooted in the principle of re-ordering space for the orderly African. Within this ideology of modernization, the missionaries defined the values and conditions of a modern life, uniting cultural and social aspects with the idealized physical form of European rural homesteads. The mission's own system of land tenure, based on the individual title deeds they handed out, was also an attempt to embed the freehold structure of the African population into a larger ideological framework of capitalistic individual ownership. It thus differed from the native location/reservation strategy, which was later replaced by the grand scheme of apartheid and the political aim of creating pseudo-independent homelands. Freehold titles were sold by the mission to Africans between the 1930s and 1960s, thus defying the 1913 Land Act forbidding any purchase of land by Africans outside their designated areas (ENGLAND 1996b; CROSS, BEKKER, CLARK et al. 1992; WERKMAN 1995). This handing out of title deeds expressed the monk's major critique of the policies of the colonial government, i.e. the hardline prohibition of unconditional tenure to the indigenous population: "Pfanner did not question in any way the legitimacy of the colonial enterprise. What he condemned was the hypocrisy of the white settlers who claimed to advance the cause of civilisation and Christianity but behaved in a manner that was neither civilised nor Christian" (DENIS 2013: 144). Nevertheless, the approach entailed a racialized perspective with the aim of modernizing the indigenous population—according to a westernized-progressive worldview—in everything from their social structures to their ways of making use of the land. As the ideological effort put into practice in the schools could not be properly sustained outside the realm of the mission or the boarding school, the re-ordering of culture and social structures had to be complemented by the re-ordering of the lived-in places.

> "Any tenant who wishes to live on our farm [Zeekoegat] may do so free of rent for the first year, and later on he pays £1 instead of the customary £2. The money thus saved must be invested in the construction of a house, not a beehive hut. The house must have a door and windows, a table and at least one chair. All the furniture required, including the door and the windows, can be obtained at our shops for £1. We do not believe that a man is civilized as long as he crawls on all fours into his hut like an animal." (SCHIMLEK 1953: 114, citing Abbot Franz Pfanner; see also BRAIN 1983)

Such elements of unconditional cultural imperialism characterized the socio-cultural sphere of missionary work at the beginning of the twentieth century. "If [Pfanner] tolerated some African customs, it was not because he appreciated them but because he felt it was too early to remove them" (DENIS 2015: 292). The overall attitude was to Christianize and systematically civilize the indigenous population, which was portrayed as underdeveloped, heathen, and wild. Thus

orderly Africans would be produced by means of orderly places, which in turn served the ordering regime of the colony. Partly influenced by a growing body of African clergy, this colonial attitude of unquestioned cultural superiority would change and give way to a critical reflection of the colonizer's own cultural development. In his publication on missionary work among the indigenous Africans, SCHIMLEK (1953: 323ff.), himself a Mariannhill monk, writes in a cautiously critical manner:

> "There is a problem of Bantu Collectivism (not Communism) and the Christian approach. When the Mariannhill Missionaries arrived in Natal, they found the Bantu comparatively well organized in a tight social structure […]. An individualistic or eccentric behavior has always been regarded with suspicion, or denounced as sorcery and witch-craft and punished accordingly. […] The missionaries realized that they were not helping the Natives socially by undermining their old loyalties, and they tried to preserve the old system intact as far as possible. Yet they could not prevent the disrupting consequences of the impact of Western civilization. […] For ages the Bantu lived their group life, in which the individual counted nothing. Being accustomed to quite a different state of things, the European individualist can hardly realize what a revolutionary doctrine Christianity must be to the African collectivist. […] There is such a thing as a 'larger family' in Bantu social organization, with a large sense of communal responsibility. […] It certainly would have been wise in Christianizing the Bantu not to have thrown overboard those instincts of community and group solidarity that have always provided the most congenial background for the development of their life."

This critique exemplifies how Pfanner's scheme for ideal African villages resembled the Glen Grey system or the Bloemfontein experiment: Beyond their socio-cultural implications, they all rested on the same basic principles. In essence, Pfanner's model aimed at shifting the worldview of the indigenous population from the existing communitarianism—deemed to be fully incompatible with and even threatening to capitalistic modes of order—to individualism. The territorial entitlement of the African subject's individualized ownership over land was meant to manifest this shift. It was believed that the spatial dimension of a commodified landscape would then inscribe Western-capitalistic principles into the indigenous population, thus rendering them fit for and sustainably compliant with the worldview of the White minority, whose hegemonic position would in turn be consolidated. The apartheid politics of spatial segregation according to racial categories must therefore be seen as aligning with the discourse and experiments surrounding the Native Question. The major difference was that the earlier attempts at re-ordering and invoking compliance with the symbolic violence of the oppressor were replaced by apartheid's approach of planned and enforced spatial violence, executed by imposing a racially segregated layout onto the South African landscape. Still, the assumption that spatial manifestation would lead to the bodily inscription of hegemonic relations is an element mutual to both eras.

The concept of the ideal African village and its social, spatial, and cultural magnitude were very much linked to the biography and personality of Franz Pfanner. He is portrayed today as a religious-charismatic figure whose actions and authority had far-reaching historical implications. These aspects are reflected in the existing academic accounts, which, as DENIS (2015: 277, Fn. 226) correctly notes, have—in sum—a distinctly hagiographic perspective. On the other hand, the interviewed descendants of the families once living on the land of the mission also took this stance, constantly affirming Pfanner's divine qualities and the importance of his work for the indigenous people who lived with him. The general approach of Pfanner, the first abbot of Mariannhill to the development and subsequent success of the mission station can only be fully understood by looking at his work before coming to South Africa. In 1869, Pfanner established the Mariastern Monastery near Banjaluka in Bosnia, an area then governed by the Ottoman Empire and socio-culturally characterized by Muslim communities. There, he developed his settler-colonialist and modernist stance in the light of European-centered progressivism (see PFANNER 1878). As during his time in South Africa, he used printed publications to attract financial supporters as well as followers for his colonial enterprise. During his time in Bosnia, his message was primarily aimed at disillusioned Catholic workers from the urbanized areas of an increasingly industrialized central Europe, as well as poor Catholic farmers from the countryside—in other words, those who would be willing to start anew and would therefore be drawn to follow a settler movement (PFANNER 1878: 3f.). For Pfanner, the situation in the vicinity of Pinetown had certain similarities to his situation among the Bosnian peasants. Echoing his view of Bosnia as an auspicious territory and a resource-rich natural realm in contrast to the industrialized places in Europe, his work among the indigenous Africans was driven by a narrative of developing a landscape and its inhabitants still untouched by the disruptive inventions of the nineteenth century. This explains why the central pillars of the ideal African villages scheme consisted of cultural re-ordering together with the modernization of agriculture and trade (cf. BRAIN 1983: no pagination).

However, developing a settler-colonial *heterotopia* did not comply with the rule set of the religious order to which the mission belonged. The reformed Benedictine approach of the Trappists aimed at concentrating the monks' work on manual labor, crafts and trade, and intensive agricultural cultivation of large areas of land. Moreover, the strict monastic rules also prescribed a life of seclusion and espoused the principles of non-interference and silence, disallowing direct proselytizing activities. The extent of Mariannhill's missionary work, its intense interaction with the local population, and its rapid expansion into other places in the colony could only be made possible by breaking with rules central to the Trappist order concerning the ratio of time spent

on religious activities versus work-related ones, as well as the rule of silence among the monks. This and the increasingly autocratic attitude of Abbot Pfanner led to conflict with the central organ of the Trappists and the subsequent suspension of Pfanner as abbot in 1892 (for a vivid account on these issues, see DENIS 2014). However, these developments did not put a stop to the work of the monastery and its mission stations in their interaction with the local population of the colony. Whereas the central organ of the Trappist order intended to bring Mariannhill back into conformity with the order's rules, it instead triggered a process leading to the separation of the Mariannhill Monastery and its network of mission stations from the Trappist order altogether. This process began in 1909 and lasted until, in 1936, the final approval of the Vatican transformed the mission station into an independent institution, the *Congregatio Missionarum de Mariannhill* (CMM) (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 33ff., 64f.). From then on, the administrative mandate for the religious territory rested with the Mission Institute, making it an actor within the contested developments manifesting and consolidating White minority rule in South Africa in the twentieth century. On the one hand, the specific spatial ordering of the mission allowed it to circumvent the increasing restrictions on land ownership and residence rights of the indigenous African population. While on the other hand, the Mariannhill Mission quickly found itself an actor within the group areas negotiations and therefore liable for the decisions resulting from that process. The religious-territorial intricacies of South Africa's *doxic landscape* of socio-spatial and cultural order made it possible for the African communities on mission land to hold onto their places of home for a time. In the end, however, it merely delayed the spatial realities of racial segregation. Pfanner's ideal African villages ultimately became subject to apartheid's dis-ordering of lived-in places, resulting in the eviction of most of the indigenous population from the farms of Zeekoegat, Klaarwater and Stockville.

The following section will shed light on these circumstances of territorial administration, racial zoning, and the eviction of the indigenous African population from the land of the Mariannhill Mission. By presenting an in-depth empirical example of one particular area developed within the framework of Franz Pfanner's ideal African villages, the peculiarities of the religious sphere within the social and spatial ordering of indigeneity during late colonialism and apartheid will be brought into the focus. This step serves our conceptual understanding the religious-territorial intricacies of South Africa's *doxic landscapes* of socio-spatial and cultural orders, hence the backdrop for the contestation and transgression of modes of ordering through conversion to Islam.

Apartheid and the Dis-Ordering of Religious Territoriality

Within the fifty years between the Trappists' arrival and founding of the Mariannhill Mission and the beginning of apartheid, a profound community set-up was established on the farms of Zeekoegat, Klaarwater, and Stockville. People from all population groups resided in the vicinity of the mission station and within the Institute's administrative realm, with the majority of inhabitants being isiZulu-speaking Amanganga people who had already lived on the site east of the Umhlatuzana river before the monks' arrival. The missionaries named the places designated for the development of ideal, modernized African societies and households Emmaus, Nazareth, and St. Wendolin's, in reference to biblical or mission-related contexts. The situation can be described as a microcosmic model of the Amakholwa communities described above, converts to Christianity among the Zulu, who had been socially, spatially, and culturally ordered around the mission station. Mariannhill offered a distinctive land tenure system which enabled the Non-White population to opt into the White minority's capitalistic modes of social order. Another similarity to the Amakholwa phenomenon can be seen in the relative social distance to the other spheres on the colonial map of the White/Non-White dialectic. The communities on the mission territory that had developed along the lines of Pfanner's ideal African villages found themselves to a certain degree caught in-between, becoming increasingly alienated from their African indigeneity, while also being socially and spatially confined by the widespread racism of the White population and institutions beyond the religious-territorial sphere, leading them to interact primarily with the missionaries (cf. MUKUKA 2006: 54). Nevertheless, this realm offered protection against the effects of the Group Areas Act for a time, although it only delayed the final reality of being uprooted and relocated. Working with a mix of empirical data consisting of archival research; the analysis of land tenure documents, historical maps, and aerial photographs; as well as qualitative data deriving from interviews with descendants of the communities once living on the mission land, these historical territorial developments are illuminated in order to demonstrate the paradoxical religious facet of the processes ordering indigeneity. The specific case of the households living in the area of Emmaus will serve as a micro-example. Within this case study lie three dimensions: The first dimension is of significance for the conceptual understanding of the overall study, as it highlights the entanglements of colonialism and religion in the realm of ordering indigeneity, therefore representing the scale of modes of social and spatial orderings. The second dimension can be seen in the descriptive-analytical value of the socio-historical data presented here to the contemporary processes of redress and redistribution. The third dimension tries to do justice to the social reality of the people of Emmaus—of being uprooted, of losing home—and therefore to a distinct identity lost

to the dubious experiment aimed at achieving racist modernity through White minority domination in twentieth century South Africa.

The end of World War II brought increasing industrialization to the Borough of Pinetown, a place which had been a mere farming village when the Trappist monks arrived in the late nineteenth century. The settlement rapidly grew to the size of a small secondary town of the city of Durban and attracted a multi-ethnic workforce. The increasing industrial development in the Boroughs farther inland from the harbor city were a direct result of South Africa's isolation during World War II, which lead it to produce more goods for everyday use and become less dependent on imports (cf. ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 84). Apartheid's racist policies put the matters of micro-to-macro-scale segregation and spatial delineation onto the daily agenda, and it became clear that the Mariannhill Mission territory would find itself located on a new socio-spatial map right in between a thriving White urban area and the African location destined to become the de facto homeland of KwaZulu. In the spatial logics of apartheid's segregative policies, Mariannhill was within an area prone to become a buffer zone, segmented along the lines of the population groups. For the spatial planning of White South Africa, the African communities around the mission and southwest of Pinetown came to be seen as living too close to the actual city. In order to avoid territorial and administrative incorporation into the Pinetown municipality and thereby avoid the Borough's taxation scheme, the Mariannhill Mission declared the farms in their ownership a *health board area* in 1951 (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 91). Establishing a health board with a governing committee rendered Mariannhill a de facto independent, though limited, local authority in terms of their rights of territorial administration. This made it possible for the mission to act as a separate institution within the negotiations with the apartheid regime over the racial zonings of the Group Areas Act developments. Without the declaration of a health board, the decisions on zoning would have been subject solely to the Pinetown municipality. First attempts to racially zone the area between Pinetown and the Umhlathuzana river under the Group Areas Act in 1957 failed due to unresolved and diverse oppositions to the scheme (ENGLAND 1995). During the negotiations with the Natal Group Areas Committee, which declared the whole of Mariannhill a White area, the health board representatives strongly argued for leaving the mission land "unzoned," though in White ownership, in order to be able to continue their work among the Africans (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 128f.) (see map 8).



Map 8: Mariannhill group areas zoning as proposed by the Mariannhill Mission in 1957. Cartography: M. Gebauer.

With Group Areas Act Proclamation 126 of 1966, the race groups laid out by the Department of Community Development in 1964 were put into territorial practice (see map 9). The whole section northeast of the Umhlathuzana River towards Pinetown had been classified as White. Land belonging to the Mariannhill Mission beyond the river had been expropriated and re-zoned as the Mariannridge township for the Coloured group. Effectively, the area between the Umhlathuzana and the Umlazi river farther to the south—the physical boundary to the KwaZulu homeland—functioned as a racialized spatial buffer zone consisting of townships zoned as Coloured and Indian placed between the indigenous African and the White territories. While the major effort in securing land for as many people classified as members of Non-White groups as possible were successful for the southern communities, such as Nazareth or St. Wendolin's, the territories to the northwest, i.e. Emmaus on Farm Zeekoegat and the whole of Farm Stockville, were lost to zonings reserved for industrial development.



Map 9: Mariannhill group areas zoning as declared by the Department of Community Development in 1964. Cartography: M. Gebauer.

The developments southwest of Pinetown are an example of how the racial-territorial policies of apartheid were meant to spatially order economic relations and tensions by ascribing a racial dimension to class differences. In other words: Future economic development would be reserved for the dominating White minority by (a) removing Non-White-classified people from valuable land and (b) keeping the Non-White workforce at such a distance that it could still serve the dominator's economic cause without being able to stake any claims to the overall development. The final zoning of the Mariannhill territory perfectly represents the apartheid hierarchy of spatial segregation and the ideology of division-and-rule, as Coloured-classified people were placed towards the Black African areas and Indian zonings were situated closer to the White urban districts. In congruence with the use of existing barriers as dividing lines, the Umhlatuzana River became the natural buffer delineating the White/Non-White dialectic onto the landscape (cf. ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 130). The indigenous Africans residing on

Mariannhill land were relocated to one of two Black African townships on the border of the homeland and thus under the jurisdiction of KwaZulu—either to KwaNdengezi farther southwest or to KwaDabeka farther north of Pinetown (cf. ENGLAND 1995, 1996b).[16] The actual removals of the population classified as Black African from the Mariannhill territory took place over the period from 1974 to 1980, following the cancellation of the additional religious clause to the Mariannhill title deed on December 18, 1973 (see figure 4).



Figure 4: Stamp removing the religious clause from the title deed of Farm Zeekoegat. Source: Consolidated Title Deed of Farm Zeekoegat 937 (1929).

As long as the title deed bore that legal amendment limiting the use of land in religious-territorial terms to the land, the actual processes of eviction, relocation, and partial expropriation could not set in. In the case of Mariannhill, the course of negotiations, various zoning propositions, and regulatory changes to the legal basis of territorial administration exemplifies the obscure, orderly modernity of planning and enacting racist segregation on all scales of life in South Africa and the paradoxical relationship of the apartheid regime to sacred space and *religious territoriality*. As long as the land belonging to Mariannhill had a legally verifiable religious quality ascribed to it, the planned racialized zoning could not be implemented. Ultimately, apartheid's social and spatial modes of ordering, which brought severe inequalities and injustices to the majority of the population, still followed a lawful—if highly unjust—course, providing the symbolic power of consecration to the acts of violence against the Non-White population. The outcome of the Group Areas Act in the Borough of Pinetown may have been inevitable from the beginning, but it is the removal of the clause by a simple stamp that signifies the de facto end of the line of negotiations. The removal of the communities indicated on maps 7 and 8 began with

[16]Interviews with Solomon Phewa (2013); Group Interview with former residents of Emmaus/Mariannhill (2013).

Kipi in 1974, whose inhabitants were first removed to a provisional settlement in Klaarwater, as the developments in KwaNdengezi had yet not been finished. Their final move to the Black African township took place in 1976 (for a specific take on Kipi, see BOYCE 2003). Next, the indigenous African populations of Nazareth, Mosley Park, Shallcross, and Burlington were forced to leave for KwaNdengezi as well, with some from Nazareth being removed to KwaDabeka. The Coloured community of Motala was evicted in the late 70s from Richmond Farm and relocated to the newly established Mariannridge township. Finally, and after a first arttempt in 1976, the people of Emmaus were forced to leave their homes and resettle in KwaNdengezi. St. Wendolin's was the only settlement within the territory of the Mariannhill Mission in which Black African–classified people were able to withstand complete eviction (cf. WERKMAN 1995: 75ff.). Constantly seen as an informal development in the eyes of group area planning institutions, St. Wendolin's became an epitome for resistance against further removals from the 1980s onwards. Among other factors, this process can be linked to St. Wendolin's resident Protas Madlala, who went to study Anthropology in the United States before the spatial re-orderings came into effect, returning—together with his wife, who was classified as White—to his place of home at the height of the resistance to relocations.[17]

Compared to other removals and relocations in urban centers of apartheid South Africa, the eviction of the Non-White-classified population from the Mariannhill territory and the subsequent expropriations occurred at a relatively late stage. Until then, the Mariannhill area disrupted the meso-to-micro-scale vision of apartheid planning substantially, leaving a section in immediate vicinity to a White corridor on the racialized segregative map of orders in constant dispute and disarray. The efficacy of *religious territoriality* played a decisive role within this process. The area maintained a state of exception as long as the administrative mandate over the land belonging to the Mariannhill Mission derived from being declared international ecclesiastical land, which grounded the sphere of socio-spatial governance in the specific religious quality of the area. The additional clause of the title deeds limiting the use of the land to religious and benevolent purposes manifested this situation in legal terms. It rendered the area a religious territory for solely religious purposes and thus temporarily protected the people living on it from the racist and capitalistic developments afoot elsewhere. Through their specific path dependency, the indigenous communities of Nazareth, Emmaus, and St. Wendolin's were intrinsically, religiously linked to the mission, representing the missionaries' core of religious

[17]Interview with Skaykh Dawud Cele (2015).

work. With the territory's path dependency and the accumulated religious quality ascribed to it through its declaration and demarcation as ecclesiastical land reserved for benevolent and missionary purposes only, the overall process of group areas zonings, negotiations, and enforcements reflected a relatively unique dynamic, subsequently securing the land to the indigenous population for a longer time than was possible in non-religious contexts. Nevertheless, the indigenous African population living on the land administered by the Mariannhill Mission health board were not (only) evicted because of the revocation of Mariannhill's religious territoriality as described above, but ultimately because the negotiations concerning the group areas had been unsuccessful. The CMM put substantial effort into negotiating the Mission Institute's land out of the apartheid scheme and enabling the resident Africans to reside on their territory. As it became clear that it would not be possible to secure the land as "unzoned," Mariannhill made a final, unsuccessful proposition in 1967, which recommended rezoning the Indian area for the Coloured group and subsequently placing the African population in the soon-to-be Coloured township of Mariannridge (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 131). At the same time, the Mariannhill Institute tried to uphold the administrative health board status of the land belonging to the mission, a process that went as far as to engage with their own ideas for industrial development on the land (ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 131). Ultimately, however, the Mission Institute could uphold neither its exclusive status of territorial administration, nor the religious territoriality of the areas, with the result that the sections of Zeekoegat and Klaarwater between the Umhlatuzana River and Pinetown, together with Stockville, became White areas and were incorporated into the Borough in 1970.

The Eviction of Emmaus: Turning the Indigenous Population "Alien in Their Own Land"

The re-ordering of lived-in places according to the ideal African villages scheme ascribed a religious quality to both those places and the sense of belonging of the people living there. Consequently, the residents' subsequent removal was also contextualized against a religious background. The promise of a homeland on religious-territorial foundations had been broken, and the inability of the Mariannhill Mission to permanently safeguard the African population from the spatial effects of apartheid was translated into a diasporic experience of being cast out from the promised land of their forefathers: "Look what they did: all you see. Gone. They turned

us aliens in our own land!"[18] This experience symbolizes the dimensions of losing not only the material place of home but also the emotional, social, and cultural connection to it and to the localized routines of everyday life in the lived-in place, which manifest belonging and identity. The scale of evictions in South Africa during apartheid was massive in terms of both the number of people evicted and the spatial dimensions of removal and relocation, including the amount of planning necessary to carry out such an undertaking nationwide. At the same time, the spatial dimension of relocation relegated the evicted people and communities to a state that can best be termed a short-distance diaspora, as the former places of home were sometimes only a few kilometers away. However, they were rendered utterly unreachable by the racist segregation of apartheid and have remained unreachable, due to the intervening developments, into the post-apartheid era as well. Those who were removed to other places in the townships and homelands found themselves in close vicinity to their former homes in spatial terms; however, their actual lived-in places were demolished and built over. Land redistribution processes in the new South Africa seem to be able to compensate the loss, but they cannot reverse the experience and aftermath of having been uprooted.

From a conceptual perspective, *uprooting* implies a relatively intangible reference and points to the contested nature and fluidity of identity politics, as the often cited dualism of *roots and routes* GILROY (1993: 9) signifies. Such an epistemological stream of post-structuralist thought underscores the magnitude of the socio-spatial injustice that took place in South Africa, i.e. the systematic and institutionalized oppression, dispossession, and large-scale eviction of people from their places of home, whether from city quarters or peri-urban outskirts. Here, *uprooting* stands for the very structural and material effects of White supremacy, specifically in the form of its *modernist perfection* in apartheid's mass removals of the indigenous African population from their urban and rural homes nationwide to designated group areas (cf. especially BALDWIN 1974). PORTEOUS & SMITH (2001) provide a more suitable conceptual term for such injustices, calling them *domicide*, i.e. "the planned, deliberate destruction of home causing suffering to the dweller" (PORTEOUS & SMITH 2001: 19). The aspect of deliberation points to the human agency behind the cause of this suffering. The scale of *domicide* ranges from more indirect and politically intangible instances, e.g. the rearrangement of public places for urban development which limits and hinders practices of belonging to place within everyday life, to overtly brutal forms such as forced resettlements in the wake of war (BLUNT 2009: 342). In his exemplary case study on

[18]Interview with Solomon Phewa (2013).

territory, community, and home in South Africa, SMITH (1994: 223ff.) consequently applies the term (though still using the neologism *topocide* that preceded—and was ultimately superseded by—*domicide* (see PORTEOUS & SMITH 2001: 12)). He thus emphasizes that the central concern of his analysis lies in the experiences of destruction and deprivation of place, as well as the experiences and expressions of what it means to lose one's own place (SMITH 1994: 254). *Domicide* calls explicit attention to the loss of home and the annihilation of place, to having one's place in the world undermined, threatened, and possibly destroyed. It is a moral undertaking to which geography has devoted much less attention than required (BICKFORD-SMITH 2009: 275), despite humanistic geography's recognition of the depths of attachment of people to territory and place. TUAN (1974: 99) makes a point in this regard when writing that to be "forcibly evicted from one's home and neighborhood is to be stripped of sheathing, which in its familiarity protects the human being from the bewilderments of the outside world." This perfectly reflects the conceptual understanding of *home* in the work of PORTEOUS & SMITH (2001), including home as place, symbol, and psycho-social meaning. *Domicide* thus affects all these spheres at the same time, while also denoting the actual loss of space and the destruction of the physical foundation for acting out one's own identity. *Domicide* subsequently inquires into the disruption of the "depths of attachment people form with territory and place" (PORTEOUS & SMITH 2001: 275).

For the majority of people removed from the Mariannhill territory, the distances between former places of home and new locations conforming to racist segregative planning entailed the above-mentioned qualities of relative spatial proximity. However, one area is of specific significance, because it was irreversibly redeveloped immediately after the evictions took place: The Amanganga people living in Emmaus, one of Pfanner's ideal African villages north of Mariannhill and in direct vicinity to the urban realm of Pinetown, were the last to be removed in 1980; subsequently, their former places of home were turned into what is today Westmead Industrial Park. Their fate will serve as a micro-example, a more detailed perspective into the spatial order of events in apartheid's disordering of religious territoriality. It may appear a common case of spatial dispossession and territorial exploitation through apartheid, but its implications in terms of ordering religion under apartheid make it a case emblematic of the peculiar entanglements of colonialism, missionary work, racism, and religion. Through the shift in the material realities of place, this uprooting became a loss of home, a loss of the place of identity, and their replacement with a diasporic situatedness. Applying the concept of *domicide* thus seems to be more appropriate than the postmodern equivoque of *uprooting* and *re-grounding* (cf. AHMED, CASTAÑEDA, FORTIER et al. 2003). Understanding uprooting as forceful eviction

and *domicide*, re-grounding becomes a forceful struggle in itself, for home as both territory and belonging.

Accessing these dimensions of social *and* spatial eviction and alienation from a contemporary perspective through qualitative research necessitated an essential extension of methods at hand. Though supported by historical documents, photographs, and maps of the area, the relatively static qualitative-interviewing settings in the homes of the participants were limited in their narrative impulses when it came to details about the lost places of home. This led to the initial decision to carry the qualitative interviews into the place that had been Emmaus and is now Westmead Industrial Park and to extend the interviews through a mobile dimension. The idea behind carrying out consecutive interviews by walking along lines and locations of a former everyday life was inspired by methodological approaches on rescue geographies (see section on methods above).

The walking interviews were geo-coded with a GPS watch in order to track their transects, which were determined by each individual participant (cf. EVANS & JONES 2011: 850). Along the walks, pictures were taken, which were also geo-coded. These represent an attempt to capture the specific perspective of the interviewee during the narration. Additionally, historical aerial photographs from the 1950s, '60s, and '70s, provided by the Land Surveyor Office in Pietermaritzburg, were made available via iPad throughout the interview. The participants could easily zoom into the aerial pictures and pinpoint specific housing structures and places, which further assisted the narration. With the consent of the participants, two recording devices were used: A smaller, common sort of device was applied in the interviewing situation with the microphones set at a narrow angle and kept as close as possible to the interviewee, while an additional, high-sensitivity device capable of record the transects' sound in stereo quality was always pointed in the direction of movement, capturing and storing the transect as an audio experience. The walks navigated old, long-lost paths that once defined common movement within the lived-in places. It was up to the interviewee to decide where to start, given the impulse of attempting to re-walk an everyday situation, such as shopping for groceries. With unanticipated immediacy, the memories of the lost places became projected onto the contemporary landscape. The participants insisted to trying to get as close as possible to the former locations of specific places such as houses, trees, or meeting places.

Picture 1: Moving along an old path leading from the northern side of Emmaus uphill to the location of former homesteads Picture: M. Gebauer.

Visiting his former home-site, from which his family was evicted in the 1980s, interviewee Solomon Phewa started to draw lines into a sandy field, representing the old house that stood on what is now an industrial area. He explained:

> "This is my homestead here, right where this factory is. I grew up here. This is home, this is my home. It is very sad. Each time I pass here. I was born here, the sixth generation. My great-great grandfather had his house here. He was the elder. The main house was there, but we were staying in it. It was a brick house. This is my home. I haven't been here since my youthful days."[19]

Phewa's family had significant status because his father, Alfred 'Sququ' Mhlushwa, had been an Induna—a *headman* to the king of the Amanganga people. Their homestead was situated at the very top of the hill upon which the community of Emmaus was settled. That hill represented the central place within the scheme of the ideal African village and included a group of trees (see map 10 further below) that functioned as a meeting place, where the elders of the households would solve the socio-political issues of the community. Solomon Phewa attended the boarding school of the Mariannhill Mission together with other children from Emmaus and later worked as a clerk at the Durban Bantu Administration Board. After the end of apartheid, he began to call Emmaus' scattered former inhabitants to gather—a process strongly spurred

[19]Solomon Phewa (2013).

by the burial of his father in 1994—with the intention of initiating a legal process of land claim and redistribution under the post-apartheid conditions.

> "I would operate every weekend anyway because there was the administrating part of it. Every weekend, every day in actual fact because I used the phone from work and so on and to get in contact and getting people that I know. I was at First National Bank in Durban. The movement grew, so the next meeting we had it was about 50 people. We felt we organized enough, now we must launch a movement."[20]

It took him about three years from the initial drawing out of a manifesto at one of the first meetings until the claim was deemed valid. As one of five trustees, he now heads the Mangangeni Emmaus Westmead Returners Community Trust, which has 250 members. The trust is a continuation of the struggle to re-order the social and spatial belonging of the people of Emmaus.

Picture 2: Material realities of domicide: Emmaus as the lost place of home is now Westmead Industrial Park. Picture: M. Gebauer.

The walking interviews had an unanticipated effect: Besides elucidating the spatial contextualization and social meaning of living on the Mariannhill land and the experiences of having been evicted, the process re-mapped the former community of Emmaus, providing the locations of the various homesteads and the names of the heads of the households. The use of

[20]Solomon Phewa (2015).

an iPad was therefore of invaluable importance, as it stimulated a participatory mapping approach. At each stop along the transect chosen by the interviewee, it was possible to methodically cross-reference the location in the world of today with photographical layers from three different time periods. The participants of the walking interviews could easily zoom into the photographs, which resulted in a re-discovering of the past and stimulated a process where the interviewees increasingly tried to be as precise as possible, as far as the photo resolution would allow. The ability to mark and annotate the digital photograph further supported the mapping.



Figure 5: The area of Emmaus in the center of a segment from an aerial photograph of Farm Zeekoegat from 1967 with annotations and markings highlighting the former households and their heads. Aerial photograph: Land Surveyor Office Pietermaritzburg.



Figure 6: Participatory mapping with the help of digitalized aerial photographs and the ability to zoom into the pictures and add annotations and markings on an iPad. Aerial photograph: Land Surveyor Office Pietermaritzburg.

A part of the mapping process can be seen in pictures 3 and 4, in which Pinetown is situated to the east and the Mariannhill Monastery to the south of the annotated section representing Emmaus. Industrial and infrastructural developments that would become Westmead Industrial Park can already be seen on the western side of the road leading from Pinetown to the monastery. These pictures represent one step of the overall mapping process. Together with the audio records from the walking interviews and the geocoded pictures taken during the walks, the results of the mappings helped to further contextualize the data gathered in the qualitative interviews before the go-alongs. Bringing together this diverse data made it possible to cartographically recreate a settlement of Amanganga people that withstood the effects of apartheid's group areas for some time under the peculiar conditions of religious territoriality discussed above, before being removed in the early 1980s. The following maps show the compiled results of these empirical approaches.



Map 10: Emmaus community with homesteads in the early 1970s. Cartography: M. Gebauer.

Map 10 represents the Emmaus settlement, which was home to about 250 indigenous Africans. The households and the names of their heads reflect family and kinship ties, as well as the memory of belonging. The locations of the different lots, fields, and places are mapped as precisely as possible based on the interviewing and participatory mapping material. However, the aerial photography lacked the resolution necessary to reveal their exact locations. Therefore, the result should be understood as a representation of the memories of belonging shared during the interviewing sessions. The overall layout of Emmaus reflects the Mariannhill missionaries' model for ideal African villages with square houses and homesteads grouped around an imagined center of the village on top of the hill, i.e. the homestead of Alfred 'Sququ' Mhlushwa, the Induna. The groups of trees on each side of that house functioned as a kind of gate to the central homestead. Industrial developments had already begun on the land of the people of Emmaus prior to the final evictions. Thus, map 10 shows the first industrial buildings as well as

the Westmead racecourse. Even though these initial developments started as early as 1960, they only began to expand after the removal of the religious clause from Mariannhill's title deed in 1973. Still, the changing circumstances were already felt by the people of Emmaus prior to their removal.



Map 11: Westmead Industrial Park on the former homeland of the evicted people from Emmaus. Cartography: M. Gebauer.

Map 11 shows the situation in the area today. Emmaus has been completely built over by Westmead Industrial Park. Only a pocket of housings has been left standing on the slope of the hill on the southern fringe. This small, informal settlement became known as New Emmaus. Though some of the people living there were part of the original communities living on the land of the Mariannhill Mission, the majority are newcomers. A new national road runs through the built-up areas, and the Westmead racecourse south of Emmaus/Westmead, which still existed in 1973, has also been turned into an industrial development. The Umhlatuzana River once

demarcated the border between the White and the Non-White group areas. The western area displayed on the map was a Coloured area before the end of apartheid. Today, Tshelimnyama is located there, an informal housing area with rural character, which has experienced high in-migration rates from former Black African areas since 1994 (cf. CROSS, BEKKER, CLARK et al. 1992: 14). Map 11 also indicates the land southwest of the original Emmaus area that has been allocated to the Mangangeni Trust as a compensatory territory through the land claim process. As the original place Emmaus has been turned into a vibrant industrial park, the former homeland was not on the table during the redistribution negotiations. Instead, the members of the trust received financial compensation amounting to 27,080 Rand per claimant and the right to settle on the neighboring territory instead. Their diasporic detachment therefore continues in a spatial context that brings the former inhabitants of Emmaus into maximum proximity to the place from which they were ejected, while confronting them with the everyday reality of their definite inability to return. Outliving the end of apartheid's racist spatializations, the industrial development thus becomes a material manifestation of the persistent spatial regime of ordered indigeneity.

Despite all the efforts of the Mariannhill Mission Institute, the racist spatial politics of apartheid shifted modes of material and symbolic order, turning the religious identity of the indigenous population in the administrative sphere of the mission into a religiously signified experience of exploitation, dispossession, and the loss of home. For the Amanganga, Emmaus and the other lived-in places on the land of the Mariannhill Mission came to stand for the promise of a safe, sacred home territory amidst the racist spatial dis-orderings of apartheid. Because their daily lives had been shaped by *religious territoriality*, the experience of *domicide* led them to question and contest Christianity and the work of the missionaries. This aspect is even described by some of the interviewees as a form of religious betrayal as it caused estrangement to Christianity in general and the Catholic church in particular (cf. ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 131f.).[21] Similar conclusions can be found in the reevaluation of the direct and indirect roles and positions of missionaries in the colonial enterprise. COMAROFF & COMAROFF (1991: 237) reference indigenous Africans' resistance to Christian missionary efforts in South Africa based on their perception of Christianity as a threat to their modes of social and cultural existence. (KHANDLHELA 1995: 59) accordingly terms the work of the missionaries within the context of colonization a *colonization of consciousness*. Regarding the Mariannhill Mission, it can be added

[21]Group interview with former residents of Emmaus/Mariannhill (2013).

that this *colonization of consciousness* was effected through the colonization of land as territory by changing the place-making modes of existence. However, the developments leading to the eviction of the indigenous population from Mariannhill also quite clearly indicate that the analysis and conclusion may not be as simple as such catchy terms would suggest. Instead, they represent a set of changing power relations within the sphere of the White dominator together with contestations of how to define and enact modernization upon the *African other*.

The interviewed descendants of the communities once living at Emmaus often pointed to Bishop Martin Elmar Schmid, an ordained priest who had been present at the Mariannhill Mission since 1938 and served as bishop from 1970 until his death in 1980 (cf. ADELGISA HERRMANN 1983: 96). He was either portrayed as the person who failed to protect the African people or even accused of having actively contributed to the developments leading to the removal of the religious clause from the title deed and the subsequent revocation of the mission's religious territoriality with its protective sphere:

> Interviewee: "I will tell you how they treated us. Not religious! For us to be removed. The missionaries had the land, but it belonged to us. But they did what they did."
>
> Interviewer: "Could they have avoided it?"
>
> Interviewee: "With ease! With ease! You see, what they did was in 1973, a clause that was protecting us in the title deed here. They cancelled it. It was the Bishop who knew about it, but he didn't take any action. This land is given to [the mission] for educational, religious, and benevolent purposes. So, we couldn't be moved because of that. At least it was a bit of protection. But when they cancelled that clause, it became industrial and no longer religious. And from an industrial area, you go to a township because you don't belong here. They shouldn't have removed us. It was a religious area."[22]

This highlights the intricate roles and powers of religious, state, and economic actors when it came to the spatial and material manifestation of colonial and apartheid orderings of indigeneity. The oppression and marginalization of the indigenous African population under the apartheid regime persists within South Africa's *doxic landscapes* and the subsequent inability to identify oneself with a specific place of home.

However, it is neither possible nor is it the intent of this case-related example to pinpoint the source of these developments in the actions of a single person or institution. What is of relevance is the location of the religious sphere within the modes of ordering indigeneity (see also ETHERINGTON 1977). That is the necessary foundation for understanding the background of

[22]Solomon Phewa (2013).

religiously based strategies for transgressing the persistent modes of ordering the *African other*. The major challenge in post-apartheid South Africa is the continuous re-ordering of segregation and injustice on all scales of life, space, and politics, from the micro- to the macro-scale. The religious dimensions reveal a conflict in the moral re-ordering of these scales in addition their material re-ordering. Dispossessed land can be redistributed, political structures re-modeled, urban space de-segregated, and the society strengthened through de-racialization and integration (cf. HARRISON, TODES & WATSON 2008 ; NDLETYANA & MUZONDIDYA 2009). Still, the need for a dialogue around belonging in terms of religious identity and ideology remains. Religion played a decisive role in the genealogy of White oppression and still lacks proper reconciliation and public debate. In this regard, RASOOL (2004: 100) argues for a theology of transformation to support the post-apartheid project, pointing to the necessity of overcoming ideological divides and orthodox religious traditions, as "orthodoxy cannot push back boundaries it merely confirms." Religious groups from various congregations and belief traditions position themselves within the political narrative of post-apartheid South Africa by pointing to their role in the struggle against oppression, while others do not contextualize those issues at all, referring themselves and their actions to a religious realm that exists beyond *earthly* politics. Within the context of Black African resistance, some groups highlight the paradoxical relationship between colonial and apartheid oppression and religion—in particular, Christianity and its intricate interlinkages to White domination—by arguing for the potential and revolutionary role of Black liberation theology. Others engage with the historical context of Christianity's colonial and apartheid roots in a far more critical way, perceiving the dismantling of Christianity as far more liberating and revolutionary.

Finally, the role played by the Trappists of Mariannhill within that paradoxical framework cannot be fairly described as being a willing tool of the colonial enterprise; it was more the result of shared colonial attitudes, visions of divine modernization, and the spirit of settler colonialism. Nevertheless, as presented above, they were ultimately yet another actor within the grand scheme of consolidating White dominance over people *and* land.

The ordering of indigeneity in colonial and apartheid South Africa and the entanglements with the religious sphere discussed so far forms the background against which conversions to Islam among those classified as Black African have taken place since the 1980s. The practice of drawing on Muslim identity formations to redefine the meaning of *Africanness* as Black *and* Muslim thus becomes a field of new emerging orders, as well as a struggle against the subjectively embodied and spatially ascribed modes of social ordering. The following chapter will present the modes of resistance to social and spatial ordering through conversion to Islam,

while also providing an overview of the role of Islam in South Africa. As in the study at large, the focus rests on the region of KwaZulu-Natal, although the developments presented are contextualized within the overall history of Muslims in South Africa. As with Christianity, the field of Islam in South Africa is a complex and contested one in terms of interlinkages with the modes of social and spatial ordering. Yet, as will be explored in the featured cases, this contestation is the very key to creative adaptation through conversion and the attempts to bring about a new, self-defined sphere of belonging through the re-ordering of meaningful actions, i.e. the ideology of everyday life.

Black *and* Muslim: Transgressing Orderly Indigeneity

Looking at the developments since the nineteenth century, Christianity has spread widely among the indigenous African population. This is due less to the efforts of the Dutch Reformed Church or the mission stations than to African Christian Zionist Churches, which have promoted a more vernacular approach to Christianity (ELPHICK 2012: 37f.). A field of struggle and contestation over ideological powers has spread across the cultural landscape of South Africa, making the translation of religiously justified positions of domination and subordination and the preaching of equality and resistance to White oppression possible simultaneously. With the turn to apartheid, particular formations of Blackness, Black Power, Black liberation theology, and Black Consciousness arose within the field of religion as a mode of ordering society and space. Writings with an Anglo-American background of Black Power and Liberation, such as works by James Cone or Paulo Freire, gained popularity among people with a Christianized religious background who were looking for a counter-hegemonic, Pan-Africanist train of argumentation based on Christian belief and theology. For others, such writing represented an incomplete break with oppression and the oppressor's religion, making them unsuitable for establishing a truly revolutionary perspective on political Blackness and African indigeneity. As MALULEKE (2008: 121) points out in his account on religion and Black Consciousness in South Africa, Christianity arrived there as a "cold cruel religion" whose early proponents preached "a theology of the existence of hell, scaring our fathers and mothers with stories about burning in eternal flames and gnashing of teeth and grinding of bone. […] Down went our cultural values." For Maluleke, the central writings of Steve Biko, founder of the Black Consciousness Movement, were of great importance to the formulation of a South African Black Theology:

> "By drawing on the work of Touré, Fanon, Malcolm X and Kaunda, Biko wanted to locate his thinking and nourish his intellect in Africa. His notion of blackness was one that included Africanness and African culture. His idea of BT [Black Theology], quite amazingly, did not totally exclude what has come to be known as African Theology. This is how Biko defined African religiosity, pointing out the discords with Christianity, but always holding out the hope of a fusion in the process of making Christianity relevant to black people." (MALULEKE 2008: 120)

For Biko, himself a graduate of Mariannhill's St. Francis High School, the missionary message came with a derogatory stance towards the existing African religiosity, which was set in contrast to a more developed and almost scientific Christianity (BIKO 2005 [1978]: 49). Nevertheless, he upheld the possibility of formulating a counter-hegemonic and *Black* African position on the basis of an Africanized Christian theology. This is where FREDRICKSON (1995: 57) locates the essential contradiction in Christianity as well as its limitations to be a solid foundation for Black resistance and counter-hegemonic re-orderings—for both the US and South African contexts.

> "The gospel of human solidarity preached by white missionaries and abolitionists was egalitarian in an ultimate theological sense, but in practice it normally placed whites in a position of cultural superiority and validated paternalistic attitudes toward the blacks who were allegedly being rescued from heathenism and oppression." (FREDRICKSON 1995: 57f.)

Hence, Black liberation theology in the South African context always found itself in the problematic and paradoxical situation of formulating a liberation ideology on the basis of an oppressor's religiosity which, in more than just spiritual ways, legitimated segregation and everyday racisms. Christianity continued to be a White man's religion for a White man's reign.

For those looking for an ideology of resistance, freedom, and Black liberation on a religious foundation, "cold and cruel" Christianity became more and more difficult to uphold. Solomon Phewa, head of the Mangangeni Trust and former inhabitant of Emmaus (see section "The Eviction of Emmaus" above), who had been relocated during apartheid to the township of KwaNdengezi on the border to the then-White urban realm of the Durban Metropolitan Area, explained it in these words:

> "You see, I lived here, when in KwaNdengezi there was never a day when a person would not die. There was no street in KwaNdengezi where a person was not killed or whatever. So, things that we were seeing every day. And we just would ask ourselves, where are we going? So, we needed a particular policy here, but what is it? And you look at what you have, and all is empty. It has no answers. Christianity was totally empty; it could not provide answers. Say, pray to god somewhere. And what you do in life here?"[23]

What he describes are the upheavals and unrest in Black African townships during the 1980s, when the colonial and apartheid system of division and rule reached its climax: As the apartheid state and system of racist governance declined, the systematically undersupplied and underdeveloped areas of the indigenous African population became hotspots for violent conflicts among the indigenous population, especially in the urban and border townships of

[23]Solomon Phewa (2015).

KwaZulu-Natal. After four decades of apartheid, the different factions of those conflicts delineated two general attitudes towards the system of White minority rule, i.e. accommodation or confrontation (see amongst others BONNIN, HAMILTON, MORRELL et al. 1996; FREUND 1996). In this context, new forms of media, such as cassettes and video tapes, disseminated various works of counter-hegemonic ideology from across the globe among the youth of the Black African townships, who were highly politicized by the developments surrounding them in their everyday lived-in places. Among these ideas, the political and spiritual message of Islam became increasingly perceived as a truly revolutionary theology, in contradiction to a misguiding liberation theology framework based on the oppressor's Christian faith. Here again, political ideologies of counter-hegemonic Blackness from the Anglo-American context played a decisive role:

> "Malcolm X, the Malik al-Shabazz. He was more in a political line of Islam and that is what we needed at that time as a youth. His speeches, you know, I'd buy them and listen to them. They were very inspirational. Malcolm X, most of us influenced a lot. […] Many embraced Islam because of hearing of Malcolm X. So, there were video tapes, audio tapes that were there, some books that were written."[24].

Concepts of Black Islam from outside the South African arena must be understood as traveling ideas whose messages had inspirational quality without agenda-setting capability and provided meaning as they became translated as transgression and resistance into the local realm of the politics of Blackness. The Nation of Islam, particularly during the era of Malcom X, is an exemplary case in this regard. While the Nation of Islam was highly influential in terms of its political message and consumable media, its actual structure of chapters and temples did not permanently materialize on the South African scene. Attempts were made to create chapters in Cape Town as well as in Durban in the 1990s.[25] The Islamic Nation Foundation, founded by the former affiliate to the Durban based Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPCI), Adam Mncanywa and having its own youth wing based in the African township of Inanda near Durban,[26] can be clearly seen as styled after the Nation of Islam (KAARSHOLM 2011).[27] While the Nation of Islam may not have taken hold in terms of forming an organization or establishing

[24]Solomon Phewa (2015).

[25]Interview with Rozanno X (2015); Interview with Cassiem Christians (2015); Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015).

[26]Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015).

[27]An upcoming publication on global passages of racialized Muslim identities and the construction of African indigeneity in a post-colonial society will deal in more detail with the issue of traveling ideas of Muslim Blackness, with a specific focus on the Nation of Islam in South Africa (GEBAUER 2019).

a chapter, it inspired a generation of young South Africans in the townships and homelands, who were searching outside of their lived-in places for role models and exemplary ideas that espoused a more revolutionary and more liberating approach to the oppressive situation, which included the radical rejection of the established realities of the *African self*. As one respondent pointed out, the Nation of Islam "brought the message but did not fit the South African cause."[28] The Nation's concept of Muslim Blackness evolved out of the Afro-American situation, whereas since the 1970s, Black Consciousness had provided a discourse of re-ordered Blackness that was distinctively linked to the South African situation.

In the South African context, the Black Muslim ideology reflected in the texts and speeches of Malcolm X was translated into the homegrown framework of Black Consciousness. Steve Biko's "Black Man, you are on your own" (BIKO 2005 [1978]: 100, 108; see also MAGAZINER 2009) was amended by Malik al-Shabazz's declaration that "the black race needs today to get up off its knees, and to get on its feet, and get rid of its scars, and to take a stand for itself" (HALEY 1964: 382). For others, the Iranian revolution of 1979 became a more tangible blueprint for the formation of a new Islamic order on a nationwide scale. In contrast to Black Muslim ideologies from the North American context, it seemed to be more applicable to the South African situation in which post-colonial, post-White nation-building within a Pan-Africanist framework played a far greater role than cultural identity politics.[29] Islamic thought challenged not only Christianity but also Marxism as the ideological foundation of the established resistance movements to White supremacy, such as the ANC, the PAC, or the different Unions.

> "At those days we were these Marxist, Communist, we didn't want to hear about religion. Also, we were, like he said an Opiate. That was Karl Marx. So, we didn't want religion. […] Then a guy was teaching me in high school, standard six. He came, he saw me watching Farrakhan [the leader of the Nation of Islam]. He was asking are you interested in this? I said ja, but my problem is about the struggle, ANC and so. What does this religion say about this struggle? He said no, Islam say fight oppression until there is no oppression."[30]

Islam offered a foundation for thinking *Blackness* anew—as an ideology of resistance in the struggle against White oppression. Again the words of FREDRICKSON (1995: 298) ring true: "American Black Power advocates were clearly a stimulus, but the adoption of African-American concepts and slogans was selective rather than wholesale, and the ideas that were

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[28]Interview with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015).

[29]Interview with Cassiem Christians (2015).

[30]Interview with Moosa (2015).

appropriated were often reinterpreted to fit South African conditions." For example, Black Muslim and Black Power ideologies from outside South Africa brought a broader audience to Biko's Black Consciousness—a political discourse of Blackness which had circulated among a more educated part of the population but failed to gain prominence beyond a relatively intellectual sphere: "A lot of us didn't even know about Steve Biko, but we got to find out due to the Nation of Islam actually."[31] Islamic ideologies of counter-hegemony and post-colonial liberation seemed to fit the various scales of spatial racisms, as the American Black ghetto paralleled the Black African townships and the Iranian theocracy served as an inspiration for potential solutions on the macro-scale of the nation state and beyond. As discussed above in reference to NASH (2003: 186), becoming Muslim *and* Black offered a possibility to transgress the fixing of *Blackness* to race and move into a realm of ethnic fluidity. The link to questions of social conditions, the framework of anti-oppressive resistance, and the invitation to pro-actively challenge and object to injustices within Islamic thought became portrayed not only as a liberation theology but a revolution theology (cf. PALOMBO 2014; ESACK 1987, 1997). Islam offered a revolutionary spiritual home beyond the oppressor's religious sphere and an alternative to or extension of Black liberation theology as a liberation from the spiritual foundation of ill-defined Blackness (cf. COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991).

While Black Muslim and anti-colonial Islamic thought gained prominence starting in the late 1970s, this did not imply that all those who were interested in such discourses converted to Islam. Grounding the social and political self in a new framework of religious thought needs more than discursive interaction; it requires institutionalized, structural support. The racist segregation of apartheid severely limited access to religious spaces and facilities other than those ascribed to the respective areas, which in the case of Black African group areas were Christian-based. At the same time, through the colonial entanglements discussed above, Muslim communities and Islamic institutions were present in South Africa, and Muslim actors were very much involved in the anti-apartheid struggle. However, translating Islam into the Black African realm meant transgressing the racist orderings of society and space. For indigenous Africans converting to Islam, such as Solomon and his friend and political companion Moosa, their embracing Islam was based on a growing skepticism towards the ideological foundations offered to them in political as well as theological terms. Getting in contact with Black Muslim thought, such as that of the Nation of Islam, facilitated an understanding of indigeneity that was

[31]Interview with Rozanno X (2015).

embedded in larger ideas of global *Blackness* and *Africanness*. Moreover, for Solomon Phewa, the experience of removal from the religious territory of the Mariannhill Mission entailed a conflict with his own spirituality and religious foundation, which led him to translate his personal history of dispossession into a larger frame of oppression towards Africans. However, for Solomon, Moosa, and all other Muslim converts who participated in this research, "embracing Islam" and therefore "embracing the *African self*," as they expressed it, demanded an intensive amount of theological and ideological self-appropriation and networking in order to stabilize the foundations of their becoming Muslim *and* Black.

The following section will contextualize the uniting of *Blackness* and *Muslimness* and discuss conversion to Islam among those classified as Black African in the light of transgressing social and spatial modes of ordering indigeneity. First, conversion as transgression must be discussed on a conceptual level before the heterotopic situatedness of Islam in South Africa is presented as an-*other* order. Following this discussion, the rare contact zones that enabled conversion will be presented, before a specific case study from the township of KwaMashu in the Durban area is used to pinpoint the contestations of a grassroots-oriented Black Muslim emergence stemming from the field of Islamic actors.

On Conversion: A More-Than-Religion Topic

Much has occurred since Horton's thesis of monolatric conversion theorized the conversion of Africans to a monotheistic religion such as Christianity or Islam as a rational process and act in the face of modernization (see ELPHICK 2012: 32ff.; SHELL 1993; COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 249). Inquiries into the political representation of religious conversion, the meanings of conversion practices, and biographical narratives stem from different fields of study—social, political, and most definitely religious. While empirical accounts are given, the field still awaits a renewed discussion of conversion's theoretical framing, which develops an understanding for the meaning of its practices, rituals, experiences, politics, and representations from a social science perspective, beyond the different religious debates and away from the modernization perspective. From a geographical perspective, WOODS (2012) set an example with his valuable and concise yet comprehensive discussion of the topic, arguing that conversion is more than an act of individual belief that implies modifying effects for the subject as well as his or her social and spatial surroundings. He also points to the silence of geography when it comes to expanding the existing mode of analyzing the *why* and *how* of conversion by interrelating it with the *where* in territorial as well as place-making terms (cf. ibid.: 446f.).

In order to contribute to resolving this ongoing deficit, this study will situate the topic of conversion to Islam within a framework informed by discussions on the modes of order and ordering in society and space, as well as the analysis of dimensions of order, resistance, and transgression. The socio-spatial dimension of religion is thereby transferred from serving as the ontological entry point to the level of an analytical category in the production of geographical knowledge (cf. LEVINE 1986: 431). Approaching conversion from a cultural geographical perspective entails exploring the practices transforming the social field, the self, as well as the routines of the lived-in places. Dealing with conversion does not imply working on religion per se or sketching out a geography of religion. Following BOURDIEU (1983) and LUKES (2005), religion can be understood as a field in which everyday practices, emotional cohesiveness, and collective identity are constituted and expressed in society and space. Thus, religion is simultaneously a field of forces and a field of struggles through which powerful social and spatial relations and place-making processes are produced, challenged, transformed, and reproduced. It follows that conversion is an intentional act of accumulating symbolic capital and accepting alternate modes of order through the exchange of forms of capital. Conversion is therefore not only about the respective positionality in the field but also the endeavor to change it, to shift the modes of order and ordering in the lived-in place through practices, experiences, and representations.

Conversion in Geographical Perspective

In analytical terms, conversion entails *converts* as well as *preachers*. The latter term is not necessarily meant literally, referring instead to the distributors of symbolic capital and grand narratives (cf. BOURDIEU 1989). Converts may become preachers themselves, if they have accumulated enough symbolic power to be acknowledged *and* recognized by others as such. From the perspective of Christian missionary work, conversion is "a type of social recruiting in which the convert yields his or her body and soul to a power deemed superior" (DANNIN (2002: 266). It is therefore most essentially an act of domination and subordination, of ordering and being ordered. Yet, at the same time, it is also—aside from oppressive forms of enforced conversions—a dialectical process and practice, bringing those modes of order and ordering otherwise taken for granted into explicit focus as topics of discussion.

WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999: 353) argues for a differentiation between conversion as a "conflictive mode" of change and alternation as a more "developmental mode," with the former being based in the converts' search for a radical change in worldview and identity as symbolic systems. This differentiation is especially valuable in relation to the converting/alternating subject's

relationship to his or her own past and former commitments (ibid.). Based on her research on conversion to Islam in Germany and the U.S., WOHLRAB-SAHR conceptualizes both dimensions through the modes of syncretism (i.e. alternation) and symbolic battle (i.e. conversion). She thereby poses a very important methodological question, placing accounts of conversion into the realm of an interpretive-qualitative paradigm of methods focused strongly on narrative and biographical interviews.

In his invitation to further geographical conceptualizations of religious conversion, WOODS (2012: 440) argues that "religious conversion is a phenomenon that goes beyond the reorientation of individual belief, and is instead a process of change that involves the (re)definition of self and other," thus highlighting the realm of change and transformation through conversion. In empirical terms, he criticizes the dominant focus on micro-explorations of personal narratives and the subsequent failure to synthesize knowledge on the scale of communities, organizations, and localities. This corresponds with the invitation by KONG (2010: 763) to research and analyze religion and geography beyond insights on the micro level of politics and space in order to understand religious conflict and change on a global level (cf. KONG 2010: 763). With his insightful compilation of existing literature on religious change and religious conversion from the scientific fields of sociology, religious studies, and political science, WOODS (2012) convincingly combines the structural and structuring dimension with aspects of human agency, thus engaging conceptually with motivation and intent on an intersubjective, psychological, and emotional level. However, as mentioned above, a conceptual advancement from the standpoint of geography requires that the *why* and *how* of religious conversion be accompanied by the *where*, the locale of the context of conversion. This can be brought together with the differentiation of space and place by AGNEW (2005, 1987), as discussed in the conceptual chapter (see section "Approaching the Conceptual Dimension of Social and Spatial Order and Ordering" above). Accordingly, geographies of religious conversion should deal with the location of conversion (i.e. its territorialized spatial and material translatability), the locale of conversion (i.e. the field of structuring and structured social relations that are the foundation for the actual acts), as well as the sense of place of conversion (i.e. the embodied positionalities of the respective subjects, as well as their bodily and sensual implications).

Bringing these two perspectives together, religious conversion can be framed as a ritualized and in most cases institutionalized process and practice of convincing and being convinced in ideological, material, symbolical, and place-making terms. It entails far-reaching effects of the de-signification and re-signification of the everyday self as well as the social and material environment. Hence, it seems appropriate to talk about a *converted representation* as well as a

converted subject. New meanings are adopted and inscribed upon the body and into the social field, with the latter being re-ordered through a change in routines and rituals (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 2004). The observable result is the attachment of altered or new values to common structures, experiences, networks, and desires. The ritual of conversion is not just one act but a series of interlinked reaffirmations of conversion, necessary to stabilize the self in the altered representation of the social, psychological, and material setting of the lived-in places. Thus, conversion never ends, it is never fulfilled or accomplished. It is an ongoing differentiation of the momentary self in contrast to the prior subject and previous intersubjectivity. Only those individuals who are socialized, educated, and ordered within the new setting, for example the children of converts, are truly able to start anew.

Beyond Rationality and Intention: Conversion as Resistance and Transgression

> "Resistance […] cannot simply address itself to changing external physical space, but must also engage the colonised spaces of people's inner worlds […]. Indeed, it could be argued that the production of 'inner spaces' marks out the real break point of political struggle…maybe." (PILE 1997: 17)

Conversion as resistance and transgression is, in analytical terms, a mode of expression, a *modus operandi* of dis- and re-ordering. It brings about a state of exception in ritual and territorial practices and politics of change and transformation, which applies to both the individual and his or her social and spatial surroundings. This aspect has already been explored by WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999: 361), who points to the fact that conversion is a reaction meant to resolve disintegration and social alienation within the social field. Re-ordered belonging is expressed through what she calls the double frame of religious conversion. So far, approaches to conversion from the field of geography have highlighted this social aspect in terms of rationalization, cultural adaptation, or the politics of representation in geo-political perspectives (cf. WOODS 2018), while other researchers, primarily from the field of anthropology, have focus on the motivations behind conversion being defiance of social orders or emancipation from them (cf. amongst others LEE 2007, 2002; WOHLRAB-SAHR 1999; WAHL 2014; LEE 2001). Yet all have in common that they take conversion as an entry point for the explanation of either rationalized or at least intentional social effects, thus implying an input-output model of conversion. This study intends to argue beyond these conceptual logics by engaging with conversion as a mode of transgression of social and spatial ordering, an induced state of exception to the daily lived routine which creates a window of opportunity for re-ordering the sense of place as a sense of orderly place-making and orderly being. Accordingly, conversion

can be understood as a *heterotopia of the self*, opening up the possibility to dismantle the embodied dispositions by re-ordering the very routines of everyday life and lived-in places. Thus, conversion is at the same time a *modus operandi* of ordering and the *opus operatum*, the ontology of order—not in terms of religion, proselytism, or the spiritual self, but of the *real*, the *actual*, and the *empirical* (SAYER 2000: 11ff.) of experienced space and society. In the context of colonialism and post-colonialism, conversion can be understood as a radical and revolutionary act of transgressing those orders brought about by decades of domination and subordination. In the case in South Africa, this mean the transgression of the knowing of one's place within the dialectic of White and Non-White. Thus, as conversion is an ontology of the self, it is all the more an ontology of order, because it is the ideological means and meaningful practice for change that already *is*, that it already happened. Conversion is transgressive, because it irreversibly shifts the subject away from the social and spatial modes of ordering and order and aims at an irreversible challenge of these modes. In both cases, conversion is more than just a "measure of hope" for change (cf. TAYOB 1999a: 99).

WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999: 361) concludes that it is adoption of the "other" or the "foreign" religion of Islam that motivated conversion in the cases she studied. The desired uprooting from one's own context is made possible through what she terms the "symbolization of maximal distance with one's own social context." Though this conclusion seems to be valid for her own empirical examples, it cannot be extended in a generalized way to other contexts of conversion to Islam. What WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999) is missing is the embeddedness of the conversion in relation to the overall social context, on the one hand, and the feeling of rootedness or up-rootedness, i.e. belonging or not belonging to the order of the surrounding context, on the other. In the cases she presents, the converts experienced alienation originating from their own social environment (e.g. social stigmatization for behavior deemed inappropriate, like being called a whore for having diverse relationships). This ultimately led, in the analysis provided by WOHLRAB-SAHR (1999), to the conversion. In the cases presented here of Muslim converts in South Africa who had once been classified as Black African, these extrinsic effects are turned upside down: While the social environment signifies the subject's belonging (as for example being African entails being Christian), this social and spatial ordering of the self is plagued by a constant feeling that the offered belongings are essentially false. The process of conversion is embedded in the subject's realization that his or her embodied sense of place may be shaped by the very politics and practices of classification and the spatial manifestation of White domination. The conversion to Islam is thus not motivated by a search for the greatest distance to the given center but by the inherent feeling that the social position and identity of the self is

on the far periphery of where it should be, that the given means of existence entail a constant state of alienation, and that conversion to Islam would enable the subject to understand and attain the imagined center of the self and share it socially. In other words, converting to Islam means questioning, deconstructing, and reconstructing the embodied dispositions and therefore the role of the self within the oppressive and segregated reality, rooted in centuries of political and missionary work by a White, Christian colonialist minority. In contrast to that reality, Islam is understood as a radical anti-colonial ideology, on the one hand, and the way of the authentically African, indigenous self, on the other, rendering the religion of Christianity the foreign or alien one.

Understanding conversion as transgression implies reframing the main research question as follows: What are the practices and acts of transgression and which boundaries are transgressed? In this light, the South African particularities of segregation, oppression, social and spatial alienation, and physical relocation shift the perspective's focus towards both the boundaries of belonging, reaching for emotional and personal order, and the boundaries of citizenship, reaching for structural order. As will be presented and discussed in the following section, *Black Islam South Africa* entails both shaping the politics and practices of territorialization and re-ordering, while also questioning the very foundations of the South African state and society's potential for transformation after apartheid.

Islam in South Africa: An-*Other* Order?

The history and genesis of Islam and Muslim communities in South Africa is an extraordinary example of the power of cultures, ideas, and ideologies traveling along the global passages of colonialism and imperialism. Islam was initially brought to South Africa by the global entanglements of the Dutch colonial network, maintained under the harsh restrictions of the various oppressive regimes, institutionalized throughout the racist and racialized period of apartheid politics, and finally *discovered*, redefined, hybridized, translated, and transformed into the social and cultural structure as the indigenous African population came into contact with Islamic ideologies and practices.

It is helpful to sketch out a roadmap of Islam in South Africa in order to illustrate the path dependencies and formations of this particular religion within the larger picture of colonial, imperial, and apartheid rule in South Africa. With regard to this study's main objectives and research scope, the focus will be on South Africa's so-called Indian Islam or Indian Muslims in the region of KwaZulu-Natal. Nevertheless, to avoid a too narrow discussion, connections will

be made to other locations of Muslim identity practice and socio-spatial ideology, primarily those found between the developments in colonial Natal and the Cape colony, now known as the KwaZulu-Natal and Western Cape. Islam in South Africa developed along different strands in different areas and at different times, always reflecting the social, spatial, and cultural background of the diverse communities in question. The decision to locate the major part of the research in KwaZulu-Natal, especially in the vicinity of the eThekwini metropolitan municipality (Durban), was the result of a process that entailed empirical undertakings at various places across South Africa. Most of them have been integrated in this work. The history and daily life of converts to Islam in KwaZulu-Natal may constitute the specific local religious, cultural, and political developments of Indian Islam that took place in that region of South Africa, but the converts' lived realities as Muslims are not at all restricted to the locale. As will be discussed further below, their sense of place as Muslim *and* Black is connected to places, actors, and institutions across the country, as well as on a global scale.

Colonial Passages, Local Groundings

To a certain extent, religion and religious affiliation only became an issue of socio-political magnitude with the arrival of European settlers and colonialist. This does not at all imply that religion, spirituality, or sacred space were not present before the time of the foreign conquerors. Spiritual expressions and religious rituals were manifold among the different population groups indigenous to the region, but the ideas of believer and heathen and of proselytism and conversion—very much translations of ideas of religious structure and practice, rooted in the European history of institutionalized and hierarchical Christian political rule—first appeared with the ships arriving at the Cape. Also imported alongside Christianity were other monotheistic religions from around the globe, particularly Islam. The impact that these religions had on the indigenous population is linked to an idea that these religions share: the construction of cultural identity through differentiation to the religious other, combined with an intrinsic motivation to spread the religious message among the non-believers, i.e. to raise awareness and convince the other of the believer's own faith. This entails persuading those others of a different way of life in terms of social and spatial orders, as well as bodily and intersubjective experiences. In other words: These religions offered competing grand narratives of ordering the self in the lived-in places, produced and reproduced by ritual and routine. For Islam to gain a strong foothold within South African society, these logics of competition and missionary engagement, or da'wah as it is called in the Muslim context, were of crucial importance from the very beginning. In no way indigenous to the Southern African region, the religion of Islam came to

the Cape with slaves brought as workforce to the colony. The involvement of the Dutch East India Company in the global slave trade facilitated a steady flow of slaves from the Indian Ocean world, which stretched from Madagascar, the East African coast, and India to Indonesia and the Malayan Archipelago (cf. BRADLOW & CAIRNS 1978: 102). SHELL (1993) provides an extraordinarily detailed account of how Muslim communities and Islamic teaching and preaching gained prominence in the Cape Colony, due to the religion's particular attractiveness to slaves from other regions of Africa. Still, there is another side to the story, as Dutch settlers endorsed the conversion to Islam among their slaves to a certain extent, instead of encouraging them to become Christians, in order to be able to enslave their children as well (cf. BADEROON 2014: 11). Along with the slaves came political prisoners from other Dutch colonies, some of whom were charismatic personalities and Islamic scholars who formed the nuclei for Muslim communities, and whose graves became sacred places of pilgrimage. Early Islamic practices at the Cape reflected a mixture of the many vernacular and contemporary rites and rituals stemming from the diverse areas of origin. DA COSTA (1994) provides insights into the various geographic backgrounds of those Muslims brought as slaves to the Cape in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and up until slavery's abolition in 1834 (though slaveholding only came to an end with the emancipation of slaves in 1838) (SHELL 1993: 421). The abolition of slavery led to a process of urbanization among the former slaves, and Islam became an urban religion within the settlements of the Cape Colony, which were by then under the reign of the British empire. Muslim ex-slaves were quickly perceived as a comparably homogenous group and gained something of an aristocratic status among the Non-White population (cf. ibid: 421f.). *Malay* became the ascription frequently used for the early Muslims at the Cape, a description which in terms of cultural essentialisms persists until today, constituting an imagined community (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 254; BADEROON 2014). Under the domination of the Dutch settlers, Muslims were extraordinarily restricted in the public expression of religious rituals, rendering Islamic practice a hidden worship (MATTHEE 2008: 77). With the shift to British colonial administration, Islamic practices were tolerated and sacred places such as mosques and madrasas (Islamic schools) could be established. This happened with some pace during the nineteenth century. In most cases, the founding of mosques in that era was related to a central personality, a trend which created a field of contestations among the different congregations and subsequent spin-offs and separations of mosques (TAYOB 1995: 46ff.). The allowance of public observance under British rule also meant that Muslim activities were moved into the realm governed by the logics of the colonial regime, leading Islamic practice to become increasingly ordered within the hierarchical social structure of dominating European settlers

and subordinate others. In addition to these developments, Sufi orders had become the epicenters of religious practices and Islamic discourse during the rule of the Dutch, in part due to their less institutional character, and they continued to thrive among the Muslims at the Cape under British reign (cf. DANGOR 2009: 108f.).

When the British Empire took hold of the colonial territory in South Africa in the nineteenth century, it established a second passage, which enabled the movement of Muslims and Islamic practice. Lying on the eastern side of the coast, the Natal colony was thus properly linked to the sea route across the Indian ocean and along the East African coast under the British administration, and the colonial harbor city of Durban became a vibrant and quickly expanding node in the global network of the Empire. The indigenous isiZulu-speaking societies found there were relatively homogenous in social, cultural, and political terms compared to the diversity of societies at the Cape. Contrary to the plans of the colonial administration, the indigenous people of Natal refused to become a cheap and disposable workforce on the sugarcane plantations of the newly empowered White farmers. In response to this refusal, a system of indentured labor migration was instituted with workers arriving from the Indian subcontinent from 1860 to 1911. This brought more than 150,000 Indians to Natal across *kala pani*, the *black waters,* as the Indian Ocean was metaphorically described (VAHED 2001: 306; EBR.-VALLY 2001; for a comprehensive account on the history of indentured laborers worth reading, see DESAI & VAHED 2010). This indenture system consisted of two five-year-contract periods. The workers were primarily Tamil, Telugu, Bhojpuri, Hindi, Urdu, and Bengali speakers from lower-caste communities (HANSEN 2012: 27f.; with reference to EBR.-VALLY 2001). After the first term, they could either continue with a second contract or seek work elsewhere. After ten years, the workers were offered a free passage back to the Indian subcontinent or the ownership or lease of a piece of crown land in the colony (TAYOB 1995: 55). The colonial administration initially expected the formerly indentured Indians to pursue jobs with the sugarcane planters. Instead, the majority engaged in trade, selling their own agricultural produce on the markets, or started to purchase and rent out land. The majority of the laborers were Hindu, and less than 10% were Muslims. From the 1880s onwards, a second group of Indians, the so-called passengers, came to Natal of their own expense in order to get involved in the colonial economy. Of these, around 80% were Muslim, most of them wealthy traders from the Indian subcontinent. This group, comprised of primarily Gujarati-speaking Muslims with Memon or Surtee background, was smaller than the formerly indentured population and made up around 15% of the total Indian population in Natal. However, due to their different economic background, they quickly

made their way to other parts of the region, such as the Transvaal or the Cape Colony (cf. HANSEN 2012: 28).

The allocation of land in the colony to indentured laborers and the regional trading activities of passenger Indians had a decisive effect upon the hierarchical position of Indians within the classificatory system:

> "In this regional diaspora, Indians tended to supplant Africans in position and authority. On farms, Indian men were often given responsibility for difficult tasks, or served in the elevated position of family cook. In the African locations, Indian traders concentrated on the 'kaffir trade'. While they provided goods to an otherwise poorly served constituency, they came to occupy a social position distinct from and superior to that of the Africans." (MORRELL, WRIGHT & MEINTJES 1996: 41)

While the migrants were portrayed as a homogenous group situated between the White elite and the dispossessed and territorially ordered Africans, the social reality among Indians was far from reflecting a uniform *Indianness*. Indentured migrants and passenger Indians were divided by religion, cast, language, ethnicity, and culture, reflecting the diverse origins and logics of social and spatial segregation on the Indian subcontinent (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 260). Nevertheless, these social positionalities had been brought into a realm where status along these lines did not automatically reproduce the familiar stratifications. VAHED (2001: 327) argues that the situations of Indian Muslims from the group of indentured laborers differed radically to those with a Hindu background, as "occupation and social mobility no longer depended on caste, while race played a pivotal role in shaping social relations." The situations of Muslim traders varied as well, as they organized their religious communities around mosques founded and built by this wealthier group shortly after their arrival in Natal (ibid.: 328).

Both groups, Muslims from the indentured labor background and those from among the passengers, lived in the same areas within the territorial order of the segregated colonial city of Durban. Thus, while Indian Muslims found themselves stratified by new aspects of race and class within the political realm, in the private sphere, the familiar divisions along the lines of caste, class, and ancestry still ordered the different communities, making social interrelations such as marriage almost impossible (VAHED 2001: 328). From the very beginning, a social distance had existed between the mainly Urdu-speaking Muslims among the former indentured laborers, one the one hand, and the Muslim traders from areas in India such as Gujarat, Kutcch or Kathiawad, on the other. This was also expressed in the religious practices, with the former laborers organizing themselves mainly around Sufi rituals and teachings of Islam (most prominently Chishti and Naqshbandi), while the former passengers practiced a more orthodox Islam. With the establishing of mosques and madrasas, as well as a higher degree of formalized

religious-organizational structure, the latter group dominated the overall Muslim community in structural, religious, and cultural terms. Aside from the Sufi-oriented communities, three broad Islamic traditions have gained traction among Indian Muslims, especially since the 1960s (VAHED 2000: 45ff.; VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 261): First, reflecting the aim of bridging Islamic and secular knowledge, a modernist stream influenced by Pan-Islamic revivalist scholars such as Muhammad Iqbal and Sayyad Qutb was influential in the formation of organizations that attracted converts from the Black African population group (see also DANGOR 2009: 113). Second, a reformist Deobandi tradition was influenced by personalities such as Muhammad Nanautawi or Rashid Gangohi. It pursues a pure and purified Islam and can primarily be linked to passenger Indians from Gujarat. This reformist approach became associated with the middle class and oriented towards modern economy. Third, a Sunni stream influenced by Ahmad Raza Khan of Bareilly in Uttar Pradesh was mainly associated with indentured Indian Muslims, coming to stand for maintaining the social as well as religious status quo. The differentiations and conflicts among the Deobandi, Sunni, and Barelvi traditions are linked to historical developments on the Indian subcontinent. In the South African context, these translated into differences of class and economic status among the growing diaspora of Indian migrants, reflecting and reproducing their places of origin and ethnicity: Gujarati traders from western India, on the one hand, and Urdu indentured laborer from North or South India, on the other (cf. HANSEN 2012: 245).

Islamic scholarship in KwaZulu-Natal was and still is strongly connected to the Indian subcontinent, a relationship that was only gradually impeded by the restrictive migratory policies and travel restrictions between India and South Africa established under apartheid. In the 1960s, this scholastic connection brought the Tablīgh Jamāt to South Africa, an Islamic revivalist movement which evolved in India in the early twentieth century in reaction to Christian missionary efforts among Muslims (cf. MOOSA 1997; ALI 2010). HARON (2005) classifies the Tablīgh Jamāt as a second-tier da'wah movement, as it mainly targets the activities of Muslims, reminding them of Islamic duties while preaching a scriptural way of Islam, oriented according to the life and projected purity of early Muslim communities. "The emphasis in the movement is therefore heavily on hadith, on an ethics of sincerity of purpose (*niyyah*), on living in the spirit and remembrance of Allah (*dhikr*), and on showing respect and care for other Muslims" (HANSEN 2012: 244). The processes of removal, relocation, and segregation under apartheid contributed to the growing support of the movement's message among Indian Muslims. It provided an Islamic identity of cultural and religious distinction and ummah-oriented unity to Muslims who found themselves in a rapidly changing environment of social

and spatial reordering. At the same time, the movement's presence and activities progressed polarizations and dividing conflicts among the different groups following different Islamic traditions, which led to the separation and division of mosques as well (VAHED 2003).

Residential segregation also had an immanent effect on the formation and building of religious Islamic communities, a process that intensified during apartheid. Aggregated and classified as one of the Non-White population groups under the Population Registration Act, Indians were granted the right of permanent residency in urban South Africa in 1961, an right denied to them under the colonial system in which they held the constantly contested status of foreign migrants and temporary sojourners (JEPPIE 2007: 4). Nevertheless, this new right to citizenship was second class from the very beginning. Indians were continuously regarded as a subordinate group "in need of paternalistic care and education in order to evolve more fully" (HANSEN 2012: 35). With the political shift to apartheid and the subsequent reordering of the segregationist colonial city on the basis of the Group Areas Act, people now officially classified, statistically recorded, and documented as Indians were positioned spatially next to Black African townships and on the fringes of White areas, effectively serving as a socio-spatial buffer zone and therefore representing in spatial terms a hierarchical position lower than Whites but dominant to the indigenous population. In terms of Islamic places and institutions, this racial territorialization can still be seen today by layering the former group areas on top of the presence of Islamic places of worship and religious education. This is exemplified in map 12, which represents the situation in and around the former colonial and apartheid city of Durban (for a comparable and in depth undertaking with the example of Cape Town, see FLÖEL & HAFERBURG 2002).



Map 12: Islamic religious places in Durban in relation to the former group areas. Cartography: M. Gebauer.

Map 12 shows the demarcation of today's eThekwini municipality together with the former boundary of apartheid's Greater Durban Area and the demarcated group areas for the White, Coloured, Indian, and African groups. It also pinpoints the three largest Black African border townships of Umlazi, KwaMashu, and Inanda, which were officially under the jurisdiction of the KwaZulu homeland. The dots on the map represent the positions of Islamic religious buildings such as mosques, madrassas, and prayer houses (musallah or jamāt khane).

The highest concentration of such religious places can be found in the former Indian townships, such as Phoenix, Newlands, or Chatsworth. The racial segregation of apartheid affected the

cultural ordering of the re-ordered population quite intensively. However, an intermediary position such as that of the Indian population group did not translate into social and cultural fluidity. On the contrary, the lived-in reality in South Africa's racially grouped areas was characterized by spatially manifested and socially inscribed boundaries, not only between those classified as White and the indigenous Non-White population, but also along the gradually differentiated population classifications. The Indian population group not only found themselves positioned in between Whites and Blacks in terms of economic activities and locations of living but also segregated on the scale of structural belonging, i.e. citizenship. The ordering logics of racial classification, segregation, and the ideology of division and rule led people classified as Black African to experience economic exploitation in their daily lives, e.g. when renting real estate or buying goods, at the hands of those classified as Indian. Anger against the structure of systematic injustices was therefore frequently directed towards the Indian population group (cf. NAIDOO 1992; HINDSON, BYERLEY & MORRIS 1994). The map therefore also reveals an intriguing effect of the transformation from apartheid to post-apartheid: New Islamic religious places were established almost exclusively within the former White areas, whereas almost none can be found in the former Black African areas. Two exceptions, a mosque and a jamāt khane, are indicated in KwaMashu, both founded by indigenous Africans. Their background will be dealt with later within this chapter (see section of "Attempting Muslim Blackness" further below). Another exception, the Greyvillea mosque sits on the border between the former homeland and the Indian township of Chatsworth. The establishment of new Islamic religious places within the former White areas is likely the result of formerly Indian-classified people moving towards the major economic centers surrounding the Central Business Disrict of Durban after the end of apartheid.

This gradient subordination and race group relationality, resulting from indirect rule and White racist logics, became even more evident in the field of education. While people classified as Black were confined either to ill-equipped schools in their townships and homelands or to those run by missionaries, Indians gained a certain level of educational mobility and liberty from the 1960s onward (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 261). Moreover, 1963 saw the establishment of the University of Durban-Westville, an institution of higher education for the Indian population group. The Indian population group may have been viewed paternalistically by the White oppressor, but it was at least cast in the light of structural development at all, in contrast to perceptions of the indigenous African population. Outside of these segregated realities, a zone of contact to Islamic practices and social and cultural exchange between Indian Muslims and the indigenous population classified as Black African did exist, and it facilitated the travel of

Islamic knowledge in terms of religious practice and way of life. The active involvement of Muslims in the struggle against apartheid, as well as the growing number of anti-colonial narratives stemming from Muslim scholars and Islamic da'wah organizations, further contributed to this process.

Muslim Resistance to Colonialism and Apartheid

Global developments, such as the Iranian Revolution, Muslim Black Power movements in the United States, and the global Islamic resurgence beginning in the 1970s (TAYOB 1995), played an important role in the genesis of various strands of counter-hegemonic positions to apartheid which emerged from the field of Muslims in South Africa. While informed by global developments, South Africa's Muslims primarily approached the confrontation of apartheid "from within," either from a nationally oriented South African perspective or a Pan-Africanist one. Yet, whereas some Muslims got involved in the struggle based on an Islamic viewpoint, others refused to do so, arguing that their status as a minority meant their involvement in *kāfir* politics, i.e. the politics of Non-Muslims, would not be in line with Islamic thought. These differences strongly characterized the discourses at the Cape as well as in Natal and continued after the end of apartheid, including the request for a *fatwa*, an Islamic ruling concerning the South African situation (see JHAZBHAY 1991). The question of Islam and resistance to apartheid is thus at its core a controversy over whether Muslims, as a minority that came along the colonial passages to South Africa, should get politically involved in contestations of the oppressive racial regime at all. The different approaches of Muslims in South African to dealing with resistance to social and spatial oppression and ordering thus clearly reflect the hermeneutics concerning Muslim minorities outside of the Islamic heartland and the differentiation derived thereof between *dar al-Islam*, as the symbolic and physical territory of undisputed Islamic living conditions and legal orders, and *dar al-harb*, as the other territory, where Muslim life takes place under the given conditions of a dominating Non-Muslim society (NIEHAUS 2002; 2008: 72ff.; see also HASHMI 2003).

For both Muslims at the Cape and in Natal, political activities ranging from strategic maneuvering to open disputes in the streets had been part of the lived reality from the very beginning, with religious issues increasingly becoming social ones from the nineteenth century onwards. A vividly documented example is the large-scale public protest of Muslims in the Cape Colony in 1886, who in the thousands displayed their opposition to the planned closure of a Muslim cemetery (SHELL 1993: 454ff.; PALOMBO 2014: 31). This historical case is important to note as it reflects two crucial aspects that extend beyond the historical incident itself: The first

is that resistance to the oppressive White settler-colonialist rule, and later the Afrikaner apartheid rule, were clearly voiced in the face of threats to the ritualistic sphere of Islamic normativity and to its bodily, social, and spatial modes of orders (such as burial regulations), effectively preventing the unsanctioned practice of Islam. Second, the confrontation with the White, or better, *Non-Muslim other* brought about exclusive moments of mass unity and the discourse of a homogenized South African sphere of Muslimness, despite the group being highly differentiated along diverse religious streams. Muslim communities and individuals in the Cape Colony started off being perceived as a cultural realm among the population of slaves and servants. In the view of the Dutch settler colonialists, dealing with Muslims meant governing the religious sphere of the colony; conflicts and contestations arose where aspects of Islamic ritual and regularities were not in line with the overall modes of order. With the arrival of the British colonizers, the hegemonic attitude towards Muslims changed, shifting them from a religious reality to a piece within the socio-spatially segregated structure of colonial life.

Acts of political representation always unfold against the backdrop of the specific socio-historical and spatial path dependencies. Hence, the situation in Natal differed, reflecting aspects of religious life and identity to a lesser degree within the Muslim contestations to the colonial and apartheid modes of ordering. Instead, the scene was dominated by issues concerning the social and economic sphere, the realm of political representation, and territorial aspects regarding the lived-in places within the increasingly segregated colonial urban space. In the context of colonial Natal, Islam and the life-world of Muslims had been directly linked to the global colonial dynamics and developments and was therefore inevitably embedded in the discourses and practices of political resistance to the colonial logics of social and spatial ordering as they were put in place *by* the British Empire. While the presence of indentured laborers in Natal fit into the system of White hegemony, the attitude towards the wealthier passenger Indians and their economic activities was a different one. As their numbers grew, they were seen as competitors in economic, political, and territorial terms (SICARD 1989: 212).

> "Whites perceived the Africans as a passive threat and affected a paternal regard for their allegedly natural subordination, but eventually they saw in the Indians a sophisticated and active menace to their own position in colonial society, competing for space, place, trade, and political influence with the imperial authority." (SWANSON 1983)

In contrast to the situation of Muslims in the Cape Colony, this led in Natal to early and continuous social and political confrontations with and resistance to the colonial regime and a merging of religious and socio-political realities when it came to the representation of Muslimness in the confrontational environment of the colony. The relationality between oppressive orders and their contestations continuously evolved with the growing number of

Indians arriving. Hence, in the 1870s and 1880s, Indians were confronted with modes of ordering involving residential segregation and political exclusion, followed by economic sanctions after the arrival of wealthier passenger Indians. The strategies adopted by the White administration of Durban, namely the demarcation of residential locations for Indians and the clustering of their commercial zones, thus represented the first planned attempt at creating group areas in a major South African town, making it a precursor to apartheid legislation (cf. SWANSON 1983: 405). While segregation targeted Indians of all religions, the economic sanctions and growing restrictions on migration in the late nineteenth century specifically affected Muslims, as the majority of passenger Indians and traders belonged to Islam. This does not, however, mean that there was a uniquely Islamic quality to the contestations of White domination and oppression in colonial Natal. Certainly, many of the personalities engaged in the institutionalization of counter-hegemonic efforts were Muslims, and the formation of longstanding organizations, such as the Natal Indian Congress, can be associated with their leadership. Still, their motives were to improve the political, social, and economic status of Indians in the colonial system (see SICARD 1989: 212f.). The fact that the first officially established Muslim organization in Natal was the Indian Committee Durban, whose agenda was to protect socio-economic and political rights, supports this perspective (cf. DANGOR 2009: 111).

With apartheid, the conditions for contesting the hegemonic system and negotiating the exclusive position of Muslims changed. Through classification and spatial manifestation, Islam became associated with the Coloured or Asian (i.e. Indian) population group, and Muslims subsequently found themselves homogenized under the racial conditions of the White/Non-White dialectic. Through the contributions of charismatic Muslim personalities—most prominently the religious and socio-political activist Imam Abdullah Haron, who died in detention shortly after his arrest in 1969 (GÜNTHER 2002; SICARD 1989: 208f.)—Islam unavoidably gained a reputation within the South African society for having an adversary stance to oppression and injustice. The political discourse emerging from the Islamic sphere was not only linked to particular personalities but was driven in large part by the formation of Islamic organizations whose missions pointed directly at resisting the White oppressors, while simultaneously offering visions for social transformation under Islamic conditions. Three of the organizations with socio-political agendas that gained prominence in the South African context

(ESACK 1988)[32] include 1) Qibla Mass Movement, which was strongly inspired by the 1979 Iranian Revolution as a blue-print for establishing an Islamic state alternative to an oppressive regime, 2) the Call of Islam, which had a distinct affiliation to the broad-based resistance against apartheid under the umbrella organization of the United Democratic Front, and 3) the Muslim Youth Movement (MYM), which was founded in Durban in 1970 and oriented towards the empowerment of Muslim communities. While this is certainly no comprehensive list of all actors of institutionalized resistance to apartheid,[33] Qibla, the Call of Islam, and the MYM essentially stand for the three major traditions of institutionalized Islamic resistance to apartheid. Qibla represents a Pan-Africanist perspective, oppositional to the idea of a transformed and democratically reformed South Africa and oriented instead to a global perspective of Islamic governance. In contrast, the Call of Islam and similar organizations reflect a liberal-intellectual position, contributing to the nationalist project of a post-apartheid South Africa from an Islamic standpoint. Finally, the Muslim Youth Movement stands for those organizations motivated to propagate Islamic thought and ideology as means to change the conditions in the lived-in places and bring about social transformation without becoming involved in the Non-Muslim, or *kāfir*, politics of apartheid and the resistance to it. The MYM is of specific importance to this study and will be revisited and discussed at different points further below.

Throughout colonialism and apartheid, Muslims in South Africa who intended to resist the oppressive modes of social and spatial ordering eventually found themselves in the conflicting situation of justifying their involvement from an Islamic standpoint. It was not exclusively the Muslim Youth Movement arguing that transformation through a "complete and comprehensive" (DANGOR 2009: 119) Islamic way of life had to happen *without* getting involved in Non-Muslim politics, as active political participation would only obstruct such a transformational process. While the MYM position was still a politicized one, other more conservative streams and scholars argued that any political contestations and involvement by

[32]Esack describes them as "three Islamic strands" in his often cited 1988 article in the Third World Quarterly, a dichotomization which has strongly influenced the academic debate. Nevertheless, it must be noted that Esack himself is the founder of one of these so-called strands, that is the Call of Islam, and had previously been affiliated with the MYM. Therefore, his academic publication should be critically evaluated in the light of the political positioning of his own organization within it. Notably, many academic authors researching and writing on Islam and South Africa are themselves prominent religious scholars in their own field, including Yusuf da Costa (Naqshbandi Regional Head in the Cape region), Goolam Vahed (publishes for IPCI), Tahir Sitoto (former MYM President), Abdulkader Tayob (once presided over the As-Salaam Islamic Educational Center), Salman Nadvi (MYM), and Ebrahim Moosa (former Western Cape Coordinator of the MYM), to name a few.

[33]Presenting all the organizations involved in that struggle at this point would move far beyond the scope of this study. The contributions of TAYOB (1995, 1990), JEPPIE (1991), SICARD (1989), and ESACK (1988, 1997), among others, should be consulted on this matter instead.

Muslims, especially where practices of resistance are shared with Non-Muslims, were not at all sanctioned, or even forbidden, by Islam(see MOOSA 1989). Pro-Nationalist Afrikaner newspapers gladly made reference to such statements, underpinning their paternalistic relationship to the obedient Muslims of South Africa (cf. PALOMBO 2014: 43). Nevertheless, the sphere of Islamic discourse and practices came to be integrated into the resistance to apartheid. Furthermore, local contestations from Islamic standpoints were very much linked to global discourses of Islam as a resurgent realm of challenging oppressive regimes. With a certain delay, Afrikaner politics realized and recognized the contingent threat that Islamic ideology posed, with the Dutch Reformed Church going so far as to declare Islam as a false religion and "a great danger for Christianity in South Africa" in 1986 (HARON 2006: 450; cf. JEPPIE 1991: 15). By that time, the bridging of the gap between anti-apartheid politics and practices and Islamic ideologies had already taken place in different lived-in places, such as those in the focus of this study. Especially among younger township dwellers, Islamic thought became an attractive alternative to Marxism as an ideological foundation for social and spatial resistance and revolutionary thinking. Moreover, as a religious sphere that challenged the faith of the oppressor, Islam even became a revolution in itself. For Natal, the epicenters and intellectual milieus for Muslim resistance were located among the segregated Indian population and came to thrive at the University of Durban-Westville from the 1970s onwards. The racial order of apartheid made the travel of these developments into Non-Muslim, i.e. Non-Indian, segments of the society difficult—but not impossible, as this study elucidates. Still, it was not only within the local realm that Islam as resistance to apartheid served to translate Islamic ideologies contesting oppression to a wider group of people. Before presenting an example of such contact zones, the classificatory representations of Muslims in South Africa requires critical consideration.

Islam and Classification: The Questionable Representation of Census Data in South Africa

In a society culturally ordered by the division of the population according to classification systems and their spatial manifestations, the question of census-related data is immanent. In fact, for the apartheid administration, enumerating the people living on the South African territory became an important tool for translating these abstract categories into social ontologies. Moreover, as increasing spatial segregation was put into practice, classification techniques developed further. For example, subsequent to the demarcation of the homelands and their connection to language groups, the 1970 census included tables on language and

offered ten different Bantu Nation Units (plus Others) as census categories (CHRISTOPHER 2002: 405f.). Censuses and statistical population data were important political instruments for the operationalization of territorialized oppression and a system of continuous population control during colonialism and apartheid:

> "The creation, and amalgamation, of groups, which were assigned legal and constitutional status, indicated the reciprocal relationship between the census authorities and other organs of government. The colonial, Union and apartheid eras represented the tightening of control, which resulted in ever greater rigidity in the system of population classification." (CHRISTOPHER 2002: 406)

Differentiation by means of enumeration served in this regard the needs of the dominating minority. While the actual act of counting the population was an essentially political one, the same could be said of the response to census questions, as well as any attempt to gauge the (im)possibilities of taking the census on a representational scale within the highly socially and spatially segregated and therefore diversely accessible country. Especially in the 1980s and early 1990s, accessing the population in order to gather the necessary data was made impossible by conflict and open violence in parts of the country, especially the Black African townships. As for the census-related representations of power, in their account on spatial patterns of religion in Cape Town, FLÖEL & HAFERBURG (2002: 209f.) point to the fact that statistical publications during apartheid facilitated the hegemonic ordering logics, here in terms of religion. Thus, comparing data before and after the official end of apartheid is a difficult, if not useless, scientific task. Extending the analysis and critical discussion of diverse socio-economic factors in South Africa presented by HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH (2017), we can conclude that census data in post-apartheid South Africa projects the persisting, embodied, and spatially inscribed modes of order, whereas their political interpretations represent projections of anticipated transformations. One way or the other, the political contingency cannot be cast aside by any means of statistical correlation or signification.

Looking critically at the respective enumeration of religious affiliations during apartheid not only serves the objectives of this study; it also illustrates the most questionable representations of South African census data, as well as the socio-political and spatial effects that enumeration could entail. As described above, the logics of classification under White Afrikaner rule involved the ascription of aspects of cultural identity, such as religious affiliation, to specific race groups (i.e. Christianity to Whites and Natives/Blacks, Islam to Coloureds and Asians/Indians). This had diverse and grotesque effects, both intentional and unintentional. For example, EBR.-VALLY (2001: 53) mentions the case of a Scottish-born, originally White-classified South African, who was reclassified as Coloured because of conversion to Islam. In a similar vein,

POSEL (2001b) points to the case of a White-classified woman who was deprived of her *Whiteness* by the judgement of a magistrate carrying out the classification by social acceptance. In her case as well, conversion to Islam turned her into a Coloured-classified person. These are only a few of the absurdities of the interrelations between population data and classification, on the one hand, and the enacting of segregative and racialized ordering, on the other. They also point to an awareness of the social implications linked to the presentation of the cultural self to the classification machinery of the oppressive regime. Such factors constrict the applicability and comparability of census data, at least when it comes to religion. As (HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017) argue, the effects of the inequalities resulting from being classified far outlived apartheid, as did the powerful position of being able to classify. An anecdotical example can be seen in the leader of a right-wing Afrikaner political party that succeeded the National Party arguing in parliament that as an Afrikaner, he is not a European but an African and therefore classifies himself as such on official forms (VERWEY & QUAYLE 2012: 556). Again, Nash's (2003: 186) equation of *Whiteness* existing in the realm of *ethnic fluidity*, while *Blackness* is manifested by *race* is of importance when it comes to self-classification along those categories that outlived apartheid. This applies to census enumeration or official documents, as well as to the realm of everyday life.

COMAROFF & COMAROFF (2006: 209f.) bring it to the point:

> "[T]he statistic is a medium of communication *and* a species of commodified knowledge, one whose value and veracity accumulates as it circulates. Part fetish, it has also become a term in the ordinary language of being."

Thus, having the right numbers on your side is a representation of power, and the self-determined act of counting, and therefore owning the statistical data, entails a decisive power of representation. This is evident when looking at the different programs of the Muslim Youth Movement in their community-oriented work in Non-White areas, as one of their main tasks was taking a census of Muslims in the respective areas (TAYOB 1995: 111). Still, judging the number of Muslims in a specific area of South Africa is a rather difficult undertaking. Besides the previously mentioned problems with the acts of enumeration and their political implications, the numbers of religious followers tend to change in rather extreme terms. Exemplary for this development is the information provided by Shaykh Kasim, born in Malawi, who has lived in a Black/African township on the fringes of the Durban Metropolitan Area since the 1980s. He is an Islamic scholar on da'wah, working among the indigenous population. In several interviews, he mentioned that when he has linked his religious activities to social events, such as feeding schemes, public gatherings, or even the creation of football teams for the youth, so that

he can approach the local population in a broad-based way, the people "came in the thousands" and became followers in Islam. Although this may be a bit of an overstatement, the number of initial followers gained through social programs was most definitely high. Nevertheless, such masses tend to come and go with the social activities and their offerings, as well as with the presence of charismatic personalities such as the Shaykh. In the interviews, Kasim stated that people tended to leave the way of Islam as soon as he was no longer permanently present. He reflected on these failures of his initial work, stating that most of the people were "empty shells" who may have taken the shahada, the Islamic declaration of faith, but later returned to a Non-Muslim life as members of the Shembe or Zionist churches. In this case, the numeric representation is not a supposedly objective reality, or even a validation of the statements provided by the interviewed person, but first and foremost the expression of meaningful experiences in the lived-in places. When it comes to publications on Muslims in South Africa, many authors seem to feel compelled to cite census data and the numerical differences and supposedly deduced growth rates among the different population groups, although only few of such publications are characterized by quantitative epistemology. Claims of a "rapid increase" in African Muslims with a growth of approximately 600% between the 1980 and the 2001 censuses (PALOMBO 2014: 32) and chains of socio-religious correlations using census data to argue for an emerging African Islam in South Africa (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005) are based on shaky grounds, to say the least. The results of such studies can be very closely linked to the issues mentioned above. Moreover, comparing the census data from 1996 for Muslims in South Africa to that from 2001 reveals that the highest growth rate is to be found among the White population group. This statistical phenomenon can also be traced by looking at the historical census data presented by VAWDA (1994: 535), in which the number of Muslims among the White group is almost four times higher in 1970 compared to 1960, and had almost double again by 1980. This then could hypothetically indicate impressive conversion activities, an emerging White Islam in South Africa so to speak, or point to shifting ascriptions across the entire enumerated spectrum. One way or the other, only further inquiries into both realms can shed light on this case. Basing deductions on such accounts should be undertaken with care. When it comes to Muslims in South Africa, DANGOR (2003: 203) is the most valid source to be cited: "There are no reliable statistics on the number of Muslims in South Africa."

Both the practice of census enumeration and especially the actual experience of being enumerated are rooted in racial and segregative politics and representations. While the validity of census data is an issue of contestation and doubt in many places worldwide, in light of the South African particularities of the local setting discussed here—i.e. the social and spatial

repercussions of enumeration and classification under colonial and apartheid order, census data has to be seen as a cultural-political construct produced under undeniably oppressive and unjust power-relations. It most definitely does not represent any sort of objective social and spatial realities. With the recent 2011 census, the post-apartheid government skipped the questions on religious affiliation, a decision argued on the basis of the self-understanding of South Africa as a secular nation. Another reason for dropping the dimension of religion from the census process could be the fact that a significant part of the enumerated population had previously responded to the question with "No Religion," which renders the outcome meaningless in many ways. Nevertheless, population groups are still the primary focus of the enumeration process, thus perpetuating the racialized differentiation of South African society. Given its self-understanding as a de-racialized nation, it could be helpful for the transformation of South African society if a similar conclusion were to be drawn regarding this census aspect as in the case of the religious categories (see also HAFERBURG & OSMANOVICH 2017: 58). It would be an interesting undertaking to add "No Race" to the coming censuses.

Contact Zones: Africanization of the *African Self* through Islam

The racial classification and spatial manifestation of apartheid's modes of ordering had decisive effects on the mobility of culture and therefore the uniting of different practices and significations, as well as their mixing, hybridization, creative adaptation, and the creation of new cultural orders. Ontological meta-categories such as class, race, gender, religion, or ethnicity always tend to unfold a structuring effect onto positions within social space, thus predefining the possibility and probability of creative encounters. Within societies that are structured by the dimension of race, the segregative tendencies are even more evolved and most often inscribed into the spatial setting of the habitat. Yet, in the South African case of decades of radical segregation along racist categories on all scales of society and space, the possibility for cultural contact zones was restricted to the utmost extent. Everyday life, whether work, education, recreation, or even just buying groceries, took place in segregated spaces that were demarcated into an orderly, hierarchical landscape. Moreover, groups were physically kept away from each other by spatial barriers such as railways, streets, and industrial areas, which were situated in between the group areas. The definition of intermediary groups further decreased contact between the White minority and the majority African indigenous population. Although there was a higher probability of social or economic encounter and group area permeability between the Coloured-, Indian-, and Native-classified populations, this did not

imply a uniting of the respective realms of lived-in realities. Those very same segregating powers were used to divide and rule the indigenous majority of the inhabitants of the South African territory, who were divide along the lines of language and constrained to the respective homelands of their thus homogenized sub-groups. The restrictive politics and practices of the social and spatial orders and orderings under apartheid truly did fulfill the inherent meaning of the word: They kept people apart. Religion, in general, and everyday aspects of Islamic cultural and religion in particular, were subject to those very same realities. Engaging with conversion to Islam among people classified as Black African is therefore a search for those contact zones that enabled the mobility and translation of religious ideology and ritual, of discourse and practice, from one oppressed group of people to another.

Regarding the academic literature, only few contemporary empirical works deal with the issue of conversion among the indigenous African population, most of which are ethnographic accounts with conversion biographies in their focus. Working with qualitative data from the Greater Durban Area, VAWDA (1994) identifies an increasingly autonomous Muslim community formation emerging within selected African townships, pointing to an increasing level of organization among the few converts to Islam. He links the aim of developing an independent African Muslim sector, i.e. one that is not linked to established Muslim organizations tied to the Indian population group, to a mixture of existing proselytizing work exactly from the institutions of this field, the history of apartheid, and the presence of charismatic African Muslims who have migrated to the townships from other African countries. In her two articles, (LEE 2001); LEE (2007) engages with conversion to Islam among isiXhosa-speaking African women in the townships of Cape Town, shifting the conversion perspective to a setting of gender, religion, and social justice. She recognizes the influence of material related to Malcolm X on the shifting perspective of the self within the field of the social ordering in the lived-in area. For her respondents, Islam became an arena to reinterpret, re-appropriate, and empower their self-understanding as African women. BANGSTAD (2007) explores a similar vein and regional focus, offering a typology of African converts to Islam among isiXhosa-speaking Africans, thereby differentiating between conversion as social uplifting and conversion as political activism. Others review and discuss the issue of an *emerging* or *African* Islam in light of post-apartheid identity formations (OMAR 2002, 2004; RAFUDEEN 2002) or the comparison of a possibly new category of South African Muslims versus the established communities and the resulting contestations and conflicts in the transformation society of post-apartheid South Africa (SITOTO 2002, 2003; VAHED & JEPPIE 2005). Undeterred by the small number of empirical accounts, such reviews tend to draw socio-political conclusions with macro-scalar reach, partly

by making use of problematic quantitative comparisons to argue for a questionable intensity behind the phenomenon of an emerging African Islam (see for example VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 262f., 280f.). In contrast, as part of her PhD thesis, HASSAN (2011) carefully discusses an African Muslimness emerging from Black African townships as a factor of ethnicity based on religion and social positionality, while also providing a helpful overview of African Muslim organizations in KwaZulu-Natal. She points to factors such as a general lack of representation of African Muslims within the field of institutionalized Islam in South Africa and to the difficulty African Muslims have in gaining political and religious respect, being often regarded a charity case (with reference to SITOTO 2002).

Furthermore, HASSAN (2011: 146ff.) correctly questions the categorizations of Indian and African Islam, while also—in correspondence with the other existing literature—acknowledging the social reality of this division as a result of colonialism and racist segregation during apartheid. What she fails to take into account is the decisive role of spatial manifestations of religion in the *doxic landscape* of South Africa and the role of religious ascription to the constitution of an orderly indigeneity for the cause of White supremacy. On one side of the spatialized racial border, young, politicized Africans came in contact with Black Islamic thought from outside of South Africa, viewing it as a means of challenging order by resisting the modes of social and cultural ordering in their lived-in places. Coming in contact with Islam as an-*other* order opened for them a window of opportunity for re-configuring existing modes of order, making possible the transgression of the *African self* in the form of the orderly indigeneity of *African other* as defined and governed by White South Africa. While a contact zone is the space for unfolding the creative and transformative energy of cultural transmutation (cf. PRATT 2008), it is the acts of transgression, understood as boundary crossings and as meaningful acts, that brings such contact zones to the heterotopic realm—as the idea and space—of an-*other* order. On the other side of the racial segregationist boundary, where specific actors and organization from within the institutionalized Islamic field facilitated the transmutation of Islamic ideology into the realm of Black African resistance to oppressive modes of ordering, the heterotopic idea was institutionalized and advanced intersubjectively, providing religious meaning to the circulating political ideas. In this context of politicized proselytism, or da'wah, two organizations were of crucial importance to the process which brought about an Africanization of Islam in South Africa. The first of those organizations is the Muslim Youth Movement, mentioned above in the light of translating Islamic thought into a message of counter-hegemonic resistance and social change. HASSAN (2011: 155) labels it the only organization with significant African representation in terms of membership and structure. Founded in 1970, the origins of the MYM

can be traced back to the activities of the Arabic Study Circle of Durban (JEPPIE 2007). Its founding members consisted of intellectuals and professionals with no connection to Islamic scholars. Their intent was to make Islam and the Qur'an accessible to every Muslim, promoting a people's Islam instead of an elitist one (VAHED 2000: 47). The MYM evolved from the 1960s onward out of the aforementioned movements in the Natal seeking to connect the secular and the religious spheres, and it was strongly influenced by the Islamic resurgence of the 1970s. The aim of the organization was to "make Islam meaningful in the day-to-day lives of Muslims" (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 261) and proved particularly attractive to younger Muslims. When Salman Nadvi, a professor at University of Durban-Westville, became president of the MYM in 1974, the organization started to put specific emphasis on approaching the indigenous African population (TAYOB 1995: 109). From those da'wah activities originated the differentiation between the established and emerging or unorganized Muslim sector, i.e. the Islam linked to descendants of migrants from the Indian subcontinent, on the one hand, and that of the converts among the indigenous African population, on the other (SITOTO 2002: 5ff.; MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA (MYMSA) 2017: 60). In order to theologically educate and empower converts to Islam, the MYM's regional branch for Natal began offering a Sunday Islamic School program in African border townships such as KwaMashu and Inanda (see map 12 above) (MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA (MYMSA) 2017: 22). This was at the same time an effort to combat the marginal status of the African converts(cf. TAYOB 1995: 111). In KwaMashu, the MYM operated in the 1970s and 1980s from the local YMCA office (see picture 5).[34] The organization's da'wah activities were built strongly on the strategy to sway politicized Africans from Marxism to Islamic thought as the ideological foundation for counter-hegemonic activities and resistance.[35] Nadvi argued in 1983 that any involvement of the MYM in anti-apartheid politics would destroy the organization (ESACK 1987: 11). Instead, Islamic ideology should offer an alternative order to the White/Non-White dialectic. In the 1970s, the Muslim Youth Movement established the Al-Qalam newspaper and launched a book and tape service. Their extensive da'wah activities and annual MYM camps centered around charismatic leader personalities among the Black African population, with the aim of creating an autonomous hierarchy among the Muslim communities (JADWAT 2012: 181).

[34]Interview with Amin Ngubane (2013).

[35]Interview with Moosa (2015); Interview with Solomon Phewa (2015); Interview with Saliim Mthimkhulu (2015).

Picture 3: MYM affiliate Dr. Dada (center right) talking to Ike al-Idris Nxedlana in front of the YMCA office in KwaMashu. Nxedlana later became a central leading figure in professionalizing the organizational character of Muslim groups in the Black African townships around Durban. The picture was taken in the late 1970s by Amin Ngubane.

During apartheid, the MYM in Natal strongly influenced individuals on an intersubjective and communal scale through an outreach that was more socio-political than theological in nature, yet it was constantly denunciated by other established Islamic scholars from the field of Indian Islam, especially by Deobandi groups (TAYOB 1995: 154). For orthodox scholars, the MYM's propagation of an Islamic way of life lacked the necessary theological commitment to Islamic matters. At the same time, however, the organization's aims strongly reverberated with the cause of Black resistance to White South Africa, making it a Muslim version of Black Consciousness (TAYOB 1995: xiii), which displayed ideological similarities to issues of African

authenticity on the Pan-Africanist scale, to Black pride as a renewed sense of integrity among Black people, and to the indigenization of everyday politics in the lived-in places.

The other organization which became an important institutionalized contact zone for converts to Islam was the Islamic Propagation Centre International (IPCI), based in Durban. Established by Ahmad Deedat and Gulam Vanker in 1957 in response to the missionary work of the Anglican diocese and the Dutch Reformed Church among Muslims (HARON 2006: 278f.), it bases its theological and proselytism outreach on comparing Christianity and Islam, arguing for the latter by specifically criticizing the Bible. While the MYM aimed at those politicized by Marxism, the IPCI became especially attractive to those interested in Islam as an-*other* order who had a Christian background and firm belief and spirituality. During apartheid and especially during the time of the upheavals, it became a port of call for people from Black African townships in their process of embracing Islam. The partial translation of the Qur'an into isiZulu by Umar Moleleki played an important part in this (cf. GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016: 25). Furthermore, Ahmad Deedat became a charismatic figure whose speeches were circulated with the help of video tapes and audio cassettes. The political effect of his work among the dwellers of Black African townships was based on deconstructing the theological foundations of Christianity, thus questioning the religiously grounded rituals and routines of the self and the positionality of the individual. Deedat's message had a polemic character and aimed at de-legitimizing the religion that supported and justified apartheid, i.e. Christianity (cf. TAYOB 1999a: 96). The IPCI material, mainly produced by Deedat himself, not only deconstructed Christianity but offered a reality where Islam can be found everywhere, e.g. by analogizing the Zulu understanding and isiZulu words for a monotheistic god with Islamic belief. Even though the general message of the IPCI was more accessible to the politicized youth of the Black African townships, with Deedat's speeches on tapes and cassettes gaining almost the same prominence as those by Malcolm X, the center had a structural problem: Its main office was located in Durban within the area of the Grey Street mosque. Thus, although IPCI affiliates worked for a time from the MYM offices in the townships, their proselytizing outreach was comparatively limited. Interviewed converts who embraced Islam at the IPCI criticized the role of the center during the interview sessions, questioning if the organization actually wanted to see Black Muslims being independent.[36] Nevertheless, Deedat's work and the outreach of the IPCI complemented the image of Islam as a counter-hegemonic ideology reflected in material from

[36]Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015); Interview with Solomon Phewa (2015).

Malcolm X and the Nation of Islam. As a South African organization with international ties, the IPCI offered a localized version of South African solutions for South African issues.

The IPCI and MYM are far from the only Islamic institutions that pursued a path of proselytism in Black African areas during apartheid and continue to do so up until today, but both organizations had and still have the strongest influence on a trans-regional scale and outreach into the international realm of a political Islam that claims to challenge oppressive, colonial, White hegemony. The IPCI and MYM could both base their work among the indigenous African population on an organizational degree which allowed them to frequently host international guests for an audience of South African Muslims which broke, or attempted to break, the existing limitations of racist segregation and limitations of movement. In terms of spatial efforts, the MYM invested more in establishing a decentralized network of local offices and regular group meetings, while the IPCI concentrated their work during apartheid on producing and spreading their own religious material, which could in turn be obtained at the MYM offices. Both organizations managed to mobilize South African Muslims from various group areas to attend large events and created relatively sophisticated book networks to circulate Islamic literature, in both instances making use of the small gaps within the tight-meshed system of social and spatial modes of ordering during apartheid. This reflects the extraordinary degree of organizational effort invested in their outreach to a growing number of converts to Islam among the indigenous African population. This was not necessarily tied to a wish to serve all Muslims in challenge to the group areas segregation, but rather to the desire to set the agenda for a new and strongly politicized group of Muslims-to-be. At the same time, both organizations avoided pro-actively participating in or advocate for the anti-apartheid struggle, offering Islamic ideology and theology as an alternative, an-*other* order for everyday lives in the lived-in places, as well as the discourses for a post-oppressive state of social, religious, cultural, and spatial order. This move reflects the aforementioned stance of Islamic groups in South Africa towards the question of getting involved in *earthly* politics versus concentrating on a solely Islamic path instead. In this regard, the IPCI and MYM became attractive to different individuals, as the former concentrated on theological issues with a political contingency, while the latter based its work on a political idea of social transformation with an Islamic contingency. Nevertheless, their work was less an effort at "Africanizing" Islam than at providing a theological and ideological foundation for the contact zone, a heterotopic order for those desiring to transgress the existing modes of social and spatial ordering on religious-political grounds.

On the other side of the boundary, converts to Islam among those classified as Black African began creating their own *Africanization* of Islamic ideology by creatively translating and

hybridizing social and cultural elements from the Islamic sphere into a concept of an authentic, liberated, and pre-colonial *African self*, which stood proudly in contrast to the colonized and Christianized *African other*. Converts quickly began to reinterpret historical artifacts, cultural traditions, and the social rituals of historical African belonging through the lens of Islam, thereby perceiving the new religion as more authentic than Christianity.

> "We African people are coming from Islam; our religion was Islam. And to bring Christianity, King James said, you cannot break the Muslim if you don't break him on the religious side of it. For them to colonize Africa, they must have a religion that is going to float along and that will be used to infiltrate the African people because they respect religion. And then from there… they will lose everything. As Desmond Tutu said: 'We had the land, you had the bible, father. How come you have the land and we have the bible now?'"[37]

This authenticity is linked to a firm belief shared among the converts that pre-colonial African indigeneity had its foundation in Islam. Regarding the re-ordering of the self and the idea of African indigeneity, repeating similarities can be found in the converts' self-reflection of their processes of re-formulating their own socio-cultural and socio-political background. Besides clearly religious analogies such as the oneness of God, other examples reposition a ritualistic *Africanness* anew: The red mud used by an *Isanusa* (diviner) to cover the skin is understood as similar to Islamic rituals of cleansing before approaching God through prayer in the absence of water, or the wearing of the *Iscoco*, the black headband worn by married Zulu men which the Mariannhill missionaries forbade (see section "Divine Modernization: Settler Colonialism and the Ordering of African Indigeneity"), is seen in its form and representational use as an Islamic artifact. Other examples given to signify the re-emergence of an authentic *Africanness* through conversion include burial practices, ritualistic slaughters, and the process of negotiating a marriage. Such articulations show that conversion to Islam denotes not only a history of resistance, especially in the case of conversions during apartheid, but also a move towards a re-ordered *African self*. Thus, with the re-interpretation of the cultural practices of the ancestors, the act of conversion becomes an act of reclaiming one's own history, a mode of reversion to an *African self* that could have been were it not for the colonial intervention. This indigeneity achieved (SHELLER 2003) through conversion is therefore perceived by the converts as a more powerful and meaningful mode of resistance to the oppressive environment than comparable

[37]Solomon Phewa (2013).

ideologies like the Black Consciousness Movement, as these were embedded within a Christianized African background.

Without a doubt, the process of reviving an ideal, pre-colonial African indigeneity in the contemporary world by re-contextualizing and translating it into an Islamic identity of indigeneity had been stimulated, at least in part, by the comparative writings of the IPCI, such as those relating the Islamic understanding of Allah with respective references to the Qur'an and the Zulu concept of a monotheistic creator god in order to argue for an Islamic root of the Zulu concept (DEEDAT 1981). The outstanding aspect in such cultural transmutations rests in the extraordinary personal and intersubjective contribution to the process of transgressing existing modes of social and cultural orderings by translating the self into an Islamic realm, not to adopt to the Islamic modes of orderings but rather to re-order one's own indigeneity and to reinstate the—often idealized—rituals and routines of the forefathers, thus creating an authentic and liberated *African self*. A reality of African roots in Islam is spatially signified with reference to the history of early Muslims sent by the prophet Muhammad to the Negus of Ethiopia, and above all, the spatial signification of Timbuktu as the religious and intellectual epicenter of Pan-African Islamic identity. As IVAKHIV (2006: 172) points out, religious communities tend to interact with spaces and territories within historical variables, therefore signifying the authenticity of the religious identity marker along a spatial path dependency. For African converts to Islam in South Africa, the spatial-historical link to Timbuktu enables them to signify their conversion within a larger framework of meaning beyond the lived-in locality or the realm of national politics. Conversion to Islam thus becomes a reversion to an *Africanness* that was lost through colonialism and apartheid.

The meaningful act of *boundary-crossing* (see section "Conceptualizing the Challenging of Order" above) transmutes the idea of the *othe*r order into the social, cultural, and spatial realm of those who transgress. Thus, the idea of an-*other* order is creatively constituting by those subjects translating the new ideas and ideologies—in this case a politicized Islam, or an Islamic politicization—into the realm of their respective lived-in places and place-bound identity formations, thereby re-ordering the rituals and routines of the self within everyday life. Such re-orderings occur among the converts to Islam, but they are more than often challenged by established Islamic organizations. The best understanding of the creative forces re-ordering indigeneity as Black *and* Muslim can be gained at precisely that point at which the translation of alternative ideas of order within the contact zones meets the contestations happening as these orders are transmuted into the socio-cultural realm of the convert. In contrast, setting conversion biographies as the sole focus of the analysis only reproduces an idealized narrative

of the effects and impacts of the act of conversion. Viewing conversion as the transgression of modes of orderings, on the other hand, seeks to identify the persistence of the lived-out practices of Muslimness in the lived-in places of orderly indigeneity. Transgression is an act of resistance, not to be understood as a singular act but rather as the continuation and repetition of practices reflecting the persistence of resistance, which re-order the very maps of cultural orderings within which the self is located. What is offered by the actors in the contact zones through their proselytizing activities is nothing more than another pre-defined set of orders, which the convert can adopt, if willing. Yet for the converts, especially those who embraced Islam in the late days of apartheid and were therefore spatially isolated *at home* from the sphere of activities offered by existing Islamic actors, the new maps of cultural orderings pursuant to conversion offered first and foremost a window of opportunity, or a state of exception in which to question and extract the *African self*, via the matrix of the new set of orders, from the existing modes of the self oppressively ordered as the orderly *African other*. In a grassroots effort, the converts overlaid the Islamic ideology with meaning by translating it into their own realm of idealized, pre-colonial African indigeneity, explaining and constituting Blackness through the new set of theological and cultural artifacts. In the same way as Islam was cast in an Africanized perspective, the *African self* became linked to and re-positioned within the global network of Islam, self-identifying not as an African Muslim but rather as being Black *and* Muslim. Those creative appropriations that produced a sense of Blackness by translating the *African self* into the Islamic ideology and the resulting *mestizaje* (cf. MITCHELL 2005; FORTIER 2005) of religious and socio-cultural forms show striking similarities to the ritualistic difference of the Islam preached and practiced by the Nation of Islam in the Afro-American context of the 1950s and 1960s. Yet whereas the idea of *Muslim Blackness* evolved in the United States in spatial isolation from the field of Islamic institutions (cf. DANNIN 2002; GOMEZ 2005), the African Muslim converts in South Africa were in sufficient proximity to a highly organized and orthodox realm of Islam that their grassroots efforts and cultural hybridizations quickly became contested, setting the process of re-ordering the *African self* on disputed grounds.

Contestations: Re-Ordering the *African Self* on Disputed Grounds

The desire for a liberated and re-ordered Black African indigeneity touches on issues of authenticity and kinship. Whereas the question of authenticity refers to a dialectic of liberation embracing Blackness with the contingency of a radical negation of elements that are seen in the light of White supremacy, kinship calls for the constitution of a new, or renewed, brotherhood

of Africans as Black *and* Muslim (cf. GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016). As described above, discourses of cultural transmutation and creative adoption are one aspect of the transformative powers of conversion; another is the aim of establishing an independent set of Islamic institutions and organizations. With relatively few resources, continuous attempts are being made to cultivate a variety of organizational structures and institutions for Muslims among the indigenous African population, ranging from burial foundations, such as the Durban-based Imbumba Muslim Foundation, to autonomously founded Islamic centers situated within the former Black African townships, such as the Intake center of the Sizanani Charity Dawah Foundation, located close to the former homeland border of KwaZulu.[38] Other examples include self-organized Sunday classes at various homes in the townships, a clear continuation of the original da'wah agenda of the MYM, as well as Islamic schools for children. Although most converts attended Islamic courses in educational facilities like the Darul Uloom Islamic College in Newcastle (cf. DANGOR 2009: 110) or the Al-Salaam Center in Braemar after their conversion, the teaching in Sunday classes and Islamic schools within the townships is provided in most cases by Muslim scholars from other African countries, such as Malawi or Somalia, who themselves use to live in the townships.[39] One of these scholars, Shaykh Ishaq Kasim, a born Muslim from Malawi who studied public administration in Mecca and assists several facilities in the African townships around Durban, sees in the lack of an independent group of Islamic scholars among the African Muslim converts of South Africa a core problem of this spatially scattered and relatively unorganized field of actors, namely a lack of local leadership. Since his arrival in 1986, he has seen many promising converts attend classes at the various religious training centers run by established Islamic institutions only to then "disappear into nothing."[40] Shaykh Kasim further explains that attempts have been made since the very beginning of group formations among Muslim converts to offer Islamic services to the community of Muslims in the former Black African townships, to engage in self-organized da'wah activities, but that most of these organizations experienced a rapid succession of setbacks. For him and for other respondents too, such experiences cannot be attributed merely

[38]Interview with Moosa (2015); Interview with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015); Interview with Amin Ngubane (2013); Interview with Shaykh Thabani Isreal Ally Mwandla (2015).

[39]Interview with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015).

[40]Personal communiqué with Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2015).

to a lack of finances or organization; they must also be understood in the context of being constantly contested by other established Islamic organizations.

Such contestations are not a matter of being suppressed or not tolerated by other Islamic actors. Nor are the grassroots efforts themselves generally seen as an organizational or even theological deviation from the established Islamic ways. What is happening is the reproduction of the social hierarchies induced by colonialism and apartheid and ascribed to the different population groups, with Muslim converts having to fit into the respective modes of social and spatial orderings. In other words, the established Islamic institutions perceive Black African Muslims more as a population in need of poverty alleviation and development than of empowerment and self-esteem. In this regard, HANSEN (2012: 258) is incorrect when she states that "hardly any welfare work is carried out by Muslims [from established Indian Muslim institutions and denominations] in the African townships." The welfare work carried out in African townships by Islamic organizations either reported by the respondents or observed throughout the research periods is so extensive that Muslim converts perceive it as somewhat humiliating, instead desiring and demanding structural and especially religious recognition by such organizations. As one respondent commented on such welfare activities:

> "They are doing work over the African people. Indigenous people. They are uplifting them and so on. Obviously, they uplift us, no one doesn't uplift us, but you don't get uplifted. Everyone uplifts us, you see."[41]

Such stereotyping of Muslim converts from former Black African areas has been described by SITOTO (2002: 6) as the devaluing of African Muslims as a "charity case." Respondents from the cases featured here underscore such tendencies by providing further examples, such as the production and use of pictures of "poor Black Muslims" for fundraising issues[42] or the assumption that when African Muslims wearing Islamic dress enter shops run by Muslims from the Indian population group, they intend to beg. The latter aspect is, however, also critically reflected by Muslim converts, as some individuals do this, especially in the vicinity of mosques. Such activities can be described as opportunistic conversion, i.e. the appropriation of social and cultural signifiers in order to obtain social services from another group (cf. TAYOB 1999a: 97). Nevertheless, such contestations, set against the background of racist ascriptions and racialized social hierarchies, are viewed by Muslim converts among the indigenous African populations

[41]Interview with Solomon Phewa (2013).

[42]Interview with Omar (2013).

in the light of global colonialism and the oppression of Black people. As the respondent from above, continued in his comment, speaking about the welfare activities:

> "That is what Malcolm X said, you see, they speak to you as if they are speaking in front of a horse, or a cow. They are talking about you. You hear all that they say, but they regard you as if you are not there. Everybody uplifts us."[43]

African converts' experiences of racialization and segregationist tendencies related to contact with established Islamic organizations stretch back to the very beginnings of their conversion biographies. In his account on the Muslim Youth Movement, TAYOB (1995: 150) reports similar issues in the 1980s. In addition, interviewed converts who went to educational facilities such as a Darul Uloom or to Islamic gatherings report experiencing open racism aimed at them. Saliim Mthimkhulu, a Muslim from Newcastle in KwaZulu-Natal describes another version of such inscriptions of othering and foreignness to being Muslim. After he and others became Muslims while living in the Black African township of Osizweni, east of Newcastle, they had themselves dresses made that resembled an Islamic style but were made by local dressmakers out of colorful fabric from other African countries. Walking around in such attire, they were "looked upon by bystanders as being from Nigeria." When approaching stores in town that were run by Indians, where they had otherwise been treated with a certain distance because of their being Black African, they then experienced that shopkeepers were more than willing to invite them into their stores, sometimes even addressing them as Shaykh. When asked if they were from Nigeria, they replied that they were South Africans from Osizweni, which in most cases brought the friendliness to a sudden stop.[44]

Although these events date back to the time of apartheid, the converts are convinced that the reality in this regard has not changed at all. Saliim tells of his children, themselves now born Muslims, who still experience stigmatization and discrimination from their Non-Black schoolmates at their Islamic college.[45] Uniting the experiences of Muslim converts in everyday life with the discourse of colonial oppression and social as well as spatial injustice signifies to what an extent the factor of race became a bodily ascription to the subject and spatial inscription to the lived-in locality (cf. HAFERBURG 2007). Such racialized contestations of newly appropriated modes of orderings are experienced not only in relation to the field of establish

[43]Solomon Phewa (2013).

[44]Interview with Saliim Mthimkhulu (2015).

[45]Interview with Saliim Mthimkhulu (2015).

Muslims but also to the sphere of *orderly Africans*. Referring to a situation in Soweto, Gauteng, VAHED & JEPPIE (2005: 264) cite a Sotho-speaking Muslima, who embraced Islam in 1971, who reported that Islam is perceived by other Africans from her neighborhood as a "coolie thing," linked to those who exploit South Africa's indigenous population. This coincides with the experiences of African Muslims in Newcastle. There as well, the Indian-classified population was and still is perceived as having a dominating position. The view that African people working for Indians are treated and paid badly persists, kept alive by discourse and everyday life experiences. Islam is understood in that regard as an "Indian thing" or the "church of the Indians." Suspicion towards Islam due to its perception as the import of foreigners is also reflected in attitudes towards people from Malawi. In that case as well, Islam is not understood as a major global religion but as the church of the Malawians. The situation of distrust is even worse when the person associated with Islam in the Black African areas is not only regarded as a foreigner but especially as a refugee. Bilal Kasim, the son of Ishaq Kasim, once explained that he avoids walking around dressed in classic Islamic attire because it causes him to be perceived as a Somali refugee and thus badly treated by African South Africans. According to his experience, traders think of him as a beggar when he dresses in a kurta while doing business.[46] Similar tensions are reported by VAHED & JEPPIE (2005) with regard to aid activities towards Somali refugees carried out by the African Muslim Agency (AMA) in the late 1990s, as well as by (TAYOB 1999a: 97), who describes the unwillingness of Muslim converts among those classified as Black African in the town of Brits to dress in Islamic clothing because they do not wanting to be called "Indians."

The historical path dependency of Islam in the context of colonialism, apartheid, and the ordering of indigeneity brings about such social and socio-spatial conflicts evolving from the emergence of independent fields of Black Islam in those areas once classified as Black African (cf. VAHED 2000; SITOTO 2003). Those contestations in the contact zones translating Islamic modes of orderings into the realm of ordered African indigeneity create conflicting areas, leading to a constant contestation of these religious-cultural and religious-political transmutations. On the one hand, the wish to reclaim African indigeneity by becoming Muslim leads to a state of alienation from the community of origin. On the other, new conflicts with Muslims from the established field of institutionalized Islam arise, making the attempt to express and practice the Muslim faith independently difficult. As a continuation of the segregationist

[46] Interview with Bilal (2015).

politics under apartheid and the effects of division and rule, the historically racialized, uneven distribution of resources and thus the related colonial structures become visible as they are reflected in the structural possibilities of expressing faith and acting through religious communities. Although these contestations persistent into the contemporary realm of Black Muslim everyday life, they are far from the final stroke in the narrative of conversion to Islam and the practice of a re-ordered *African self*. On the contrary, the transgression continues by moving the social realm of being Muslim *and* Black away from the sphere of contestation into an anticipated future for a Black Muslim society—in cultural and spatial ways. The following will introduce a case study of contested belongings that exemplifies this development among a specific group of African Muslims, who are preparing for an *exodus,* or a *township Hijra,* to ultimately lead the African Muslims of South Africa away from the persistent modes of social and spatial orderings.

Attempting Muslim Blackness in KwaMashu: The Limitations to Re-Ordering Indigeneity within the *Doxic Landscape*

What began as the traveling of ideas and ideologies of Muslim Blackness into the South African sphere, with contact zones to Islam as an-*other* order offered by organizations such as the IPCI or the MYM, brought about a slow but steady shift within the *doxic landscape* of the modes of orderly indigeneity with regard to religion. In the greater Durban area, the specific local focus of this study, a small number of Muslim converts can be found—together with their children, the first generation of native born South African Black Muslims—in each former African township. Mostly as a consequence and continuation of the institutionalization carried out by the Muslim Youth Movement, these Muslims are closely connected with each other, investing an outstanding degree of energy, time, and economic resources into African Muslim community work and the shared efforts to establish an identity of being Muslim *and* Black. The case featured in the following section is set in the township of KwaMashu, north of Durban, a place specifically developed by the local apartheid government to function as a border township between the White urban area and the homeland of KwaZulu. Here, the organizational efforts of converts to Islam lead to the foundation of a mosque, which can be regarded in its material sophistication, visibility, size, and meaning as the most important development of African Muslim autonomy in KwaZulu-Natal. Nevertheless, the case also reveals the effects of contestations on Black Islam, as well as the impact that the conflicts with other Islamic organizations have had on the endeavors of those once classified as Black African to transgress orderly indigeneity. The case presented here represents a common sequence of events, as it is characterized by the dynamic cultural-political bricolage of Islamic grassroots developments among the Muslim converts in Black African areas, which have experienced strong contestations by and severe confrontations with Islamic organizations from the field of Indian Muslims. The broader field research related to this study documented other, similar stories and developments within various African areas of KwaZulu-Natal, whose comprehensive presentation here would exceed the scope of this study. Instead, the featured case from the

township of KwaMashu will serve as a representation for the contested belongings of converts to Islam among the indigenous African population and their attempts to continue their transgressions despite the persistent power of an orderly indigeneity that renders the wish for belonging and re-grounding a continuation of the signification as the *African other*.

A Space of Not-Belonging: New Town-Ship KwaMashu

Together with Umlazi and KwaDabeka, KwaMashu was one of the very first designated Black African townships near White Durban planned on the basis of British New Town principles (cf. MAYLAM & EDWARDS 1996: 116). Labelling the newly established townships New Towns was highly misleading: While the planning of New Towns was guided by the idea of creating fully independent habitats for living and working, the townships were still dependent on the White core city of Durban on a level of services and labor. Such settlements only served to cater to the demands of the White capitalist city, namely by housing a cheap, Non-White labor force.

Table 1: Historical development of KwaMashu. Source: (MANZI 1994: 46ff.)

Historical development of KwaMashu
proposed in 1948
1952: Durban City Council authorizes negotiations for land acquisition for 5,000 acres in Duff Road area; acquisition of 2620 acres in 1954
1956: approval by Minister of Native Affairs (nine village units, two hostel units, R19,362,000 for land, services, facilities, etc.)
1957: renaming Duffs Road scheme to Kwa-Mashu Housing scheme for approx. 123,500 people plus 2,500 beds in the hostels; construction takes place
1959: KwaMashu is handed over to the Director of Bantu Administration (accommodation for 10,000 people available)
1963: KwaMashu scheme completed as planned
1966: Spatial extension of KwaMashu
1970: Recreation facilities become available (soccer fields and stadiums, tennis courts, swimming pools, community halls, childcare centers)
1971: 15,404 houses for 107,000 people, plus hostel units for 16,880 people
1973: establishment of Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board (commencing the work of the Bantu Administration Committee of the Durban City Council)
1974: Self-governing status for KwaZulu
1977: Jurisdiction transferred to the KwaZulu 'Homeland-Government'

The built-up habitat of KwaMashu consisted of two forms of housing, high-density male hostels and family residential houses with two or four rooms, which could be rented or purchased. Only

one house could be owned or rented; sub-leasing or trading was not permitted at all. After the neighboring homeland of KwaZulu gained its self-governing status in 1974, the Durban townships of KwaMashu and Umlazi fell to the homeland-administration (LODGE, NASSON, MUFSON et al. 1991: 155). The removal of almost all Black African residents from the Greater Durban area to the newly created townships on the outskirts was completed, and the population deemed unwanted by apartheid legislation was removed from White Durban:

> "The largest towns with Zulu inhabitants are on the outskirts of Durban. Kwa Mashu is administered by the Port Natal Bantu Affairs Administration Board, but the official intention is that it should be incorporated in KwaZulu." (HORRELL, HORNER & HUDSON 1975: 195)

Even though Black African-classified people were regarded as temporary sojourners in the city space from that time on, the territories on both sides of the racialized border were intrinsically linked with each other. This is illustrated by SMITH (1990: 47) in Figure 7.



Figure 7: Segregating a Black workforce: migrant labor, frontier commuters, and permanent residents. Source: (SMITH 1990: 47).

The author notes:

> "[T]he KwaZulu townships are effectively part of metropolitan Durban and many of their residents commute into the city daily […], yet officially they belong to a separate self-governing territory which could ultimately become independent of the RSA." (SMITH 1990: 5)

The exclusion of KwaMashu from the territory of White Durban and the subsequent transfer of jurisdiction to the pseudo-independent but relatively powerless government of KwaZulu rendered the inhabitants of the incorporated townships foreigners in Durban, frontier commuters (as explained above in the section "The Spatial Ordering of Indigeneity," see also maps 4 and 12), living on the supposedly international boundary between the White-inclusive urban and industrial core and the excluded Black African homeland-to-be KwaZulu (SMITH 1990: 47). MANZI (1994) presents an intriguing socio-economic analysis of KwaMashu and its residents, exposing a cruel sense of place based on a constant feeling and knowledge of not-belonging. The majority of the people interviewed in his study stated that—despite having been forcefully evicted—they initially perceived the relocation from their former slum homes to the housing scheme to be an improvement in housing quality at least; however, the hopes they projected onto KwaMashu were not fulfilled. Instead, insecurity, in terms of both social ties and safety, became their reality. While the costs for the newly erected public housing homes were relatively low, the uniformity of the poorly built, box-shaped houses together with the lack of maintenance and the lack of proper service facilities and communal places resulted in socio-economic degradation, which left the inhabitants of KwaMashu with a severely low standard of living (MANZI 1994: 62). All the so-called improvements the White administration of the city of Durban promised the new housing scheme would bring to the Black African population could not cover the actual lack of choice and opportunity it brought, nor make up for the frustration that was and is experienced by the younger inhabitants, who have constantly found themselves "facing barriers when trying to improve their life chances" (ibid.: 63) (whereas the older generation has tended to find itself in apathy). The whole area quickly devolved into a state of social and spatial decay, brought about by a combination of violence, crime, delinquency, and alcoholism. All these conditions are of crucial relevance for the unsettledness inscribed upon the inhabitants in bodily terms, as well as for their contested longing for belonging and their struggle for control over the very modes of social and spatial ordering while living in the dis-orderly dystopia of everyday life. As MANZI (1994: 64) summarizes it:

> "The problems encountered are directly responsible for the generation of either demoralization or personal rebellion. […] The salient characteristics of the culture of 'NOT BELONGING' include a high incidence of social 'pathologies,' family disorganization and breakdown; mother dominance and male marginality in the family;

> the weakness or absence of male models in child socialization; self-control bringing no rewards, leading to wasteful hedonistic lifestyles; a belief that life is ruled by luck or supernatural forces."

Despite their self-developed sense of belongings, the places of origin of the new denizens of KwaMashu had been declared dis-orderly by the logics of social and spatial orderings of apartheid legislation. The new township was meant to be a space for the *African other*, ordering the population group into the larger scheme of apartheid segregation. In contrast, the lived-in reality of the relocated people quickly inscribed a sense of continuous unsettledness within the boundaries of the orderly planned New Town-Ship of KwaMashu, a dystopia of dis-orderly indigeneity.

From the mid-1970s onwards, KwaMashu and the two neighboring townships of Inanda, which developed out of a mission station (cf. HUGHES 1996), and Ntuzuma became major centers for the work of the Muslim Youth Movement and the organization's Africanization strategy. The Sunday Islamic School Program (cf. MUSLIM YOUTH MOVEMENT OF SOUTH AFRICA (MYMSA) 2017: 22) and events meant to serve the African community of KwaMashu took place on a regular basis. The result was a relatively high degree of organization among the African Muslim congregation and a pull factor for Muslim converts from other Black African townships around Durban. KwaMashu, and especially the area of Section J, became an epicenter for Muslims among the indigenous African population. The work of the MYM in that area and its subsequent impact were multiplied to a great degree by the presence of the Malawian Islamic scholar Shaykh Abbas Phiri in KwaMashu (VAWDA 2004, 1994). Phiri, a charismatic personality, entered South Africa in the 1940s and settled in Ntuzuma in the 1970s, turning his home into a jamāt khane, a madrassa, and a meeting place for Muslims in the area. From the beginning, the MYM and Phiri joined forces in their efforts to bring Black African-classified people in contact with the ordering sphere of Islam.[47] His proselytizing strategies among the indigenous African population were built on welfare work together with the lobbying of Islamic activities among the traditional, local authorities (VAWDA 1994: 539). His mandate to speak *for the African self* and to be heard by authorities of the indigenous population must be seen in relation to his origin as a Muslim of African nativity. This is of crucial importance for understanding how nascent Black *and* Muslim indigeneity could only gain momentum when translated by personalities that the converts themselves regarded as indigenous. While the

[47]Interview with Bongani (23.3.2015).

MYM's da'wah activities were extended into the sphere of Black South Africa, making use of globalized narratives of Muslim Blackness as a facilitator to transport the ideology of Islamic resurgence as an-*other* order through the contact zones and the racialized socio-spatial boundaries, they were still perceived as deriving from the field of Indian Muslims. The fact that only a person of African descent could be accepted as a leader and transmitting intermediary for the converts to Islam underscores the degree of racial segregation and racialized modes of orderings resulting from three centuries of White domination. Another personality ascribed the quality of an indigenous leader is Imam Issa al-Seppe, a convert from the Black African townships who became a chairman of the Muslim Youth Movement (SITOTO 2002, 2003; cf. LE ROUX & NEL 1998). His death in 2002 is described by Black African Muslims still today as a tragedy and the heavy loss of a leader.[48] Presently, the aforementioned Malawian-born Islamic scholar Ishaq Kasim is widely regarded by Muslims from former Black African areas of Durban as the successor to indigenous Islamic leaders such as al-Seppe or Abbas Phiri:

> "When Essa Al-Seppe passed away, ay, every African Muslim said, now we are in trouble. He was a leader; he was a great leader. The quality of leadership. He had everything. Now we got another Shaykh, we call him a shaykh, Kasim Ishaq. He is another great scholar. He is the only one that we have, an indigenous Muslim."[49]

The persistence of the modes ordering indigeneity up until today presupposes a racialized ascription to the question of who is mandated to represent the African Muslim community. The early converts to Islam from KwaMashu formed a committee with the purpose of erecting a mosque in KwaMashu. Phiri facilitated the process and the necessary fundraising and later became head of the mosque. Before it was established as a solid building, the mosque started in a provisional tent (see picture 4). In the 1980s, the mosque became more than a religious place: It hosted a variety of welfare initiatives and social programs, ranging from educational courses, to feeding schemes and sports programming, such as Karate classes and its own football team, the Mosquitos.[50]

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[48]Interview with Shaykh Dawud Cele and Shaykh Thabani Isreal Ally Mwandla (2015).

[49]Shaykh Dawud Cele (2015).

[50]Interview with Shayk Ishaq Kasim (2015); Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015).

Picture 4: Provisional KwaMashu mosque, probably in the late 1970s. Picture: Amin Ngubane.

At the same time, a number of the converts to Islam from different Black African group areas who were active in the foundation and construction of the mosque decided to move into the vicinity of the building in order to materialize the creation of a Black Muslim community and to make Islam more visible in the African township:

> "I felt that all the group who were Muslim in that town must all go and buy houses next to the masjid so that we can support the masjid and that people can easily know that this is a Muslim. And fortunately, most of the guys who were part of us at that time all had their houses here at J Section. I am counting who is late, Abdumalik is also late, Cassiem was at P Section, though others have moved out from the township, we were all concentrated in this area. With the hope that, because our intention was to try first Islamize J Section. Let people in J Section become Muslim so that we can be able to spread Islam throughout the township. Even our letterheads were KwaMashu-Ntuzuma Muslim Association because we originated from Ntuzuma. So, we expand to KwaMashu. So, we grew up, I bought this house in 1983, and Idris [see picture 5 above] also bought another one, also in 1983. We all stayed within this area since then, in the J Section. After 1985, I resigned my job. I started with, both of us Idris and I, we start business here in the center because we wanted to be seen doing our prayers as it has been stated by the Quran."[51]

[51]Amin Ngubane (2015).

The founding of the mosque created momentum for community building and intensified the grassroots approach to Islamic education and the religious appropriation of Islam among Muslim converts. The vision for a re-ordered lived-in place was based on the image of the ideal Muslim community of the prophet Muhammad and the first congregation of Muslims, forming a spatial nucleus around the mosque. Guided by scholars such as Abbas Phiri and Ishaq Kasim, who mainly organized the social activities in the 1980s, the converts read and discussed the Qur'an and other Islamic sources, learned about the Hadith (the verified expressions of the prophet and the second most important scriptural source after the Qur'an), and educated themselves in the history of Islam, especially from a Pan-Africanist perspective. As a result of the Black Muslim ideologies from the Afro-American realm circulating among the converts and serving as a foil to the re-ordering of indigeneity as Black *and* Muslim, the new theological sphere was imbued with a strong connotation of social justice. These discursive processes were most definitely influenced by the work of the MYM that brought the religious dimensions of Islam together with the desire to have an impact on everyday life, and they offered the converts a way to contextualize their existence as the *African other* and locate it in a larger framework of oppressive Western and Christian regimes. At the same time, aside from such religious-political implications, the shifting of the routines of everyday life through the newly adopted rituals, such as keeping strict prayer times and the associated washing rituals, or the visible wearing of dress inspired by the new Islamic perspective, led to a constant re-ordering on the level of the bodily subject. Creating visibility was important for connecting the social impact and change with the new normality of Islam as everyday life practice.

Each step the grassroots development of Muslims in Black African townships took in transgressing the modes of ordering indigeneity was answered by contestation from other Islamic organizations from the field of so-called Indian Muslims. The institutionalization of a growing number of African Muslims did not happen independently but was supported from the very beginning by funds from other Muslim organizations or families. In the view of the interviewed converts, such help and funding were not per se problematic; however, a growing number of Muslims among the newly founded congregations viewed it in light of the hegemonic relations and segregationist hierarchy among the different population groups during apartheid and began to perceive the influence as oppressive: "Indians enslaved the whole system, telling you what to say and to do."[52] Based on the Islamic principle of *zakat*, the welfare-related

[52]Shaykh Ishaq Kasim (2013).

fundraising and religious obligation to share one's wealth, the Islamic financial landscape and the structure for collecting funds for Islamic developments saw a certain professionalization during the second half of the twentieth century. The Muslim Youth Movement founded its own Zakah fund, which later became the South African National Zakah Fund. Furthermore, the Youth Movement created the financial investment company Jaame. In addition, two Islamic banks, the Al-Barakah bank linked to a wealthy family from Saudi Arabia and the Islamic Bank of South Africa, grew in importance to the structural development of Islam in South Africa (cf. TAYOB 1995: 182). The construction and development of the mosque in KwaMashu was mainly funded by these banks.[53] Parallel to receiving funds from such organizations, the new converts began to create their own institutional structure. The aforementioned KwaMashu-Ntuzuma Muslim Association became the first attempt to do so, with an organizational structure consisting only of Muslims from Black African areas. To finance welfare activities and social events, each Muslim belonging to the congregation had to make a weekly donation. As the number of converts grew, so did the funds. At the same time, a discourse of making the mosque financially independent from other Islamic institutions evolved among the Muslim converts. However, not all of them supported such a move, criticizing that this would only run along the lines of those racist modes of orderings they had hoped to overcome by joining a brotherhood of Muslims with an ordering logic beyond the sphere of apartheid.[54] Nevertheless, while the structural support from Indian Muslim organizations was seen as a help in terms of funds, it was also perceived as an attempt to control the Islam preached and discussed in KwaMashu.[55] These tensions led to a split in the group after the circulation of an article from a Saudi-Arabian newspaper in the 1990s that mentioned an additional donation given to the mosque of the indigenous African converts. Some of the converts demanded to see the money, and an open conflict about the legitimacy of the mosque leadership broke out. The dispute led to a certain disillusionment among the congregation, a subsequent discrediting of the group, and a loss of religious followers. Respondents who were active during that time pointed out that many of those from the townships who had been attending prayer times and social functions could be found at the Shembe church after the conflict broke out. The remaining Muslim converts had to realize that the Shembe, or Nazareth Baptist Church, was a direct competitor of the Islamic

[53]Interview with Bilal Zizi (2015); Interview with Bongani (2015).

[54]Interview with Bilal Zizi (2015).

[55]Interview with Amin Ngubane (2015).

ideology when it came to acquiring followers in the Black African townships, who sought a religious authenticity and native religiosity.

> "Shembe? Those people, they are supposed to be Muslims. But I cannot see where it went wrong. And Shembe is a very big church because it comes from an indigenous African. If Islam from that time it came from a Black person, it would be all over. Many Muslims, Black Muslims, who left Islam they went to Shembe."[56]

Within the religious sphere of transgressing the *African other* resulting from the modes of ordering indigeneity, Shembe had a decisive advantage over Islam among those once classified as Black African, as it builds on a reputation of originating from an indigenous African leader, not only in terms of organization but also of theology and religious rituals. As an African-initiated church, the Shembe belief system builds strongly on merging Christian elements with rituals deriving from pre-Christianized African religions. Especially among the Zulu, Shembe enjoys a good reputation and is endorsed by the existing traditional leadership structures (cf. RIEDKE 2016: 53).

In reaction to the conflict over the donations from Saudi Arabia and the influence of Non-African Muslims on the KwaMashu mosque, the splinter group founded the Organization of African Muslim Unity in 1997 (cf. SITOTO 2003, 2002), named with obvious reference to the Organization of Muslim Unity founded by Malcolm X after his parting ways with the Nation of Islam. They built their own jamāt khane, a house for prayers and religious functions, two blocks away from the KwaMashu mosque. The impact and outreach of the organization has remained limited up until today, although theie jamāt khane has become a vibrant space for African Muslim activities. With the modes ordering indigeneity consisting of spatial *and* bodily inscriptions, the conflicts and contestations between the field of Indian Muslims and those converts to Islam seeking African indigeneity as Black *and* Muslim became more than just religious-political disputes over institutionalized power relations. The transmutation and re-ordering of the *African self* is a transgression of the very body of the *African other* as deliniated by the social and spatial modes of order that defined indigeneity—for the African subject as well as for people of other classifications, e.g. Muslims once classified as Indian, who had come to look at the indigenous population as the other. The developments around the KwaMashu community reveal that the contestations around the contact zones run deeper than merely the question of who is organizing the mosque. Transgressing orderly indigeneity by means of Islam

[56]Shaykh Thabani Isreal Ally Mwandla (2015).

touches the spheres of social disputes and territorial struggles, as well as the scale of the body as the realm where resisting and transgressing the permanence of inscribed modes of orders becomes a highly contested and difficult task. The following section will present a case from the township of KwaMashu which highlights these bodily dimensions of the politics of indigenization in the context of Islamic ideology.

KwaMashu Cemetery: Death, Deathscapes and Politics of the Corpse

In September 2015, news circulated about a Muslim cemetery being reopened in the former Black African township of KwaMashu. Its origins can be dated back to 1908, with five Muslim graves from the Dhooma and Bassa families still on site. The cemetery is situated close to Inanda, the neighboring area of KwaMashu and the assumed place of residence of the buried families (SUDER 2015a). The head of the Islamic Burial Society, Ahmed Paruk, is cited in the Al-Qalam online newspaper saying that more cemetery space is needed due to an increasing influx of Muslims from the Indian sub-continent and African countries, especially over the last ten years (SUDER 2015a). No reference is made to African Muslims from the KwaMashu area or any other Muslim community from neighboring townships. This is even more curious, as the KwaMashu mosque, which had been established under the auspices of converts from the Black African-classified population in the 1970s and 1980s, is included in the preliminary planning for the reopening of the graveyard. These plans include extending their building with a ghusl khane, where the ritual washing of the body of the deceased is performed. At the same time, a small graveyard next to the mosque, established by Muslim converts from KwaMashu themselves, is poorly maintained. The aforementioned Imbumba Muslim Foundation, a burial foundation established in 2011 by Muslims from former Black African areas of KwaZulu-Natal, is linked to these efforts to finance and organize Islamic burials for African Muslims, and the setbacks they have experienced reflect the struggle for independent facilities for that group. The reopening of the cemetery and the associated connotations of superiority and inferiority along the lines of racial and colonial population groups can be approached by understanding the specific configuration as a *deathscape* (KONG 1999, 2001a, 2004; MADDRELL & SIDAWAY 2010), i.e. as meanings invested in space through place-making processes anchored in matters of death, dying, mourning, and remembrance (cf. forward by Lily Kong in MADDRELL & SIDAWAY 2010). A space of mourning reflects not only the sensual, emotional, bodily-inscribed, and ascriptive qualities of the *scape* but also the power relations within and between social groups. Thus, it is considered an expression of power politics with the potential to express and manifest

and hence secure hegemonic positions over time. Following MADDRELL & SIDAWAY (2010: 4f.), *deathscapes*, are thus a way of understanding contemporary social processes and the intersection of society, space, and power. The extent of such thinking and the spatial scale of the scape can range from artifacts such as roadside memorials (HARTIG & DUNN 1998), to burial and memorial sites like cemeteries or columbaria (TEATHER 1998; KONG 1999), or even complete sections of an urban space, appropriated in its meaningful significations by death, memory, and power. (KONG 1999: 3, 6f.) provides the example of the Tel Aviv city square in reference to the assassination of the former prime minister of Israel, Yitzhak Rabin.

Deathscapes "illustrate the constructions of nations and the politics of internation [sic!] relations. […] [M]eanings are invested in deathscapes which speak about the power relations between nations" (KONG 2001a: 217). In this regard, the fact that the KwaMashu cemetery was reopened by a group of Muslims described by the interviewed converts as Indians represents the perceived superior positioning of the one population group (Indian) over the other (Black African). Against the backdrop of the segregative politics of colonial South Africa as well as the social, economic, and spatial interventions of apartheid, this conflict resembles the scale of the previously mentioned relations between nations (cf. ibid.) and represents the persistent divisions stemming from centuries of division and rule. CHRISTOPHER (1995) provides us with an intriguing analysis of the cemeteries in the city of Port Elizabeth in the Eastern Cape of South Africa. He reveals that a racial segregation *within* the burial sites ultimately gave way to a segregation *of* the cemeteries themselves along the lines of racialized segmentation of space after 1948, the year when the National Party gained power over South Africa and began instituting apartheid. Such patterns have been replicated throughout South Africa, with the effect that the radical segregation of space and society in terms of religion and race (ibid.: 45) is again reproduced in the example of the Muslim graveyard in KwaMashu. This cemetery reopening fails to include all Muslims, thereby revealing territorial tensions among the population groups brought into social and spatial existence by apartheid.

Contestations through space for death can, as KONG (1999: 3) identifies, evolve around three major fields, i.e. the sacred vs. the secular, within and between constructs of sacredness, and as power relations along the lines of gender, class, and race. Those aspects apply too in the featured case. First, Muslims from the KwaMashu township avoid entering the old cemetery as it is located in proximity to the former workers' hostels and therefore sits in a socially problematic area:

> "We [Muslims from KwaMashu] do not go there because of the area as we could be seen there and then could get into problem with gangsterism at the location. […] It is

> easy for the Indians to go there because they could just come and fffft [blows air through his teeth], in and out."[57]

Here, not only do the racialized aspects of the *deathscape* come to the fore but also the different secularized positions of the actors in relation to the locale of the cemetery. While both actor groups may share the inherent sacredness of a Muslim graveyard, they decode the socio-spatial implication of the secular space of the hostels on various levels with different implications for the everyday lives of the actors that want to access the cemetery.

Those workers' hostels or compounds can be found around all major industrial cities of South Africa. They date back to a system established at the beginning of the twentieth century that was set up to facilitate accommodation to an all-male workforce from the indigenous population working in the industrial sector or the mines. Those men were initially hosted on a private basis, mostly in so called backyard quarters (DAVIES 1991: 76). The municipal administration perceived them as a migratory workforce and thus as temporary sojourners. The social reality of the workforce-related influx developed differently than the cities and their administrators had anticipated, threatening the idea of an orderly, exclusively White urban space in colonial South Africa.

Durban followed the same path as the other major metropoles of twentieth century South Africa, experiencing an intense influx of people classified as non-White or non-European into the vicinity of the industrial growth areas surrounding the harbor city. The majority settled outside of the city limits which created unplanned, informal settlements. Most prominently among these was Cato Manor, an area that persisted throughout the whole period of apartheid despite its complete demolition and thus became a symbol of territorial resistance to the spatial racism of the system (see amongst others MAHARAJ 1994; POPKE 2001).

With the expansion of the borough of Durban in 1932 and the beginning of racial demarcation in the 1950s, most of the workers were relocated to hostels in the newly built Black African townships, such as Umlazi or KwaMashu. The living conditions in the overcrowded and under-facilitated compounds were bleak, best represented by the example of the sanitary conditions provided by the so-called shit-bucket system, run by shit workers who collected the buckets from each compartment (cf. HEMSON 1996: 166).[58] Nevertheless, the hostels were run by the city for

[57]Abdulrazaq (22.3.2015).

[58]Personal communiqué with Muhammad Green (2015).

as long as there was a need for cheap workforce and the South African city space attracted workers from the rural areas (SMITH 1990; MAHARAJ 2002a, b). No longer facilitated by the municipality as worker's hostels for the male, migratory workforce, today, most of these old and often deteriorated housing areas in the African townships of eThekwini, the post-apartheid metropolitan municipality that includes the city of Durban, are either afflicted by severe social problems and crime or at least perceived as such by the neighboring population. This not only implies a socio-spatial efficacy for the specific location of the former worker's hostels but also an ascription of ordering towards the subjects that enter such spaces, especially on a regular basis. For a person who is not an inhabitant of the KwaMashu township, such as Muslims from other areas, and those who have not been classified as Black African, the ordering scheme and the place-to-subject ascriptions only act upon them for a limited time. In contrast, a Muslim who lives in KwaMashu may not be able to avoid a longer tie to the socio-spatial implications related to that space, because they remain within its social sphere, leading them to naturally fear getting involved in issues that stem from that area or raising the suspicion of being so among other people in KwaMashu. The negative ascriptions evolving from the hostels are also linked to the history of in-fights among the population of the former Black African areas in the late 1980s and early 1990s, as the hostels' inhabitants represented a different fraction from the majority of those living elsewhere in KwaMashu.[59]

Such differences in the ascription of secular or sacred significations to certain places reveal the contestations which are—against the backdrop of a history of territorial segregation and social stratification along the lines of race and class—profoundly *in place*, thus making the reopening of an old graveyard more than just an issue of reviving the function of a religious place. As part of the micro- to meso-scale of Durban's *doxic landscape* of social and spatial modes of orderings, the place of the graveyard and the differences in its accessibility represent a *deathscape*, a place of contestations between the sacred and the secular, constantly reflecting the stratifications of socio-spatial power relations along the lines of racial inscriptions.

A second aspect further reveals the reopened graveyard as a space contested according to different constructions of sacredness (KONG 1999: 3). Several interviewed converts mentioned their skepticism about being able to be buried at the reopened cemetery at all because they are not accepted by the established Muslim groups: "We were not even invited [to the reopening].

[59]Interview with Bongani (2015).

I read about it in the news. The usual people were there, yes, also some of the long-standing African Muslims. But they do not represent us."[60].

Sacred space is inherently contested space: It is neither elusive nor constituted but taken, negotiated, defended, and re-appropriated. It reflects the overall power structure of a society (cf. CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995: 15f.). Conceptualizing the graveyard as a *deathscape* helps to understand the perceived and enacted control over territory by a single group. Death, burial, and mourning become matters of control over access, exclusion, and inclusion. Spatial and practical connections to and interactions with the graveyard thus depends on the "interpretive potential of the site" (CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995: 3) and the sacred place becomes a reflection of the persisting tensions among a society divided by apartheid. The powerless actors become spaceless and are left fighting over death practices and even the bodies of the deceased—over the politics of the corpse.

One specific example occurred in 2015 during one of my research periods: The story spread quickly among members of the Black African Muslim community and became a reference for identifying and aligning oneself in the power-play between *indigenous* converts and *born* Muslims. Allan Idris Mabaso, a convert from KwaZulu-Natal, passed away while residing near Heidelberg, south of Johannesburg. Being the only Muslim convert in his family, his relatives refused to have him buried according to Islamic regulations, instead insisting on a Christian burial. However, his wife Fazila Mabaso was able to stop those burial plans through a court injunction, and Mabaso's body was handed over to Muslims who traveled to Heidelberg to retrieve the corpse. Nevertheless, a vocal Moulana from the mosque allegedly demanded verification that the deceased was indeed a Muslim. While the Imam Moulana Cassim Jada, who dealt with the case, say that claim is utterly and entirely untrue and that the mosque works closely with the African communities, catering to disadvantaged African Muslims (SUDER 2015b), the current President of the Muslim Youth Movement Thandile Kona stated that

> "Part of the problem when it comes to burials is the ostracism and isolation faced by Muslims of African origin. We are in limbo, not fully part of the Muslim community and seen as having deserted our 'own' communities and families. Non-Muslims see the disparities in the Muslim community, and some have experienced discrimination at the hands of Muslims… and they can't understand our embracing of what to them is a 'religion of Indians.' Therefore, when an indigenous Muslim dies, the family and the non-Muslim community from which he or she comes, see an opportunity to 'reclaim'

[60]Solomon Phewa (2015).

> their own who had lost his or her way. The attitude is 'you had him/her in life, you can't have him in death.'" (Thandile Kona as cited in SUDER 2015b)

Along the divisions *within* one religious faith, the politics of death are not only tied to contradictory claims to territory and power but also extend to the body of the deceased, thus producing the politics of the corpse within the framework of deathscapes. In what seems to be a case of self-determination regarding the question of where to be buried, the divisions stemming from the colonial heritage of the South African society come to represent the self *through* the suffering of the group, i.e. Black African Muslims. In the case of Black African Muslims, therefore, death and burial involve conflicts over territory, bodies, and the practices of dying and mourning, while at the same time representing the overall situation of belonging neither to the group of origin (Black African) nor the group of redefined belonging (Muslims).

Finally, the reaction of the Imam of the Heidelberg mosque points to the third major field of Kong's contestations through spaces of death described above, i.e. the intrinsic power relations along the lines of race, class, gender, and ethnicity. Confronted with the conflict over verifying that the deceased was a Muslim, the Imam questioned mentions that Islamic institutions have a strong relationship to the believers in the Black African areas because they specifically cater to disadvantaged African Muslims. Thus he automatically associates Muslims from those parts of society once classified as Black African with being disadvantaged. This discursive interlinkage again represents the persistent inequalities that are lived out along the lines of racial divisions through South African society: Converts from the Black African part of society do not feel fully integrated into the Muslim community, because they are regarded as poor and disadvantaged subjects. At the same time, the established Muslim institutions that can be linked to the category of Indians do not understand this critique of treating Muslims unequally, because they do help disadvantaged African Muslims who are newcomers to the religion of Islam. The category of Black African is perceived as well as experience as the inferior, which represents and reenacts the racialized classifications in their hegemonic order as it was defined during the apartheid era, from White at the top to Black African at the bottom.

Throughout the different research periods of the featured case studies, one of the initial questions I posed to new contacts among the Muslim converts was about forms of self-organized Islamic institutions. Somewhat surprisingly, in many cases the very first attempt at self-organization had been the establishment of a burial society. It was not the formation of an Islamic center, a community group, or a circle for religious education, but the setting up of a society to care for the deceased and raise funds for the members' burials that was the focus of efforts to manifest a self-determined Black African Islam. The rather strict Islamic rules

surround the death and the burial of a Muslim may be one reason for this. Nevertheless, the example of the conflicts surrounding the KwaMashu cemetery presented here reveals the intricate politics of the religious self-determination of subjects set within a religious landscape where religion was and still is a colonial tool, and where the politics of self-determination are strongly limited by the scope of acting them out in territorial, material, symbolic, and practical terms. Therefore, as the territorial and spatial aspects are largely unattainable, the material, symbolic, and practical aspects of self-determination become the centerpiece of power over the self and the group. In this regard, control over one's own body is regarded as a quintessential symbol of success, while the control over a corpse equates to control over the representation of a new order of practices and identity.

With reference to TUAN (1978), (CHIDESTER & LINENTHAL 1995) highlight the importance of posing the simple question of the "meaning of the sacred," thereby exploring various dimensions of experience, definition, wholeness, order, and power in order to understand the entanglements of sacredness and space beyond traditional, culture-bound images (a shrine, a temple, a bishop being consecrated (cf. TUAN 1978: 84)). While sacred space is nothing more or less than space of apartness and definition, which is separated, delineated, and cut off from the surrounding homogeneity experienced in profane space (cf. KONG 2009b), it is the "[s]acred phenomena […] that stand out from the commonplace and interrupt routine" (TUAN 1978: 84). The case of the Muslim cemetery exemplifies how religious place-making is experienced as an interruption of routine within the lived-in places, which fails to wholly break with the social and spatial orderings of the persistent racialized dialectics of us and them, of those ascribed with more power than the other by the old regime of White minority rule. Symbolizing the post-apartheid liberties of Indian Muslims, who are able to restore their place-boundedness in the former Black African segregated areas, the reopening of the Muslim cemetery in KwaMashu does not question but rather reifies the routines of social and spatial racialization. Spatial appropriation is still enabled by a hegemonic relationality between the former race groups. Therefore, Islam may stand as an anti-order to the spatial inscriptions of apartheid, but it is not an-*other* order, a *heterotopia*, or state of exception to the persistent socio-spatial ascriptions, restrictions, and injustices experienced by those who lead their everyday lives within the former Black African townships.

Thus, the reopened cemetery becomes a space of contestation for the Muslims among the indigenous African population of KwaMashu, who are left without power and mandate as a result of persistent race relations. Given the inability to act as African Muslims in religious-territorial terms, the politics of the corpse become a pivotal positionality within contestations of

the persistent order. Expressing the need to follow Islamic rituals is a political message aimed at delineating the self from the Christianized and therefore colonized Africanness in the Black African townships. Therefore, establishing self-organized burial funds and organizations is an intriguingly important step for converts to Islam among the indigenous African population, though it is a step that is often accompanied by experiences of failure. Nevertheless, while the self-determined institutionalization of Islamic societies from within the emerging field of Black Muslims in South Africa is still strongly contested by established Islamic organizations, the politics of the corpse seem to be an equally if not more important field for organizational energy. While actors from the field of established Muslim organizations claim the politics of the territoriality of Islamic burials as one of their fields of influence, the African Muslims interact and engage with the politics of the Black *and* Muslim corpse, rendering Muslim Blackness—even in death—a transgression of existing modes of social and spatial orderings.

The examples provided in this chapter concerning attempts to re-order indigeneity within the realm of Black Islam show that the processes of conversion in the contact zones and attempts to Africanize Islam in South Africa on disputed grounds are leading to a more fundamentalist stance in the Africanist tendencies of some of the converts. The message of African authenticity and the religious indigeneity of Islam is being translated into a wish for African homogenization, understood as a racial exclusivity. Founding independent Islamic institutions and organizations within the Black African areas has not only been a matter of proselytism, historically or today; such activities can also be aimed at creating "100% pure Black Muslim" structures.[61] Transgressing socio-cultural modes of order of the *African other* have become less an aspect of authenticity than of purification, thus resembling the racist ascriptions of colonialism and apartheid. The Islamic message has not been able fully transgress or transcend the racist tendencies between the Indian and African population groups. Although conversion to Islam offered and offers a measure of hope for social change (cf. TAYOB 1999a: 99), it was and is still perceived as an "Indian thing."[62] The orthodoxy of the established Islamic scholars from the field of Indian Muslim organizations has contributed to these racialized tendencies and prolonged their existence into the era of post-apartheid South Africa. "Truth has become synonymous with the *Ulama* and to question the *Ulama* means questioning the truth" (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 262). Thus, after more than thirty years of emerging Muslim Blackness,

[61]Solomon Phewa (2013) in front of the Intake Islamic Center.

[62]Interview with Saliim Mthimkhulu (2015).

transgressing orderly indigeneity is still a work in progress. The break-away group of Muslims in KwaMashu who founded their own jamāt khane continue with their transgressions by following a path of self-reformation of Islam in order to self-appropriate *Africanness*. In a common development among politicized Muslims in South Africa (ibid.), they have attached themselves to a Sufi Shaykh, who preaches promises of a new era of indigenous Islamic hegemony, as the following chapter of this study will illustrate.

Continuous Transgression: Departing Orderly Indigeneity

When people from Black African group areas engaged with concepts of Muslim Blackness during apartheid, they did so in order to ground themselves in an ideology that allowed them to deconstruct the existing modes of social and spatial orderings in a truly transformative way. Islam as religion, way of life, and socio-political foundation became a window of opportunity, a heterotopic space which made it possible to question the oppressive orderings of indigeneity as the *African other* and therefore the routines of everyday life in their lived-in places. As an element of orderly African identity, Christianity came into question as well. Re-thinking their own lives through the theology and Non-White history of Islam led converts to reposition the Christian religion, shifting it into the realm of the oppressive order, while they came to understand Islam as the revolutionary African way. Inspired by examples of Muslim Blackness from the Afro-American context and the re-ordered model of an Islamic nation created by the Iranian revolution, the Black African-classified converts to Islam found a way to embed the South African discourse of Black Consciousness into a framework of social and cultural transformation, which promised to eventually succeed. While the support provided by Islamic organizations in the contact zones and by born Muslims from other African countries facilitated the emergence of a field of indigenous African converts to Islam, the spatial segregation of the converts' lived-in places not only necessitated organizational autonomy but also led to a grassroots moment transmuting the *African self* into the Islamic realm. Having a religious as well as political scope, these developments were often in positions contradictory to organizations from the established field of Muslim communities and institutions and their perspectives on an Africanized Islam. Such contestations began to gain momentum, especially after the end of apartheid and the subsequent permeability of the former segregated group areas. While the re-ordering of African indigeneity on such disputed grounds led to disillusionment for some, others saw the contestations as a continuation of oppressive colonial-hegemonic race relations, thus viewing their evolving Muslim Blackness as a continuous transgression of persisting modes of orderings. The break-away group from the KwaMashu mosque is one example for such attempts to create new foundations for an Africanized Islam in contrast to the local field of Muslimness. In their search for spiritual leadership, the group became attracted to a Sufi

movement which offered more than a foundation for the re-ordered self in the places of everyday life. As will be explained in the following final case of this study, the Sufi movement in question also offers a vision for a new order, beyond the lived-in locale and beyond the failed post-apartheid promise. By uniting the message of a global emergence of Islamic liberation for oppressed indigenous people with the specific social and spatial modes ordering the South African sphere, the movement extends the new promise of what can be called *indigenous millennialism*, which—it is believed—will eventually lead the oppressed indigenous Africans out of those spaces that continually ascribe oppression to the African subject. This final empirical chapter discusses these continuous transgressions. In order to provide a concise understanding for the magnitude of the Murabitun ideology in the context of *Blackness* in South Africa, the following section will first discuss the teachings of the Shaykh of the Murabitun, Abdulqadir as-Sufi. Some academic accounts on the Sufi order exist (LE ROUX & NEL 1998; HERMANSEN 2000; HARON 2005; ARIGITA 2006; DOUBLEDAY & COLEMAN 2008; BUBANDT 2009, 2011; ROSÓN LORENTE 2014; PASTOR DE MARIA Y CAMPOS 2015), but none of them so far has payed attention to its actual ideological basis. As the writings and teachings of this movement became a central focus in the interviews and group discussions of the research at the heart of this study, this chapter will try to close this critical gap in the analysis of the Murabitun order and their fundamentalist influence on the identity of some Black *and* Muslim South Africans.[63]

Indigenous Millennialism: The Religious, Social, and Spatial Promise of Black Muslim Indigeneity

In the early 1980s, Abdalqadir as-Sufi, a Scottish convert to Islam and founder of the Murabitun Sufi order,[64] began with his ideological outreach and da'wah activities (Islamic missionary work) in South Africa. His involvement specifically aimed at those parts of the population that were, under the racist logics of the apartheid state, classified as Black African. He started preaching a millenarian promise of Islamic revival in a global context of anti-Western and anti-capitalist thought. His message is contingent on the racialization of belonging with absolute and fundamentalist differentiations between a *Muslim us* and a *kuffar*, a *non-believer them*. His outreach

[63]Parts of the chapter will be made available in a revised version in an upcoming publication (GEBAUER 2019 (forthcoming)).

[64]The term "order" for Sufi groups is to a certain degree misleading, as it may imply a centrally organized hierarchy. Instead, Sufi "orders" are characterized by a more fluid hierarchical structure, with the figure of the shaykh being a the central focal point in organizational and spiritual terms (cf. MARTIN 2004: 680f.).

soon attracted those searching for an alternative spiritual and political basis for transgressing the social and spatial modes of ordering in their lived-in places. In a social setting where indigeneity was defined and regulated to perfection by an oppressive White minority in order to support and justify the differentiation of domination and subordination along the dialectic of White/Non-White, the Murabitun message offered a re-ordering of the indigenous African identity, an *Africanization of the self and belonging*. While the preaching and teachings of Abdalqadir as-Sufi construct imaginings of belonging to a greater ideal of being Black *and* Muslim, imagined as a home and territory, the propagation of Sufi practices such as dhikr, the ritualistic praising of Allah, facilitate the shared experience of the coming *other* order. With its vision of radical transformation, Murabitun ideology taps into the pulse of dissatisfaction in deprived Black African areas, providing not only meaning for the continuing experiences of injustice but also a vision of an Islamic era of indigenous African liberation and supremacy and the creation of a new human of indigenous quality. As the discussion below will show, the translation of Murabitun ideology into the realm of Black politics is linked to (a) the imagining of a counter-hegemonic and counter-colonial tradition of Islamic revivalism and (b) the framing of an indigenous millenarian scenario within an anti-Western set of conspiracy theories. This discussion will then continue with the issue of projecting Blackness as a political ideology and realm of resistance and transgression onto the Islamic narrative offered by the Murabitun. Uniting these two facets will shed light on the spiritual and political foundations upon which people base their self-perceptions as Black *and* Muslim individuals, in hopes of transforming the given conditions of their social ordering. In the context studied here, the Murabitun narrative has fallen on fruitful grounds, promising the coming of a caliphate as millenarian salvation and a golden era of freedom, justice, moral rule, and the reestablishment of *tawhid*, the unity with god. As BUBANDT (2009: 113) points out, the "Murabitun *tawhid* is a post-secular utopia." It unfolds as a promise that indigenous Africans will rise in a coming earthly millennium of social restructuring. The cornerstones of this vision are an *indigenous millennialism* and an *Islamic revivalism*. This section first analyzes the development of the Murabitun order in South Africa and the impact of its ideology against the backdrop of the promise of an end time for the persisting modes of segregation and injustice. It then asks how indigeneity as Blackness is merged with a Sufi-oriented vision of a purified and revived Islamic community. Finally, the impact of indigenous ideology on the researched group of African Muslims will be discussed.

Millennialism: The Meaningful Narrative of Social Transformation

Leaving aside false predictions of the dawn of various millennia and new orders and disappointed expectations of a coming apocalypse, millenarian ideology is one thing above all its diverse religious, conspiratorial, and political aspects: It is the uncompromising belief in a meaningful narrative of social change and transformation. This is why the *end of times* as discourse, symbolic significations, and intersubjective practices needs to be taken into account in conceptual thought beyond the field of religious studies. In the case of South African converts to Islam, both the belief in social transformation and the awaiting of a new era are of crucial importance, especially for those previously classified as Black African under the racist regime of apartheid. For them, the struggle to resist and transgress the persistent power relations deeply inscribed into society and space and the striving for change are today more a matter of belief than something to be readily expected in the form of a just and de-racialized post-apartheid state. The promise made to the people of South Africa in the early 1990s, and politically manifested in the metaphor of the rainbow nation, can itself be understood as millennialist to a certain degree. However, now disappointed expectations seem to overshadow the secular prophecy of social transformation. Instead, the radical modernism of apartheid and its multi-scalar social and spatial segregation along the lines of racially constructed population groups can be understood as the fulfillment of the millenarian project of White supremacy, which began with the politically mythologized exodus of the Dutch Boer settlers from the Cape Colony on the Great Trek (cf. DIJKINK 2006: 203). Apartheid, the divinely-ordained social separation and spatial segregation achieved by means of cultural ordering, became a paradise for the dominating minority and a real-life dystopia for the subordinated majority (DODSON 2000). Even though the White settler colonialists were in many ways influenced by religious ideology, Dutch Calvinism in particular, the apartheid project is a form of secular millennialism (cf. BARKUN 2003: 15ff.), or as proposed by LANDES (2011: 27f.), an innovative millennialism (in contrast to a restorative form) aimed at bringing about a modernist utopia of orderly society, a world of perfection. Resistance to the racialized orderings of apartheid was influenced to a great degree by grand narratives of social transformation such as socialism and communism. Religious blueprints for new modes of ordering on a macro-scale, such as the Iranian Revolution of 1979, also gained prominence in the struggle against apartheid (LEHMANN 2006), being viewed as a path to a faithful and promised land (cf. LANDES 2011: 21). These aspects also indicate how the differentiation between secular and religious millenarian scenarios is difficult to maintain in a time of globalized cultural hybridizations and political bricolage. To speak of a "geopoliticisation of religion" and a civil millennialism (DIJKINK 2006) seems to be

more appropriate, as the manifestations of opposing orders are increasingly aligned with geopolitical factors. Although the religious dimension is increasingly being reoriented from its eschatological position to a socio-political one, the basic conceptual idea of millennialism as the "apocalyptic" renewal in the here and now of earthly life remains in place (cf. LANDES 2011: 21).

In terms of a conceptual understanding of millenarian ideologies as political discourses, symbolic significations, *and* social practices, we must consider the scale of the individual in his or her social environment holding on to a promise of a coming new order. It is on this scale that the discursive construction of a social world consisting of *public* and *hidden* transcripts (cf. LANDES 2011: 21) is intersubjectively translated into the reality of the lived-in places, thus becoming a layer of supposedly extended knowledge of hidden truths of an otherwise disguised reality. Thus, in the case of Muslim converts from Black African areas of South Africa, the millennialist perspective renders the embracing of Islam not only a matter of resistance to and transgression of persisting modes of social and spatial ordering, but also a spiritual and political promise of a new order to come, the hidden transcript of an unavoidable transformation. In addition, because colonial rule did not only bring segregation and oppression with it but also Christian missionary efforts, entering the sphere of Islam essentially questions religiously legitimized colonial ascriptions, as it offers a radical and revolutionary break with the spiritual link to the oppressors' religion. For the African converts, the narrative of a divine future of social orderings that will overcome and overthrow the existing regime arose through interaction with the Islamic revivalist ideology of the Murabitun.

Murabitun Ideology as Indigenous Millennialism

The Murabitun under Abdalqadir as-Sufi are one of the 'newcomers' to the contemporary field of mystic Islamic orders in South Africa, though they are far from the only Sufi tariqah with an agenda of social development and transformation (cf. HARON 2005: 284ff.; VAHED 2001: 321f.; SMITH 1969). The origins of the Murabitun order, or the Shadhili-Darqawi Sufi tariqah, is linked to the conversion biography of the Scottish playwright and actor Ian Dallas. He claims to have been initiated in Morocco by Shaykh Muhammad ibn al-Habib al-Darqawi in the late 1960s. In the mid-1970s, he started his own tariqah in Norwich, England and took up position as Shaykh under various changing names (al-Murabit, al-Darqawi, as-Sufi). Accounts of his biography can be found in the few publications that discuss the Murabitun (BUBANDT 2009, 2011; HARON 2005; HERMANSEN 2009; LE ROUX & NEL 1998; PANKHURST 2013; PASTOR DE MARIA Y CAMPOS 2015; ROSÓN LORENTE 2014). While some dates vary, these accounts

reproduce a similar narrative of the order's central personality, which seems to stem from the image cultivated by Abdalqadir as-Sufi and the way in which he mythologizes his own biography. He documented his 'coming of age' in the form of an autobiographical novel, the *Book of Strangers* (DALLAS 1988), which portrays his transformation to a Muslim in a narrative manner and presents his personal story as an inspiration for followers. Moreover, the book serves the religious legitimization of Ian Dallas as the charismatic leader of a Sufi tariqah. The construction of this mystic personality cult is further assisted by the work of one of his very early followers, Abd al-Haqq Bewley, who has also engaged in translating Islamic texts. Abdalqadir as-Sufi appropriated Sufi-oriented teachings and practices and hybridized them in light of a spiritualist search rooted in a growing criticism of Western culture and capitalistic ways of life, subsequently projecting his anti-capitalistic sentiments and an epistemology of postmodern deconstruction of the modern nation state onto Islamic mysticism (cf. HARON 2005: 286). For HERMANSEN (2009: 34), such religious-political narratives in opposition to Western modernism are a common trait of Sufi movements founded by Western converts. As-Sufi's own conversion biography reflects the search for religious roots and ritual groundings beyond the sphere of the 'old' European world, which became a trend in the 1960s and 1970s, especially among young intellectuals. In the introduction to their edited volume on Sufism in the West, DRESSLER, GEAVES & KLINKHAMMER (2009: 2) refer to this trend as a re-sacralization and an "Easternization" of Western spirituality, in which religious—and especially mystic—thought and practices from beyond the West are perceived as a higher state of being, superior to a "soulless materialism" of a corrupted Western environment. Among other groups and in other places, the Sufi tariqahs of the Maghreb, Morocco in particular, became attractive to those searching for spiritual answers and worldly truths, as they offered meaning to hyper-modernized subjects in post-World War II Europe. This reception of Sufism as a universalist spiritual antidote and the import of mystic practices and teachings led not only to proselytism but also the marketing of Eastern spiritualities and a commodification of Sufi-related cultural products and rituals in Europe and North America (ibid.). Ian Dallas/Abdalqadir as-Sufi and the Murabitun movement must also be seen in light of this political-religious trend of the twentieth century. The order quickly expanded to other places on the globe, such as Granada, Spain, where they began planning the Granada Mesquita Major in the 1980s, celebrating its inauguration in 2003 (for an account on the mosque worth reading, see COLEMAN 2008). Another example is the San Cristóbal de las Casas in Chiapas, Mexico (see GARVIN 2005). The order's success and attractiveness is linked to a millennialist message of a future order of

indigenous liberation and superiority that can be achieved by means of an Islamic revivalism in religious as well as social terms. As PANKHURST (2013: 182) sums it up:

> "Their ultimate aim is the destruction of the global capitalist banking system and the re-establishment of the caliphate, to be achieved through the creation of Islamic trading communities around the world, which would undermine the existing world order and naturally bring about the emergence of Islamic rule."

Abdalqadir as-Sufi's anti-hegemonic, anti-Western ideology had been present in South Africa since the late 1970s, when his political and socio-religious publications circulated among young Black Africans who were becoming politically active in the struggle against apartheid and racist oppression. Thus, before as-Sufi entered the country himself, his publications could be found next to those with a Black Power background emanating from the United States as well as conspiratorial writings such as *The Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, the famous forged revelation of an international Jewish conspiracy, and other books on supposedly hidden global power structures (see LANDES & KATZ 2012b). While such publications were in most cases censored or even forbidden by the apartheid regime, the Murabitun writings where not affected by those control mechanisms and evaded censorship, presumably due to their religious appearance.[65]

Three books were of crucial importance to those seeking new spiritual and political belongings in Islam and thus to the travel and translation of Murabitun ideology into the South African situation: *Jihad. A Groundplan* (AS-SUFI 1978), *Letter to an African Muslim* (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981), and *Root Islamic Education* (AL-MURABIT 1993). The first invited Black African-classified readers to link their own resistance to the White-dominated modes of social and spatial ordering to the greater cause of a global anti-hegemonic and anti-colonial struggle. It circulated beyond Muslim networks and was frequently referred to by the Murabitun followers interviewed in KwaZulu-Natal as a clear instruction manual on how to deal with the given situation of oppression under racist orderings and how to prepare for resistance. In contrast to the wide-spread perception of Islam as the "church of the Indians and Malawians" (see section "Contestations: Re-Ordering the *African Self* on Disputed Grounds"), the book *Jihad. A Groundplan* offered the perspective of a global politicized realm of Islamic ideology and a new spectrum of politics of difference beyond the White/Non-White dialectic of apartheid South Africa:

[65]Interview with *Umar* (2015).

> "To the *kafir* who enters Islam – he finds he has joined the most radical and the most beleaguered minority group in existence - and yet behind them stand millions of muslims in the chains of kafir-controlled regimes. To enter Islam is to enter struggle. But a worthwhile one that places a person immediately in a world community." (AS-SUFI 1978: 22)

The work is a 48-page summary of the anti-Western Islamic revivalist teachings of Abdalqadir as-Sufi. By presenting a selective, anti-hegemonic history of Islam, the Western model of the nation state and the society living in it are described in anti-Semitic terms as being based on the usury of Jewish banking. Consequently, "masonic" democracies need to be overthrown and replaced with true Islamic leadership. The writing contains a fundamentalist core with repetitive elements of them vs. us dichotomy, with the enemy other being constructed as a hidden global elite of freemasons, with members of the academic world—linguists, anthropologists, and historians in particular—being described as an element of the oppressive system (cf. ibid.: 7). Together with the postmodernist deconstruction of concepts like the nation state or civilization, a future Islamic world order is presented as the justice-providing successor to the present state of the world. As-Sufi hit a nerve with indigenous Africans in apartheid South Africa when writing about the oppressors' construction of tribes as a means of domination and demanding the rebuilding a self-declared Islamic understanding of tribalism and indigeneity that breaks with the cultural hegemony of White Christian rule (cf. AS-SUFI 1978: 18). Further, his writing includes an indigenous millennialist promise that the next age of mankind will "fall to the lot of the new southern 'nomadic' societies who will take over from the 'settled' (i.e. industrial) societies in the north" (AS-SUFI 1978: 20), which will be fulfilled in a setting under Islamic social rule.

The political inclinations of this Islamic ideology and its unambiguous rejection of any non-Islamic discourse like democracy or socialism, even those working against such oppressive systems as apartheid, are continued in the *Letter to an African Muslim*. The latter book had a similar format and scope and made its way to South Africa and into the segregated Black African townships and homelands through Muslim networks, such as the outreach programs of the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa and their Muslim book service network (cf. TAYOB 1995: 150). It is described by converts as a concise analysis of the exploitation of the African continent and the realities that indigenous Africans have experienced under White colonial rule. In continuation to *Jihad. A Groundplan*, it argues for rejecting forms of resistance that build on Western-democratic or socialist-communist ideologies as intrinsically wrong and unfitting for the African situation. By way of a postmodern and post-structuralist critique turned political message, Abdalqadir as-Sufi extends his deconstruction of the Western nation state by including

colonialism as well as the development paradigm, thereby making his message applicable to eras beyond the official end European colonialism.

He projects his apocalyptic perspective of transformation onto the African continent by arguing along a combination of geopolitical and religious lines, thus claiming that the history of missionary and colonialist endeavors has suppressed the truly liberated existence of Africa as an Islamic continent, which needs to be revived. "There is no question but that the future destiny of Africa is Islamic" (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 43). For as-Sufi, the old colonies have been recast under the "new dependency" of capitalist economic exploitation, under which their governments depend on the wealth and welfare of the former colonizers. Without directly outlining the logic of the argument, he presents a hidden power which has taken control of the continent in the wake of development and modernization, bringing with it crime, amorality, concentration camps (sic!), and among other horrors, thus destroying an "indigenous nomadic life," which in his words and without further explanation is said to be vital for the future of the human race. Subsequently, he foresees an Islamic revival, coming to put his vision of future power-relations into practice:

> "There is little doubt that young Muslims alive today will live to see the beginnings of Islamic rule again, the re-establishment of the shari'at, even to the return of permitted slavery, with the now ruling white colonists themselves become the slaves of the Muslims under halal and just control." (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 41)

These arguments have been singled out by interviewed followers of the Murabitun movement as one of the most important eye-openers. Its attractiveness and impact can be grasped by interpreting the text as an inversion of the politics of resistance during the late phase of apartheid that was targeted at overcoming racist and racialized segregation, exploitation, and dispossession by dismantling the White minority regime. Instead, the control of state, territory, and society should pass over to the majority of inhabitants of South Africa, once classified as Non-White. Abdalqadir as-Sufi's line of thought runs deeper still, as it predicts a new colonialism in succession of the current state of oppression and presents the very means of resistance and striving for independence as being themselves entangled in the logics of the supposedly hidden power structures. Thus, only within the realm of Islam as religion and societal order can a true revolution happen. Murabitun ideology not only deconstructs the politics of resistance offered to those whose daily lived-in reality is one of segregation and racial marginalization; it also destabilizes the attempts to reposition the self in the field of 'color politics' by labeling that whole field a false arena, in which even the tools of resistance are pre-defined by an omnipresent power structure. Then, a promise of a future Islamic order is made:

> "The road to the liberation of Africa and the raising up of Africa, and to being finished with this tragic hundred years just gone by, is clear. liberation from exploitation and degradation and the horrible christian nexus of prostitution and alcoholism and the theft of resources. Liberation from the mythic fantasies of marxist materialism which nowhere liberates and everywhere enslaves, a doctrine created by jewish intellectuals (Marx, Lenin and Trotsky were all rabbinically educated) to destroy her enemies, and that includes Islam. A new Islamic century is beginning." (AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 47f.)

What is already sketched out in the *Letter to an African Muslim* as the millenarian blueprint, an Islamic revivalism on the basis of the Maliki school of Islamic jurisprudence and the adherence of Al-Malik's major work, the Al-Muwatta', is then further developed in the book *Root Islamic Education*. In most cases, that publication is distributed directly by the Murabitun to new followers and serves as an instruction manual for the re-ordering of the self and social surroundings. It argues for a purification of the (indigenous) self by following a purified Islamic ideology, which draws on a scripturalist approach to Islamic thought emphasizing adherence to the Qur'an and hadith, the authenticated expressions of the prophet Muhammad. This purified Islamic ideology leads to a mode of governance that is intriguingly spatial. It idealizes Medina as the city of the Prophet and the life of the first community of Muslims as the perfect form of Islamic ordering to which Muslims need to return to: "The Islam of the Messenger of Allah […] was achieved, was laid down, did happen, did last, did endure, and then was swept away" (AL-MURABIT 1993: 15). In contrast to other religious millennialist ideologies, which project the coming new order onto something that is for now in *illo tempore* and an *illo loco* (cf. discussion above with reference to ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 263), Abdalqadir as-Sufi's vision for a future community and Islamic order includes connotations of spatial order tied specifically to the place of Medina, as it would be today had it not been subject to historical developments. The imagining of the Salaf, the first generations of followers of the prophet Muhammad, is precisely projected onto that city, rendering it a promised land lost. This leaves the different Murabitun communities with the obligation to rebuild the imagined city and community in their own living places, according to the principles of tasawwuf, the Sufi ways. By bringing Salafi Islamic revivalism together with the strict adherence to the Islamic jurisprudence of the Maliki school, Abdalqadir as-Sufi sketches out an instruction manual for how to govern this future socio-religious Islamic landscape, offering a pure scholarship for a purified territory. In the same way that his promise projects the lost city of Medina as the ideal place, it casts the last Ottoman Empire—in his regard lost as well to the developments of modernism in the twentieth century—and its governmental system of the caliphate as a role model for governing Islamic society in a post-capitalistic and postmodern way. This millennialist space as the purified place for a revived Islamic order is a powerful narrative, as it allows as-Sufi to create an ideological blueprint

landscape through Murabitun teachings and communal practices. This ideological landscape is layered on top of the reality of the followers' lived-in places, thus always reinforcing the promise of the better place to come and enabling followers to experience an emotional connection to that coming order today.

For Abdalqadir as-Sufi, all forms of Islamic governance after the first community represent a corruption of the social, spatial, and communal ideals of the Islam of the first 'Salafi' generations of Muslims (AL-MURABIT 1993: 172). Political change is not to be brought about by religious practice alone, as it is seen to be rooted in political action, a claim of social and territorial hegemony, and a framework of politics of differentiation and difference, of us and them. This activist and interventionist re-positioning of the otherwise spiritual sphere of Sufi practices and thought entails an absolute rejection of orthodox Islamic scholarship, criticizing it as being detached from social realities, as well as its theological message, which fails to induce change in the lived-in situation (cf. AL-MURABIT 1993: 13). Abdalqadir as-Sufi's stance towards what he sees as the body of Islamic scholars is based on a critique of the social distance of theological Islamic knowledge. In contrast, he argues for taking religious practices out of the sacred places and into the public, linking it with da'wah activities, while at the same time moving Islamic obligations such as the zakat into the realm of political action. In the early days of Murabitun activity in the Black African areas, this aspect led to a series of incidents that damaged the public image of the order, from which it still suffers today. The claim that "Africans should retake their natural possessions in Africa, with force if necessary" (LE ROUX & NEL 1998: 11) was put into action under the first Murabitun Amir, Abdurahman Zwane, by forcing members of the African Muslim Agency and the Islamic Missionary Society to hand over money as zakat. Although justifications for such actions can be found in Abdalqadir as-Sufi's writings (cf AS-SUFI 1996: 92f.; PANKHURST 2013: 185f.), the incidents were condemned, and Zwane was eventually replaced. Still, the basic attitude of how to put the ideology into practice continued, as a regional Amir explained:

> "People actually were scared of Murabitun because we were just straight forward. When things were wrong, we just mentioned that, and we did whip some people for doing wrong things. We whipped them. That's it. And we even promised the Indians a whipping also."[66]

[66] *Umar* (2015).

In socio-economic terms, religious and social orderings are to be purified in the name of revivalism by establishing a post-capitalistic communal life based on economic activities of trade "hand to hand" (AS-SUFI 2014), as it is projected onto the imagined original Islamic community. Breaking away from the "usury system" of banking and paper money is a core argument in Murabitun thought and practice and has been taken so far as to propose minting gold dinars and silver dirhams as a future Islamic currency (BUBANDT 2009, 2011). Until recently, this minting program was a central piece of the political outreach of the Sufi order, with Umar Vadillo serving as the intellectual frontrunner of the project. Now however, interviewed followers explained that as-Sufi has stopped emphasizing the issue (cf. AS-SUFI 2014). Still, the post-capitalistic narrative proves to be outstandingly powerful among Murabitun followers in the Black African townships of KwaZulu-Natal. The instruction to circumvent capitalism and the experienced injustices of economic relations by changing the very practices of economy on a personal and communal level resonates with their constant longing for changes in the modes of social and spatial order, as well as their struggle to belong in a society which is still characterized by racialized stratifications. Interviewed Murabitun followers are strongly convinced that escaping capitalism by changing the practices of economic exchange is a political necessity pursuant to their embracing Sufi-oriented Islam, as well as a foundation for the bringing about a new order.

The utopian perfection of an imagined first community transforms the Islamic revivalist narrative into a revivalist millenarian project for a future Islamic world order. Between Islamic revivalism and indigenous millennialism, Murabitun ideology has had a decisive influence on converts to Islam from those Black African townships and homelands who have come in contact with it. Abdalqadir as-Sufi's writings and teachings promise a world to come, in which the expression of the *African self* will be possible, unbounded from the religious as well as social orderings of a society that has been culturally influenced by the work of Christian missionaries and politically dispossessed by White Christian colonial regimes. The *dimension of Blackness* stemming from the indigenous perspective on Islamic practices and spirituality is expressed in the imagined incompatibility of the emerging *Black* Islam with the established *Indian*-related Islam. The preached rejection of orthodox Islamic scholarship plays an important part in this. However, what broadens this dimension is the positionality of Abdalqadir as-Sufi's millennialist message between prophecy and conspiracy, and the subsequent radical othering. These aspects will be discussed in the following section before moving further into the realm of the translation and hybridization of indigenous millennialism into the realm of a self-declared identity of Muslim Blackness.

Sufi Millennialism between Prophecy and Conspiracy

Sufi movements from outside of South Africa and their charismatic leaders hold a specific attractiveness to Muslims in South Africa and converts to Islam in particular. In his brief discussion of the Naqshbandi-Haqqani order and their activities in South Africa, CASSIEM (2007) refers to this as a post-apartheid Sufi resurgence, in which Sufi shaykhs are ascribed a higher degree of credibility, authenticity, and trust compared to Imams that were trained in the Islamic scholarly institutions of the Arab world, who are reproached for preaching Wahhabi Islam. Moreover, in the historical context of apartheid South Africa, orthodox scholars of the 'Ulama' have had to struggle with the stigma of being seen as collaborators of the oppressive regime of White minority rule, who refused to join the resistance (JEPPIE 1991; TAYOB 1990). Furthermore, as newcomers, able to move for some time outside of the inscribed and ascribed racialized orderings, foreign Sufi movements have been able to more easily approach the population in the former Black African areas. This is especially true of those with a narrative of undoing injustices against disadvantaged communities. However, in this context, the Sufi messages also become translated into a realm of political fundamentalism, an inherent effect of the radicalization resulting from apartheid's radical modernity of racial segregation and oppression. The Murabitun must also be seen in this light. As a charismatic personality with a ritualized and mythologized personality cult promising a global Sufi brotherhood, Abdalqadir as-Sufi can be interpreted as a prophet of an Islamic revivalism that falls somewhere between apocalyptic analysis and millennialist promise. The specific indigenous quality of his work rests in his assumption that the current social orderings will be overthrown and replaced by future societies ruled from the South. For the assessment of apocalyptic narratives, LANDES (2011: 32) proposes a model consisting of two axes: one locating the apocalyptic narrative between the poles of cataclysmic and transformative scenarios and the other representing the roles of the believers in the narrative on a continuum from passive to active. Murabitun ideology represents a very clearly transformative scenario of the ultimate change of orderings on all scales, from the individual to the globe. The role of the believer in this ideology alternates between active and passive. While calling followers to take things into their own hands, as-Sufi also prescribes a reactive position of preparing oneself and awaiting the moment of action. Intriguingly similar to a 'sleeper cell' approach, his preaching fits in well with the overall conspiratorial connotation of the presence of a hidden menace. His ideology draws on stands of argumentation that deliver enough information for followers to opt into it, while keeping the writings vague enough to allow followers to fit their own situation into the overall narrative.

At the same time, his ideological underpinnings strongly build on anti-nationalist positions, an aspect which renders his message attractive for the indigenous Africans of South African. He indirectly teaches those who were deprived of citizenship and participation in national society throughout colonialism and apartheid to reject the transformational project of a democratic, post-apartheid South Africa and to strive instead for a territorialized social order, i.e. the building of a new state for a new order that is defined by the logics of Islamic revivalism. Although Abdalqadir as-Sufi advocates at certain points for bridging the ethnic divides—as these politics of differentiation are interpreted as an inherent element of the powers of the modern nation state (cf. AS-SUFI 1978: 38), his message should not be mistaken as an inclusive one. Rejecting the social and political ordering system of the nation fits into his deconstruction of Western democracies and his extremely selective and partially distorted analysis of the history of globalization, while at the same time constructing cultural politics of difference between us and them, between the Muslims as the future leaders of the world and the unbelievers. Additionally, his continuous anti-Semitic inclination builds on conspiratorial beliefs of a "dangerously misread" and "undoubtedly existent dimension of freemasonry" as the underlying power structure secretly controlling the globe, mainly through economic policies and the control of financial markets (AS-SUFI 2000: 74). In this ideological reality, Muslims are the victims of and, at the same time, the only future hope against all injustices brought about by supposedly just democracies (cf. AS-SUFI 2000: 78). These democracies are in turn viewed as machine-like systems with "unprincipled and hypocritical politicians serving the needs of a deciding and dictating system of bureaucracy in the background" (see also AS-SUFI 1978: 41ff.), while the public is "interfaced (sic!) through media and assembly halls" (cf. AS-SUFI 2000: 9f.).The answers to these hidden threats—the 'true' reasons for oppression and injustice—are then sketched out within an Islamic agenda which continues the revivalist perspective and the adherence to Malikism found in the *Root Islamic Education* and perpetuated the "Ribat Model" described in *Jihad. A Groundplan*, a scheme to be "inwardly and outwardly equipped to establish an Islamic society according to the Madinah pattern" (AS-SUFI 1978: 40). The latter publication, from 1978, demands that individuals form communities that concentrate their work on religious purification by studying and preparing for the coming battle through the Sufi practice of dhikr, combined with training in tactics and combat, before going into solitary retreat and awaiting the moment when his or her "inner eye is opened and he is freed from fear of creation and lack of provision" (ibid.).

Building on this ground plan, the agenda in the *Technique of the Coup de Banque* represents a fundamentalist message of oppositional binaries, of chosen sides, in the anticipated battle (see

AS-SUFI 2000: 81f.). Here, humankind and human-made laws enslave and impoverish, while Allah and divinely given rules enrich and liberate; humanism destroys civilizations, while Islam is their creator; and democracy lacks the compassion that Islamic governance provides. In addition, the constitutions of states are presented as false scriptures for legitimizing violence, while the "revealed book," the Qur'an, provides the necessary license to fight and kill the kuffar, the non-believer. Concerning humanism and unbelievers, Abdalqadir as-Sufi's position is defined more precisely in the follow-up publication *Sultaniyya*, in which he writes that

> "the modern kuffar, by that I mean the atheist, the secularists, the christians, the jews, the buddhists and the hindus […]. They are the humanists! How could this ignorant, savage horde create a civilisation knowing nothing and believing nothing? […] Constitutions are forged Qur'ans." (AS-SUFI 2002: 18)

Murabitun ideology essentially constructs a millenarian scenario against the backdrop of apocalyptic conspiratorial ideologies common to the contemporary, secular millennialist movements of the twentieth century. Abdalqadir as-Sufi's promise of a new (world) order is therefore more a matter of aggressive conspiracy theory than of messianic outlook. It stands in stark contrast to the millenarian content of contemporary Sufi orders with similar global aspirations, such as the Haqqani-Naqshbandi (cf. GEAVES 2001). However, as-Sufi's writings and teachings do resonate with conspiratorial publications like the 'classic' conspiracy theory found in the *Protocols of the Learned Elders of Zion*, a book found on the bookshelves of various Murabitun followers, which was regularly discussed in interviewing sessions as a proof of the imperialist control of the apartheid oppressor. LANDES & KATZ (2012a: 11) point out that conspiracy theories are a way to bring sanity to the cognitive dissonance of modernity by delivering holistic visions of social homogeneity, which are only hindered by threats from the outside. In his account on the role of the *Protocols* in contemporary political discourse, BERLET (2012: 207) extends this argument by stating that:

> "All conspiracist theories start with a grain of truth embedded in preexisting myths and prejudices, which movement leaders then hyperbolize. People who believe conspiracist allegations sometimes act on those irrational beliefs, and this has concrete consequences in the real world. Conspiracist thinking and scapegoating on a mass scale are symptoms, not causes, of underlying societal frictions. Nonetheless, the spread of conspiracy theories across a society is perilous to ignore because scapegoating and conspiracist allegations are toxic to democratic civil society and are tools used by cynical demagogic leaders to mobilize a bigoted mass base."

Murabitun ideology works along these lines, while its leader's biographical background reveals an embeddedness in the very same dissonance of modernity common to the post-war generation in the West. The ideological and fundamentalist narrative links Islamic mysticism to anti-Semitic conspiracy theories on the level of economic accusations. The weak economic status of

Black Africans is credited to Jews manipulating the economy through the banking system and the issuance of paper money (cf. BERLET 2012: 188). Instead, the Murabitun encourage their local groups to make themselves economically independent from the surrounding 'masonic' system of a *kuffar* capitalist society, previously going so far as to propagate the use of their own gold dinar and silver dirham as currency (BUBANDT 2009). The millennialist revelation promises a post-capitalistic, post-usury life in a revived community of indigenous Africans. The social program for bringing about this transformation in the lived-in places is embedded in a vision of Islamic revivalism. The critique of orthodox scholarship is directly linked to the call to get involved in religious terms in order to bring about change in the here and now. Linked to this radical framework is the practical realm of Sufi-oriented Islamic rituals, which work to facilitate the formation and maintenance of smaller, de-centralized groups of Murabitun followers. By preaching the importance of dhikr, of praising Allah within a mystic ritual, Abdalqadir as-Sufi creates a repetitive scheme of communally shared practices, which create 'unorthodox' sacred spaces as *heterotopia* for the everyday life, and thus foster the upholding of Murabitun ideology through Sufi practice. Much of this can be seen as rooted in as-Sufi's own conversion biography, as discussed above. What could be termed a fundamentalist filter-bubble allows analogies to similar isolated, counter-hegemonic Muslim groups such as the Nation of Islam in the United States (cf. LIPSTADT 2012). It explains the attractiveness of the "religio-political," or even "religio-geopolitical" (cf. DIJKINK 2006) ideology to converts from contexts of resistance to Western hegemony and the modernization of societies, as in the case of indigenous Africans in South Africa.

Towards a Black Islamic Millennialism: Projecting *Blackness* onto Murabitun Ideology and Practice

Millennialist ideas of cultural-political transgression and social transformation based on an ideological framework of Muslim Blackness are popular among people of color living under racist oppressive regimes, including but certainly not limited to the South African situation. The Murabitun phenomenon bears a striking resemblance to the Nation of Islam in the United States and its pull-effects as a radical, counter-hegemonic and anti-White movement that merged Blackness and Muslimness into a religious message of millenarian outreach with a racialized contingency (see CURTIS 2006). Moreover, on both sides of the Black Atlantic (GILROY 1993; for a comparative account on Black and Muslim identity politics across the Atlantic, see GEBAUER & HUSSEINI DE ARAÚJO 2016), movements have been founded by converts to Islam that entail the projection of the socio-political struggles of converts and their

cause of resistance onto an Islamic framework, which allows their self-defined expression in a cultural realm that is articulated in opposition to the White Christian oppressor. The Nation of Islam did in fact play a role in many conversion biographies among Muslims from Black African townships. Malcolm X in particular is repeatedly referred to as an inspirational figure, merging Black power with a powerful expression of resistance. "Many embraced Islam because of hearing of Malcolm X. So, there were video tapes, audio tapes, some books that were written. […] It made sense to us."[67] While the American context of Black Power served as a source of inspiration, the organizational ideas of the Nation of Islam were not translated into the South African context in a magnitude comparable to the Murabitun movement. This is because the core of the message was perceived as American centered and therefore unfitting for the South African struggle. Besides, resistance to apartheid had its own ideological development of Blackness. Out of the political activities of students in the 1960s and 1970s, the Black Consciousness movement developed. Its founder and leading figure Steve Biko argued for Blackness as an inclusive, counter-hegemonic category of political identity (cf. MACDONALD 2006: 115f.; HOWARTH 1997). Black Consciousness transformed the category of "Non-White" within the racialized dialectic of a White/Non-White South Africa into "Blackness"—a realm of shared suffering *and* shared struggle (cf. FREDRICKSON 1995: 301). Those who were not White but did not challenge the modes of order remained "Non-White." Ideologically disassociated from phenotypical racism and associated instead with the realm of activism, Blackness became defined by the cultural-political dimensions of shared identity and counter-culture (GILROY 1993). At the same time, Steve Biko's ideology can be understood as the programmatic political translation of the dismantling of logics of symbolic power (cf. BOURDIEU 1989; SCHUBERT 2008), i.e. the acceptance of the subordinate position as a necessary counterpart to actual subordination.

> "Social transformation and a true humanity could only be achieved once a counterhegemony to the dominating values and practices of the white superstructure had been prefigured in the opposition movement. Internalized acceptance of racial domination among the oppressed stemmed from low self-esteem and feeling of self-hatred, conditioned by the prevailing ideology of white superiority and black inferiority." (ALLY & ALLY 2008: 172)

The ideology of Black Consciousness influenced the struggle of the younger generation in the Black African townships and homelands and thereby became meaningful on an individual level

[67] Interview with Solomon Phewa (2013).

for converts to Islam. It also provided the foundation upon which Islamic organizations could link their political message with the cause of resistance to racist oppression. This was true of the political self-understanding of the Muslim Youth Movement of South Africa, for example, an organization founded in the 1970s in the wake of global Islamic resurgence and inspired by modernist Islamic scholars such as Qutb or Mawdoodi. As one of its former members points out, the Muslim Youth Movement "wanted to politicize [the] youth with an Islamic perspective, to create an awareness and develop a leadership that would serve the struggle via Islam" (JADWAT 2012: 182). The propagation of an Islamic way of life and the promise of a subsequent transformation of the self and society reveals a millennialist dimension in the programs of the Movement, which most certainly had an impact on Black African Muslims. All respondents among the interviewed converts had been politically sensitized, mobilized, or structured in the 1970s and were directly or indirectly influenced by the outreach programs of the MYM. The movement's synchronicity with Black Consciousness was made possible by embedding the Islamic ideas within a framework of Blackness. "The MYM's rejection of the West, and its call for an Islamic 'way of life' reflected the Black Consciousness Movement's appeal to an authentic Black identity in South Africa" (TAYOB 1995: 122). At the same time, the topics of Black pride and a self-defined sense of African indigeneity were high on the agenda of the MYM. However, unlike Black Consciousness, the MYMs message of an "Islamic way of life" prevented it from being drawn into macro-scale political developments in South Africa, as it propagated a post-national idea of community (ibid.).

The Movement hosted or interviewed international guests from inside and outside the Muslim world from the very beginning, thus presenting their members with a wide variety of perspectives on social life, politics, and religion. These guests' writings were circulated through the book networks, and their views were published in the Movement's newspaper Al-Qalam. Among these guests was Abdalqadir as-Sufi, who first visited South Africa in 1983. His promotion of the sole adherence to Malikism together with the rejection of modernist scholars (AL-MURABIT 1993: 14) challenged the Muslim Youth Movement's position with an absolute and radical political message for Black South Africans (TAYOB 1995: 151). The Murabitun themselves presented a new home to Muslims in Black African areas and offered them the possibility to organize themselves in smaller groups on a decentralized, grassroots level. Nevertheless, color became an issue during the very first encounters with as-Sufi. One follower reported the following from his first meeting with the Murabitun leader in 1985:

> "I was just listening, these guys were saying, the Shaykh is coming, the Shaykh is coming! Who is the Shaykh? The one who wrote the Letter to an African Muslim. Oh, Ok. Then it was 1985 when he finally came. […] The Letter to an African Muslim gave the

> impression to us that the man who wrote this book must be a Black man. And when this White man came there. How can this White man write a book like this? It was a little bit disappointing. We expected a Black man and there was this White man. Eish."[68]

Nevertheless, as-Sufi's content had an argumentative proximity to the Black Consciousness narrative and applicability to the Black Muslim situation. He discussed with those he met the economic and political situation of Black African-classified people and offered his critique of the monetary system, while presenting Islam as a revolutionary religion.

> "He was talking about our condition. He was like telling us how to look at ourselves. How to look at our condition. Not like we saw ourselves with the ideologies of the PAC and the ANC, the Karl Marxism and the things like that. He took away that completely and then we understood how relevant Islam was to our situation. We nearly wasted our lives and our time with the ANCs and the PACs, when Islam has got all the solutions. […] You know, now, his Whiteness was turning a little bit darker."[69]

His deconstruction of the prominent African organizations of resistance, such as the African National Congress or the Pan-African Congress, was followed by instructions on how Black Muslims could form their own hierarchical structure, a system of amirs, wazirs, and qadis, and thus take things into their own hands.

> "And when we came from there we were like strong. Giants. We were fresh, we were solid, we were fit. We were strong. […] We became Murabitun and this was now a real group of Black Muslims."[70]

In a classical way, the millennialist contents in the Murabitun teachings unfold as a combination of rejection of the old and a program for the creation of a new order. This rejection of the old is not only directed towards the oppressive modes of social and spatial ordering but also towards those organizational structures that have ordered the acts of resistance thus far. In the same way that as-Sufi deconstructs the nation state, he decouples the ideological framework of South African Blackness from the political structures of the struggle against oppression by presenting those structures as a corrupted undertaking and a waste of time. Those new followers who had already been politicized by Black Consciousness could then project their Blackness as politics of identity onto the offered Islamic structure, even though the references to the particularities of the South African case are minimal in as-Sufis works.

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[68] *Umar* (2015).

[69] *Umar* (2015).

[70] Interview with *Umar* (2015).

Abdalqadir as-Sufi's writings do refer to colonial Africa in general and South Africa in particular on various occasions. His publication *Letter to an African Muslim* is the most prominent title, but it mainly underscores its locally unspecific criticisms of capitalistic globalization with random examples of their effects on the situation on the African continent. Nevertheless, as discussed above, the *Letter* became a focal point for politically motivated converts to Islam in the Black African areas during apartheid, as it situated the local lived injustices within a postmodern web stretching from anti-colonial ideologies to the deconstruction of capitalist and socialist models of state and society, encompassing an embeddedness in a global vision of apocalyptic conspiracy. The major thematic setting is that of the hidden elite and the way to a post-capitalistic life: "Democracy gave South Africa two things even worse than the shameful Apartheid: it put the gold securely in the hands of the usury elite, safe and secure, and then made Johannesburg the murder capital of the world […]"(AS-SUFI 2000: 80). The millennialist message allows a projection of the lived-in situation onto an ideological framework that offers enough radical answers to the desperate conditions, while leaving enough space for the reader to interpret his or her personal scenario into the greater narrative. It thus circumvented not only the larger political battles during apartheid but also allowed the African indigenous population to disassociate the self from the post-apartheid project and to pursue the fulfillment of the millenarian promise of Islamic revivalism. Thus, democratic transformation is rendered a broken promise, while the societies of the South are predicted to build a new human on earth (AS-SUFI 1978: 20; AS-SUFI AD-DARQAWI 1981: 48). The unfulfilled post-apartheid promise of a united society in a post-colonial state based on social justice, spatial redistribution, cultural diversity, cohesion, and reconciliation—a millenarian project in itself—is confronted with the prophecy of the coming of a caliphate, which will serve as the socio-political as well as spatial habitat of a revived global umma, the utopian community of Muslims. While similar approaches from Sufi Islam draw on the reemergence of the Mahdi and the subsequent beginning of a new era of global Islamic reign, Abdalqadir as-Sufi projects the fulfillment of the revelation onto a very modern conception of territorialized social order, for with the last Ottoman empire serves as a macro-scale blueprint and the imagined life of the first community of Muslims under Muhammad serves as a guideline for the micro-scale of everyday life. In the meantime, Sufi practices offer ritualized routines for re-ordering the self and hybridizing Black *and* Muslim realms of identity.

Travels and Translations: The Racialization of Fundamentalist Islamic Thought

The case of the Murabitun and their followers from Black African townships and former homelands of South Africa is an example of global travels of ideologies of resistance and transgression, specifically religious ones, and how they are translated into the local-specific realm of anti-hegemonic politics and practices. According to PASTOR DE MARIA Y CAMPOS (2015: 146), with the intensified outreach of the Murabitun and the expansion of their da'wah activities into regions of the globe formerly under colonial rule, Murabitun followers no longer consisted primarily of middle-class converts with a European cultural tradition. Instead, the movement became attractive to those who perceive themselves as the indigenous population of an area that had been oppressed by dominating colonial regimes from the West, and who therefore continued to live under the unjust conditions of a structural governance and materialistic culture. These new followers of the Islamic social ideology were the result of a continuous focus in Murabitun outreach on sketching out a future Islamic world for those living under the unjust conditions brought about by racism, colonialism, and capitalism. The ideological promise of a new world Islamic order and the subsequent prophecy of the demise of Western democracy and culture are a characteristic feature of those publications by Abdalqadir as-Sufi that deal with socio-political issues, which began circulating in South Africa in the late 1970s. What is offered is an Islamic revivalism with a core Salafi tradition, which positions the imagined community of the first Muslim generations as a societal model. Similar to what LANDES (2011: 144) points out in his discussion of millenarian cargo cults, the situation of the self is projected onto the religious framework, not the other way round. In the South African case, the mythologized narrative and future vision of African indigeneity is projected onto the belief-structure of Islam, thus hybridizing and indigenizing it, as a means to improve the African narrative. At the same time, this indigenous perception of the self unfolds against the background of a shared history and continuous experiences of suffering, oppression, and injustice in the lived-in places of everyday life. Murabitun thought has thus been translated into the realm of the White/Non-White dialectic of the racialized *doxic landscapes* (CRESSWELL 2003: 277) of South Africa. The ideology became available to a younger generation of South Africans beginning in the 1970s through cassettes and books, along with other political publications of conspiratorial quality. In this regard, in light of the critical discussion of Abdalqadir as-Sufi's writing above, anti-Semitism and millennialism seem to run very well with each other. Apartheid's censorship of political literature and the limited access to books and education due

to a segregated school system made such books as the *Protocols* or *Jihad. A Groundplan* all the more attractive to a Black youth that was growing more and more politically active.

Since their arrival and the beginning of da'wah activities in South Africa, the Murabitun have been accused of propagate a racist ideology along the segregationist lines of color and population group differentiation, thus preaching a Black African Islam while lashing out against Muslims from the established communities, especially those with an Indian South African background (cf. TAYOB 1995: 150). However, viewing these contestations as racist instigations is a foreshortened interpretation of the persistent effects of socially inscribed and individually embodied modes of segregation stemming from colonialism and apartheid, which presents social and spatial effects as an intentioned ideology und unilateral position. A critical assessment of the writings and teachings of Abdalqadir as-Sufi is certainly justified when it comes to othering and ethnicity, especially the works' overt anti-Semitism—a racism of its own. However, what happened as soon as the Murabitun started preaching their ideology in South Africa is that that message of Islamic indigeneity as an anti-hegemonic, anti-Western, and anti-colonial ideology became translated into the *doxic* realm of South Africa's social and spatial orderings and therefore racialized. Racism thus comes as a socio-political contingency, not as an intent. In political terms, Murabitun ideology is aimed specifically at colonially oppressed indigenous people, promising a self-determined future beyond the experiences of injustice in their daily lives, while drawing on the recreation of indigenous ways of life through Islamic practices. On the religious side, as-Sufi brings a rejection of orthodox and established Islamic theology together with a connotation of purification of the Muslim self. Both aspects of the Murabitun message—an *indigenous millennialism,* i.e. the re-ordering of the self and belonging, on the one hand, and an *Islamic revivalism*, i.e. the new order of Islamic communities and the re-emergence of an Islamic caliphate, on the other—are to be established through transgression of the White/Non-White dialectic of South Africa's modes of ordering and therefore automatically represent a challenge to and contestation of the historically situated Muslim groups and institutions that are mostly found among the Indian and Coloured population groups. Abdalqadir as-Sufi's confrontational position towards established Muslim communities is linked to his demand that followers adhere to the school of Malikism alone, which is the scholarly core of his Islamic revivalism. However, his rejection of the authenticity and religious legitimacy of the *Muslim other* is inevitably translated into this realm of racialized religious belongings. To call the message of the Murabitun an inclusive or universalist one would ignore these critical facets of their ideology. Nevertheless, the movement's racist implications come as a contingency and

must be understood as a translation of the South African realities of the cultural politics of segregation into an Islamic framework of fundamentalist thought.

After centuries of colonial domination, division and rule, and social and spatial segregation, the South African society is a deeply unsettled one in which trust is not easily earned. Ideologies that build on mistrust, as is the case of the conspiratorial narrative of the Murabitun, seem to be attractive in this regard. In addition, indigenous African cultural ordering includes its own millennialist accounts. A prominent example is the Xhosa cattle slaying of the nineteenth century, during which followers of an apocalyptic prophecy "dreamed of a world before the white invaders had come and destroyed the great age that was" (LANDES 2011: 95). Another example can be traced to the region of the former Zulu homeland. In their historical account of domination and subordination in colonial Natal at the turn of the century, (LAMBERT & MORRELL 1996: 85f.) describe the millennial discourse and activities aimed against the White oppressor prior to the Bambatha rebellion of 1906:

> "Resistance could take on a millennial form, often involving the killing of white animals or the destruction of European made (sic!) implements. […] Jantshi gave expression to the belief in millennialism when he told Stuart in 1903 that 'a time will come when another wind will blow and a state of affairs different to what is now existing will be brought about… When such day comes an end will be put to present modes of government.'" (LAMBERT & MORRELL 1996: 85f.)

Looking at the Bambatha rebellion and its importance for the revolutionary Black Muslim narrative of Murabitun followers illustrates how Islamic millennialist ideology can be translated into the realm of African experience under colonialism and apartheid. The rebellion in question arose as a reaction to a poll tax imposed in 1905, leading to violent clashes in the Natal Colony and neighboring Zululand. The uprising of the Zondi chief Bambatha proved to be a futile undertaking against an absolutely superior enemy in terms of military means. Still, it became a martyr-like narrative for generations to come, an apocalyptic event, amalgamated in two uneven battles in which 3,000-4,000 Africans were killed, 7,000 were taken prisoner and 4,700 floggings were carried out, but ultimately commemorated as a case in which "an African took a stand."[71] For many among the indigenous population of South Africa, facing the desperate situation and the fatalistic experience of life within an oppressive and exploitative ordering regime, experienced not as a distant political discourse but as an everyday reality manifested throughout the twentieth century and continuing today, renders the post-apartheid promise a

[71]Interview with *Umar* (2015).

false prophecy. Turning to radical narratives that provide fundamentalist perspectives of us vs. them seems to be an attractive answer to the desperate cause of those who suffering under a system which absolutely dominates from an almost divine, machine-like distance—as was the case in the Bambatha rebellion and other previous forms of millennial resistance. Along the lines of the aforementioned *public* and *hidden* transcripts of apocalyptic scenarios and millenarian thought, life in the townships of the 'new', de-racialized, and democratized South Africa is seen through the hidden transcripts of the inherent failure of democracy and the conspiratorial perception of a masonic and Jewish elite as the 'true' enemy, which can only be defeated by circumventing the existing social order. In contrast, the coming kingdom is Islamic *and* indigenous, a revivalism of the *African self* through the Islamic order and the creation of a renewed Black *and* Muslim society. LANDES (2011: 423) classifies such scenarios as tribal or nativist millennialism. This section argues for the category of *indigenous millennialism* as it points to the uniting of the end of times and a nascent new order, which will—it is believed—put an end to the longing for belonging and bring stability to the *African self*.

Township Hijra: The Social and Spatial Ordering of Black Muslim Indigeneity

Under the influence of the alternative promise of indigenous millennialism provided by the Murabitun, the re-ordering of African indigeneity as Black *and* Muslims has been taken a further step compared to the efforts made in the 1980s and 1990s. Not only have the idealized cultural fragments of a pre-colonial Africanness been re-interpreted and revived through Islam; the very principles of Islamic belief have been hybridized into a Black African realm. The processes of re-ordering of the *African self* by translating a historicized, pre-colonial African indigeneity into Islamic ideology as explained above (see section "Contact Zones") have been extended and inversed, as Islamic rituals and routines have been transmuted into the African sphere. Through extraordinary personal contributions, the Islamic theological material and thought provided by the Murabitun is literally being translated into the cultural realm of Zulu Africanness. At first, Shaykh Abdulqadir made the wird, the texts for dhikr, available in the form of a transliteration of the original Arabic. Soon after, the Murabitun followers of KwaMashu who practice the dhikr—the "endless repetition of the name of god as a new form of ritualized religious service" (ENDREß 1997: 68f. (own translation))—on a weekly basis in the jamāt khane in Section J asked for an English translation of the texts, in order to be able to fully understand the wird. In a third step, a member of the group translated these texts into isiZulu with the result that the dhikr is now practiced in the native language of the converts. Through this translation, the Arabic word

Allah became the isiZulu word *mDali*, the creator. The group explained that this was the result of a long debate concerning which word for God in their own language would best suit their understanding of *Allah*. In isiZulu, God is represented by different words such as *Nkhulunkhulu* (the greatest), *Somandla* (the all-powerful), *Menzi* (the one who does), or *Mvelinqangi* (one god who does not create and is not created, or he who shows up and amazes) (Interviews with Muhammad, Ishaq, Solomon, Amin, Ally, Dawuud). Regarding *Mvelinqangi*, interviewed converts frequently made reference to Surah Ikhlas 112:1-4 in the Qur'an (he begetteth not, nor is he begotten), pointing to the doubtless similarities between these understandings of God. This discourse can be linked to a popular publication written by Ahmed Deedat of the IPCI, in which he makes this same analogy (DEEDAT 1981). The group of Zulu Murabitun decided to use *mDali*, pointing out that this word represents the merging of *Allah* and the Zulu understanding for the oneness of god. The translation of the wird thus represents an translation of Islamic thought into a self-conscious sphere of African Zulu indigeneity. Conversion to Islam therefore becomes a continuous transgression of Blackness by constituting a Black Muslimness, rendering Islam the *authentic* religion, not on the grounds of ritualistic similarities between the Islam as a way of life and an idealized pre-colonial African indigeneity but through the Africanization of Islamic thought, which makes the latter suitable for the re-ordered *African self*. The perceived cultural hegemony experienced in the contestations with actors and institutions from the field of Indian Muslims is turned into a self-esteem and even perceived cultural superiority of *Africanness*.

The continuous transgressions of the modes of orderings are not limited to the realm of social and cultural politics and significations; they are acted out in very spatial ways as well. Towards the very end of the field research for this study in 2015, the group of Murabitun Muslim converts presented their plan to collectively leave the lived-in areas of the townships in order to create a new home for a community of African Muslims outside of the urban zone of eThekwini (Durban).



Picture 5: Construction plans for a new Islamic center outside of Durban. Picture: M. Gebauer.

The plan calls for the construction of the new center, named the KwaNjobokazi Islamic Project, in the Umbumbulu district to the west of eThekwini (Durban), near the village of KwaNjobokazi. Situated in a rural area of the former KwaZulu homeland, the converts intend to build religious facilities such as a mosque and a madrassah, along with sleeping quarters for children, a skills center, and even sports facilities like a karate school. The land has already been purchased from the local chief Mkhize, and the first steps of construction began in 2015. The different functions of the new Islamic center resemble the activities that were already taking place at the KwaMashu mosque before the dispute. The plans are not only a continuation of ongoing work, however. They also reflect a refinement of the process of re-ordering the *African self* as Black *and* Muslim. The lesson learned from the conflict around the KwaMashu mosque is that the space of the township, with its spatially inscribed racialization and oppressive orderings of indigeneity, prevents the independent and authentic development of a community of Black Muslims.[72] The shared idea of being Black *and* Muslim resulting from the travels and transmutations of Muslimness into the realm of Blackness is being thought anew in light of the Murabitun call to move out of the oppressive lived-in places and to create a territory for themselves:

[72]Interview with *Ismail* (2015).

> "If we call to Islam we must do so openly – and to do that is to call people to a persecuted minority in the world at present nowhere in command, and yet the best of people, forbidding evil and calling to good. We are at war. And our battle has only just begun. Our first victory will be one tract of land somewhere in the world that is under the complete rule of the shari'at of Islam. Its rule must be simple and from source." (AS-SUFI 1978: 38)

This pursuit—the construction of a new place of living for the community with the intent to move all participating Muslim families from the townships into new homes surrounding the center, in order to lead a subsistent life away from the city—is strongly inspired by the idea and ideal of the Salaf, the first community of Muslims. Understood as a path to a "faithful and promised land," it is described as a "Hijra."[73] Because of the forced removals and relocations during apartheid, life as Black *and* Muslim in the former Black African townships can be interpreted as living in a diasporic state, detached from the promised land of their forefathers, even if they still physically live on or in proximity to it. Even after the end of apartheid rule, these lived-in places remain in a state of dis-order, because they were created by White South Africa to spatially order African indigeneity and to keep the indigenous population profoundly in place. The continuing effects of what PORTEOUS & SMITH (2001) describe as *the annihilation of place* render the post-apartheid paradigm a broken promise, especially in relation to life in the post-apartheid city. Thus, the only alternative appears to be out-migration, or Hijra, from those spaces, those permanent orderly dystopia, that make the re-ordering of African indigeneity otherwise impossible.

The religious modes of orderings in South Africa continue to be a space of contestation. This becomes obvious in the similarities between the teachings of Abdulqadir as-Sufi and those of Ahmed Deedat. Both work with the narrative of the anti-indigenous positions to be found within Christianity and its respective missionary activities. In contrast, Islam is propagated as a return, a reversion to the origins of the self and to indigenous cultural belonging and heritage. The socio-political, religious, and spatial ideology offered by the Murabitun to the converts to Islam among those once classified as Black African has become a fruitful continuation of the core message initially put forward by the Muslim Youth Movement, i.e. to avoid engaging with *earthly* politics and to look for solutions in Islam instead. The millennialist promise of the Murabitun offers a new window of opportunity for re-ordering the *African self* by linking the transgression of orderings more closely with an ideal of purified indigeneity. Furthermore, Murabitun

[73]Interview with *Mariam* and *Ahmad* (2015).

ideology entails a strong spatial dimension, which in turn translates the search for belonging through conversion to Islam into the indigenous millennialist vision of realizing utopian communities outside of post-apartheid space. In an intriguing way, the attempt to create a new ideal Islamic center for the ideal African Muslim community bears similarities with the case of the Mariannhill Mission's ideal African villages scheme discussed above (see section "Divine Modernization: Settler Colonialism and the Ordering of African Indigeneity"). Throughout colonialism, apartheid, and even into the post-apartheid era, the *doxic landscape* of South Africa seems to offer an arena for experimentation to those who feel mandated to order indigeneity on religious grounds. The Muslim converts' move to build their own ideal Islamic center must be seen as an attempt to gain a voice and a mandate within this *doxic landscape* and an endeavor to actively participate in the orderings of their lived-in places by means of a religiously motivated out-migration, or *Hijra*, from the spatially inscribed, bodily ascribed, and therefore persistent modes of orderings. The fact that suitable land could only be acquired within the former homeland territory of KwaZulu again signifies the seemingly inescapable segmentation of South Africa. Apart from that, however, what is taking place is a shift away from a *Muslim Blackness* understood as the transmutation of a pre-colonial idea of African indigeneity into the realm of Islamic thought. As discussed in the chapter "Attempting Muslim Blackness", such attempts have always taken place on disputed grounds and have not fulfilled the hopes for transgression but rather reified the colonial and apartheid modes of orderings. Under the influence of the Murabitun ideology of indigenous millennialism, these transgressions began to shift in another direction, with the un-orthodox Islamic thought of Abdulqadir as-Sufi providing a new framework for being Black *and* Muslim. The aim is no longer to try to find the *African self* within the orderings of Islam as religion and way of life. Instead, the cultural-political bricolage resulting from the process of translating the *African self* into an Islamic framework has turned into a cultural-religious transmutation of Muslimness into the realm of a purified, fundamental, and highly racialized understanding of Black Muslim indigeneity. The vision for an indigenous millennialism based on religiously revisionist Sufi-Islamic ideology re-defines the original aim of conversion as resisting the social and spatial modes of ordering, shifting towards *Black Muslimness* and the fulfilling of a prophecy of a new and re-ordered Islamic age to come that will not only defy the persistent modes of colonial hegemony—in South Africa and beyond—but also dominate the field of Islam in theological as well as institutional terms.

Black Muslim Indigeneity: Transgressing Social and Spatial Modes of Ordering

Throughout the history of colonization in South Africa and especially in the time of apartheid, the practice of Islam was strongly interwoven with a changing but consistent struggle for identity and space. Being Muslim became racialized and was racially inscribed into the *doxic landscape* of South Africa through the oppressive White regime's delineation of the group areas and definition of their respective population groups, including those groups' religious affiliation. However, Islam became more than just an orderly element in the modernist conception of segregationist domination. As a field of forces and field of struggles stretching beyond the national sphere of South African politics and linking Muslims to a global network of institutions, ideas, and ideologies, Islam offered a state of exception—a theological, intersubjective, and spatial *heterotopia*—and a means of interrupting the lived-in modes of racialized restrictions and enforced identities. At the same time, the particular path dependencies along the colonial roots and modes of existence during apartheid's segregation led to the isolation of Islamic communities, actors, and institutions within the South Africa as a whole, producing a specific orthodoxy of Islamic fields.

When looking at conversion to Islam among the indigenous African population, the indirect racialization of believers through the Islamic fields must be seen in addition to the direct social and spatial modes of orderings that were aimed at the Non-White population, determining their everyday life under colonialism and apartheid. BARNETT (2006: 153) is correct when pointing out that

> "[i]f colonialism and imperialism involve the denial, denigration, and negation of the cultural traditions of subjugated groups, then political opposition to these processes can be characterized in part as a set of struggles for the right of communities to represent themselves."

Conversion as resistance to the orderly *African other* is one such struggle for the power of representation; however, social fields tend to overlap and therefore create contestations at the contact zones. Thus, as Africans pursued indigeneity by becoming Muslims and began their

own institutions to represent their identities as Black *and* Muslim, they came into conflict with the established field of Islam in South Africa, which itself created its orthodoxy within the given framework of racialization and restrictions. The cases featured in this study reveal that the transgression of social and spatial modes of orderings through conversion to Islam in a post-colonial society, such as South Africa, is aimed at two orders: One is the direct experience of dominating *Whiteness* and the other is indirect oppression inscribed into the racialized field of Islamic actors.

The featured cases with a focus on KwaZulu-Natal positioned the processes of conversion as transgression in a local setting comprised of a social, spatial, and political sphere of African indigeneity strengthen and defined by Zulu ethnicity, as well as a field of Islam with its own specific internal logic, power struggles, and a strong sense of cultural belonging. The attempts to strengthen and empower the ideology of Blackness by thinking and living it through the orderings of Islam (*Muslim Blackness*) took place on disputed grounds and in some cases failed to unfold a liberating effect, instead reproducing the existing modes of order. The continuing transgressions and especially the transmutations of Islamic modes of orders into the African sphere gained renewed momentum, and a particularly spatial expression, through contact with the Murabitun movement. Here, an unorthodox idea of being Muslim began to evolve, which became legitimized through the struggle for Blackness and the *African self* (*Black Muslimness*). The envisioned *township Hijra*, whether it happens or not, expresses the longing for belonging which a millennialist promise of indigenous quality claims it will fulfill, thereby not only undoing the injustices of the past but also overcoming the promise of a de-racialized, democratized post-apartheid South Africa. The path of conversion thus leads into a socio-political as well as religious framework of Black Muslim indigeneity as a true post-colonial setting for re-ordering society and space.

Furthermore, researching conversion to Islam among the indigenous African part of society highlights the diverse expressions and entanglements of Muslim identity constructions as practices, politics, and discourses of the persistent orderly indigeneity of the *African other*. The realm of African indigeneity in South Africa is a conflict-laden arena, be it under the auspices of bodily and spatial inscriptions of colonialism and apartheid or the contestations resulting from the creation of a self-defined, empowered African identity. In South Africa, African indigeneity entails conflict: It is a strategy and a symbol at the same time—ascriptive, affirming, political, and spatial. For indigenous South Africans, becoming Muslim stands in some cases for the continuation of this conflict, for a fortification of the self in the everyday life of post-colonial South Africa aimed at strengthening one's position within the struggle against persistent modes

of social and spatial ordering. In other cases, becoming Muslim stands for abandoning the conflict through such a radical transformation of the self as that the logics of the continuous conflict no longer have any effect. In such cases, a new societal order is generated and maintained, a foundation for future generations and an authentic move towards a liberated (South) Africa. That is the cause of the converts to Islam. Some of them pursue it by continuing their transgressions of the *doxic landscape* through being Black *and* Muslim, while others aim at a final exodus from the dystopic ream of post-apartheid South Africa.

One way or the other, such developments are attempts to create their own set of mythologized belongings, combining a pre-colonial ideal of indigeneity and a connection to a global realm of shared sufferings as Black *and* Muslim individuals. It is appropriate to speak of a mythologized context in this regard, as the analysis of the dynamics reveals *intentional* narratives and therefore the sharing of intent through the re-ordered rituals (cf. ESCHER & WEICK 2004: 255) of Black Muslim indigeneity. Such rituals are re-interpretations of pre-colonial Africanness as well as transmutations of Islamic theological and socio-political elements into an anticipated, authentic, and purified African indigeneity. The mythical world of Africanness becomes orderly in its reinterpretation and hybridization through the meta-narrative of Islam. Understanding the ancestors' ways, looks, rites, and politics as Islamic uplifts the historical background in contrast to the religious humiliation of colonialism, which entailed the branding of Black African history as heathen, inferior, and barbaric. Repeated Islamic rituals and symbols, like prayers, dhikr, clothes, etc., are thus not only to be understood as religious rituals but as rituals assigning meaning and value to the *African self* and community (cf. JACKSON 1989b: 48). The converts thus construct a bridge between the ideal of the *African self* prior to the beginning of White domination on the one end and the vision for a new Black *and* Muslim era to come on the other. By projecting an ideal past of an identity lost to colonialism and Christian missionary work onto an African Islamic future, the time-frames of colonialism, apartheid, and post-apartheid are abridged or even neglected, which can be interpreted as a negation of the history of racist oppression, dispossession, and exploitation, and with it the persistent social and spatial modes of orderings. Challenging Blackness in post-apartheid South Africa is not only a matter of challenging external mechanisms, institutions, hegemonic ordering logics, etc. It is also a matter of challenging the tacit, embodied structures themselves. Conversion can therefore present a critical moment of internal as well as external re-ordering, of the self and the environment, which redefines belonging in social and spatial terms In conceptual terms, Islam is a *heterotopia*, offering a window of opportunity to continuously think and practice an-*other* order. However, with the racist modes of orderings affecting the field of Islam in South Africa and the experience

and expression of Muslimness in the former Black African areas, the link to a future era to come seems to be most essential for continuing transgression. Only a millennialist promise of indigeneity seems to uphold the belief that a break with the social and spatial modes of orderings in the lived in places can be achieved.

Black Muslim indigeneity is thus not only a transgression of orders, it is the attempted negation of their existence and power. Re-ordering the self as Black *and* Muslim means opting into a new meta-narrative that offers a social, cultural, and spatial solution to segregation and denigration, while at the same time rejecting the process of Christianization as part of the fractured societal order imposed by colonialism, racism, and apartheid, which has kept the indigenous population profoundly in place by legitimizing oppression, devaluing indigenous heritage and African ways of life, as well as de-constructing the indigenous social setting (cf. DODSON 2000: 145; MALULEKE 2008: 119ff.). Black Muslim indigeneity unfolds as an-*other* order, a constant *heterotopia*, and the transgressive attempt at—and attempted transgression *into*—a future order, both social and spatial.

As a collection of modes of re-ordering the *African self* in social and spatial terms, the Black Muslim indigeneity discussed in this study finds various expressions. It can stand for the cause of continuing the unfinished struggle against the White oppressor and the remaining oppressive structures, aiming at the very roots of dispossession and oppression. Being Black *and* Muslim then unfolds a counter-colonial momentum, as Islam is associated with aspects of anti-colonialism and counter-hegemonic positions set against the former oppressor and the persistent oppressive structures. It is a sphere of radical difference, empowerment, and the creation of self-esteem, projected by the converts as essentially and truly African. Furthermore, Black Muslim indigeneity can stand for the vision and anticipation of a future social and spatial Black Muslim utopia, and most of all the attempt to realize that future by leaving the oppressive society and habitat behind and creating a new one in its stead. Black Muslim indigeneity thus becomes a mode of *achieved indigeneity*, i.e. a self-determined re-grounding after being forcefully uprooted. For SHELLER (2003: 276), the aspect of achievement "refers to a process of being uprooted from one place and re-grounded in another such that one's place of arrival becomes a kind of reinvented home. It implies the displacement (yet not total loss) of a previous home/culture and the claiming of a new place of belonging." With the utopic vision of an African Muslim future being linked to the re-ordering of the *African self* as a pre-colonial ideal of indigeneity, conversion to Islam can also be understood as a reversion to Africanness in the sense of an *indigeneity achieved* by intentionally removing oneself from an ordered social and spatial structure while simultaneously seeking to be re-grounded in a new place of belonging that resembles that of the

forefathers. Third, Black Muslim indigeneity can stand for an inter-generational revision of the very maps of cultural orderings with a decisive shift from the converted parents to their children. With few exceptions, this aspect has not been given prominence in the featured cases. Still, as almost all converts who participated in the research have children of different ages, from small toddlers to teenagers, this aspect was a constant topic of discussion. For the parents, being Black *and* Muslim represents a way of creating solutions for Africanness in the here and now of the everyday life in the lived-in places. It is also still a constant struggle against the bodily ascribed and inscribed modes of orderings. This contestation within the *habitus* of the converts can be described as the most difficult of all transgressions. For that reason, the converts hope that their children will not be locked in such an internal dispute, because they are growing up as African Muslims. Nevertheless, the stigmatization and discrimination of African Muslims—as discussed regarding the experiences of Saliim Mthimkhulu's children at their Islamic college—can be seen as a precursor to continuing questions and contestations to come. In this light, the vision for a future ideal community with their own territory becomes even more important to those parents belonging to the Murabitun. Finally, Black Muslim indigeneity can represent the mode of a counter-culture (cf. GILROY 1993, 1991). Resisting and transgressing the social and spatial modes of orderings, especially the bodily inscribed ones, needs a mode of expression, a window of opportunity in the *doxic landscape* of cultural orders. Islam is such a mode: Brought about—in the case of Durban—by Indian migrants who moved through the colonial networks of the British Empire, it became a sphere of practice, materiality, and symbolism that was foreign enough to the colonizers' religion and therefore the religion of the colonized. There was an anti-colonial capacity to it, an chance to break with the subjectified dystopic order of the colonized and uprooted *African self*, enabling modes of resistance (cf. COMAROFF & COMAROFF 1991: 31) which are, in contrast to the Black Consciousness Movement, free from the culture of the oppressor, i.e. free from Christianity. Transmuted and transformed into an ideal of ancestral belonging, Black Muslim indigeneity is the mode of a counter-culture, making the expression of a heterotopic order within the lived-in places possible and linking the self to a global ideal of being Black *and* Muslim.

By looking at the Muslim converts in the former Black African areas, this study has discussed a unique set of social and spatial dynamics arising from the manifestation of the sphere of becoming and being Black *and* Muslim beyond the local, regional, and national particularities, which connects practices in the lived-in places with globally traveling ideologies. The struggle to belong as indigenous Africans in the persistently unequal social and spatial conditions of post-colonial South Africa is translated into a contemporary and globalized realm of Muslim

indigeneity. Thus, conversion is not only a transgression resisting the particular modes of ordering, but also a window of opportunity to decouple the ascription and inscription of the *African self* from the orderly indigeneity of the *African other* as defined by centuries of White domination. As discussed above, resistance as transgression, as stepping into the sphere of *heterodoxic topoi*, is either inward looking, pointing the transformation towards the maps of power, or it is outward oriented, towards something new, often based on intangible, invisible, and unconscious desires and beliefs (see section "Agency of Change: From Resistance to Transgression"). Subsequently, for some of the converts, the aim is to transform the conditions at hand through a Black *and* Muslim way of life, while others strive for an out-migration from the social and spatial modes of orderings which in their view are reflected and reified again and again in everyday encounters, even within the field of Muslims in South Africa, as can be seen in the case of the Murabitun. The movement of converts from the urbanized townships to resettle in the countryside in order to establish an ideal community of Muslims is an intriguing expression of the spatiality of the White/Non-White dialectic defined by an opposition of racialized habitats, i.e. the formerly White urban nodes and corridors vs. the Black African hinterland. By locating Black Muslim indigeneity in a territory that—within the *doxic landscape* of South Africa—is ascribed with African indigenous sovereignty, those converts belonging to the Murabitun group hope to free themselves from the persistent orderings. The Murabitun ideology of the 'Ribat' model links this move to an idealized Islamic historicism of the Almoravid Berber dynasty in the Maghrib of the eleventh and twelfth century and their creative re-interpretation as a network of counter-hegemonic actors on the periphery, on the one hand. On the other hand, the anticipated *township Hijra* links the planned ideal African Islamic center to a global network of singular groups of indigenous Muslims in post-colonial settings, making the 'Ribat' model a blueprint for a new order to come and therefore rendering the local-specific spatial re-orderings the vision of a holy land, not only outside of the persistently oppressive urban space but also outside of an idea of an un-Islamic *and* un-indigenous territory. Only the sacred space can become an orderly space for a utopic vision of African indigeneity (cf. TUAN 1978).

Relating this to the *doxic landscapes* of South Africa, it can be argued that the apartheid project aimed at acquiring something like a sacred status as a modern concept of ordering society on all levels of existence, creating a sacred space of order and justice for the White minority by combining settler ideology with the religious territoriality of a promised land and a God-given duty to bring order to it—in spatial terms, as well as by ordering the supposedly heathen indigenous population. Subsequently, since the official end of White domination, the

transformative paradigm of post-apartheid South Africa stands as a promise of re-ordering and the undoing of social and spatial injustices. However, everyday life in the former segregated Black African areas remains in a relatively desperate state. The post-apartheid promise is perceived by the converts to Islam almost as cynically as the narrative of the townships being the well-ordered places for a modern African life. In the 1980s and 1990s, the converts to Islam of Section J in KwaMashu, together with other Muslims from the greater area of Durban, found a new spiritual and political belonging in their Islamic activities, which they lost again in the dispute concerning the management and Islamic orientation of their mosque. In the Murabitun order, the break-away group found a new spiritual home—and patriarch—whose millennialist though promised them a new place of belonging for the *African self,* the ordering of indigeneity beyond the persisting modes of social and spatial orderings, and the creation of their own sacred space. For the heterogenous field of Muslims in South Africa, these developments have had a decisive influence. RAFUDEEN (2002) is likely correct in his assessment that, in terms of identity formations, Muslims in South Africa seem to be in a state of limbo, caught between their persistently restricted and oppressively ordered groundings established under colonialism and apartheid, one the one hand, and their search for a position, a "niche" as RAFUDEEN (2002: e) terms it, in the greater scheme of the new post-apartheid South Africa, on the other. Looking at the evolving contestations and disputes between the established Islamic organizations and actors and the growing number of converts among the indigenous African population, the author's call for creating a true (South) African Muslim identity that is "rooted in the indigenous traditions of the South African and broader African people" (ibid.) by teaching indigenous culture and indigenous languages in Islamic schools appears to be a lost cause.

In order to fully grasp the conceptual dimension of Black Muslim indigeneity, it seems appropriate to borrow from the discussion of the situation of Afro-American Muslims in the United States. On both sides of the Atlantic, being Black *and* Muslim represents the dilemma of a *dual diaspora*. With regard to the Afro-American context, DANNIN (2002: 264) points to the

> "double consciousness between religious and ethnic identity. Did he [Malcolm X] perceive himself as a Muslim representing a religiously diverse African-American constituency? Or an African American who invested his personal identity in the Muslim umma? These questions concern the dilemma of those who straddle the crossroads of two diasporas, one African, the other Muslim."

Muslims among the indigenous African population face similar contestations of belonging. On the one hand, they are in a diasporic state within the national sphere of South Africa. The long history of oppression, dispossession, territorial restriction, segregation, and forceful removals renders the majority of inhabitants foreigners to the physical habitat and *doxic landscape* in which

they live in. The aspect of *domicide*, discussed above as the ultimate and irreversible loss or better the annihilation of place, casts them in a diasporic state, being scattered on a meso- to macro-scale due to township and homeland politics, while also being unable to return to their places of origin which were re-developed soon after their removal. Thus, it is appropriate to view this situation through the lens of *diasporic consciousness* as proposed by GILROY (1994: 207), "in which identity is focused less on common territory and more on memory, or, more accurately, on the social dynamics of remembrance and commemoration." What has been described in the case of the communities evicted from the religious territory of the Mariannhill Mission as short-distance-diaspora (see section "Apartheid and the Dis-Ordering of Religious Territoriality") is not only a longing for belonging in terms of place-making but also a longing for remembrance. Existing as *Black* in South Africa means embodying the memories of losing home, making *Black* politics a continuous commemoration of the shared experience of *domicide*. Becoming Muslim in the South African context casts the politics of belonging into a second diasporic state, a result of the uprootings, re-groundings, and translations in the history of Islam in South Africa. For the converts among the indigenous population, embracing Islam and the articulation of being Black *and* Muslim has aimed at a history of resistance and represented a move towards an *authentic and liberated African self*. However, against the background of contestations in the contact zones of local Islamic fields, social and socio-spatial conflicts have evolved from the emergence of this new realm of identity in processes that persist up until today, as the KwaMashu cemetery case exemplifies. This is expressed in two ways: On the one hand, becoming Muslim has been one way to fulfill the longing for self-defined and intentional differentiation from the characterizations ascribed by South African society, though this has led to alienation from the converts' communities of origin. Although becoming Muslim implies the re-ordering of being African, experiences of religious racialization, for example being called "Black Indians" (VAHED & JEPPIE 2005: 265), have also come to the fore. On the other hand, new conflict situations with Muslims from the orthodox Islamic institutions have arisen, making the expression and practice of Muslim faith independent from established Islamic field hardly possible. Moreover, the acquisition of land for religious places has always implied the involvement of those institutions perceived as supreme and thus oppressive to Black Muslims. This has led African converts to the continue segregative modes of orderings themselves. Again, the history of the racialized distribution of resources and the related colonial structures become visible, as they are reflected in the structural opportunities and limitations for expressing faith and acting through religious communities. Being Black *and* Muslim not only represents a *dual diaspora* but the everyday reality of *double racisms* (RANA 2007) related to the conflation of race and religion in the *doxic landscape*

of South Africa. In order to overcome this situation, Black Muslim indigeneity connects to global streams of Muslim Blackness and Black Muslimness—to the Afro-American context, as the influence of the Nation of Islam shows, as well as to a global movement of converted indigenous populations from post-colonial contexts, as in the case of the Murabitun. In addition to the diasporic state of Blackness, being Muslim implies a diasporic consciousness as well, linking the converts to a shared idea of suffering as Black *and* Muslim and a diasporic brotherhood of converted indigenous people.

In the context of this study, diaspora is understood as a heuristic device to contextualize the struggle for belonging and the complex contestations of re-ordering the self and community in terms of South Africa's social and spatial modes of ordering. This perspective derives from FORTIER (2005) specific focus on aspects of multi-locality and multiple, often contradictory attachments. However, her reference to GILROY (2000: 124) regarding the necessity of a "historical and experiential rift between the locations of residence and the locations of belonging" is decisively modified here, as the location of belonging is a utopic future-to-come and simultaneously a projection of a pre-colonial African indigeneity lost to colonization and missionary work, which is to be revived in a millenarian age of re-ordered, Islamic indigeneity. In order to grasp the heuristic quality of diasporic consciousness for the conceptual understanding of Black Muslim indigeneity deriving from the featured cases, the idea of *home* has to be approached as the necessary counterpart to diaspora. BRAH (1996: 192) points out that the "question of home […] is intrinsically linked with the way in which processes of inclusion or exclusion operate and are subjectively experienced under given circumstances. It is centrally about our political and personal struggles over the social regulation of 'belonging'." Referring to this, WALTER (2001: 194) notes that in this understanding *home* is an implicit element, a necessity binary opposite of the diaspora. In the same way, the dynamics of movement, transgression, religious-political transmutations, and cultural-political bricolage found among the converts to Islam implicitly represent a struggle to belong and a longing for home. The anticipated ideal African Muslim community is the most explicit expression of such new maps of cultural orderings as place-making processes. However, this future vision for a re-territorialized Black Muslim indigeneity is not to be understood as a binary alternative to the persistent modes of social and spatial orderings. Instead, attempting to realize a utopic order socially and spatially is more a question of *home* understood as a journey (TUAN 1971: 188f.). For the converts to Islam among the indigenous African population, their venture is a mode of home-coming and home-making, of achieving belonging through an *achieved indigeneity* as Black

and Muslim. The township Hijra attempted by some is an alter-territorialization of a home-to-come, away from the dystopic, un-homey lived-in places of post-apartheid South Africa.

As pointed out in the introduction to the conceptual framework for order, resistance, and transgression, order is an enigmatic idea. So is home. Both seem to stand for uniformity but entail contestation and constant longing. In the same way that conversion to Islam offered a sense of order and re-ordering the *African self,* breaking with the orderly indigeneity of White South Africa, becoming Black *and* Muslim, involves longing for home and an ongoing journey, which deserves further inquiry. This study made a crucial step forward in conceptual terms by understanding the conversion to Islam among those once classified as Black African as a series of acts transgressing the social and spatial modes of orderings. The persistence of the orderly indigeneity of the *African other* as defined by colonialism and apartheid is a result of their social, spatial, and bodily ascriptions and inscriptions. In this context, conversion became a project of re-indigenization as well as a re-ordering of everyday life in an anti-colonial manner. The existing academic accounts on conversion to Islam in South Africa discussed in this study seem to miss the self-determined, self-defined quality of Black Muslim indigeneity and are rather reluctant to analyze and contextualize these dynamics against the background of persisting colonial, racialized, and spatial modes of ordering. Still today, these aspects seem to render the project of re-ordering the *African self* an impossible undertaking, leaving the indigenous South African people in a constant dispute for home and with a constant longing for belonging in an unsettled society. For this reason, acts of resistance must be acts of transgression; it is the only way to move beyond the existing framework which otherwise pre-defines the acts of resistance. The dynamics of the cases presented here, moving from resistance to orderly indigeneity to an indigenous millenarian perspective, show that the actions of conversion to Islam and opting into being Black *and* Muslim are not limited to the South African realm of social and spatial orderings and power relations but aim instead at moving beyond it. The converts' continuous transgressions are driven by a longing for home, a journey of out-migration from the maps of cultural orderings, and most recently, the unfulfilled promise of post-apartheid South Africa.

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