CONCERNING ISSUES:
Making Things Political in Durban

Dem Institut für Ethnologie und Afrikastudien der
Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz
eingereichte

D I S S E R TA T I O N

zur Erlangung des akademischen Grades

DOCTOR PHILOSOPHIAE (Dr. phil.)

vorgelegt von

Eva Nyirakivu Riedke

geboren am 26.06.1986 in Kibuye, Ruanda

2016

CONCERNING ISSUES

Making Things Political in Durban

Eva Nyirakivu Riedke

CONTENTS

Figures and Maps

Frequently used Zulu terms

abahloli – women who conduct virginity inspections
amabutho – warrior regiments
amakhosi – chiefs (plural)
abantu – people / human beings
ipolitiki ephilayo – 'living politics'
izintombi – virgins/maidens
iziphandla – goat skin wrist-band
izinduna – headmen (plural)
lobolo –practice of bridewealth
muthi – traditional medicines
ndabezitha – address for a chief/'Your Highness'
sangoma – diviner/traditional healer
shebeen – township bar
ubukhosi – institution of chieftaincy
ukusoka – male circumcision
umuntu – human kindness

Frequent Acronyms

ANC – African National Congress
ANT – Actor Network Theory
CBD – Central Business District
CGE – Commission on Gender Equality
CPF – Community Police Forum
DA – Democratic Alliance
DUT – Durban University of Technology
HRC – Human Rights Commission
IFP – Inkatha Freedom Party
KZN – KwaZulu-Natal
RDP – Reconstruction and Development Programme
STD – Sexually Transmitted Disease
STS – Science and Technology Studies
UCT – University of Cape Town
UKZN – University of KwaZulu-Natal

"They changed the name from 'Moore Road' to 'Che Guevara Road', from 'Cowey Road' to 'Problem Mkhize Road' [PAUSE]. I mean some of these names, no one here even pronounces them properly – you should listen how the taxi drivers say 'Che Guevara'. And to name a street a 'problem'?! Well, its ridiculous!"

It was early 2012 and I was here spending an early Tuesday afternoon in Councillor Lesley Logan's apartment on Durban's beachfront promenade. Having sipped through only one cup of black tea, our conversation moved rapidly from the last election results; to how dynamics between the opposition parties had aggressively played out during the last City Council meeting; to the recap of another meeting about the city's lack of cemetery space; and finally to the street name changes in Durban. Albeit always clearly changing the topic, I felt that the progression itself (the manner in which one concern followed another) also demanded an inference – particularly now, when she raised the issue of the street name changes. I thought back to other conversations, how frequently this 'storytelling' sequence had been and eventually always came to the point of the street names. Was it that the street-renaming debacle served so well to explain/ to illustrate/ to make 'obvious' to a foreign PhD student Durban's local politics?

Lesley continued: "We [the Democratic Alliance] have no problem with them [the street names] being changed, but we have objected to the names themselves because they have nothing do with us – a name like 'Che Guevara'. You see? You know what I mean? The other names we objected to because they are just blatantly offensive – [PAUSE] like how they renamed 'Kingsway Road' in Amanzimtoti in honour of 'Andrew Zondo'. [PAUSE] He was a member of the ANC who planted a bomb in a shopping centre in the area in 1995. Many people died! In the end, I mean if you look at the list, then you see that most of the names are of people who fought in the liberation struggle. [PAUSE] The whole thing of choosing names wasn't one in which the public had much to say, that is what became clear once again!"

As our meeting came to an end and we arranged to meet again soon, I was already late for another rendezvous in KwaNkilinda. This was a township located 40 km north on the city's outer fringes and the second 'field site' where I spent my days doing research. I had arranged to meet up with two young men around my age – Sibu who was a student in development studies and who occasionally helped me with translations, and Bongeni who I had met a few times at local ANC branch meetings in the township.

We met at one of the sharp looking container shops with tables and plastic chairs. It was an informal afternoon catch-up – the sort I approached with almost no agenda. It was the sort of company in which I met simply to talk – they were the rare occasions in which I also concerned others with worries, frustrations. The two often prompted self-reflections and gave advice.

As we sat, I immediately sought to apologise for my lateness. "I just met someone in town and it took longer than planned". The two assured me that I didn't need to worry. I explained: "I met with a DA councillor. We were talking about the street renamings. And you know, on my way here, I then realised, that here [in KwaNkilinda], people hardly ever speak to me about them!" This remark immediately caught Sibu's attention. He jumped in as soon as I had finished my thought. "To be honest Eva, this street name thing is really something I associate with people in Durban. I mean I have seen the discussions in the papers – sometimes every week an article. To me, it is like it is a privilege, that that is an issue they see as so important". Sibu was right, I thought, in the 'city' the street names attracted much more public engagement – people aired their views in the newspaper, in municipality meetings, at public debates, over dinner table and beer conversations. The new signs were regularly defaced with spray paint, then cleaned up, only to be sprayed over again.

Bongeni quickly interjected: "No, Man! It is not like that!" He looks at Sibu. "We also changed some of the names. You know that one there [points] – Tom Tom street? [PAUSE]" He turned, to explain to me: "Tom Tom was a good friend of Themba and the others there [points] and he was killed in this IFP [Inkatha Freedom Party] fighting back then. You know the story, Eva. I mean Tom Tom he was one of our comrades. We know what he fought for! And we remember him for it [PAUSE] And I mean these names are much better than these numbers that are everywhere else in the township. For me its like things are changing".

Looking down at his lap, Sibu nodded approvingly at his friend's correction. Suggestive that he was nevertheless in this moment not in the mood to debate the local significance of street names further, he turned to me, and to change the subject asked: "What are the plans for today?" In the mere moment I had left to pursue a trail of thoughts, I wondered: Was it that street name changes in KwaNkilinda affected people less? Also why was it that street name changes were an effective means to articulate problematic relations – i.e. 'the things that were going wrong'. They were at times 'the stuff' through which to object (and practically intervene) in matters that concerned people.

1. Concerning issues – a first abstraction

Much like the putting up of new sculptures and the pulling down of old

sculptures, street name changes have, around the world, been part of efforts to actively transform the symbolic landscape following a political transition (see Azaryahu, 2011; Duminy 2014; Dwyer & Alderman, 2008; Guyot & Seethal, 2007; Palonen, 2008; Rose-Redwood et al., 2010; Yeoh, 1996). The street-name changes in Durban aroused a considerable amount of public debate in a variety of networks – public discussion rounds were held on numerous occasions to debate the matter; local newspapers reported meticulously on the issue; bloggers latched on; Facebook groups were founded; academics commented; and the matter readily made its appearance in day-to-day conversations. Beginning in 2007 and carried out in two phases, over one hundred street names were changed – primarily in Durban's city centre and in the upper and middle-class residential areas on its fringes. The objective was clear: the renaming of public spaces was to reflect the new political order while at the same time acknowledging a difficult past.

An overwhelming majority of the new names chosen, commemorated individuals involved in liberation and revolutionary struggles (usually against colonial regimes), whereby approximately two-thirds were devoted specifically to individuals with an active engagement in the ANC (see Duminy, 2011; 2014). In the city council, the ANC's opposition parties were from the outset voicing their critique, concerned that the renaming process lacked public participation and that the new street names, particularly through the emphasis placed on the ANC's liberation struggle, projected a highly *partisan* image of South African history.

The views expressed in and outside the city council, made clear that the street name changes were a catalyst (one of many) for the articulation of problematic relations and interdependencies, and, by extension, the furnishing of claims about 'what is' vs. 'what ought to be'. The controversies that arose around street name changes were not seldom framed as symptomatic of a larger crisis, and yet somewhat paradoxically, 'what is truly at stake' proves unclear and resistant to definition. In the case of Durban's street name changes, many agreed that it was not the changing of 'names' per se that mattered, but rather that it was a particular reading of the past that was being institutionalised, that was eliciting concern.

It is precisely 'issues' such as these that I intend to focus on. My concern is with the articulation of 'issues' as problematic entanglements that actors and groups of actors are implicated in, and how these, to borrow a formulation from Marres (2005b), "spark a public into being". In relation thereto, my objective is to explore precisely *where* these issues are then debated, fought out, negotiated and redefined. The focus is placed on experimental arenas such as those that developed around street name changes in Durban, and the concrete processes of critical scrutiny, negotiation and justification therein. The argument is that tracing issues and their publics to specific sites in which actors or groups of actors 'do the work' of the public, allows us to see more than what we readily come to recognise as the settings of 'the political'. Our

attention is directed to the alternative *sites*, *subjects* and *forms* that define publics and their politics at a given moment in time.

The empirical investigations that follow draw upon cases, situations, conversations and engagements that either took place in the city of Durban or in the township of KwaNkilinda 40 km north of the city. While these are sited accounts, in everyday contexts, they, at the same time, make obvious the wider relations in and through which people live. As such, the sited explorations presented also seek to make clear "the unboundedness of the setting" (Marres, 2012a: 25), and how the issues dealt with by actors and groups of actors in this study transgress the locality to which they initially appear to pertain. Troubling and partially also unknown, the wider entanglements in which people are implicated become meaningful – i.e. their causes and effects, and how these transgress the places they inhabit. Thomas Hylland Eriksen (2001) speaks of *'small places, large issues'*. Alternatively, we can also speak of how sites are implicated in other sites. My focus is hereby less on tracing the trajectory of particular issues – how an 'issue' travels and gets translated, how it becomes an issue in a given local context – but rather on the 'work' that actors and groups of actors do to address it, its *sites*, *subjects* and *forms*. These, no doubt, are then the manifestations of specific 'segments', moments in the trajectory of an issue (Latour, 2007).

The chapters that follow are structured around empirical documentation and analysis of different instances in which things are made political. The first chapter is concerned with the installation of statues and sculptures in Durban around which a series of long-lasting controversies unfold. Therein, similarly to the street name changes, the post-apartheid city text became a locus of dispute between different actors and actor groupings. In a subsequent chapter, I look at the revival of virginity testing in KwaZulu-Natal and the core issues that come to frame the setting. The third chapter explores a dispute around a housing development project in the township of KwaNkilinda – how land, houses, and infrastructure improvements are made political. The final chapter carries on from the third and traces the public engagement of a group of township residents that have joined the shack dwellers movement *Abahlali baseMjondolo*. How do things come to matter practically and politically in processes of issue articulation and what are the mechanics at play when publics that emerge in relation to particular issues and problems are prevented from rendering these political?

I hereby follow the offer by Noortje Marres (2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2012a; 2014) and Bruno Latour (2005a) – themselves taking their cue from John Dewey (1991 (1927)) – to see "politics turn around issues that generate a public around them instead of trying to define politics in the absence of any issue" (Latour, 2007: 4). If one follows this proposition, politics as a practice is considered to be *issue-orientated* and understood as always being *occasioned* by 'issues'. The pragmatists foreground an understanding of (democratic) politics in which there is no ideal order. Order is brought about creatively.

Foregrounding moments in which orders are unsettled, ideals, subject definitions, procedures and arrangements are seen as continuously subject to experimental adaptations (Marres, 2005a; 2012a). Also entailed, is a notion of the permanent renovation of the architecture of the state. As will become clearer, this particular approach differs from others in political theory in that it a) turns around the 'objects' of politics, rather than the 'subjects' and b) it explicitly brings to the fore those arenas of political action that lie beyond the official machinery of government (de Vries, 2007; Latour, 2007). It prompts empirical accounts of *politics-in-the-making*, rather than *politics-made*.

This chapter will expand upon the conceptual and theoretical framing for the empirical accounts that follow. To do so, it weaves together two main threads – *first,* an issue-centred understanding of politics wherein politics is not seen as some essence, not as a particular domain of life, a particular sphere, but rather as trajectory; and *second,* the concern with *how* politics turns around issues, drawing upon a field of research that has sought to explore how situated practices of critique and justification unfold – i.e. how in a process of constant interaction actors confirm and interrogate, take for granted and question the conditions under which they live.

It is issues that are considered to '*spark a public into being*'. For this slogan, first put forward by Marres (2005b), a central point of inspiration has been a debate between the pragmatist philosopher John Dewey and the journalist Walter Lippmann about the fate of democracy and public involvement in politics. Their debate concluded in the late 1920s that contrary to the assumption that political affairs in technological societies had become too complex for ordinary citizens to participate, it was in fact these very controversies, i.e. "the hardest to disentangle", that *enabled* public involvement in politics (Dewey, (1991), 1927; Lippmann, (2002) 1927: 121). This proposition was later re-visited by Noortje Marres (2005a; 2005b; 2007; 2010a; 2012a; 2014) and Bruno Latour (2005a; 2007) with regards to public involvement practices in the modern matrix of democracy, a society permeated by science and technology. Captured in another of Marres' (2005b: 212) forceful slogans "*No issues, no politics*", she has argued since that, despite the fact that the 'what' of politics may today prove increasingly resistant to definition, too little consideration is nevertheless paid to how issues prompt public engagement in politics and the role that the objects of politics play in making democratic politics happen.

Central to this issue-centred framework is a particular socio-ontological understanding of how people's engagement in politics is mediated by problems that affect them, which equally rests strongly on pragmatist philosophy. Herein, the argument goes that what gets people engaged in politics and what all members of a particular public share, is an 'affectedness' by a given affair. People are not in the first instance connected by way of shared or opposing opinions or interests, but by being implicated in a given issue that existing institutions are unable to resolve. In their elaborations of the Lippmann – Dewey debate, Marres and Latour dwell upon the fact that

every issue brings forth a new public and that the "actors of one affair, are the spectators of another" (see Lippmann, 1997 (1922)): 100). In addition, they stress that entanglements are never purely social. It is the joint implication of actors in arrangements – technological, material, natural and otherwise – that mediate the formation of publics. Latour (2005) merges these considerations – from Dewey and Lippmann to the extensions made by Marres – in his article '*From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik: or how to make things public*', to which I shall also return to in more detail below.

The second theoretical thread which will be elaborated in this introductory chapter concerns the question of *how* politics turns around issues; what it is that people disagree about, how actors render visible different meanings of the same issue; how existing associations between entities are problematized and new ones put forth; how different forms of justification are brought into play; and how closure can be reached. Here, on the one hand, Anselm Strauss' (1978, 1982) framework and its elaborations in the works of Adele Clarke (Clarke & Star, 2008; Clarke 2012) become significant. Both were concerned with social worlds and arenas, which provide a starting point for exploring, as Lamla (2013) recently put it, "whether, where and how social arenas are formed, once different social worlds and conventions come into critical conflict with each other and need to be rearranged by experimental processes". Equally valuable is a link to the pragmatic sociology of justification put forth by Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2006), which, as I seek to argue, allows for an exploration of the *formative* practices of issue articulation. Their works provide the conceptual tools to describe situated practices of critique and justification, the manner in which "members of a complex society criticise, challenge institutions, argue with one another, or converge toward agreement" (Boltanski and Thévenot, 2006: 15). It is in the context of a plurality of normative orders and regimes of justification to which actors can refer that we can analyse *how* in political arenas, existing orders are consolidated or new, experimental, negotiated orders develop[1].

2. Elaborating the Lippmann – Dewey Debate

In the 1920s, the aforementioned debate took place between the philosopher John Dewey – considered one of the primary figures of American pragmatism – and the journalist Walter Lippmann. It begun with Lippmann's publication of '*Public Opinion*' (1997 (1922)) and was carried forth through Dewey's review thereof in the '*The New Republic*' magazine. In this debate that followed,

---

[1] While drawing on a number of additional concepts and scholars in the forthcoming chapters, I, for the sake of clarity, primarily restrict myself to discussing six protagonists, their conceptual vocabularies and thinking devices: Lippmann & Dewey, Marres & Latour, Boltanski & Thévenot. Throughout the text, I frequently take them as 'short-hands' for what are in reality very heterogeneous and fragmented research networks, recognising that I might run the risk of over-simplification.

Dewey represented an early theorist of participatory democracy, and Lippmann, in contrast, an articulate spokesperson of democratic elitism – a conception of democracy which, in its most simple sense, minimizes the role of public participation in the political processes (Whipple, 2005). Schudson (2008: 1032) stresses that labelling the interchange between Dewey and Lippmann as 'a debate' may in a sense also be a bit problematic. While a 'difference of opinion' no doubt crystallised through the many analyses of their works, it remains unclear whether Lippmann ever considered himself to be in dialogue with Dewey. Dewey had published a review of Lippmann's *Public Opinion (1922)* and *The Phantom Public (1925)*, followed by his own publication of *The Public and Its Problems* in 1927, however, as Schudson (ibid) writes: "In no subsequent instances does Lippmann respond to Dewey's position, and nowhere, to my knowledge, did any contemporaries interpret Dewey's reviews as a notable confrontation. What turned the Lippmann-Dewey discourse into a "debate" were liberal intellectuals in the 1980s and 1990s [...]". Whipple (2005: 159) suggests that in fundamental ways, what has been framed as an intellectual exchange between Lippmann and Dewey "revolved around their opposing views of (a) the nature of human nature and (b) the nature of democracy and its social function". While Lippmann viewed human nature as passive and basically irrational, Dewey emphasized the active, experiential, and rational nature of social actors.

Lippmann upheld that the complexities and entanglements of a technological, twentieth-century society had brought about a context in which citizens' perception of public affairs had become concerningly distorted – public affairs had grown so complicated that citizens could no longer be expected to competently make decisions about them. Unable to competently make decisions, their agency was increasingly limited, and their role as citizens was transforming from that of participants to that of mere bystanders. Deceptively simple, Lippmann (1997 (1922): 68 discussed in DeCesare, 2012: 106) formulated his central concern as follows: "The environment is complex. Man's political capacity is simple. Can a bridge be built between them?"

The first chapter of '*Public Opinion*' (1997 (1922)), with the chapter title '*The World Outside and the Pictures in Our Heads*' proposed that the problem which Lippmann had identified was both due to a) *structural barriers*, particularly modern mass media, which inevitably distorted what it presented of a complicated world and placed constraints on citizens' access to the truth, as well as due to b) *human nature* itself, i.e. human nature not being "equipped to deal with so much subtlety, so much variety, so many permutations and combinations" (Whipple, 2005: 159- 160). As Marres (2005a: 42) summarises Lippmann's concern at the time:

> "[...] if it cannot be assumed that those involved in the debate have a
> good grasp of the affairs under discussion, then it cannot be expected
> that the opinions and preferences that they form about them are
> pertinent. But in a democracy these opinions and preferences are

precisely supposed to inform decision-making. The *object of politics* thus emerges as a problem for democracy" (emphasis added).

In conclusion, Lippmann saw the solution in a redistribution of intelligence, critical agency and choice within the political sphere – away from the masses and towards an intelligent elite. In other words, a deliberate 'handing over' to those intellectuals and experts chosen to be the machinery of the state, chosen to concern themselves with the complexity of issues, come to judgments and arrive at solutions. Lippmann thereby believed that "good government could be had only by allowing disinterested experts to exercise a preponderant power over government" (Ryan, 1995: 209, cited in Marres, 2005a: 37-28).

While the contributions by Lippmann and Dewey are commonly analysed as ones in which the two theorists lacked any common ground, Dewey in fact fully shared Lippmann's increasing disillusionment with American democracy, i.e. the existing order of politics. While Dewey was critical of the actual condition of the masses – "(The) Public seems to be lost; it is certainly bewildered" – and was not concerned to argue that American democracy was in good shape, he nevertheless clung to a faith in the masses' theoretical capabilities (Ryan 1995: 216-217; Whipple, 2005: 162). A faith that the interest of the public could again serve as the "supreme guide and criterion of governmental activity" (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 146). In other words, both Dewey and Lippmann agreed on the problem, but diverged concerning its solution. Dewey's position, in contrast to Lippmann's, was that while 'the object of politics' could no longer be 'bracketed' (so the 'what' of politics was no longer necessarily self-evident), democratic politics could very well accommodate the complex public affairs that Lippmann was pointing to.

Dewey upheld that a *participatory* model (in contrast to an *elitist* conception) of democracy could "provide the conditions for the greatest realization of broad individual and collective capacities"– democracy not merely being a means to an end, but "the idea of community life itself" (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 148, discussed in Whipple, 2005: 161). He writes in '*The Public and its Problems'* (1991 (1927): 144): "The old saying that the cure for the ills of democracy is more democracy is not apt if it means that the evils may be remedied by introducing more machinery of the same kind as that which already exists, or by refining and perfecting that machinery. But the phrase may also indicate the need of returning to the idea itself, of clarifying and deepening our apprehension of it [...] ".

In metaphorical terms, Dewey (1991 (1927): 207) expounded his ideal of the public, and its role in democracy, as follows: "The man who wears the shoe knows best that it pinches and where it pinches, even if the expert shoemaker knows how the trouble is to be remedied". In his view of participatory democracy, Dewey foregrounds two principles that he had already articulated in his earlier writings; a) the experiential act of participation and b) his view of human agency, defined by forms of both habitual and reflective intelligence

(ibid.). Central to his notion of agency was that human beings are, under no circumstances, mere and passive slaves to their habits and customs, but rather remain active agents able to critically reflect back on their past experiences and shape their future ones (ibid: 162). Yet, it was the *kind* of issues that the technological society of his age begun being confronted with, that were beginning to pose difficulties for the operation of representative institutions. These were problems that resisted established routines of problem solving: transgressing the instrumental means of individuals and the established forms of institutional action (Marres, 2005a: 45).

In his second book '*The Phantom Public*' (2002 (1927)), Lippmann broke with his earlier proposition that democracy requires an intelligibility of public affairs and access to accurate information. He came to argue that the formation of pertinent opinions by the people comes to be fuelled by the very nature of issues, their complexity and intelligibility (Marres, 2005a; 2005b). As he writes:

> "[I]t is in controversies of this kind, the hardest controversies to disentangle, that the public is called in to judge. Where the facts are most obscure, where precedents are lacking, where novelty and confusion pervade everything, the public in all its unfitness is compelled to make its most important decisions. The hardest problems are problems that institutions cannot handle. They are the public's problems. (Lippmann, 2002 (1927): 121)."

Hereby, Lippmann came to make a similar argument to what Dewey later picked up in the '*Public and its Problems' (*1991 (1927)), namely that the emergence of modern controversies – complex, mediated issues which challenge existing institutional arrangements and thereby also established forms of opinion formation – not only pose difficulties for public involvement in politics, but that their emergence must, at the same time, also be recognised as an *enabling* condition for democracy.

Together, Lippmann (1997 (1922); 2002(1927)) and Dewey (1991 (1927)) come to argue in their writings that a) issues which proliferate in modern technological societies had become so complex that they can no longer be readily identified and that b) these issues transgressed the boundaries of existing communities and the established forms of institutional action. The result is a mismatch "between the scale at which we are habituated to organise and think and that of the consequences that affect us" (Calhoun, 2013: 94). In other words, the obstacle is a "proliferation of affairs which cannot be effectively processed by established forms of political organisation". As Dewey (1991 (1927): 113-4) fittingly puts it: "We have inherited, in short, local-town meeting practices and ideas. But we live and act and have our being in a continental national state". He elaborates by writing: "the local face-to-face community has been invaded by forces so vast, so remote in initiation, so far-reaching in scope and so completely indirect in operation, that they are, from the standpoint of the members of local social units, unknown" (ibid: 131).

Those affected by the indirect consequences of modern social and political arrangements, share a common interest in controlling these consequences (ibid: 126). However, "to *form* itself, the public has to break existing political forms" (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 31 – emphasis added).

Lippmann and Dewey continue by proposing that a public is formed and called to act precisely when 'problems arise', i.e. when actors are implicated by complex entanglements yet do not have the means of direct influence (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 15f). The complex entanglements that characterise public affairs do not constitute an *obstacle* for public involvement, but rather *occasion* the formation of publics. "Public involvement in politics is thus sparked by the failure of existing social groupings and institutions to settle an issue" (Marres, 2005a: 47). And it is then, where a public is confronted with the failure of existing institutional arrangements to deal with the issue, that the public must, to quote Dewey, (1991 (1927): 32) "re-make the state". While Lippmann stressed that complex entanglements occasion public involvement in politics, Dewey articulated more precisely the form of 'affectedness' by issues that served as the 'enabling condition'. Simple and familiar problems, in contrast, fail to foster 'participationism' on the grounds that these are in most cases 'manageable' within the existing institutional framework, through social groupings and the already established political communities (Marres, 2005a: 43-7). In Marres' words: 'complex entanglements', in turn, require something else in order to be addressed: namely a public (2005a; 2005b). As she puts it in short words: "it is affairs which challenge established competences, rather than affairs which (re-) confirm their usefulness, that provide the occasion for a public to become politically active" (Marres, 2005a: 46).

In the following, the discussion will focus more specifically on *how* issues are seen to occasion public involvement in politics. The objective is to explore further this socio-ontological understanding of issues whereby people's involvement in politics is seen to be mediated by problems that affect them and which yet prove resistant to definition. The discussion builds upon a series of contributions by Noortje Marres, Bruno Latour and Peter deVries, who amongst themselves, but also in discussion with others, have made reference to and elaborated – for a present day context – Lippmann and Dewey's propositions. On a few occasions, I shall return to the controversy surrounding the street-name changes in Durban.

2.1 From problems to publics

For Dewey and Lippmann, it is not the mere failure of existing institutions to address an issue that occasions public involvement in politics, but fundamental is also the manner in which actors become *implicated* in issues. As Dewey (1991 (1927): 15) writes: "The public consists of all those who are

affected by the indirect consequences of transactions, to such an extent that it is deemed necessary to have those consequences systematically cared for". Lippmann (2002 (1927)) defined public involvement as being mediated primarily by communication *about* a given issue. He upheld that the relation between a public and its issues is in all respects secondary and indirect. "The role of the public is determined by the fact that its relation to a problem is external. The opinion affects an opinion, but does not itself control the executive act" (Lippmann, 2002 (1927): 36; see also Marres, 2005a: 47-51). For Dewey however, the indirectness of this relationship did not mean that the public cannot or is not, at the same time, *substantially* implicated by an affair. Dewey thereby introduced the notion of 'affectedness' by issues.

For Dewey it "is not just that when established instances fail to deal with a problem, a public arrives from some mysterious elsewhere to push for a settlement of the issue, to assure that problems are solved" (Marres, 2005a: 48). Members of publics are those who are *indirectly* affected by 'harmfully', 'enduring' and 'extensive' consequences of modern social and political arrangements – thus, issues are for Dewey (1991 (1927): 15ff) those in which actors become *indirectly* but also *substantially* implicated (Marres, 2005a: 60). This understanding translates into two important criteria for the type of consequences that in Dewey's view call a public into existence. First, is the notion of being affected by the "indirect consequences of transactions" (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 15) – these are different from those that are direct, and thus controlled by those involved in their production. Issues in which actors become indirectly implicated differ from those that a community would readily be able to address, or that government institutions can and do handle. A public is 'sparked' when those who are intimately affected by the harmful consequences of human actions recognise that "it cannot use inherited political agencies" to address them (ibid). Secondly, Dewey distinguishes between erratic and extensive/enduring consequences of action, suggesting that former can "be accommodated as part of social life" (Marres, 2010b: 19). As Marres (ibid: 20) captures Dewey's central tenet:

> "The event of 'incursion' […] transforms social actors who more or less 'routinely' went about their daily lives into a public that must take it upon itself to organise into an external force (vis-à-vis the actions that must be intervened in, if harmfully effects are to be addressed). In Dewey's account, the state of being harmfully affected by events beyond actors' control requires the formation of a collective agency and, more generally, the need to get involved in something like politics".

Marres (2005a: 48) notes that by placing a notion of 'affectedness', i.e. the indirect consequences of action, at the heart of his definition of the public, "Dewey provides a radical alternative to definitions that rely on an understanding of subjects as intentional beings" (ibid). She adds: "[...] being affected by indirect consequences, observing them, and limiting their harmful effects here are the key components of public involvement in politics" (ibid).

Central is the notion of 'indirect consequences'. Dewey hereby specified more precisely than Lippmann, the type of problems that 'spark a public into being' (Marres, 2005b), nevertheless "Lippmann's characterisation of the public as external to the affairs in which it intervenes is important as it makes clear that "public involvement in politics depends on a particular *process of problem definition*" (Marres, 2005a: 49 – emphasis added).

In order to understand in more detail the 'work done' to articulate particular problems as points of concern for public involvement, one can according to Marres, Latour and deVries, benefit greatly from studies done on public controversies – by the likes of Brian Wynne, Andrew Barry, Michel Callon, Isabelle Stengers, Emilie Gomart and Maarten Hajer – and in particular benefit from 'associations' and 'attachment' notions entailed therein. From a perspective of Science and Technology Studies (STS), Dewey's notions of 'affectedness'/'implication' provide the stepping stone for an ontological perspective that moves beyond objectivist and discursivist understandings of issues[2]. On the notion of 'attachments' "that people mobilise (and that mobilise people)", Gomart and Hennion (1999 cited in Marres, 2007: 774) define attachment as "a relation between human and non-human entities that is characterized by both 'active commitment' and 'dependency'".

Taken as such, the notion allows one to consider the manner in which actors may be harmfully implicated in issues through *ontological* associations. In other words, it is particular combination of 'dependency on' and 'commitment to' that characterizes actors' involvement in issues (Marres, 2007: 774). Marres borrows the term 'attachments' from Gomart and Hennion (1999) whose study had focused on the relations (involving human and non human entities) between music lovers and music and drug users (or 'drug lovers' as they put it) and drugs. If considered with respect to street name changes, one may question whether the notion of 'dependency' is fully fitting. Primarily, for the "active passions" – that Gomart and Hennion suggests are precisely the result of an 'endangerment' of associations – vary considerably when we consider how residents of a given city relate to street names vis-à-vis how drug users relate to drugs. The modalities of attachment differ considerably. The point becomes not to render these relations synonymous but rather, by drawing on the notion of attachment, point to particular 'agencies' that allow us to appreciate (amongst other 'realms') actors' public involvement in controversies. The objective is as Gomart and Hennion (1999: 221) put it: we extend this analysis of the collective production of agencies [...]. This process does not fit

---

[2] Objectivist approaches that explore the role of issues in democratic politics, emphasise that actors' affectedness by a given affair can be determined 'objectively' on the basis of neutral standards. Discursivist understandings, in turn, centralise "the mobilisation of terms, symbols or ideas" in processes of issue definition (Marres, 2007: 776). Socio-ontological perspectives problematise the distinction between the two, granting discourses a determining role but also emphasising that affairs do not exist objectively apart from the discourses that describe them. The notion of 'attachments' points to a form of 'being affected' due to one's entanglement with entities that are at risk and that may well put one's mode of existence at risk (ibid).

the limited sociological dichotomies. Passive/active, free/determined, or subjugated/dominant, such dualisms do not work". As Hennion (2012) adds elsewhere: "the grammar of attachment is a strange one, perpendicular to the active/passive axis". For street names and drugs, a form of 'attachment' can thus be pin pointed that evades clear distinctions between dependent things and determining ones (see Latour, 2000). (I return tot he notion of ‚attachment' in Chapter 3).

STS here adds an explicit constructivist perspective, in so far as issues are not approached as mediated 'givens', but require active articulation to qualify as such (ibid: 768). Studies in STS make clear that "objects and social groups are co-constructed" (ibid: 771). Contrary to the analysis of frames (how particular issues are framed and then met with the formation of counter-frames), the notion of 'attachments' allows us to conceive of the "associations mobilized in the enactment of public controversy to be partly constitutive of the issues at stake in it" – unlike frames, generally considered to be external to issues (ibid). Particular frames are thereby what actors mobilize to enact their concern with issues – they define how a particular problematicness is 'perceived' or 'defined' – but beyond frames, particular attachments to things and people represent significant ontological associations. It follows, that if being affected is re-defined in post-positivist terms (not simple as a 'given') that the state of being affected is also a process of "learning to become affected" (Latour, 2004b; Marres, 2005a, 2012a). To approach the formation of a public as a political process is then also a way of trying to do justice to its contingent and open-ended outcome – the organisation of a public is by no means automatic or guaranteed (Whatmore & Lindström, 2011: 604; Marres, 2005a: 62).

2.2 The public = concerned individuals

In a paper concerned far more with STS conceptions of politics in general, and thereby less explicitly engaged with the debate on how issues and their trajectories constitute a central feature of today's political ecology, deVries (2007) critiques the lack of concern with matters of 'sub-politics' – referring to all those sites to which politics has been dispersed or displaced which are not readily identified as sites of political action. "STS efforts to analyse 'sub-politics' – the complex, expert knowledge intensive and distributed political issues technological societies deal with outside of official political institutions and arenas – are troubled", he writes (ibid: 805-6). The problem has been, he argues further, that the notion of 'politics' that has guided STS in recent years, has still invested too much emphasis on the 'subjects' of politics as opposed to the 'objects'. 'Subjects' he here refers to as mini-kings. "The conception of politics that has guided STS places questions about legitimacy at centre stage and frames political actors as 'mini-kings': as subjects with preferences, interests and plans that they want to be executed". (ibid: 806). Put simply, deVries is critical of elucidating political controversies in terms of "hidden

motives and interests" (ibid: 802). He urges us to turn the focus instead to the 'objects of politics', as opposed to its subjects. The 'object' of politics then, following his argument, "is not a goal that is in the minds of subjects – not a matter of preferences, interests and plans" but rather "what circulates in an association that has an appropriate constitution and is under- stood as an aim for *praxis*" (ibid: 805-806).

Latour (2007) in a subsequent response to the paper, agrees with deVries (2007) that 'politics' has been carelessly applied to almost anything – 'by now everything is political' – and by holding on to age old definitions of politics, we have too readily limited our discussions to the machinery that is officially political and indeed limited our understanding of political action on the workings of 'mini kings'[3]. Latour (ibid) adds that while we do good to re-open the 'political' up for reconsideration and to pursue a political theory that turns around the objects of politics, 'the deliberations of 'mini kings' – i.e. subjects with preferences, interests, aims and plans – nevertheless continue to remain an obvious dimension of issues and their trajectories[4]. Issues, he proposes, undergo transformations and pass through different stages (he identifies five stages in total). These stages are in different ways 'political'. Stage 1 denotes to the establishment of new associations between entities (humans and non-humans alike). Stage 2 is "whenever an issue generates a concerned and unsettled public" (ibid: 6). Stage 3 is "when the machinery of government tries to turn the problem of the public into a clearly articulated question of common good and general will [...] and fails to do so" (ibid). Stage 4 (and here he points to the workings of mini-kings) in turn sets in when issues have been further metabolised and "fully conscious citizens, endowed with the ability to speak, to calculate, to compromise and to discuss together, meet in order to 'solve problems' that have been raised by science and technology [...]" (ibid). He illustrates: "global warming is certainly not in this stage – nor is the case of extra-solar planets – but innumerable issues are perfectly amenable as problems to be solved by one of the many procedures that have been invented to produce the consensus of rationally minded citizens" (ibid). Not all issues go through all stages, some issues can never be addressed by "assemblies of well-behaved problem-solvers" (ibid: 7), and even others may at one stage appear apolitical altogether – naturalised through the workings of vast and silent bureaucracies (Stage 5).

Marres (2005a) discusses the dimension of 'interests' further and thus makes another contribution to the debate that deVries sparked when he critiqued the on-going concern with actors as so called 'mini kings' and the polis as a community of 'mini kings'. She adds that Dewey's emphasis on how actors are indirectly but substantially implicated in issues, allows for the public to be

---

[3] Latour (2007: 2) in fact writes: "It's about time that political practice receive the same attention that we have devoted to science and its laboratories".

[4] Both deVries (2007) and Latour (2007) argue for an object-oriented political theory. While deVries embraces an Aristotelian conception of politics to do so, Latour draws upon pragmatism.

defined in terms of 'affects' rather than 'interests'. "It is an intriguing possibility, because it suggests that the formation of a public is not first and foremost about acquiring power (the defence of interests)" (ibid: 57). Similarly to Latour, Marres (ibid) further argues that when following Dewey's genesis that the political community is not in first instance connected by way of shared or opposing opinions and interests, but by the particular issues that have brought actors together, the pull of interests must nevertheless be recognised "as running through the tangles of (potentially) harmful indirect consequences that call publics into being". She explains further:

> "[...] it makes little sense to assume that the associations that make up the public and those that make up the private form distinct wholes: it is far more likely that such associations are entangled. Both private interests, understood as individual actors' attachments to things like businesses and their profits, as well as public interests (attachments to matters of collective concern, such as climate change) are caught up in one and the same tangle of issues" (ibid: 57).

While Dewey ((1991 (1927): 34-35) specifically employs the word 'interests', he defines *public interests* primarily as a form of common concern about the "indirect, extensive, enduring and serious consequences" – i.e. such perception of the consequences creates a common interest (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 126; 188). What can be read as a critique of 'interest explanations'[5], Dewey writes in the first chapter of '*The Public and its Problems*' (1991 (1927): 12):

> "We must in any case start from acts which are performed, not from hypothetical causes for those acts, and consider their consequences. [...]. We take then our point of departure from the objective fact that human acts have consequences upon others, that some of these consequences are perceived, and that their perception leads to subsequent effort to control action so as to secure some consequences and avoid others".

'Concern', Marres (2005a: 57) in turn proposes, does more justice than the term 'interest', not least because of the frequent inability of actors to "know what it is they are affected by".

---

[5] There exist numerous elaborations on the many problems attached to 'interest explanations' and these are commonly rooted in critiques of 'rational choice' explanations more generally. Among them is Steve Woolgar's (1981) seminal contribution '*Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science*', in which he highlights that when invoking 'interests' to explain actions, what is readily missed is a clear 'causal path' from interests to actions and that in fact, indefinitely many possible interests exist to explain an action". Interest explanations thereby frequently leave unexamined the way interests are in fact always actively "constructed, invoked and utilised" (ibid: 372). It also follows therefrom that an attribution of interests may be projected by the analyst onto actors who themselves would not define them as such. Specifically with respect to the issue-centred framework pursued here, Marres (2005a: 57) adds that "the notion of interests tends to come with a subject- oriented conception of politics and democracy: the things actors are interested in here are easily reduced to mere instruments for actors' self-assertion".

2.3 The public = concerned outsiders

Unique to Dewey and Lippmann's notion of the public – and which makes it different to other notions of the 'community of the affected' is in their understanding a particular 'formative' interplay between internal and external relations to a given issue (Marres, 2005a; 2012a). On the one hand, the insistence that social actors are substantially implicated in an issue so as to no longer be indifferent, but at the same time they are too removed from the sites and networks required to address the issue at hand (ibid). In other words, publics consist of 'concerned outsiders' (Marres, 2012a: 50). What is implied therein, is also a unique feature of the pragmatist's public (in contrast to other notions of publics), namely the emphasis that pragmatists place on the way in which issues acquire pertinence – i.e. the *means* by which they acquire relevance. Associations are made and defined *in practice* (Latour, 1996; Pinch, 1981). As Marres (2012a: 50-51) emphasises: the question of how "issues can acquire the public pertinence that is required for effective public action to be taken upon these issues [...] is different from the problem of affectedness, which does not take into consideration the articulation of relevance relations". Internally, publics will always need to negotiate and re-negotiate, establish and re-establish relations of relevance, in a manner different to clear-cut interest or stakeholder groups. (To this dimension of relevance formulation, I shall again return to when I discuss the case of the housing project in chapters 3 + 4).

A post-positivist framing through STS has thus emphasised that "before a problematic entanglement counts as a matter of public concern, it must be actively articulated" (ibid) – that the empiricist belief in the possibility of 'locating the trouble', of pin-pointing 'harmful consequences' through which actors become adversely affected, needs to problematicised (Wolin, 2004 (1960); Ezrahi, 1990). Dewey had insisted that a public needs "to find itself", that it needs "to be self aware" (Dewey, 2012 (1927): 115-117). While his elaborations on this notion of "finding itself" remain vague, Calhoun (2013: 96) makes the point more explicit: "the public can be fully effective only when it is self-aware as well as aware of the indirect consequences and relationships that both give it problems to address and make possible its large-scale internal connections".

As Dewey writes in the '*Public and its Problems*' (1991 (1927): 188): "But while associated behaviour is [...] a universal law, the fact of association does not of itself make a society. This demands [...] perception of the consequences of a joint activity and of the distinctive share of each element in producing it". Elsewhere he writes: "An inchoate public is capable of organisation only when indirect consequences are perceived, and when it is possible to project agencies which order their occurrences" (ibid: 131). He hereby elucidates the degree to which a unique combination of intimate affectedness (including 'being touched', 'being moved') and forms of mediatisation come to play a role in bringing about the figure of the public (Marres, 2010a). Marres (2010a:

196) also stresses this point in her analysis:

> "In Dewey's view, material publics are condemned to lead only an inchoate, obscure, staggering, and unstable existence, as long as they remain aloof from the symbolic circulations facilitated by publicity media, and this for two reasons. First, the consequences that call publics into existence are unlikely to be recognised as such if they are not documented in information media. This is because these consequences, being indirect, are likely to transgress the boundaries of existing social grouping. [...] Second, a public is unlikely to recognise itself as long as the effects that call it into being are not made *widely* observable" (emphasis in original).

In the case of the street name changes in Durban, this prompts a consideration of the manner in which actors and groups of actors arrive at pertinent formulations of what constitutes 'a matter of common concern'. Illustrated also in my conversations that were featured at the beginning of this chapter, the 'issue at hand' and the 'issue community' are not objectively given, but are subject to specifications of problematic entanglements. The articulation of relevance relations is traceable from the mere moment in which actors define 'street name changes as being (or as not being) politically relevant' – for instance, as 'simply' being significant to 'transformation' – to the point where street name changes (as the object of contention) provide the opportunity for actors to render explicit more particular attachments. As defined earlier, the notion of 'attachments' is about both feeling a tie, a meaningfulness, and being part of that tie (Hennion, 2012) – i.e. somewhere between deciding to care about the street signs and feeling compelled to care. Street name changes come to mediate public involvement for they, in Marres' (2005a: 128-134) terminology, not only assemble 'shared attachments'. Rather, it is also divergent, frequently antagonistic, attachments that "people mobilise (and that mobilise people)" that are rendered publicly visible (Marres, 2007: 759).

As Marres (2005a) emphasises the persistence of antagonistic and mutually exclusive attachments she draw, throughout her work, on Mol and foregrounds a difference between 'plurality' and 'multiplicity'. Both terms refer to some kind of variety. Yet, as Poeck and Vandenabeele (2014: 224) also explain:

> "whereas plurality in Mol's account implies different entities that exist side by side, in parallel, multiplicity refers to varying entities that are enmeshed in one another, but at the same time, cannot be reconciled. It implies both mutual entanglement and difference. Matters of concern thus entail a multiplicity rather than a plurality of attachments".

Enacting the irreconcilability of attachments, in this sense is something different from there merely being a plurality of views, opinions, values and knowledge claims. (The distinction will become clearer in Chapter 3 where I discuss in more empirical detail the notion of 'antagonistic attachments' –

between as residents put it "maintaining ruralness" and "bringing development").

The concerns that actors have for the 'symbolic transformation' of the post-apartheid city-text can be analysed in terms of such attachments. Actors in the street name controversy labour to enact personal associations, and by doing so come to deconstruct some hidden background conditions of everyday life. While in my conversations on that day, both the DA councillor and Bongeni from the township agreed that street name changes were principally 'a good thing', both articulate different forms of (in many respects, still 'vague') 'meaningfulness' – meanings that we cannot merely equate with any inherent or timeless 'real interests'. Consider here Cllr Lesley Logan's remark about 'Che Guevara' being unpronounceable for taxi drivers, prompting day-to-day situations of ridicule and thus (contra to official intentions) leaving those who travel Durban's streets unable to experience 'lived history' in any meaningful sense – be it a history attesting to South Africa or to 'revolutions for good cause' more generally. Whether or not Che Guevara is to be a revered figure for South Africa may in itself be a dimension that Lesley is here ascribing value to in her statement.

Bongeni, in turn, points to the change from 'numbers' to 'names', which for him not only entails a paying of tribute to those who fought in the struggle, but through the inscription of 'names', also represents a progress (symbolically) towards equal citizenship with those who have always had names (as opposed to numbers) attached to streets on which they live. In the township of KwaNkilinda, all streets ad numbers prior to the recent renaming process to which Bongeni refers. For him, places were now 'officially' getting new names, and it was thus a sign that they could now honour that history which they had long tried to keep alive, in his words, "informally". For long, sections of the township had been named to commemorate those who in local register counted as heroic struggle heroes. Sections were called "Angola", "Addis" or "Moscow", affectively remembering personalities who had been sent to these places during the struggle. When people would speak to friends, family, or acquaintances on the street about a lovers' feud that took place, a child that was born somewhere, or a granny that died, they would generally refer to the place with these names[6].

Without doing justice to all the intricacies, these conversations come to illustrate how actors can be mutually implicated in an issue by shared but also exclusive attachments to matters of collective concern. Both address the need for new historical inscriptions, one emphasises reconciliation, the other the

---

[6] This practice continues today and sections of townships are re-named in honour of those that "carry the struggle forth". During the course of fieldwork, a section in informal settlement of Cato Crest became known as "Marikana" – in honour of those mineworkers who had lost their lives to police brutality at the British-owned Lonmin mine outside of Johannesburg on 16 August 2012. See also Chance (2015b: 862).

paying of tribute to former struggle heroes; one foregrounds an aesthetic idealisation of street *signs*, the other suggests how such material infrastructures are deeply entangled with forms of citizenship[7]. Here it is to note that their interests (their concern for a particular 'common good') in the issue in part exclude one another, and it is such 'exclusions' that work to transform the problem at hand into a political affair.

2.4 Social ≠ political communities

What Dewey and Lippmann with their theories speak out to, are the problems that technological societies are confronted with – these increasingly grow ad hoc in nature, are continuously displaced among locations, are raised at different times in different sites and overflow the boundaries with which we seek to enclose and define. In Dewey's (1991 (1927): 137) words:

> "The ramification of the issues before the public is so wide and intricate, the technical matters involved are so specialized, the details are so many and so shifting, that the public cannot for any length of time identify and hold itself. It is not that there is no public, no large body of persons having a common interest in the consequences of social transactions. There is too much public, a public too diffused and scattered and too intricate in composition".

According to Dewey (ibid), the formation of a public is called for when existing institutions prove unable to settle an issue. Those affected become tied to one another through their implication in a particular affair, without by any rule already belonging to the same community. It follows that the political community created can hereby not be equated with a pre-existing social community – actors are not connected by a shared form of life, but precisely by the issue that collectively affects them. When problems fail to be taken care of by existing institutions and the social groupings that encounter them, a new form of political involvement is made necessary in order to address them. It is in the very nature of the issues, that these transgress the boundaries of existing social communities or 'social worlds'. In other words: "Dewey's public may in a similar way be described as a relation, or rather a tangle of relations, among entities that do not belong to the same social world but are connected through an affair that affects them jointly" (Marres, 2005a: 58).

Marres (ibid: 57) highlights that distinguishing joint implication in an issue from shared social affiliations stems, once again, from the notion that actors are not tied together by shared or opposing interests', but rather by the nature of their common implication and the need to take into consideration what effects a given issue has on other actors. Marres (ibid: 58-59) uses the example of those actors jointly implicated in the issue of Genetically Modified (GM)

---

[7] See also Alderman's (2008: 196) explicit discussion of "how place names are evoked to bring distinction and status to landscapes and the people associated with them".

food, to illustrate this point:

> "Think of committed vegetarians in Europe, and globally operating
> agribusinesses in Kansas that decide to splice a pig's gene into their
> tomatoes. These two groupings are unlikely to share many social
> affiliations. [...] But they are jointly implicated in the issue [...] — the
> vegetarians because they would be prevented from being vegetarians if
> they would end up eating tomatoes with pig in it, the agro-industrialists
> because this, after all, is their business proposition" (ibid: 58).

Herein, it furthermore becomes clear that in a Deweyan public, individuals
are not connected as 'complete persons', but that they are rather implicated
together due to specific aspects of their mode of living (see also Dewey, 1991
(1927): 191). This is also related to Strathern's notion of the 'partible' being
(1988: 13). As the example of GM food shows, due to relations amongst
relative strangers, amongst whom social bonds do not necessarily exist, actors
and groups of actors can also become *antagonistically* implicated in issues
(Marres, 2005a: 58). In addition, a form of fluidity, perhaps even instability,
persists whereby without a fixed membership, the actors in one affair may be
the spectators in another. As Dewey (1991 (1927): 33) writes: "In no two ages
or places is there the same public. Conditions make the consequences of
associated action and the knowledge of them different". From this it follows,
as Harman (2014: 173) points out, that "each issue/object generates a new
public, instead of the same grey anonymous mass weighing in foolishly on
every possible topic". Due to the very nature of the problems that 'spark a
public into being' it proves difficult to draw borders around publics. "It is
their uncontainability, not containment, that here emerges as a constitutive
feature of publics" (Marres, 2012a: 46).

Lippmann and Dewey both emphasise a form of 'deep plurality' (see
Lippmann, 2002(1927): 87-88) as it relates to the notion of the public –
criticising modern theories of democracy that have kept alive an abstract
entity of the public, the existence of a 'genuine mass' that performs public acts.
As Lippmann observes in '*The Phantom Public*' (2002 (1927): 67):

> "[The accepted theory of popular government] rests upon the belief that
> there is a public which directs the course of events. I hold that this public
> is a mere phantom. It is an abstraction. The public in respect to a railroad
> strike may be the farmers whom the railroad serves; the public in respect
> to an agricultural tariff may include the very railroad men who were on
> strike. The public is not, as I see it, a fixed body of individuals. It is
> merely those persons who are interested in an affair and can affect it only
> by supporting or opposing actors".

Much like Lippmann, Dewey (1991 (1927): 18-19) also left no doubt that it is
concrete individuals who perform the role of the public. As Marres (2005a: 63)
observes: "The public of Lippmann and Dewey is a living and breathing
creature, in that it needs machines, the support of people, money, and access
to institutional positions, in order to flourish". To quote Dewey: "ultimately

all deliberate choices proceed from somebody in particular; acts are performed by somebody, and all arrangements and plans are made by somebody in the most concrete sense of 'somebody'. Some John Doe and Richard Roe figure in every transaction". (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 18)

As such, a public only has agency on the basis of what individual actors 'do' – by aligning themselves for or against the protagonists in a given affair who themselves are individual actors (*Lippmann*) and through the political machineries and the 'material agencies' of the state (*Dewey*) (Marres, 2005a: 62-63). According to Lippmann and Dewey, the public's *agency* is seen to rest with actors in privileged positions. Marres (ibid: 64) has in her analysis questioned whether such an understanding may however be problematic and come to limit the value of their very contribution. As she asks: "how can a comparatively resource-less community of strangers caught up in an issue be capable of assuring a settlement for an issue, when available institutions and communities are not?" She suggests, in turn, that there "may be other kinds of 'phantom publics' than the abstract general collective actor of Rousseau that Lippmann and Dewey criticise" (ibid: 64). While no doubt agency rests with individuals who 'do the work' of the public, in part a public may always retain its capacity, or in simplified terms 'its power', from being an abstraction, i.e. an 'imaginary entity'.

2.5 The pragmatists and Habermas

While I have sought to limit myself to a few key 'protagonists', at this point in the text, a reference to Habermas and how his notion of the public vis-à-vis the (democratic) state compares/contrasts to that of the early pragmatisms, is nevertheless due. In particular, so as to also make clear how Habermas' public relates to the pragmatist inspired notion of 'publics sparked by issues' (Marres, 2005a). At the risk of over-simplifying Habermas' ambitious theoretical contribution laid out in '*The Structural transformation of the Public Sphere' (1991 (1962))*, the basic premise that defines his notion of the public sphere is that "political action be formed on the basis of rational-critical discourse" (Calhoun, 2013: 69 see also Gripsrud et al, 2010). While Dewey had conceptualised publics as forming in response to particular issues – i.e. formed by those affected – "Habermas identified a more or less stable zone of publicness (the public sphere, or '*Öffentlichkeit*') located between civil society and the state, grounded in the former and addressing the latter" (Calhoun, 2013: 69-70). For Habermas, the bourgeois public sphere of his time, was grounded in the coming together of individuals to reason about public matters – most prominently in transitional places (between public and private) such as coffee houses. Two more specific divergences from the pragmatist conception of publics follow from this – a) a Rousseauian distinction between private and public interests stands at the heart of Habermas' theory (Bernstein 2010) and b) in Habermas' sense, the public sphere designates "a theatre in modern

societies in which political participation is enacted through the medium of talk" (Fraser, 1990: 57). Both Dewey and Lippmann, in contrast, bring to the debate the notion that we should also attend to the public in its material dimensions and thus, beyond discourse, to consider how material environments and technological mediators come to define public participation (Marres, 2012a – A point that I pick up again below).

Habermas' most likely sharpest critique in his book revolves around the role of the mass media, critiquing the role that it has come to play in (democratic) politics. He writes: "The world fashioned by mass media, is a public sphere in appearance only" (Habermas 1991 (1962): 171, cited in Whipple, 2005: 166). Much in line with Lippmann, Habermas provides empirical insight into the relation between relevant distortions of communication that were – during his time – infecting public capability for rational-critical debate and representing an obstacle to consensus (ibid)[8]. The difference is that for Dewey, "the potential for broad public participation becomes neither rationality nor consensus", but rather lies with "the capabilities of citizens to engage in critical and reflective agency" (ibid: 158). In other words, it is dissent and scepticism on the part of citizens that are seen to fuel an open-ended, critical curiosity and reflective inquiry. Public participation is understood as modes of questioning, if not yet challenging, the existent *status quo* (ibid: 170) (to be returned to below).

2.6 The state 'made'

Dewey's notion of participatory democracy has already been touched upon (see '*Elaborating the Lippmann – Dewey Debate*' above), but a few additional points merit attention. As made poignant in the comparison with Habermas, Dewey does not identify different publics as belonging to a permanent critical sphere, mediating between private households and the state. Rather, Dewey upholds that there can be no a-priori form of delimitation (of 'publics' or of 'The public'), as publics always arise in response to specific issues. Dewey and Habermas nevertheless both see the state as essentially representing a "secondary form of association" – meaning, in its simplest sense, that publics cannot 'rule by themselves' (Rogers, 2009: 227-228). Publics articulate matters of concern through the state, its material agencies and officers. What follows, is that "there is no state without a government, but also there is none without the public" (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 67). A state takes the form that it does, because of the nature of the publics that exist, and its form is always subject to

---

[8] Habermas drew inspiration from two radically different schools of social theory – namely, American pragmatism and critical theory. As Whipple (2005: 166) suggests, this is also recognisable in '*The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere*' (1991 (1962)). As such, Whipple adds, "the ultimate value [...] lies in its successful unification, on the one hand, of pragmatism's particular optimistic-normative orientation and, on the other, critical theory's harsh scepticism toward the actual structural barriers to true democracy.

change – "gradually, belatedly, and in a piecemeal fashion – if and when it is asked to solve a different set of problems" (MacGilvroy, 2010: 32).

In organizing themselves to deal with the indirect consequences of associated action, publics depend on political institutions and the 'officials of the state' – "the translation of claims and grievances into state power requires officers and administrators who are charged as trustees of a public, holding a fiduciary power" (Rogers, 2009: 227). "Officials are those who look out for and take care of the interests thus affected" (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 16). The formulation "officials look out for" remains somewhat vague, but what Dewey simply points to is the manner in which on the one hand, publics need to operate through state officials to act effectively, and on the other, how the legitimacy of state officials remains tied in with addressing and responding to the demands of distinct publics. Dewey emphasises:

> "although the activity of political institutions – that is, the formation of laws, statues and binding regulations, or the establishment of administrative agencies, for example – will often be the result of those officials and representatives, this only comes about […] because the direction and purpose of these institutions is determined elsewhere" (Dewey, 2012 (1927): 26).

Rogers (2009) in his analysis of '*The Public and its Problems'*, brings to the fore the seamless continuity that Dewey draws between the public and the state. This is illustrated where Dewey (1991 (1927): 64) writes: "There is no sharp and clear line which draws itself […] like the line left by a receding high tide, just where a public comes into existence which has interests so significant that they must be looked after and administered by special agencies or governmental officers". This also establishes room for dispute. He continues: "The line of demarcation between actions left to private initiative and management and those regulated by the state has to be discovered experimentally" (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 64-5). The form of the state is thus always dependent on the nature of publics – institutional arrangements are always evolving and changing. As soon as the form of the state is stabilised, it needs to be remade. Despite insisting that the nature and scope of the state is always 'experimentally determined', Dewey (1991 (1927): 39) also concedes that "actual states exhibit traits which perform the function that has been stated and which serve as marks of anything to be called a state". These however, should by no means be understood as fixed – needing to be responsive to new and emergent publics (Rogers, 2009: 230- 231).

Lastly, what is significant in Dewey's understanding of the state is the emphasis he simultaneously places upon existing institutions being "inimical" to the emergence of new publics (Rogers, 2009: 232). Dewey writes:

> "To form itself, the public has to break existing political forms. This is hard to do because these forms are themselves the regular means of instituting change. The public which generated political forms is passing

away, but the power and lust of possession remains in the hands of officers and agencies which the dying public instituted. This is why the change of states is so often effected only by revolution" (1991 (1927): 31).

The quote points towards a recognition of the *obstacles* inherent in translating the claims of the public – i.e. the transformation of those publics brought into being by indirect consequences into a politically effective force, may be severely constrained (Marres, 2012a: 46). For some publics, smooth incorporation (enabled by the aforementioned 'fluid line' between public and state) fails, whereby these then seek to wield power through state resistance, to disrupt state power through the production and circulation of counter discourses and oppositional interpretations or through revolutionary means (Fraser, 1990: 66ff; Rogers, 2009: 232ff).

3. The turn to objects

Researchers, theorists and philosophers who have engaged with the issue-centred concepts of democracy outlined so far, have also devoted considerable energy to re-thinking the place of material objects in politics (Barry, 2001; Lash & Lury, 2007, Bennett, 2010; Hawkins, 2011; Harvey, 2014). As Braun and Whatmore (2010: x) suggest in their introduction to '*Political Matter*': "The matter of politics and the politics of matter have never seemed so thoroughly intertwined". In part, the studies devoted towards this very intertwinement make recourse to American pragmatism and its insistence on actors implicated in inherently problematic modes of material entanglements – i.e. actors come to participate politically by virtue of their implication. What has emerged is a particular framing – one which focuses less on how material objects acquire political capacities from their ability to act on subjects (the non-human agency debate), but rather one which addresses the ability of material entities to serve as tools or props for the performance of public involvement. This means not merely how objects, technologies and settings *mediate* the performance of participation, but also how these themselves become the *object* of public performance – i.e. they define "what participation is really about" (Marres, 2012a: 28).

In her book "*Material Participation*", Marres (2012a: 25-27) emphasises that her particular attempt to expand upon concepts that have emanated from actor-network theory and related 'post-instrumentalist' approaches[9], has been defined by two objectives; a) to grant special importance to devices – i.e. how specific devices are invested with particular capacities of engagement and participation, as well as b) a commitment to settings that have evaded our understanding of the political realm, including the everyday/the domestic.

[9] Post-instrumentalist approaches, Marres (2012a: 33) defines as those that aim to dismantle "the modernist assumption that the political life of things can be limited to that of passive means or tameable instruments of human action".

Both entail an 'ontological broadening' of the public's constitution and signal a move beyond "the narrowly confined settings in which public participation is classically associated – the spaces of bourgeois debate – to include the spaces of everyday living (ibid: 49). The overall objective is to address a relative opacity left by previous studies, namely to determine further the sites, modes and devices of *issue involvement* (ibid: 35). The material dynamics of problematisation – how an issue comes to be perceived and defined, and the manner in which a public is formed herein go hand in hand (ibid: 42).

As outlined elaborately above, Dewey and Lippmann define the public in terms of a distinctive mode of problematisation. In his essay entitled *'Does reality possess practical character?'* Dewey (1908) formulates further his precise concern with a problematic mode of *material entanglement*. Herein, he proposes that problematisation must be understood as playing itself out on the plane of complex material tangles – "technological, material, natural, or otherwise" (Marres, 2012a: 46). Political and moral phenomena must be understood as dynamics that "unfold on the plane of objects". "Such things as lack and need, conflict and clash, desire and effort, loss and satisfaction (must be) referred to (as) reality" meaning that we must approach political phenomena (such as conflict, clash, efforts, etc.) as aspects of objective, problematic situations (Dewey 1908: 54). Values, desires and interests are in any form of political engagement, attached to objects and come to be defined in relation to those objects.

A focus on the role of things in social, political and moral life, has as part of the 'turn to objects', been taken up in a series of fields and also the idea that 'things matter' is not new (*see Box 1*). Studies have explored the manner in which things are capable of political and ethical intervention – amongst others, trying to understand how material objects come to fashion and enable the enactment of socialities, subjectivities and indeed citizenship and public action (Akrich, 1992; Barry, 2001; Harvey 2014; Hawkins, 2011; Larkin 2008; Mains 2012; Schnitzler 2008). A recourse to pragmatism, has led to an effective detour around the all-too-prominent question of whether or not we are then to understand objects, things, as being imbued with normative capacities and has, in turn, foregrounded a *performative* perspective. "Rather than projecting the metaphor of debate onto practice", attention is turned to "how specific devices enable (or disable) the unfolding of spaces of participation" – i.e. the investment of things with capacities of engagement (Marres, 2012a: 27). In line with Dewey, 'the content' of public participation is conceptualised in terms of specific situational objects to which people attach meanings. As material objects come to be 'loaded' and 'inscribed', these mediate our "political and moral capacities to be affected" (ibid: 32).

Box 1

THINGS – The misfortune of the term

The word 'thing' in English, is both concrete and ambiguous – being used in everyday speech to mean what is sure but not clear, or, as Brown put its, to point to that which hovers "between the nameable and unnameable, the figureable and unfigureable". The term is associated with both 'objecthood' and 'materiality', however it is at the same time less concrete. This is the misfortune of the term.

Bruno Latour has constructed an entire social theory around an objection to the sharp distinction between 'things' and 'objects' - objecting to a distinction that Martin Heidegger had famously articulated in '*The Thing*' (1971). While Latour and Heidegger are but two in a long line of scholars who have concerned themselves with 'things' (or even 'thing theory' – see Brown, 2001), for the sake of making sense of my investigations, it is useful to for now think along Latour and to pick upon a few coarsely arranged snippets from his works. This is merely to add a glimpse of clarification and not to provide a comprehensive summary of what has become a field in its own right.

Latour writes in '*Why has critique run out of steam?*' (2004c: 233): "[...] all his [Heideggers] writing aims to make as sharp a distinction as possible between, on the one hand, objects, *Gegenstand*, and, on the other, the celebrated *Thing*. The handmade jug can be a thing, while the industrially made can of Coke remains an object. While the latter is abandoned to the empty mastery of science and technology, only the former, cradled in the respectful idiom of art, craftsmanship, and poetry, could deploy and gather its rich set of connections".

In this text, Latour takes up the distinction made by Heidegger between object and thing, to outline where he sees the difference between 'matters of fact' and 'matters of concern'. 'Things' for Latour come to mean the artefacts of science and technology – that combine both facts and values. 'Things' for Latour, "are both in a sense 'objects out there' and are issues formed through the gathering of values and people" (see Herndl & Graham, 2015: 48). Treating objects as things, Latour's theoretical premise becomes the need to trace (ex in '*Pandoras Hope*') "the network of associations and transformations that link humans and nonhumans, facts and values" (ibid: 48-9).

The key line of enquiry for the controversy surrounding the street name changes in Durban is, to follow course with these studies, less concerned with how street names/street signs *act* politically, but rather on how they acquire the capacity to *mediate* matters of concern (Marres & Lezaun, 2011: 495). Thus how the street names come to 'matter' politically and thereby become "the object of multiple public articulations" (ibid; see also Hawkins, 2011). Sibu in the situation described, refers to the street signs to illustrate to me that "things are changing". He means now, two decades since the end of apartheid, streets have 'names' that once only had 'numbers'. To him, street signs have become 'loaded', 'charged' with notion of citizenship. The conversations sketched out at the beginning of this chapter serve to illustrate that the concerns for larger issues, for 'matters of the general', derive from entanglements in everyday life. With actors agreeing that it is in fact the 'everydayness' and the apparent 'banality' of street names that make them such a powerful tool for "re-appropriating colonial urbanisms", the re-naming process was met with public attention, debate and acts of resistance. The new names were regularly defaced with spray paint. Other Durbanites engaged in more "low profile resistance" (Scott, 1990) and simply continued to use the original names (Duminy, 2014: 320).

Durban's street renaming process was met with resistance as actors came to concern themselves with questions of "who or what is worthy of commemoration in Durban; of whose vision of and for postapartheid (sic) South African society is 'correct'. Also concerns were voiced about the 'real' meanings or intentions hidden in the official process and its associated acts of resistance; and of who or what has legitimate authority over the production of the urban symbolic environment [...]" (ibid: 311). That 'reconciliation' and 'transformation' might herein be considered as 'matters of general concern' becomes discernible in what became the counter-oppositional discourse. As Duminy (ibid: 324) emphasises in his far more intricate analysis of the street name changes in Durban, those in opposition of the re-namings were in most cases casted by local state representatives as "acting against transformation". As he writes: "by consistently referring to agents and events in the language and rhetorical style of 'transformation', ANC-affiliated actors categorised the entire project (including themselves and the new names) within a grand teleological narrative of progressive social change" (ibid). (See Duminy, 2011 for a fine grained analysis of the 'larger meanings' that the street renamings in Durban came to have').

3.1 Devices of affectedness

According to Dewey and Lippmann, when a public is 'sparked into being', actors are both significantly implicated in, and yet remain alien to, the issue at hand. In other words, the problem of the public is somewhat that of a double positioning. As a consequence, the public is confronted with a problem of

relevance. The public-in-the-making needs to negotiate and articulate forms of 'affectedness' and specify actors' harmful entanglements. Marres (2012a; 2014) proposes that publics define relations of relevance, amongst other means, through the deployment of devices – and that thereby an attention to technologies, settings and objects enables an exploration of the *means* by which issues come to matter to actors. As issue communities are not ontologically given, "relative relations *can be produced* among the entities, settings and actors that make up the public" (Marres, 2012a: 55, emphasis in original) – and devices come to play a role in the articulation and disarticulation of the problems at hand (ibid: 55-59). Devices acquire the capacity to establish connections between different settings, issues and actors and thereby transcend what is lacking (a common space, a common vocabulary, etc.). Returning to the notion of "affectedness", such devices can be conceptualised as "devices of affectedness" (Marres, 2010a: 204). Objects are understood as always "unstable objects" and through material-semiotic *work* come to resonate with particular matters of concern (Schnitzler, 2013). This process, which Marres (2014; see also Marres and Rogers, 2005) refers to as a process of 'issuefication' entails parallels, but also differs significantly from other forms of *Dingpolitik* (Latour, 2005a) – in particular as 'issuefied objects' are treated as different from 'scripted objects'.

Let me make this distinction clearer (I then return to it again in Chapter 2). The notion of the 'scripted object' goes back to Madeleine Akrich's (1992) study of electricity meters in the Ivory Coast. By proposing the concept of the 'script' she sought to account for the normative capacities of objects – the ability of objects to act upon subjects by projecting upon them a particular role. The object is hereby conceived as enabling or constraining certain actions. Significant to Akrich's account is that the electricity meter is political in part because its political intervention occurs latently, i.e. below "the radar of what is generally assumed to be going on" (Marres, 2014: 263). The political intervention of the electricity meter took place by rending electricity use measurable, and thus the device enabled the on-going registration of individuals, and by registering them, created not only customers but also citizens ('documented subjects') in a national infrastructure. The object was 'political' in that it implicated people in the political order (discussed in Marres, 2014; Marres, 2010a).

Marres (2012a: 63 - 69) compares Akrich's electricity meter with a 'tea light' and its capacity to invoke a range of (environmentally connoted) issues. The tea light is an electronic light bulb installed on your kitchen sink that gives the tea-cooking-individual an indication of whether demand on the national power grid is high or low (see also discussion by Oenen, 2012: 99). "If the tea light glows green, is basically saying: 'Go ahead! Make some tea! Knock yourself out!'" On the other hand, if it glows red, it is saying: "'Now is not the best time for that cuppa, give it a little while'". The tea light allows the user to see "whether", as Marres (2012a: 63) puts it, "your next cuppa will be a particularly carbon intensive one" or not.

Considered in a chain, the effect of the tea light is the following: "This contributes to evening out the load on the grid, which helps produce energy more efficiently, thus making economical, technical and ecological sense while imposing only a minimal burden on the (tea-drinking) public. Actors are enabled, through simply action, to do something about an issue in question. Importantly, it enables action, the argument goes, without the user needing to grasp the complexity of environmental concerns. The tea light, in contrast to the electricity meter, becomes political as it comes to 'resonate' with issues. Marres (2014: 263) writes elsewhere: "Here, what requires special attention are not, in first instance, the effects of objects on subjects, but rather the 'normative range' of the object itself: the spectrum of concerns that it 'carries' or may 'activate'".

The tea light can also be compared to Latour's (1992) speed bumps[10] or Winner's (1986) bridge[11] that were analysed for their political qualities. In both cases, the ability to intervene politically is made effective because it is not caught by public perception – evading the sites we readily consider to be political. At large, these came to be characterised by a "relative unobtrusiveness", a "clandestine status" (Marres, 2010a: 186). Marres argues that what escapes the studies of Winner, Latour and Akrich is however the consideration of 'publicity' in illustrating how objects mediate political relations. The tea light is, in contrast to the speed bump, the bridge or the teapot, shown to have an *explicit* capacity to mediate people's involvement, it becomes a prop for the performance of public involvement – and does so under conditions of publicity. It establishes connections between everyday living and complex environmental issues such as climate change. Similarly to environmental light bulbs, the tea light discussed, effectively works to "equip individuals to practically intervene in, or at least relate to, global public affairs" (ibid: 179). With the use of the tea light, a sense of political or moral action ensues. At the same time, the teapot is much less 'determinate' – than let's say the bridge or the speed bumps. Its political power rests on its capacity to "resonate with a spectrum of issues: climate change, smart grid, peak oil, innovation, the carbon economy, coal fired plants, and so on" (Marres, 2014; 267).

---

[10] Latour (1992, 1999a) argues that speed bumps slow down traffic like 'silent policemen' – thereby representing a technology or material artefact that is designed to shape (in this case *constrain*) human actions. By embodying or having delegated to it, a number of roles we readily think of as 'human' roles, Latour comes to define the speed bump as an active component in socio-political arrangements.

[11] Winner (1985), in his well-known study of Moses' bridges on Long Island proposed that the bridge as a technological artefact was political. Due to the way in which the bridge had been designed (deliberately or non-deliberately), he argued, it had a socio-political effect. Winner (ibid: 28) explains: "Poor people and blacks, who normally used public transit, were kept off the roads because the twelve-foot tall buses could not get through the overpasses. One consequence was to limit access to Jones Beach, Moses's widely acclaimed public park"(discussed at length in Joerges, 1999; Woolgar and Cooper, 1999).

Objects are herein not loaded with actor like capacities (talking, thinking, speaking) (ibid), but it is rather the "explicit investment of objects themselves with political or moral capacities, such as the ability to make global issues relevant on the plane of everyday living" (ibid: 36). The teapot not merely exemplifies a material device entering into the performance of participation, but rather the material device becomes itself the object of public performance. This, Marres (2011: 516) has summed up as the difference between "the materialisation of participation rather than simply its materiality". A teapot may as an issuefied object, also represent a scripted object. Also, there exist a wide range or variation of issues that an object can invoke, canalise, or specify. The normative capacity of objects hereby comes to lie in their capacity to inspire, engage, disturb, provoke and challenge in political and morally significant ways (Marres, 2012a: 1).

'Things', Dorruff (in Boomgard & Doruff, 2012: 17) writes, "participate in themselves as modes of existence; intersecting practices of objection, resistance, reciprocity, compliance, generosity" (ibid). Significant in Dewey's conception of publics, has been that actors are materially and physically embedded, and that participating in a public is irreducible to the participation in discursive exchange. To concentrate on 'material participation' – i.e. the objects, technologies and settings that come to define political participation, entails moving one step further than the 'turn to objects' already achieved. The question of whether material entities should be accorded normative capacities 'in themselves' is replaced with a concern for "the investment of things with capacities of engagement" (Marres, 2012a: 2). Secondly, it prompts us to recognise the investment of material settings, objects and devices with more or less deliberate participatory capacities – meaning, the 'political power' of objects no longer searched for in what lies below the threshold of visibility or no longer measured against normative conceptions of political action.

As a last example, also from Marres' writings, consider the act of turning down the thermostat. It is, Marres writes, "a more or less successful attempt, not to save the planet, but to transform the state of being affected by the 'impossible' issue of climate change into a viable practice" (2010a: 204). Such practice – in many respects contingent, mundane and reflective of actors' everyday concerns – illustrates how material participation is performed, how action upon issues is made 'do-able'. As with climate change, actors do not necessarily need to grasp the full complexity of the issue in order to participate. From a pragmatistically informed approach, it comes to be the modulating, formative relationship between "*making things public*" and "*things making publics*" that defines the unfolding of *Dingpolitik* and, specifically, defines how issues come to concern publics (Boomgard & Doruff, 2012: 8 – emphasis added).

4. The street name controversy

As suggested, the conceptual and theoretical points of interest that I have introduced here will in the forthcoming chapters be discussed in relation to other 'matters of concern' that were kept alive during my thirteen-month-stay in Durban. Let me make a brief interlude back to the controversy around street name changes in Durban before turning in this final section of this introduction to the notion of 'relevance' and 'forms of justification' (and primarily the works of Boltanski and Thévenot, 1999; 2006), which, I want to argue, help us to explore from the *sited* ways in which actors become antagonistically implicated in particular issues, the specific practices dedicated to their articulation and the manner in which concern is enacted.

With the framework I have outlined so far, issues come to be defined by particular entanglements of actors' attachments. These entanglements constitute both *sources* and *resources* for public involvement. In the case of Durban, the inscription in public spaces of an authorised representation of the past has become an 'issue', a 'matter of concern'. In the process of issueification, street signs, statues and sculptures have as objects figured prominently in the formation and expression of particular publics and their concerns – so effectively, one may argue, because as objects they emphasise both the "permanence of the regime that erected them" as well as "the immutability of the system itself" (Nadkarni, 2007: 195). Street names give way to a particular interpretation of the past, but at the same time will assume an 'everydayness', invisibility and 'banality' in the day-to-day dynamisms of the city (Duminy, 2014). Street name changes, much like the taking down of old statues and the putting up of new ones, represents a performative practice through which political authorities seek to establish, or 'domesticate' a particular reading of the country's history (see also Alderman, 2000; Azaryahu, 2011; Palonen, 2008; Yeoh, 1996). In the case of Durban, the names chosen can be seen, much like in the country's other cities, to establish a form of ideological and historical continuity to the era of the liberation struggle (see similarly Southall, 2003; Marschall, 2009).

What becomes clear in the brief conversations around the street-name controversy featured at the beginning of the chapter, is that people voice different 'concerns' – or also feel complete ambiguity – towards the renaming. Varying associations are attached to 'street signs', and more generally, actors do not ascribe the same degree of salience to forms of 'history making' in public spaces. For some, street names matter, for others they remain a banality. As interviews made clear, those concerned 'pull' at the issue in different directions, trying to make apparent different modes of implication (affectedness) (Marres, 2005a: 104-5; 138; see also Latour, 2004a with reference to 'hairy objects'). For it to remain a matter of concern, or to be kept 'durable', it must be 'taken care of' – and as such, the network that developed around street name changes, appeared to establish ever new forms of engagement, offering new ways to relate to the problem at hand. The street signs became

politically 'charged' in more ways than one, as different attachments were rendered explicit.

As was the case in the conversation with the councillor in her beachfront apartment, Lesley Logan initially emphasised that the city hadn't followed procedures correctly, that the process lacked public participation. Over time, in opinion pieces published in newspapers, in public debates on the matter, on social media platforms, etc. the controversy gave way to other, more totalising, concerns. Amongst them, that the national liberation experience, which is hereby symbolically inscribed, is marking out, as Southall (2003: 129) has also put it, the dominant parties of the present as "the legitimate inheritors of the past". The new names were seen as centralising the role of the ANC in the liberation struggle, 'blending out' the experiences and 'contributions' of other anti-apartheid groups and political parties – thereby it became seen as an ANC-led practice of signification aimed at legitimising the ANC's dominant position within the present socio-political order.

Significant in the controversy is the fact that it went beyond mere statements about one's position 'I am for new names'/ 'I am for keeping the old ones' – but rather that the object of contention (the interpretation of the past) provided the opportunity to enact, in other words, the "disagreement between various, entangled, exclusive attachments" (see Marres, 2005a: 129). It opened a space from which to render explicit and thereby open up for critical scrutiny arrangements of institutionalised reality (Boltanski, 2011: 56-57). It allowed those involved in the controversy to highlight the 'whatness of what is' and 'what should be' (Calkins, 2014).

The empirical chapters hereafter will explore in more detail such dynamics. They will attend to a series of 'issues' – understood as "events and associations involving humans, environments and things " (Moats, 2014) – and how these are made public and negotiated in ways that go beyond politics-as-we-know it. As discussed above, this includes a focus on the publicisation of issues; the articulation of actors' joint and antagonistic attachments therein; the manner which issues become actively displaced; and the dynamics that, in turn, unfold in the configuration of actors and claims. In other words, analysing situations and events, the aim is to provide answers on how specific, contentious issues that current institutional arrangements prove unable to handle, are addressed – the *sites* of engagements, its *subjects* and *forms*. What are the *things* that politics turns around and how do they turn around these *things* (Latour, 2007: 819)?

5. Crisis/ the interruption of routines

As Sarah Whatmore (2013: 85) points out, the emergence of new publics as a consequence of 'controversies' has been captured in Michel Callon's (1998)

'hot situations', Bruno Latour's (2004c) 'matters of concern' and Isabelle Stenger's (2005) 'things that force thought'. These have in common, that all provide "vocabularies for addressing those moments of ontological disturbance in which the things on which we rely as unexamined parts of material fabric of our everyday lives become molten" (Whatmore, 2013: 85). Latour (2005a: 5) writes in his introduction '*From Realpolitik to Dingpolitik*':

> "It's clear that each object – each issue – generates a different pattern of emotions and disruptions, of disagreements and agreements. There might be no continuity, no coherence in our opinions, but there is a hidden continuity and a hidden coherence in what we are attached to. Each object gathers around itself a different assembly of relevant parties. Each object triggers new occasions to passionately differ and dispute. Each object also offers new ways of achieving closure without having to agree on much else".

While the proximity of 'matters of concern' to the issue-centred framework proposed by Marres is clear and explicit, it is also evident that numerous others have elaborated conceptually on the transformative and generative powers of controversies and issues – the manner in which these 'arouse', 'trigger', 'spark'. Here, I will now turn to the works of the French pragmatists, in particular the works of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (2000, 2006; Boltanski, 2011), as these, I propose, provide the analytic detail with which to analyse what happens when different actors and groups of actors, with different perspectives debate – and how in debating – a public is called into being. The critical pragmatic approach that they define, enables a fine-grained analysis of specific contexts of dispute, of its intricacies, what is mobilised and what happens as a consequence.

5.1 Disturbances and uncertainty

Whatmore (2013: 90) speaks of the 'onto-political tack' (that we can now pin into a diverse range of contributions) and uses the term to refer to an engagement with 'disturbances' – the kind that "forces people to notice the unexamined stuff on which they rely as the material fabric of their everyday lives, and attend to its powers and effects". This 'onto-political tack', as an epistemological foundation, is what establishes the common ground between the early pragmatists, the French neo-pragmatists and modern studies in the fields of Actor Network Theory (ANT) and STS - those around whom I build my arguments in the following chapters. For Dewey, political agency stems from the disruption of the ordinary or the routine and, in consequence, the attempt to establish spaces of articulation. That is to say, in Marres' (2007: 775) words, it is the "endangered status of the 'attachments' that come together in issues, and that mediate actors' involvement with them". In turn, in the process of defining 'what is at stake' for a given public, actors and groups of actors render visible associations that appear problematic, that can no longer

be taken for granted.

The works of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot (1999, 2006; Boltanski, 2011; see also Honneth, 2010) carry on from this very point, providing in detail, a theoretisation of what is said to unfold, and how it unfolds, in concrete sites, during such 'critical moments' (now their terminology). The scrutiny of attachments and social arrangements, patterns of 'testing' and, following therefrom, the enactment of 'justifications' allow actors to coordinate uncertain situations and to stabilize relationships in contexts of contingency. Boltanski and Thévenot (1999; 2006) propose that it is through the negotiation of discordances and contingencies in practical situations that the political, and social life more generally, is both stabilised and ordinarily transformed.

While this does not do justice to the complexity of Boltanski and Thévenot's contributions, let us consider in brief what can herein be conceptualised as two different 'dimensions'; a) that which precedes the scrutiny of what was previously taken for granted (the disruption of routines/the experience of unknowns) and b) patterns of testing (disputing 'what is' vs. 'what ought to be') followed by the enactment of justifications and the critique of social arrangements. Latter enables translating uncertainties into something that enables one to act. The first (a), points to a premise that is embraced by most, if not all, of the literatures I have so far discussed here – namely that a constitutive element of our very 'being in the world' is an engagement with the experience of contingency and the resolution of uncertainty (see for a discussion Lamla, 2013; Bogusz, 2013). It is a subscription to a basic premise of ethnomethodology captured so fittingly in German: "[...] Gesellschaften und ihre Akteure (verwalten) nicht primär Stabilität, sondern die Unsicherheit ihrer Garantie" (Bogusz, 2013: 314; see also Knorr-Cetina, 1993).

What is meant by 'uncertainty' gains further clarity with Boltanski's distinction between 'reality' and 'world'. Boltanski proposes that in moments of dispute or controversy, it is the relationship between that which hangs together ('reality') and that which is uncertain (the 'world') that is rendered visible. 'Reality' is the state of affairs that institutions present as real, official, authentic and true. It stands for the orderly structure of institutionalized arrangements – that which tends to provide stability and permanence. In short, "it is a reality constructed under the power of institutions" (Boltanski 2011: 91; see also Calkins, 2014: 46-47). The 'world' is the background against which 'reality' is set apart (Boltanski 2011: 57). It resists the control and orderings of institutionalised reality and remains largely incalculable. The experience of the 'world' is marked by an immediate, intuitive, and living quality. In critical moments, the experiences of actors, what people are in the process of doing, ceases to be self-evident. Circumstances then unfold that, from their perspective of 'reality', were not considered possible. Uncertainty thus manifests itself in doubt about social arrangements, the threat posed thereto and, as a consequence, the fragility of reality at large (Boltanski 2011: 54; see also Susen, 2014). The distinction between 'reality' and 'world' involves

critical reflexivity and becomes a space from which critiques of reality can be formulated (Boltanski 2011: 91). As Calkins (2014: 47) puts it: "It allows thinking it otherwise". Uncertainty, if we follow Boltanski, is understood as embodying "a critical optic", that prompts "a reflexive answering of questions such as 'what is' and 'what counts'" (ibid.).

5.2 Testing and justification

The second dimension (b), now already pointed to, is concerned with the notion of 'test' and 'justification'. Uncertainty is seen to express itself in controversies or situations of discord and, in a general sense, what Boltanski and Thévenot's framework enables, is an analysis of the critical competencies employed by actors to reach justifiable agreements therein. It is concerned with the "the operations persons perform when they resort to criticism, when they have to justify the criticisms they produce, when they justify themselves in the face of criticism or collaborate in the pursuit of a justified agreement".

In '*On justification*' (2006), Boltanski and Thévenot go on to elaborate so called 'orders of worth', taken to mean multiple principles of evaluation that define "the formation of arguments that are acceptable". They provide an outline of six particular orders of worth, each characterised by a distinctive moral philosophy as a central 'generative mechanism'. Their categorisation suggests that evaluations are made in terms of: efficiency (the worth of industry), competition (the worth of market), concerning trust (the worth of home), general interest (the worth of citizenship), opinion (the worth of fame) and creativity (the worth of inspiration) (ibid; see also Du Gay & Morgan, 2013: 17). These represent principles of evaluation for both individual action and politics of the common good, according to different criteria of judgement. Also, each entail "discrete metrics, 'tests' and proofs of worth objectified in material cultural artefacts and devices" (ibid.). The different orders of worth represent specific beliefs about how the world works, and can be invoked by anybody, in any given situation – on the one hand to criticize, to justify or to reach an agreement and on the other hand, to support one's own views.

With their approach they seek to dissect situations that are submitted to an "imperative of justification", i.e. moments of critical questioning, marked by an exchange of criticisms, grievances, and blaming (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000: 209). A "dispute involves not only people, but also objects. In particular, people may disagree about objects" (Dequech, 2008: 528). Herein, the 'state of worth' of things and persons under scrutiny – and at its most general level, the coherence and justness of a social order – need to be justified. Justifications, in turn, represent 'the giving of a reason' that make reference to a given criteria that is called upon in order to validate or legitimate it as a contribution to the common good. This justification is required of both by he who criticises and he who is criticised. As Holden and Scerri (2014: 3) put it: "where a

discussion or debate focuses on a contentious social issue, a 'good' justification appeals not only to blatant private interest but to some established general interest or common social value".

From an issue centred perspective, the notions of 'test' and 'justification' entail two important dimensions: a) the interpretive effort through which actors seek to define 'what is at stake' in a given situation of discord and, on its basis, b) the ability to draw upon an available set of orders of worth to justify one's action – and there through also establish concern for a particular 'common good'. As Wagner (2001: 113) writes: "real life situations are characterised by ambiguity with regard to their belonging to any single *cite* [order of worth], the interpretive work of the persons involved will crucially consist precisely in determining this issue of belonging to a specific realm of validity claims". The "concern for the good that people are moved by" (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2000: 208) does away with trying to lay bare the objective causes of human action[12], and precisely for this reason, appears as a 'fitting' addition to Marres' framework and the exploration of how 'publics are sparked in being' – namely seeing their formation not only as stemming from some muddled form of 'trouble' but as also requiring definition.

What Boltanski and Thévenot effectively allow us to do with their framework is an analysis of how actors in a given situation make use of plurality of justificatory logics as well as the different conceptions of the common good that are attached to these logics. The 'orders of worth' in a sense represent the general agreements that exist at a particular time between different actors and groups of actors about what constitutes harmonious arrangements of things and persons. By drawing upon them, actors appeal to resources that they have in common and which reach beyond the specifities of the situation (Wagner, 2001: 112; Boltanski, 1990: 74) Boltanski (2012: 44) writes that actors "in order to justify, have to extract themselves from the immediate situation and rise to a level of generality" – and hereby makes reference both to orders of worth that are valid in all generality as well as to actors' inclusion of objects that are qualified in community (see also Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006; Thévenot, 2002). Wagner (1994: 282) emphasises that a relation exists between the two dimensions: "the *limitation* of the *possibilities* of interpretation through material pre-structuring" is accompanied by "the *extension* of the *spaces* of interpretation beyond the immediate situation". An example for the relation of objects vis-à-vis orders of worth includes for instance Noiriel's (1992: 155-180) argument about the 'identity card'. Noiriel analyses the identity card as "an object used to make visible adherence to an order of classification and thereby to strengthen this classificatory order itself, an order containing the idea of national identity among others" (discussed in Wagner, 1994: 282;

---

[12] The French pragmatists do not intend to suggest that they can unearth the objective reasons behind actors' actions. They remain critical of approaches that foreground '*strategies*' - as employed by persons in order to pursue an inherent or timeless set of '*real interests*'.

Wagner: 2001; 112).

Boltanski and Thévenot have always emphasised that the plurality of logics of justification is necessarily an open one – as they write in an early essay (2001: 209): "the model does not aspire to an exhaustive comprehension, and one will vainly search here for a matrix that allows social reality to be described in all its aspects". With this, they make explicit that any number of additional 'orders of worth' may be identifiable in addition to the (at least) six that they have established. Despite this emphasis on being non-exhaustive, and thus not necessarily representing a rigid framework, in the chapters that follow I do not aim to ascribe actors' justifications in disputes to particular 'orders of worth'. I hereby follow Latour (2005b; discussed in Guggenheim & Potthast, 2011: 161) for whom the thesis of a plurality of orders of justification has been a central source of inspiration. For Latour however, it is not radical enough in terms of taking seriously the articulation of grievances, the different forms of critique that unfold and the claims of justice made by actors. The mistake is not "the empirical observation of different forms of critique, but elevating these forms to externalities and giving them explanatory powers". Doing so, would be a return to an assumption that has long been critiqued, namely, the socio-theoretical assumption of a supposed '*illusio*' (Guggenheim & Potthast, 2011: 159). Latour urges us to abandon the assumption that orders work through and 'behind' the back of ordinary actors – a critique that ANT and the neo-pragmatists had at birth both levelled against the then dominant theory of Pierre Bourdieu (ibid: 158). Latour (2005b: 232) proposes instead that the value itself lies in the collection of justifications. As he writes:

> "Collecting statements not only traces new connections but also offers new highly elaborated theories of what it is to connect. They perform the social in all practical ways. Such is the power of the 'justifications' analysed by Boltanski and Thévenot: they have no size but they leave 'sizings', so to speak, in their wake since those expressions allow people to rank themselves as well as the objects in dispute. Every time an expression is used to justify one's action, they not only format the social but also provide a second order description of how the social worlds should be formatted".

I express agreement with Latour's concern (ibid) and here only follow Boltanski and Thévenot so far (and not further). By doing so, and thereby somewhat re-valuing the framework of the French neo-pragmatists in this manner, it comes to exemplify strong affinities also to the social worlds/arenas model of Anselm Strauss (1978; 1982; 1984; 1993) and the elaborations made upon it by Adele Clarke (1991; 2003; 2005; 2006; 2008; 2012). The framework put forth by Boltanski and Thévenot entails central parallels to the framework laid out by Strauss and Clarke. 'Social worlds' represent, in the tradition of Strauss and Clarke, "a recreation group, an occupation, a theoretical tradition" – each seen to "generate perspectives that then form the basis for collective action" (Clarke & Star, 2008: 115). They represent "groups with shared commitments to certain activities, sharing resources of many kinds to achieve

their goals and building shared ideologies about how to go about their business" (ibid). Individuals typically participate in multiple social worlds at once; these not being fixed or homogenous, but rather fluid and heterogeneous (ibid; Garetty, 1997: 730 - 732). 'Arenas', in turn, refer to "the interacting of social worlds around issues – where actions concerning these are being debated, fought out, negotiated, manipulated and even coerced within and among social worlds" (Strauss, 1993: 226).

Lamla (2013: 358) emphasises in a juxtaposition of the social worlds perspective with the research program of Boltanski and Thévenot, that the former is "more 'open'/'flexible', in the sense of not seeking to delineate maximum contrasts between the basic orders of worth and their corresponding modes of justification"[13]. Thus significant for the forthcoming attempt to synthesise very different theoretical strands is an analytical commitment to the plurality of articulated worries, of what 'matters', through micro-social observations of disputes, critiques and disagreements without necessarily drawing the link to macro-structural orders of worth (a point already made by Latour in the previous quote). As Clarke and Montini (1993) illustrate in their study on the RU486 (the so-called 'French abortion pill'), it is different perspectives from different social worlds involved in the broader abortion/reproduction arena. But here 'perspectives', contrary to an interpretation put forward by Mol (2002; Mol & Messman, 1996), is perhaps far more than simply different 'viewpoints' on the same 'thing' – it may rather be that many different 'things' are actually perceived according to perspective (see discussion in Clarke & Star, 2008: 123, 130).

6. Conclusion

Lippmann (2002 (1927): 121) writes in '*The Phantom Public*': "It is [...] the hardest controversies to disentangle, that the public is called in to judge. Where the facts are most obscure, where precedents are lacking, where novelty and confusion pervade everything, the public in all its unfitness is compelled to make its most important decisions: Marres (2005b), in her contribution to Latour & Weibel's (2005) '*Making Things public*', builds upon this proposition to coin the slogan "issues spark a public into being". In these accounts however, what has escaped a theoretical elaboration is 'how' controversies bring about the formation of publics. As Whatmore & Landström (2011: 584) critique: "the energetic business of 'arousing', 'triggering', 'sparking' connections is sometimes glossed over". By drawing inspiration from the works discussed in this final section, the works of Luc

---

[13] Own translation. "Empirisch [...] ist die 'social world perspective' sehr viel offener, insofern sie nicht nur die maximalen Kontraste zwischen wenigen Domänen des Engagements für Gerechtigkeit mit ihrem Grundrepertoire an Kritikmustern herausarbeiten will (ohne eine solche Untersuchung auszuschließen), sondern insbesondere an den feinen Unterschieden und unmerklichen Wandlungsprozessen interessiert ist [...]".

Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot, of Anselm Strauss and Adele Clarke, I propose, we are encouraged to explore with more analytic detail scenes of struggle and to dissect the forms of critique and justifications as they play themselves out on the ground of real disputes (Holden et al., 2013). As Holden et al. have already suggested, what the French neo-pragmatists offer is a schematisation of *what* happens as different social worlds debate, in the process of debating, foster the formation of a public (ibid: 6).

For this reason, let me once again pull together the central tenets discussed in this final section: controversies are understood as being fundamentally fuelled by forms of "shared uncertainty" and thus, what is rendered visible in the face of persistent disagreement are essentially "the dynamics of a multiform quests for certainty" (Holden et al. 2013: 14). Through arguments and criticisms that we can follow, what actors and groups of actors do is evaluate 'what is' and 'what ought to be', making recourse to forms of justification that go beyond the immediate occurrence at hand and its inherent specificities. Evaluations of occurrences come to be marked by the rejection of old simplifications and the attempt to establish new ones. As Venturini (2010: 262) points out "In controversies, actors tend to disagree on pretty much anything, including their disagreement itself". Barry (2013: 6) similarly suggests: "the spatiality, temporality and limits of any given controversy are themselves likely to be in question". For this reason, it also becomes impossible to reduce the problematicness at hand to 'a single resuming question'. What was previously taken for granted is drawn into question – but herein, it remains important, Venturini (2010: 267) stresses, that "most actors and groups aspire to some kind of stability. Few actors are interesting in destabilising existing social networks just for the sake of chaos". Bogusz (2012: 315) provides translation in conceptual terms. She speaks of "die erkenntnisleitende Funktion von Ungewissheit". "Ungewissheit stellt also die nötige Irritation von Routinen her, auf deren Basis experimentelles Handeln erst a) ausgelöst wird und b) neue Erkenntnis produziert, die das Problem löst".

By exploring in detail how in a specific situation actors justify and denounce arguments, argue along different lines, I propose similarly to Holden et al. (2014), that it allows us to unpack the *processes* by which publics are formed. Far more specifically, we can say that the *modus operandi* of such situations is that of an "*apprenticeship* to 'what' is at stake" (Stengers, 2010, emphasis added - discussed in Whatmore & Landström, 2011: 583-6). *How* publics are formed cannot be explained away by reference to some inherent 'aim', but rather comes to be defined in "the very process of their emergence". This notion of '*apprenticeship*' playing itself out in and through disputes also echoes what Latour (2004b: 205) termed "learning to be affected" – meaning "'effectuated', moved, put into motion by other entities, humans or non-humans". In other words, what is analytically explored in the forthcoming chapters is, amongst other respects, the 'things' that actors and groups of actors are affected by. Situations that are themselves marked by elements of strong ambiguity, that

actors grapple with through the articulation of more and more subtle discriminations – distinguishing one concern from another, establishing meaning, ascribing relevance and qualifying certain states of affairs over others.

Pursuing what has also been labelled as an 'object centred perspective', the analyses that follow do not foreground how an issue comes on the agenda of established political fora or gains the attention of an existing public, but rather, it sets out from the object of concern itself, and how a public forms around it. As Latour (2005a: 14) admits, this might appear like a very 'trivial practice'. It encourages us to focus on the 'worries' that connect us, "our matters of concern, the issues we care for, [rather] than [...] any other set of values, opinions, attitudes or principles". By analysing the controversies surrounding statues and sculptures in Durban, surrounding virginity testing ceremonies and surrounding small scale development projects in the township, I pursue an object centred perspective that foregrounds *politics-in-the-making*, rather than *politics-made*.

7. Chapter overview

The next chapter, *'The Field and I'*, provides a background to this study and the ethnographic fieldwork conducted in and around Durban, KwaZulu-Natal. It details the 'political culture' framing with which research begun and how the 'issue-centred perspective', which was subsequently pursued, carries forth but also draws into question central premises of the former.

The events I detail in CHAPTER 1 carry on from the disputes around street name changes detailed here. The chapter pursues the political trajectory of a series of sculptures/statues in Durban, all produced by one and the same artist. Being works of art in public spaces, the sculptures/statues were politicised to varying degrees – one faces the fate of being entirely removed, another becomes the focal point of considerable clashes and public debate, and a third initiates no form of critical scrutiny whatsoever. Exploring why different actors and groups of actors considered these two of these three works of art as 'problematic', the chapter concentrates on the 'issues' that stand at the heart of post-apartheid controversies around statues and sculptures in public spaces.

CHAPTER 2 focuses on the revival of male circumcision and female virginity testing in KwaZulu-Natal. I recount my observations at an annual virginity testing celebration that took place under the auspices of a chieftaincy, on the border of the aforementioned township of KwaNkilinda. Analysing the unfoldings of a single day, I explore why different actors (the chief, his headman, the testers, health officials, the 'virgins', etc.) take part in the event – the divergent attachments and the associations that mediate their involvement. In the final section, arguments around the notion of 'material participation'

are discussed – in particular, the proposition put forth by Marres (2012a) that central to an understanding of issue politics is a consideration for how objects, devices and settings become 'charged', or come to 'resonate', with a range of issues and thereby acquire normative capacities. The idea that stands behind Marres' notion of material participation is that simple actions are turned into an index of public participation – these allow actors to participate without requiring them to grasp the full complexity of particular issues.

CHAPTER 3 turns to two housing development projects in the township of KwaNkilinda, around which conflicts unfolded due to corruption charges against those in charge as well as disputes between the different stakeholders over land rights, land use and the type of infrastructure development that should be implemented. I turn in detail to a conversation I had with the local chief, Inkosi Maphulo, wherein he details moments along a trajectory of issue articulations, and how he became implicated therein. On the basis of this conversation, I go on to explore in more detail actors' multiple (partly antagonistic) attachments to matters of collective concern, the articulations of a tangle of issues related to 'land' and 'development' and more generally the 'work' that comes to permeate processes of issue formation across space and time.

In the final chapter, CHAPTER 4, I return to the conflict around the housing project in more detail, and explore the protests that unfolded in response thereto; the engagements that a group of residents pursued through the shack dwellers movement *Abahlali baseMjondolo*; and finally the funeral of a former *Umkhonto we Sizwe* solider, whose murder was related to the housing project. Based on this series of events, the chapter considers in more detail the question of so-called 'non-issues', prompted by the works of Bachrach & Baratz (1963) and Lukes' (2005 (1974)) and the notion of 'non decisions'. In what sense may actors' articulations of a strict discontinuity between 'issues' and 'non-issues' – i.e. a discontinuity between 'the issues of politics' and the so-called 'non-issues of daily life' – work to unsettle established power relations? In turn, in what sense can threats, intimidations and violence be interpreted as explicit un-dis- or mis-articulations of concerns through with which actors effectively sought to amass political leverage against the status quo?

Fig 1.

'Russel Street' in Durban's Central Business District was renamed 'Joseph Nduli Street'. Old significance: Lord John Russell, Prime Minister of Great Britain in 1846. New significance: Joseph 'Mpisi' Nduli is remembered as an activist, political analyst, ANC organiser and *Umkhonto WeSizwe* (MK) commander (see also Koopman, 2012) (Picture: Eva Riedke).

THE FIELD AND I
From fieldwork, framing to form

I could legitimately call this chapter 'Methods chapter' and I could begin by specifying where I did research, when, how many people I talked to, for how long, whether it was structured semi-, or non-structured and how these people were selected. As Tim Ingold stresses in his provocative paper '*That's enough about ethnography!*' (2014: 384) such practice has become a "slavish adherence to the protocols of positivist methodology", whereby what is effectively devalued are the rigorous principles of anthropological inquiry and its main way of working – namely participant observation. Ingold also makes clear that at the same time, anthropologists' protests will be of no avail unless, as he puts it, "we can explain what we mean by ethnography" (ibid). Applied to the individual research endeavour, I suggest, this means also not mystifying 'what he or she did'. That is, also to define the process of fieldwork, from the framing of one's enquiries to the thickening of one's descriptions. In the following my intention is, in three sections, to a) provide a background to how this study began and the turns it took, b) to make explicit how the questions I sought to answer changed (what I term the 'framing'), and c) to consider my own 'implication' in processes of issue articulation, in the field and after. The *practices* of fieldwork – the details of who I spoke to, how, and how I got to know him or her – I have, in turn, chosen to make explicit in the individual chapters.

1. The field

My field 'sites' were primarily in Durban (the city), in the township of KwaNkilinda on the city's peri-urban fringes and in a traditional authority that, in parts, bordered on the township (see a map at the end of Chapter 3). Ethnographic fieldwork was carried out for a total of thirteen months, between October 2011 and March 2012 and returning again between October 2012 and April 2013. In this period, I conducted my research as part of a DFG-funded project on 'political cultures'. The long title of the project matched its ambitious aims: '*African Political Cultures: A Comparative Study in Guinea-Bissau, Libya, South Africa and Zambia*' (Ethiopia was later added as a fifth country).

Following the end of my fieldwork in 2013, the political cultures project was not funded for a second phase and its members largely went their separate ways, some seeking new funding to complete fieldwork, publications, etc. My PhD supervisor (and former head of the project), Prof Trutz von Trotha died unexpectedly in this same period following a brief illness. In the midst of difficult circumstances, I was granted a PhD stipend and with this stipend also began a period in which I sought to actively 're-frame' my approach. I had conducted fieldwork in Durban on a range of *controversies* – unfolding around

street names, art in public spaces, the revival of virginity testing and a housing development project in KwaNkilinda. This was the empirical material that I had collected and which would remain the same. When the political cultures project ended and by stipend-funded period begun, what took place was a 're-framing' of the *analytical concepts* and the *theoretical underpinnings* . These, in turn, would come to define a different form of sense-making of the controversies I had traced.

In the previous chapter I set out to provide a precise formulation of the conceptual cornerstones and to introduce those authors who in the following chapters will feature as the 'key protagonists'. These will both continue to re-appear in the discussions. Here, I now intend to define the framework in somewhat more general terms. In a sense, I will 'zoom out' again to consider the theoretical/philosophical assumptions and underpinnings of the issue-centred perspective on politics. Doing so, I will consider in more detail the premises of the 'political cultures' project. At the same time, I will refrain from elaborating in any detail what this framing foregrounded and what it failed to account for (in part because the project did not last long enough to do so). The main aim is to situate the forthcoming analysis in its broader research process, to detail its seriality, and to elucidate where the specificities of the *current* framing lie.

2. The framing

In an outline of the political cultures project, it reads: "Africa is a continent where creative experimenting with political orders is omnipresent. Currently, we observe the rise of new actors and the emergence of new institutions and ways of conflict resolution" (Klute et al. 2010: 3). An analysis of political culture, the argument goes, is central for understanding and explaining these processes. The outline reads further: "It [political culture] includes political actions, normative rules, institutional arrangements, discourses, rituals and symbols. Political culture is a dynamic phenomenon. Power, legitimacy, and violence are at its core" (ibid). The project emphasises an analysis of micro-politics, "as represented in debates over traditional authority and in disputes over relations between generations and gender as well as between different cultural styles and moral orientations" (ibid: 5). It suggests that the concept of what constitutes 'politics' needs to be opened up for reconsideration. It draws upon the notion of 'heterarchy' to capture transformations of statehood. Contrasted with a hierarchical conceptualisation of the state, heterarchy aims to describe the plurality of competing power foci as well as the mutable and unstable intertwining of state and non-state actors. It thus builds on notions of 'para-statehood' and 'para-sovereignty' (Hauck 2004; Klute & Trotha 2004; Trotha 2000, 2006).

This is only a brief outline of the political cultures project, which does not do

justice to the intricate manner with which a range of analytical concepts – complex and wide in breadth – were convincingly weaved together to elicit a sense of coherence. What becomes apparent from these citations, are general agreements with the issue-centred perspective previously laid out: namely, a concern to move beyond state-based understandings of politics, politics pushed beyond traditional spheres, also the need to turn to what lies behind the established realm of government and representation. It follows that it is not only necessary to look beyond the sovereign and the state, but in a second step to also grasp how events become linked or delinked with ordinary political institutions. Second, is a concern for the *experimental adaptation* of ideals, subject definitions, procedures and arrangements – that is, the perception of a socio-political world in which attempts to address public matters of concern transgress what we readily come to recognise as belonging to the 'political', and in which forms of displacement are accompanied by redefinitions of the appropriate *sites, subjects*, and *forms* of (democratic) politics. At the same time, the 'political culture' lens on a different note proves irreconcilable with the 'issue-centred' perspective outlined here, primarily due to its assumption that every activity can be related to and explained by a social aggregate that stands behind it – i.e. a political culture or plural political cultureS. Let me elaborate on this point.

2.1 Post-foundational

The central notion of an issue-centred understanding is simple. As Latour (2005a) remarks, "so simple that it might sound trivial". We can say, it centres on the following idea: 'matters of concern', the issues we care for, call forth publics and gather assemblies, a political force to be reckoned with. "Public controversy around techno-scientific issues is dedicated to the articulation of these issues and their eventual accommodation in society" (Marres, 2007: 759). Peoples' involvement in politics, the central premise holds, is mediated by the problems that affect them. As the introduction outlined, Marres and Latour take their cue from the pragmatists – the point is to see "politics turn around issues that generate a public around them instead of trying to define politics in the absence of any issue" (Latour, 2007: 4). What STS, ANT scholarship and the pragmatists have in common is primarily the idea of 'an absent ground'. They are also considered to be 'post-foundational approaches', as they maintain that the 'foundations' of society are fundamentally contingent. Politics is therefore contingent. As Bowman (2013: 467) puts it in a review of Marchart's (2007) '*Post-foundational political thought*', "[These] contingent ('political') arrangements arise as such (with different aspects of them becoming at different times the stuff of 'politics') [...]". What is above all emphasised is that the 'grounding' (ex. of politics) is contingent, revisable, plural and contested (ibid). "The very site of politics as a site of action, conflict and dynamism, where nothing (i.e. no ultimate ground) guarantees its stability" (Saar, 2012: 81). Dewey is hailed as the major prophet of *anti-*

foundationalism (not 'post-'), whereby, as Marchart (2007: 12-13) suggests, the negative label of 'antiness' however, primarily has an instrumental meaning to stress the divide. The difference is otherwise difficult to pinpoint.

Collins (1987: 195), adopting a position of sociological realism, highlights from a slightly different vantage point why sociological approaches that take aggregates of social interaction as given are considered problematic:

> "What is 'empirical' meets us only in the form of microencounters, and any macrostructure, no matter how large, consists only of the repeated experiences of large numbers of persons in time and space. Our macroconcepts are only words we apply to these aggregations of microencounters. The fact that these words – 'nation,' 'society,' 'corporation' and so forth – are part of the discourse of everyday life merely presents us with another item of data and does nothing to ensure that the terms correspond accurately to the aggregation of microencounters that actually take place." (also discussed in Schareika, 2011).

From the perspective of the former political cultures project, 'power, legitimacy and violence' – analysed by tracing the unfolding of disputes across different sites – are to be related to and explained by 'political cultures' behind them. These largely represent an order 'behind' the actors engaging in the field. In contrast, a post-foundationalist approach aims to study the more or less sedimented systems of rules, norms and meanings – the grounding of society, the social, the culture and the political are always emphasised as remaining contingent. It insists that fields of interaction are never simply 'ungrounded', but neither simply preordained or predetermined by rational calculations or by deep-seated macro structures.

Let me illustrate how this premise comes to form part of the issue-centred perspective by making reference to 'political legitimacy'. The argument is that legitimacy is intimately tied to the fate of *issues*, the settlement of which is at stake. 'Inherently problematic situations', in Dewey's words, occasion public involvement, and political practices are ultimately dedicated to the articulation of issues and to their eventual accommodation. Actors thus become involved in politics by adopting and articulating issues, aiming to bring them to the attention of institutions equipped to provide solutions (Marres, 2007; 2005a). Legitimacy, in turn, becomes "the problematic of the legitimating power of plural and shifting publics" (Chandler, 2014: 46). As Fossen (2013: 444) highlights: "what is legitimate and what is merely taken to be so is interpreted as *performative*, understood not as a kind of 'making,' where the performance is a delimited occurrence leaving behind a finished product, but as situated in ongoing activity". In critical moments, actors assess significance and implications of different claims made as to 'what is legitimate' *(ibid: 444-5).* Legitimacy and illegitimacy is a distinction in permanent tension, subject to on-going critical engagement – a reference to 'culture' is, in constrast, implicit of a more definitive resolution of the predicament. In Fossen's (ibid:

434) understanding, "[t]he *nature of the object* of evaluation of claims to legitimacy is itself at stake in a political situation" (emphasis added).

Those whose works have inspired and shaped the issue-centred perspective laid out here, it can be said, are all more or less 'post-foundationalists'. Their point becomes one of moving away from macro-structural elements. In addition, they are also cautionary of elevating forms to 'externalities' and giving them explanatory powers – a point I detailed in the previous chapter in relation to Boltanksi & Thévenot's (2006) notion to 'orders of worth' (Guggenheim & Potthast, 2012: 161). Hereto, I want to add two additional points to the common constellation of philosophical concerns; namely a) a concern for an 'anthropology of ontology' and b) the assumption that material artefacts and systems are integral to the conduct of politics. As I hope to make clear these two points condition each other.

2.2 Ontology

In the last decade, the so-called 'ontological turn' has sparked much interest (and anxiety) in the social sciences, also in anthropology. A number of statements, critiques, and discussions are now available (e.g. Henare et al. 2007; Jensen and Rödje 2010; Paleček and Risjord 2013; Scott 2013) and its implications for anthropological research are being concertedly and critically discussed (e.g. Carrithers et al. 2010; Laidlaw 2012; Holbrand et al., 2014). These debates by far extend the scope of this study and thus I want to limit myself to a 'footnote' on these debates, making explicit what the commitment to ontology 'does' in the study of issues. Lynch (2013) criticises that the interest in the 'ontology turn' is being guided by a set of distinctly philosophical presuppositions, failing to appreciate it in empirical terms. I want to suggest, in turn, that a few avenues along which 'politics' is being rethought, also represent perspectives through which this otherwise legitimate critique can be ameliorated.

Ontology concerns the study of 'being' and 'reality'. Kohn (2015: 313) in his text entitled '*Anthropology of Ontologies*', writes that the 'turn' to ontology means the following for the discipline: "it takes into account two key elements of our field: one methodological, the other theoretical". Theoretically, anthropology's defining concept is 'culture' (broadly construed) and Kohn makes explicit that ontological anthropology sets out to grapple "critically and conceptually with its affordances and limitations in sophisticated ways" (ibid: 313-4). Ontological concerns aim to augment traditional anthropological critiques that see the reality of phenomena as 'socially constructed'. Methodologically, the turn draws in many respects on the ANT framework and its notion of 'symmetrical anthropology' (Latour 1993) which, simply put, refuses to give explanatory priority to one actor or entity over another. As Kohn (2015: 316) makes clear "its metaphysical correlate would be a 'flat

ontology' (Bryant 2011): The world is the product of many kinds of agencies, none of which is necessarily more important than any other".

Woolgar & Lezaun (2013: 322) in a critical commentary on the 'ontological turn' write that "'[o]ntology' has sometimes been used as a sort of signifier to claim a more thorough-going or insistent form of deconstruction" therein however "it remains unclear how claims about the ontological composition of the world differ from more conventional propositions about the social construction, co-production, or performative constitution of a certain reality". Responding to the question 'what 'new' will come of the ontological turn', Woolgar & Lezaun (ibid: 323) defend STS and argue that recognition has long been paid to "the multiplicity and degrees of alterity of the worlds that science and technology bring into being" also before the term 'ontology' became fashionable. "STS 'has not been turned'" they conclude, but "it seems to have gathered a new analytical momentum from combining, under the guise of ontology, a set of widely held intuitions and sensibilities" (ibid).

Kohn (2015) and Woolgar & Lezaun (2013) both point, in different ways, to an augmenting of existing 'sensibilities'. But this can also be made more explicit. Woolgar & Lezaun (ibid 323): write:

> "The purpose of researching ontology, then, would not be to arrive at a better formulation of the reality of the world, or of the ways in which the world is real, but to interfere with the assumption of a singular, ordered world, and to do so by re-specifying hefty meta-physical questions in mundane settings and in relation to apparently stabilized objects".

They derive therefrom the favour for a new curiosity. In particular, namely, for 'the way objects are enacted in practices' (in reference to Mol, 2002). With this line of reasoning, Woolgar & Lezaun (2013) get to the point of what an issue-centred perspective sets out to do. A symmetrical approach to politics and public involvement, as Marres (2005a) has outlined, is to account for the ways in which ideals are enacted in practice. Both are approached as *practical achievements* (see also Bloor, 1992 (1976)). Peoples' involvement in politics is mediated by the problems that affect them. It is 'socio-ontological' for it focuses on "the attachments that people mobilize (and that mobilize people)" in the performance of their concern (Marres, 2007: 759). What is 'ontological' about it is a new conception of democratic practices. Whereas issue formation, Marres (ibid: 762) succinctly explains, is 'traditionally' often conceived as "a discursive process, involving the mobilisation of terms, symbols and ideas that are to inform problem definitions". 'The turn' comes with appreciating that actors "may be implicated in issues through ontological associations" or, put differently, the manner in which issues come to intervene in 'ways of life'. 'Enacting' departs from presumptions about the pre-existence of entities and foregrounds the generative power of the practices involved in the constitution of (political) reality.

The adoption of a distinct ontological lexicon and a curiosity for how 'objects are enacted in practice' is also accompanied by a scholarly treatment of material artefacts and systems – that is to say, a focus on the role that objects, technologies and environments play in facilitating social, political and moral life. It is also to this form of inquiry that an issue-centred perspective latches on. As Barry puts it, material artefacts and systems come to be seen not only as the stable foundations on which politics unfolds, but as integral to the *conduct* of politics (Barry, 2013: 2). With the notion of material participation, Marres (2012a) addresses the question of the role of objects in political participation. She comes to argue (with significant parallels to Barry, 2013) that material objects have a role to play in getting people involved in political processes – participation is done with things (see for a review of both works Hawkins, 2014). Both Barry and Marres do not adopt the argument that there is something intrinsically political about non-human entities, not promoting, as Hawkins (2014, e43) put it, "a general materialist theory of democracy". Rather their argument is that entities are *enabled* to acquire political capacities in certain settings and associations, are 'made to matter', and there through help to perform specific political realities. To return to Marres' illustrative example of the tea light I discussed in the previous chapter, the tea light becomes an artefact through which it is possible to demonstrate environmental awareness and to make 'one's contribution'. Participation in environmentalism is made 'doable' for the average person as answers "to the otherwise abstract question of what is to be done about environmental problems" are materialised (McInerney, 2014: 717).

In an article entitled '*Why political ontology must be experimentalised*' Marres (2012b: 419) frames the argument that an 'additional step' should still be taken, namely beyond positing that "objects simply have normative capacities (or not)" towards specifically investigating *how* they become invested with specific normative powers". Concerning the tea light, for instance, how does this device come to enable a co-articulation of participation? – i.e. "satisfying many groups by providing public participation, technological innovation, social and/or environmental change, and often at the same time" (Johnson, 2013: 1015). Here it is not *latent* machinations of socio-technical-material arrangements at work but rather, as Marres emphasises, the tea light is *explicitly invested* with normative capacities. Not an emergent effect, but a deliberate effort (Jensen & Morita, 2015: 84). Introducing the notion of 'experimental ontology', Marres (2012b: 423) writes:

> "experimental ontology, too, treats the issue of 'what the world is made
> up of' as something that gets partly decided in empirical practices. But it

goes beyond that in a number of ways. It directs attention to efforts to purposefully design politics and morality into material objects, devices and settings".

With this understanding, politics and democracy are seen as accomplished through the deployment of devices, objects and settings (ibid). Jensen & Morita (2015: 84) suggest critically that Marres' notion of 'experimental ontology' is not *new* per se, that her approach aligns neatly with the notion of 'empirical ontology' upheld by STS for longer, yet that it foregrounds in an intriguing manner a *particular dimension* of the empirical. It has the merit of "highlighting the political and moral investments people make in technical forms". (I return to this point in Chapter 2).

2.4 The empirical extension

This study, from the point when the framing was no longer one of 'political culture', has come to engage with the works of Noortje Marres and her impressive list of publications in which she elaborates from different vantage points an issue-centred understanding of politics. Marres has worked with Bruno Latour in Paris and was affiliated to Steve Woolgar's STS research group in Oxford (Oenen, 2012). Currently she is a senior lecturer in sociology and Director of the Centre for the Study of Invention and Social Process (CSISP) at Goldsmiths in London. Latour in his introduction to '*Making things public*' (2005a) acknowledges Marres's significant contribution to his works – as Oenen (2012) puts it, Marres gave Latourian actor-network-theory a "political twist" by "connecting it to pragmatists political theory". Marres (2007) in turn, gives a nod to and carries forth Latour's critique of political philosophy "for having been the victim of a storng object avoidance tendency". The aim of both authors, their writings repeatedly suggest, is to redress the bias in political philosophy of having paid inadequate recognition to the *what* of politics, "the *res* that creates a public around it" (Latour, 2005a: 6) (see also Oenen, 2012).

Empirically, the cases discussed in the forthcoming chapters differ from what has been discussed so far by the 'issue theorists'. In this respect, I suggest, they provide food for thought, or enable, as Prasad (2008) puts it, a potential 'retooling of analytics'. Criticisms have been levelled against STS that when extending their work to transnational contexts, it has exemplified a 'first in Europe, then elsewhere' temporality (Prakash, 1999). Prasad (2008) argues that the label of a 'eurocentric bias' – i.e. STS being based on a Eurocentric epistemic canon – would be misplaced. Rather, what the critique raises awareness to is the need for a reflexive interrogation and retooling of the STS analytics that may be necessary as attention shifts 'to the post-colony'.

Concerning precisely the focus on 'issues', McInerney (2014: 717) in a review of Marres' (2012) book '*Material Participation*' addresses this discussion from

yet another vantage point – namely, that a re-tooling may not only be sparked when research is done in other parts of the world, but also when the empirical topics are extended (the two logically constitute each other). McInerney (2014) highlights the preponderance of STS with matters of environmentalism. What do we make of issues less well-established? The point can be interpreted as two-fold; a) 'environmentalism' is (globally) well-established as an 'issue', and b) the sociology of the environment has had a long and fruitful dialogue with STS (see Callon, 2009; Hawkins, 2011; Latour, 2004a; Lezaun, 2011; Marres, 2007; 2011; 2012; 2013). Let me here consider the former, then the latter point.

The manner in which 'issues' differ in the degree to which they are readily seen as 'issues' depends on whether they are well-publicised. It is also linked to the operation of global techniques of issue formation and the manner in which local issue definitions have acquired political significance in sites beyond the 'local'. The controversy explored in Chapter 1 '*An elephant that provokes*' suggests that public art, statues or also street name changes are situated squarely in transnational debates about symbolic reparations/restitution/transformation. In turn, Chapter 2 '*A ceremony which cures*', deals with perceptions of a 'crisis of morality'. In these two chapters, the 'issues' which practices of public involvement work to articulate are characterised by different forms of pre-existing 'issuen-ess' – the nature of the issues' *establishments* vary. Further, concerning the second vantage point of McInerney's (2014) observation that STS has had a long engagement with matters of environmentalism, we may argue that studies with this 'focus' have compellingly engaged with questions adressing the realm of the 'political'. At the same time, they have however also exhibited a tendency to 'flatten' the world of grave divisions and structural inequalities – a point that Barry (2013) extends to ANT more generally (see also Rottenburg, 2008). The empirical case studies in the forthcoming chapters, in turn, precisely centre-stage the practices by which divisions, boundaries and inequalities are articulated, become politicised and contested. Along this avenue, the nature of the empirical case studies may again have theoretically generative implications.

3. Being implicated

Scott et al. argue (1990) that '[t]he myth of the neutral social researcher in contemporary scientific controversies' cannot be sustained in practice. Haraway (1991: 189) argues that when researchers emphasise an unbiased, external position, it is the performance of a "god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere". Researchers doing research on issues become 'implicated' – not seldom due to the fact the issues addressed are of the kind that arouse a high level of 'moral concern' or 'moral investment' (Fassin, 2008; Stoczkowski, 2008). Concerned with the question of their 'critical treatment', Birkbak et al. (2015) raise the question "what does it mean for our research to be 'critical?' Their response, in turn, draws upon and elaborates Latour's suggestion that

the critically minded researcher should defy the temptation to 'critique' a given phenomenon, but should rather "make sure that issues reach *criticity*" (2005b, 8, emphasis mine). In this last section, I first want to address the underlying dilemma by a) detailing the manner in which I became 'implicated' in processes of issue articulation and b) making clear how these considerations fit into the on-going debate about an anthropological 'critique of critique' – without, however, providing any new answers for what Rappaport (1993) in a catchy manner terms 'the anthropology of trouble'. Second, I want to conclude by providing a note on *form*, detailing a few considerations for why I wrote the way I wrote.

The controversies detailed in the forthcoming chapters build on participant observation and accounts of fieldwork are the primary form of evidence for arguments. During the course of my field research, I always lived in Durban, and travelled to KwaNkilinda and the traditional authority of Inkosi Maphulo for four to five days a week. I took *isiZulu* classes and was fluent enough to converse in elementary conversations but continued to primarily speak English with those I interacted. Three field assistants accompanied the project at different stages. They did not accompany my doings on a daily basis, but joined me primarily for meetings and interviews for which I knew that I depended on interpretations. For speeches I recorded, discussions I taped, radio shows I downloaded and newspaper articles that I collected meticulously, I got help from a translator at the University of KwaZulu-Natal's linguistic department.

In the midst of disputes of all sorts, mundane to violent, I attempted not to get aligned to one position, not to be partisan, moving back and forth across the lines, tracing disputes in different directions. At times, I pursued tangents from controversies, recording material, for which at the time of collection I did not know how they could be used. Barry (2013: 27), in reference to Strathern (2004: 5), defines it as being guided by an open ended non-linear method of data collection, whereby "[r]ather than devising research protocols that will purify the data in advance of analysis, the anthropologist embarks on [an] exercise which yields materials for which analytic protocols are often devised after the fact" (ibid). Secondly, working specifically on disputes, I was also guided by what Kovats-Bernat (2002) has termed a deployment of 'pragmatic field strategies'. Both notions of ethnographic craftsmanship imply recognition of the fact that the classic aesthetic of distinctive method alone is at times an inadequate imaginary, inapplicable or simply naïve (see also Riedke, 2015 and for a more general argument Marcus, 2009).

On different occasions, my lack of explicit allegiance brought about concern and suspicion about my motivations – once, in an evening meeting of the local ANC branch in KwaNkilinda, residents were warned that I was an *impimpi* [spy/colluder] for, as I was later told, I was someone who always also spoke "to the other side" and "knew how to play tricks with questions". Other times, my lack of explicit allegiance seemed to heighten the perceived possibility that

I could be instrumentally 'won over for a particular cause'. I here want to consider that as a researcher one becomes 'implicated' in issues, despite adhering to self reflexive and pragmatic field strategies and above all, despite such efforts not to get aligned. In part, because forms of implication are not reducible to intentional actions, pre-defined interests or strategic will of actors – i.e. becoming implicated extends well beyond the workings of individual actors. What this means concretely, will become clear in the following account of three moments in the field. For the sake of discussing them later, I refer to these three incidences as 'the chief and the game drive', 'the transsexual field assistant' and 'Abahlali and the struggle for land'. The first two incidences occurred during fieldwork, the latter took place after my return from Durban.

The chief and the game drive: It was March 2012. My PhD supervisor, together with the additional five members of the 'political cultures' research project was due to visit me in the field for two weeks. At the time of their visit, I already had a close field relationship with Inkosi Maphulo, a chief whose traditional authority neighboured the township of KwaNkilinda. I explained that in these two weeks I would want to introduce my colleagues and to show them where I worked and whom I worked with. Maphulo responded: "Do they know *amakhosi* [chiefs]? They are also from Germany, yes? Maybe, we can take them to the zoo together?" "I can arrange a game drive and we can have a look at the land". With 'zoo', he meant a small private game reserve. It lay on land for which he was in the process of preparing a land claim. The subtext of his suggestion was about how he sought to present himself and his office as an *inkosi* [chief] and the significance that 'land' had in relation thereto. That is to say, a matter of self-image, but also connected with what the Comaroffs in '*Ethnicity Inc.*' (2009) define as 'ethno-political' stratagems.

The transsexual field assistant: It was November 2012. I picked up my field assistant on the way to an important meeting with a Shembe priest. Shembe, alternatively called the Nazareth Baptist Church, is one of the largest African initiated (or independent) Churches in southern Africa. In the Province of KwaZulu-Natal, the church has enjoyed a strong alliance with *amakhosi* [chiefs]. As Cabrita (2010: 22) suggests, the church has provided chiefs with new avenues through which to "mobilize loyal constituencies", an institution through which to define their political rule as "divinely established" and generally speaking, to "legitimate their power". This particular meeting with a Shembe priest had been arranged a few weeks prior by Inkosi Maphulo, who was also a chiefly convert to the church. My field assistant at the time was a young journalist, living in a township on the very southern borders of the city, a student of development studies and openly transsexual man. As he entered the car, I noticed he had long, red, nail polished, acrylic fingernails. He explained he had been dressed as a 'drag queen' for a party the night prior. While driving, we entered into a heated argument:

I anticipated that the priest might take offence from his appearance, that in one way or another it could compromise our participation at the meeting. He in turn, emphasised that if that were to be the case, it would also raise awareness for transgender/gender non-conforming identities. "You never had a problem with who I am! Now you do?" "Also Shembe and *amakhosi* need to realise that times are changing! Things in South Africa are not as they used to be!"

Abahlali and the struggle for land: It was October 2014. I had returned from Durban. In the final months of my fieldwork, a conflict had unfolded around a housing project in the township of KwaNkilinda. A group of residents had joined the shack dwellers' movement *Abahlali base Mjondolo* and protested against the alleged corrupt allocation of the houses built, land dispossession and corruption. During the months in Durban, I had conducted ethnographic participation in the community and engaged with the members of Abahlali who figured in these protests. Thandisile was the Chairperson of the movement's local branch, who from the early days of the protests had acted in a leadership position, mobilising for a collective fight against local injustices. In September 2014, Thandisile was assassinated in what was said to have been a 'hit-man murder'. After I received the news, I was asked by a resident from KwaNkilinda, a member of Abahlali, whether her death would change the role I would now take in 'their struggle' – more than merely recording and revealing what had happened?

All three incidences define moments in which the manner in which I had become (was due to become) 'implicated' in particular issues, was made explicit. The 'degree of severity' in each case differs in multiple respects, and for this reason they each prompted a different response. When the research group from Germany arrived, my colleagues and I readily joined Inkosi Maphulo on a game drive touring the to-be-claimed-back land. When my field assistant and I had a heated debate in the car, we nevertheless ended up going to the meeting with the Shembe priest together, albeit not working well together on that day. Following Thandisile's death, I again, as I had done previously, emphasised my intention to address multiple perspectives and that in contrast to aligning myself with one position, it was my objective to address the complexity of the situation as they experienced it. It was also through a form of distancing from the struggles in which they themselves were engaged in that I - so I tried to explain - could speak about exclusion, exploitation or the abuse of power.

To all three situations, I ascribed in hindsight a 'heuristic' significance in their own right. The manner in which subjective moral uncertainties and discomforts arose, enabled me to unpack previously ungraspable complexities and ambiguities of the research context. Considered from this angle, paradoxes and contradictions – from which 'matters of concern' were no doubt partly born out of – made themselves *felt* as 'frustrations of fieldwork'.

In what follows, I want to reflect in more detail on my implication in Abahlali's struggle for land and the considerations that in particular Thandisile's death brought about. My engagements with the group of residents from KwaNkilinda who, during the course of fieldwork, had come to align themselves with Abahlali, raised concerns in a way that was more *explicit* than other engagements had done. These were concerns that ranged from the moral and ethical principles of ethnographic research, questions of being partisan, the intention to remain external to events, the epistemological challenges of moral judgements all the way to the 'plea for critique' with which I was confronted. In turn, on the basis of this plea, I grappled with the forms of critique ethnographic texts could take[1]. While I also reflect upon Thandisile's death in an annex to Chapter 4, entitled '*Prayer at the grave'*, I, in brief, want to consider here the argument put forth by Birkbak et al. (2015: 287) that "[r]esearchers are implicated in issues in specific ways that allow [us] to register critiques and methods, and emphasize or supplement them". Related thereto is Latour's (2005b, 8) idea that the critically minded researcher should "make sure that issues reach *criticity*" (emphasis added).

3.1 Critique

Latour as well as Boltanski and Thévenot with their 'sociology of critical capacity' have in common that 'critique' is not seen as the capacity of the researcher, but the capacity of the actors themselves (Guggenheim & Potthast, 2012: 163). For both, this formed part of their critical response to Bourdieu. Central to Boltanski's framework outlined in '*On Critique'* (2011) is the relation between critique and agency, namely, "the ways in which actors use and develop modes of critique in everyday situations they regard as problematic" (Slangen, 2013: 63). Critique espoused by the critically-minded-researcher on matters of concern should be of emancipatory intent, is the argument. For Boltanski (2011), Slangen's review (2013: 64) highlights, "critique needs to present itself as an extension of the struggles which actors themselves are engaged in". On the other hand, Slangen (ibid) adds "it needs to distance itself from these local forms of critique in order to avoid merely expressing a specific set of moral dispositions".

The argument made by Latour, and taken up in the discussion by Birkbak et al. (2015: 267) on the one hand makes a similar point. The notion of 'critical

---

[1] These are problems which were heavily debated in public (beyond the boundaries of the academic community) in response to Alice Goffman's (2014) book '*On the run: Fugitive Life in an American City'* - an ethnographic study on the impact of mass incarceration and policing on low-income African-American urban communities, drawing on research conducted in a neighbourhood of Philadelphia. Critics responded to the widely acclaimed study with concerns about Goffman having crossed over the impartial observer line, the ethical dilemmas that accompany this brand of ethnography, as well as the argument that she had in fact committed a felony during the research. See '*The trials of Alice Goffman'* by Lewis-Kraus (2016) for an overview.

proximity' is to "remind us that to be critical does not necessarily imply a researcher critiquing a given phenomenon from an outside and distant position […]". For Latour, the imperative "is to care for such day-to-day 'issuefications' rather than adding new critiques" (ibid). That is to say, to recognize and give voice to the critique already present in the empirical case studies. On the other hand, the notions of critique adopted by Latour and that of the sociologists are not the same. The difference between Latour's line of argumentation and that of Boltanski is that latter allows for a form of 'meta-critique' – distinguishable from everyday critiques, entailed in 'day-to-day 'issuefications'' (Rottenburg, 2013). Spun further, from the perspective of the 'sociology of critical capacity', to "make sure that issues reach criticity" is achieved *also* by unmasking a more defined, closely specified version of the 'totality' (the social order) that actors-in-focus are unable to see in this form[2]. This means that Boltanski – in contrast to Latour – sees the need for a form of overarching critique, a form of meta-critique (Slangen, 2013: 63; Rottenburg, 2013: 70-73). As Rottenburg (2013: 72) puts it:

> "Die Soziologie der Kritik macht Kritik vom Zweck zum Gegenstand ihrer Unternehmung […]. Dabei hält die Soziologie der Kritik – contra Latour und pro Foucault – an der Möglichkeit einer soziologischen Metakritik fest und damit an der Fähigkeit zur Einsichten in Strukturzusammenhänge, die aus der Perspektive der Akteure verschlossen bleiben, auch wenn sich die Metakritik unlösbar in die Beziehung von Macht und Wissen eingebunden weiß (Boltanski, 2010: 24)."

To summarise, we can say that the researcher is offered the possibility of three different roles: a) taking part directly in public criticism like other citizens, endowed by a certain scientific authority; b) giving a voice to everyday critique in a manner that displays their requirements and promotes their fulfilment, or c) "unveiling hidden structural constraints or mechanisms that put a brake on such activities" (Thévenot, 2011: 51-52). All authors discussed here question the legitimacy of the former *('a' above),* Latour primarily foregrounds *(b),* Boltanksi & Thévenot largely uphold the possibility of both *(b)* and *(c).* If we then position Dewey thereto, it is important to note both his insistence on "a logic of inquiry and debate which would foster the crystallisation and resolution of public problems" *(a)* as well as foregrounding the need to reveal "structural requirements or impediments weighing on these critical activities" *(c)* (see discussion in Thévenot, 2011: 52; 53).

3.2 Rendering meta-critique more empirical

Engaging further in the anthropology's debate about critique, especially the

---

[2] Bourdieu's sociology can be described as having as its object 'society' instead of 'social order' and thus a focus on 'generality' instead of 'totality' – whereby, as a consequence, Bourdieu also adheres to an entirely different form of critique (see Slangen, 2013: 63).

formulation of a 'critique of critique' goes well beyond the scope of this text. Nevertheless, I want to highlight that central for a form of meta-critique to be *emancipatory in intent,* are the issues. What attention to 'issues' deliberately promises to do is to *empirically* ground the distinctly philosophical presuppositions that are as of yet still attached to notions of a meta-critique (see also Lamla, 2016: 56). To align neatly with a pragmatist inspired notion of critique, I propose that a meta-critique which lets out of view the *issues* out of which an understanding of the 'totality' developed is likely to (again) become susceptible to what Strathern (1991: 189), in a reproving fashion, termed the "god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere". Lamla (2016: 56-7) in a contribution from which I draw inspiration, highlights what the centre-staging of the 'objects of concern' promises to bring about:

> „erst die soziologische Rekonstruktion von dingpolitischen Artikulationsprozessen erlaubt es [...] Selbstreflexionen empirisch zu erden, d. h. die unterschiedlichen Lebensformen und Existenzmodi ernst zu nehmen, aber auch ihre Interdependenzen sichtbar zu machen und abkürzende Selbstrechtfertigungen [...] oder Hegemoniebestrebungen zu hinterfragen, so dass schrittweise neue Kompositionsmöglichkeiten sichtbar werden und das Demokratieprojekt sich auf solche Komplexität einstimmen kann."

In response to Bourdieu, Boltanski and Thévenot's 'sociology of critical capacity' took the social order – instead of society – as its object and Boltanski formulated his notion of a comprehensive critique on this basis. A focus was placed on 'totality' rather than 'generality' (Slangen, 2013: 63). The proposition hereby is that in staying true to pragmatist philosophy, and to *empiricise* it, a meta-critical framework would need to further reconcile the notion of comprehensive 'totality' with the practices studied, which also from a position of distance revolves around particular 'issues'. The possibility of an overarching critique is kept, but perhaps rendered more empirical. With this proposition, I further draw inspiration from the argument made by Lamla (2016: 57) who underlines that it is to the '*what*' that forms of reflexive scrutiny afford their effectiveness:

> "Öffentliche Selbstreflexion und -entfremdung allein helfen überhaupt nicht weiter, wenn sie sich nicht an *issues* des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens abarbeiten und deren Verunsicherungseffekte produktiv wenden, sondern über diesen frei schwebend institutionalisiert werden".

4. A note on form

The choice of empirical cases discussed in the forthcoming chapters, may at times seem 'cherry picked'. I have sought to detail, in different parts of the text, the manner in which they 'made their appearance' in my fieldwork. I had not embarked on an ethnographic exercise of 'finding' these controversies. For

instance, it was the chief, Inkosi Maphulo, who urged me to observe monthly virginity testing events. As he even put it at the time: "virginity testing has a lot to do with politics, you will learn a lot from going there". The context through which particular public controversies became part of my research, are in itself meaningful for understanding the issues and the forms of public involvement dedicated to their articulation. The second feeling that a reading of the forthcoming chapters may bring about, is a sense that the style of representation is in parts fragmentary. Let me provide a few considerations that prevented me from deliberately 'undoing' that which may be seen as fragmentary.

Particularly STS and ANT theorists have in recent years devoted considerable energy towards issues of representation, perhaps more so than anthropology at large. A consequence has been an almost near obsession with issues of writing style. Two frequently discussed examples include the texts by Annemarie Mol and John Law – who each published a book in 2002. Mol's '*Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice*' (2002) is written with a division of the page into two texts, the main text and a subtext. In the main text on the top half of the page, Mol provides her ethnographic account of atherosclerosis. In the second text, spread out on the bottom half, she positions herself on a theoretical/conceptual plane – discussing Latour, Strathern, Haraway, Butler, Goffman, Foucault, Mouffe and others. The bottom text can be read before, after, or concurrently. They are both intricately related but not integrated. It has the effect, as Mol suggests, that the texts that constitute the theoretical/conceptual wrapping "resonate, run along, interfere with, alienate from, and give an extra dimension to the main text" (Mol, 2002: 3).

Law's '*Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience*' (2002) adopts a different layout. Law sets out to show how a technology, the TSR2 airplane, is many things to many people. These 'aircraft stories' are presented as fractured, decentred and hybrid. To tell a more focused story, Law argues would be to "collude with a cultural bias for simple, singular narratives" (see also Mody, 2004: 117). Much like subjects, objects depend on webs of relations for their existence. Subjects and objects are for Law "precarious achievements", or as he terms it in the book, "fractional coherences" (see Saldanha, 2003: 422). They are simultaneously coherent and incoherent, single and multiple. He works to map out the technical and discursive practices that together constitute, and also 'fracture' the TSR2 aircraft, suggesting that at times, pieces do not "consolidate themselves to make coherences or simplicities" (ibid). He makes explicit that singularity is merely a façade, always produced out of multiplicity and thereby pieces can only cohere fractionally.

In sum, what others have considered to be a 'near obsession' with form and style is an influence of 'theory' and its ideologies. That is to say, it is intricately related to an "attention to and fascination with ontological multiplication" (Ward & Wilkie, 2009) and the post foundational commitment towards seeing the ultimate grounds of politics and society as fundamentally

contingent, revisable, plural and contested. Taussig (2004), in turn, reminds us that 'not story-telling' is not yet possible – despite efforts such as those of Mol (2002) and Law (2002). Ethnographies, through the concepts employed, the divisions into chapters, headings and subheadings always imply simplifications, systematisations, homogenisations. The objective cannot be to do away with a schema at large but rather to pursue, in the words of Law, a loosening of a powerful tradition, "this tradition of ordering, of consistent explanation, of foundations, of origins" (ibid: 188).

4.1 A note on names

In the accounts and my reflections in the forthcoming chapters, I have sought to ensure that my interlocutors will be protected. For this reason, I have changed some of the names of the people and places that feature in this text. Particularly the incidences that unfolded around a housing project in the township (detailed in Chapters 3 + 4), prompted me to use a pseudonym for the field site. I here come to refer to a township on the outskirts of Durban as the township of 'KwaNkilinda'. The names of a few interlocutors, in turn, also remained unchanged. Individuals appear under their real names when they played a role as public figures, whose views and actions were in that moment also a matter of public record. In other contexts, in which I spoke to them "off the public record" I was at times asked to now use a pseudonym. The result is thus a mixture of real names and pseudonyms.

Tuesday - November 2011

The big climate change conference, COP 17, ended last week. The city is beginning to turn to the old. As a curtain raiser for the conference, a group of artists had planned to paint a blue line through the Durban's Central Business District (CBD) – a demonstration of where sea levels would one day most likely be. '*Walk the Future'* was the announcement. The idea was to raise awareness for climate change in a place that people experience in their day-to-day routines through the city[1].

An article in the *Mercury* a few days ago read that the idea was scrapped in favour of a "choreographed human line" – now no blue paint would mark future water levels, but councillors, activists and delegates would walk the line instead, following a group of South African dancers. Apparently, the problem for the city had been the colour – 'blue' – for blue was the colour of one of the ANC's opposition parties, the Democratic Alliance (DA). Last year three elephant statues were prevented from being completed, only two weeks prior to completion and the reasoning had almost been the same. The three elephants reminded the ANC-led municipality of the Inkatha Freedom Party's (IFP) logo and thus "they were not welcome in a city run by the ANC"[2]. The controversy around these elephants still carries on. It has become known as Durban's 'elephant saga'. With the blue line, that newspaper article suggested, it is the colour of an opposition party that cannot be drawn "in a city run by the ANC". Even if it turns out that this was only a rumour in circulation, it remains a view no less.

In the newspaper this morning there was another short reference to the blue line paint project – this time about the artist that had stood behind the plan, Lesley Perkes[3]. In response to the municipality's decision to revoke its 'go ahead' on the blue line, Lesley Perkes had now returned to Durban with a team and stuck 240 '*Sutcliffe*'[4] peel-off road name stickers over street signs in central Durban. reading *Sutcliffe Ave, Sutcliffe Blvd, Sutcliffe Rd, Sutcliffe St, Sutcliffe Str, Sutcliffe Pl, Sutcliffe Cr*, etc. Peel off stickers, but they caused much enragement nevertheless. The article quotes the Mayor James Nxumalo as saying: "What they did is not only a defamation of Sutcliffe's character, but whoever put up those signs has also defamed the city".

I was in the township when it happened, and by the time I got back into town, the stickers had been removed already. I googled the story to find pictures. The group had run through Durban with a ladder to quickly put up the stickers,

---

[1] See Carnie, 2011.
[2] See VanWyck & Pillay, 2010.
[3] Lesley Perkes, a public art activist, passed away in February 2015.
[4] Sutcliffe was Municipal Manager of the eThekwini Municipality from 2002 -2011

had worn white coats and carried clipboards. This was a performative dimension that added another level of meaning.

I called Lesley Perkes, her office number at *Artatwork* in Johannesburg. At first stirred by my interest, she then said only a few sentences into our conversation "I don't think I have time for this. You need to have clear-cut questions for me. There are so many journalists calling about the project we did. You see, I am glad you are picking up on this for your project, but I only have time for very specific questions". Putting myself in her shoes, I knew how maddening my questions (those of any academic) were for most, for those who for some reason or another were forced to engage with us. Yet also, on this day, 'her time for me' seemed valued against 'her time for journalists' –calls would come in, and her story would reach the newspaper pages the next day. Had I perhaps also asked the wrong questions? "Why 'white coats', why 'clipboards'?" – I had asked. Perhaps explaining the second-layer meaning to me in detail would have compromised the 'political affordances' of the artwork itself. Putting labels on what they had sought to achieve with the project – especially, the lab coats, the clipboards – perhaps compromised the artworks' ability to force certain issues into Durban's public debate. A certain vagueness was what sparked critical debate, I reasoned.

A day later, I found a short piece online, written by the artist, Lesley Perkes. Most passages seem to directly address the former City Manager Michael Sutcliffe. He is not only seen by most as the man behind Durban's controversial street name changes, but is also amongst those blamed for the intervention in the 'elephant saga'. The elephants have sparked considerable debate about artistic freedom of expression, the moral authority of art, art as intellectual property. In her text online, Lesely Perkes does not make direct reference to the preceding decision to scrap the 'blue line' project. She rather writes: "On the historic occasion of the EThekwini Municipality's hosting of the [climate change] conference […] a lightning-fast art squad deemed it appropriate to celebrate the City Manager".

She goes on to critique a trend of censorship pertaining to the arts, to public space, public life and creativity. "There is genius and magic in South Africa, but there is also too much idiocy in charge that attempts to disempower us", she writes. On what had provoked the 'stickering' of street names across Durban, following the city's decision to scrape the 'blue line' project, I pick out the following:

> "We are inspired and expect to make people laugh and laugh and have fun and wonder what's going on and think about what they want from leaders and what makes a good leader. We especially want people to think about what makes us/them great and how come we often end up looking mediocre or pathetic when we are not. We are most certainly not" (Perkes, 2011).

Chapter 1. This chapter is devoted to controversies around statues and sculptures in public spaces. It tells the story of three pieces made by one and the same Durban artists. In addition to the accounts from Durban, attention is also turned to the debate that unfolded around the Cecil Rhodes statue at the University of Cape Town in 2015. The chapter explores the multitude of accounts as to what these statues/sculptures 'are' and how they acquire political affordances and become sites for the deliberate articulation of concerns. The proposition is, that in these processes of the processes of politicisation detailed here, the 'statue is more than a statue', employed also to lay bare South Africa's transformation challenges.

CHAPTER 1
A statue that provokes –
the interpretation of the past

I n mid February 2010, headlines in the newspapers in Durban read: *"Get rid of these elephants!"*, *"Jumbo art: a white elephant"*, *"Elephant sculptures are just part of a bigger picture"* and *"Sculptor denies big five contract"*. This was the beginning of a protracted debate around three elephant statues that were due to be completed in the coming weeks. A few days later, as the artwork had already become the source of even more furore, journalists continued to report on the matter, with following headings then flashing the newspapers: *"Elephant whispering gets louder"*, *"The elephant debacle: a hijacked species"*. One journalist finally declared that a case of *"Elephantiasis Durbanitis"*[1] had broken out in Durban (Ardé, 2010a; Ardé, 2010b; Broughton & Khumalo, 2010; Coppen, 2010; Sanpath, 2010; Sudheim, 2010). At the heart of the dispute – of the 'elephant debacle' or the 'Durban's elephant saga', as the controversy begun to be referred to – was a public artwork of three life-size elephants, which stood partly completed on a traffic island. They were located between the lanes on a flyover at the entrance to the city, the cars speeding past, and therefore somewhat also at a distance from anyone not travelling by car. The sculptor behind the artwork was the internationally acclaimed elephant artist, Andries Botha.

The following chapter will explore the story of three sculptures/statues made by Andries Botha: the three elephants at Warwick Triangle, a statue of King Shaka at King Shaka International Airport and a statue of John Langalibalele Dube, the founding president of the South African Native National Congress (which became the African National Congress in 1923). The third statue, of John Dube, was commissioned to stand at the Dube Tradeport, a newly built logistics hub around the international airport. Work on the elephants was stopped two weeks prior to completion, the statue of King Shaka was erected and subsequently taken down, and the statue of John Dube was, in turn, installed without sparking any great debate. My intention is to explore why these sculptures/statues did or did not generate much public interest. I treat these installations as empirical occasions through which to explore processes of 'issue articulation' and to consider how we can begin to make sense of the proposition that the articulation of issues is constituted by, and dependent upon materialities, rather than unfolding in an autonomous domain in and of itself. In a final section, I will also turn attention to the *'#Rhodes must fall'* campaign that unfolded at the University of Cape Town (UCT) in 2015 – a

---

[1] The author of this newspaper article, Sudheim (2010), provides the following explanation: "Even though the tropical parasitic disease *Elephantiasis* is characterised by a catastrophic thickening of the skin, the local version – known as *Elephantiasis Durbanitis* – afflicts only members of the ruling party and is defined by a startling reversal of the usual symptoms in that it causes an alarming thinning of the skin". What is meant, will become clearer through the more detailed account of the dispute.

protest movement that called for the removal of the Cecil Rhodes statue at UCT's campus.

The link is drawn to the case of Rhodes for the student leaders of the campaign were very articulate about why they were calling for the fall of Rhodes, addressing concerns that have partly also stood behind the politicisations of statues/sculptures in Durban. The argument is hereby, that the concerns over monumental iconoclasm – in reference to history, meaning those of who are remembered and those who are not – have resulted in similar forms of politicisation elsewhere. 'At stake', therein, I want to suggest, is *not only* the symbolic inscription of particular readings of the past and forms of contestation by actors who chip away at these dominant constructions (see Rassool, 2000). Rather, I want to emphasise – drawing inspiration from Marres (2013) – that at the heart of these controversies as they unfold is also the articulation of 'issues' located between fraught history and present realities. Provoking a multitude of accounts, statues, sculptures and monuments become sites where particular issues are articulated, where those implicated seek to tease out, as Minty (2006: 422) puts it, "the complexities inherent in a complex and now rapidly changing country".

1. Three elephants

The artist, Andries Botha, lives and works in Durban, has exhibited internationally and is particularly well known for his life-size elephant sculptures made out of natural or recycled man-made materials. Amongst his most well known projects is a stately herd of elephants trailing along the beach and into the sea at the Belgian resort of De Pann (2006) as well as '*Nomkhubulwane*', an elephant made out of galavanised steal and recycled tires, exhibited for the '*Rainbow Nation*' exhibition in The Hague (2012). These have been installed as symbols of the '*Human Elephant Foundation*', an organisation Andries Botha started in partnership with the respected South African conservationist Dr Ian Player. As the organisation suggests, 'the elephant' serves as "a metaphor for the yearning for forgotten conversations between humans, the Earth and all living things" (see www.andriesbotha.net).

The names of other foundations are listed on his personal website, including the '*Andries Botha Foundation*', which Andries founded, undertaking social welfare and humanitarian activities 'through art'. The list is a testament to different strands of political activism. In Durban, Andries has lectured at the Durban University of Technology since 1982. I find in an article by Chapman (1992: 80), who borrows from Carol Becker (*Catalogue*, 1991: 24), an account that captures what lies behind his work and also how, as an artist, he tries to "speak back" to a complicated South African situation"

> "a paradigmatic transgressor: an Afrikaner profoundly concerned with
> the obliteration of race distinctions, a male artist focused on issues of

gender and androgyny, a spiritual artists committed to the social/political/collective and public arenas, an intellectual driven by intuition, a maker of beautiful objects outraged by preciousness and commodification, a South African engaged in the daily struggles of this country, trying to live as a citizen of the world" (Chapman, 1992: 79-80).

As the controversy around the three elephants begins to unfold in Durban, I meet Andries a few times. I make him aware that I want to trace different directions, follow the actors and the issues said to be at stake in the debate. Since officials from the municipality stopped the completion of the elephants, it is clear that he has had numerous requests by journalists and others 'to tell his story'. From various vantage points, defending and critiquing the piece, attention during these weeks in February 2010 had been drawn to the artist behind the piece (and his intentions). Nevertheless, during our first meeting – for breakfast in an 'arty', 'green' café in Durban – he takes the time to also tell *me* his side of the story. He suggests, that he feels forced to institute legal proceedings, and emphasises that it was public artwork *commissioned* by the city in 2009, ahead of the 2010 FiFa World Cup. "If I let it be, the piece will simply be removed, there is little concern for the 'art', the artists' freedom of artistic expression". He adds later, "The pieces can't simply be modified, altered or destroyed at will". I experience Andries as an intellectual, keen to engage in sophisticated, philosophical discussions. 'Art', its vulnerability, needs to be defended, he makes clear. Sculpture also constitutes a form of ethical intervention. In the conversations we have he, time and again, establishes the 'meaning', the 'symbolism', the 'message' that he intended three life-size elephant to have. Their location on a narrow traffic island, emerging in their posture from the ground up, with the cars speeding past, is not ambivalent he makes clear. It is to this 'symbolism' that the artist ascribed to the elephants, and the (conflictive) interpretations that then followed, that I shall now turn.

The city commissioned Andries to produce the three life-sized elephant sculptures for a freeway island at the entrance to the city in 2009. Andries had previously also been commissioned for a series of public art projects by the municipality, and was hereby already a well-known figure in the local 'public art' scene[2]. The elephants were commissioned for what was reported to have been a total of R-1.5 million and formed part of an urban design project intended to upgrade the city's Warwick Triangle area in the run-up to the World Cup 2010. The flyover is one of the main entryways into Durban, geographically prominent in terms of linking places and travelled by many who take the N2 from the airport to the city. According to Andries, he

---

[2] Prior to 2010, Andries Botha had been commissioned for a public statue of Isaiah Shembe, which has since remained uninstalled as different factions of the church contested the rightful depiction of their prophet. Also, he has been commissioned to create statues of Nelson Mandela, John Dube and Dorothy Nyembe for the Ohlange Memorial Park, of which the statue of Dorothy Nyembe remains locked away at the city's Architecture Department, as an architect working for the Department told me.

received the commission specifically because of the environmental symbolism that the sculptures would have at this particular location. The area were they were to be located, had once been a swamp and the last place where elephants were allegedly seen to have roamed freely before the herds were driven out of the region by humans through the development of the port. As Andries remarks: "My proposal was the idea of an art work that begins to address, in a public space, various issues, such as environmental issues, issues of coexistence and intolerance" (Andries Botha quoted by Tiziana Casapietra, 2016). It is the special allure that elephants have, he argues, "that makes them such appropriate ecological ambassadors as we struggle to find new ways of dealing with, and for, the ailing environment" (Andries Botha quoted in Aberdeen, 2013).

In February 2010, just two weeks prior to completion, work on the sculptures was unexpectedly brought to a halt by the city, and word spread that the intervention was prompted through the regional chairperson of the ANC, Cllr John Mchunu. Mchunu was said to have driven past the sculptures and proclaimed that the three elephants were a symbol of the oppositional Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the ruling African National Congress's (ANC) long-time rival in the province. The elephants, as a symbol of the IFP, were therefore "not welcome in a city run by the ANC" – the argument went (Van Wyk & Pillay, 2010). Immediately, as journalists approached the first city officials about the matter, the argument was raised that due process had not been followed when the work was commissioned and the project had not been adequately discussed or approved by council (Broughton & Khumalo, 2010). Had the respective committees in the municipality even approved the controversial artwork that now neared completion? To Andries, the sudden interpretation of the piece as a symbol of the IFP, seemed to negate the very meaning that the municipality had initially ascribed to the project, i.e. the elephants as an "apolitical African metaphor for tolerance, co-existence and due consideration for a vulnerable eco-system" (ARCA Blog, 2011).

In order to protect the three elephant statues, Andries felt forced to take the matter to the Durban High Court. The case was brought against eThekwini Municipality and other parties, including KwaZulu-Natal's Minister of Arts and Culture (ibid). The aim was to secure the completion of the artwork, and to receive payment for the hours of work that he and his team had already invested. In the months that followed, a very vibrant and vocal advocacy group backed him, calling support for artistic freedom of expression. Public debates were held on numerous occasions to debate the matter; local newspapers reported meticulously on each judicial progress made; the Facebook group that was launched, '*Save the Durban Elephants*', witnessed an on-going growth in members; and a yellow-ribbon campaign was held at the site of the sculptures to show support for the artist and his 'battle'. Mook Lion – a Durban street artist and former student of Andries – made elephant screen prints appear in random parts of the city, from electricity boxes to

supermarket walls, a campaign he termed '*Still free*' (see Fig 4 at end of chapter).

1.1. Antagonising 'pasttimes'

Some residents were able to make only little sense out of the city's intervention in the completion of the piece. From them, critical opinion pieces regularly sparked off debates in the newspaper columns and in the Facebook group '*Save the Durban Elephants*'. These commentaries highlighted above all the startling ambivalence of the elephants' politicisation as a symbol of the IFP. As one comment read: "I am absolutely speechless! What next? Are we going to start shooting all our elephants so as not to upset the ruling party's trip to the game reserve?" Another suggested: "Paint them in ANC colours and it will be fine!!!???? Then say they are in memory of something political and all will be OK". Again others drew connections to the process of street name changes in Durban that had preceded the elephant debacle and how a symbolic emphasis had therein also been placed on heroic liberation efforts, in turn, partly lamented for having no "local meaningfulness". 'Moore Road' had been renamed 'Che Guevara Road'. With reference to this, a member on Facebook lamented: "The elephants are more in place in Durban than Che Guevara!!"

From a completely different perspective, other residents sought to destabilise the very *political affordances* that the elephants had already acquired over the course of the debate – suggesting that the range of concerns that were staged around the elephant statues, were not what should be addressed politically. "There are bigger issues you should be worrying about. Like the poor, the needy, the starving!!!!!!!!!!!!!!"– a comment in the aforementioned facebook group read. In a conversation I had with my field assistant at the time, he remarked: "I think, it is the same thing as with the street name changes. When I spoke to my father about this elephant debate the other day he said: "it is a *privilege*, that these people can concern themselves with such problems". He adds: "My father was saying that most people cant care about these things".

In the course of the court trial and the negotiations that accompanied the debacle, the Municipality proposed that the sculptures be removed or turned into the 'Big Five' so as to no longer resemble the symbol of the opposition party. As Michael Sutcliffe, then City Manager, suggested in an interview I had with him: the elephants were a *commissioned* piece of artwork and thereby the city retained the right to change the terms and conditions. As the protracted legal battle carried on for almost three years, the sculptures themselves progressively deteriorated. The wire holding the stone figures together was stolen at different times, the sculptures were being used as shelter during the night, and in May 2012 one of the stone elephants was smeared with red paint. It was suggested, that the objective was to portray a

'hunted' and 'poached' elephant with an amputated trunk (Mkamba, 2012). This act of vandalism took place only one week after '*The Spear'* painting had been defaced at the Goodman Gallery in Johannesburg. The painting had depicted South Africa's President Jacob Zuma in a pose reminiscent of Lenin with his genitals exposed. Latter had ignited a national and international debate on matters of race, freedom of expression and artistic rights in South Africa. The possibility thus exists, that whoever smeared the elephants in Durban with red paint, sought to establish a connection to 'the spear' saga.

Chapman (2010) describes in an article for the magazine *Mahala* – in a writing style reminiscent of both a critical opinion piece and a personalised blog entry – how he had heard that in the wake of President Zuma's 'spear saga' Durban's elephants had also been smeared with red paint. In an attempt to understand what had urged someone to do this act of vandalism, he went down to the site to 'experience' the artwork himself. It was a late night in Durban, a time of the day when it mostly the homeless that were roaming the inner-city streets. On his interpretation on why 'it' had been done, he writes:

> "He [who smeared the elephant] made the elephant bleed to give it life… more than to signify its death. In allowing the sculpture to bleed, the sculpture is no longer a sculpture, or a symbol owned by the IFP, contested by the ANC, or the intellectual property of the artist, or the physical property of the city that has paid a couple of million for it… the sculpture is an animal created by gee-oh-dee and owned by mother nature herself. Surely the blood is not the issue here. It is not the source of the fire, but the smoke signal."

A few days later, the Facebook group '*Save the Durban Elephant*' posted pictures of a sacrifice being laid down before the elephant with the amputated trunk, still smeared with red paint. For members of the Indian community in Durban, the elephant statue had acquired spiritual meaning and importance, a symbolism of Lord Ganesha, i.e. the Hindu deity in a human form but with the head of an elephant.

Opinions – as they were passed in street gossip, in conversations with councillors, with city officials – continued to differ on whether an official tender offer had been issued or not. "Or had Eric Apelgren [Head of the Municipality's Department for International and Government Relations] simply discussed the possibility of such a project with Andries, without the proposal having been formally tabled before the respective municipality committees?" one councillor questioned in a conversation with me. "That is the question we [the city council] are still considering". A 'lack of consultation' was the most frequent reason given for why city officials had failed to foresee that against the backdrop of the province's historical conflict between the IFP and the ANC, a sculptural portrayal of three elephants could invoke quite

disparate interpretations. As Carol Brown, a freelance curator in Durban[3], at the time repeatedly emphasises in conversations about the elephant saga; in comparison to Johannesburg or Cape Town, the city of Durban has no formal policy on the commissioning of public art works. As a consequence, tenders are often awarded to artists on an ad hoc basis and not seldom through the relationships to 'someone who knows someone'. This is exacerbated by the fact that numerous municipality departments are involved in the commissioning of statues and sculptures, and their frequently competing interests on the use of public spaces are implemented somewhat 'un-channelled'[4].

1.2. Contesting the city text

From the perspective of the ruling party, the elephant sculptures were seen as a threat to the symbolic hegemony of the ANC, i.e. a public artwork that drew into question whether Durban indeed was an unchallenged ANC stronghold, 'a city run by the ANC'. The sculptures were also perceived as a deliberate 'move' of the IFP that had the potential to open 'old wounds' from the years of internecine fighting between the two parties in the 1980s and early 1990s. The assumption that IFP officials in the city had played a role in the commissioning of the sculptures was interpreted as an act of resistance, a means of challenging the otherwise ANC-dominated transformation of the city's symbolic landscape. From the perspective of the ANC, the 'appearance' of the elephants constituted a form of counter-hegemonic 'claiming of space' by the IFP, which could then be used by the opposition as a vehicle for establishing power, or alternatively, for highlighting their lack of power. In this sense, it was not only the *significations* attached to the sculptures as such that became a matter of concern, but, in turn, also the meaning inscribed upon the *space* in which they were located (Johnson, 1995; Marschall, 2006). Put differently, the politics of the art project and the politics of the place could not be kept separate.

For those who critiqued the city's intervention, what was seen to stand behind the ANC's politicisation as an IFP symbol, was also the idea that a particular historical narrative was beginning to crystallise, what Rasool in his text defines as certain modes of "reading the 'nation', its people, its history" (Rassool, 2000: 1) and that this narrative needed to be 'secured' and circumscribed conclusively. At the time the elephant saga unfolded, the concerns voiced centred on the notion that 'the city text', to use Duminy's

---

[3] Carol Brown was Director of the eThekwini Art Gallery/Museum until 2006, who now works as a freelance curator in Durban. For six months during my fielwork, I rented a room in her home.

[4] As Carol Brown suggests, in the past, projects have fallen under the authority of the municipality's Department for International and Government Relations, the Architecture Department, the Durban Art Gallery and the local history museum.

(2011) terminology, was rapidly changing and that a particular reading of the past – centred around the ANC's liberation struggle – was in the process of being rapidly inscribed. It was in most cases pin-pointed in the commemorative street name changes that had begun a few years prior. In this sense, the elephant saga again *provoked awareness* for the conflictive continuation of preceding 'politics of signification'. Let me provide in detail a few such accounts.

When news of the ANC's intervention in the completion of the elephant sculptures was addressed in a meeting of the city council, IFP caucus leader Mdu Nkosi denounced the ANC's reaction as "ridiculous and childish". The municipality tabled the option of removing the sculptures completely, or turning them instead into the 'Big Five'. This meant changing the sculptures from three elephants to an elephant, a cape buffalo, a leopard, a rhinoceros, and a lion (Van Wyk, 2013). The IFP, objecting to this suggestion, proposed that one of the elephants be given to them and resurrected at the party's headquarters in Ulundi. Writing in a letter to the city manager, Nkosi argues:

> *Mdu Nkosi*: Our understanding is that the one elephant will be destroyed completely; which in our view will be a waste of resources and energy. We wish therefore to request that rather than destroying it, the eThekwini Council should kindly consider giving this one elephant to the IFP, for as you know elephants are part of the IFP public image. We are prepared to remove it from its current site to our Offices in Ulundi at our costs should we be allowed to have it (Nkosi, 2010).

The IFP never admitted to having a 'stake' in the commissioning of the sculptures, however when asking for one of elephants for their headquarters in Ulundi, it worked to legitimise the very symbolic meaning that the regional ANC had ascribed upon the sculptures – i.e. perhaps, the elephants could indeed be read as symbolic of their party. In a second dimension, the IFP in itself contributed to the politicisation of the sculptures, defining the ANC's intervention that brought the work on the sculptures to a halt, as an act of rekindling old animosities. Put differently, the position of the IFP was that if the elephants were indeed seen by the ANC as symbolic marker of the province's past and were for this reason removed, then it is a sign that the ANC still remains unwilling to fully reconcile the parties' past.

In mid February 2010, when President Jacob Zuma held his state of the nation address – an address always subsequently opened to a national assembly debate – an IFP Member of Parliament, Rev Musa Zondi, brought the controversy of the Durban elephants into a national arena and addressed this very point. He focused in his address to the national assembly on the 20-year historical milestone since Nelson Mandela's release from prison and the legacy of reconciliation that he had left behind (see Zuma, 2010). This had

been one of the main topics in President Jacob Zuma's speech and therefore Rev Musa Zondi framed his response as follows:

> *Musa Zondi*: It was inevitable, fitting and proper to also reflect on President Mandela's legacy of reconciliation and peace, which he bequeathed to present and future generations of South Africans, twenty years on. It is, however, most tragic that real and true reconciliation has eluded us in this country for various reasons. [...] This reconciliation which has eluded us for two decades after the cessation of conflicts of the past, does not only need to take place between white and black South Africans but also between and among black South Africans; and indeed between and among various political organisations that operate in this country.

> [...] It is for this reason that we read with horror that an ANC-controlled eThekwini Municipality which commissioned the erection of the sculpture of three elephants has now, after squandering millions of tax-payers' and rate-payers' funds, balked under pressure from those inside the ANC who now think it was not politically correct to have commissioned such a sculpture because they think it would bolster the image of the hated IFP whose logo has three elephants (Zondi, 2010).

In sum, it can be said that every act of official remembrance foregrounded on struggles of interpretation, on decisions of what memories should and should not be remembered and indeed any institutionalisation of a particular 'narrative' of the past is marked by acts of *damnatio memoriae* – the obliteration of particular memories. The decade of conflict between the ANC and the IFP in KwaZulu-Natal remains a period of history that is largely eclipsed from lasting forms of material culture (including statues, sculptures, commemorative sites, exhibitions). The 'collective memory' of the era (following Halbwach's (1992) understanding of the term) is largely preserved by repetitively drawing attention to the need to reconcile the past and to the ANC's practices of silencing accounts not aligned to the authorised narrative of the conflict. The conflict is thereby nevertheless institutionalised but through *repetitive* as opposed to *lasting* representations of history (Assmann, 2006: 238).

What accounts such as those of Rev Musa Zondi illustrate, is that the expressions of concerns went beyond these specific elephant statues, beyond what was readily observable. For those who stood behind Andries and critiqued the city's intervention, the 'elephant saga' was illustrative, once again, of the ANC's effort to inscribe a particular reading of the past. As Arthur Gammage, a member of the city's architecture department told me:

> *Arthur Gammage*: The problem isn't just with the elephants, it's generally about what we put up in cities, and what we take down. As you well

know Eva, it is not the first time that a statue has become contentious – there are many statues locked up in different storage rooms in this city. The arguments we had about the street name changes were about the same issue.

As suggested above, growing recognition is paid to that the ANC's effort to cultivate and symbolically inscribe in the city text "'prestigious' associations between themselves, their institutions and the popular memory of the anti-apartheid struggle, understood as a heroic liberation effort" (Duminy, 2011:2, see also Duminy, 2014; Marschall, 2003; 2006; 2009; 2010; 2012). An attempt, in other words, to create an 'uncontestable landscape'. If we follow Southall (2003: 129), the 'working' implied, is one of ascribing legitimacy to present-day political leaders, i.e. these then come to embody continuity with their predecessors, the 'liberators of the past'. 'Unwanted' memories are suppressed, and deliberate efforts are undertaken to 'airbrush' contradictions or ambiguities that potentially taint the image of the party (ibid; Duminy, 2014). In sum, what statues, sculptures, monuments, can be said to fashion, are, as Rassool (2000: 1) puts it, "the categories and images of the post-apartheid nation".

In the regional context of KwaZulu-Natal, a 'wall of silence' is to a certain degree built around the historical relations between the ANC and the IFP. The 'authorised version' of the past necessarily centralises the role of the ANC in the liberation struggle, 'obfuscating', 'blending out' the experiences and 'contributions' of other anti-apartheid groups and political parties. While such constructions happen 'from above', as Rassool (2000: 21) highlights, contestations that seek "to challenge or chip away at the dominant constructions" readily unfold 'from below' (see also Duminy, 2014). This was also the case in March 2012 when the ANC unveiled a Heroes' Arch in Empangeni, commemorating those who had been killed in political violence on KwaZulu-Natal's North Coast. The statue was only inscribed with victims of political violence who had been members of the ANC. In an address a month later, IFP President Mangosuthu Buthelezi identifies the act of memorialisation as a step against reconciliation, and questions in his speech "How can the President of this country lend authority to the lie that none of the heroes of our struggle were IFP?" (Buthelezi, 2012). Similar to this event, also on other occasions, members of the IFP have gone on to emphasise the ANC's lack of commitment to reconciliation with the IFP.

1.3. Questioning the confines of democratic transition

When I spoke with Michael Sutcliffe, who is the former city manager[5] of Durban and a prominent ANC member, he suggested that the elephant sculptures also brought to the forefront, beyond their association with the IFP

---

[5] Michael Sutcliffe was Durban's City Manager from 2002 until December 2011.

logo, far more general interpretations of the post-apartheid 'democratic revolution' that for many has remained a dream deferred. Sutcliffe immediately highlights in the first few minutes of our conversation, that when it comes to commemorative markers, conceptualised in the field of politics or the arts, that the vision of the unified nation still fundamentally clashes with the reality of a persistent divide between 'black' and 'white'. As he says with respect to the elephants:

> *Michael Sutcliffe*: I think there are two worlds – well, at least two worlds. One is a majority *black* world and one is a majority *white* world and unfortunately the two don't meet. The elephant debate was really about that – and Andries missed that point!

The elephant sculptures were not infrequently referred to as the 'white elephants' of Durban. On the one hand, this clearly alluded to the amount of public funds which had flown into the commissioning of the art piece and the ensuing court debacle, but on the other hand, it also drew attention to the fact that a 'white artist' had been permitted to construct a sculpture that was now perceived to be a 'landmark' of the ANC's regional opposition party. In this respect, it was the artist's *race* that led to the sculptures' controversial reception. Disregarding the artist's intentions, for some, the elephants came to reflect the 'tragedy' of post–apartheid South Africa, wherein expectations of socioeconomic progress have largely remained unmet and the national democratic revolution appears derailed. Sutcliffe, who was then still city manager, recounts from the negotiations that he had with Andries:

> *Michael Sutcliffe*: I said to him: 'with this thing – you are coming at the wrong time. People have died! And worst still, you are not putting yourselves in the shoes of those ANC councillors there who have grown up under terrible conditions of apartheid, still live under terrible circumstances. And you are saying 'its principle' – there is no *principle* involved here!' [...] Part of me after trying to deal with Andries, my own approach was 'lets just leave it [the statues unfinished] and use that as the basis for discourse'. A discourse that begins to talk about how you struggle that gap. Because until you at least have more equality in our country, more equality in our society, this is what happens!

What Sutcliffe means when he speaks of Andries' 'principle' is the reasoning Andries had given for instituting legal proceedings against the city. Sutcliffe suggests in his comment that little is achieved by appeals to "the democratic principle", "the rights of art and the artists" when the unequal power relations of the past continue to be felt so deeply in the present. For him, the underlying tenet of the elephant saga, as the quote above suggests, is that the sculptures had unintentionally brought about an association with the logo of the IFP, which gave the artist's act of inscription into the city's symbolic landscape a new meaning and which, in turn, evoked deeply embedded memories and

feelings of apartheid generated grievances and the subsequent civil war years in KwaZulu-Natal. "People have died!" he emphasised again.

Remarkable about Sutcliffe's account, is that he sees in the elephants an opportunity for engagement "about how you struggle that gap" – i.e. as a possible means to intervene and to shift existing conflicts and tensions into another register of engagement. At the time, I understood this expression as in part being contra to the regional ANC's party line and the statements that also Sutcliffe himself had made during his term as City Manager. His suggestion was here to make the issues, public concerns and the controversies articulated in response to the elephants, the *object* of politics. Sutcliffe appears to see in public art the opportunity for a register of expression that, sitting beside the more conventional framings and sites of political debate, enables a form of disentanglement from the 'here and now'. In this understanding, sculptures become a more abstract entity with reference to which the complexity of issues prevalent in the setting can be teased out. If we follow Marres (2013: 23) further, the second dimension of what is brought about, is that the articulation of issues becomes *situated,* and the political engagement with the 'matters of concern' is made *doable,* "inside the very environments that animate them" (see also Marres, 2012). (To this idea, I return at length below).

Sutcliffe's account further illustrates a point that was also discernible in a few commentaries by others, namely, that as part of the distinct political meaning of the artwork that was being fabricated, struggle rhetoric of 'unmet expectations' came to play a role. As one councillor for instance put it, "What these elephants tell me, is that the ANC needs to carry the struggle forth!" Sibu, the councillor I here spoke to, adds a few sentences further along: "Everyday we receive these *small signs* that we are still 'not yet there', that we need to continue fighting". The elephants were a 'sign' and a device through which to '*amplify*' as Marres puts it, issues and controversies, that have already been staged, that already transverse the setting.

1.4. ANC loyalty – the way things work politically

In the course of the controversy, the ANC regional chairperson, Cllr John Mchunu, who had driven past the sculptures and proclaimed that the three elephants were a symbol of the oppositional IFP, passed away. Also the former City Manager, Michael Sutcliffe, during whose time in office the elephant saga had begun, was no longer in office. So Cllr Mchunu had died and Michael Sutcliffe had vacated his position as City Manager. Themba Shibase, a Durban based artist and lecturer at DUT, emphasises that somewhat ironically, this was itself a factor in preventing the dispute between the parties from being resolved. He says:

> *Themba Shibase*: The thing here is 'loyalty' in the ANC. I mean, I can

imagine myself being an ANC councillor, and here we are in the council and have to vote on this thing. 'We don't even know what it is, but we know one thing, the late Chairman Mchunu objected to this thing – he must have objected for a good reason! We can betray him by reversing his objection, or we can honour him by keeping this objection alive'. The ANC that I know would use that kind of reasoning!

A few days later, I meet with Cllr. Tex Collins, the Head of the Democratic Alliance at the time. He makes a similar point to the art lecturer, Themba Shibase, about 'what was at stake'. An initial politicisation through Cllr John Mchunu had occurred, however the public had rendered the argument absurd. The reason the matter could not be 'dropped', was for this was not "how things worked in Durban's city council". He draws a parallel to the street name changes in Durban. "These are both things", he argues, "simply being pushed through". He adds, once Cllr Mchunu had intervened and called a halt to the completion of the three elephants, "there was little that could be done to alter the city's 'take on the matter'". As he says:

> *Tex Collins*: The chairperson of the ANC in the province, John Mchunu, happened to be driving past one day in his big black four-wheel drive vehicle, saw what was going on, jumped out of his car, had a hissy fit, and came into the office. He was no longer a councillor then, so really he had no authority in the council. But because he was big man in the ANC, he was able to influence the decision and work stopped immediately [...] John Mchunu was a big man, he told these guys 'This is the way we will vote', and they voted. It is as simple as that!

1.5. The compromise – a 'fourth' elephant rises

It was not until February 2013 (two years later) that an out of court settlement was reached and the artist agreed to resume work, and to construct an additional elephant to the existing three. Four elephants, it was suggested, would no longer bear direct resemblance to the logo of the IFP. In May 2015 (six years after being commissioned), the four elephants at Warwick triangle were unveiled. At the time when Andries begun reconstructing the previous three elephants that had partly been destroyed and publicly announced that a fourth would be added, he also re-articulated the elephants' *initial framing*. As one newspaper quotes him saying:

> *Andries Botha*: The fourth elephant…will be free-standing and rise from the ground. It will be surrounded by three elephants (emerging from) the ground in different poses. (The sculpture symbolises) the rebirth of elephants. Historically, elephants roamed this area before they were killed by hunters (Andries Botha quoted in Dawood, 2014).

A fourth elephant begun to rise amongst the existing three, and with this, the 'elephant saga' in Durban drew to an end.

In the following, I want to turn attention to two other sculptures produced by Andries, the King Shaka statue at King Shaka International Airport and a statue of John Langalibalele Dube, commissioned to stand at the Dube Tradeport. As done here in an account of the elephant saga, the objective is to explore what makes particular statues contentious. I draw inspiration from Marres (2013) to consider how statues and sculptures come to occasion (or do not occasion) the explication of concerns. That is to also say, in what manner do statues and sculptures come to constitute devices for the enactment of controversy and deployable for the articulation of issues? (ibid).

2. King Shaka

Before South Africa hosted the FIFA World Cup 2010, a new airport was built 35 km north of Durban's city centre in order to handle the expected rush in tourist numbers. The new airport was named after King Shaka, the founder of the Zulu Kingdom, and a larger-than-life bronze statue was commissioned to commemorate the name-giver. Andries Botha received the commission for a total of R3.2 million. The finished statue would depict King Shaka standing amongst two Nguni cows in a contemplative pose, his shield and spear resting against a mound on the ground. According to Andries, this specific pose and representation deliberately sought to question and challenge the clichéd interpretations of King Shaka as a "blood thirsty dictator" and "noble savage", representing him here as a "complex and nuanced philosopher King" (see Fig 5).

Erected between the arrivals terminal and the pick-up zone, the statue was unveiled in May 2010 as part of the airport's official opening ceremony. President Jacob Zuma delivered a speech at the unveiling, in the presence of King Goodwill Zwelithini (the reigning Zulu Monarch), Mongusuthu Buthelezi (President of the IFP), Zweli Mkhize (then Premier of KwaZulu-Natal), and a series other official dignitaries. President Jacob Zuma (2012) addressed the audience in his inaugural speech:

> *Jacob Zuma*: Your Majesty, Distinguished guests,
>
> The sculpture of King Shaka that dominates the public park deserves a special mention. This is not only because of its majestic presence, but also because of the interpretation of the essence of the founder of the Zulu nation. For too long, we have allowed the historical image of King Shaka to be viewed within the colonial mind-set. King Shaka was a strategic thinker, able to position the African philosophy around the

idea of nationhood. The airport is therefore very appropriately named after this master strategist and pioneer (see official transcription, Zuma, 2011).

A few weeks after the ribbon-cutting ceremony, news reached the airport that the statue must immediately be removed. The representation of King Shaka was reported to have caused a stir with the Zulu royal family. The King had said the features made the Zulu King look more like a "herd boy" rather than the fierce hunter warrior that he was (Khumalo, 2010; Mdletshe, 2010; Van Wyk, 2010).

Even though King Goodwill Zwelithini had been present during the formal unveiling, he had returned a few days later to question the interpretation of the artist. Prince Mbonisi, the spokesperson for the King told journalists; "King Shaka would never look like a young boy looking after cattle. He is the King of the Zulus!" (*The Independent*, 2010). The statue was quickly removed from the site, with the two cows however left standing. It was announced that a new statue would be commissioned, one that would more accurately capture the 'heroic qualities and legacies' of Shaka (Attwood & Hlongwane, 2011). A commission was formed to deliberate over the remodelling of the statue, and which was due to consult with leading academics, historians, King Zwelithini and senior members of the Zulu royal family. As the Premier put it: "A team has been appointed to receive inputs and finalise the sculpture. This team, which includes academics, will work with the sculptor in order to improve on the existing work and also add on features of historical significance" (West, 2010). Andries declined an invitation to be part of these efforts in conceptualising and designing the new statue. "I told the premier I did not think my presence would help the process he was trying to engineer, because of the complexity of political perceptions of the artwork, and notions of ownership and nationalisation" (Andries Botha quoted by Attwood & Hlongwane, 2011).

2.1 'Zuluness' – past and present

In late 2011, the Premier's Office announced that Peter Hall, another of KwaZulu-Natal's internationally acclaimed artists, had been chosen to complete a new statue, this time depicting the King standing on a raised plinth, elevated, his spear held high and adorned by a towering blue crane feather – a symbol reserved for Zulu royalty (Attwood & Hlongwane, 2011). This depiction of Shaka as proposed by Hall, resembles strongly a drawing made by the European settler, Lieutenant James King, and published in his diary in 1836. Andries makes clear in one of our conversations that he had critically considered this very illustration of King Shaka by James King, but

viewed it as forming the basis for clichéd readings of King Shaka that his artwork had sought to deconstruct. The manner in which his design went hand in hand with a different reading of Shaka was laid out in his submitted proposal at the time. Now it became the blueprint for the newly proposed statue. What might therefore appear as a rather surprising demand by the present monarch, namely to reconceptualise the statue in agreement with an inherited, white-settler 'portrayal' of Shaka, can also be framed as a deliberate politicisation of the statue as part of the King's struggle for political legitimacy.

The initial politicisation of the statue was suggestive of the King making himself 'be heard' as well as through his critique questioning or objecting to the dominant role played by the ANC in defining dominant, legitimatory constructions of the past. For this interpretation, it is important to consider that since the early 1970s, King Zwelithini has largely been stripped off his executive political powers and has acted as a largely symbolic, yet undeniably significant, political figure. While the King's constitutional role remains clear, he is a popular topic of public debate, fuelled in particular by regular newspaper headlines that report on his lavish spending of state funds[6]. In the face of these critical debates about his function and role, Zwelithini's successful call to remove the King Shaka statue once again highlighted his political assertiveness and made evident that he continues to be a powerful agent when it comes to defining the meanings of present-day 'Zuluness'.

Surprising however, as public opinion pieces and the chitchat on the streets made clear, was the *ease* with which the King was able to ensure the removal of the statue. As the then head of the oppositional *Democratic Alliance* (DA) in Durban, Cllr Tex Collins, said to me, expressing his bewilderment and discontent: "The Zulu King, he is not my King – lets be perfectly honest! He doesn't earn a single cent himself, he is paid for entirely by the citizens of KZN and his finances are always in a complete disarray". He asks me with a tone of irony: "So if he says 'I don't like the statue!' then the process is simply: 'Take it down!'? Is there nothing more to it?"

The counter argument, in turn, was that it was precisely the fact that the King had stepped forth on such a seemingly mundane issue – in other words, 'a statue' in comparison to more pressing political matters – that largely ensured that his intervention received sufficient recognition. Themba Shibase, the art lecturer at DUT, explains it slightly differently to me:

---

[6] The provincial government controls the Royal Financial Household, with allegations being made in 2013 that Zwelithini, who hails from President Jacob Zuma's home province, receives preferential treatment in comparison to the other provinces' Kings. In 2012, the budget for KwaZulu-Natal's Royal Household Department was reported to have been R35- million. This budget is allocated for the King's own monthly allowance, the living costs of his wives, his children's school fees as well as the general maintenance of his palaces (Evans, 2013).

> *Themba Shibase*: The work was commissioned by the provincial government, yet *uShaka* is the heritage of the Zulu nation and the Zulu Monarch. [...] Obviously you can't allow Zulu history, Zulu culture and so forth to be assimilated by provincial government because then people start doubting "what is your role?"

Themba also tells me of a very symbolic act that had occurred, which seemed had sneaked passed the media. Andries had made a series of long feathers in bronze that he had given in a beautiful wooden casing during the inauguration – one for the Premier, one for the President, one for the King. When the Royal House made the call to have the statue removed, the Premier immediately returned the gift that he had already accepted. Here Themba highlights:

> *Themba Shibase*: The reason being, anything that has to do with Shaka, obviously needs to be ok'ed by the King! If you cross the King, even though he does not have that much political power, if he denounces you as a relevant person to the Zulus, it could end your career. [...] So that is how much these politicians are playing cautious around upsetting the Zulu monarchy, or not upsetting him. They are very cautious. They will jump to the tune of the King.

Zwelithini's intervention was read as an act that sought to make explicit the role of the Zulu monarchy as the present-day most 'authentic guardian' of 'Zulu culture'. If one explores in detail how individual occurrences unfolded, it becomes apparent that a) the King had responded directly to what President Zuma had said in his inauguration speech, namely that the statue was about commemorating "the essence of the founder of the Zulu nation" (see Zuma's quote above); also, b) he directly appealed to the 'Zuluness' of those who had endorsed the commissioning of the statue – in this case the Premier of the Province, Zweli Mkhize, and President Jacob Zuma and c) he referred back to President Zuma's speech in which latter had said "this statue has a majestic presence". King Zwelithini was hereby able to lend his claim relevance by making direct reference to the very physical presence, materiality, of the statue. Interpreted in simplified terms, the articulation of 'what was at stake' drew directly on what had been said, and the relevance that the President had ascribed to its location – i.e. since the President has testified to the significance of this statue and its location, then this is all the more reason that the statue must represent Shaka 'correctly', as 'the King of the Zulus', the 'fierce warrior' that he was.

The statue hereby became susceptible to a re-signification on the basis of its aesthetics. Uniting all three points (*a, b, c above*) is the fact that Zwelithini through is intervention appeals to the 'Zuluness' of the ANC leadership – explicating an issue/a controversy that has come to transverse political settings in various ways beyond the immediacy of the Shaka statue. Particularly since President Zuma's election as ANC President in the 2007

Polokwane race against Thabo Mbeki, appeals to 'Zuluness' have gained new political significance. Zuma had, in his first election as president – and to a lesser degree also in the course of his 2013 re-election – based his campaign on the claim to 'undiluted Zulu heritage', neatly encapsulated in the "100% Zulu boy" t-shirt slogans that thousands of his supporters wore (see Moya, 2006).

These different dimensions illustrate that politicisation of the statue did not derive from its initial framing: instead, it acquired its distinctive capacities over the course of its instalment, the speeches that were held and the references that were made to it (Marres, 2013; Dewey, 2005 (1934)). Zwelithini called for the statues' removal on the grounds that it did not represent King Shaka in a regal manner and for being commissioned without consultation with the Royal Household. The 'workings' of the Shaka statue were then in part due to the popular resonance of Zulu nationalist discourse within the ANC since Jacob Zuma's rise to power – this managed to provoke amongst some of the actors implicated, a response/a demonstration of loyalty towards the monarchy. The new King Shaka statue that is to be commissioned will not significantly alter the meaning of what is to be remembered, but highlights *who* is ordering *what* to be remembered, and *who* opposes it. At a time in which an overlying policy to 'Africanise' South Africa's symbolic landscape is perceived to unfold, with the objective to inscribe narratives of the past previously written out of the official historical record, Zwelithini's intervention served to question the dominance of the ANC in the official memorialisation of the past [in German: *die alleinige Definitionsmacht des ANCs*].

The statue of King Shaka that was removed has been placed in storage. While the new statue of King Shaka is being conceptualised anew, the two cows that formed part of Andries' artwork remain standing outside the terminal building. Andries has repeatedly asked that also the cows now be removed. As a newspaper article reports him saying: "I waited patiently and asked them, in a positive light, to remove the balance of the sculpture because, in its current state, it violates the integrity of the work". He adds: "Constitutionally no one can *deconstruct* a work of art" (Andries Botha quoted by Mbonambi, 2012 – emphasis added).

I discussed the dispute around 'Shaka' with another Durban artist, who in turn emphasised "Well, it seems to me quite clever to take Shaka and leave the cows standing. Everyone knows something was there, and with the media making such a frenzy, everyone also knows *what* was once there". This 'preserves' the politicisation that unfolded, for a while longer – and 'preserving' the message that King Zwelithini's intervention carried with it. The journalist also wrote, that he had asked Andries whether he would consider taking legal action against the parties involved. Andries responded: "This is hectic because it has been politicised. Being an Afrikaner and taking the Zulu monarch to court, who is that gonna benefit? There's much better ways to resolve the matter" (Andries Botha quoted by Ndaliso, 2010).

2.2 Size and details matter

Some of the 'workings' of the King Shaka statue can also only be explained by considering its technical features and the norms upheld as 'proper features' of a statue depicting a historical figure. The Royal Household had argued that with the first statue standing 'un-elevated', Shaka looked like a young boy looking after cattle. The second statue to be made by Hall, in turn was announced as depicting the King standing on a raised plinth, elevated, his spear held high. Marschall (2009) makes an interesting point about the effect that the policy of 'balancing historic memory' – pursued as mechanisms of reconciliation and nation-building – has had on the *form* of post-apartheid statues, i.e. meaning both their design and the materials used. She argues that the intention to effectively 'counter' the colonial and apartheid narratives symbolically inscribed in the landscape through new commemorative markers "prompts those who initiate such responses to insist on similarity and correspondence of design" (ibid: 264). In other words, the installation of bronze statues, often criticised as being based on a Eurocentric model and western notions of monumental design, become, as an act of 'mimicry', "an integral and necessary part of their meaning within the framework of their intended ideological purpose" (ibid.). From this perspective, the decision to cast a larger-than-life sized bronze statue of King Shaka already can be read as stemming from such emulative intentions. Equally the emphasis placed on the 'height' of the statue, can be interpreted in this vein. As my field assistant at the time fittingly remarked: "How often do you see Queen Victoria standing on the ground? Do you ever?" Here he made reference to the statue of Queen Victoria that stood just outside of Durban's City Hall, on an elevated plinth.

At least a few actors who had become implicated in the controversy around the Shaka statue, were aware that a similar 'case' had unfolded 2005 – for some, the statue therefore attracted attention for the attendant issues were connected. The controversy had been around a statue of King Dinuzulu, erected across from a statue of General Louis Botha in central Durban. In March 2005, a newspaper article written before the statue of King Dinuzulu had been installed, read:

> "The imposing statue of General Louis Botha, the first prime minister of the Union of South Africa, at the corner of Berea Road and Warwick Avenue in Durban, which was to be removed to give way to a "more acceptable" heroes' monument, has been spared in a gesture of reconciliation. Instead, a new statue of the Zulu king Dinuzulu will be erected next to it - to recognise "great icons" of KwaZulu-Natal who were pitted in bloody wars 100 years ago" (Khumalo, 2005).

The statue of King Dinuzulu, produced by Peter Hall was then erected in 2006. It stood under wraps for two years with a security guard stationed next to it because political squabbles prevented an official unveiling. A few councillors from the eThekwini municipality had allegedly prevented the statue from being unveiled for the statue of King Dinuzulu was shorter than that of Louis Botha's, which it faced (*Times Live*, 2010; Marschall, 2010). In 2008, it was then publicly installed. That is to suggest, with respect to the King Shaka statue at the airport, that the politicisation occurred with the 'ease' that it did and the statue acquired the affordances that it did, in part, due to the apparent similarities with other incidents. Issues and concerns were able to be articulated by actors through 'connections' beyond what was readily observable. That is to say, ties were established to other contexts and the issues and controversies latent therein (Marres, 2013).

3. John Langalibalele Dube

The statue of John Langalibalele Dube was a third statue by Andries Botha. In March 2012, not long after the controversy around the King Shaka statue had unfolded, it was to be installed only a few hundred meters bee-line away from the terminal building, in front of the Dube TradePort offices[7]. I had on a few occasions met with Richard Jordan, "in charge", as he put it, "amongst other things, for the integration of public art into the development of the Dube TradePort". It was through Richard Jordan and Andries that I was made aware of the Dube statue and its upcoming unveiling, an event that, despite the controversy unfolding around the Shaka statue, had not been made public to any great degree. The unveiling would form part of the official opening of the Dube Tradeport, i.e. a 'side-event' thereof. I accompanied Andries and his team on a late afternoon for the installation of the statue. They were alone at the site – no press, no officials. A few days later the official unveiling followed. The installed bronze statue depicted John Dube standing next to a table. Next to the table, stood a chair on which the viewer of the artwork could take a seat. On the table lay a book, its pages open and Dube's fingers complacently next to it, as if he had just engaged with the book or was about to engage with it. Embodied in the piece was not one-sidedly Dube as a founding President of the ANC, but also the educationist, author, newspaper publisher and intellectual that he had been (see Fig 6).

---

[7] Dube TradePort is home to the King Shaka International Airport, which was officially opened ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. The TradePort includes the Dube Cargo Terminal, Dube TradeZone, Dube TradeHouse, Dube AgriZone, Dube City infrastructure and an IT and telecommunications platform, Dube iConnect. It is a public-private partnership.

3.1 Narrating the nation through its heroes

President Zuma was present during the official ceremony, as was Zweli Mkhize (then Premier of KwaZulu-Natal), Michael Mabuyakhulu (MEC for Economic Development and Tourism) and a few other high-ranking government officials from the province. Members of the Dube Family had also been invited. The speeches that were held primarily made mention of the key strategic reasons behind the Dube TradePort, envisioning the TradePort as a hub that would in the near future serve as southern Africa's premier logistics platform. In his address, President Zuma establishes the following connection to the name giver:

> *Jacob Zuma*: The Dube TradePort has appropriately been named after a man who symbolises success. He expressed eloquently his vision for the regeneration of Africa. He said he was longing for that day: „When the sunshine of a new civilization shall rise upon a land teeming with commerce, where upon every hill top shall be seen the school house and the church, when indeed Africa will be a nation among nations (see official transcription, Zuma, 2012).

The speeches by the other dignitaries provided similar accounts of Dube. The present was being narrated through one of the great lives of resistance and liberation. A change in subject matter was somewhat brought about with the critical tone of Zanami Jali, the chairperson of the '*John Dube Foundation*'. He remarked first, triggering short laughter in the audience rows, that "The ANC has made a 'full circle' in 100 years. It has come from J. D. to J.Z." He adds that he had previously said to another member in the audience that "Maybe 'Z', being the last letter of the alphabet, it is [now] the end". He pauses, and for a moment it was not clear how he meant it. Then he continues "And he [the other man in the audience] said 'No, no no! Every end, brings about a new beginning!'" With a slight change in tone, he assures the audience: "And I believe that is where we are now after one hundred years, we are at a stage where we are faced with *challenges* of a *new beginning*. As they say: 'A *new* day, *new* opportunities'.

He continues with his speech.

> *Zanami Jali*: We are now realising, to a very great extent, Mafukuzela 's dream. I don't know if all of us here know what 'Mafukuzela' means. That was John Dube's nickname, which means it is 'somebody who is indulging in futility'. It is because he was a daydreamer [PAUSE] and that is the best way to dream. Because daydreams, you can get up and realise them. Night dreams, sometimes you wake up and you have forgotten what you have been dreaming about. [LONG PAUSE] I hope that [...] all the people of goodwill, who *are* concerned, or *have to be* concerned with the legacy of John Dube, will be called 'daydreamers' too. In other words, they *aren't going* to try and act small.

In sum, the speeches each made their reference to the figure of John Dube, looming large as one of the most important figures in South African history. What did he stand for, how does his quest translate to the present – with reference to the TradePort, the ANC, the state of the nation. Little mention was therein made of the statue that stood, still draped, next to the elevated podium for the speakers. The artist's name was also never mentioned. A little later, I noticed that Andries had taken the decision not to attend the event. The statue was unveiled, President Zuma and other dignitaries sat on the bronze chair and the press photographers took pictures. A buffet was opened inside the adjacent office buildings. The statue passed unpoliticised.

4. What statues provoke

"Public art in South Africa today often consists of commemorative art promoted as 'heritage' and installed in pursuit of specific socio-political goals such as reconciliation and nation-building" (Marschall, 2010: 77). This is not only the case in South Africa. For societies undergoing a fundamental socio-political change, the era of transition is often marked by the desire of the new governing elite to iconoclastically bring about a 'new beginning' by radically removing symbolic reminders of the old order. Marschall (2009; 2010) has argued that due to South Africa's negotiated transition of power (rather than a violent revolution) and the idealism associated with the 'rainbow-nation' image in the early years of the post-apartheid era, the government has largely refrained from taking radical measures against existing monuments and statues. Rather than pursuing a radical iconoclasm, the primary concern lay with "balancing the symbolic markers inherited from the previous era, validating the memories, experiences, heroes and narratives of those previously written out of the historical record" (Marschall, 2010: 81). "A multicultural adjustment of a monocultural artistic landscape", as Marschall (ibid: 80) fittingly puts it.

As discussed already above, what is seen to be forged through new statues, monuments, heritage sites as well as state-commissioned art in public spaces is a particular reading of the past – i.e. a compelling 'foundational myth' or 'master narrative' which involves the selective remembering and the invention of usable pasts in order to define the beginning of the new order. Commemorative markers visually represent, officially endorse, preserve and solidify a particular narrative that, in turn, works to control and guide people's perception of the contemporary socio-political order. The question of *whose* version of history is institutionalized, is, after all, always an explicitly political one (Glassberg, 1996: 11). In the South African context, the argument has been put forth that since the end of the 1990s, the idealism that was initially associated with the rainbow-nation image has begun to fade, the term itself has lost currency, and has been replaced by a more assertive push for transformation (Marschall, 2010, see also Baines, 2007; Bundy 2007). The

notion of a rainbow nation continues to be important, is still employed in state theatrics, but has at the same time – to borrow a term from Maré – been "peripheralised into the obviousness" whereby it continues to exist, mostly in a superficial and relatively meaningless manner (2000: 181).

Marschall (2009; 2010: 90) and Baines (2007) suggest that underpinned by "the fading of the rainbow and the rise of Africanists within the ANC", symbolic markers of the post-apartheid nation increasingly centre on a grand-narrative of the ANC's struggle for national liberation. This has become, as Burns (2006) puts it, the 'foundation myth' for the new South Africa. Rassool (2000: 1), who deliberately highlights that a multiplicity must still be seen as characteristic of a so-called 'foundation myth', equally points to the manner in which certain readings have begun to crystallise as the "chief modes of reading the 'nation', its people and its history". The transition has been reduced to a single event – and the liberation through the ANC has come to mark the break from past oppression. "The 'miracle' of the new South Africa and the demise of apartheid", Rassool (ibid) writes "have been made possible by the 'wisdom' of heroic leaders, and especially by the 'special magic' of Nelson Mandela".

Trotha (2004) speaks not of a national 'master narrative' but of a 'basic story' (also referred to as the 'basic narrative' or '*Basiserzählung*' in German). This Trotha defines as:

> "that construction of the history of a society and culture, which contains the dominating legitimatory construction of the past. In disputes over constructions of the past, the basic story is an inevitable point of reference. It is the benchmark of the collective political self-image of a society. Political identity must contain a model of the past. The basic story is the cultural and politically institutionalized version of this past" (2004: 2).

The 'basic story', according to Trotha, provides "the basic legitimation of the political system" and defines the "fundamental norms of political actions" (ibid)[8]. From the politicisation of the elephant statutes and King Shaka, and the manner in which the installation of the Dube statue, in turn, simply passed over, insights can also be drawn about the construction of a 'national basic story', or South Africa's new post apartheid foundation myth – i.e. the characteristics it seeks to magnify. Here, my objective is however a slightly different one. My intention in this final section is to take the 'foundation myth' or 'basic story' somewhat as a given premise. That is to say, in the multitude of responses and accounts that the statues and sculptures brought about, actors themselves emphasised with certainty their conviction that what

---

[8] For Germany after World War II, Trotha (2004: 2) proposes, the 'basic story' was one of National Socialism and the need to 'come to terms' with it. "People disassociated themselves from Nazism, while using it to explain, criticise and justify events in the present" (ibid). He thus terms it a 'basic story of separation' (*Basiserzählung der Abgrenzung*). See also Herz & Schwab-Trapp (1997).

commemorative markers work to do, is to inscribe particular, constructed readings of the past.

In the following I therefore do not seek to *delineate* South Africa's post-apartheid 'foundation myth' or 'basic story', but rather to foreground the *power* that historical narratives (already inscribed or in still being inscribed) are seen to exercise. That is to say, I want to attend to the *affordances* of sculptures, statues and monuments, as these come to be understood as inscriptions of a manufactured historical narrative. I draw on pragmatism, on John Dewey and his book '*Art as Experience*' (2005 (1934)). I also consider the writings of Noortje Marres who equally draws upon the ideas of the pragmatists and extends them. In a text on the environmental art installation, Nuage Vert, produced by the English-German collective '*HeHe*', she considers the affordances of art projects for the articulation of issues.

4.1 Inscription from above and experience from below

A dynamic literature has emerged around the political struggles that surround commemorative statues and more generally, 'art' in public spaces[9]. After the French Revolution, numerous statues of monarchs were defaced or demolished. In post-independence India, statues of Viceroys and British monarchs were removed and placed in Delhi's Coronation Park. With the fall of the USSR, the Yeltsin government removed the Lenins and Stalins and relocated them to monument parks (see McGar, 2015; Nadkarni, 2007; Palonen, 2008). Focusing on statues, sculptures and monuments in public spaces from the perspective that these contribute to a particular 'city text' (Thotse, 2010) or inscribe a particular historical 'narrative' (Baines, 2007; Burns, 2006; Marschall, 2009; 2010; Trotha, 2004) commonly leads to the assumption that controversies that unfold in their midst, are also primarily about questioning or contesting this narrative that the statue represents. That is, statues are politicised with the purposeful plan to rewrite history and to highlight the historical significance of something previously marginalised. Politicisations, in this reading, represent conflicting evaluations of the past and divergent visions of 'what' should be symbolically inscribed (Thotse, 2010: 174). From a pragmatist perspective, the argument goes that what in part remains underappreciated through this lens, is the *experience* of a given statue, i.e. not what it is 'meant to represent' but how actors become attached or detached based on their experiences of the evolving product (Strandvad, 2012: 163). This is a *process* extended in space and time.

As Dewey (2005 (1934): 1) writes: "When an art product once attains classic statues, it somehow becomes isolated from the human conditions under which it was brought into being and from the human consequences it engenders in

---

[9] For South Africa, these include: Deacon, 1998; Grobler, 2008; Grundlingh, 2001; Marschall, 2009; Nutall & Coetzee, 1998; Wakashe, 1994 and Witz et al., 2001.

actual life-experience". Statues no doubt have this 'classic status' of which Dewey speaks, for which they are then treated apart from how they are experienced. Dewey (2005 (1934): 2) adds: "When artistic objects are separated from both conditions of origin and operation in experience, a wall is built around them that renders almost opaque their general significance, with which esthetic (sic) theory deals". Dewey, in my reading, while writing on 'art', draws our attention to the fact more generally that the meaning of statues, as symbolic markers, is not fully pre-determined. When statues become the sites of active 'politicking' by different actors, significations embedded in everyday experience are rendered visible, which, I want to propose here, loosen our understanding of *what statues are* and the *affordances* they are ascribed. We are made to reconsider how they come to feature in processes of issue-articulation.

4.2 Marres: Art as issue articulation

Marres (2013) in a text entitled "*Who is afraid of the green cloud? On the environmental rendering of controversy*", explores the controversy that unfolded around the project 'Nuage Vert' – the projection of a large green laser cloud onto the emission smoke coming out of a power plant, installed first in Helsinki and then in Paris (see also Lury & Marres, 2015). This media art installation, she proposes: "occasioned the articulation of various issues having to do with energy, environmental change, and the place of the factory in public life". One of her central arguments is that in the multitude of accounts as to *what Nuage Vert is* and *what makes it special*, exists an "explication of concerns and controversies beyond what is already observable" (Marres, 2013: 5). The project "makes possible an enhanced expression of issues" (ibid).

To adopt such an approach is to assume a very particular relation between 'artistic work' and its 'interpretation'. Akin to Dewey's (2005 (1934): 9) understanding of art as a thing of ordinary experience, the proposition is that the meaning and significance of a given piece of artwork does not derive from its initial framing. Rather, as Marres argues, "Nuage Vert acquires its distinctive capacities *over the course* of the device's deployment" (Marres, 2013: 6; Dewey, 2005 (1934)). Marres goes on to argue that: a) the meanings of a given project prove resistant to easy, fixed interpretations. Because the features and capacities are not fully determined by the artwork itself, and it is capable of multiple interpretations, an 'under-determinacy' persists; b) it can be apprehended as a 'disturbance' by different actors in different way. Perceived as a disturbance, the artwork works to c) 'seduce', 'provoke' or 'force' actors to establish, explicate and define the wider context, and the issues and concerns latently present in these settings (Marres, 2013). Marres hereby provides the toolkit with which to explore empirically how the politicisation of a statue 'is not just about the statue'.

These three points (see a, b and c) developed in Marres' contribution, require a bit more elaboration so as to make sense of them. Let me discuss them with reference to the elephant saga I detailed above. *First*, (a) let me address the notion of 'under-determinacy'. Andries Botha's three elephants on the flyover at Warwick's Triangle were due to invoke a symbolism of human-environment relations. As Andries put it: "My proposal was the idea of an art work that began to address, in a public space, various issues, such as environmental issues, issues of coexistence and intolerance" (Andries Botha quoted by Tiziana Casapietra, 2016). The elephants were then perceived by the regional chairperson of the ANC, Cllr John Mchunu, as a symbol of the oppositional IFP for three elephants were also feature on the party's logo. The case of the elephants illustrates an argument that has been around since the 1980s, namely that "the features and capacities of technological devices, and in relation thereto also their political, normative capacities, are not fixed or a property inherent to these technologies. "It is only in, and as part of, specific practices and arrangements that technologies acquire their specific form and abilities" (Marres, 2013: 8; Bijker and Law; 1992; Bijker & Pinch, 2012; Suchman, 2007). The keyword is an 'interpretive flexibility' of artefacts (Bijker, Hughes & Pinch, 2012: xviii).

Second (b), is the notion of 'disturbance'. It was in the course of time that the elephants begun to infiltrate peoples' daily lives, were perceived as a 'problem' and begun to provoke responses. The elephants became visible, and critics begun to conclusively define the disturbance that these statues could bring about, when the ANC Chairperson, Cllr John Mchunum had declared that these elephants were a symbol of the IFP and thus "not welcome in a city run by the ANC". That is to say that 'disturbance' is here in part understood as being brought about by the installation of an artwork in a particular setting but much more about being established, defined and circumscribed as such by actors, *in practice*. The credo by Assmann & Frevert (1999: 49) is in this respect meaningful, namely that 'monuments are only kept alive through the attention that they receive'.

We can say that from the moment when Cllr John Mchunu lamented that the statues were a symbol of the IFP, the three elephants progressively came, to borrow a term from Marres (2012a; 2012b), 'charged' with a spectrum of 'issues'. The different commentaries around the elephant saga pointed out, amongst others, how race and identity had come to play a role, blacks and against whites. When Andries announced that he would institute legal proceedings, the elephants became the reference point in debates on the moral authority of artwork and artistic freedom of expression (see Andries Botha quoted in Tiziana Casapietra, 2016). Also, the long lasting conflict between the ANC and the IFP in the 1980s and early 1990s, the fragile process of reconciliation between these two parties was seen to be at stake. Lastly, others established links to the preceding controversy around the street name changes in Durban – where the new street names chosen and the alleged lack of public consultation, had been interpreted as a provocative statement of ANC's

political dominance. Hereby, the 'combustibility' of the political space in Durban itself became an issue.

The *third* point (c) that I draw from Marres' contribution concerns precisely the mode of operation, or the 'workings' of the work of art. Once perceived as a 'disturbance' or 'disruption', the elephants managed to 'provoke' a multitude of responses from different actors. These, Marres (2013: 13) suggests, explicate and perhaps even amplify, issues and controversies that are *already on going*. In relation to Nuage Vert, Marres speaks of a 'trial of explicitness' to describe the manner in which the project worked to elucidate its environment. Nuage Vert brought about 'a modification of the setting' –dyeing the emission cloud green which was previously simply grey or even barely visible. "In doing so", Marres writes, it helped "to clarify some of the rules, habits and behaviours that organise these everyday environments". Also, to bring about the art installation, a whole range of actors and regulations needed to be brought into alignment. The project, in turn, provoked these actors "to give an account of the wider environment in which the device is to operate, and of the type of relations and practices that organise and enable it". These clarified *features*, and indeed *issues*, that were already latently present, she explains.

Marres' argument can be tied to two strands of literature, namely the 'sociology of demonstrations' (of which Marres also makes mention) as well as Boltanski and Thévenot's 'sociology of critical capacity', whose central tenets I outlined in the introduction. Let me define in a few lines how her argument builds on these strands. The former is the school of George Ritzer and Harold Garfinkel. Both sought to make clear that "where social reality is violated" light is shed "on the methods by which people construct social reality" (Ritzer, 2000 (1983): 386). Interventions hereby render legible and apparent, according to Garfinkel, "the socially standardized and standardizing, 'seen but unnoticed,' expected, background features of everyday scenes'" (Garfinkel, 1967: 36, see also Kenneth, 2012: 89).

The second strand to which Marres' argument can be tied, namely the works of Boltanski and Thévenot's 'sociology of critical capacity', in turn provides the toolkit to make sense of actors' accounts that are provoked by the artwork. Marres terms this the "effects that it produces in others". As Honneth (2010: 377) explains: "The first step in their [Boltanski and Thévenot's] argument consists in the assumption that actors generally coordinate their action plans using their acquired competence to resort to moral conceptions that justify legitimate ways of social coexistence". Actors coordinate themselves with almost no critical reflection as long as there are no perturbations in their joint action. It is when so called 'unnatural situation' occurs – also discussed under the rubric of 'crises' or 'glitches,' – actors have to direct attention "toward hitherto routinely presumed cognitive and moral assumptions" (ibid.). Disruptions thereby render visible for the sociologist how actors come to engage with assumptions tied to the social order. Actors seek to establish anew a "mutual understanding of the moral norms that are to regulate the

legitimate expectations" (ibid: 378). What Marres (2013: 9) terms a 'trial of explicitness', Honneth captures similarly but in different terms. Moments of perturbation, he argues (ibid: 377), are marked by "a 'necessity of justification,' which regularly forces the members of society, faced with ever recurring crises, to disclose and defend their latent conceptions of order". To say that the initial politicisation of the elephants sparked a 'moment of perturbation' is a fitting description and, if considered closely, it is indeed more fitting than notions of 'disturbance' or 'disruption' for the uncertainty it produced was not *imminent*, readily 'at hand', but rather extended in time and space, itself contested and partial.

In sum, Marres (2013:) proposes that works of art, in her case Nuage Vert, can be understood as devices of issue articulation, in her case helping to "explicate the issues and controversies that transverse the settings of Helsinki and St Ouen". The insertion of Nuage Vert here "provokes actors to produce accounts of the setting, to account of it, a whole range of concern, potentialities and issues latent in these contexts become apparent" (ibid: 13). How does this understanding of specific artworks as devices for 'amplifying issues and controversies *already on-going*' relate to the political significance that Dewey (2005 (1934)) ascribed to art?

4.3 Dewey: art for defining common concerns

The central point expressed in Dewey's analysis of '*Art as Experience'* (2005 (1934)) is that if art is closely tied to people's everyday lives, that then it has a central role to play in any democracy. As Mattern (1999: 62) describes Dewey's vision: "A work of art expresses to people their common experience and shared histories and, perhaps, common concerns. Together, these have the effect of "integrating and reinforcing a group's identity by clarifying and reinforcing the meaning of group life" (ibid). As an example, Mattern mentions the AIDS quilt, initiated in 1987 in San Francisco as a powerful visual reminder of the AIDS pandemic. The quilt, he suggests, develops a common awareness of "shared interests, commitments and sentiments" (ibid). The artwork accomplished the task of bring about a communicative arena in which actors become "aware of their union with one another in origin and destiny" (Dewey [1934] 1980, 271). Mattern defines Dewey's understanding more specifically. He writes that in *experiencing* a work of art, the potential also exists for actors to see their lives in a new light, that actors may be forced to reconsider "accepted and sanctioned beliefs, assumptions, and practices". That is, by the artist here taking on elements existing in the world 'out there' and selectively reconfiguring them. The "function of art, has always been to break through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness" (Dewey, [1927] 1985). In other words, to allow actors "to see more clearly and more critically" (Mattern, 1999: 64).

Dewey sees art on the one hand as "forcing controversial issues into a public arena" and on the other hand also as fuelling the capacity for critical judgment Mattern, 1999: 65). This to him is the "moral function" of art. He suggests that art works "tear away the veils due to wont and custom" and "perfect the power to perceive" (ibid: 65). This understanding directly linked up with the political philosophy laid out in '*The Public and its Problems*' (Dewey, 1991 (1927)). Art, Dewey argues, has the capacity to promote awareness of 'matters of concern', to gather support and commitment necessary to address them, and with the potential to bring about a form of community-based political action. The shortcomings of Dewey's work, however, echoed the critiques also raised in relation to the '*Public and its Problems*', namely that he ascribed little room to conflict, negotiation, and contestation (see Mattern, 1999: 54).

Marres draws on Dewey's understanding. How then does her framing extend Dewey's ideas? Marres' work – that, I argue, carries forth a sociological commitment to moments of perturbation – centre-stages controversy and conflict. Nuage Vert, Marres (2013:2) argues, is an "artistic device for the enactment of controversy". She carries forth Dewey's notion that art allows for issues to be made public, and to define and address matters of common concern. The political capacities that Nuage Vert gained – and we can say the same for the elephants and the King Shaka statue – however did not derive from the artworks themselves and they were not determined by their initial framing. Rather they acquired these capacities over the course of their deployment, more specifically as acts opposition, resistance, and contestation unfolded in response to the project.

The second observation to which Marres (2013: 13) draws our attention is that works of art function as devices for "amplifying issues and controversies that are *already on going*" (emphasis in original). She writes with regards to the light installation of the green cloud: "It seems to me that Nuage Vert attracts controversy only insofar as it operates upon issues and controversies that already transverse the setting" (ibid). This is significant, for art is thereby ascribed a very specific capacity in processes of issuefication, at a particular stage, hereby as a mediator of *existing* controversies. The articulation of issues is seen as constituted by and dependent upon materialities, rather than as unfolding in an autonomous domain in and of itself. In the case of Nuage Vert, she makes clear, accounts of what the art installation 'is', went beyond what was directly observable. The project thus provided a particular occasion, wherein actors worked to tease out complexities and entanglements in which they had become implicated all along. It provided a 'deliberate occasion' for critical scrutiny.

The same can be said for the elephants and the King Shaka statue. The controversies and issues to which actors made reference were not limited to the then and there, i.e. to the immediate setting. The initial contestation of the artwork brought about an arena wherein on-going controversies could be judged. Therein, the respective statues featured as an artistic device through

which to enact and make legible fears and uncertainties that otherwise resist efforts of being defined. In other words, the artworks enabled particular affairs – otherwise complexly mediated and usually resisting efforts to be traced and defined – to be rendered legible. The difficulty of 'fixing' what the artwork 'is' and why it is significant, Marres argues, is itself crucial to its ability to render issues legible and knowable. "Precisely because it is impossible to stabilize the definition of the device itself, because it proves resistant to easy, fixed interpretations, [Nuage Vert] is able to seduce and force actors to explicate the wider context [...]" (Marres, 2013: 10). The 'under-determinacy' itself comes to define the capacity of explicating issues latently present (ibid, see also Bijker and Law, 1992; Suchman, 2007). Dewey had erased conflict, negotiation, and contestation from art, whereby it seems, it is the cacophonousness and controversiality of artworks that preceisly seems to define the affordances as devices for the articulation of issues (see also Marres, 2013: 2).

This pragmatist inspired understanding of art, in relation to publics and politics, can be situated with what has become known as a 'new sociology of art'. Those who ascribe to this school of thought, exhibit two primary characteristics, namely the aim is to explore questions of art and aesthetics, without a) inflating the status and importance of art – succumbing to somewhat idealistic and 'essentialist' understandings of artworks and by b) trying to avoid vague statements about the 'social determination of art', i.e. the 'gifted artist' and his/her representations of reality (Fuente, 2007: 410). Rather, a socio-material understanding is advanced whereby attention is called to the *work* of *artwork*. As Fuente emphasises, this means that artwork comes to be seen as "one of the actors involved in the drama of its own making". Artwork is fundamentally the result of a process (ibid: 421). Strandvad (2012) formulates the same idea slightly differently: the artwork, the 'product', comes to be seen an active participant in the very process of its development. "As networks are established around the evolving product, it becomes a mediator of the social relations which it is at the same time a product of" (ibid: 164).

What is underlined is that the artwork and the social relations that form around it are co-constitutive (Hennion, 2001). Drawing also an actor network theory, the suggestion is to explore "how artwork might do more than *contain* meaning" (emphasis mine). That means, also exploring in particular cases how the status of artwork is "altered from a passive container of meaning to an active participant" (Strandvad, 2012: 165; Fuente, 2007, 2010; see also Becker et al. 2006; DeNora, 2000, 2003; Molotch, 2003). I think it is possible, for instance, for the 'status' of the John Dube statue to change, i.e. for it to longer seem 'uncontroversial'. Any statue can attract one or more controversies, when seen as being in relation to something that is 'at issue'.

5. Concluding remarks: Post-apartheid statues and their spectacles

After the end of apartheid, the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) emphasised that symbolic reparations and restitutions needed be made in order to begin repairing the irreparable. This notion of 'symbolic reparations and restitutions' found its way into a range of practices, and had, "other than its obvious impact on rethinking heritage and monuments, for example, a particular impact on thinking about public space and public art" (Minty, 2006: 423). With 'symbolic reparations', the TRC meant measures that facilitate the "communal process of remembering and commemorating the pain and victories of the past" (2003 Report; quoted in Naidu, 2005, see also Minty, 2006). These are mechanisms aimed at restoring dignity, and include the creation of commemorative places, objects and public displays, as well as the renaming of streets and public facilities – efforts aimed at honouring the new heroes of the post-apartheid era. The TRC had a significant role to play in shaping the present-day significance ascribed to public space and public art. Public art gained significance for came to be seen as "a driver for social change", as having the "ability to reach broader groupings than is done by established arts institutions" (Minty, 2006: 424).

Rassool (2001) emphasises from the perspective of 'the rise of heritage' that "the ideological work of national identity formation, and the task of the creation of 'good citizens', are in some ways being shifted away from the schools to heritage institutions and mediums of public culture". It is in public spaces instead that attempts are being made to inscribe new historical narratives and to thereto "fashion the categories and images of the post-apartheid nation" (ibid: 1). Rassool makes clear that it is in public spaces that new histories are being formed and for this reason they require our empirical attention. They also provide an empirical occasion to explore how dominant narratives, with a tendency of 'coming from above' are being drawn into question, where contests unfold. Arenas develop around commemorative markers, wherein the "hierarchies of historical knowledge" are being challenged (ibid: 21).

Both Minty (2006) and Rassool (2001) point out – from the perspective of 'art in public spaces' and that of 'heritage' – that with a visuality akin to that of public spectacles, statues, sculptures, monuments, street names, etc. regularly become the sites of rigorous engagement around different challenges plaguing the post-apartheid nation. As Minty (2006: 438) suggests, it is due to the 'ephemeral nature' of a number of the artworks produced in recent years, that "a laboratory of thought" has come to emerge and for debate to unfold before new ideologies are inscribed into an already scarred landscape. Minty fittingly speaks of "valuable space for reimaginings" (ibid). Commemorative markers, the argument goes, perform concrete work in the political sphere. 'What' precisely is the object of public debate – so to speak, the 'issues at stake' – I want to again illustrate by detailing one last story of a politicised statue. In this final section, the focus moves from Durban to Cape Town.

From Durban, I told the story of one statue that was almost completed then veiled, another that was unveiled then removed, and a third that stands in peace. In Cape Town, more precisely at the University of Cape Town (UCT), the '*#RhodesMustFall*' protests took form in March 2015 and called for the removal of a bronze statue of Cecil John Rhodes that has stood on UCT's campus since 1934. In contrast to the accounts from Durban, here the fate of a long-standing statue was the source of controversy. Cecil Rhodes was one of the most prominent British imperialists of the 19th century, founded the nation of Rhodesia, the Beers diamond company, controlled the British South Africa Company and served as prime minister of the Cape Colony from 1890 to 1896. His statue has stood on UCT's Upper Campus for many years. It depicts Rhodes seated, overlooking the rugby fields and the middle and lower campuses, as well as much of the city and the Cape Flats.

5.1 #[It] must fall

Much of the controversy has revolved around the figure of 'Cecil Rhodes'. But, as many commentators on the movement noted from the start, "Rhodes himself is not really central to its [the movement's] aims" (see Chaudiri, 2016). The protest group declared itself "a collective movement of students and staff members mobilising for direct action against the reality of institutional racism at the University of Cape Town". The campaign for the statue's removal attracted a great deal of attention, both nationally and internationally. A wider movement grew, calling for a "decolonisation" of education. It inspired allied student movements, at universities in South Africa but also in other parts of the World. For instance, a parallel '*#RhodesMustFall*' campaign was founded at Oxford University, which called for the removal of Oriel College's statue of Cecil Rhodes. At other universities across the globe, students called attention to the colonial legacies of great seats of learning. In late March 2015, the statue of King George V, which stands in front of the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) in Durban, was splattered with white paint, and a sign attached to it reading "end white privilege"[10].

So what happened at UCT? The first protest occurred on 9 March 2015 when a student, Chumani Maxwele, threw human excrement at the statue of Cecil Rhodes. The bucket of faeces sought to draw attention, one newspaper argues, to the harsh lived realities of many black communities from which UCT students also hail (Kessy & Boonzaier, 2015). "As black students we are disgusted by the fact that this statue still stands here today as it is a symbol of white supremacy", Maxwelle himself had argued (Maxwelle quoted by Bester, 2015). "How we can be living in a time of transformation when this statue still stands and our hall is named after [Leander Starr] Jameson, who was a brutal

---

[10] Other statues whose removal were discussed in response to the events at UCT were the Paul Kruger statue in Pretoria's Church Square and that of Jan Van Riebeeck in Cape Town.

lieutenant under Rhodes?" (ibid.).

Mobilising for a mass meeting in the early stage of the campaign, the movement wrote on Facebook:

> *#RhodesMustFall*: The statue is only a single object that represents the colonial narrative we have been forced to accept. Its removal thus represents the narrative that has been buried beneath the violence of the institutional culture at UCT. This meeting is to tell UCT that when we remove the statue we are going to excavate the entire narrative that they have tried to bury. The truth of this country's history and epistemologies is buried between the pages we read, buried between the hands of our mothers and fathers that toil on the grounds of the university, farms, mines and homes".

In meetings, the student movement gave a sense not only of passion, articulacy and charisma but also a sophisticated and searing political critique. Not necessarily all adopted a democratic logic however. As Hodes (2015) recollects in her article in the *Daily Maverick*, one speaker reminded the crowd during a meeting, that the land on which UCT stands had been donated by Rhodes "in a contract drawn in blood". The only legitimate proposal, in turn, to confront the crimes of the past, is that his name be "blotted from the history books". While many statues have been debated publicly before, and while debates of whether to take down that which was once sacred to the colonialists, have unfolded on numerous occassions, the '*#RhodesMustFall*' campaign was somewhat unique for the a high level of intellectual debate, specifically on 'social change'. The larger ambitions of the movement were articulated with great clarity (see also Kros, 2015: 151; Kessy & Boonzaier, 2015) – in other words, the 'issues' to which the movement has been committed.

The debates all too quickly made clear that the student-led protest was not only about Rhodes or his fall. Rather, Rhodes had become the symbolic face of institutional colonialism (Chaudhuri, 2015). The campaign was not intended to deny a particular history. The statue was politicised, as Kros (2015) argues, for the *power* that it continues to exercise over the present. The statue has become a particular site that has provided an opportunity to reflect on issues of institutional culture at the university – to render legible how the legacies of colonialism and apartheid are still deeply felt. One banner, which also deliberately made an appearance in the photographic imagery produced around the movement, read '*All Rhodes lead to colonisation of the Mind*'[11]. As

---

[11] Kros (2015) explores the coverage in social and mainstream media of the '*#RhodesMustFall*' campaign, and in particular addresses the visual material that was created in its midst. Drawing on Sontag (2001: 3) and Barthes (2010: 34), she highlights how photographs "alter and enlarge our notions of what is worth looking at" and more than other forms of documentation offer "an immediate, viscerally emotional contact" to the occurances unfolding. The manner in which the visual capture of events plays into the affordances of particular devices in the enactment of

Chaudhuri writes: "These larger ambitions of the movement – that is, to bring out into the open institutional racism in university life in South Africa and Britain, and to decolonise education – speak to concerns that many have had for a while". He adds: "These concerns, by now, have a long itinerary, but they have been awaiting *a forum for articulation*" (emphasis mine). The manner in which the campaign travelled to other Universities, in and outside of South Africa, makes all the more clear that the 'issues' which stood at the heart of the campaign, transcended a battle over Rhodes and his legacy.

On 16 March 2015, UCT students staged a walkout from a meeting convened by university management on heritage, signage and symbolism on campus. Here, UCT Student Representative Council President, Ramabina Mahapa, argued: "For too long the narrative at this university has silenced the voices of black students and black history. This university continues to celebrate, in its institutional symbolism, figures in South African history who are undisputedly white supremacists". He also raises the question "Whose heritage are we preserving? Who created the symbolism, for whom and for what?"(Ramabina Mahapa quoted by Kessy & Boonzaier, 2015). On 25 March 2015 a university wide assembly took place. Here, as UCT itself later reports from the assembly, "[h]eritage, signs and symbolism were superseded by the harder issues synonymous with transformation". These were "equity, institutional culture and racism, curricula, higher education, and colonialism" (Swingler, 2015). Rorisang Moseli, a 20-year-old student studying Politics, Philosophy and Economics (PPE) took to the podium during this meeting and reflected on the 'suspicion' that continues to be felt when debates on racism and discrimination unfold in the present. "South Africa was born out of a negotiated settlement. We have been negotiating since 1994, and now today, at this assembly, we need to prove that our pain and experiences of racism are real, and not imagined. Do we need to negotiate this to?" (Moseli quoted by Tshabalala, 2015).

The student protest sought to deliberately challenge the 'rules of engagement' and the 'agenda' that have defined discussions about transformation so far. As Kessy & Boonzaier (2015) puts it: "This [rules of engagement] is about power relations and who is likely to benefit from dialogue, whose voices are heard and who is recognised". They add: "What the call for dialogue by those in power misses is that some voices remain silenced in the very process of engagement".

On 9 April 2015, one month after the protests had begun, the statue of Rhodes was removed with a crane from its plinth. Cheers went up as the statue lifted, with cries of '*Amandla* [power]' coming from the crowd. The statue is currently being stored at an undisclosed location, and applications have been

---

controversy/ for the articulation of issues is a dimension that would need to be considered further.

filed to have it permanently removed from campus. UCT, in response, is reported to have appointed a 'independent heritage practitioner' to help with the application, who then has the duty to assess the "the statue's history, context and heritage significance" and to initiate a public consultation process (UCT, 2015). As the statue was removed, many of those who had been watching took turns standing on the empty plinth – songs, dance and jubilation ensued. As Sibusiso Tshabalala writes in an article in which he reports on the statues fall, many of those watching had on their mind the question: "What next?" One answer to this question, Tshabalala found on a placard that was carried by a black female UCT student minutes before the removal of Rhodes' statue. It read: "*Next, the invisible statues*".

5.2 The power to provoke, the means to articulate

What the '*#RhodesMustFall'* campaign and the stories of the three sculptures and statues by Andries Botha have in common is that they prompt the question: When can statues or symbols simply be ignored, and when is it difficult to do so? Amit Chaudhuri (2016) proposes the following answer: "when we can view [...] history with detached irony, as evidence of the antediluvian, a museum-piece that does not require to be confronted since it no longer has the power to threaten". He answers to 'why' the Rhodes statue at Oxford University suddenly became intolerable. His answer: we must "look towards the contemporary historical moment and to Britain today". He adds:

> "It is a Britain in which, in the last 25 years there has been an extraordinary narrowing down, a closing of ranks, in favour of class and colour. This retrenchment has been accompanied by an atmosphere of denial. It has given rise to a mentality in which there is so much elision of the past and subtle prevarication about race that the bogus breast-beating about the necessity of accommodating historical complexity by leaving the statue in place frankly sounds insulting to many".

The context in which Rhodes was politicised in South Africa is different, but reflects in a similar manner what Mbembe (2015: 2), addressing also the politicisation of the Cecil Rhodes statue at UCT, terms a 'negative moment' – i.e. "a moment when new antagonisms emerge while old ones remain unresolved", "when multiple old and recent unresolved crises seem to be on the path towards a collision".

What is telling about Chaudhuri and Mbembe's answer, is the manner in which they highlight how statues loose their potency and then regain it at other times, depending on the 'issues' in the here and now. Chaudhuri also expands to statues, the notion that Becker, et al. (2006: 6) and Fuente (2007: 421) have adopted when speaking of artworks, namely that these have "lives and careers". Statues have lives and careers. In turn, movements in time and space affect 'what they are' and 'what they can be made into'. In particular

historical moments, statues allow actor groupings – particularly the "less powerful, those who are being excluded" (Chaudhuri, 2016) – to pinpoint the antagonisms, old and new, that define the 'negative moment' lived. Rhodes occassioned an articulation of some of the issues that South Africa is presently facing when it comes to its institutions of higher learning. Far more concretely, Mbembe (2015: 3) suggests, what *#RhodesMustFall* made explicit, is that the demythologizing of certain versions of history, which the TRC had called for, must go hand in hand with the demythologising of whiteness. Focusing on Rhodes, the campaign pinpointed what is needed to decolonize a 21st century university, to 'democratise access', and to enable a rightful sense of ownership. In fact, it worked, to define an expansive sense of citizenship, Mbembe suggests (ibid: 6).

5. 3 A proposal for temporary monuments: a solution?

Corrigal (2016) rightfully draws our attention to the fact that even when the Cecil Rhodes statue was finally removed from its plinth at UCT, "the notion of its permanence was only partially shattered – it wasn't destroyed – just relocated". She discusses the art exhibition '*I to I*' by Johann van der Schijff, who teaches 'sculpture' at UCT. Concerning this art exhibition, she notes that van der Schijff proposes a radical alteration to public art; namely, that monuments should never be conceived of as permanent. For this reason all of his artworks exhibited have wheels attached to them "so that not only can they be removed quickly, but, potentially, if they prove useful to society, can travel to different sites at different times where they can be accessed (or rejected) by different communities"[12]. Their value thus remains (historically) conditional. Again this speaks to the notion of Becker et al. (2006: 6) that statues have "lives and careers". Statues are made into emblems, which then can also be dropped, redefined, symbolically 're-made', dropped again and brought to life again at a later stage.

By suggesting a 'solution' for societies in transition, namely the installation of 'temporary statues' or 'statues on wheels', Johann van der Schijff prompts a final consideration of what lies behind the politicisation of statues. That is, their *permanence*. Statues, by being installed with the intention of remaining in a given location for years to come, work to signify "the permanence of the

---

[12] The second radical idea addressed in Johann van der Schijff's exhibition is that monuments should be functional, i.e. „in that they set the stage for public performances and can be used by the public rather than just operate as objects to gaze upon". Enabling interaction, he presents monuments as an opportunity to come to terms with the past individually while in a public setting (Corrigal, 2016). The statue of John Dube at the Dube TradePort outside of Durban, deliberately invites gestures of interaction – an individual being given the opporunity to take a seat in the presence oft he former ANC president. In what manner the ‚functional' dimension ascribed to particular artworks comes to define their affordances in the enactment of controversies, the articulation of issues, requires more consideration – it is however beyond the scope of this chapter.

regime that erected it". After a while they become less visible. There is then some truth to the famous saying by Robert Musil (1987: 61) that "there is nothing in this world as invisible as a monument". Statues become the object of concern for in their 'everydayness' – their 'invisibility' as we walk past them everyday – they allow for the 'domestication' of particular reading of the past into social life. Lastly, it is their very permanence that allows them to become the powerful mediators of the social relations of which they are at the same time a product. The capacity to be politicised, is in part premised precisely on the *significance* that actors and group of actors ascribe to this *permanency*.

If the possibility is given that statues, sculptures, and monuments – and in a similar fashion also street names – could simply be wheeled off, taken town, when these appear as immoral or as politically provocative, this also has an effect that we may readily fail to recognise. The ideal of public art as being subject to on-going processes of making, valuing, defining and redefining would fundamentally be altered. If public sculptures had wheels, what would happen to the potency of these symbolic markers as important *mediators* of social action, of provoking debate about controversial issues, of "teasing out" as Rassool (2001) eloquently puts it "the complexities inherent in a complex and now rapidly changing country"?

Fig. 2

Andries Botha's elephant
sculptures at Warwick
Triangle in 2010. The
artwork was yet to be
completed. (Picture: *'Save
the Durban Elephants'*
facebook group).

Fig. 3

Offering being made to one of the elephant sculptures at Warwick Triangle (Picture: *'Save the Durban Elephants'* facebook group).

Fig. 4

Elephants that featured as part of Mook Lion's 'Still Free' street art series (Picture: Mook Lion).

Fig. 5

Andries Botha's King
Shaka statue at King
Shaka International
Airport prior to its
removal. (Picture:
Michael Cookson).

Fig. 6

Guests at the unveiling of
Andries Botha's John
Langalibalele Dube statue
at the Dube TradePort.
(Picture: Eva Riedke).

Saturday – Early February 2013

I have only a few more weeks of fieldwork left and only few weeks to wrap up everything. Also with the *inkosi's* [chief's] family, it is the time for final visits. Maphulo's wife, Thulisile, said to me yesterday: "*Eish*, it is really soon [my leaving]. You should have learnt more from our culture". It seemed less of a critique than merely a disappointment about what we had done, and failed to do, during my visits to their homestead. Smiling, she then added: "maybe I can still teach you". "Did you speak to *inkosi* ['chief' in isiZulu – her husband] about when you will come next? I want to teach you how to cook Zulu chicken and *eish*, also the beading for church. Next time, you bring the beads and I will teach you how to make these bracelets for virginity testing. I will show you".

Last week I understood what 'Zulu chicken' meant. Thulisile had cooked it a few times during my visits. Each time, through the manner in which she emphasised – sometimes days in advance – what she would cook, and by the way the family eagerly awaited lunch that day, I knew it was not a day-to-day meal. As his daughter carried the dish to the table last week, Inkosi Maphulo had explained to me: "Over there [pointing to the township] you will never find this 'Zulu chicken'. They buy from *Checkers* [a supermarket chain] now. Chicken in these big bags, frozen – you know them?" While also a matter of recipe, 'Zulu chicken' thus simply meant 'backyard chicken', 'live chicken', not 'white' but the 'grey and brown-feathered' kind. A kind that, no doubt true, most families in the township were *not* – or, according to Maphulo, were *no longer* – keeping.

Saturday Mid-February 2013

As I came, I was told that Inkosi Maphulo was still at a meeting with the *izinduna* [his headmen]. "But", as his wife assured me, "they are in that community house down there. You know, where you went for the voting [traditional leader elections]? So, he will see your car and then come". I had brought a bag full of beads, mainly pastel colours. As we sat in the new rondavel in front of their main house, I untied the black plastic bag sitting in my lap. "I am not sure, I got the right kind. I think for church it is these pastel colours, yes? For virginity testing it is more the bright colours [PAUSE] Yes?" She assured me: "These are the right ones. They are good. Now I will teach you!"

While she continued working on a belt she had begun for one of her daughters, the second eldest, she suggested that I try and learn with a much narrower bracelet. Once I had understood the basic steps with the needle and a moment of mutual concentration on our bracelets had passed, she broke the

silence. "Have you gone to see Lundile [her sister in law, the virginity tester] and the girls again?" She was referring to the virginity testing in January.

"Yes, I did! This last time, Lundile also invited me to come very early in the morning so that I could observe the actual 'testing'. She didn't do it herself in January, but had an elderly lady come visit – apparently it was the woman who had taught her, her 'mentor'. Can you say mentor?" I really wanted to continue telling Thulisile about the visit, but as I gave thought to the story, I questioned for a mere moment whether I could tell her the way I had told others. The concerns over what I wanted to say ranged from it being an insult, disrespectful; all the way to imagining her response as simply being 'I don't believe you'. But then I reassured myself: on so many affairs, in her direct, even blunt, to-the-point manner, she has given me a running interpretation of subtexts. She had so often helped me to 'make sense' of matters.

I thus continued: "The testing was at Baba Induna's place. What I was a bit concerned about when I observed the testing this time – I mean it was my first time that I was present for the actual 'testing'. All the other times when I had gone, I either came a bit later in the morning, or I came the night before, or I sat with the girls in a different rondavel – where the girls sit before they are called in". A bit unsure again, I added: "You probably know all this" She smiled reassuringly but then continued beading. I went on. "The girls came into the rondavel, and the lady who Lundile had invited, checked 'to see'. What I thought was a bit of a problem was that the lady only used two pairs of gloves for all these girls. There were maybe 60 girls there that day. Some of them had their period, you see?" I add: "From the medical side of things, I am a bit sceptical about it. Also, because the provincial Department of Health is supporting virginity testing, isn't it? I mean, and then something like this with the gloves occurs"

I hoped that she would quickly interject. She left a moment of quiet, looking down, concentrating on the needle in her hand. "Mhhh". "You know that I don't send Ntuli [their eldest daughter] to this? You know that? My children don't go! They go to *Nongoma* [the King's residence] for *uMkhosi woMhlanga*[1] [the reed dance] once a year because this is *culture"*. "It is our *tradition"*, she emphasises. "I also make the belt and the bracelets like these [pointing to the beads]. But *to check*, me? I don't do it. It is not right what is happening! For me, I *talk* to Ntuli and I *check*, but I do not *check* like that".

After all these months and also the time I had spent getting to know Ntuli, their eldest daughter and the chief's wife, I had never asked about virginity testing in *their* family. I had never come to consider that the chief's own daughters did not take part.

---

[1] The maiden 'reed dance', *uMkhosi woMhlanga,* takes place in August or September at the Royal Enyokeni Palace in Nongoma, northern KwaZulu-Natal. As an annual ceremony that celebrates virginity, it is attended by thousands of girls from all over the country (and beyond).

Chapter 2. This chapter is about virginity testing. I explore the arguments of both proponents and critics, and consider its framing, since the mid 1990s, as a tangible way of handling the HIV/AIDS epidemic. In brief, I consider in relation to virginity testing, campaigns for male circumcision. The question is raised: in what sense have these practices acquired 'normative capacities' enabling a form of 'material participation'? The argument put forth is that both virginity testing and campaigns for male circumcision render visible a material dimension of engagement with particular 'issues'

CHAPTER 2
A ceremony that cures –
doing 'one's share' in times of HIV/AIDS

In early 2016, print and social media in South Africa were sites of much heated public debate: could the uThukela District Municipality in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal institute a bursary scheme for young women, which has as its criteria that they be 'virgins'? Those who spoke out for the so called 'maidens bursary' generally built their argument on the protection of cultural rights. Critics vehemently countered that practices of this kind were little more than a patriarchal mechanism of controlling women's sexuality, that virginity testing at large is discriminatory and a form of gender-based violence against women and girls. Let me quote here a few snippets from the discussion that unfolded. In an opinion piece published in the *Daily Maverick*, the Minister for Social Development, Bathabile Dlamini, who is also the chairwoman of the ruling African National Congress Women's League, writes:

> "Virginity testing is not an African issue, it is a component of harmful practices aimed at subjugating the bodily integrity of women. It complements other harmful practices such as female genital mutilation which is essentially a practice guided by the ideology that sex for women should not be about pleasure, but about procreation. In most cases virginity testing is ineffective, unhygienic, and a gross violation of a girl's human rights. Moreover, it is not even a reliable measure of virginity" (Dlamini, 2016).

She adds:

> "In sum, the best way to combat HIV and AIDS is to empower women and girls, and not through practices that are, in fact, tantamount to being a sexual offense".

Dudu Mazibuko, the mayor of the uThukela District Municipality, stood by her decision to institute the bursary scheme, emphasising that much like virginity testing at large, it was a means of keeping young women safe in a province that has the highest rate of teen pregnancy in South Africa, and which continues to have the highest HIV infection rate[1]. 113 students within the Uthukela municipality would receive college scholarships of which 16 were earmarked for sexually inactive students (Mngoma, 2016; Winsor, 2016). Mazibuko told a radio station: "To us, it's just to say thank you for keeping yourself and you can still keep yourself for the next three years until you get

---

[1] According to survey statistics released in 2014, the province has an HIV positive prevalence rate of 37% (HSRC, 2014).

your degree or certificate" (Radio 702, 2016 quoted in Winsor, 2016). The grant will be renewed, as long as the student can submit a certificate that she is still a virgin.

In another opinion piece also published in the *Daily Maverick*, Pierre de Vos (2016), who teaches Constitutional Law at the University of Cape Town, emphasises the 'double standard' of the bursary scheme. He writes: "A myriad of techniques are used to enforce and promote the idea that sexual activity by (especially unmarried) women is dangerous, 'impure', or immoral, while turning a blind eye or quietly celebrating the sexual activity of men". He adds:

> "Virginity testing" constitutes a flagrant and egregious infringement on this right to privacy as it purports to give others the right to invade an area of private intimacy and to police the most private choices about intimate relationships. What is supposed to be an intensely private matter – decisions about whether to engage in sexual activity – is rendered a semi-public matter open to scrutiny by others".

The views of the scholarship recipients were (as to be expected) only minimally represented in the media. In an opinion piece published in the *Mail and Guardian*, Nandisa Tushini (2016), a healthcare practitioner, emphasises in what manner virginity testing is to be located alongside notions of *umuntu* [human kindness], *abantu* [the people] and *lobolo* [bridewealth], and thus gives voice to possible considerations of both young women and their families. She weighs the pros and cons in a noticeably balanced manner. As she writes:

> "[…] Being *umuntu* is not just about being a human in the biological sense. It encompasses having and living certain values, having consideration for other people, respecting those who are, those who have been and those who will be. It involves an understanding that your actions and behaviours have consequences on your family, ancestors, neighbours etc. Becoming *umuntu* is hard work and requires one to be in a society that respects this notion and raises its citizens to be *abantu*.

> This type of person would consent to practices such as virginity testing for their self, their children, and even their relatives because it is part of the communal value system. It is not an uncommon occurrence to adhere to these standards. In this type of society, virginity is not only a symbol of wealth, it is testimony to one's commitment to the standards and virtues by which *umuntu* is created. Virginity is a symbol of wealth for the price of *lobolo* that a woman's family will receive at the time of marriage and a symbol of fertility […]".

In sum, it can be said, the public debate around the 'virginity scholarships' brought back to life more long-lasting controversies about the revival of 'virginity testing' and forms of 're-traditionalisation' to which the practice is often linked. Significant, as Bathabile Dlamini (2016) notes, is that "[t]he

discussion itself provides a lens on the complexities of South African society". Virginity testing, as this chapter aims to render visible is "many things to many people" (Law, 2002). It represents both an effort to deploy *collective pressure* and to provide the *symbolic means* for young women to take responsibility for sexual relations. In the words of Wickström (2010), virginity testing is a 'preventive ritual' that represents a collective effort to protect young people. References to 'tradition' or 'custom' in the debates also represent a 'rhetoric of nostalgia' as Thornberry (2015) terms it. They come to constitute a political language, employed in aspirations for greater influence (patriarchal, political, or both). Also, it has come to define efforts of 'moral regulation' enmeshed in political efforts to counteract the 'moral dissolution' of the nation (Posel, 2005).

In the following chapter, I aim to pursue three main objectives. *First*, I will provide an outline of the debate that has unfolded around the re-introduction of virginity testing in KwaZulu-Natal since the mid 1990s and how it forms part of an effort to handle the dramatic HIV/AIDS epidemic. One argument therein has been that by placing the emphasis on women, the practice fails to acknowledge the co-responsibility of men (Tayler et al. 2007: 34). I here explore in relation to female virginity testing, a controversy that unfolded during my fieldwork in 2011 around the introduction of the *Tara KLamp* (sic) – a Malaysian manufactured male circumcision device. Links were drawn between virginity testing and male circumcision in terms of both representing measures to counteract the spread of HIV/AIDS (now addressing both sexes). *Second*, I will detail my observations of an annual virginity testing celebration that took place close to the township KwaNkilinda in December 2011, exploring the imaginative ideals of the different actor groupings present, i.e. the testers, the young women, local health care professionals and the traditional leaders. Rendered visible through this particular event, I argue, is a politicisation of sexuality enmeshed with concerns over the moral character of the nation. *Third*, I turn to the notion of 'material participation' (Marres, 2012a; 2012b; 2013). I propose that virginity testing and male circumcision allow us to consider the 'material' dimension of engagement with particular 'issues'. Here, the argument goes that particular objects, devices and settings (such as in Marres' case, environmental teapots or the tea light) come to *'resonate'* with a range of (in her case 'environmental') issues. Thereby these acquire 'normative capacities', through which they become deployable by actors. Virginity testing and male circumcision are ascribed specific affordances for the performance of particular modes of engagement – thereby they come to facilitate a means 'to do good' or 'to do one's share'.

1. The revival of virginity testing

The revival of virginity testing begun in the mid 1990s and has included both the several-days long Reed Dance [*Umhlanga*] ceremonies held annually in

September at the King's palace in Nongoma as well as smaller-scale local initiatives which test young women on a monthly basis, culminating in a yearly ceremony in the presence of local traditional leaders and other invited guests. In the context of my fieldwork, monthly testings would take place in groups of 50-70 'maidens' who gathered at a local homestead, school, or community hall. Two or three local elderly women – in most cases having some form of certification as 'testers' – would carry out, one after the other, a hymeneal inspection to assert whether the girls[2] have abstained from sexual intercourse or not. Girls' names and the result of the testing would be recorded in the tester's book, along with the dates of when each individual was tested. The provincial Department of Health and the Department of Arts and Culture, according to a representative working in the health sector, were involved in terms of facilitating workshops for the testers (ex on health care improvement, or on STDs), providing rubber gloves for the monthly testings and also providing financial support for the annual celebrations. Nevertheless, there is no overarching institution controlling or coordinating the practice of virginity testing in the province. As Kaarsholm (2009) and Scorgie (2002) emphasise, it is rather the case that different 'schools' of virginity testing exist in KwaZulu-Natal (KZN). There is considerable diversity in practice, wherein testers disagree on different elements of the procedure, ranging from the criteria for 'passing' or failing an 'examination', to what forms of certification should be issued and whether other symbolic markers of 'success' should be institutionalised. Latter include for instance, marking classed 'virgins' with a dot on their forehead following their examination, or the wearing of red tassels around their neck. The disparities that exist with respect to the 'criteria' highlight the active 'creation' of virgins, or as Scorgie (2002: 58) puts it, act as a deliberate "reminder that virgins are made, not born".

Historical accounts on 'Zulu cultural practices' in the twentieth century – written predominantly by ethnographers and missionaries – provide a comprehensive documentation of courtship practices, initiation rites and notions of virginity that preceded the reintroduction of virginity testing in the mid 1990s (see in particular Krige, 1950 [1936]; Gaitskell, 1982). Therein, it is generally agreed that up to the 1970s the rationale behind sexual regulation was "to regulate fertility so that children were born within the boundaries of the patriline" (Scorgie, 2002: 61). Pre-marital chastity among Zulu girls was not inherently linked with sexual abstinence however. Virginity testing is described in these early accounts as a means of regulating consensual sexual activity, intended to 'delay' penetrative sex, and thus avoid pre-marital pregnancy (Thornberry, 2015).

Girls were socialised in peer groups of the same age-set, wherein they were

---

[2] In the following, I frequently simply use the term 'girls' to refer to children as well as young women who take part in the practice of virginity testing. I hereby write in accordance with common usage and the term mostly used by these individuals themselves. Alternatively, common usage also includes *izintombi,* meaning 'virgins' in *isiZulu* [singular = *intombi*].

taught that sexual liaisons and premarital sexual experimentation with pubescent boys were permitted and even desirable, providing that it would stop short of penetrative sex. One of the permissible practices was so called 'thigh sex', meaning that the woman would lie on her side with her legs crossed tight, the man penetrating her thighs, however without reaching inside the labia (Krige 1968: 174 also cited in Wickström, 2010: 538). "Thus, it was bad to destroy someone's virginity, but it was also bad not to 'play at all'", Wickström (2010: 538) writes. Young men, in turn, were equally socialised in the course of puberty rites on 'how not to penetrate'. Virginity was culturally valued and served as a symbol of morality, signifying to the community that one adhered to and respected the conventions of authority based on generation and gender (Scorgie, 2002: 61).

The recent revival of virginity testing has largely been framed as a response to the linked social crises of HIV/AIDS and sexual violence (Thornberry, 2015). The Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini has urged families to have their daughters 'tested', suggesting that the rapid spread of the epidemic will be curbed if the lost cultural prestige of virginity is revived. The attendance at public testing festivals has according to Thornberry (ibid: 131-2), risen dramatically. In the early years of its revival, appeals to 'culture' and 'tradition' were frequently made in reference to Thabo Mbeki's appeal for an African Renaissance. As Leclerc-Madlala (2001: 534) suggests, it was assumed that Mbeki's call for "African solutions to the African AIDS problem" was an indication that the country's governing elite could be counted on to firmly embrace the revival of 'indigenous traditions'. In this respect, Leclerc-Madlala (ibid) and Decoteau (2013a) both highlight that Mbeki's presidency was significant in framing virginity testing as a culturally appropriate solution to a myriad of problems reflected in and resulting from the AIDS epidemic. Further, those in favour of the practice being revived emphasised that it was fundamental to, as Vincent (2006: 19) puts it, "their ability to express their value and dignity as members of a specific cultural community". The argument was hereby that democratic constitutionalism has been experienced as working towards the loss of such cultural practices, and 'tradition' in general. Loss of tradition, Decoteau (2013b: 163- 191) highlights, further signifies anxieties over a loss of gender ideologies, morality, identity and trust.

Outrage and public opposition against the (revival of the) practice was nationally, as well as internationally, primarily voiced from a human rights perspective. Critics argued that the practice constitutes a violation of childrens' constitutional rights to privacy, bodily integrity and dignity – in general, a troubling development for South Africa's democratic order (Vincent, 2006: 19). The Human Rights Commission (HRC) and the Commission on Gender Equality (CGE) made significant contributions in the process of challenging the legality of virginity testing (Scorgie, 2002: 56). Scorgie (ibid: 61) makes the observation at a consultative conference held on the matter in 2000 – hosted jointly by the HRC and CGE – that in the course of discussions, little focus was placed "on the question of virginity testing as a form of AIDS prevention, or

even on the matter of constitutional illegality", but rather, primarily "on the relevance of 'culture' and 'tradition' in contemporary South African society". Central to the public debate, it can be said, has been a clash of human rights vs. cultural rights (George, 2008), a spirited battle between 'a return to culture' vs. 'a liberation from culture' (Wickström, 2010: 534). As Decoteau (2013a: 143) points out, 'rights' are positioned in opposition to (gender) 'traditions' (see also Hunter 2010).

In 2005, under growing pressure of the Commission of Gender Equality and the Human Rights Commission, the South African Parliament banned virginity testing for all girls under the age of 16 (Children's Act 2005) – thus protecting rights of cultural and religious practice, while also protecting children from harm (Wickström, 2010: 534; Scorgie, 2006). Wickström highlights that only two months after the decision, 20,000 young women were reported to have visited the Zulu King's palace in Nongoma for the three-day *Umhlanga* [reed dance] celebrations. Here, much like the years prior, they underwent a virginity test and were celebrated for their morals and good behaviour (Wickstrom, 2010: 533; Mthethwa 2005). During the monthly virginity testing events I observed, there was little inclination to assume that the Children's Act had acquired much significance. Girls of all age groups were present and tested. Despite the prohibition placed through the Act, the practice of virginity testing seems to continue unabated (see also Dlamini, 2016).

Within the scholarly discussion – in which, to a considerable degree, it has been ethnographic research that has provided the basis for different analytical arguments – Leclerc Madlala (2001: 533) locates virginity testing within a 'gendered meaning-making process' and argues it is premised on the belief that "the epidemic is the result of women being sexually 'out of control'". She interprets the practice as an effort to handle the AIDS epidemic by exerting greater control over women and their sexuality. Scorgie (2002), in turn, points to the difficulties that have arisen with the revival of the practice. She highlights that at large, the movement has encouraged young women to abstain from sexual activity completely. What fails to be addressed however are the implications of gendered power relations between young people and the dynamics of negotiating "love proposals" (ibid: 66-7). She further emphasises 'silences' that persist within the framework of virginity testing around: a) the sexuality of boys and young men; b) around marriage – upheld as an attribute of adulthood – but unattainable to many; c) the risk of HIV infection that is likely to persist beyond marriage, for instance, through concurrent relationships; d) and means of contraception and protection from sexually transmitted diseases (STDs), in light of the fact that condom use is actively discouraged by the 'movement' (in so far as it can be called a 'movement').

Wickström (2010), whose argument I mainly intend to explore further in this chapter, argues that in light of these findings, provided by authors such as

Leclerc-Madlala or Scorgie, not enough attention has been paid to local conceptions of both relationships and sexuality. Based on her field research in Nkolokotho, Wickström (2010) argues that virginity testing is understood as "a kind of local public health initiative and a collective ritual", as an effort to deploy collective pressure "to increase the individual's and the community's responsibility for sexual relations", and with the objective to "strengthen girls' and womens' positions at a time of chronic HIV/AIDS" (ibid: 532-3). Wickström here expands on the notion by George (2008) that virginity testing constitutes 'a preventive public health measure'. What distinguishes Wickström's (2010) analysis from others, is the suggestion that virginity testing, as practiced in Nkolokotho, is a local initiative that while putting the responsibility on women, also aims to strengthen and empower women and protect them from unsafe sexual relationships (ibid: 537; see also Posel, 2005). Further, a central tenet is that in the individual experiences of virginity testing, notions of 'personal integrity' are not above all associated with 'individual freedom'. Wickström (2010: 541) writes:

> "When I asked individual girls about their experiences of virginity testing, their answers included showing respect for your parents, not causing them pain, and being proud of yourself. The girls see themselves as being in a continuous interplay with others and as part of a larger whole, not in opposition to independence but as a fundamental ground for being someone".

Wickström provides a similar argumentation to that adopted by Bathabile Dlamini (2016) in the debate about the 'maiden scholarships' (see quoted above), emphasising that notions of *umuntu, ngumuntu, ngabantu* also underlie the revival. "A person is a person through persons" is a collectivist orientation, she emphasises (Wickström, 2010: 541). In one of her conclusions, Wickström (ibid: 547) suggests that the revival of virginity testing is not centred on the belief of turning back to an old moral order. Rather, it is "grounded in and inspired by deep cultural convictions about the nature of persons and sociality" and as such, the movement is suggestive of an effort to harness a new form of collective consciousness (ibid). The trope of 'traditionalism', she appears to argue, is thus deployed to a different end than otherwise commonly assumed. She suggests: "By making virginity a matter of public concern, the thinking goes, people can help girls delay their sexual debut and encourage men to respect girls' sexual integrity" (ibid: 535). Virginity testing is a "'preventive ritual' more than a 'diagnostic measure'", is her proposition (ibid: 532).

To this perspective, I shall again return below. The objective will be to elucidate then the manner in which on the basis of a shared interest in a set of *issues*, virginity testing (and also male circumcision) may be seen to enable a form of 'material participation'. What matters here is how objects, devices and settings become 'charged' with issues and acquire normative capacities. As such, they are ascribed the special affordances for the performance of political

or moral action, i.e. facilitate forms of 'public engagement'. Before I explore this question of how engagement is materialised or, as Marres' (2012a: 5) puts it, how 'material participation' constitutes "a distinct form of public action", I will first, however, turn to male circumcision. In brief, I will consider the introduction of the *Tara KLamp*, a campaign that was rolled out in 2011 in an effort to handle the HIV/AIDS epidemic in the province. Next, I will detail my observations during an annual virginity testing celebration close to KwaNkilinda in December 2011. Finally, I will return to the notion of material participation.

1.1 Male circumcision and the Tara KLamp

Critics have lamented in the debate around virginity testing that the role of boys and young men has effectively been silenced, operating on the assumption that exerting greater control over women and their sexuality would inevitably alter patterns of behaviour in general. The monarch of KZN, King Goodwill Zwelithini, was undoubtedly influenced by the national (if not international) outcries, when he responded to these criticisms in 2005 and announced at a Reed Dance celebration in Nongoma, that he would also introduce rites to ascertain male virginity (Mthethwa, 2005). In newspapers, social media platforms but also in a meeting I observed of the traditional leaders of eThekwini in Pinetown – who were then receiving a briefing on HIV/AIDS campaigns by the Department of Health – numerous procedures were being considered. This included proposals of ascertaining the intensity of impact of a boy's urine stream on the ground or the path his urine stream took while lying on his back. Alternatively, an examination of the fraenulum was also discussed as way of determining whether a young man has had sex or not (see also Wickström, 2010; Markus, 2008). What was readily apparent was an effort to *construct* and *market* a 'parallel' to how virginity was understood with respect to women. Comments highlighted that also monthly testings should be conducted for men and that respective certifications would need to be issued. At the same time, there was an acute awareness that such proposals depended on the dismantling of orthodox notions of masculinity, i.e. a 'modernisation' of gender norms and 'what it means to be a man'[3]. A representative from the Department of Arts and Culture suggested that "Judging roughly, these debates around 'male virginity testing' only lasted a few months" – i.e. then they began to be levelled down.

---

[3] Apparent in newspaper articles and in contributions on social media platforms at the time was on the one hand, recognition of competing or conflicting masculinities in present-day South Africa, but simultaneously a tendency to *homogenise* 'traditional' masculinity (see Decoteau (2013a) who critiques a similar tendency in the academic literature). What it means to be a 'Zulu man' is, in turn, largely defined in patriarchal and misogynistic terms, and little attention is paid to inherent reconfigurations and reifications.

In 2009, King Goodwill Zwelithini then announced that he would revive the tradition of male circumcision in an effort to fight the spread of AIDS. The call occurred in concert with President Jacob Zuma's launch of the 'moral regeneration movement'. According to the movement's self-description online, it constitutes a civil society led initiative, supported by the government, which "facilitates and coordinates all processes and initiatives aimed at combating moral degeneration" (*MRM*, 2016). Five months into Zuma's presidency, he had given a landmark speech on the country's fight against HIV/AIDS to announce a decisive departure from the Thabo Mbeki's stance of denialism and indifference. Restoring the 'tradition' of male circumcision rites while 'modernising' them, begun to feature in national campaigns to curb HIV transmission but was also valorised as part of Zuma's call for moral regeneration (Decoteau, 2013a; see also Waetjen & Maré, 2008). In an interview in 2010, Zuma said that he had been circumcised "some time ago" and had encouraged his sons to undergo the same procedure. He added to the question of reviving this practice, that since it was King Shaka who had stopped circumcisions, "it could only be another King who says, 'I'm now opening it'" (*The Mercury*, 2010; Dugger, 2010). President Zuma stood firmly behind the King's desire to revive male virginity testing. Significant, when comparing Mbeki and Zuma, is the manner in which the tropes of 'traditionalism' and 'modernity' have been articulated in different ways. The HIV/AIDS epidemic has been one of the primary political terrains upon which the battles of their presidency have been played out (Decoteau, 2013a: 149).

As the quote from President Zuma provided above makes clear, the circumcision of men was once a Zulu tradition, abolished during the era of King Shaka during prolonged periods of war. Before Shaka, circumcision was an important marker of adulthood, comprising "a very extensive set of ceremonies, education and training [including physical conditioning], all of which lasted close to a year" (DeVries, 2004: 25). King Dingiswayo, a mentor of Shaka, replaced the elaborate rite of passage with enrolment in the *amabutho* [Zulu warrior regiments], whereby the teachings that had formed part of circumcision school were incorporated into the training of the military age sets (ibid). When Shaka became King, the *amabutho* system was expanded further, wherein the state demanded service from young men for 15 to 20 years. Circumcision was herein discontinued, for warriors were likely to spend too much time recovering from the procedure (ibid: 26; Decoteau, 2013a).

1.2 Revival of male circumcision

So in 2010, under support from KwaZulu-Natal's Department of Health, male circumcision services were rolled out across the province and brought to hospitals, clinics and newly established circumcision camps. It was in the camps, that the campaign most visible incorporated the notion that 'medical

male circumcision' would go hand in hand with the teaching of 'traditional values', i.e. 'what is expected of a man' and an advancement of the moral regeneration programme. On the one hand, the King emphasised the role that traditional leaders should play in 'reviving' an historical 'Zulu tradition' amongst their communities, regularly applauding the establishment of camps. On the other hand, he emphasised that the practice must be 'modernised' – it must be a matter of choice, safe, and in accordance with modern medical standards (ibid). With this emphasis, he sought to take the wind out of arguments voiced by critics of initiation, including those who annually turn attention to the number of deaths experienced in the Eastern Cape during 'initiation season' – where men undergo the Xhosa rite-of-passage (see *Mail & Guardian*, 2010; Mthembu, 2010 more recently: Diakanyo, 2013; Makinana, 2013; Smith, 2012). The 'Zulus' would bring back circumcision differently, was Zwelithini's message.

In a meeting of the *amakhosi* [chiefs pl.] of eThekwini, in which representatives from the Department of Health provided a 'briefing' on HIV/AIDS campaigns being rolled out, I witnessed that 'tradition' within the new circumcision campaigns began to be framed as an optional, modern lifestyle choice that *amakhosi* must effectively 'sell' amongst the youth – a framing that was also met with considerable disapproval. Medical studies were presented, and statistics from a series of scientific clinical trials which had shown that circumcised men lowered their risk of transmission by as much as 50%. One *inkosi* [chief sg.] present during the meeting, in turn, later interpreted with a tone of irony that it appeared to now be his duty, as well as that of traditional leaders more generally, to market the "educated traditionalist". He thought for a moment, and then smiled and added: "Things have really changed since Mbeki".

In the coming year, the appeals that were made to traditional leaders by the King and the provincial government changed further when a campaign around a Malaysian manufactured male circumcision device was rolled out, the so-called *Tara KLamp*. In a text on the use of the clamp by Millard (2012: 127), the use of the device is described as follows: "Using the same principle as the *Plastibell* used in circumcising neonates, the devices sandwich the mucosal and skin layers of the foreskin between concentric inner and outer rings, allowing for sutureless circumcision". After these devices have been applied, the distal foreskin can be excised or the patient can wait for a period of seven to ten days for it to fall off. The Department of Health, which was in charge of the dissemination of the clamp, legitimised the procurement by stating that in contrast to the standard surgical method, it was more suitable for 'mass circumcision campaigns' as it would work to limit the amount of time spent in medical facilities (Dhlomo, 2012). It was discussed as a form of 'home circumcision' – a procedure that would not require a clinic visit but could be performed by 'traditional practitioners'. There has been much enthusiasm for plastic circumcision rings in countries that are scaling up circumcision

services[4]. In this case, small-scale studies had already been conducted on the *Tara KLamp*, confirming its effectiveness. Subsequently, a larger clinical trial however, the so-called 'Orange Farm trial' conducted in Gauteng Province, was prematurely discontinued by the medical ethics board due to a complication rate of 37% (Lagarde et al., 2009). When the clamp was introduced in KwaZulu-Natal, it had thus not been approved by the WHO's clinical evaluation. For having failed a randomised control trial, the campaign around the Tara KLamp received much critical press.

In October 2011, critique of the campaign again gained new political dimensions – now it was not the need of an effective clinical trial to approve the device. With headlines such as "The king, the car and the KLamp" allegations were levelled that the *Tara KLamp's* Director had given King Goodwill Zwelithini a car worth R1 million in return for the Health Department's introduction of the clamp (see also Davis, 2011; Faull, 2010a; Faull, 2010b; Rawoot, 2010; Faull & Sole, 2011). The King, so was the assumption, had financially profited from the procurement deal with *Intratrek Properties*, the Malaysian company that sold the *Tara KLamp* devices to the KZN government (see Fig. 7).

Inkosi Maphulo, a chief whose traditional authority partly bordered KwaNkilinda and who I had come to work with closely, discussed these media reports with me. He made clear that in his view the introduction of the clamp constituted little more than subversive provincial politics from which local traditional leaders could also draw no gain. As he said, "Now, this is not about *culture*. Now, it is pure *politics*!" He adds further: "If we now know that circumcision will help us in preventing AIDS, then that is good! But this is not a *traditional* practice any more. If we don't do it in a forest, then also don't do it at home. Then the right way is done by doctors, in a clinic, and not with something like this!" With this he made explicit the concern and opposition that some traditional leaders raised in response to the manner in which the King had revived the practice. Particularly he provides a critique of the efforts to market the *Tara KLamp* as a device enabling a form of 'home circumcision'.

I would not want to suggest that all traditional leaders shared this view. However, in conversations with traditional leaders on 'male circumcision' and the *Tara KLamp*, there was an inclination to deliberately articulate the manner in which tropes of 'modernity' and 'tradition' had been re-signified since the presidency of Thabo Mbeki. For Mbeki, 'traditional' health care was an *alternative* to the broader Western biomedical establishment (see also Decoteau, 2013a: 146). Zuma, in contrast to Mbeki, deployed the tropes of traditionalism and modernity differently. As Decoteau (2013a), puts it, Zuma has used

---

[4] In an article entitled '*How do you circumcise a nation? The Rwandan case study'*, Mutabazi et al. (2014) discuss efforts to scale up voluntary medical male circumcision in Rwanda and the possibility of using a device similar to that of the Tara KLamp, rather than depending on the forceps-guided surgical method.

'traditionalism' "to call for a reconstitution of sexuality, thereby sanctioning certain cultural practices while simultaneously 'modernizing' them". My point here is simple: first, the ability to pinpoint the subtle political manoeuvres is not restricted to the critically minded distant observer. Second, traditional leaders expressed concern, and thus also made others aware about the manner in which re-significations unfolded. These articulations can in themselves be seen to serve as powerful instruments with which to pursue different ends. In this case, a tool of 'resistance' to a particular idealised notion of what is to constitute 'Zulu culture' – as laid out by the King. Put differently, what becomes clear is the manner in which 'tradition' and 'modernity' are pitted against one another, representing powerful ideological tools, and how these continue to undergo dynamic adjustments. The debacle around the *Tara KLamp* was significant for it represented an instance in which the contradictions and inconsistencies, with which such resignifications are replete, were unmasked and, in part, critically exposed in public.

In January 2015, KZN's MEC for Health, Sibongiseni Dhlomo, reported that since 2010, half a million men and boys have successfully been circumcised across the province (*Ezempilo*, 2015). Speaking at an event in Kokstad in 2015, the newspapers reported that Dhlomo addressed the King and said: "We will never tire to thank *Ongangezwe Lakhe* for his wisdom and leadership in calling for the revival of the *Ukusoka* [male circumcision] tradition as means to fight the spread of HIV and Aids that has ravaged His people". "The HIV that was once so deadly and seemed untouchable is now like a boxer who is on the ropes and facing defeat". The *Tara KLamp* was officially no longer disseminated for circumcision outside of medical facilities, Dhlomo in this speech emphasised the cooperation that ensued with *Indlondlo* [the heads of the initiation schools] to roll out the mass circumcision campaign (*The Citizen*, 2015).

In sum, what the controversies around male circumcision (and the introduction of the *Tara KLamp*) illustrate, is that the practice is more than a response to the scientific and policy communities who have heralded male circumcision as an effective means to lower the risk of HIV/AIDS transmission. 'Getting circumcised' also becomes a form of political or moral action. A means of 'doing good' in the face of a 'moral crisis' that, in turn, is not just about HIV/AIDS but also comes to be about sex and sexuality, changing masculinities, and the demand for gender equality. As a representative from the Department of Health succinctly put it in the meeting with *amakhosi* already referred to: "It is not just AIDS we are targeting here, but *healthy living*!"

If we adopt the notion of 'scripts' and 'scripted objects', as developed by Akrich (1992) and Latour (1992), attention would turn to the ability of objects, devices and settings to act on subjects. As Verbeek (2006: 362) puts it "[L]ike a theatre or a movie, they [Latour and Akrich] hold, technologies possess a

'script' in the sense that they can *prescribe* the actions of the actors involved" (emphasis added). In contrast, when we follow Marres (2012a; 2012b) and speak of objects becoming 'charged' or 'resonating' with issues, the focus is not on the 'innate capacities' of objects, but what is political about them is seen as more 'open ended', less determinate (Marres, 2012b: 37). The political nature of objects, devices and settings is seen as stemming from the *projection* of issues, which in turn equip them for moral or political action.

In the following section I now turn attention to my observations at an annual virginity testing celebration that took place in December 2011 close to KwaNkilinda, in Inkosi Maphulo's traditional authority. Describing in detail the events of a single day, I concentrate on the different actor groupings that took part: the testers, the young women, local health care professionals and the traditional leaders. The objective will be to explore in what manner the practice of virginity testing – much like male circumcision – is overlain with different levels of engagement, i.e. in what manner has virginity testing come to 'resonate' with a range of issues?

2. One annual virginity celebration

On a field adjacent to Induna Mhlophe's homestead, a tent had been erected with chairs for what seemed like 200 people at least (see Fig 8). The *induna* [headman sg.] was one of Inkosi Maphulo's headmen, his daughter, Lundile, was the tester whose monthly testings I had come to attend regularly. The previous testings had also always taken place at 'Baba Induna's' homestead ('Baba Induna' was how he was known by most). Being the 'annual' celebration, this event was much larger than the monthly testings. Two cows had been slaughtered the night before, and Lundile had gone to great length in the previous weeks, "telephoning away too much cell phone credit" as she kept on emphasising, in an effort to invite all the 'stakeholders' to the event. Inkosi Maphulo and a few of his other *izinduna* [headmen pl.] were due to come, health care workers from a clinic in the nearby town had been invited, the local ward councillor, two business men who had close relations with the chief, as well as representatives from the Provincial Department of Health and the Department of Arts and Culture.

In the large tent in front of Baba Induna's homestead a few things were still being set up. A series of tables had been put up at the front in a u-shape for the invited VIPs, and a little space remained in between the audience chairs and the u-shape tables – here the 'maidens' would later dance and sing. What was going on felt like a confusion of young men trying to fix the sound system, numerous toddlers playing with and moving around the neatly aligned plastic chairs, two or three groups of older girls who had also moved the chairs and were sitting around, chatting, gossiping, applying make-up and taking cell-phone selfies, and a group of three elderly ladies sitting in a row at

the edge of the tent. The group of elderly ladies, of whom I knew that some were also testers from a different community, sat with their arms crossed, and on occasion gave the toddlers or the group of girls a verbal reprimand, followed by a silent, disappointed 'glare'. Parked next to the tent was a pick-up from the Hillcrest AIDS Centre whose members were unpacking and beginning to set up their 'testing area' under a gazebo. They would later conduct rapid-HIV tests. Lundile, the tester, was nowhere to be seen. After I asked one of the sound system men, I was told that she was still helping with food preparations.

The 'actual' virginity testing had taken place the night before and had followed the same routine as in that which is conducted on a monthly basis – the girls had been invited to Bada Induna's homestead. Lundile frequently termed this part of the testing "a sleepover" during which she would have the time to talk to the girls until the late hours of the night; "we talk about things like marriage life, our culture, how to protect yourself and I tell them that 'you must be proud of who you are'". Lundile stressed her 'educational' function and emphasised that through the relationships that developed to 'her group' of girls, she sought to instil in them "self-confidence, dignity and pride". For this, she explained: "I can't always be strict with them, and when we spend the night together, it is also fun. They can talk to me". Through her engagement with the girls on a regular basis, she managed to build up individual relationships. "I care about them you know, because they are almost like my own [children]", she remarked. Scorgie (2002: 65), who has engaged far more explicitly with the position of the *abahloli* [testers] in the revival of virginity testing, makes a similar observation. To 'ensure' that girls do not become sexually active before they are old enough, "[f]or the *abahloli*, the central point is that children need to be guided into adulthood, they need to be 'looked after'".

I hadn't been able to find Lundile, so I sat with a group of girls in the tent. They asked me to take pictures with my camera. "Perhaps", they asked, I could later "post them on facebook?" Engaged with waiting for poses and taking their pictures, another girl approached the group and asked me whether it would be a problem for me to ask my field assistant "to go home". She said that they attended the same courses at the University of KwaZulu-Natal (UKZN) and that she "felt shy" to have him here. "You see later, we will also take our tops off when *inkosi* comes. He is not from here you see, I only know him from UKZN [University of KwaZulu-Natal]". With 'not from here', she meant not from the area. I readily agreed and talked to me field assistant. He was understanding and left to pursue other matters for the day.

At this stage – we now had 9:00 am – the girls were ushered by the two representatives from the clinic who had finished setting up their gazebo to form a line for the rapid HIV test (see Fig 9 - 10). The girls asked me to come along and queue with them. Perhaps it was because I had, at their request,

asked my assistant to leave, and was now 'alone', that they took the initiative to have me 'tag along'. We stood and talked and the group was interested to hear my thoughts about the event. Was there something comparable to virginity testing in Germany, they asked? Then, one of the younger girls from this clique sought to switch the group's conversation from English to *isiZulu*. She appeared concerned about something. After I asked a few times what was wrong, the others explained that she was worried that the test would show that she is 'positive'. Also trying to console, I responded by asking: "If the test last night showed that you are a virgin, then do you have to worry about this one?" One of the older girls then jumped in and responded for her. She said: "You see, that test [referring to the testing the night before] does not show everything! That is why she thinks there might be a problem."

In this conversation that continued in front of the HIV testing gazebo, the girls highlighted a few of the 'problems' they face in their everyday-relationships with 'boyfriends', 'lovers' as well as other acquaintances that one girl referred to as "the men you maybe meet here and there". Slowly made aware of the problem, the main issue in the group appeared to be that a few of the girls had had anal sex and now their presence in the HIV testing queue brought about a sudden rush of concern. At this moment, I only gained the smallest of insights into their lives and the difficulties that underlie their relationships with men. What the conversation nevertheless made clear is that while they share high levels of awareness about HIV/AIDS, it is difficult to "save oneself completely" and to avert all forms of sex. Particularly, because peer pressure to engage in courtship and gain sexual experience is high in those friendship circles in which virginity testing plays less of a significant role. "Some of the people at UKZN [University of KwaZulu-Natal] they know and they also feel strongly, I mean *care*, about these things. But of course, many don't. And those, they *judge* you!" Sibu, who had remained quiet so far, jumps in. "Sometimes, it helps you, you know? If you can say to some guy that you go to virginity testing. If he respects you and your belief, then he will not pressure you".

Let me continue with detailing in a few more lines, the conversations that unfolded in this queue. (I here paraphrase from a recording and the notes I took later in the day). The girls continued to talk in what was half English, half *isiZulu*. Sandile, whom I had already met a few times and who was also a student at UKZN, realised that I had trouble following, despite being eager to engage. She said "I have told you about my boyfriend, yes?" She laughed as she referred to him as 'her boyfriend'. The group giggled and another girl teasingly flicked her arm. "Me, I don't do these things with him, I stay *pure*". The group got loud and funny. "No! serious. I stay pure. But it is difficult. I think it will not last long. He gives me a lot, but I don't give! You understand what I mean, Eves? [sic]" "What does he give you?" I asked. "Ahh things" She smiled and looked down. Another girl quickly interjected "Sugardaddy, she means, her sugardaddy". Sandile laughed, but also grew more and more shy. She asked me in a sterner manner whether it was a 'suggardaddy' or a

'boyfriend'. She seemed to seek words of approval or agreement from me. "He is older, but we have been seeing each other for almost a year", she adds. "Sure, he is a boyfriend then!?" she asks.

What her story highlighted was the form that 'transactional relationships' also took – they were enduring and for her not unlike "normal relationships". Sexually, Sandile negotiated ways of practicing sex – 'what she wanted', 'what she didn't want' – but this wouldn't go on forever, she emphasised. Eventually, "it will be difficult to stay *pure*" as Sandile put it, "and I will maybe decide to leave him". "For me, it ['staying pure'] will continue to stay important so that I don't loose myself". Again, the girl who had just teased her with a 'sugardaddy' remark, again jumps in. "What Sandile is saying, for us it is important to have *both.* Like to do *this* here, which is our *culture*, and to have our life at DUT [Durban University of Technology] or somewhere". As we continued discussing, the queue in front of the testing gazebo slowly moved forward, and our conversations seemed to distract somewhat from the fears that had been the topic prior.

Much has been written on young women's engagement in 'transactional sex'. Posel (2005: 131) for instance highlights, "For large numbers of young women, sex is often the indispensable vehicle for consumption"[5]. With reference to the work of Selikow et al (2002), Hunter (2002) and Ashforth (1999), Posel (2005: 131) emphasises how women make recourse to

> "[…] a range of sexual partners who meet particular material needs (for transport and rent, as well as for fashionable clothing, mobile phones, etc.) – men who are sometimes called *inkukhuyami* ('chicken') to be 'plucked' for their money rather than their love – or, in a different genre of classification, the 'minister of finance', 'minister of transport', or 'my ATM'".

Sex is consumed and at the same time consumption is sexualised (ibid). These studies highlight what also becomes significant for an understanding of virginity testing, namely the present day politics of sexuality, the complexity of gender relations, changing discourses of sexuality, the values attached to courtship and sexual experience and for how the meanings and materialities of sex are negotiated in everyday relationships. Present day virginity testing campaigns foreground complete abstinence, which is hard to maintain, particularly if courtship and sexual experience are highly valued (Wickström, 2010: 540). For young women, virginity testing is not just about delaying their sexual debut, but also becomes the site of efforts to negotiate everyday

---

[5] The general argument that Posel (2005: 151) makes here is that "sexuality is situated within an economy of exchange" – which also has implications for men. "In order to have sex, men must have purchasing power. But men who simply have sex with women, without being able to make their partners' lives and the lives of their children secure, are not respectable (Hunter 2004)".

relationships and sexual encounters, and in somewhat Foucauldian terms, incorporates 'techniques of the self' (see also Posel, 2005: 134). Sandile emphasised the importance of not ''loosing herself' – akin to the fear of loosing her sense of core that grounds her. Importantly, the young women who take part in virginity testing make explicit their active *engagement* in public conversations about sex and gender ideals – how they foreground, interrogate and address a wide-range of topics that relate to their ways of being female and *their* experiences with men. Sandile's friends' remark that "for us it is important to have both" in addition points to how virginity testing must be located in struggles to resolve a crisis of identity – the contradictory demands and conflicting desires that arise from the 'being caught' between an essentialised 'traditionalism' and that which is sometimes framed as "the *right* to be urban", including economic mobilisation and the allure of self-invention.

Once each girl had undergone a rapid HIV/AIDS test, a certificate was issued with their status, which was then carried around together with the virginity certificates. I did not notice that anyone was tested 'positive' – but I also assumed that if this had been the case, it would most likely have been silenced. On a previous occasion, during a monthly virginity testing, I had been made aware that a young girl had come to be tested, but Lundile had found out she was no longer a virgin. "I examined her, and *it* [the hymen] was no longer there". Lundile suggested that she would inform the parents, for perhaps the girl was also raped. Lundile had not said much to the girl directly, only that they would need to speak later. When I asked Lundile, whether the other girls would find out, she suggested "I will talk to that girl later in private, and to her parents. The group, they will find out when she herself tells them, or when she doesn't come back".

Once all the girls had been tested, they stood around and again found the time to socialise and chitchat, comparing each other's certificates. Only a few minutes past the last HIV/AIDS test, the girls were ushered into the tent to rehearse a few songs. An air of expectancy was establishing itself, and I was told by Lundile that the *inkosi* and his *izinduna* were already on their way. As the girls took their place in chorus rows, they were at this stage also asked to take off the white tops. For the arrival of the traditional leaders, the girls would be bear-breasted, wearing only the 'traditional', uni-coloured red or black skirts, some also having a wrap-around fabric with a print of the King that they draped over the shoulders. A few girls clearly felt uncomfortable and had to be 'reminded' a few times that they needed to take off their shirts.

A phone call came at around 11:30 am that Inkosi Maphulo and his *izinduna* had arrived, and had parked a kilometre up the road, the girls made their way in a procession – as a group, singing and dancing – followed by a collective escort of the car and its visitors back to the field and the tent (see Fig 11). As the men got out of their car, they were saluted by one of the *amabutho* [warriors]. The young man, with shield and spear, was wearing one or more

(real or fake) leopard skins. Standing across from the traditional leaders, it became visible that neither Inkosi Maphulo nor his *izinduna* were wearing what they had on previous occasions defined to me as 'traditional Zulu dress'. Inkosi Maphulo wore a suit, as did two *izinduna*, the others dark trousers and buttoned shirts. The only clothing symbolic, or iconic, of 'traditional' dress was the goat-skin headdress of one *induna*, and the goat-skin wristband that most of them wore[6]. As they entered the tent, and took their seats, I was asked to sit to the immediate right of the *inkosi*. The maidens performed a series of ceremonial dances.

Lundile was first to speak a few words of welcome. She kept it short, welcomed everybody and especially thanked the community members – the chief, the traditional leaders, the elderly women who had stepped in to help on all corners, the fellow testers that were present, and 'her girls'. As she put it, 'her girls' had come to her earlier in the year and said "Ma! We would like to be recognised now", upon which she approached '*Ndabezitha'* [the chief] and the other leaders and made clear, as she put it, that "recognition needed to be paid to these girls for what they have done". She added quickly "I am tired, I have been running around a lot, I will leave the talking to everybody else today. I thank you!"

Lundile hands the microphone to the health care practitioner from the nearby health clinic whose team had earlier conducted the rapid HIV/AIDS tests in the gazebo. She does little in the way of formal greetings and immediately addresses the girls, first in *isiZulu*, then in English, as "the flowers of the nation" – a common address in the context of virginity testing. As she says: "I want you to know why you are called 'flowers of the nation'. We elder people have made mistakes in life but our *hope* now hangs with you, do you hear me? This is why you are called our 'flowers of the nation'".

She seems to deviate from the otherwise scripted protocol of such functions, noticeable by the murmurs that go through the rows. She does little in the way of greeting the different stakeholders present, and devotes only little time to welcoming and praising the chief and the *izinduna*. "It makes me angry, when I see our children so beautiful like this but I don't see the boys. The problem is that the boys will be proposing to these young girls, meanwhile they have been gallivanting everywhere". She turns to the traditional leaders seated to her right, requiring them to listen carefully. "If I had my ways, the men would also be here too. Older men know how to test men's virginity, which is what is needed now". She underlines the persistence of gendered dangers, the intensity of rape, violence occurring in intimate relationships, teenage

---

[6] The goat-skin wristband (*Isiphandla* in *isiZulu*) is deemed to have protective qualities. In most cases, it originates from an animal sacrifice, whereby a bracelet made from the hide of the slaughtered animal is given to the person who performed the sacrifice as well as to his/her family members. In a social context, the wristband is likely to take on additional significations, in some contexts; 'wealth', devotion to 'ancestral beliefs', and/or signifying the importance one ascribes to one's rural home area.

pregnancies and emphasises the many cases that she and her colleagues witness week after week at the clinic. What makes her 'angry', she repeats, is the 'silence' that ensues around the sexuality of boys and young men. She points out "We can't solve the problems we have, if we just concentrate on the females".

She continues with a story of a recent patient in the clinic who was tested HIV positive, despite the parents (both tested negative) assuring the clinic doctor that their daughter was "still a virgin", that they "have a certificate". Following a lengthy consultation with the patient, the patient confessed that she had had anal sex. While a few in the audience begin whispering to each other, the clinic representative continues. "I want to talk to you about this, you will have to forgive me" she says so as to apologise for what she feels might be a taboo. The chief at this stage leans over as he sees me writing notes and tells me that her name is Mrs Tebogo.

> *Mrs Tebogo:* There are other things that are happening here, done by these young girls who come and do virginity testing. They do these things because they don't know better. You will find a person will try to convince the girl to sleep with him, saying to the girl 'if we do it this way no one will be able to tell'. Today, I want to speak to the virginity testers and to the mothers who are here, who also know what I am talking about.

She pauses and then turns her attention to the girls who are seated on the floor. The tent was broadly divided into three, the invited guests seated at tables at the front, testers and community members seated on chairs towards the back, the virgins seated on the floor in the middle. "You young girls you know what I am talking about, you learn about these things in school, that there are different ways of having sex. A man will tell you that; 'It is ok!' 'Because the virginity testers they only look in the front, but if we do it from the back, no one will notice!'" She speaks softly, haltingly, and with long pauses to accentuate the seriousness of the topic. Readily apparent is thereby the silence in the tent – no murmuring, no whispering, no giggling when she goes on to speak uninhibitedly about sex.

She again returns to the story of the young girl that was tested at the clinic – the parents both HIV negative, the girl positive. Here, the clinic staff had 'discovered' a girl who had attended virginity testing events, and had infected herself through unprotected anal sex. "I prefer girls that are being called stupid because they won't sleep with any one, rather than clever girls that will soon be walked on top of". She adds: "You are the coming-up-nation. We want to create a *new* nation. We do not want to create a nation without *culture*, that is why I call on you, the 'flowers of the nation' to take care of yourself". She pauses again so as to let the audience take in her statement.

> *Mrs Tebogo*: The last thing is, in those tents, we are not only testing kids.

We want the whole community to participate. […] Another thing is I want to see the men there. People who go to clinics are mostly women. Right? Men seem to rely on their wives, thinking if the wife is negative, I am also negative. So in those tents out there, we want to see men leading the lines, and then women, and then children. [...] Everything that happens in the tent is between the two of us, there is no congregation there, so you better go now and get tested or you will be coming to the clinic with a wheelbarrow!

The revival of virginity testing has gained support by both KwaZulu-Natal's Department of Health and the provincial Department of Arts and Culture. The health care practitioners who conduct the rapid HIV/AIDS tests, amongst them Mrs Tebogo who held the speech, thus also represent the Department of Health. In familiar language, Tebogo spoke of the 'silences' that have been upheld throughout the revival of virginity testing. As she emphasises in a conversation with me later that afternoon: "the things I talked about are not 'silences' to mean people 'don't know' about them, but 'silences' in the sense that people *ignore* them". It hasn't always been the case that the health department and, as a consequence, trained medical staff, have been invited to attend and speak at these meetings. She regards the practice explicitly to be a form of public health care initiative that seeks to increase individual and collective responsibility for sexual practices contributing to HIV infections. She herself, also views it as a 'tool' for female empowerment – primarily if virginity testing is considered for its "practical side", as she puts it. Then, she argues, it is not merely that 'responsibility' is placed on women, but the connotation becomes one of greater sexual autonomy for women and the capacity to 'negotiate'. While believing that the practice could be 'reformed' from the inside out, if silences such as the practice of unprotected anal sex were addressed, Tebogo still shares common ground with the other actors present, in particular in terms of *what* has become 'concernful'. That is, that the epidemic is symptomatic of a much larger 'moral crisis'.

Songs and dance were again performed between the speeches. A representative from the Provincial Department for Arts and Culture was the next speaker. She congratulated the community and the traditional leaders on having organised such a large celebration to pay recognition to the girls. I still sat next to Inkosi Maphulo, who now leaned over to say: "This is Mrs Zondo. It is very good that this lady from the Department came. You will see, it is very good!" The *izinduna* seated to his left were quietly still discussing the previous speech, uninterrupted by the beginning of Mrs Zonda's address.

Mrs Zonda's speech is short. She is in a rush, she explains, to also attend the wedding of a family member. As the invitation had come from *inkosi* himself, she felt a sense of duty to at least attend shortly. Zonda speaks only for a few minutes – about the Department facilitating the training of the testers across the province, then that the department's goal is to see as many 'maidens' as

possible at the next reed dance in Nongoma[7]. Then she makes clear that to *her*, virginity testing is about being 'pure' – as it is always said – but that 'being pure' encompasses more than Tebogo, the previous speaker, had suggested. "It is about how you show respect to the older generation, how you treat other people". She adds, now in English, "It is about moral regeneration". She switches back to *isi Zulu*. "Virginity testing is part of our *culture* and for this reason it must come back. This is what the Department [for Arts and Culture] does. It is committed to bringing back *our* culture". First 'culture' is accentuated as she speaks, then it is the 'ours' that is emphasised. The department assists *amakhosi* with the budget for such events, she explains. "*Amakhosi* alone don't have the budget for such events". "We try to link virginity testing with other programmes, you see? Important is that our culture, our custom, is brought back. That it is not erased!" During Zonda's final remarks, the audience was distracted by the *amabutho* [warriors] walking alongside the tent, taking their seats close to where the testing gazebo still stood. Inkosi Maphulo, before getting up to speak next, leaned over and whispered to me that the appearance of the *amabutho* was to serve as a blessing for the girls, "the flowers of the nation".

Maphulo spoke next and welcomed the invited guests. Everyone was likely to be hungry, everybody had taken too long with their speeches, he said, so he would be the last, and keep it short. He addressed Baba Induna, *at* whose homestead the event took place, and who was now seated outside with the *amabutho*.

> *Inkosi Maphulo:* We thank you warriors for coming here. It is very bad if we do this ceremony for the virgins without your presence. Last week we had the ceremony for the virgins at KwaNtoloza, close to where I live, and there was no young man. So we are happy that in this village of Baba Induna, we can see *amabutho* and young men, and it is important to me that they are listening to what has been said here.

Maphulo then turns to Zonda. He says:

> *Inkosi Maphulo:* I would like to make a request to *Ma'* [Mrs Zonda from the Department of Arts and Culture] since I have heard that she has to go now. *Ma'* I went to Engonyameni, close to Umlazi. There was a virginity ceremony happening there and I found that their space is too small and there are too many kids. I want to propose: it is better if they host their kids and those from surrounding areas here close to KwaNkilinda. [...] We have a very big place here and it is beautiful. We can fit a lot of tents here, the virgins can come and camp here, and the Department of Arts and Culture can assist in organising ceremonies such as this one. We can assist like today – there are two cows that we

---

[7] She here refers to the annual 'reed dance' ceremony, *uMkhosi woMhlanga* that takes place in August or September at the Royal Enyokeni Palace in Nongoma, northern KwaZulu-Natal.

donated for the people to eat, all *izinduna* that are sitting here, I ask them to bring a bottle of something. Even the *induna* who is a Pastor has to bring a bottle of brandy [the audience laughs]. I will be the first to buy a cow and request the others to do the same [women begin ululating].

Lundile, with the help of another tester and two young girls, carries in a large, neatly folded lion print blanket – a common gift for the chief during such functions. Inkosi Maphulo eyes the preparations unfolding around the gift, the chair that has been placed at the front for him and announces that he must also come to an end with his speech. He thanks everybody individually.

> *Inkosi Maphulo:* We also want to thank in particular Baba Induna and the *amabutho* [warriors]. The young men here must protect our virgins who have come here to be tested. We are not saying they should not admire them but as they also represent the royal house, they represent us. [...] It is important that everyone should respect the virgins, respect them, not forcefully touch them, because they are the future of this country.

As Inkosi Maphulo welcomed all the invited guests and in the end again named individuals he sought to express his gratitude to, he mentioned, amongst others, the name of the local ward councillor, Cllr Mkhize. Previous speakers had also made reference to him. Initially, I took little notice of this gesture, for it was protocol for every speaker to individually repeat the names of those that a previous speaker had also welcomed. I knew the ward councillor from my fieldwork in the area and during Maphulo's speech I made the observation that he had in fact remained auspiciously absent all day. He had been greeted repeatedly, but was not present during the event.

The repeated reference to the absent ward councillor, the traditional leaders' choice of dress on this day, as well as Maphulo's decision to devote considerable time to illustrating his local network of relationships (who had donated how many cows when), together illustrate some of the political dynamics that surround the revival of virginity testing *locally*. Upon asking Maphulo why in fact everyone, including himself, had greeted the ward councillor who was absent, Maphulo simply remarked; "It is protocol!" His answer, in turn, allows for two possible interpretations (potentially also more): a) the reference made to an elected political leader in the course of an event, even when that person is absent, implies that the people present perceive the event as not only following a 'traditional', but also an inherently 'political' logic – and thereby abiding to political rules and norms; b) by repeatedly drawing attention to the councillor, the speakers explicitly seek to make his absence from the event all the more visible.

The choice of clothing, in turn, adds another facet to these two interpretations. Aside from the goat-skin wristband, the majority of the traditional leaders wore nothing iconic of their role and status as traditional leaders and thereby

performatively leaving no room to assume that the present-day institution of *ubukhosi* [chieftaincy] upholds a political function distinct from state institutions within local politics. Inkosi Maphulo had emphasised how important it was that a representative from the Department of Arts and Culture was present. Mrs Zonda herself emphasised when she spoke that "*Amakhosi* alone don't have the budget for such events". On this day, virginity testing was framed as a 'service delivery' provided by the traditional leaders for the community. The event provides an insight into the 'intermediary' position that the chieftaincy upholds between the local and the national level. Also, through the signification ascribed to virginity testing as also a form of 'service delivery', the event is illustrative of one of the avenues along which traditional leaders seek to establish and safeguard their influence *vis-à-vis* elected ward councillors.

The largely still ambiguous position of the state concerning the roles and duties of traditional leaders within local government institutions has brought about – depending on local dynamics – both cases of inclusive cooperation and violent dispute between traditional leaders and ward councillors (Williams, 2010; Oomen, 2005; Beall & Ngonyama, 2009[8]). Traditional leaders continue to be met with great expectations of both the delivery of 'development' as well as the promise of more accountable and participatory politics (Williams, 2010: 28). In the case at hand, the ward councillor and Inkosi Maphulo were currently looking back on a few months of tense relations, during which the community members had frequently voiced their disapproval with the councillor[9]. There through, the attempt of the traditional leaders to effectively 'de-traditionalise' themselves during this annual virginity testing celebration also, in part, sought to performatively create new understandings of 'delivery', that traditional leaders are well able to take on the roles of government officials. By inviting representatives from the clinic and the provincial ministries, the traditional leaders here escaped the image of representing nothing but timeless custom, and featured in contrast as politicians able to answer to concrete, present-day confrontations of misfortune. If virginity testings from other areas would indeed come to take place in Inkosi Maphulo's traditional authority, as he proposed to Mrs Zonda from the Department of Arts and Culture, this would bring with it means of 'brokering' (see Bierschenk et al. 2002; Mosse & Lewis, 2006) (To the relationship between traditional leaders and elected ward councillors, particularly to forms of 'mutual dependency', I shall return to in the next chapter).

---

[8] In the post-apartheid context, the political institution of chieftaincy has been the cause of much contention and concern. Considerable amount of research has concentrated on the formal and informal accommodations of traditional leaders and the manner in which state and local traditional authorities interact. These include, amongst others: Beall, 2005; Beall, 2006; Comaroff & Comaroff, 2009; Oomen, 2000; Williams, 2004; Krämer, 2016. The operational co-existence of the chieftaincy with elected government bodies will be discussed in more detail in Chapter 3.
[9] The ward councillor was, amongst other criticisms, facing allegations that he had raped a young woman in the community.

It was already late, around 17:00 pm, when Inkosi Maphulo received the lion print blanket and the final dances were performed. I was then invited for food at Baba Induna's homestead. In a rondavel adjacent to the main house, a few of the 'maidens' begun to serve food and liquor. Inkosi Maphulo, his *izinduna* and a few men from the community who I did not all know were seated in a circle, leaning with their backs against the round walls of the rondavel. A large wooden tray of different offal and beef cuts (uncooked) was brought in. These were from the cows that had been slaughtered the night before and we were asked to choose our bits. It was a lively atmosphere of much banter. As Maphulo explained, they were also joking about me in terms of being unable to choose a cutting from the offal cuts when the raw meat had been brought in Different cuttings had different meanings, and in the same manner that the head of a cow was for instance always allocated solely to the *amabutho* [warriors], one induna had suggested in a joking manner, they should also reserve a particular piece of the cow for the anthropologist – that would make it easier for him/her to choose. Maphulo assured me that the joke had no earnest intent, and that they also frolicked with him. He should, they suggested – also provoking much laughter – finally choose his wife amongst the girls that had been certified today. As an *inkosi,* he explained to me, he was increasingly coming under pressure to find a second wife. The banter continued, plates of the cooked meet were brought in and the bottles of brandy that different guests had brought made their rounds.

Before leaving in the evening, I found a brief moment to speak again with Inkosi Maphulo in a quiet corner, outside in the compound. He asked me if I had enjoyed myself. I, in turn, reflected in a few mere sentences the unfoldings of the day. I said to him: "The event was *not only* about the virgins, was it? There was much attention also to the young men". I reminded him that the first speaker, the health care representative from the clinic, had been uninhibited about addressing in front of the audience, the need to revive virginity testing for men. Thinking back to what she had said, he smiled briefly, then he became more earnest again. "I can't take these ideas seriously!" With this he meant male virginity testing. "Yes we need to get a hold of these young men. Like Baba Induna is doing with the *amabutho* here. They [the young men] were here today. They *should*, that is *good*. But when it comes to men's circumcision, as I have said to you before, it needs to be done in the clinic. Eisshhh." Immersed in his own thoughts, he sighs and shakes his head with this last sentence.

2.1 A local public health initiative?

In what sense does virginity testing represent the revival of a historical cultural practice? In what sense does it represent, as Wickström (2010) has argued a 'local public health initiative'? Virginity testing has been revived in a

context in which gender identities, masculinities and femininities, have undergone historical changes; in which economic inequalities between the genders have taken on new forms (Hunter, 2002; 2010); and in which the once established patterns of sexual regulation no longer operate. Initiation schools are no longer serving the function of socialising young men into only practicing non-penetrative sex – such as 'thigh sex' – before marriage. As Wicktröm (2010: 358) writes, drawing on Gaitskell (1982: 341), "[i]n contrast to the Victorian concept of chastity, virginity among Zulus has not previously been associated with abstinence. The important thing was to avoid penetrative sex, defloration, and thus pregnancy". Today, in contrast, being a virgin is primarily connected with abstinence (ibid). Also marriage rates themselves are rapidly declining due to high unemployment rates and the high price for *ilobolo* [bride wealth] have made marriage unaffordable for many (Hunter, 2010). The concept of delaying your sexual debut is thereby no longer linked to a core institution of sexual regulation, namely marriage (Markus, 2008).

What the presence of the health care representatives at the event illustrates – as do also the considerable energy that is devoted to the documentation of the monthly testings, the issuing of virginity certificates and HIV status certificates, as well as the debates that repeatedly rise up concerning testers' criteria for determining a girl's virginity – is a progressive 'medicalisation of the practice, or even 'scientisation' (see also Thornberry, 2015; Scorgie, 2002). What Mrs Zonda from the Department of Arts and Culture emphasises in an interview that I had with her a few days after the event, is also a 'professionalisation' that accompanies the role of the testers. "Mothers and women are now being trained and 'workshopped' as testers. They get certificates for the training they do with us. They are then the ones who teach the maidens how to behave. Not only that you must keep your virginity but also about the *culture.* Also things like respecting the elders". Funded training programs give those women who work as testers, primarily older women, a central role in smaller communities and now pursuing what is in a sense a profession, also status. Lundile, the tester at the event discussed here, emphasised that she was not a nurse and that she had not received the training that a community health worker perhaps received, but at the same time, she said, she was working in the same 'field' as these professionals. Somewhat akin to the notion of an 'experienced–based expert'.

From this, it remains important to note that a historical practice from the past is here actively re-introduced as representing custom and 'traditional culture' and is being revived in a context utterly different from the prior – "juxtaposed to other objects, enmeshed in new relationships of meaning" (Handler & Linnekin, 1984: 280). It thus has become something 'new', something else. The historical horizon of the practice however remains central and does not appear to fade, also for testers like Lundile. As Lundile once forcefully put it: "We are bringing back something that we have done since the time of Shaka". Secondly, while on the one hand the practice of virginity testing has been

medicalised, the concept of 'virginity', as Wickström (2010: 544) emphasises, has also been 'widened'. Virginity testing is not just about fighting the HIV/AIDS epidemic in a tangible way. The practice, similarly to male circumcision, has come to resonate with a range of issues. By connecting virginity to the protection of the political and cultural unity, virginity has been made into "a matter of public concern" (ibid: 535).

In the following final section, I want to pick up Wickström's (2010: 532) notion that virginity testing in fact is "a 'preventive ritual' more than a 'diagnostic measure'". I want to consider in relation thereto the question: a preventative ritual – in the sense of making do 'what' or preventing 'what'? Inspired by Marres' (2012a; 2012b) concern for how objects, devices and settings acquire a range of normative capacities, facilitating moral and political action, I want to consider how virginity testing (much like the *Tara KLamp*) come to resonate with a range of *issues* – not just HIV/AIDS.

3. Material participation

Thornberry (2015: 133) argues that the popularity of virginity testing is at least in part being fuelled by the belief that such practices help "to recreate a lost social order, one that predates the corrupting influences of European rule" (see also Moletsane 2011; Marcus 2009). In the face of the HIV/AIDS epidemic, virginity testing represents both "a kind of local public health initiative and a collective ritual" (Wickström, 2010: 533). Wickström writes further: "even if the individual girl is the focus of the testing, it is mainly about reinstating and reinforcing morality, not only in individual girls, but also in the community as a whole" (ibid: 535). Let me in brief draw on the speeches held during the annual virginity testing celebration close to KwaNkilinda. The girls were frequently referred to as "the flowers of the nation", which, as the clinic representative explained, is taken to mean that "the *hope* now hangs with you". This applies to the girls tested but in general terms also to the 'younger generation'. Tebogo further emphasised the need to address the sexual responsibility also of boys and men. "We can't solve the problems we have, if we just concentrate on the females". Here problems extend beyond the HIV/AIDS epidemic, as she spoke of rape, domestic violence and teenage pregnancies. Politics of nationalism were invoked, when Tebogo then said: "You are the coming-up-nation. We want to create a *new* nation".

Let me also consider a few snippets from the other speakers' remarks. The representative from the Department of Arts and Culture, Mrs Zonda, who was given the microphone after Tebogo, immediately sought to underline that 'being pure' meant more than being a 'virgin' in the medical sense of the term. "It is about moral regeneration", she argued. "Important is that our culture, our custom, is brought back. That it is not erased!" Inkosi Maphulo, the final

speaker, then again said that "our virgins" must be protected, for they "are the future of this country". Later, Maphulo, during our conversation in the courtyard before I went home, spoke of the need to "get a hold" also of the young men. What had the girls themselves said? Talking about relationships that they were having, one girl who is pursuing a degree at Durban's University of Technology, had said: "[…] for us it is important to have *both*. Like to do *this* here, which is our *culture*, and to have our life at DUT [Durban University of Technology] or somewhere". Sibu, who had also stood in the queue of the testing gazebo, remarked: "Sometimes, it [virginity testing] helps you, you know? If you can say to some guy that you go to virginity testing. If he respects you and your belief, then he will not pressure you".

In these comments, virginity testing as a practice is linked in differing ways to the struggle for empowerment, as due to instil in young women self-confidence and self-esteem, as raising responsibility for health issues, and as furthering a respect for elders, respect for tradition and custom. It is seen as one of many responses to the breakdown of morality that politicians, religious leaders, and social commentators regularly point to – a means of recreating a lost moral order. Further, reference is made to the struggle to fashion a new, good and unified South African nation. Virginity testing is framed as a setting equipped for moral and political action that enables one 'to do ones share' in the battle against HIV/AIDS, but also beyond the epidemic, enables a form of 'participation'. Remaining 'pure' is framed as a common, everyday way of dealing with those issues that cannot be talked through, which cannot be considered in their entirety, whose full complexity cannot be grasped. Participation, as Marres (2011) would put it, is made 'doable'. Tangible (and material) answers are given to the ethical question of 'how to act' on a given issue (Verbeek, 2006). In this setting, acts that "flow from natural concern with oneself and one's close environment" are translated into acts of value for a larger common good (van Oenen, 2012: 99). Virginity testing, we can say, is made to simultaneously serve multiple agendas.

3.1 Facilitating participation, the capacity to do 'good'

Previously, I discussed Marres (2012a) example of the 'tea light' and how this light frames an everyday material action (making tea) as a form of action upon the environment. Here, I want to draw on another one of Marres' (2012b; 2014) examples of material participation, namely the 'environmental teapot'. Teapots in the UK, she suggests, have been "proliferating with special intensity in publicity media, in the context of a broader hype around sustainability and environmental living". As she writes:

> "These teapots were usually accompanied by slogans advertising the
> special opportunities offered by kettles and teapots for saving money,
> energy and the environment: 'boil only what you need', 'keep your kettle

in check', 'green your cuppa' [...]" (Marres, 2014: 260).

Teapots came to invoke a range of 'related' but 'different' issues, including climate change, the smart grid, sustainable design, coal-fired power plants. Teapots, Marres argues in her analysis, have become '*charged*' with issues and thereby gain normative capacities. She locates the teapot within politics of nationalism. "The very ordinariness of the teapot makes it possible to invoke a population: because it is both ubiquitous and supposedly culturally specific, an everyday practice like tea drinking can be taken to imply membership in a larger collective" (ibid: 262). Herein, the normativity of objects is not understood as residing in the 'blueprints for action' that are inscribed in objects and projected onto subjects – akin to the notion of 'scripts' by Akrich (1992) and Latour (1992) – but rather something that 'happens' on the level of things.

In the case discussed here, what makes it possible for virginity testing as a setting/a practice (in the case of the *Tara KLamp* also a particular device) to invoke particular issues? How does it come to align it with particular moral and political purposes? For the teapot, Marres argues the answer lies in a) the manner in which campaigns have visually established connections between a teapot and the planet, b) how teapots became 'digitally enhanced' providing for instance a real-time feed, whereby the object received data about current carbon emissions in the UK, c) and the techniques of labelling of consumer products. The analysis of the annual virginity testing event makes clear how the associations to issues are *performatively* brought about by the actor groupings present – i.e. the traditional leaders, the provincial government, health care workers, local business men, etc. – through their presence and their enunciative acts.

Certain connotations, for instance of virginity testing as a 'preventative' measure in the battle against HIV/AIDS, are, at least in part, brought about by the attendance of particular actors, in this case the health care workers, the visibility of their testing gazebo during the annual celebration and by the status certificates that are issued. In the case of male circumcision, the use of the *Tara KLamp* has been proclaimed as enabling men not only to do 'their part' to slow the spread of the epidemic but also to preserve 'traditional ways'/ to counteract 'a loss of culture'. Significant here, is that a particular connotation of male circumcision was on the one hand achieved by the enrolment of particular actors, namely the monarchy and a few traditional leaders, but also through the manner in which the device itself has been 'equipped'. The *Tara KLamp* was marketed with particular instructions, informing the user that the device can be applied at home, at religious sites or, as a representative from the Department of Health put it, "in any other 'non-medical places'". This was said during a meeting with the *amakhosi* at the Local House of Traditional Leaders. In sum, it is particular textual and technical cues that come define the device's capacity for political and moral action. The normative dynamics of 'scripting' and of 'issueification' are here interrelated.

Scripted objects are said to be political for the effects can be traced back to them. "[T]he more singular its effects, the stronger the scripted objects' claim to politicality", is Marres' (2012b: 15) argument. When attention is in contrast placed on how particular objects, devices and settings become 'charged' with issues, "it is the variability of forms, issues and associations that the object may accommodate, which signals that we are dealing with a 'normative' object" (ibid: 16). Marres (2012b: 15) adds that it is "the contrasts and tensions among the issues and associations that are loaded into the object" that come to define the normativity of the object. The 'issuefied object' in contrast to the 'scripted object' enables, in Callon's (2009) terminology, a form of co-articulation. One device of engagement becomes multi-faceted. A form of 'normative adaptability' becomes apparent in the sense that objects, devices and settings can be made to serve a variety of normative agendas (Marres, 2011: 521).

Through co-articulation, moral and political action is enabled in a number of different registers all at once. In the case discussed here, virginity testing is being framed as enabling a form of HIV/AIDS prevention, as disciplining the subject into adopting a positive lifestyle, providing the resources for being a 'responsibilised citizen' (Robins, 2006) as well as bringing about a return to 'African tradition', the reinstalling of moral and cultural values, including the respect for elders. Importantly, during events such as the one discussed here, in this space, it becomes clear how *alignments* are *produced* performatively between these different registers – so that 'remaining pure' is at once about the HIV/AIDS epidemic, Zulu culture and the post-apartheid nation. It is through the public critiques of virginity testing, that the contrasts and tensions between the different associations are rendered visible again, that these alignments are called into question. Consider in this respect for instance the public debate that ensued in response to the 'maiden scholarships' of the uThukela District Municipality.

3.2 The politicisation of sexuality, the fate of the nation

Particularly the connection that is established between virginity testing and the struggle to fashion a new South African nation requires further consideration. In every society, sexuality and biological processes are laden with social significance and moral aspects. Sexuality is always political, a site of "multiple strategies of regulation and discipline" – generally to a greater extent for women than for men, and at particular historical conjunctures these semantics gain more political relevance than during others (Posel, 2005: 127). Posel (ibid) in a text on the post-apartheid of politicization sexuality, makes more explicit the manner in which sex and sexuality have become connected to the nation building project in South Africa. She writes:

> "Meanings and materialities of desire, forms and technologies of pleasure,

ways of practicing sex, and the sexual identities which attach to all of these, form and reform within other hierarchies of dominance and the contestations they provoke. And of course, sexuality is always the site of multiple and contending regimes of moral regulation. Yet at certain moments, the regulation of sexuality becomes the site of more intense, angry and anxious controversy and confrontation"

Post apartheid South Africa has been in the throes of such a moment. Posel adds: "the politicisation of sexuality is perhaps the most revealing marker of the complexities and vulnerabilities of the drive to produce a newly democratic, unified nation" (ibid). Sex and sexuality have become entangled with politics of nationalism and strategies of nation building, the HIV/AIDS epidemic has been declared a 'national catastrophe', such that debates about both inextricably become a reflection on the identity and values of the national subject. Drawing on George Mosse (1988), Posel (2005: 145) illustrates how sexual decadence and deviance represent widely appropriated signifiers of what she terms "the atrophy of national character and the moral dissolution associated with it". The association is made possible, in part, by the powerful symbolic resources and metaphors that centre on the family, the body and kinship. Nations, as well as cities, human and political communities, have for long been metaphorically conceptualized as persons or bodies. The family, body, kinship are familiar building blocks to make sense of larger entities (Herzfeld, 1997: 5). These metaphors in turn provide, what Posel (2005: 146) fittingly terms "symbolic recipes" for the healthy containment and the productive disciplining of sexuality, and enable associations to be established between for instance the practice of virginity testing and the community of the nation[10].

What implication does this understanding of objects, devices and settings have for how we see publics and how we come to define engagement with particular issues and political participation more generally? The proposition is that it should lead us to reconsider the *means* by which *participation* is accomplished (Marres, 2011). Increasingly, there have been attempts to locate public engagement in everyday practice – very prominently, for instance, when it comes to environmental issues (Asdal, 2008; Berk & Fovell, 1999; Dobson, 2003; Hawkins, 2006; Marres, 2011; Marres, 2012a; Stolle et al. 2005). Campaigns in recent years have promoted everyday material activities "like heating, cooking, driving and washing" as providing "especially suitable sites for 'doing one's share' for the environment" (Marres, 2011: 511; Hinchliffe,

---

[10] In this discussion, it is important to note that the value of 'virginity' and the testing of young women for virginity has historical connotations across the world – a hymenal inspection had been carried out on prostitutes and the psychologically unstable in Europe in the nineteenth century and right up to 1918 (Svanström 2006; Wickström, 2010: 541). Findings suggest that it might again be growing practice internationally (Behrens, 2014). Consider in particular the 'virginity pledge' most common in the United States, the 'Silver Ring' movement, and 'sexual abstinence training' – many of these include ceremonies at church or in schools in which girls and boys pledge to preserve their virginity until marriage, through oral or written commitments.

1996; Hobson, 2006).

While it is problematic to speak of virginity testing or male circumcision as representing a form of 'home politics' or 'everyday politics' in the sense understood by this line of scholars, what nevertheless proves valuable in their perspectives, is that a) attention turns to the methods and techniques of public engagement and concerted action beyond institutional frameworks, b) they push us towards rethinking the division between 'private' and 'public' that commonly still secures boundaries of citizenship and c) that they do not define public engagement primarily in terms of 'literacy'. As Marres (2011: 511) writes on the latter: "rather than seeking to increase people's *knowledge* about the issues", the focus is on "*action and impact* – on what people do about the issues in question" (emphasis in original). An alternative conception of public participation develops, in the sense that an element is added to its predominantly informational and discursivist notions of participation. Material activities, many mundane, come to be recognised as being 'overlain' with levels of engagement. Marres (ibid: 513) adds: "It suggests that public participation cannot be adequately accounted for in terms of abstract procedures or general methods only [...]". Akin to Marres (2011: 513), the point that I have sought to stress in relation hereto, is that the ability of objects, settings and devices to enable public participation is not innately *given*, i.e. it is not in "the nature of things themselves" to enable public participation. The focus is rather on the 'loading' of issues onto objects, settings and devices. In the most recent debates around the 'maiden scholarship', a link was for instance drawn between 'keeping your virginity' and 'gaining education'.

It would be misconceived to argue on the basis of these observations detailed here that 'a new type of citizenship' is emerging and that former types are in the process of being 'supplanted'. The attention paid to participation located in material practices does however make clear that there is another figure alongside what Marres (2011: 512) terms the 'informational citizen', namely 'the material public'. In Africanist anthropology there have been detailed analyses of everyday material practices that work to contest existing demarcations of the political, (Chance, 2015a) and the politicisation of mundane infrastructures that equally constitute efforts to redefine the urban political (Chalfin, 2014; Robins, 2014; Larkin, 2013). Central to the notion of 'material public' put forth by Marres (2011; 2012a) are the relations between: participation – material objects, settings and devices – and everyday practice. Rather than material devices of participation supplanting or becoming the successor of traditional formats of citizenship, she argues, the relationship between these three is often more 'nuanced' and 'ambivalent' (Marres, 2011: 513).

I here want to suggest that it becomes productive, in the case of virginity testing, to see the practice as a tangible means of addressing a range of issues through the manner in which the setting has acquired 'normative capacities'.

The effect of taking part, can be understood in terms of 'doing one's share' to "override the failed solutions and non-solutions of the state and elites" (Appadurai 2002: 39, 40). At the same time, 'tradition' is invoked to 'critique' contemporary economic and political realities, in "moments of the reflexive crumbling of the social order" (Decoteau, 2013a: 154; Honneth, 2010: 377). As Decoteau (Decoteau, 2013a: 154) suggests further: "For many, the past signifies horrific racism, violence, and oppression, but also the glory of struggle and the hope for freedom". Where the rewards of liberation have been distributed unequally, "'tradition' is often summoned in an attempt to control an uncertainty that is profoundly felt" (ibid: 154; see also Comaroff & Comaroff, 2000). This is also a form of condemning, as Chance (2015b: 861) puts it, "the proliferation of 'rights' and their violation". In sum, this means that material forms of participation can be understood as firmly *co-existing* with the more abstract procedures or methods, but as also subjecting the latter to scrutiny.

4. Concluding remarks

The revival of virginity testing has been critiqued for it represents a practice that, in its current form, cannot be said to have deep historical roots. As Thornberry (2015: 132) however highlights, "proponents of current virginity-testing revivals do, however, consistently appeal to an idea of custom rooted in nostalgia for a pre-colonial past". Hand in hand with narratives of a 'return' to the past, Vincent (2006: 27) suggests, is the notion that "to go back is to be renewed, to slough off the burdens of colonialism and its imposed ways and to find healing and wholeness in a pristine imagined past". Secondly, the revival of virginity testing has been critiqued for being inherently unjust. The practice is hereby said to be discriminatory, placing the attention on girls and young women, and thus working to perpetuate and strengthen a harmful patriarchal moral order (Behrens, 2014: 177). The growing popularity of the practice can hereby, as the argument of Leclerc-Madlala (2001: 533) goes, be located within a gendered meaning-making process that sees the HIV/AIDS epidemic as the result of "women being sexually 'out of control". Testing is further considered as an affront to women's privacy, dignity and bodily integrity (Behrens, 2014).

In the scholarly discussion that ensues, Wickström (2010) has primarily framed the revival of virginity testing as a form of 'public health ritual' (see also George, 2008). KwaZulu-Natal is often considered as the epicentre of the HIV/AIDS epidemic. Local understandings primarily frame the revival of the practice as a response thereto and as an effort to "deploy collective pressure and symbolic means both to increase the individual's and the communities' responsibility for sexual relations" (Wickström, 2010: 532). She adds further "[b]y making virginity a matter of public concern, people can help girls delay their sexual debut and encourage men to respect girl's sexual

integrity" (ibid: 535). Even though the individual girl remains the focus of such testings, the practice is primarily about "reinstating and reinforcing morality, not only in individual girls, but also in the community as a whole" (ibid). Wickström (2010: 532) urges us to see virginity testing as "a preventative ritual, more than a diagnostic measure".

Picking up Wickström's (2010) proposition, the objective has here been to *first*, consider the attempt to extend virginity testing to boys and young men. Behrens suggests, that this was a response by the Zulu monarch to the critiques that the practice was inherently discriminatory. Set in relation to the controversies that unfolded around meaningful criteria for determining male virginity, King Zwelithini announced in 2009 the revival of male circumcision amongst young Zulu men. Framed as a 'once Zulu tradition', the King said that he would like to see mass circumcision campaigns rolled out across the province in the battle against HIV/AIDS. Second, I have detailed my observations at an annual virginity testing event close to the township of KwaNkilinda. The objective has been to explore the spectrum of 'issues' with which virginity testing is being associated, i.e. the 'issues' that are invoked by the different actor groupings present. What, in turn, appears to be organised is *more* than a 'preventative public health ritual' (Wickström, 2010), also represents to the different actors present a tangible means of engaging with particular issues and of doing one's share for the 'larger whole'.

Drawing on Comaroff & Comaroff (1997), Wickström (2010: 546) writes "[v]irginity testing in Nkolokotho is a question not of resorting to tradition, but of re-tooling culturally familiar technologies as new means for new ends". I want to argue that the manner in which virginity testing indeed becomes a 'means' can be specified further. First, as I have suggested, virginity testing has been 'loaded' making it an especially suitable setting for 'doing one's share' in the battle against the HIV/AIDS epidemic, but also providing the means for becoming a 'responsibilised citizen' (Robins, 2006), enabling a return to 'African tradition', and thus helping to recreate a lost social order. The phenomenon is one of 'co-articulation' (Callon, 2009; Marres, 2011).

Public participation is enabled through a form of material action – and in many different registers all at once. This understanding is critical, I think, *firstly* in the sense that it adds further 'nuances' to the understanding of virginity testing as a form 'collective ritual' that Wickström (2010) has convincingly proposed. The elaboration carried out on the basis of Wickström's understanding, is that objects, setting and devices can become the object of a form of 'normative adaptability'. *Secondly*, virginity testing as a form of material participation comes to *challenge* "certain classic assumptions regarding the proper locations and formats of public involvement" (Marres, 2010: 178).

By recognising the different levels of engagement with which the revival of virginity testing has become loaded and thereby *made* into a form of 'material

participation' – i.e. a means by which individuals come to practically intervene and engage – we are prompted to 'open up' commonly held assumptions on the distinction between the public and the private, and between everyday mundane political practices and the realm of political participation. An issue-centred perspective, then, helps to bring into view different modalities of virginity testing and the significance of its revival. Its potential I can best frame as questions. Speaking in Dewey's (1991 (1927)) language, the question is what 'issues' stand at the centre of virginity testing practices? Speaking in Latour's (2005a) language, the question is, around what 'assemblies' do various 'publics' come to convene, and *how* do these new configurations come to take on a political face?

Fig. 7

Newspaper article
published in the Sunday
Tribune in October 2011
(Picture: Eva Riedke).

Fig. 8

Tent erected for the
annual virginity testing
event in front of Baba
Induna's homestead
(Picture: Eva Riedke).

Fig. 9

Girls queuing in front of
the HIV/AIDS testing
gazebo. (Picture: Eva
Riedke).

Fig. 10

Fabrics depicting the
Zulu monarch, King
Goodwill Zwelithini.
Many girls draped these
around their shoulders
during the event. (Picture:
Eva Riedke).

Fig. 11

Girls dancing in a
procession to meet Inkosi
Maphulo and the
headmen that arrived
with him. Their car was
parked a short way up
the road from where the
tent had been erected.
(Picture: Eva Riedke).

Monday - November 2011

I attended a meeting of the traditional leaders in Pinetown at the '*Amakhosi SupportOoffice*' – the first meeting during which I was formally introduced to the *amakhosi* [chiefs] who lands fall under the municipality. After the meeting, a buffet was set up in the hallway outside. Through the open door, Victor, who had chaired the meeting, gestured to one man standing in what had then become a talkative food queue. He simultaneously explained to me: "Eva, I still wanted to introduce you to Inkosi Maphulo. Remember? The one who I said would be good for your research? Come, let's go".

With Inkosi Maphulo, I rehearsed the greetings and introductions that I had recently learned in *isiZulu*. With an amused smile, he seemed impressed by the mere gesture. Following the usual small talk and the three or four well-rehearsed sentences that by now served to sum-up my project, Inkosi Maphulo invited me to his house for Friday. I asked him for directions to his 'homestead', to which he did not respond immediately. Looking into a distance – as if letting the road-turns run through his head – he remarked after a moment: "Are *you* the one driving?" Before I could assure him that that wouldn't be the case, he continued: "I think it would not be good for you to come by yourself. You should go to the police station in KwaNdengezi. [PAUSE] You know that place, yes? Ask them to provide you with a police escort." He repeated to Victor: "That is *their* duty! The police there, I mean. They should give her an escort!" With a sense of unease that neither Victor nor I had much to say in response, I merely looked to Victor, who gave Maphulo's wish an approving nod.

Friday - November 2011

I went to the township police station to which Maphulo had requested I go. I politely asked whether someone could show me the way to the "*inkosi's* homestead" [the chief's homestead]. The policeman behind the counter smiled with no immediate response. A colleague standing behind him looked up attentively from a file in his hands. Only smiling, I felt like both were in that fleeting moment entertaining the same form of amusement. The first officer chuckled and then responded jokingly to me: "That old man really thinks he can just have us drive you there?" [PAUSE] [LAUGHING] "Well, he didn't inform us! And I don't think he is the sergeant here".

Upon discussing the issue further amongst themselves in a neighbouring room – the door towards me however left open – they came back and told me: "We currently have no car to provide for an escort. The only car is in Pinetown at the moment, there was an incident there".

As they suggested, I took a seat in the waiting area, next to an elderly lady and another woman my age with a crying baby. The officers continued going about their daily business behind the counter. Judging the occasional nod in my direction – so as to greet, however not demanding an additional exchange of words. They were nods which also gave me the impression that everyone had been informed who I was and what I was waiting for. The police station was hosting an unusual spectacle this morning.

My impatient looks from the clock on the wall, back to the counter, back to my cell phone, in turn, most likely also made no secret of the fact that I felt an embarrassed unease – and I was sure that from all sides, this was a mere voicing of power. The two officers knew that I knew, and for that reason, we then also smiled. After an hour, I concluded that the car would most likely not show up – or, as I presumed, it had been parked outside all along. I proposed that it might also be an option to have someone accompany my field assistant, Sipho, and me in 'our' car. Once he dropped me off, Sipho could drive back. The officers agreed without hesitation, and a policewoman was called to accompany us in our car.

After the bridge, that lies outside the boundary of the township, to the left, and off the paved road, the police officer remarked that this was now 'traditional territory'. After a few turns on the most washed out road, it seemed like no one in the car really had an idea where we were going. The conversation in the car switched to *isiZulu* and while it was clear that we were merely trying different forks in the road, I nevertheless sought to ask how far it could be. The police officer said; "Eh, I am sorry! I am not sure where the *inkosi* stays. I know it is somewhere on this hill. But you know 'we' never come here. We must ask around for directions".

Seeing KwaNdengezi from the gate that we finally reached, we had undoubtedly taken long for the distance travelled. As Sipho and the police officer turned the car to immediately head back, Inkosi Maphulo and his wife opened the gate. I rehearsed my greetings to them and as they watched the car drive off, they inquired whether the trip had been "ok". I responded "it was fine, *Siyabonga*". "I also went to the police station, as you suggested, but it seems like not everyone there knows where you live". His tone went earnest, with an expression of also being somewhat amused. He responded "Eiisch! That is not the case! [PAUSE]. That is what they said? These people! The township is right there! [*pointing across to the next hill*] They can see me from where they are seated! Don't believe them!"

Chapter 3. This chapter focuses on the *processual* nature of issue articulation as well as the manner in which the enactment of concern, and participation more generally, explicitly constitutes a *material practice*. It traces trajectories of issue formation that centre on matters of 'housing', 'land' and 'development'. The chapter begins with the story of a chief and his insistence that, as a chief, he faces a "lack of power through land". It then explores the disputes unfolding around two local housing projects in the area – in the course of which different sets of actors, across different sites, sought to render concerns - entangled with to those of the chief - 'visible' and 'tangible'.

CHAPTER 3
A chief that urbanises –
houses on land contested

W hen I first met Inkosi Maphulo in 2011, the Provincial Department for Cooperative Governance and Traditional Affairs (COGTA) was building a new house for him in his compound. Since 2010, COGTA funded university courses for *amakhosi* on topics of rural development; good governance; on matters of political leadership and in computer literacy. Some *amakhosi* had received cars and laptops; others even received a new house[1]. All efforts were aimed at "strengthening", as publications from the department repeatedly put it, "the interface between the government and communities", i.e. to accommodate traditional leaders in the local governance structures (see COGTA, 2014). It underpinned a larger process of putting the policies that existed on paper into practice. When the first group of traditional leaders were being honoured in a graduation ceremony for a course on good governance at the University of KwaZulu-Natal, a newspaper article read:

> "the programme will help traditional leaders better understand key aspects of local governance, such as municipal budgets, encourage closer working relationships with councillors, and allow them to remain relevant as they rule over increasingly "dynamic and modern" subjects" (Jansen, 2012)[2].

The cars, the Department's Executive, Nomusa Dube, said in a handing over ceremony, would allow traditional leaders "to attend meetings", to "co-ordinate the operations in the province", "to do work for their people". With the handing over of laptops, the Department expressed expectations that traditional leaders would now cooperate and work more effectively with ward councillors and begin to attend council meetings. In this speech, Nomusa Dube said the gifts were "aimed at improving the status of traditional leaders after years of being marginalised by the apartheid government" (see also Hans, 2011).

The new house that was built for Inkosi Maphulo was a modern three-bedroom family home (rectangular in its form). To the left, on the flank of the hill, providing a view over the valley, a modern all-brick rondavel with a large window front had also been built. The rondavel stood next to the three-bedroom house in which the chief was to move in with his family. The

---

[1] I here again use the terms 'traditional leader', 'chief', as well as the isiZulu terms '*inkosi*' (plural = '*amakhosi*') relatively interchangeably. I recognise that the use of the former has been particularly contentious as using the term can imply a notion of stasis. I however employ the terms 'traditional leaders' and 'chiefs' in accordance with common usage, official publications and as terms also used by these *amakhosi* themselves.

[2] See Ndanliso (2015) for a newspaper article reporting on a graduation ceremony in 2015.

"modern round hut" Maphulo explained to me, was so he could host his official functions. "There, I can have my meetings with his *izinduna* [headmen]".

A few months into my fieldwork, construction on the new house and the rondavel was completed. The family however didn't move in for another few months, and continued to live next door. This pre-occupied me and I frequently asked about the "new empty house". In most cases, Maphulo changed the subject and diverted from my question. One day he eventually reasoned: "It is very *new*. It is not a *traditional* house. [PAUSE] People talk, you know? We are waiting bit. You know here [the old house], I also have this one and this one [*pointing to two rondavels in front of the house*] for my ancestors. With that [the new house] it is not the same. I can't just move, you understand?" As he carried on, his answer entailed a conflation of multiple explanations: personal nostalgia for the old, concerns – his own as well as those of 'others' – over 'how an *inkosi*'s homestead *should* be', leading, in turn, to a tactical move, his attempt to soothe concerns by waiting. Waiting, he seemed to hope, would make felt that 'it wasn't an easy step, also for an *inkosi* to move into a new house'. "A new house like this one", he emphasised.

Through our conversations in the coming months, a number of distinctions carried on – particularly between rondavel and rectangular houses, of which both had 'new kinds' and 'traditional kinds'. While many families living in the area had both, more and more families opted for rectangular houses, Maphulo told me. In addition, he maintained further distinctions between these, the township houses and the informal/*jondolo*/shack settlements. Standing in front of his house, one day a few months later, Inkosi Maphulo again talked about the houses and emphasised that glaring divisions bisected the landscape – between in his traditional authority, the township, and the informal settlements on the township's fringes. He said: "Eisshhh. There is no more land!" He sighed, caught in his own thoughts and seemed to speak primarily to himself. Standing next to him, he became frustrated in the course of the conversation that to me, these divisions in the landscape were not visible. He was adamant "I know some say they can't see it. But it is not just *me* who knows (gesturing towards the hills). You can *see* it!" The frustration I sensed seemed to be tied to the fact that 'seeing' these divisions was in his eyes central to understanding other concerns he grappled with 'as chief'. "Here you can see, I have no power through land", he finally added.

1. Introduction

I pursued the question of what Maphulo had meant when he had said "I have no power through land", a point he would repeat also on other occasions. What he and I had been talking about as we had stood here on the lawn in front of his house, I was to learn, were more widely shared concerns and

sources of public unease which catalysed the emergence of a series of disputes and conflicts. This chapter is devoted to processes of 'issuification', understood as entailing two parts, a) "the emergence of ontological trouble" as an event and b) "the specification of this trouble", what we may say are processes of 'issue formation' or 'issue making' (Marres, 2014: 270).

This chapter makes its arguments in three sections: *first*, I provide a brief introduction to local government structures at ward level. The complex political arrangements that exist locally come to define the concerns and uncertainties voiced. As I take as a point of departure the story of a chief, I am also partial to the legislative accommodations made to the institution of chieftaincy ('*ubukhosi*' in isiZulu) since the end of the apartheid. The roles and functions of other individuals that feature as part of the governing elite at ward level – for instance, as headmen or ward councillors – will feature alongside. *Second*, I will turn in detail to a conversation I had with Inkosi Maphulo sometime in January 2013. The conversation, which I recite here at length, introduces a series of conflicts that were unfolding in and on the border to the township around two housing development projects. Therafter, in a *third* section, I will analytically explore the concerns articulated by the chief vis-à-vis those of other residents, providing a fine-grained account of the actions taken against the housing projects and what different actors perceived to be problematic. Considering in detail how different sets of actors, across different sites, participate by placing specific concerns related to 'land' and 'development' at the centre of public attention – and render them tangible – I consider how these articulations also worked to shake up common presuppositions of "who and what counts" (Chu, 2014: 353).

2. Local government – the accommodation of the chieftaincy

What had become one of my 'field sites' on the outskirts of Durban was a peri–urban patchwork quilt of townships, informal settlements, and unambiguously rural areas. These all formed part of one 'ward' – the smallest administrative unit in the country (see Map 1 on p. 193). The image is one of houses and shacks scattered on the slopes of undulating hills, transversed by a river in the valley. On one hill up from the valley stood the chief's homestead, up the slopes on the other side begun the outskirts of the township. The councillor's office and the police station stood at the highest point of the hill across, clearly visible from the chief's house. On a ward map, the township dominated the centre of the ward's boundaries, and to the *East* and to the *South* it was bordered by two traditional authorities (of Inkosi Maphulo and Inkosi Mkhize). To the *North*, as one followed the main road that ran through the township and carried on beyond its fringes, the landscape gained a distinctly rural flavour. To the *West*, with land in part belonging to the township, in part to the Inkosi Maphulo, informal settlements blurred the borderlines, eventually stretching into industrial estates that lay outside the

ward. This heterogeneity, it was frequently said, had been deliberately designed into the re-drawings of post-apartheid boundaries – an attempt to dismantle an administrative machinery that functioned on the basis of social and racial divisions (see also Low et al., 2007).

2.1 Early negotiations towards a mixed polity

Since the end of apartheid, the operational co-existence of the chieftaincy with elected government bodies has been defined in an incremental, piecemeal fashion. Numerous policy guidelines have been issued since the 1993 interim constitution. However, the implementation of these guidelines continues to be characterised by much vagueness and ambiguity. As Marais (2001: 303) even suggests: "Perhaps the most neglected contradiction in South Africa's quest for transformation is the ambiguous status and powers conferred on 'traditional' authority systems". Tapscott (2008), Sithole & Mbele (2008), Beall & Ngonyama (2009) and Williams (2010) suggest that an overall 'lack of clarity' concerning the status and powers to be conferred on traditional leaders continues to reflect the ambivalences within the ANC itself. As Williams (2010: 2) writes:

> "Despite the fact that at its founding in 1912 the ANC welcomed the participation of chiefs in its organisation and many chiefs were active in the ANC throughout the anti-apartheid struggle, many believed that the apartheid regime had effectively de-traditionalised and de-legitimised this pre-colonial institution. In this vein, it is the view of a number of politicians, journalists and scholars that at some point in the future the chieftaincy must be abolished in order for South Africa to become truly democratic (Ntsebeza, 2005; Mamdani, 1996; Munro, 1996)".

The scholarly literature frequently summarises the present-day authority and influence of 'traditional leaders' as deriving primarily from three 'pillars': their role in solving local disputes; their role in managing the allocation of land rights and land use, and thirdly; their perceived role as a custodian of 'culture', 'tradition' and 'morality' – latter securing them a central role in ancestral rituals and ceremonial performances (for KZN in particular, see Beall et al., 2005; Khan et al., 2006a; Beall & Ngonyama, 2009; Williams, 2010). These, as Williams (2010: 7) frames them, are the *expectations* levelled against a chief concerning the responsibilities he is to fulfil on a daily basis but, at the same time, they also mirror the main provisions – the main 'functional areas' for traditional leaders – that have progressively been worked out and implemented by the post-apartheid state. Let me trace this process of accommodation by providing a brief historical perspective.

Traditional leaders in KwaZulu-Natal in particular were, from the period of constitutional negotiations, backed by two organisations that lobbied on their behalf – CONTRALESA, initially founded by a group of traditional leaders

from the KwaNdebele Bantustan in opposition to the homeland system, and by Chief Mangosuthu Buthelezi who in 1975 had founded the Inkatha National Cultural Liberation Movement (later the 'Inkatha Freedom Party'). Pursuing a federalist agenda, Buthelezi sought to attain "whatever sovereignty was possible for the 'Zulu nation', the king and traditional leaders ruling it" (Oomen, 2005: 46; see also Maré, 1992; Maré & Hamilton, 1987; Crais, 2006). CONTRALESA, in turn, was formed in September 1987 by KwaNdebele chiefs and headmen. Its aim was to unite all traditional leaders and to "school them in the politics of liberation, to fight for the eradication of the bantustan system, to win back the lands 'stolen' from their forefathers during colonialism", contributing in the struggle for a "unitary, non-racial and democratic South Africa" (Bank & Southall, 1996: 415). Initially steering a neutral line between the IFP and the ANC, CONTRALESA from 1990 onwards was affiliated to the United Democratic Front (UDF), the umbrella organisation of the mass democratic movement inside the country. In the negotiations that accompanied the formulation of an interim constitution, traditional leaders demanded an inclusion of a constitutional principle to secure and protect their authority alongside elected local government officials – upholding that they continued to represent *the de facto* local government institution "closest to the people". As Oomen (2005: 59-60) puts it, they were through and through critical of the envisioned function alongside a democratically elected local government, emphasising that this would be the case of "two bulls in one kraal" [3].

2.2 'Two bulls in one kraal'

From the time negotiations begun, party allegiance of traditional leaders was an important factor. Buthelezi owed much of his success to his support base among KwaZulu-Natal's chiefs and their headmen, who bought into and gave credence to his use of Zulu ethnic identity for political purposes (Beall & Ngonyama, 2009: 12; Maré 1992). Up until the late 1970s, relations between Buthelezi and the ANC were good, with the ANC-in-exile hoping that he would play a key role in aligning the large isiZulu-speaking rural constituency with the ANC-led national liberation movement (ibid.). In the 1970s a power struggle begun over the form that resistance politics should take –´ as Piper (2002: 76) puts it, "a struggle over the process to, and content of a post apartheid state". Territorial conflicts spread across the province between the mid 1980s and 1990s. It was a violent battle for control over black areas, to which 12,000 people are estimated to have lost their lives, with thousands more injured and displaced (see Kelly, 2012; Krämer 2007; Kynoch, 2005).

During the period of democratic transition, the ANC had actively sought to

---

[3] Another popular slogan during the negotiations was "two people cannot drive the same vehicle at the same time".

dissuade traditional leaders from participating in party politics. Particularly in KwaZulu-Natal, the ANC feared that if it failed to break the IFP's hold on chiefs, it would be unable to ensure a stable transition, both in the region and nationally[4]. Traditional leaders made significant concessions on the eve of the 1994 general elections. Two principles were added in the interim constitution, which read that when the final constitution would be drawn up, "the institution, statues and role of traditional leadership, according to indigenous law, shall be recognised and protected" and that equally "a traditional monarch shall be recognised and protected in the constitution". In a second resolution, in what was one of the last official duties carried out by ex-president F. W. de Klerk, was the passing of the *Ingonyama Trust Act*. Extensive state land was herein transferred to the Zulu King, King Goodwill Zwelithini, who became the sole trustee of some 2.8 million hectares of former 'tribal land' in the province, which could thereafter only be accessed, allocated or alienated by *amakhosi* and *izinduna* with his blessing (Beall & Ngonyama, 2009: 13; Oomen, 2005: 49). Being transferred to the Ingonyama Trust, the land became owned by the Trust, by the King and through him, by the *amakhosi*. With it's passing, those living under traditional authorities do so on what may be called usufruct rights (Khan et al., 2006a: 100). The passing of the Ingonyama Trust Act was significant for political party purchases of the chieftaincy. The establishment of the trust effectively created a schism between Buthelezi and the King; it worked to free King Zwelithini from his dependence on the provincial administration; and, as Beall & Ngonyama (2009: 13) put it, at the same time ruptured "Inkatha's claims to being the only representative of the indigenous institutions of KwaZulu".

The interim constitution granted traditional leaders an "*ex officio*" role in local government, however national and provincial governments soon clarified that this did not mean full voting rights but rather secured them a status as 'observers' in democratic governance structures. Traditional leaders held out for more and continued to demand that they be given a meaningful role in governance and in matters pertaining to service delivery and development (ibid: 51). The guarantees of the 1996 constitution had remained vague but effectively constituted "a bid for time" (ibid: 53). In 1998, in the *White Paper on Local Government* (1998), one of the first policy documents that explicitly spelled out the role that traditional leaders, it was similarly a role as 'overseers' of local disputes, adjudicators of traditions and customs and as facilitators on matters of development (Beall et al., 2005; Khan et al., 2006a). Read together with the *Municipal Structures Act* (Act No. 117 of 1998), traditional leaders were herein ascribed a 'consultative role' within local government institutions. Both documents however continued to deny the chiefs any privileged role in decision making vis-à-vis the elected councillors. Rather, what was listed in great detail - leading to an infuriating response from traditional leaders - was a long list of customary functions: "to facilitate the gathering of firewood, to

---

[4] In the first elections, the ANC won by an overwhelming majority, but lost KwaZulu-Natal to the IFP. It was not until 2004, that the ANC would receive a dominant vote in the province.

coordinate first fruit ceremonies, to coordinate rain making ceremonies, and to attend to matters of witchcraft and divination" (*Business Day* article quoted in Oomen, 2005: 67).

2.3 Re-demarcation

In 2000, the national municipal demarcation process in South Africa led to the reconfiguration of municipal administrative boundaries. In Durban, negotiations around new boundaries took place between 1996 and 2000[5]. When the new boundaries were eventually redrawn, Durban Metropolitan Council (then renamed into eThekwini Metropolitan region) became 68% larger (Khan et al, 2006a: 96). This extension was mainly due to the incorporation of peri-urban and rural areas – extending so far so as to include 17 traditional authorities within its boundaries. Of all stakeholders, the traditional leaders were particularly hostile to the demarcations. In her discussion of underlying anxieties, Beall (2005) emphasises the 'political party' dimension. The *amakhosi* were predominantly still IFP supporters, while the majority of the elected councillors in the Municipality were affiliated to the ANC. With the re-demarcations, the influence of the municipality would grow and *amakhosi* would not as easily be able to "bypass" – getting what they wanted from the IFP-dominated provincial government (Beall & Ngonyama, 2009: 19). Contrary to other Municipalities, eThekwini, in turn, however took a unique stance in 2003. As Michael Sutcliffe, then City Manager, announced in his Newsletter on 18 March 2003: eThekwini would be "the first metropolitan area, and the first major municipality, to allow for traditional leaders to participate in the affairs of governance". This meant that eThekwini would become on the first municipalities to try and put the vague stipulations of 'cooperative governance' into practice.

The 'progressiveness' of the municipality's stance on traditional leaders gained recognition. The concerns of traditional leaders were nevertheless not ameliorated and continued to coalesce around a set of key issues. They emphasised that the accommodations that existed on paper would henceforth still need to be put into practice. Their actual roles, representation and remuneration in municipal structures needed to be clarified (Beall, 2006: 13). Related thereto, the balance of power between them and the elected ward councillors remained poorly defined. *Amakhosi* were expected to travel to meetings of the City Council in Durban, but would, in such meetings, have no voting rights. eThekwini Municipality would be responsible for service provision on their land when located within the municipality's boundaries –

---

[5] The redrawing of municipal boundaries went hand in hand with a process of renaming. As Koopman (2012: 136-7) writes "almost invariably towns and cities with 'colonial' names used their African language vernacular names as the name of the municipality, while retaining the original name for the place". In 2000, the city of Durban thus became run by the eThekwini Municipality - much like the City of Pretoria became run by the Tshwane Municipality.

the municipality functioning and 'providing development' in areas under their jurisdiction (Sutherland et al., 2014). Traditional leaders herein feared that in the form their status and role alongside elected councillors had been stipulated, municipal authorities would always supersede their traditional leadership roles, would confer upon them an image of merely being "benign overseers". When it came to the hard facts of material infrastructure delivery, this would leave them unable to ensure that houses were built, roads paved, sanitation improved (Khan et al., 2006a: 97; Beall et al., 2015: 399).

The *Traditional Leadership & Governance Framework Act* (TLGFA) in 2004 brought some clarity. It paved the way for the establishment of 'traditional councils' and 'Local Houses of Traditional Leaders', and formally endorsed their operation alongside local government structures (Beall et al., 2005: 263)[6]. Williams (2010: 98) notes the goal was "to 'transform' the chieftaincy so that it could coexist with modern, democratic institutions". The body of traditional councils were to enable broader representation and greater accountability – henceforth they would need to consist of a maximum of 30 members, of which one third must be women. 40% of its members would need to be elected, while the chief would appoint the remaining 60%. The Act further mandated in what manner councils could be held accountable by the community, including regular meetings, meeting records and financial statements.

Most noticeable, the TLGFA stipulated with the new traditional institutions it created (councils and local houses), the specific functions that these, as well as the chief himself, would perform (Williams, 2010). As Williams (ibid: 102) further points out: "of the twelve separate responsibilities for traditional councils, seven refer explicitly to co-operation with local government on development issues". Co-operation was made explicit in that it stated traditional councils must cooperate with ward communities in the identification of community needs, and are to be secured a participatory role in the development of policy and legislation at the local sphere (ibid). In terms of hierarchy, the TLGFA nevertheless clearly maintained that: "elected local government institutions are the primary bodies of local governance for leading local development implementation" (ibid: 206). This left untouched the dilemma for traditional leaders "of having to engage with local government for developmental improvements, i.e. services, in order to retain their support base" (Khan et al. 2006a: 100).

The TLGFA was paralleled by the passing of the *Communal Land Rights Act* (CLRA) of 2004, which, taken together, was read by many critics as an eventual victory for traditional leaders. The Communal Land Rights Act (CLRA) intended to provide for legal security of tenure, by transferring title of

---

[6] Local Houses of Traditional Leaders would come to exist alongside the National House and the six Provincial Houses that had been established in the 1994-7 period, in the six provinces that officially recognised traditional leaders: the North West, Mpumalanga, the Northern Province, the Free state, KwaZulu-Natal and the Eastern Cape.

communal land to 'communities', nominally represented by a land administrative committee. Existing traditional councils largely took the position of such committees. Beall (ibid) notes:

> "The CLRA accords a central role to 'traditional councils' in the allocation of this land, which assuaged the anxieties of traditional leaders about losing control over this key source of power and influence, although it raised anxieties among those who saw it as deeply retrogressive and a problematic obstacle to the advancement of property rights"[7].

In the 17 traditional authorities of the eThekwini municipality, the passing of these Acts has meant that land usage continues to be under the control of traditional leaders; however the municipality has the right to take up issues of land usage in traditional authorities as part of their integrated development planning (IDP) and its implementation, but does not have direct influence over land ownership and tenure. As will become clearer, tensions regularly amount when infrastructural services such as roads, electricity and water are to be extended across boundaries. In sum, the relation of the chief *vis-à-vis* the local ward councillor can be seen as fundamentally hierarchic, while also subjecting both to a form of mutual dependency (on latter, see Krämer, 2016: 125-30). Much as Lund (1998: 6-7) describes similar relations between the *Chef de Canton* and the *Sous-Préfets* in Nigeria, it is 'land' matters that are permanently situated in the overlap between ward councillors and chiefs (see also Lentz, 2013).

2.4 The chieftaincy accommodated

What did Inkosi Maphulo mean, when he said he had "little power through land"? Scholars, policy makers and traditional leaders themselves at present continue to emphasise the legislative status and role of *amakhosi* must be understood in relation to *land*. "It is for the land", as the Director of *the Amakhosi Support Office* in Durban, Victor Mkhize, also put it, "that the municipality continues to court us". In meetings held at the office, consultants, ministry representatives, members of the municipality and councillors would regularly meet with traditional leaders to consult on matters of health, education and development. Traditional leaders, in turn, however did not attend council meetings. This was in part illustrative of the negotiation tactics of traditional leaders with the municipality, which was still involved in stipulating their rights in the eThekwini Council – i.e. their voting rights, their say in budget allocations, reimbursements for the participation at meetings, etc. I asked Victor why traditional leaders had not yet attended council

---

[7] Both acts continue to remain highly contested in public and scholarly circles. The volumes by Ntzebeza (2004; 2005), Ntzebeza & Hall (2007) and Claassens & Cousins (2008) represent some of the most prominent commentaries on the TLGFA and the CLRA and on the implications these two Acts have had, and continue to bring about for the institution of chieftaincy.

meetings despite being invited to do so, and he responded: "Well, we have a saying in isiZulu '*enethunga ayisengili phansi*' meaning 'He who has a calabash (milking pail) should not be obliged to milk on the ground'. With this we are saying to the municipality: 'Come to *us*, come to *us*, don't think of any alternatives!' We still have the land".

The notion of 'mutual dependency' is far more nuanced and complex than existing scholarly contributions may lead us to believe. Foregrounding primarily the interdependency that formally exists between chiefs and office holders in elected local government (former has land, latter has access to municipal budgets), what is sidelined are the attachments to issues around land and development. These are, amongst other factors, defined by Inkosi Maphulo's status as a 'peri-urban chief' and his "power through land" can only be understood by also considering peri-urban dynamics – i.e. the expansion of the city into the peri-urban areas; rural-urban migration in search of work; changes in the economic value of land; non-formalised renting and selling; as well as disputes over property claims that ensue. The 'problems' he grapples with, in part differ markedly from those that *amakhosi* face whose lands lie on the rural outlays of the city.

The story of Inkosi Maphulo draws attention to the fact that what he in everyday language terms "power through land" or even "legitimacy through land" is intimately tied to issues and processes of issueification. Processes of issueification are marked by moments of ontological trouble. The "uncertainty and 'unease', which tacitly, continually haunt social life" (Boltanski, 2011: 55) are herein rendered visible and become *entangled with* local presuppositions of "who and what counts" (Chu, 2014: 353). Following processes of issues formation also means following practices through which formal arrangements are actively negotiated. Issues defy formal political arrangements. That is to say, issue politics transgress institutionalised political orders, unfolding in the 'in betweens'. Following the trajectories of issue formation – in this case, how concerns over matters of 'land' and 'development' are articulated by different actors, across different sites – is a proposal to account for the manner in which 'processes of issue formation are *constitutive* of politics'[8] and thus also for how the post apartheid chieftaincy is on and on 're-formated'.

3. Inkosi Maphulo

The conversation with Inkosi Maphulo's that will follow, aims, in a very basic

---

[8] The objective is to elaborate on the general argument that the emergence of politics is to be captured by tracing the circulation of a particular issue cross different domains or various sites - see, amongst others: Latour (1999b), Barry (1999; 2001), Marres (2004, 2005a) and Gomart & Hajer (2002).

sense, to recount the wider context in which we both found ourselves at the time. I intersect the interview with short explanations and contextualisations – in addition to my questions –so as to underline, on the one hand, that there is no "story that 'tells itself'" (Briggs and Mantini-Briggs 2003 cited in Fassin et al. 2008: 226) and on the other hand, to render explicit the artificial character of my presence (as an ethnographer) (ibid). His account takes the form that it does due to "moments of life shared", taking me into his confidence, but also because all conversations during fieldwork somewhat remain "moments of work", formalised, as Fassin et al. (ibid.) remind us, "in such acts of storytelling".

Maphulo tells me of how he had come to 'loose' his land. He intertwines biographical elements with the wider historical context of his life. He excavates the past in order to render the present understandable to me – why the types of houses matter, where the divisions in the landscape lie, and why when a new house is built for him, he opts to 'wait'. The story of the chief renders transparent the contradictions, uncertainties and opacities that begun to fuel a series of conflicts between traditional leaders, the ward councillor, land developers, and those citizens that held their ground against lost land and forced removals. No doubt, these conflicts would also have been graspable if introduced from the perspective of one of these other actors, not the chief. However, foregrounding – primarily by granting his problematisations length and detail - the story of the chief, follows the proposition by Fassin et al. (2009: 226) in the '*Life & Times of Magda A*', that his story can be read as "the articulation of the two realities: *a life* inscribed in its *times*". The roots of issues also always lie in the past.

3.1 'Ndabezitha, just sign here'

I was sitting with Inkosi Maphulo in front of the new rondavel. A few months had passed since our conversation to which I had referred earlier in this chapter. Inkosi Maphulo had begun to hold the meetings of his traditional council in the new rondavel, as well as meetings of other sorts, with people who came to see him at his homestead. On this day, the air stood at a stand still in the hut. He suggested we take two chairs and sit on the lawn. As the wind whisked passed the hillside, there was always a steady breeze on the lawn.

Inkosi Maphulo, as we sit, shows me a pile of documents and certificates that he wanted to file together. Tapping the stack, he explains

> I am trying to complete them, it is for land I will claim back[9].

---

[9] In what follows, where words have been edited out, I have marked these sections with […]. A line break has been inserted whenever the speaker paused in a manner that suggested a change

[*He shows me the document at the top of the pile*] That was given to me by the consultant, but it is from Ingonyama Trust. I think you know that all *amakhosi* places are under Ingonyama trust, yes? So if there is a piece of land that must be transferred to eThekwini municipality, it is Ingonyama Trust that is doing the process.

[*He points to the township that we can see across on the next hill*] That place. During the phase of my father that place was under *inkosi's* jurisdiction. Then when my father died in 1974, that place was changed to a community authority. And then my uncle, through this *isiPhakanyiswa* – you know, yes? – he became the chairman of that community authority. My uncle was an *induna* [headman] but they made him into an *inkosi* [chief].

To explain: The father died in 1974 when Inkosi Maphulo was still a child. Unable to take the office, the community appointed his uncle to take the position of chief. In communities in which the *inkosi* holds office by virtue of an electoral procedure or appointment as opposed to hereditary succession, one speaks of '*isiPhakanyiswa*'. The person who is elected, holds the office for a period of five years and can then be re-elected or his appointment extended. His uncle functioned as *inkosi* for a total of ten years before Maphulo assumed office.

There are so many areas that used to be mine. Kinyaba was my area, Khaswayo, Salem, Luganda was my area. All of these places now belong to the municipality and I don't know how. I was not consulted. But I think they did it when - - [PAUSE] It is a problem with the passing of my father, then they got the chance to make some changes […].

Eva: So you believe this induna, your uncle, signed the land over to the municipality?

No, no. He never even went to school that man. The municipality is just taking land without our consultation. I am still going to follow for these places.

You see, it is the kind of houses that they are building which shows that this land now belongs to the municipality. They are not using the rural housing scheme. They are using the urban one. And they are issuing the title deeds. [PAUSE] 'One house per *umuzi*', that is what is being done in *amakhosi* areas. You see, when we talk about houses in this area [traditional authority], it is 'one house per *umuzi*' [household]. Only one

---

of thought. Explicitly longer pauses have been marked with [LONG PAUSE]. Words that were stressed/emphasised have been put in *italics*. When a sentence wasn't finished, I indicated this with - -.

house is built. Whereas in the municipal area, they use the lease of the people. They build as many houses as they can. But here in *amakhosi* area, 'one per *umuzi*'. […]

Here, also they don't demolish the old house when they build a new one. They *add* a house. You point the site, they build.

Eva: You say you will 'follow up' in some on these areas, what will you do?

Actually I am thinking to get a lawyer who can knock the doors. Because I can't do it on my own [PAUSE] to get all the information for those places. [LONG PAUSE]

I always tell the Mayor [James Nxulamo] that a lot of *my* land is here in Durban.

Eva: What does he say, the Mayor?

He is a politician! (*Gestures with his hand, as if saying to a child "go on"*) Just like this. He is a politician, eishh…politicians. (*He laughs*).

Eva: Speaking of the Mayor! Is there any news from Victor (coordinator of the Amakhosi Support Office) about when amakhosi *will start attending the municipality meetings in Durban. Last time I spoke to him, he said you were finalising the talks with the municipality?*

Well, they are still discussing. […] Now we are waiting for the Mayor and the Minister [Head of COGTA - Nomusa Dube]. Victor said that we must be workshopped before we attend, so that we can know what is to be done there, what is not to be done. Because the councillors have their own orders. [PAUSE] Also, we are waiting for the medical scheme and the pension, which we still don't have.

Eva: I see. When I last spoke to Victor, he was very optimistic that the negotiations will be good and that they (the municipality) will say 'yes' to the medical insurance and the pension scheme. [LONG PAUSE]

I know that the working relationship between you and the councillor in KwaNkilinda isn't the best. Do you think with amakhosi attending council meetings, your working relationship will change for the better?

Well, we [as opposed to the councillors] do invite the councillors in *our* meetings [of the traditional council]. And the councillor has got the powers to, 'to do what?' - to delegate someone who will be listening for the councillor in *our* meetings. […] Because we *do* need the assistance of a councillor. Because he is the one who has the budget. *We* have no

budget. But the councillors they've got the budget in the municipality. So these traditional councils they are working on the basis that they must consult the councillors for the budget. If you want to do something here. [PAUSE] Like development.

It is important to note that on the basis of the city's ward demarcations, a chief may be compelled to work together with multiple councillors as different ward boundaries transect his traditional authority. The same counts for ward councillors: one ward councillor is in some cases met by multiple traditional leaders (*amakhosi* and *izinduna*), who all have authority over land matters. Ward boundaries and the boundaries of traditional authorities do not coincide but rather intersect and criss-cross each other (See Map at the end of this chapter).

In my area, there are actually three councillors: Mkhize, Phewa and Cllr Khumalo. Mkhize is a new councillor, I can say that much. Phewa has been a councillor for five years. The working relationship is good. Mkhize is new, but I think his relationship will be good with me. Because, I can say to you, [PAUSE] he is a member of he ANC and I also support the ANC. I don't think there will be any problem. Because *all* the councillors are good with *amakhosi,* who they know that they like the ANC. Because they are being told there in the municipality, in the caucuses, that 'so and so is a member, he is someone who is working with *us*'. So automatically we don't have a problem.

They [Cllr Mkhize And Cllr Phewa] make their plans for the wards. Well, they don't *ask* me, but they *inform* me that "we have done this and this and this". As an *inkosi* I have the influence over Mkhize and Phewa to say "you must not forget to put this and this and this in there [development plans]". So we work together.

Eva: So your problem is mainly with Cllr Khumalo [councillor of the ward that includes KwaNkilinda]?

Khumalo is working alone! Of course he will tell you "don't worry, I am working together with *inkosi*". But Khumalo is working alone. He doesnt want any *inkosi* next him and especially he doesn't want Induna Ndlovu next to him. Because of the different political parties. [LONG PAUSE]

But, I mean now, the people over there [in Molweni] voted. They voted and they decided that they want what the municipality can provide them *now*. They want development *now now!*"

In an area of Inkosi Maphulo's traditional authority, known as Molweni, tensions had been rising in the past few weeks. Molweni bordered the township and fell under one of Maphulo's oldest headmen, Induna Ndlovu.

About this particular *induna*, most people readily told me the story that he was 'still' aligned to an opposition party "He is still Inkatha!". On one side of the road that passed by his homestead lay land that fell under the traditional authority, to the other side lay the township. A few months back, the municipality had made proposals to begin an urban housing project in Molweni. The housing scheme would also be accompanied by water and sewerage systems. In a series of community meetings, Induna Ndlovu had lobbied against the development scheme, however the community eventually voted for it – with the difference that it should take the form of *rural development* not *urban development*. Rumours had it that following this decision the relationship between the traditional leaders and Cllr Khumalo became tenser than ever before – in particular between the Induna Ndlovu and the councillor. Following the vote on the project, two other incidences followed, which fuelled further discord: Induna Ndlovu had allegedly on more than one occasion allocated land to new residents within existing compounds. Then in the past week, a woman living in the area who had protested against such allocations was murdered and it what was said that this had been a hit-man killing. I knew that Inkosi Maphulo was increasingly being cornered 'to act'. As someone said to me prior to my current meeting with Maphulo: "That man [Maphulo] he needs to get the situation under control!"

> Maphulo: It has been the councillor's tactic to tell people what party he [Induna Ndlovu] is in. I don't believe that if someone is a member of a particular party, that that should be a problem! I don't know, I don't believe in that. We are all people of God. And the parliament cannot work with one political party. There must be oppositions. So that this system of government can go on, there must be *observers*.
>
> *Eva: The problems with Induna Ndlovu in that area there [I point] are they on-going?*
>
> Yes. [PAUSE] If *induna* is allocating people in my land, Khumalo is taking the municipality to dissolve those houses.
>
> *Eva: What do you mean "dissolve those houses"?*
>
> Yes, he is working with the housing department from the municipality. If the councillor says "you must do this", they just dissolve those houses.
>
> *Eva: Do you think the problem with Induna Ndlovu and Cllr Khumalo is that Ndlovu is still a member of the IFP?*
>
> I know Induna Ndlovu is not ANC. I don't know whether he is still Inkatha. But I have got no problem with him. We work together. Because we put aside the politics. The councillor is another man! There is no one who has good relations with that man. [PAUSE] That man he

is killing too. If you are opposing him, he is killing you. I don't know why the people are failing to get rid of him, to put him out of his position.

I know that there are some members of the ANC in the [traditional] council and there are some of the Inkatha. Of the different political parties in fact. I know that. There can't be *one* - all under *one* political party, the whole council. […][LONG PAUSE]

Well, how can I say? [PAUSE] The leadership of the ANC, or else I can say, the Minister [Head of COGTA - Nomusa Dube] advised us to not to join [a political party]. She [Nomusa Dube] said "all the people belong to *amakhosi*. Then, you mustn't have the card [ANC membership card]". "You mustn't be involved too much in politics". [PAUSE] Not just Dube, but also the Premier [of KwaZulu-Natal - Zweli Mkhize] said this.

But I know that some *amakhosi do* have a membership card. I don't like that. I only have membership of CONTRALESA. CONTRALESA is a partnership of the ANC. And I have got the membership of that. [LONG PAUSE]

Well, even if I had a membership [of the ANC]. I would not be allowed to attend the political party meetings. The other people [of his constituency] who are Inkatha, what about them? […] You can't as an *inkosi*!

We always tell them [the people] that: "*inkosi* is not involved in politics". So they are happy about that. […] We always say that: "as the structure of *amakhosi*, we are under the government. We cannot oppose the government, because we are under the government. If another political party is winning the elections, we will automatically go under that political party. Because we will be serving them."

Eva: I understand. [LONG PAUSE] *I want to also ask you about the other problems on that side of the township (I point in the distance). The people from Nyala, the ones who have been protesting against Councillor Khumalo, did they come to see you again? They told me that they wanted to come and see you to talk to you about the documents, the Permissions to Occupy (PTOs) that they have for their land.*

'Permission to Occupy' is a form of leasehold, i.e. a conditional permit, whereby one may occupy a land in custody of a traditional leader, and develop the land as mutually agreed. These do not qualify for registration in a Deeds Registry, and holders can generally not use them for collateral. PTOs continue to feature centrally in debates about the South African land reform

and insecure tenure in communal areas (See Cousins & Hall, 2011; Classens & Cousins, 2008; Cousins & Classens, 2004).

To explain my question further. Nyala was a section of the township (therefore not under the traditional authority) in which tensions had been mounting progressively during the course of the past few months. A housing development project was being carried out since late 2012 in which fully state-funded RDP houses were to be built for residents who lived in heavily deteriorated houses, or for families whose immediate members could no longer be accommodated in a single house. A list was established by the councillor's office, listing heads of households that were to receive a new house. As work on the construction sites begun, a series of disputes arose between the community members and those responsible for the housing project on matters of a) where houses were to be built – and b) whether, for reasons of land shortage, houses could in fact be built in peoples' existing compounds and thus over the protection of graves in people's yards; as well as c) whether old houses could be pulled down before new ones were built.

When the first houses were finished, tensions intensified as people were seen moving into the new houses who were not from the local community. Accusations were levelled that the councillor had financially profited from replacing existing names on the housing list with a series of new names. The angered residents, in turn, begun joining the prominent shack-dwellers' movement *Abahlali baseMjondolo* and were working to make transparent the political meddling and corruption that had taken place. The protesters had told me that they also sought to gain help from the chief. While they no longer lived on land belonging to the traditional authority, they still held in their possession old PTOs for the land. Again, tensions were recently transformed dramatically, when a so-called 'outsider' – living in one of the new houses – was killed. The victim was a former *Umkhonto we Sizwe* (MK) soldier, who had allegedly been 'deployed' to the new houses, by the councillor, to ensure safety.

> (My question - again) Eva: I understand. [PAUSE] *I want to also ask you about the problems that side (I point). The people from Nyala, the ones who have been protesting against Councillor Khumalo, did they come to see you again? They told me that they wanted to come and see you to talk to you about the PTOs for their land.*

> They [residents] came here and I gave them this document [*again points to the documents on his lap*]. […] This one [*pointing*].

> Eish [*sighs*]. These places, they are all under eThekwini municipality now.

> Back then, we called for a big meeting at the community hall [in Nyala] to explain to the community that no *inkosi* any longer has anything to do

with this area. That this land was given away during the time of my uncle. Now it seems as if the people were not aware of that. They don't know whom the land belongs to. Now the municipality is implementing development. […]

Well, it is not my land anymore. It is under the municipality. When the people come to ask for help, what can I do for them?

I am not allowed to work outside of my jurisdiction, as *inkosi*. I always tell them: "that land belonged to me before but now it is not mine". So I have got no way to assist that thing of *Abahlali*. I cannot get involved because the land does not belong to me anymore. It belongs to the municipality.

Eva: have you spoken to the councillor about the problems in the area?

Yes, yes!

Eva: what did he say?

He says he is building houses for the people. He is denying that there are other unknown people who are in those new houses now. But *Abahlali* says there are many people that are getting inside those new houses, but they [the Abahlali members] are not being provided with houses and that those houses are being built in their premises. Also they are complaining that houses are being built on graves. [PAUSE] Yes, all of that! [LONG PAUSE]

From that side [*pointing towards the councillor's office*] they are now saying that they are going to take up those graves. [PAUSE] They will then take the bones to the graveyard. That is a big complaint from the residents.

Eva: the grave of your father is also still there in the township isn't it? Will they leave that alone?

Yes! They will leave it alone. They can't take it. That place was declared not to be touched. It is a graveyard for *inkosi*. They will not touch it. They will not touch it. They can't. [LONG PAUSE]

They tried to touch it when they were building the township many years ago. You see the road was supposed to go on top of the grave, and now there was a big snake there. And so the people, the labourers ran away. There was a white man who said to the labourers: "Ey! You must go there!" and the people [the 'labourers'] said: "we *can't* go there". He [*the 'white man'*] went there with the machine, the paver and then died.

Eva: the man on the paver died?

Yes! He died. And so the people said "No. We are not going to put the road there!" I was still a child then. It was when they started building the township. 1974. No! 1975. Because my father passed away 1974, so it was 1975 that the township was built. [LONG PAUSE]

It is a problem that now we have got no *vacant* land.

We have got no *vacant* land. Even that last land there in Thokozane [*points*]. It is completely full! You see? I have very little power through land, because, eish - - [sighs]

Eva: You say the land is so full, which is a problem. Is it because a lot of people moving in this area? Why is it so 'packed'?

Eish. I don't know. [*sighs*] [LONG PAUSE]

People are building *mjondolo* [shacks] on the plots to then give them away, to rent. Maybe to someone from the Transkei or Lesotho to stay there and have a rent. That is the problem. And the people are also selling the land themselves. They say to someone: "Ok. Just give me R5000 and you build there". And you see? If you rent, you make a lot of money. [PAUSE] Something like that. And I am afailing to stop that. Because the people they like to sell the land.

On a small plot like this [*draws with finger on page*], you can make lots money if you say: "For R1000 you can stay here, you R1000 here". That is why that place is packed and we are struggling to stop it!

The problem is not just the selling and renting and I mean that it is packed like this. But also that the place needs to be developed. Now the municipality wants to give the development to that place but is failing because the place is packed. You see? So you can't put the toilets that place. Because it is packed! You see? You can't put toilets there because it is packed. You cant put the pipes!

I *know* in that area the roads must be done and the toilets must be built. I know that the municipality, the Department of Housing, must build decent houses for them. For it to be like this though, I will need to sign it over to them [the municipality] [PAUSE] and then the graves will be out. Then they [residents] will cry again. Its always the graves. [PAUSE] If I don't sign, they will say that I am 'anti-development'. [LONG PAUSE]

It is not like there [*pointing to Molweni*] where the people still respect me.

[LONG PAUSE]

You know, recently another *inkosi* asked me why I let it get this far, [PAUSE] why I have no more vacant land? You know what he said? He said: "if a township is growing in your garden, then are you still an *inkosi*?" You know? It is like they see me as [PAUSE] you know, someone to whom you say, "*Ndabezitha**, just sign here![10]"

(The conversation carried on with meeting arrangements, the exchange of councillors' and chiefs' telephone numbers – the more mundane logistics of everyday fieldwork)

4. Trajectories of issue formation

In this conversation with Inkosi Maphulo, a number of details can be left to speak for themselves – i.e. how his working relations with the three different ward councillors (of wards that transgress his traditional authority) markedly differ; his views, or more precisely his cautious scepticism, concerning traditional leaders' participation in party politics; his perception that the chieftaincy as an institution is to defend local interests and standpoints against the dominant party and the state[11]; the negotiations that have carried forth between the *Amakhosi Support Office* and the eThekwini municipality about traditional leaders' participation in its council meetings, about co-operative forms of governance at ward level, about their duties and powers. I leave these – as a significant contextualisation of *amakhosi*'s present status – largely unelaborated. In turn, I will however elaborate on the conflicts that unfolded around the housing projects in Molweni and Nyala about which we spoke, illustrating the progressive articulation of issues, in a variety of settings, by a variety of actors. (For an overview of the township and these sections again see the Map end of chapter).

4.1 Molweni

In Molweni, accusations were currently being levelled against Induna Ndlovu that he was corruptively allocating land to 'newcomers' on plots of land that already belonged to families, for which they had been issued PTOs years back. Rumours suggested that when one elderly woman "became loud" against the *induna* and his illicit allocations, that she was killed "to silence the problem". The killing of Mrs Mlanga, a 52-year-old widow, was the latest in a line of

---

[10] Ndabezitha is used as a praise name for an inkosi, translatable as 'Your Royal Highness'.
[11] Inkosi Maphulo said: "there must be observers". I am confident, that this should not be understood in the sense of someone who 'pays close attention to something but does not to take part' – but that he rather uses the notion of 'observers' to mean a position akin to that of political opposition parties.

disagreements between the community and the *induna*. However, for the first time, tensions carried with them fears that things might escalate into outright violence.

In the preceding months, heated negotiations had been held about the housing development scheme that was to be provided through the city's Department of Housing. Meetings were held with the community, in which Induna Ndlovu, Inkosi Maphulo, members of the traditional council, the ward councillor, members of the ANC's *Branch Executive Committee* (BEC), members of the ward committee and representatives from the municipality were also present. Initially, the community had stood firmly behind Ndlovu who spoke out against the plans. As he had warned the residents in one such meeting: "if you allow for such developments to take place, this place will no longer be rural like it is now, it will be a squatter camp! This is what they [implying the councillor and the municipality] end up doing with our land! It will be a squatter camp!" Ndlovu's concerns in part echoed those voiced by Inkosi Maphulo and those raised against Maphulo – namely, when he was told that 'a township was growing in his garden'. These were concerns about land becoming 'packed', 'ruralness', cherished with reference to its type of houses, larger plots, less densely settled land, being lost and with it also a particular 'way of life'. Also implied were fears about an influx of 'people from elsewhere' that sought to settle near the city in search of means to make a living.

After a series of meetings, a vote took place, and the community voted against the proposed plans, voted *for* housing development to occur, but of the "rural" not the "urban" kind. Somewhat a 'compromise', the decision entailed certain unclarities – in particular what this form of housing development would mean for the "future say", as one man put it, of traditional leaders in this area. At the time, some families had begun being moved into temporary container shelters, their old houses soon to be demolished. They did not know how long they would need to live in temporary accommodation and when the new houses would be finished. Mrs Mlanga, the woman who had been killed only last week, had lived in a section unaffected by the first phase of the project, where families continued to stay in their 'old houses'. However, much like the families who had been relocated, families here grappled with the question of whether the decision concerning the development scheme now meant that the area would come to belong to the township – in other words, that it would no longer fall under the jurisdiction of the Traditional Authority. Let me address these dimensions in the following order: first, the controversy that ensued around the implications that the housing development scheme would have for the traditional leaders, then second, in briefer terms, the *induna*'s alleged allocation of already-allocated-plots, which was seen to have led to the death of Mrs Mlanga.

I met with the ANC Secretary of the ward, Cllr. Cele, who lived in KwaNkilinda, however worked as a councillor in another ward. He was a very close friend of the ward councillor, Cllr Khumalo, and was one of the central figures in the local ANC. It was in his function as an ANC representative that he had been present during most of the community meetings about the housing project. "This area", he explained to me, is "still not really under municipality, but once the housing project is completed, they are going to be serviced by the municipality in terms of electricity, water and all the other things. We will be starting with the rural housing development because they chose that they would not have urban development". For clarity, I repeated my question and asked whether this meant that the area would fall under the authority of the municipality, and no longer belong to Inkosi Maphulo's traditional council.

> *Cllr. Cele:* Under the authority of the *inkosi*. But it is like a 'joint venture' – we can say under the authority of the *inkosi*, but serviced by the municipality. They are going to have electricity, water. [PAUSE] The only thing that they are not going to have, that they don't like, is a sewerage system. It will be pit latrines, so that is the difference. But water, roads, electricity, houses are done by the municipality [PAUSE]. It will also change the titles [land titles]. We can't have the government build you a house and then one day an *inkosi* can come and chase you out of it. […] They also need to be protected. I really do not know what title deed they are going to have exactly but what I know, a councillor cant give you a house and tomorrow you are kicked out."

His response on the one hand echoed the popular criticism of PTOs as providing for no tenure security. But on a different note, his response also remained puzzling. How was it that the question of 'whose jurisdiction this area would in future fall under' was not clearly stipulated? The second part of his response seemed to relativize his at first confident remark that the area would continue to fall under the authority of the chief. Looking back, it occurred to me, that 'title deeds' and 'tenure security' had remained suspiciously absent from the list of concerns voiced during the community meetings. I suggested to Cele whether this was something of a 'grey area'. "Those are grey areas!" he emphasised with sureness. "Yes! But because we *chose* it that way [PAUSE] I mean, to have traditional leaders. Traditional leaders always come with grey areas!"[12]

---

[12] It is important to note at this stage that I pursued an analysis of occurrences primarily on the basis of what actors *said* they knew, not on what they c*ould* have known. For instance, this meant, that I did not commit to finding out in what manner there do exist clear guidelines that stipulate what title deeds residents would be issued. I did not go on to find out to what degree individuals such as Cele were simply 'pretending not to know'. The question of how different practices deliberately worked to create 'opacity', although interesting in its own right, went beyond the scope of this chapter.

While the question of title deeds had not been discussed, what had however been heavily disputed during community meetings were the sewerage pipes, which Cele in turn mentions as the markers of difference between 'urban' and 'rural development'. During the community meetings, there was a deliberate involvement of 'material dimensions' – in other words, disputes were carried out by way of objects, deliberately mobilised to publicise the issues at stake, they were made to tell the story of an anticipated future that residents 'did not want'. Marres and Lezaun (2011) have offered the notion of 'material engagement' to explore the practices by which objects, devices, settings and materials - not just subjects - become invested with political and moral capacities. In other words, the manner in which materiality affects *how* people get involved in politics. With questions revolving around what 'this place would become', sewers and toilets, with the concerns and imaginings stored in them, were deployed in a manner that made them important "semiotic and aesthetic vehicles" (Larkin, 2013: 329)[13].

I had another conversation about Nyala a few days later - this time with a *shebeen* (bar) owner, Mr Moyo, and Themba, the copy shop owner who had become one of my closest interlocutors. The bar, on the main road of the township, was at this point of my fieldwork a common meeting place and I had come to know Mr Moyo on evenings in which I passed the bar, but to this point, we had never had a true conversation. Their friendship, as Themba explained, went "way back" – "to the struggle, Inkatha, and all of that." Themba and also Mr Moyo, were both critical of Cllr Khumalo and, while having no direct ties to Inkosi Maphulo, they now made frequent reference to him. As Themba explained, they did not relate to each other primarily on the basis of social bonds ("the *inkosi* lives there, I live here in the township) and that it was perhaps rather a 'loyalty through principle'. As he explained when I asked about how he related to the chief vis-à-vis the ward councillor (here my paraphrasing): a) Cllr Khumalo faces all these allegations of corruption, misgovernance, criminal charges; b) but, we (as residents) wont be able to 'get rid of him' – only the higher echelons of the ANC leadership can do that; c) and now, because of all that, the *inkosi* has gained credence. Rephrased in more Deweyan terms, in the routine character of everyday life, they did not share much, but now particular occurrences had taken place through which they had become jointly implicated in a series of affairs that were putting their respective forms of life at risk (Dewey, 1991 (1927); Marres, 2005a).

---

[13] See also Robins (2014) on the '2011 Toilet Wars' that preceded the local government elections that same year. The paper engages with the controversy that unfolded around images of unenclosed, white porcelain toilets in an informal settlement in Khayelitsha in Cape Town. As Robins (ibid: 480) writes: "The spectacular image of the open toilet created the conditions for the framing of sanitation as a matter of concern for politicians, activists, journalists, citizens and, most significantly, judges [...] the open toilet came to stand in for the indignities and injustices of daily life under apartheid as well as the limits of transformation after apartheid". To determine whether and in what manner the '2011 Toilet Wars' played into the mobilisation and publicisation of issues as they unfolded locally in KwaNkilinda, would have required a far more fine-grained analysis of what was said during the community meetings.

Discussing the housing project in Nyala, Themba said that evening in the *shebeen*:

> *Themba*: ehh [*sighs*] this councillor will do everything to take everything from him [Inkosi Maphulo]. I think its difficult for the municipality to take that side [*pointing to the eastern side of the township*], but it will be much more easier to take these other sides from him [*pointing towards Nyala*]. This is KwaNkilinda Township [*draws circle on the table*] and it is easier for the municipality to take these neighbouring places [*pointing*].
>
> *Mr Moyo*: Yeah yeah! [*nodding*]. Once they take these [pointing to Themba's invisible drawing] they can go further again. Once they put water and electricity for the people [PAUSE] - especially *water* [PAUSE] because there is electricity already that side, but water is still a problem – they can go further.
>
> *Themba*: They [the municipality/the councillor (?)] cannot just say 'we are taking this land'. They would say 'we are bringing *development*'. They would go to the people and ask, 'do you want water? Do you want roads?' And the people would say 'yes!' Whereas they should in fact contact the *King* [Inkosi Maphulo[14]] and tell the *King* to go to the people and say 'do you want this and that?' and then the people would agree to the King. [LONG PAUSE] What I am saying: once they put water, they start asking for rates. They put water, electricity, they build roads, and then they distribute plastic bags for reusables [PAUSE] and then it is theirs. […]
>
> *Themba*: All this land in actual fact still belongs to the *inkosi*, but because it has been modernised, it belongs to the municipality. [LONG PAUSE] The *amakhosi* haven't got a budget to provide services, they [traditional leaders] wont be able to build RDP houses. Only the municipality *provides*. Then in an area like that, they [residents] don't see a future in the existence of *amakhosi*.
>
> *Mr Moyo*: That is how they are going bit by bit. They are not taking the place by force, but doing it bit by bit.

Themba and Moyo in sum suggested that the following was taking place: areas that lay on the township's fringes, bordering the traditional authority were being subject to an incremental transformation, the township was being expanded 'bit by bit', as Moyo suggests. Thinking back also to the account that

---

[14] It is common for someone to also refer to the chief as 'King' when speaking in English. Much like '*ndabezitha*' in *isiZulu* is used to address the chief. Ndabezitha means so much as 'your royal highness'.

Inkosi Maphulo provided in the conversation that I cited at length, it becomes clear that a 'loss of land' cannot necessarily be equated with a redrawing of official demarcations. Albeit astounding, what sort of titles would eventually be issued following the completion of the housing project, to what degree existing PTOs would provide residents with a form of security, remained unclear. 'Loss of land' seemed to more accurately refer to a loss of "political say" – as residents put in – in areas that once fell under traditional authority. In Williams' terminology, we could speak of a loss of *performance* legitimacy, set in relation to traditional leaders' *moral* legitimacy. Williams (2010: 29) writes: "[…] one of the main areas of dispute between the chieftaincy and the state is the implementation of development projects […]. Both the chieftaincy and the state wish to provide the development and receive credit for its effective implementation."

Themba carries forth our conversation in the *shebeen*. He proposes that Inkosi Maphulo and Induna Ndlovu had essentially failed as 'development brokers', in the common sense of the figure (Bierschenk et al. 2002; Mosse & Lewis, 2006). In other words, they had in the tussle with the other negotiating parties not been the ones to receive 'credit' for the housing project. As Themba explained: "Inkosi Maphulo will receive no 'credit' for the housing project", and hand in hand with the provision of water, electricity, roads, plastic bags and reusables, the land "would no longer be his". The relationship between the chief and the ward councillor, already fraught with tension, had played a role and also, that Induna Ndlovu had initially spoken out against the development scheme. One elderly resident from Nyala joined our table in the bar. Known as Old John, he suggested:

> *Old John:* It is not that they [traditional leaders] do not *want* water or sewer pipes. They understand that we need these things. They are saying that to maintain 'ruralness', we must stop these things from coming. But it is just that they will not be able to provide this form of development without giving up power. That is why they are arguing with this logic.

Ndlovu's reservations about the municipality's proposed housing scheme (urban or rural) – as he had put it, "they will turn this area into a squatter camp" – had emphasised, counter-intuitively, the capacity that traditional leaders lacked, on the basis of their current legislation, to implement development projects. This was clear to residents like Old John. Trotha, in his contribution '*From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy*' (1996: 96), succinctly defines the dilemma as follows: "The prospect of chieftaincy very much depends on the fact that the idea of the chief as the 'guardian of tradition' is complemented by the ideas that the chief is an 'agent of the present' and is a 'guarantor and agent of the future'".

What Old John emphasises when he says "they will not be able to provide this form of development without giving up power. That is why they are arguing

with this logic" provides a partial explanation for why Induna Ndlovu opposed the housing development project. In as much as Ndlovu represents a 'broker' in its classical understanding, namely as a figure that negotiates between fixed positionalities (ex. 'the state' and 'the people'), he can also be seen to represent a broker in the sense that James (2011) has come to define the figure. She sees the role of the broker as follows:

> "not simply as a figure who stands between powerless people and the externally imposed power of the modern state or the irresistible force of the market, but – partly opportunistically and partly in response to his constituents' demands – as one who activates the continuing interplay between apparently irreconcilable discourses and practices."

Importantly, James (2011: 319) emphasises in her account that brokers must be seen as "often bridging these separate worlds while simultaneously deriving benefits from keeping them some distance apart" (see also Boissevain, 1966). It is from this vantage point that we can make further sense of Induna Ndlovu's opposition to the housing development project. The housing project had made explicit the *antagonistic attachments of* actors who were caught up in trying to uphold allegiance to the chieftaincy while living a life on the fringe of a rapidly expanding township. Promises of adequate housing, water, roads and service improvements where intimately caught up with a larger logic of post-apartheid citizenship, but at the same time also generated complicated emotional investments[15]. Put differently, the housing project brought to the fore the continuous interplay and an inherent irreconcilability between maintaining 'rurality' and advancing 'development', between 'modernization' and securing an adherence to 'customary ways'. Herein notions of 'adequate housing' in part ran contrary to aesthetic values being upheld. In sum, Ndlovu's authority as a headman, in part also rested on 'keeping them [the social worlds] some distance apart'.

On the most recent occurrences in Molweni that had been linked to the housing project, Inkosi Maphulo spoke of the '*induna* allocating land' and, 'Khumalo taking the municipality to dissolve those houses'. He here also referred to the same headman, Induna Ndlovu. To better understand what had happened, I met with the daughter of Mrs Mlanga, the elderly woman who had recently fallen victim to the disputes. Mba is the eldest daughter of three, still lives at home with her siblings, and was present during the night in which her mother was killed. She recounted the events as follows (my paraphrasing based on notes):

> *Mba*: My father got the land from the *induna* [Ndlovu] back then. My mother has now been living here for over 25 years. Then recently, the

---

induna came one morning with a couple from Umlazi and said that these people were going to build a house in our yard, just in front of our house. My mother of course got furious and said to him 'this will never happen'! He asked if she had proof that this was 'her' land. She said that her dead husband had gotten the land from him, so he should know that it belongs to her. The *induna* then came back with some other older men who were on his side and threatened her. This was two days later. They said she 'should think about what happens if she gets lout like this'. My mother informed the councillor of the threats and told him that she was very concerned and that she would also speak to the *inkosi* to get some help. But the councillor said that the *inkosi* 'would not be needed'. He would tell the station commander [police] and Ntula from the Community Police Forum (CPF) and they would 'immediately take care of it'. The following day, at night, a man came to our house and just shot her.

As mentioned, the area in which Mrs Mlanga had lived was in an area of Molweni where residents were still living in their old houses. Households such as that of Mrs Mlanga were for now due to remain unaffected by the housing project. Taken together, Inkosi Maphulo's remark about the headman allocating houses and these then being 'dissolved' and the account by Mba, they highlight how following the community's decision about the project, the struggle over land became as much about property as about the legitimacy of competing claims to authority. While the chieftaincy was called into criticism, Cllr Khumalo was endeavouring to build a 'presence' in what had become a political order disrupted - an "open moment" in Lund's (1998) terminology. In relation to the processes of issueification that were unfolding, I want to briefly consider on an analytical level two points further, namely: a) how through Mrs Mlanga's murder, concerns over 'tenure insecurity' were rendered public, b) how this event, in the larger trajectory of the articulation of issues, featured in the redrawing of the political landscape.

We may consider the *induna*'s alleged land allocations, or even the murder of Mrs Mlanga, as a deliberate effort of the *induna* to seize an opportunity, or as a desperate attempt to 'get the most out of the position he still held'. Then his actions become a matter of *malevolent intentions* in this contested space – empirically however, 'intentions' remain largely inscrutable. Alternatively, we may see the incidence as a 'dramatisation' of inherent irreconcilabilities – as a situation that rendered visible, in the unquestionably clearest way possible, what was so deeply unsettling. Lippmann insists in '*The Phantom Public'* (2002 (1929): 58) that "only when someone objects, does the public know that there is a problem" – making clear that forms of 'rendering visible', 'mobilisation' or even 'cultivation' of actor's attachments are what mediate actors' involvement in processes of issue articulation. As Lippmann adds in '*Public Opinion'* (1997 (1922): 217): "[events] do not take shape until somebody protests, or somebody investigates, or somebody publicly, in the etymological meaning of the word, *makes an issue of them*" (also discussed in Marres, 2005: 49, emphasis

added).

Issue formation is a *successive* articulation, *distributed* in time and space. 'Tenure security', or even 'the need for security' taken in a broadest sense, were dimensions on which the community had remained silent during community meetings – a hot potato quickly showed forward. The death of Mrs Mlanga was also an *extension* of specific consequences that affected actors. As it drew in residents who had been unaffected by the housing projects, it brought about a shift in the existing configuration of *particular actors* around *particular causes of concern*. Importantly, relations between 'land', 'development' and 'belonging' - taken in its double meaning as "something one owns and membership in a community" - was rendered explicit in a different form (Lentz, 2013: 2).

Where a controversy develops, it becomes fundamentally entangled with reflections and evaluations of 'what is' and 'what ought to be', and which go beyond the immediate occurrence at hand and its inherent specificities (Boltanski, 2011). The *induna*'s allocation of land catalysed precisely such moments of questioning. Mrs Mlanga received threats, then approached the councillor for protection. The councillor, in turn, provided a sense of immediate security by assuring that he would inform the police. On his part, it was a situational negotiation of authority and legitimacy. However it also worked to shake up some of the common presuppositions of "who and what counts" (Chu, 2014: 353) – Inkosi Maphulo would, according to the councillor 'not/*no longer* / be needed'.

4.2 Nyala

While Molweni lay outside of the township and had formed part of Inkosi Maphulo's traditional authority, Nyala was a section of the township that, as Maphulo explained, had been 'signed over' to the municipality during the time of his uncle. Here, the municipality had begun building RDP houses prior to my fieldwork in 2012. A list had been made of those families who were to receive a house. However, once the first houses were completed, individuals from outside of KwaNkilinda moved into the houses and accusations were quickly made that through Cllr Khumalo they had 'bought themselves in'. The majority of affected residents then joined the shack dwellers movement *Abahlali baseMjondolo*.

Impelling insights into the workings of Abahlali are provided by the publications by Kerry Chance (2015a, 2015b, 2015c). Let me only provide a brief introduction at this point (and carry forth in Chapter 4). The movement developed out of a road blockade organised in 2005 in the Kennedy Road settlement in Durban, protesting the sale of a piece land which had been promised to shack dwellers for housing. By now, the movement stretches far

beyond the shack lands of Durban (Chance, 2015a). As Abahlali writes on its website: "it is the largest organisation of the militant poor in post-apartheid South Africa", claiming more than 25,000 supporters. As Chance (2015b: 861) puts it, the movement now "operates in a transnational network of lawyers and landless affiliates from Chicago to Rio de Janeiro to Port-au-Prince". The movement's members noticeably comprise "unemployed youth, liberation struggle veterans, and church leaders; the majority are African women" (ibid). In KwaNkilinda, this trend was visible – the elected branch leadership was primarily comprised of women.

Abahlali is a shack dwellers movement that defines itself as carrying forward the struggle of liberation not realised through the ascent of the ANC to power. It focuses on those "who still live in the shadows of the city", articulating matters of land, housing, unemployment, education, basic infrastructure – fighting against urban evictions and forced removals. Exploring the idiom of "sacrifice" (among the generation of the "born frees" more generally), Chance (2015b: 868) notes that Abahlali "names itself, and those living in townships and shack settlements more broadly, as legitimate heirs to Mandela's legacy". The movement builds on a tension between sacrificing and being sacrificed. As former president of Abahlali, S'bu Zikode captures this imaginary in a *Guardian* (2013) article: "Much is at stake. If South Africa's urban poor do not win this battle, our cities will become ATMs for the politicians and the rich".

In KwaNkilinda, Abahlali members begun to mobilize street-based activities, mass gatherings and road blockades for houses that had allegedly been corruptly allocated and those once listed as the target group had disappeared from all lists. "Once again", as one protester put it, "the poor are too poor, to pay the bribe to get a house". A press statement from the January 2013 captures the group's primary concerns as follows:

> "On the 31 August last year the community had to protest against the City's stealing of residents' yards in the name of development and in some instances allegedly selling the RDP houses that they built on people's yards, and over their graves, to people who are not from the community. The memorandum that was handed over was, like many others, thrown in the bin and has never been responded to. Many people's homes were destroyed and replaced by houses built for those who are not even known by the families and the community. The politicians are misusing this housing project to get wealth and power for themselves at the expense of the community".

Abahlali's actions in the township were not only a display of force against dispossession (essentially contending issues in their *current* state) but, much like the residents in Molweni has sought to make clear, also an expression of concern about an emerging reality (in anticipation of *future* consequences)[16].

---

[16] This is a key notion put forth by Latour & Weibel (2005) in '*Making things public*', namely that publics form around *future* objects (see also Dantec & DiSalvo, 2013).

For those who had joined Abahlali, graves featured prominently as a recurring theme – in day-to-day conversations, in Abahlali's press statements, Facebook posts and the newspaper articles that reported on the movement. The group emphasised the burial sites in their compounds when they went to seek support from Inkosi Maphulo. "The councillor is just building on top of our ancestors' graves. I am sure that a chief will see eye to eye with us on this!" a young woman, Lundi, who had joined Abahlali, told me. Some residents still had PTOs for the plots on which they lived, others made reference to their forebears' graves and hoped these would be a basis on which to reclaim the land. The group recurringly writes: "houses were built on their gardens and even next to or over their family graves. There has been no respect for the dead. African people have a high respect for the dead. This is an insult to the people and to their culture". As one Abahlali member, Thandile, emphasises on a visit: "this place is more like the rural, you can't tell me it looks like the township! The kind of houses *do* matter!" With the 'kind of houses', she went on to elaborate, she did not just mean 'the way it looks', 'its size' relative to the standard two-bedroom-RDP houses, but also what filled 'the space' around the house, such as chickens, graves, a pumpkin patch, and the small shack over the pit latrine.

The stories of graves come to serve a similar purpose to what Lentz (2013: 4) terms "first possession" stories – namely to "legitimate the origin of property rights and construct a link between the founding ancestors and the storyteller (and his group) through which the rights established by first possession have been transmitted to the current proprietors"[17]. At times through personal narratives (oral land registries), at other times on the basis of their PTOs, residents rendered a particular genealogy public. Through such genealogies, it was both property rights, imparted along lines of descent, that were being articulated, but also membership to a specific community. Namely, as a people that *opt* to live under an *inkosi* – not because they live in an area demarcated as 'traditional authority', but because they adhere to a particular 'way of life'. The story of the snake on the *inkosi*'s grave, which was recounted to me by different individuals on different occasions, represents another dimension to their claims. Through such narratives, assertions to plots of land – that formally had been demarcated as falling within township boundaries – were made through the spiritual realm. As Thandile put it in one conversation with me: "That story [of the snake on the *inkosi's* grave] shows you that just because a township grew around that grave, doesn't mean that things have really changed".

Themba, in our conversation in the *shebeen*, suggests: "the talk of graves" accompanied "the talk about rights". As he explains:

---

[17] Significant is that land had, prior to the formation of the township, been allocated by the traditional authority. Akin to what Lentz (2013) terms 'first possession' narratives, it is a tracing of kinship lines along which rights were imparted, emphasising allegiance to the chieftaincy of the day, and thus centering less on 'first comer status' understood as man's 'first encounter with nature'.

Themba: it looks like there were so many things that happened before and we didn't bother ourselves about what was going on, we were only concerned with having a house, getting food, living our lives [PAUSE] and now, suddenly, with all these problems things are coming out and our minds are being revived. 'Our rights! Where are our rights?' [PAUSE] That is township style!

Also me, I didn't know about many of these things. When that place was sold, when this place changed [fell under the municipality]. We didn't bother ourselves with these things. But now people are looking into it. Looking at the maps, talking to the *inkosi*.

As Steven Robins (2008) emphasises in his book '*From Revolution to Rights in South Africa*', 'rights *talk*' - or a new form of *consciousness* more generally - no doubt forms an integral part of the post-apartheid public discourse. From one point onwards, Themba points out, it however also featured as a more prominent mobilisation in the twists and turns of the struggle against the housing project. As Abahlali inserted itself, and residents from KwaNkilinda joined the shack dwellers movement, a 're-formatting' of the issues at stake took place and the movement provided a new language with which to phrase their concerns and commitments. The gap between the ANC's promises of more equitable access and on the other hand the grim experiences of everyday social, economic and political realities, has become too wide. With such messages, Abahlali contributed to "a *political* articulation of issues" that had "a critical edge" (Marres, 2006: 5 emphasis added). Its role, we can say, was to generate issue definitions that would readily "cut into institutional processes of opinion-, decision-, and policy- making, to make the issues at stake manifest to a larger public. (ibid). By invoking explicitly 'cultural rights', the graves provided an avenue by which to 'displace' the issues – and by enrolling the chief – displacing the issues towards an addressee more promising, a site more accessible to their expression.

Cllr. Cele, the ANC secretary in KwaNkilinda, it was rumoured, was along with the ward councillor implicated in the illicit allocation of the new houses in Nyala. The ward councillor, the police's station commander, and the chairperson of the community police forum, were more and more frequently referred to as "the councillors crew". Abahlali members were regularly being threatened – a car parked in front of their house at night, full headlights beaming through the windows. On other occasions, threats were voiced in daylight encounters, the local Abahlali leadership pressured to bring a stop to the meetings, road blockades, protest marches. Always, the protesters referred the intimidations back to the councillor and his "crew". As tensions ramified, me, my work in the township and the relationships I had to members of Abahlali were increasingly confronted with suspicion. In particular Cele and the councillor no longer seemed certain what my objectives were and "whose side I was really on" (see also Riedke, 2015). One afternoon in Durban city

centre, Cele sought to explain the problem in Nyala to me. As will become clear, his tone had markedly changed from previous situations I recounted above, which in itself attested to the fact that in contrast to Molweni, lines of conflict had become considerably sharper.

> *Cele*: Those low cost houses are being built between the old structures. The municipality is developing that area. Now the people who grew up there, stand up and say 'you cant built a house there because that piece of land belongs to me. We used to have our chickens there, we used to have this here, our granny [grave] is there". And all those things. [PAUSE] that is what has been happening. Now the duty of the government is to ensure that the plot is for the people and that the government builds for everybody. The government divides the area equally for *everybody*. [PAUSE] Now they don't have papers for that area, that is why the government is developing that area. The government can't go to any area where you have a title deed. They, they don't have a title deed.

> *Eva*: *Do they have Permissions To Occupy [PTOs] for their plots? If so, do these not count?*

> *Cele*: They appear to have, yes. [LONG PAUSE] You see, when you are developing an area where there are structures, where people have been living, there is always that kind of problem […] they always mention the graves.

Cele, by emphasising that "the government divides the area equally for everybody" comes to contest the 'framing' of the protesters by defining the problem primarily as one of the ANC delivering on its post-apartheid promises. With an emphasis on 'equitable distribution', this worked to undo the protesters' establishment of their dispossession. Effectively, conflicting attachments hereby came to be *excluded* from the problem definition – attachments which for those who had joined Abahlali centred on the perceived indifference of 'those developing' for their value of 'the rural'. They in turn wanting to uphold a different 'way of life' than was being lived in the township. Cele's insertion of 'development for all', resembles a 'closing down', – when trying to pin-point processes of *issue formation*, it illustrates a form of partial 'undoing'. Barry (1999) in his account of the protests against the completion of a section of the *M3* motorway in England, speaks of a distinction between forms of publicity "which direct, restrict or close, and those which open up or destabilise the space of politics in creative or destructive ways". Both point to the operations that articulations of attachments or framings bring about as part of the work done on issue formation. To the messy interlacement of framings vs. attachments I shall return below – here my point is to highlight *how* they operate.

Those who had joined Abahlali sought support from Inkosi Maphulo, in order to "prove" that the land still fell under his jurisdiction – and that his consent had ultimately not been given for the housing project. They compiled the PTOs of those that still have them, and tried to piece together when what land was signed over to whom. As Cele, critical of these efforts, emphasises:

> *Cele*: The thing is, it is not about knowing the date. It is about the proclamation of the township and that now the *inkosi* is *there* [*pointing in the distance*]. There shouldn't be any ordinary community member considering these questions. It is too complicated for them, to know when and what was done. […] Do you think they can see it? [whether land falls under the municipality of the *inkosi*] It is really only just the houses that tell. [PAUSE] Really, you can only see it on the map. If you know the area, you can walk and say the map says 'you are this side, you are that side'. [PAUSE] If the land belonged to the *inkosi*, he would have intervened. […] So the question of whether the land is 'municipality land' or '*inkosi*'s land' is neither here nor there. They [the protesters] are *here*, the municipality is *here* and the *inkosi* is *there* [*Drawing on the table*].

Cele's reference to the "ordinary community member considering these questions" is noteworthy. He was referring to the fact that the protesters turned to the maps and sought to piece together the dates. Was there a loophole, could they reclaim rights to the land from which they had been dispossessed? Residents questioned what they knew (see also Themba's quote above). Using Stengers (2005a) vocabulary, they worked to '*slow down*' reasoning, to arouse different interpretations, to collectively interrogate explanations and to objectify existing knowledge claims (Whatmore, 2009: 595). Through what may also be termed local epistemic practices of knowledge making, community members (vis-à-vis those who might be considered 'experts' on the matters at hand) sought to unsettle public trust in the 'facts'. From this observation, a crucial point can be emphasised, namely that publics produce 'not as their aim but in the very process of their emergence, the power to object and to intervene in matters which they discover concern them' (Stengers, 2005b: 161 discussed in Whatmore, 2009). Any separation between epistemic and ontological dynamics of issue formation comes to fall apart. Moments of ontological disturbance are generative, in their "potential to foster the disordering conditions" (Whatmore, 2009: 588) in which reasoning is forced to "slow down", in turn, creating opportunities to arouse "a slightly different awareness of the problems and situations mobilising us" (Stengers, 2005a: 994).

4.3 Infrastructures that matter

What has run through the various accounts discussed here and is again made explicit in Cele's last comment, is also the alleged visibility vs. invisibility of what essentially renders the *urban* distinct from the *rural*, or an area that falls under the traditional authority as distinct from the township and the informal settlements. This had been the topic of the conversation between Inkosi Maphulo and I, when we had stood in front of his house. In the accounts of the different actors and groups of actors, it is references to the *aesthetics* of buildings, but also to wires, pipes, roadways and burial sites that re-appear. Both claims and counter claims were contingent on the lively collaboration of materials – as an enabling or disabling force in the processes of articulating the issue at stake. As Barry's (1999) study on the roads protests renders visible in a similar manner, is that the articulation of issues cannot be reduced to aspects of political discourse, wherein the landscape forms a *backdrop* to events, but rather, it is precisely the "environment 'out here'" that "is at stake" (Barry 1999 discussed in Marres, 2005a: 107). The environment 'out here' serves to render concerns *tangible*.

Writings on infrastructure have emphasised two main points of 'visibility' or 'eventfulness', namely it becomes apparent: at their point of introduction or upgrade, where infrastructures are perceived as a wave of 'progress', a symbol of modernisation and when they "come into public recognition as an iconic modern sign of the technological sublime". The second prominent point of visibility occurs through their failure – that is to mean, both their malfunction and non-existence (Chu, 2014: 252-3). In the in-between, infrastructures frequently become 'invisible'. In the accounts from KwaNkilinda, the provision of infrastructure was centre-staged, but at once, through the uncertainties it fuelled, the delivery of houses *failed* to instigate a sense of societal progress of post-apartheid transformation. Actors questioned whether a better future was indeed being realised. The houses both invigorated and unsettled particular hopes. In other words, a broad complicated admixture of associations and different affective repertoires were mobilised and these partly ran contrary to their purported technical functions (see Harvey & Knox, 2012; Larkin, 2013; Rodgers & O'Neil, 2012). One Abahlali member I quoted had stressed that "the *kind* of houses do matter!" – pointing as much to their aesthetic as to their technical operation.

Here, a point that Larkin (2013) has come to emphasise becomes central, namely that the political effects of infrastructures cannot simply be *read off* from their surfaces (being built, or falling apart). "They generate complicated emotional investments that induce a range of sometimes counterintuitive response and distinct, if ephermal sensibilities" (ibid: 334). Oftentimes statements run counter to "accepted narrativites of modernisation", vivifying a complicated admixture of affectual relations that people have to infrastructures (see also Harvey & Knox, 2012). Larkin (2013) fittingly captures this sophistication under the slogan "*The politics and poetics of infrastructure*".

Infrastructures come to have a "peculiar ontology" for "they are things but

also the relation between things" (Larkin, 2013: 329). In contrast to technologies, "they are objects that create the grounds on which other objects operate" (ibid). Chance (2015a; 2015b), in her work on Abahlali has analysed what members term *'living politics'* (ipolitiki *ephilayo*) – using it to characterise both 'the political' in public dramas such as street protests and road blockages, but also in more mundane domestic activities such as cooking with fire, reading by candlelight, or making illicit connections to the electricity grid. All are practices aimed at making the poor be heard and seen. She illustrates how mundane practices of slum dwelling are rendered political through intersections of race and class. She quotes an Abahlali member named Mnikelo: "When a white man lights a candle, it is supposed that he is being romantic. When a black man lights a candle, it is supposed that he is poor" (Chance, 2015a: 407). For Abahlali members, Chance (ibid) writes, "the use of candles and the routine quality of fires in infrastructurally bereft settlements distinguish the poor from the middle or upper class". Abahlali's notion of 'living politics' intersects with the literature on infrastructure, for it emphasises the manner in which residents make their material life a platform for politics. Similarly, Brenda Chalfin (2014) in her study on 'excremental politics' in Ghana's city of Tema explores not only the determinations of public toilets and sewerage systems but also how the built environment underwrites collective outlooks on entitlements. With the "right to shit" being turned into a 'matter of concern', sewerage and sanitation are enlivened so as to wrest new urban public spaces and political life. Both Chance (2015a; 2015b) and Chalfin (2014) are inspired by the broad consideration around the political ascendance that 'infrastructures of bare life' are gaining.

Studies on infrastructure have, amongst other dimensions, emphasised that histories of racial prejudice materialize in urban architecture and city planning only to reinforce racially driven distinctions and hierarchies – i.e. the material organization and form of a landscape not only reflects but also comes to reinforce social orders (Rodgers & O'Neill, 2012: 405, see also Mbembe, 2004). Following the thinking of Jacques Rancière (2006), Chu (2014: 353) speaks of infrastructures working to cultivate a "certain tacit 'common sense'" of the world and that world's built-in or proper distribution of life chances and life energies". The emphasis that different sets of actors in KwaNkilinda placed on different forms of '(in)visibility' in the context of the struggles that unfolded, rendered explicit the manner in which the aesthetics of these very houses ("the *kind* of houses do matter") was also employed to *narrate against* the complex heterogeneous system in which residents perceived they were being bound. Houses are not just built for adequate housing, but also for symbolic meanings (Todorov, 1994: 10 discussed in Larkin, 2013: 335-6).

In sum, my point harks back to the alleged (in)visibilities. It has become commonplace, if not "seemingly obligatory" as Larkin (2013: 336) puts it, to assert that infrastructures, at one point in time, through their mundane everyday functioning, become 'invisible'. This emphasis placed on "invisibility" Larkin contends, is however only "a partial truth". "Invisibility

is certainly one aspect of infrastructure, but it is only one and at the extreme end of a range of visibilities that move from unseen to grand spectacles and everything in between". Inkosi Maphulo, standing on the hill's ledge, overlooking the areas that continue to fall under his jurisdiction and those which have signed over, says: "I know some say they can't see it. But it is not just *me* who knows (gesturing towards the hills). You can *see* it!". Compellingly, Maphulo here captures a point that can also spelled out with more conceptual jargon, namely that (in)visibility is a) *situated* – "what is background for one is a daily object of concern for another" (Larkin, 2013: 336), and b) needs to be perpetually *kept alive*, so as to renew its political effect. In processes of issue articulation, the point becomes not to credit truthfulness to one assertion of (in)visibility over the other, but to explore how (in)visibility is mobilised and why (Larkin, 2013). How does infrastructure – when considered beyond the achievement of its purported practical ends – *enable* the 'public' as a social formation, realm of interaction, and collective consciousness? Latour, and Weibel (2005) asked the question: "How are things made public?" The complimentary question is: "How are publics made with things?" (DiSalvo, 2009: 49).

5. Concluding remarks

This chapter has been devoted to the *politics* involved in the articulation of affairs, i.e. the *processes of issueification*. As Latour (2004d: 12) writes, "the public is made when we are entangled without knowing why and by what". The 'public' is not however instantaneously 'sparked', 'triggered' or 'aroused' and thus the objective has been to explore the process by which a public forms around an issue and the politics involved in the articulation of affairs. In other words, to make the *practices* by which issues are made public, *traceable*. The second objective has been to focus on one actor, namely the chief, implicated in the disputes that unfold, and through this particular lens, also contribute to an understanding of South Africa's post-apartheid chieftaincy. How does a chief who says he has "no power through land" become implicated in processes of issue formation, in which various actors, across various sites, articulate matters of concern related to 'land' and 'development'? Let me again return to these two objectives in my concluding remarks.

5.1 The 'process' of issue formation

The issues of 'land' and 'development' in this case align with the definition of public affairs provided by Dewey (1991 (1927)), namely affairs that bring together a wide range of actors who do not necessarily have much in common as far as their daily lives are concerned, but who are jointly implicated in a problem that puts their respective forms of life at risk. Dewey's notion of

publics enables us to understand the conditions around which publics form and reminds us that in essence a public remains to be a "messy conglomeration of many stakeholders who might in other settings, around alternate issues, be at odds with each other" (Le Dantec and Di Salvo, 2013: 244)

Marres (2006) proposes that by piecing together the basic building blocks that Dewey and Lippmann provide, a new concept may be made – or an old one redefined – namely that of the 'issue network'. The concept works to draw attention to a) how issues provide, enable or even necessitate *connections* amongst actors from different 'social worlds' (Strauss 1978, 1982), b) to the *work* entailed in processes of issue formation – the formatting of issues, and c) how actors or groups of actors become implicated in extended configurations of other actors and issues that are at times also marked by inherent *antagonisms (*ibid: 4*)*. Issue politics at large comes to represent a range of political practices that "add to and intervene in" representative politics (ibid: 3). Marres underlines that the public is not a naturally existing entity, but always actively 'brought into being', constructed, orchestrated and in co-production with the architecture or materialities of existing political arrangements.

Central to Lippmann and Dewey's understanding of public involvement in politics is on the one hand that social actors are substantially implicated in an issue so as to no longer be indifferent, but at the same time, that they are too removed from the sites and networks required to address the issue at hand (Marres, 2012a). In other words, publics consist of 'concerned outsiders' (ibid: 50). This understanding, in turn, makes clear that public involvement depends on a process of defining 'what is at stake' – "of making an issue" (Lippmann, 1997 (1922): 217). Publics are not 'sparked' into being instantaneously, but form in a process extended in space and time, among various locations and enrolling a multiplicity of actors – each contributing to the articulation of the issue (Marres, 2005; Barry 1999). The formation of an issue largely occurs in the absence of a public, and the formation of a public may in fact not occur at all. Dewey (1991 (1927): 131) emphasises that for a public to form, it must be able to define its 'affectedness';

> "An inchoate public is capable of organization only when indirect consequences are perceived, and when it is possible to project agencies which order their occurrence. At present, many consequences are felt rather than perceived; they are suffered, but they cannot be said to be known, for they are not, by those who experience them, referred to their origins".

Where publics fail to form, or fail to form effectively, it is, DiSalvo (2009: 51) suggests, "not because of a lack of issues, but rather because the issues resist identification and articulation, leaving publics unformed and tentative".

As became clear in the two conflicts that unfolded around housing projects in

KwaNkilinda, different points of contention, different attachments, were foregrounded at different times. The various attempts to articulate the issues at hand did not necessarily 'add up meaningfully'. As Marres work has repeatedly emphasised, it must be expected that actors "push and pull" at the issue in partly opposing directions – in the process, what is enacted, is in part, the irreconcilability of actor's attachments (Marres, 2005a: 105). Political action did not take place in specific centres of political authority, but was dispersed across diverse sites – also spatially (Barry, 1999: 88). Residents in Nyala perhaps never even came to interact directly with those who protested against the housing project in Molgeni, their backgrounds were not the same and their slogans differed. A public can be said to form and un-form in concert with the evolving social conditions – also making it difficult to tell, whether at a given point in time, it would be appropriate to speak of 'one' or rather 'many' publics.

The affair indirectly affected a range of actors who were not *commonly* but *jointly* implicated. Dewey's public foregrounds a tangle of relations, among those who do not belong to the same social world but are connected through an affair that affects them jointly. "Joint implication in an affair" does not translate into a "shared interest" and for this reason it can accommodate 'irreconcilabilities' in a different way (Marres, 2005a: 58). As a public forms, its objective is not to construct a common political identity around a single issue. Rather in an abstract sense, the formation of public is aimed at rendering visible – albeit at times only momentarily – something that would have been otherwise unknown (Barry, 1999; Marres, 2005a). Barry (1999: 77), when he discusses the 'intended effects ' and 'successes' of the M3 protests, writes that these served "to demonstrate a truth which it has been otherwise impossible to demonstrate in public by other means". For this, the displacement across sites itself becomes central.

5.2 Frames & attachments

Let me in brief explore further the notion of 'antagonistic attachments', which as this chapter has sought to illustrate, are rendered visible as controversies are enacted. Latour (2004a) in his discussions of environmental debates and climate change in particular, has pointed to bizarre alliances being formed between actors and groups of actors who, for different reasons, come to be jointly implicated in a given affair. An example includes mad cow disease. Latour (2004a: 113) lists those who have came to play a role around the outbreak in Europe; including "the European Union, the beef market, prions in the laboratory, politicians, vegetarians, public confidence, farmers, and Nobel prize-winning French scientists" (Lockhurst, 2006: 6). As Dantec & DiSalvo (2013: 259) note: "in such cases, attachments form and function on another register from that of the standard political left or right, capitalist or Marxist, and environmentalist or industrialist. Rather, attachments emerge

from, and operate on, affective, ethical and in some cases moral registers". With the notion of 'attachments' – which has been used by ANT scholars for longer – Marres (2005a: 128-32; 2006: 9) provides a significant elaboration on Dewey's work, and uses it to emphasise that actors may come together "precisely because they disagree over the issues in which they are jointly implicated and the ways in which these are to be addressed". Where the notion of 'frames' is considered alongside the notion of 'attachments', the idea of '*antagonistic* attachments' also gains clarity.

As Marres (2007: 774) writes, the notion of frames "stands out as an empirically useful concept to describe how public concern about issues is regulated by substantive means; that is, through *issue definitions*" (emphasis mine). She goes on to emphasise, that from a pragmatist perspective, the notion of frames however "cannot fully account for the *substantial dimension* of public involvement in politics". Frames are usually characterised by relatively stable entities used to make sense of unstable things (Marres, 2007: 774). In contrast to attachments, they have salience relations already inscribed in them (Dantec & DiSalvo, 2013; Entman, 1993). They are employed to highlight certain elements over others, which implies logically, that they also direct attention away from others. Entman (1993: 52) cites the example of the 'cold war' frame that dominated US news on foreign affairs in the early 1990s – much like other frames, it served to define the problem, diagnose cause, make moral judgements and suggest remedies.

Significant is that frames, by being external, pre-existing to the issue at stake, also stem from and are shaped by existing authority structures. In the process of defining what is at stake, the foregrounding of attachments, in contrast, enables an 'opening up' of the associations said to coalesce around a given issue – i.e. expose the *tensions* present in the dependencies and commitments of different actors. Dantec & DiSalvo (2013: 246) write that the notion "enables us "to move beyond a response to known relations in existing authoritative structures, toward a means of understanding and expressing those same authority structures as dynamic". In the conflicts discussed, the majority of residents would have readily supported housing projects when these are framed as a materialisation of citizenship, as a form of 'transformation', as 'delivery'. As different disputes unfolded, residents however progressively begun to make explicit different socio-ontological associations that situated the housing projects in wider, and inherently problematic, configurations. Directing attention to them, in part, worked to destabilise existing authority structures and institutional divisions. A certain 'critique' could be appreciated in them.

The notion of attachments, in turn, foregrounds the dynamic associations that form around issues. Earlier on, attachments were defined as an interplay of social and material 'dependencies' on and 'commitments' to – that is to say, they are the associations through which actors become substantially

implicated in a given affair (see 'Introduction'). Dependencies and commitments are not a priori givens, but rather *emerge* and are *modified* by the constitution of the public (Dantec & DiSalvo, 2013: 246). Hennion (2012), in a conference presentation, recently urged us to deliberately leave the notion of 'attachments' in vague terms – cautioning us not to define attachments as an abstract concept, and then "applying it to anything willy nilly". As Hennion (ibid) proposes: to 'be' in a state of attachment or to 'have' an attachment markedly differs from being 'bound'. "It is a both a way of being and a way of doing", involves affectively feeling a tie and being part of the tie. Attachments must at once be made and are dependent upon being experienced.

Attachments have a historicity to them, are defined by *long durée* processes; also, attachments are more than 'already there' – they both *engage* and *form* (Hennion, 2010). By centralising experience, but at the same time not being the same as experience, attachment gains a quality that locates it between a 'passive form' and an 'active disposition' (2012). The same dynamic is maintained in Thévenot's (2006) concept of engagement – an untidy relation persisting between 'act of engaging' and of 'being engaged'. Latour (2004b: 205) speaks of "learning to be affected" – meaning "'effectuated', moved, put into motion by other entities, humans or non-humans". (No doubt, significant variations also exist when these different notions are defined in greater detail – here they have the purpose of pinpointing a specific *dynamic*). Concerning processes of issue formation, it can in sum be said that "frames are largely about working around known issues, and attachments are about responding to evolving commitments and dependencies" (Le Dantec and DiSalvo, 2013: 244) – empirically, however, as the situations analysed here also make clear, they remain inextricable intertwined in the articulation of 'matters of concern'.

5.3 A chief without land

Let me return with a few final remarks to the question of the post-apartheid chieftaincy. As Williams (2009: 192) writes, "we find an on-going struggle, taking place over a variety of different policy issues, between chieftaincy and the state over the nature of chieftaincy's authority". 'Land' and 'development' have featured centrally therein. Pieces of legislation have been passed over the years, aiming to redefine, and in many instances limit, the power of the chieftaincy. Traditional leaders have sought to resist the state's attempt to limit their authority, and worked to further entrench themselves into the post-apartheid order (ibid: 195). "The reality is", Williams (ibid: 197) writes, "that the South African state, like most post-colonial sub-Saharan African states, has found it difficult to broadcast its authority in the rural areas, and thus have been forced to rely on chieftaincy for this purpose". "Lack of resources, corruption, unresponsive representatives, and struggles with provincial and national government departments" has led to "a crisis in the spheres of local government". A crisis of local governance, Oomen (2000; 2005: 173) and

Williams (2004; 2009: 198, 205) suggest, that a) led many rural residents to seek support from traditional leaders, and b) political elites to concern themselves with how to utilise traditional leaders as 'partners' for local governance and development.

The story of Inkosi Maphulo somewhat unsettles this picture. Where the relationship between traditional leaders and councillors is good, Maphulo suggests, it is due to a messy mix of personal sympathies, political party membership, and the workings of higher-ranking officials who work to ensure that the status of a chief is recognised and protected. With two ward councillors, Maphulo maintains a 'cooperative relationship', with Cllr Khumalo this has failed. One of the main areas of dispute between the chieftaincy and the state continues to be the implementation of development projects. Williams (2010: 29) writes, both "wish to provide the development and receive credit for its effective implementation". What he terms "performance legitimacy", is defined for both actors in similar terms. As Maphulo emphasises in a confirming manner towards the end of our conversation cited earlier: "if I don't sign this [land agreement], they will say I am 'anti development'". However, he then also recalls what another chief had recently said to him "'if a township is growing in your garden, then are you still an *inkos*i?" Here, he captures what is for him the other side of the same coin. Put plainly; as a chief, he must do his best do bring development to his areas; to ensure the land remains 'his'; *and* to preserve it as distinctly 'non urban'. His hesitancy to move into the new house that stood in his compound was in many respects symptomatic of his concerns over precisely these affairs.

While he has a scarcity of vacant land to allocate, while he has "little power through land", as he puts it, Inkosi Maphulo *does* nevertheless have a legitimate voice in public controversies around land and development. He comes to 'weigh in' on a number of issues. It is worth considering this point further and to turn to Trutz von Trotha's (1996) elaborations on what he terms a transition from 'administrative to civil chieftainship'. In a civil chieftainship, he proposes, the chief figures as a "central place of public dispute". He writes

> "It is a place where conflicting interests, opinions and ideas of all the members of the local community are expressed and discussed. Here the members of the local order voice their hopes and grievances, their interests and wishes, their conflicts and their consensus. The chief thus is a central place where something is constituted which might be called in western terms 'the local public'" (ibid: 99).

Trotha's notion of the 'civil chieftainship' no doubt represents an 'ideal type', in the sociological sense, that one is hard pressed to find. In addition, he foregrounds a notion of political participation premised primarily on rational-critical debate, while I suggest that in processes of issue formation, political practice is more than public debate – i.e. that material environments and technological mediators are central for understanding the articulation of issues and the enactment of participation. Nevertheless, Trotha (1996)

convincingly draws our attention to the task conferred upon the chieftaincy in the articulating of affairs. From a pragmatist perspective, as a public mobilizes it engages in practices fo issue displacement – displacing unadressed issues away from established insititutional arrangements to sites and actors more accessible to their expression. Studies on issue politics have so far emphasised the active displacement *away* from the boundaries of national representative democracy for these fail to settle the issues at hand (see Marres, 2005; Zakhour, 2015). In this limelight, what does the chief's enrolment in the trajectories of issue formation detailed here, make clear? The chief was enrolled at different stages to 'weigh in', why?

The displacement of issues to other locations, for instance to sites associated with traditional leadership – as members of Abahlali repeatedly sought to bring about – provides a new articulation of the issue at stake, i.e. another trajectory along which the issue acquires its definition. Gomart & Hajer (2002) have argued that politicisation explicitly occurs trough the shifting of the stagings of an issue, which as Marres (2004: 133) adds, produce "*deviations from previous stagings of the issue*". Applying this to the cases discussed, we may say that the chief was not only deliberately enrolled in the processes of issue formation that unfolded primarily as an institutional addressee for the affairs, i.e. 'to take care of them', but rather for what *he made of the problem* - for the issue acquires its definition along a trajectory of displacements.

From a different vantage point, we are in the cases discussed here prompted to recognise that issue displacements and the displacement away from sites are as much about the expression of particular affairs as they are about an attachment to particular ideas, rules and procedures, i.e. about an attachment to 'forms', in Thévenot's (1984) sense of the term. The inability of established institutional arrangements to settle the issues at hand is at once what brings about practices of displacement (an excuse for the displacement of issues) as well as an attachment to these arrangements being precisely what is at stake. As Zakhour (2015: 28) compellingly puts it, contrary to the emphasis that has been placed on the active displacement *beyond* the established institutional arrangements to ensure a settlement, the possibility remains that roles, ideals and procedures "may *constitute* the issue". Put differently, the question is how an attachment to 'issues' and an attachment to 'forms' are inextricably intertwined.

Their different points of emphasis left aside, both vantage points make one compelling argument, namely that issues and the process of their articulation, are in fact more than "surface activity". Marres (2004: 129 – emphasis added) warns us: "the issues as an *organising principle* of politics to a large degree disappear from view" (ibid – emphasis mine). For the cases discussed, Marres' warning prompts a consideration of whether the political practices of issue articulation, the mobilisations that took place around matters of land, development and belonging, may in fact constitute crucial interventions in the political landscape. In other words, as *constituting* practices which work to

unsettle existing presuppositions of "who or what counts" (Chu, 2014: 353).

To approach the study of the post-apartheid chieftaincy by focusing on the strictures of formal political accommodation, the formal distribution of rights, is also to uphold an ideal order against which practices must live up to. A pragmatist perspective, in turn, foregrounds not the constitutional order, the checks of legislation or distribution of rights, but rather "the problematic of the legitimating power of plural and shifting publics" (Chandler, 2014: 46). From this it follows, that when the status and role of present day traditional leaders is foregrounded as resting on the control over land allocation and land use, then the chief's political engagement is in a sense reduced to a form of 'managerial politics'. The aim here has been to shift the perspective slightly, to emphasise that the role and status of chiefs can, in turn, only be made sense of fully by shifting attention to the level of 'attachments' and the manner in which traditional leaders find themselves enrolled in various, partly contradictory, trajectories of issue formation. Locating Inkosi Maphulo's concerned remark that he has "little power through land" – and the recognition that his reference is not to vacant land *per se* – within wider processes of issue articulation, in relation to publics and their enactments of concern, provided in this case minute, yet nuanced, insights as to where chiefs in South Africa stand today.

Map 1

KwaNkilinda township
and the neighbouring
traditional authorities.

Fig. 12

Homestead of Inkosi
Maphulo perched on the
side of the hill - the top
house with the adjacent
rondavel. (Picture: Eva
Riedke).

Fig. 13

View from Inkosi
Maphulo's homestead –
overlooking the
neighbouring hills
(Picture: Eva Riedke).

Fig. 14

A house with reference to which Inkosi Maphulo explained to me "this is rural style development". (Picture: Eva Riedke).

Fig. 15

The grave of Inkosi
Maphulo's father.
Located in the township
of KwaNkilinda. (Picture:
Eva Riedke).

In these past few months, the ANCs electoral conference has been ever present and with it the question whether Zuma will be re-elected. The newspapers this week all flashed their headlines of local ANC branches filing 'ghost memberships' to push for their candidate. A new term I also recently learnt: '*fly-by-night branches*', meaning those branches that were until now completely insignificant, but 'suddenly' gained a considerable number of members. All this, and yet in the township, to suggest that campaigning is in full swing, or to ask about expected election results is, as my field assistant suggests "By no means a good idea". "There is no campaigning going on!" "If there is, then it is for Msholozi [Zuma] second term".

I spent the afternoon in Themba's copy shop, after he had complained last week that I no longer had time for him. He was pleased to see me – pleased that I had a few hours to spare, to chat, while he went about attending to his customers. As soon as I sat on the couch, he pointed to that day's *Ilanga* newspaper and the front-page article of an IFP councillor that was shot in front of the Magistrate's Court. He said: "Thankfully, we have not had a problem with that here because no one is from those parties [IFP, NFP] anymore". He paused "But even if it isn't the parties fighting, it is not quiet here". He adds: "You and me, we know, there are some funny things happening". I wasn't sure what he meant. His tone sounded surprised. With big eyes and an amused and performatively earnest expression, he said "Eish, isn't it always you telling me interesting township politics? " He continues: "Have you not seen them? There are these text messages being sent around". He waited for a reaction from me, but then quickly interjected: "They are about meetings being held in the township, to elect the people who will then go to the ANC conference in Mangaung and vote for us [vote in the name of the local ANC branch]. They [the messages] are only being sent to *certain* people. And they don't have a number". "That is what is so strange about them!" he emphasised. Now I responded: "No! I *have* heard about those! Yes Yes! But I don't really understand how they work. And who is getting them?"

"Well, *people*!" He then turned in his seat and begun rummaging in one of the boxes on the floor. "I didn't get a message, so I can't tell you how it works". I sensed that he hadn't expected this reaction from me, i.e. me now asking 'how it works'. I gained the impression by one way or another 'it wasn't right' to talk about how these messages 'work'. "I got a different message yesterday though. I can show you that one. It also has to do with the ANC conference. Also no number! It is this V sign." He shows me a picture on his phone. A picture of the 'V' sign – the index and the middle finger raised. "This is the sign for 'Zuma second them'. I think it means, because I got it, 'I am safe'". He looks down at his phone for a while. "But I tell you! Who knows? Tomorrow I might get the other sign". He goes on to explain that 'the other sign' is a

football substitution sign with two index fingers rotating around each other, signifying, as he puts it that "it is a time for change in the party". The substitution sign belonged to the loyalists of Kgalema Motlanthe, those 'against' Zuma second term.

Sensing that he was seriously concerned, fearful, at the same time unable or hesitant to put a name to it, I sought to somewhat lighten the mood. And so I said: "Themba, don't you always tell me that you are running on 'overtime'? Do you now mean that you are also starting to get scared?" "Are these SMS really scaring you?" He laughed, that his notion of 'over time' had entered my vocabulary. As he had once explained to me: due to his 'struggle credentials', he could speak out in meetings, challenge the councillor, talk about that which should not be talked about. In his words "I was almost killed three times, so everyone here knows that *this* for *me* is nothing but overtime!"

Now he responded to my question about whether he was scared. He said: "Well, I can only tell you. I am planning to go to the *sangoma* [diviner/traditional healer] for *muthi* [medicines]. You know?" He looks at me with a grin on his face. "Perhaps you should also go. But I am not sure how much he would charge you". He laughs. The thought of me going to the *sangoma* makes him chuckle again and again in the moments that follow, as he begins to go about taking apart an old computer on the table in front of us.

As if something suddenly springs to his mind, Themba pulls out the newspaper from under the bag of chips in front of me. "You know? There was an article about all this in the *Ilanga* newspaper today – page 37. Check it!" He had obviously continued to think about the text messages being sent around. He hands me the paper and turns to pick up his cell phone that is ringing on the desk behind him. I flick the pages of newspaper, but can't find the page that he mentioned. While on the phone, he tells me again – "Page 37!" Hanging up, he takes the paper. "They have written about all these things. These signs. These sort of things. You know?" (He almost always added 'you know?' to the end of his sentences). Themba goes back and forth through the page five or six times, mumbling "page 37" repeatedly to himself. "They must have taken it!" he finally remarks and drops the paper back on the table. "This is what I mean, funny things are happening. Also papers just disappear! I am telling you, it is time to get some extra help [*sangoma, muthi*]!"

In this moment, a customer comes in, holding a lined notebook. On it, he put together a handwritten resume. He asks Themba whether the notes can be computerised for a job application. Themba turns to me: "Eva, we must continue this later. I probably must also not talk to you about these things here. You never know who could come in. We meet later at Moyo's place!" 'Moyo's place' was the township *shebeen* [bar] – recently, Themba has frequently asked that we meet here. More specifically, in the *shebeen*'s 'romantic lounge', from which – akin to a studio – all sound is dampened out.

Chapter 4. This chapter is about a conflict around a housing project in Nyala (also detailed in Ch. 3). It is concerned in more detail with a road blockage by township residents, the official launch of an Abahlali baseMjondolo branch and the funeral of an *Umkhonto we Sizwe* veteran who had been allocated one of the new houses. Attention is turned to 'non issues' and the question in what manner processes of turning 'non issues' into 'issues' can bring with them an unsettling of existing power relations.

A gun that sings –
from dissatisfaction to unrest

I begin this chapter in October 2012 when community members in KwaNkilinda blockaded the main road towards the township, protesting against the allocation of houses in Nyala. I continue with the launch of the local Abahlali baseMjondolo branch one month later. I end with the funeral of Comrade John Mhlangu, a member of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* Military Veterans' Association (*The spear of the nation*), which I attended in February 2013. The period that spans these three events, was one in which the township came to be engulfed in a through and through tense political climate. Threats and intimidations took place regularly. These were readily linked by township residents to the 'councillor and his crew' – as the ward councillor (also the ANC branch chairperson), the ANC secretary, the head of the community police forum and two other local 'big men' had become known. "These threats have to do with the housing project in Nyala. More and more people are getting involved, protesting against the councillor!" I was told by a *shebeen* (township bar) owner. It is almost like a mini revolution in this township. You just wait and see!"

As time progressed, residents however grew suspicious of their initial clear-cut interpretations of who belonged to the side of the 'councillor and his crew' and who belonged to the so-called 'other side'. That is to say, there was no longer readily agreement as to *whom*, and in light of the occasional witchcraft allegations, also *what* stood behind specific incidences. As one woman with whom I sat at the taxi stand in the township one afternoon remarked: "Things are changing and I am sure it has to do also with the ANC conference. Every time we have elections, witchcraft becomes an issue and people start running to the *sangoma*. No one trusts anyone. It is like now – we no longer know who is who". A new form of suspicion pervaded everyday social interactions. Text messages with no number being shown from the 'sender' represented such an unsettling category of 'anonymous' threats. While some argued that these were a 'symptom' of the ANC's election campaigns, others upheld with certainty that it was (also) witchcraft at play.

As tensions mounted in the township, the ANC's 53rd National Conference was approaching and was to be held in Mangaung in December 2012. The conflict around the housing projects in Nyala – between those seen to be in charge of the project, those who had been promised houses but had not received any, and the 'outsiders' who had moved into the new houses – became, in the run up to the ANC's elective conference, intersected by multiple other lines of conflict. That is to say, the protests against the housing project did not per se become 'overshadowed' by the impending elections, but rather the basic substance of what was feared, gained new dimensions, as the comment by the woman at the taxi stand also makes clear.

The conference in Mangaung was a head to head race between President Jacob Zuma who opted to hold his office as ANC president for a second term – campaigning under slogans of "unity and continuity" – and a 'pro change' group that united behind Deputy President Kgalema Motlanthe – campaigning for "renewal, revival and restoration". More generally, the conference in Mangaung was about the election of the party's top six leadership positions. KwaZulu-Natal's (KZN) ANC leadership, it was said, was attempting to fill these top six posts with party leaders from the province. Newspapers spoke of aims to get 30% representation in the National Executive Committee, effectively "Zulu-fying the ANC" (Rampedi, 2012).

In the province of Kwa-Zulu-Natal, deemed a 'Zuma stronghold', divisions in the ANC posed a threat to homogenous party block voting. Newspapers reported that ANC provincial chairpersons and senior provincial leaders were 'doctoring' the local branches to ensure Zuma's successful re-election as ANC president. Allegations of membership forms being withheld were made public. In other branches, reports were made of vote-rigging and ghost delegates being recruited to win provincial nomination conferences at all costs (see Molele et al. 2012). As Themba, the copy shop owner from KwaNkilinda, put it: "In some places right now, there are dead comrades signing attendance lists at meetings". The eThekwini region, with 103 branches being the ANC's biggest, was seen as particularly divided. Each branch would send one voting delegate to Mangaung, making 974 in total from KwaZulu-Natal (35% of the delegates overall). With Kwa-Zulu Natal sending such considerable numbers, and also the province being Zuma's 'home province', stakes were high that the 'right delegates' would need to be sent to Mangaung (Tolsi, 2012).[1]

In KwaNkilinda, there were no visible signs that outside of ANC ward meetings, any open lobbying took place. As Cllr Khumalo emphasised to me ahead of the Mangaung conference: "Here, we are *all* united behind Zuma for a second term – 100% Msholozi second term! There is no one that belongs to the Motlanthe camp here!" 'Msholozi' is Jacob Zuma's clan name. Conversations out of the limelight emphasised that lobbying did occur but had "gone underground". The no name text messages that were sent around were an example, fuelling fears that if one received a 'wind of change' SMS, one could 'from nowhere' be construed as being anti-Zuma. The ANC elective conference fuelled suspicions that one could 'generally', on matters that had nothing to do with the party conference, be seen as being belonging to 'the wrong side'. This included anxieties about being seen as aligned to the Abahlali protesters, being seen as opposing the councillor, being seen as belonging to one of the political opposition parties. The explicit anxieties born

---

[1] Addressing KwaZulu-Natal ANC delegates at a cadres conference held at the University of Zululand prior to Mangaung, President Zuma used the analogy of a bus to say that is was not only important that the right delegates boarded the bus, but that also the right driver was chosen for the bus - "so that you do not end up in a destination you do not want" (Khumalo, 2012).

out of the situation around the housing project had become tied together with a broader dimension. As a consequence, anxieties somewhat became 'unbounded' or 'disconnected' (see Bonhomme, 2012 for a similar argument on witchcraft). A climate of generalized suspicion established itself.

While the housing project and the ANCs elective conference became complexly intertwined, it remained impossible to tell in what manner the threats, intimidations and violence that individuals experienced was exacerbated by ANC politics at provincial and national scales. In the following, I will limit my attention to the conflict that unfolded around the housing project in KwaNkilinda. The Mangaung conference remains an undeniably significant 'backdrop' to the events that unfolded. How party politics came to take its toll on everyday life will shine through the different accounts I discuss.

1. Recasting the power game

The objective of the chapter is to consider questions of 'power' in relation to processes of 'issuefication'. The works of Dewey, and the pragmatists more generally, are frequently framed as being inattentive to the operations of 'power'. In turn, it is the 'agenda-setting' theorists of that have far more deliberately addressed 'power' in relation to 'issue politics'. To these count Stephen Lukes and Elmer Schattschneider. What I seek to do in this chapter is to a) consider the proposition made by Rogers (2009) and Hildreth (2009) that Dewey *did* consider dimensions of power and domination and b) by drawing on the work of Marres (2005a), to reconsider the arguments put forward by the agenda theorists that centre around the question of so-called 'non issues' vis-à-vis 'issues' as well as 'real issues' vis-à-vis 'politicised issues'. That is to say, *first*, how does power manifest in the 'non issues', i.e. how are certain affairs prevented from being articulated as political issues. *Second*, how is a distinction between 'real issues' and 'politicised issues', as Schattschneider had proposed, inherently problematic but at the same time, how does it provide an additional vantage point from which to consider the *politics* involved in the articulation of affairs. The proposition hereby is that in the process of issue formation, actors draw into question precisely the incongruence between the 'issues of politics' and the 'issues out here'. I pursue in the following sequence: I want to provide a brief outline of these two arguments (a and b); then, in a second section turn in detail to the events that unfolded between October 2012 and February 2013 in KwaNkilinda (the road blockage, the Abahlali branch launch and the funeral); and in a concluding section explore again the manner in which our attention to particular *performances of concern*, enables insights into how entrenched hierarchies of power are challenged.

1.1 Dewey on power

Critics have upheld that Dewey's political thought – and pragmatism in general – has been inattentive to the operations of power (see Mills, 1963; Diggins, 1999; White, 2004). This is also the stance upheld in the critical responses to his work by Sheldon Wolin (2004 (1960)) and Walter Lippmann (2002 (1927)). Melvin Rogers (2009: 70), one of the few theorists that has come to pragmatism's defence, in contrast proposes: "On a careful reading of Dewey's political and ethical writings, what emerges is a view of democratic governance that places political power and its management at the centre of analysis" (see also Hildreth, 2009). He emphasises: "[...] at the core of his understanding is a preoccupation with power and domination" (ibid). Rogers (ibid: 71) hereby proposes that Dewey considers workings of power primarily with reference to its 'legitimate use' and 'the contestability of power'. As Hildreth suggests, Dewey "is acutely aware of how issues of power impede the realization of his central normative commitments: individual growth and the development of 'democracy as a way of life'". When compared to Wolin and Lippmann, Dewey a) envisions a fundamentally different relationship between citizens and experts, b) upholds that the legitimate use of power rests on a *conditionality* of how that power will be used and c) sees the public as always holding in reserve the ability to contest the ends to which such political control is being put, preventing political power from being exercised arbitrarily. Let me elaborate on these three interrelated points.

As pointed out in the introduction, the writings of Lippmann formed part of a larger debate in the 1920s on the viability of popular sovereignty – that is, the question of *whether* and *how* the public can competently engage with public affairs in a manner that political power becomes substantively informed by those over whom it is exercised. Lippmann ((2002 (1927): 47) writes in '*The Phantom Public'* that the public "does not select the candidate, write the platform, outline the policy any more than it builds the automobile or acts the play. It aligns itself for or against somebody who has offered himself". Lippmann foregrounds the doings of 'experts' in politics, i.e. experts give shape to political phenomenon, the unseen political phenomenon that the common citizen is unable to grasp. Experts provide facts, interpret facts and provide vision. As Rogers (2009: 72) adds: "The cognitive authority he [Lippmann] attaches to experts thus slides into a kind of political power that shapes the landscape in which political officials and the citizenry function from the outset". Dewey's position, in contrast, is that political problems demand the engagement of *the public* – a step beyond the purview of experts. "While experts may be able to provide technical knowledge, they have no way of judging the 'bearing of [that] knowledge' (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 365 discussed in Rogers, 2009: 73).

Set against Lippmann, Wolin (2004: 517) writes: "'In the end', Dewey's most crucial concepts – experimentation, method, and culture – were ways of evading questions about power". Wolin (1996: 38) recognises the ability of

individuals to "take on responsibilities, deliberate about goals and choices, and share in decisions that have broad consequences and affect unknown and distant others". However, it is only by *revolutionary means* that the otherwise powerless come to pose a threat to the constraining effects of institutions and elites, to 'politics as usual' – i.e. it is only by revolutionary means that "the demos makes itself political" (ibid). In Rogers' (2009: 74) words: "Whereas Lippmann moves too far in the direction of privileging elites, Wolin moves too far in the opposite direction, resulting in an inability to reconcile popular sovereignty with representative institutions". Democracy is born of revolt according to Wolin. He implicitly upholds a distinction between 'revolutionary' and 'normal' modes of responding to collective affairs (Rogers, 2009: 74). In contrast to Lippmann, democracy, is then, "both *functionally* and *conceptually* tied to revolution" (ibid, emphasis in original).

In sum, Dewey can be said to fundamentally agree with Lippmann and Wolin in as far as he recognises the technical dimension of issues facing modern citizens and the ensuing dependency on experts. *First*, unlike Lippmann however who foregrounds the role of experts, Dewey views their position as 'ancillary' to that of the public. He upholds "a profound faith in the capacity of ordinary citizens to judge and act intelligently" (Hildreth, 2009: 780). Dewey emphasises forms of deliberation that work to bring 'conflicts' (among citizens) out into the open and that then give shape to the very purpose of 'expertise'. He envisions a form of public problem solving (Hildreth, 2009: 781), a kind of "collective artisanship to social inquiry" (Rogers, 2009: 79). Publics are infused with the spirit and experimental activity that is generally seen to characterize scientific enquiry. *Second*, Dewey, in contrast to Wolin, does not reduce participatory democracy to fleeting moments of revolution. Herein, we can distil, as Rogers (2009: 77) puts it, a concern with 'capacities of deliberation', a concern of publics "to manage power over those whom it will be exercised" so that its use does not become arbitrary. Citizens maintain the capacity to rethink the control over the forces that govern their lives, to scrutinise the purpose and boundaries of existing institutions, and to 'remake' the state, as Dewey (1991 (1927): 32) says. Importantly, 'capacities' remain *relative* to a transactional field - capacities are complex functions of habits and social customs, also defined by social relations and structures of power (Hildreth, 2009: 793-4). So while Dewey never offers a systematic statement on power, power can nevertheless be seen to feature two-fold in his writings: as 'employed' in the formation and expression of publics and their issues – and to avoid 'domination'.

C. Wright Mills (1963) would at this stage still contend, that what Dewey outlines is a model of politics as public problem-solving that is impotent against established power relations and entrenched hierarchies of interests (discussed in Hildreth, 2009: 784). That is to say, that public problem solving may work at small scale, but that it is not well suited for action of revolutionary nature. Mill's critique of Dewey's works underlines that "politics is synonymous with the fight for power" (ibid). The model of

scientific inquiry to which Dewey always made reference provides a misguided model for politics. "Science is based on the ordered study of phenomena; it relies on established methods, valid knowledge claims, and a tightly knit community of experts. In politics factual information is often manipulated or just plain ignored" (Mills 1963: 294 discussed in Hildreth, 2009: 784). Dewey's model, according to Mills, sidesteps existing distributions of power and structures of inequality and leaves the question of political leverage able to challenge these entrenched hierarches unaddressed. Hildreth (2009) in a defence of pragmatism, in turn, makes explicit that Dewey does not fall short of recognizing that social change is "an extraordinarily difficult endeavour" (ibid: 787) but that Dewey clings through and through to the proposition that experimental inquiry provides the "normative resources and criteria for critiquing power relations" (ibid: 794) – that inquiry itself "is a distinctively *political* act" (798).

While Dewey himself indeed says little about political leverage able to bring about dramatic change, he upholds that democracy is ultimately 'self-correcting', that change is brought about by attention to the existence of *concrete* and *specific* problems in our lives (Dewey, 1939: 227; Hildreth, 2009). In my account of the road blockade, the launch of the Abahlali branch and the funeral that follows, I take from Dewey that 'conflict', as it here unfolded around the housing project, "is a *sine qua non* of reflection and ingenuity" (1916: 188). Without repairing to a foundational notion of 'interests', the accounts enable an understanding of how experience and social practice may be seen to provide the normative resources and criteria for critiquing power relations (Hildreth, 2009). That is to say, in a different terminology, how transformative politics is rooted in the everyday disputes and deliberations over 'what is' and 'what ought to be' (Boltanski & Thévenot, 2006).

1.2 The agenda theorists

Marres (2005a) draws on a different body of works to consider questions of power in relation to processes of issuefication, namely contributions from theories of agenda setting. I shall in brief outline some of the main points that emerge when the pragmatists' contributions are set against those of the agenda setting theorists, limiting myself to the works of Elmer Schattschneider and Steven Lukes (I shall return to these points again in the final section). Dewey and Lippmann conceive of public involvement in politics as being occasioned by controversies, namely, as Marres (2007: 767) puts it, "when problems arise that prove resistant to definition and settlement by established knowledge and institutional procedures". In turn, in the situations in which established political forms prove unable to contain the effects of change, "issues appear as an organizing principle of the public" (Marres, 2007: 769). Agenda theorists equally considered 'issues' as the

decisive factor in democratic institutional politics, suggesting these determine which actors get involved in political process and on what terms (ibid: 761). Two propositions require further attention, which can at first glance be seen to pose a challenge to the pragmatist account of issue politics. Namely, a) Schattschneider's (1960) central tenet which reads that the issues of politics which define political processes, primarily serve as instruments in struggles for power and b) the notion of 'non issues' taken up by Lukes (2005 (1974)), which draws attention to the affairs that through a play of forces are prevented from turning into political issues (Marres, 2005a).

The classic works of 'agenda setting' developed the argument that issue-political practices as pursued by governmental politics "undermines political democracy from the inside out". Marres (2005a) details how this proposition cut across debates in the field of political science in the 1960s and 1970s. Schattschneider in '*The Semisovereign People*' (1960) was one of the first to make clear that the composition of the political agenda was itself a fundamental part of the political process. Drawing attention to the importance of the 'conflict of conflicts', he works to illustrate the manner in which forces within government struggle to dominate the political agenda. In his words:

> "What happens in politics depends on the way in which people are divided into factions, parties, groups, classes, etc. The outcome of the game of politics depends on which of a multitude of possible conflicts gains the dominant position" (ibid: 62).

It follows that "the party which is able to make its definition of the issues prevail is likely to take over the government". 'Issue politics' is 'power politics', so the argument. As Marres (2005a: 85), in turn, underlines: for Schattschneider actors engage politically, primarily to seize power. "For Schattschneider, an issue comes into being as the result of some kind of survival-of–the fittest struggle within government over the political agenda" (ibid).

Much like the other agenda theorists, Schattschneider concentrates on practices of issue politics within the spheres of government but pays little attention to *public involvement* in politics. As Marres (2005a: 82) succinctly puts it: "They [the agenda theorists] describe the arrangements that *should* facilitate such involvement, rather than accounting for the ways in which it actually comes about"[2]. Government politics provide the definitions of issues at stake – i.e. ordinary citizens, located at a distance, play a predominantly secondary, reactive role. As Schattschneider (1960: 108) writes: "All classical concepts of democracy have overestimated the strength and universality of the self-generated impulse of people to participate in the life of the political

---

[2] Put differently, by treating practices of issue politics as they unfold in government politics as distinct from public involvement in politics, also means failing to recognise *both* as practical achievements. From a pragmatist-inspired standpoint, the objective is then to re-establish symmetry (see also Marres, 2005a: 83).

community" (Marres, 2005a: 76-77). Because the general public is located at a distance of government institutions, "whether and how and which citizens come to participate" depends on the issues defined (ibid: 76). This stands in contrast to the Deweyan notion of issue politics for it does not give much credit to the *issues* of politics themselves. That is to say, it doesn't pay much attention to the socio-ontological 'attachments' "that people mobilise (and that mobilise people)" (Marres, 2007: 759) – i.e. to the 'objects of concern' to whose articulation political practices are essentially dedicated (Latour, 2005b).

Lukes in '*Power: a Radical View'* (2005 (1974)) makes a significant contribution to the account of issue politics by introducing the notion of the 'non-issues'. On the one hand, the notion builds on Schattschneider's (1960: 71) idea of 'the mobilisation of bias'. Schattschneider had argued:

> "All forms of political organization have a bias in favor of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organization is the mobilization of *bias*. Some issues are organized *into* politics while others are organized *out*" (emphasis added) (ibid).

On the other hand, Lukes' discussion of 'non issue' is inspired by Bachrach and Baratz's (1970: 44) concept of the 'non-decision'. 'Non-decision making' understood as

> "a means by which demands for change in the existing allocation of benefits and privileges in the community can be suffocated before they are even voiced; or kept covert; or killed before they gain access to the relevant decision-making arena […]".

Lukes (2005 (1974): 23) stresses that Bachrach and Baratz (1970) effectively come to redefine (*broaden*) the boundaries of what may count as a political issue (see also Bierschenk, 1988 and Offe, 1977). By drawing attention to the tragic fate of environmental, economic and social problems that are kept from even becoming political problems, Lukes fundamentally elaborates our understanding of the role that issues play in organising politics. Marres (2005a: 84) argues that nevertheless problematic, is a distinction that Lukes upholds between "issues on the governmental agenda, which are politicised but fictional" and on the other side "external realities that are authentic but not politicised". She adds "he thus seems to assume that politicisation destroys the reality of issues: only non-politicised issues count as real, while political issues are contaminated by illusion" (ibid).

Two points that Marres (2005a: 8) makes in her analysis of Schattschneider and Lukes should be given further attention here. She argues: "each in their own way, these authors characterise issue politics as a politics that is driven by interests that are not those of the public". That is, issue politics is seen to occur at a *distance* from ordinary citizens. The main point of divergence between the propositions made by the agenda theorists and the Deweyan

notion of issue politics is, as Marres goes on to argue, that we cannot assume that issue formation primarily unfolds in the existing arrangements of representative democracy. She draws attention to the fact that "practices of public involvement in politics may draw on and mobilise issues just as practices of governmental politics do" (ibid: 84). Secondly, Marres illustrates that a strict discontinuity between the issues of politics and the non-issues of daily life, as Lukes upheld it, proves untenable if public involvement in politics is explored as it unfolds in *practice*. Public involvement as a practice "in one way or another involves the questioning of discontinuities between issue definitions put forward by institutions, and articulations of issues as they arise out there, in extra-institutional locations" (ibid: 85). Actors thereby get involved in politics when the issues of politics are perceived as *failing to meditate* the experiences of everyday life.

Marres (2005a: 87) suggests that if reformulated accordingly, it is the following considerations (or complications) of the agenda theorists that remain pertinent: a) namely the consideration that issue formation often takes place at a distance from the general public; b) that "interests in issues often takes the form of special interests" and these do not necessarily correlate with public interests; c) in order to fully make sense of the role of issues in politics, attention also needs to be paid to the role of so called 'non issues' – i.e. the manner in which "serious issues may be actively kept off the political agenda" (ibid); and lastly, d) recognising that issues of politics also serve as instruments in struggles for power. Ascribing to the latter (d), allows us to explore how issues come to unsettle relations of sovereignty. It is particularly to these latter two points that I want to return to in the following account of events that occurred in KwaNkilinda. 'Non-issues' much like non-decisions are rendered empirically visible in actual observable conflict – i.e. conflict, overt or covert, between those engaged in non-decision making and those they exclude from a hearing within the political system (see Bachrach and Baratz (1970), also discussed in Lukes, 2005 (1974): 24). It is practices aimed at keeping particular affairs from turning into political issues that herein become *traceable*. The mobilisations by Abahlali concerning the housing project in the township can be seen to address precisely the discontinuities between issues 'in there' and issues 'out here'. In relation thereto, the spate of threats, intimidations and violence are considered (alongside other explanations) as interventions by political actors that work to prevent potential issues from being actual – i.e. means of 'sabotaging' residents' attempts to publicise issues. What is rendered visible in its most explicit, and non-foundational sense are *struggles for power* inherent in issue politics.

In sum, Rogers (2009) and Hildreth (2009) enable us to see how the contestability of power features in Dewey's political philosophy. For Dewey, these authors argue, actors retain the necessary critical capacities to control the arbitrary uses of power. Schattschneider (1960), Lukes (2005 (1974)) and the analytical discussion of their works by Marres (2005a), in turn, make us

attentive to how it is *problems* themselves that should frame and guide our inquiry. Contestability of power relations plays itself out through 'issues'. In Marres' (2005a: 87) words, what we recognise is that precisely "the rise of an issue turns out to play a crucial role in the formation of publics that seek to intervene in matters of government". This, we can say is, 'agenda-setting upside down' (ibid). What these arguments on the politics of issues should draw our attention to in the following account of the road blockade, the Abahlali branch launch and the funeral in KwaNkilinda, are in more detail the specific 'workings'. That is to say, to make us attentive to *how* issues, as normative resources and criteria, play a role in perceiving and critiquing relations of power.

2. The road blockade

The road blockage was the first of many protests that would occur in KwaNkilinda against the housing project in Nyala. Later, the group of residents that took to the streets in October 2012 would do so as part of the well-known Abahlali baseMjondolo movement. A few months prior, in August 2012, a protest march had already taken place to the councillor's office where a memorandum was handed over to the speaker of the eThekwini Municipality, Cllr Loogie Naidoo. Drawing attention to the project in Nyala, the memorandum called for construction to be stopped; the community liaison officer for the project to be replaced; for renegotiations to take place in the interest of residents; and for investigations to be launched into allegations of corruption and intimidation.

The municipality, I was told, had deliberately and disrespectfully ignored the memorandum. Thus the group, on this day about 100, mainly women, took to the streets and *toy toyied* – a protests dance associated with the liberation struggle. The group stood at a distance of burning tires, parts of wood, pieces of old corrugated iron and cardboard, which they had used to block the road. Officers from the local police station stood at a distance, and deliberated on how to clear the fire off the road. A reporter from the *Daily News* was present, who said he would write a short story on the protests and also interview Cllr. Khumalo.

When the article appeared in the newspaper the coming day, it included a response from the ward councillor. As he said community meetings had been held to address the grievances of residents and the project had always been for *all* the people of KwaNkilinda, not only for residents from Nyala in which the houses now stood. Any resident that has been assessed and who has qualified for a house, would receive a house. The article further quotes Khumalo as saying: "These accusations are baseless and unfounded. We explained to them that each family would be allocated a RDP house. They seemed to understand the criteria, and now I am baffled why these sudden

protests" (Nene, 2012).

I, at this point in my research, knew the ward councillor, had on a few occasions been to the local police station and had been introduced to a handful of families in the section in which the road block now took place – in short, many of those who saw me interact on the streets on this day, had most likely seen me before. I knew actors on 'both' sides of the conflict. In the previous months, I had, on different occasions, been assured that the presence of white, female, foreign, anthropologist was a new sight in the township – "people who look like you are either journalists from Durban or they work for Eskom [a electricity company]". I was now increasingly confronted with questions about 'what I was *actually* doing', 'what I was *actually* interested in', and 'whom I was *really* talking to'. My engagements with those activists who were mobilising street protests, would from here on have a significant impact on the relationships I had already established in the township. Meeting with individuals on both 'sides' of the conflict, I was frequently made to recognise that neutrality was not an option (see Glazer, 1970: 314). I was asked what I knew about the housing project, what the councillor had said about the protesters, whether I was now joining "their struggle". Elsewhere, I have reflected on what here begun to unfold, by drawing on Pieke's notion (1995) of "accidental frontline anthropology" (see Riedke, 2015). To these dilemmas I shall again return below.

The night after the road blockade, I was told later, a few individuals were threatened and intimidated. Thandisile, a strong willed woman in her mid thirties was singled out. She was the spokesperson amongst the activists, had garnered support among residents in Nyala to join Abahlali baseMjondolo and introduced herself as the interim chairperson of Abahlali in the area – interim until the official elections of the branch leadership. Cllr Khumalo's blue 4x4 Nevara was said to be seen in Nyala that night, parking in front of Thandisile's home for a prolonged time, the headlights on full beam. As the car eventually drove off, two shots were fired in the air. Vincent, a resident from Nyala who had also been present during the road blockade, recounts another incident from the same night[3]:

> *Vincent*: After the protests [...] one man was followed by the councillor and his crew. They went to his house at night with a *bakkie* [pick up truck] full of guns and petrol bombs and told him "You see! During the day you were always with people, but at night you are alone! You see who I am with? I can take you on. So don't get involved with things that don't concern you!"

The road blockade had gained coverage in the media, by 'spreading the news'

---

[3] Due to the nature of fieldwork, I could not always be present, particularly at night. At other times, I could only witness occurrences from a particular perspective. In contrast to previous chapters, I thus rely to a considerable degree on actors' accounts of 'what took place' – quoting them at length when they recount how particular events unfolded.

of their cause, it cultivated additional participation, and above all, through shared experiences, fears and concerns, it provided for a sense of coming-togetherness. In the coming days, preparations were carried forward for the new launch of the official Abahlali branch. The launch was to be held in the community hall in a section neighbouring Nyala. Residents would here be tasked with electing members to leadership positions in a branch area committee.

3. Launch of the Abahlali branch

The branch launch in mid November 2012 was due to start at 10:00 a.m.. Residents gathered outside the hall, waiting for a church group to finish its service. While waiting, Cllr Khumalo arrived in his Nissan Nevara. Behind him, Cllr Cele in his white Pajero. (The cars were emphasised more and more in peoples' accounts – on the one hand, being a status symbol, a sign of 'the wealth they gained through politics', and on the other hand, the cars made visible the presence of the councillors, particularly at night). Shortly after the arrival of the councillors, a combie with 15 Abahlali supporters arrived from another shack settlement in Durban. They came to support the residents from KwaNkilinda; they came to support 'the movement'. There was not much interaction, merely a perpetual suspicion discernible between the councillors who remained seated in their cars and those who had come to attend the launch. After the church group finished their sermon, the hall emptied, and the councillors were quick to enter. S'bu Zikode, at the time (founding) President of Abahlali, recounts in a conversation with me:

> *S'bu Zikode*: When the church service ended, the councillors immediately went into the hall and occupied the first seats. And then there was Nhlanhla, the Community Liaison Officer and a fourth man, who they [residents] said was the Chairperson of the Community Policing Forum (CPF) […] So the councillor then hijacked the meeting. You could see he was very angry, nervous, [PAUSE] angry.

> He opened the meeting and he told people that the aim was to talk about crime. He said: 'Obviously, housing is a second issue, but we are going to launch a CPF [for the township section 'Nyala'] because recently there have been high instances of crime in this area'.

> He had brought his own people to the meeting, some of them armed, who were moving in and out of the hall. Up and down there was a group of men that we thought were his security guards or something. They would go up and down.

> Then he went on to address the meeting and he tried to pretend as if things were normal. But then people were making noise. As he went on and on, we came and sat quietly – very disciplined – as part of the

audience, but in the front. [LONG PAUSE] At one point Mr Jondo raised his hand and he said: 'As far as we know this meeting is for Abahlali, it is for *us* this meeting'. Everybody then started clapping and he [Cllr Khumalo] became even more angry.

Let me in brief explain what stood behind the councillor's effort to 'hijack' the meeting and to devote its purpose to the launch of a Community Police Forum (CPF). Community policing, as a benchmark for democratic policing, is, according to Hornberger (2013) being rolled out on an unprecedented scale since the end of apartheid. The imperative has been to reform the police force by abolishing the military nature of apartheid policing, legitimatising police authority, transforming the relationship between police and community – "'de-demonising' their perceptions of each other" The objective, on a general note, has been to encourage community participation in the production of their own security (see also Schärf, 2001; Benit-Gbafou et al., 2008; Leggett, 2006). As Hornberger's (2013) study illustrates, the result is however often a different one. About the existing CPF in KwaNkilinda, residents regularly suggested that state violence, including intimidations and threats by the ward councillor and his 'crew', were *extended* and not *curtailed*. What CPF would frequently come to represent was essentially not a reform of the *public* but rather the formation of a *private* police (Hornberger, 2013: 609). I return to this point later.

'Jondo' was the man's first name, yet everyone always added 'Mr' to it when speaking about him. That Mr Jondo spoke out against Cllr Khumalo's 'hijacking' of the meeting was significant. When he showed up earlier that morning at a gathering where a handful of people had met to talk through the proceedings of the day, he came wearing an ANC t-shirt. Thandisile and the other members of the interim steering committee sure took notice of it but didn't make a comment. But when S'bu Zikode arrived with other members from Abahlali's Durban Office, he reprimanded Mr Jondo. On a day in which he is to be elected into an Abahlali leadership position, Zikode argued, he cannot wear an ANC t-shirt. Abahlali's red t-shirts have become a "nation wide symbol of resistance" was the argument. Mr Jondo thereafter changed his t-shirt. Rising to his feet in the hijacked meeting, now a few hours after the t-shirt incident, signified commitment to Abahlali's cause. At the same time, as a regular attendee of local ANC meetings, he simultaneously crossed a line in public that could put him at risk of threats and assaults. An elderly woman from the meeting would later say he made "a sacrifice for Abahlali's struggle that could cost him his life".

A CPF committee for KwaNkilinda already existed and its chairperson, Bheka, was said to belong to the 'councillor's crew'. The announcement that an additional CPF committee would be launched for this specific section of the township, I assumed, was a means of 're-capturing' the loyalties of individuals such as Mr Jondo. That is to say, previously loyal ANC members, who felt alienated through the housing project, their hopes blistered, and who

now sought new means to reconnect to the politics they have effectively been shut out of. The proposal to now launch a committee specifically for problems that recently occurred in Nyala seemed like an effort to 'win back' potential turncoats, swaying them with promises of new positions in new local government structures.

S'bu Zikode continues recounting how the meeting unfolded:

> *S'bu Zikode*: So after Mr Jondo spoke and people were supportive, you know, chanting, he [Cllr Khumalo] just pretended he didn't hear. [PAUSE] As if his authority could never be challenged like this. He just continued talking.
>
> *Eva: did he say anything to Mr Jondo?*
>
> *S'bu Zikode*: He did not entertain him. He just said 'Oh. Ok. I will come back to that'. But then he went ahead.
>
> We [Abahlali leadership from Durban] were sitting quietly and we were shocked about what was happening. But the interesting thing was, what we were reflecting most about, was the reaction of the community. I mean they were being hijacked at broad daylight. […]
>
> Then we became inpatient as he went on and on. Thandisile at times would approach him. Thandisile is a very powerful woman. Very humble. She went to him to say: 'Councillor, as you know, this is *our* meeting and we have guests here'. At one point the councillor then acknowledged that and said: 'Well, yes, I can see some strange faces here. But we must engage with some issues first. Later, we shall also engage with this issue of housing'. He knew that people were more concerned about housing than crime. [PAUSE] Thandisile would go to him and he would listen to her as if he is complying. 'Ok. Give me another 30 minutes' he would say. Then we would wait for another 30 minutes and he would go on and on.

Cllr Khumalo predominantly moderated the meeting. At two intervals, he called on CPF Chairperson Bheka and Cllr Cele to provide 'a background of crime' in the area. S'bu Zikode and the rest of the Abahlali leadership that had come to attend the launch, increasingly grew inpatient. They left the hall to deliberate outside. S'bu Zikode recalls that on the one hand, it was clear that no launching would take place, on the other hand, they felt that they could not leave in a situation like this, i.e. "with the community not brave enough to speak up", as Zikode says. "But what option did we have? It [a form of resistance] needed to come from them".

As members of Abahlali begun to leave the hall in protest of the meeting having been 'hijacked', Cllr Khumalo proposed that as "in the past", a "third force" had taken its toll on security in the area. "These people who have

caused problems here are Inkatha who have gone undercover". When considering this remark made by Cllr Khumalo, it is noteworthy that Chance (2010), through her research in shack settlements in other parts of Durban, has observed similar statements being made when confrontations unfolded between Abahlali and elected officials. She (2010: 16) writes "public statements, between 2005 and 2010, by various officials [...] posited Abahlali, not as a legitimate civic organization, but as a dangerous "third force" bent upon disrupting elections, and, more generally, undermining ANC structures". What this worked to do, the argument goes, is to project a larger political dimension onto the tensions that unfolded, to inject historical political rivalries onto an established terrain of conflict, detracting from the affairs that were due to be discussed (see also Kynoch, 2005). To this point I shall return later.

In this meeting, Cllr Khumalo then referred to the combie with which Abahlali members from another shack settlement had arrived, emphasising that "these people look very poor!" As Thandisile explains: "He told people 'you must look out for those people. They want your houses. I can see how poor they are!' I warn you, this is *politics*". This remark, i.e. Cllr Khumalo's 'warning' of 'politics' (*ipolitiki* in isiZulu), again has more significance. In KwaZulu-Natal, the connotation that continues to be most readily conjured up when the term 'political' is used, is the violent conflict between supporters of the *ANC* and the *IFP* that swept the province during the 1980s and early 1990s. Williams (2010: 110) similarly speaks of politics gaining a 'narrow definition', as "competition between political parties that ended in violence". Chance (2015a: 399) observes: "'the political' in public discourse is often opposed to the anti-democratic or the criminal, expressed, for example, in racialized condemnations of violent protests and in fears of rising crime rates" (see also Comaroff and Comaroff 2006). With this remark Abahlali was marked out as an oppositional political organization and a direct opponent that needed to be eliminated.

Thandisile again recounts how the residents from KwaNkilinda who had come to identify with Abahlali "felt embarrassed" by how the launch was unfolding. Those who had come to attend the launch had left the hall one by one. She says 'the problem' was that some community residents had indeed come under the assumption that the councillor was hosting the meeting and not Abahlali. Confusion had persisted throughout the event about *what* the meeting was to really be about. She explains:

> "We had gone around with a loud hailer the night before the meeting, telling everybody in the area that the launch of the branch will take place tomorrow. We told people that we will elect our Abahlali leadership. That other comrades from other shack settlements will join us. We told people: '9:00 o'clock, community hall'. When we finished, Khumalo drove around with his Navara. With the hailers they [Cllr. Khumalo and 'his crew'] also announced a meeting for '9:00 o'clock,

community hall'. Same place. So people who were there the day of the launch, were confused!"

With a few other residents, Thandisile travelled to the Abahlali Offices in Durban the day after the failed launch "to apologise" for their inaction to Zikode. As she recounts: "Zikode told us that we should have a few more meetings here in Nyala before we launch a branch, and make sure that the community understands the struggle. 'It won't work, if it is just for the houses' he told us". Zikode has emphasised to Thandisile and the interim committee from the township that the launch had failed for two reasons: a) due to the councillor announcing a CPF meeting, same time, same place, and b) because those who had indeed come to attend the launch of an Abahlali branch, "did not yet fully comprehend *what* the movement is about".

Let me turn to S'bu Zikode's recollections of what happened after the failed launch.

> S'bu Zikode: After the launch that failed, we had several meetings. Because that is exactly why we don't want to jump into launching a branch. We cannot launch a branch if people are still not clear about what they are joining. We say to people 'we are not like political parties. We are not chasing numbers. If you take membership of Abahlali today it doesn't make *us* happy because this doesn't help *you*' There has to be a change in mind. It is about emancipating politics. That is what matters! […]

> We said to them, we are not angry that on that day you did not stand up for the councillor, rather we feel pity for you [LONG PAUSE].

> We took them through a slow process to better understand what the movement is for, other than dealing with issues of service delivery, or those houses. Their concern is with housing. We said to them 'yes we will deal with that but it is not the root cause of such exploitation and trial that we are facing. What you are going through reminds Abahlali of its challenge and that it should *not* be confined to issues of service delivery. What you are going through is exactly what we are tackling at a bigger scale.

How does Abahlali's 'struggle' sit vis-à-vis electoral party politics? This was a central concern, not least also for those who sought to become members of the movement (recall the incidence of Mr Jondo and the ANC t-shirt). Abahlali arose from the struggles in Kennedy Road in 2005. In the 2006 local government elections, it launched a "No Land, No House, No Vote" campaign. Abahlali embarked on a boycott of the elections, declaring itself as pursuing "anti-party politics" (Zikode 2006; 12). Zikode emphasised in conversations with me, that amongst its activists, Abahlali of course also includes active members of the ANC, the Inkatha Freedom Party (IFP), the National Freedom

Party (NFP) and the Democratic Alliance (DA). Members can keep their party membership cards, Zikode makes clear, but then they remain 'general members' and cannot be voted into any local leadership positions. "Otherwise we would risk them becoming accountable to the local councillors instead of being accountable to the people".

Zikode argues: "What is important within the space that Abahlali provides, is to say 'what brings us here is our suffering, our exploitation, our exclusion'". He emphasises: "We make a very clear distinction between so called *peoples' politics*, which we call 'living politics' (*ipolitiki ephilayo* in isiZulu*) and *party politics*, which is your electoral politics." The two *can* readily be separated. Perhaps, he proposes, if one considers the histories of the province, they, in fact, readily need to be separated. As he puts it: "Deeper, we think the movement is very important given the history of this province. Automatically, it has been the case that if I am ANC, that someone from the IFP is my enemy. This general perception that if we are not in the same party, that makes us enemies". In this respect, Abahlali in a sense provides "a reconciliatory space where these bigger enemies are less important", he says. As Gibson (2010: 13) suggests in words similar to those of Zikode quote here "[...] AbM [Abahlali] shack dwellers are expressing a new kind of inclusive politics from the ground up, one which appears local and piecemeal, such as providing services to settlements, but is also radical and national".

The notion of 'living politics' is central. Abahlali emphasises that its mobilisations are grounded in shared material conditions – life in the shack lands and beyond. It is defined by what S'bu Zikode above termed "our suffering, our exploitation, our exclusion". "From here, we challenge the post apartheid's ANC in power", Zikode adds in a later conversation. Chance (2015b: 865) has illustrated that Abahlali members see themselves as "carrying forward the messianic project of liberation". She adds "*carrying forward liberation* harkens back to an ANC— as a liberation movement—under Nelson Mandela prior to its becoming a ruling party" (ibid, emphasis mine). Abahlali stresses, for instance in the documentary '*Dear Mandela*' (2011)[4] but also recurringly in press releases, that the ANC has moved away from Mandela's visions and betrayed his memory and that of other struggle heroes. The movement writes the following after Nelson Mandela's death in 2013:

> "The ruling party is fighting for membership and the sustainability of the party rather than addressing the people's concerns and challenges. Today people do not volunteer for the party because they want to join the struggle for justice, equality, and democracy. Today people join the party

---

[4] *Dear Mandela* (directed by Dara Kell and Chris Nizza) explores the lives of three young adults living in shack settlements in South Africa. As the synopsis reads: "When their shantytowns are threatened with mass eviction, three 'young lions' of South Africa's new generation rise from the shacks and take their government to the highest court in the land, putting the promises of democracy to the test". For more information, see www.dearmandela.com (accessed June 216, 2015).

to invest in the party so that tomorrow it will be their turn to eat our future [...].

We recognise the party of Mandela as the Khongolose[5]. Many of our members remain loyal to the Khongolose. But today we are led by the ANC and not by the Khongolose.

Today, as Mandela has passed on, the ANC is an organization that has harmed us and that will continue to harm us. But Mandela lived for us and not for the ANC". (Abahlali, 2013c – also cited in Chance).

At first blush, it appears contradictory that some Abahlali activists are also ANC members. The ANC's legacies and specifically the symbolic importance of icons such as Mandela, in the end however play their roles in *defining* the struggle that Abahlali carries forth. For ANC members to also legitimately be Abahlali members – for a distinction to be upheld between 'living politics' and 'party politics' as Zikode puts it – it is implicit that the movement is seen as pursuing "politics beyond the state." 'Living politics' is "a politics of ordinary women and men", not an elite politics but "a politics of those who do not count" (Figlan et al., 2009: 78).

As Figlan et al. (2009: 79) put it: "A living politics must be a politics that is carried out *where* people live" (Figlan et al. 2009: 79 – emphasis mine). The notion raises attention to politics in informal domains, outside of formal institutional politics. Central is a particular brand of street politics that members imagine go back to the struggle that birthed the nation. Members 'sacrifice' for the struggle through the mundane routines of their everyday life. Occupying land, illicitly connecting service supplies, but also mobilising protest marches, setting up road blockades, are practices that – precisely through the endangerments and sacrifices that they entail – come to constitute a *raison d'être* (Chance, 2015b: 872). S'bu Zikode's account above, in turn, makes very clear the 'efforts' required to transform 'injuries experienced' into a form of 'political agency' – especially when he recounts leaving after the interim leaders of Abahlali in KwaNkilinda were unable to 'take over' the meeting. These are the 'politicisations' of the injurious qualities of people's lives.

Let me return to the launch of the Abahlali branch. Following the failed launch, numerous meetings were held with residents from KwaNkilinda to discuss theories of poverty, Abahlali's roots in Kennedy road were recalled, the conceptual principles of 'Abahlalism' and its constitution was discussed and, in the words of S'bu Zikode, the objective was "to make clear what we do, which we don't do 'for', but we do 'with'. He adds: "Our approach is to say we are not going to struggle 'for you', but 'with you'". When a new launch date was set, Thandisile sought to secure the community hall for the event.

[5] '*Khongolese Wabantu*' means 'congress agreed' in Nguni, and has also been used to refer to the ANC.

She sought to book the community hall directly through the Municipality – thereby, she assumed, she could ensure both transparency but also be certain that the hall would be 'theirs'. The municipality officer whom she spoke to however told her that being a *'community* hall', the Municipality had no means to allow for any form of superseding bookings to be made. "If you are a member of the community, then it is your hall. We cannot book it for you!" she was told. In turn, Thandisile travelled to the police station in KwaNkilinda. "Because of the problems last time, I wanted the police to be informed here, I wanted the police to know that there could be a confrontation with the ward councillor. Also for our security they should be there", she said. A third stop then took her to the community hall, to inform the hall's 'care taker', that the hall would be needed for the launch of an Abahlali branch and provided him with the time and date.

The day of the launch arrived. Thandisile, with the other members of the interim committee arrived on time, only to find the hall locked. The hall's caretaker claimed that Cllr. Khumalo had taken the key. Partly in anticipation, the organisation of a large venue tent wasn't difficult. Within a few hours, the tent was set up on the dead-end pavement in front of Thandisile's home. The launch itself then proceeded comparatively uneventful. Numerous speeches were held 'educating' about the movement, the local Abahlali leadership was sworn in, struggle songs were sung. Onlookers milled around. A form of restlessness animated the event as many of those present anticipated that Cllr Khumalo would still show up. A young man who entered later said he had seen the 'councillor and his crew' driving around the neighbourhood. "But the police are also patrolling around", he cautioned. Rumours circulated that some form of confrontation could still disrupt the gathering – talking of different scenarios, mentioning with different implications, the 'councillor's crew', affiliates of the ANC, the KwaNkilinda police, and the CPF. In their own terms, the rumours elicited, in parallel, a unique affective, qualitative apprehension of the 'community's problems' which the speakers, one after another, sought to put into words. On that day however, Cllr Khumalo did not come to make a direct appearance.

3.1 After the launch

A sense of how the situation unfolded in the two weeks following the launch of Abahlali, can be gained by considering two different perspectives; *first*, my own – meaning how my field relations to members on 'both' sides of the conflict were subject to change; and *second*, the manner in which rumours of threats and intimidations increasingly incriminated Cllr Khumalo and other members of the townships' governing elite.

In the early stages of my research, I had established good relationships with Cllr Khumalo and had taken part in local meetings of the African National

Congress (ANC), who were now framed as the perpetrators of violence. Nevertheless, to continue doing research in the township, they also remained formal and informal 'gatekeepers' and were in a position to easily derail my day-to-day doings. That I also spent time with those that had joined Abahlali was no secret. I asked Cllr Khumalo openly on a few occasions whether I could pursue my research in the township and both times, while I felt his response was a half-hearted reply, he replied: "Yes! It is fine! You can continue. The first time he had said this, his blessing also appeared short lived. In isiZulu, he remarked in a local ANC meeting that I attended: "When we speak of the 'third force', we all know what is meant. But we must also be careful not to trust others that we may think are on our side. Comrades, I warn you, watch what you say, there might be an *impimpi* [spy/colluder] amongst us!"

Whether a test or deliberate form of intimidation, I felt compelled to continue meeting him on a regular basis. It was a strange hybrid of pragmatism and the urge to uphold a sense of transparency. While in itself unnerving, I assumed that with our meetings I could in one way or another provide an opportunity for him to follow what I did, and in turn, to respond to it. In most instances, I made an appointment to meet him at his office. On most days, he would keep me waiting at length. When we met, we both seemed concerned with maintaining a sense of detachment and neutrality – in other words, we created the impression that we were meeting 'simply to talk', to update each other on what was occurring. On one occasion however, following the launch of Abahlali, he pointed out that he had seen my car parked outside Thandisile's home. He asked: "what did you do there? What unfounded claims did these people make?"

Similar concerns were during this period raised by the Abahlali members. How would I help them? Was I sufficiently supportive of their struggle? Ambiguities about my role frequently surfaced. To 'prove' my commitment, I was on occasion asked to provide assistance. When four members were arrested in late January 2013 and charged with public violence and assault, Thandisile asked whether I could help in disproving the charges laid against the Abahlali members. Other members also begun wanting to share 'proof' that they had collected on the alleged *corruption* and *fraud* offenses – including an original housing list to which they had gained access through an employee working in the councillor's office, conversations they had recorded on their cell phones, emails they had copied, as well as photographs that circulated. In these encounters, I repeatedly stressed that I could not accept their material, not only for it would jeopardise my own security, that of my assistant, but potentially even theirs. For similar reasons, I became more sensitive about my own forms of data collection and data protection – I never kept more than one day of field notes on me, repeatedly changed my notebooks, relied heavily on abbreviations and adopted a disguised, rough, handwriting.

As I repeatedly turned offers for 'proof' down, I explained that I needed to

remain somewhat 'neutral'. Such expressions were rarely successful however – it seemed inadequate to merely share their vital concerns and to provide assurance that I sympathised with their situation. While meeting face-to-face, it was as if my back was already turned to them, walking out the door with what would later become a story 'about them'. As Glazer (1970: 314) fittingly puts it, "in times of heightened group antagonism, there is little room for neutrality". In moments of acute crisis, I was asked to give advice. This included instances in which members were arrested and charged with public violence and moments in which cases of threat or assault needed to be reported. While I feared that by outlining my take on matters, providing advice, an image of impartiality would be difficult to uphold – aggravating, not improving my difficult position. I equally, however, felt that these were necessary 'bargains'. At a time when effects of violence, threats and intimidation came to define the currents of everyday life, I saw it as a means through which their engagements with me, in its most limited sense, could also come to serve *their* ends.

Since the official launch of the Abahlali branch in KwaNkilinda, the residents who had refused to endorse the housing project – who had spoken out against the lack of consultation with the community and subsequently the alleged corrupt allocation of the houses – now regularly reported threats and intimidations. One afternoon at Thandisile's house, during which a number of members were present, Thandisile remarks "After the road blockade, they came at night to some of our houses and told us to stop. Since then, they have been around the area at night. They also parked here, up the road, one afternoon in front of Malinda's house just to scare her. To let her know they were there". A hyper-visibility of particular cars was repeatedly emphasised, patrolling the section of Nyala. Another member in the group seated there that afternoon at her home, adds: "We are all scared every night. We call each other at night and tell each other like 'be careful, I just saw a car close to your house there'". Thandisile then continues speaking:

> *Thandisile*: I live with my mother, my children and my brother. I have no husband. That is not really the problem [no husband], but if they will come at night, what can we do? I have reported some of the threats to the police station and opened a case. But of course nothing happened. The problem is that you have to go to your police station. You can't just go to any. And we know that the police station commissioner, Officer Dlamini, here is also a very close friend of the councillor. Part of his 'crew'. And the head of the CPF, Mr Bheka, is also a friend of the councillor. Same thing.

In their accounts, Thandisile and her neighbour highlight the pervasiveness of threats, repeatedly implicate the 'councillor's crew' and draw attention to a securitised elite network in which the local police station played its part. Fearful of what would happen, if threats would turn into violence, they point out that "hit men are cheap". "We see them driving around now. But can't know when they will come at night, because these are always people that you

have never seen. They are paid". Thandisile's account also draws parallels to what Hornberger (2004) terms an imaginary of 'your police – my police', where the police can be used in one's own everyday struggles. "The symbolic matrix" Hornberger writes, "does not need to be fully explicable or articulated; it is located somewhere between basic practical knowledge and explicit ideology". "'[Y]our police — my police' reveals a relationship marked by possessive qualities and announces an imaginary of the state police as private police" (ibid: 216).

Mr Jondo, who was now a member of the local Abahlali committee in the township, but who had intermittently been eyed critically within the movement for showing up to the branch launch with an ANC t-shirt, changes the subject in the conversation that unfolds so as to reiterate in my presence why, as a group of residents, they had sought to join Abahlali. He underlines that participation in formal democratic institutions, such as local ward committees, project committees or the community policing forums, through which their grievances could be voiced, were being undermined. Committees are loaded with appointees from the dominant party and thus left unable to call executives to account. The implication is also a 'blurring' of different forums and their distinctive functions. As he puts it:

> *Mr Jondo*: There are no meetings where we can voice our grievances. All the meetings that take place in this township are ANC meetings. In all of them, you have the 'same faces'. Those who sit in the BEC [ANC's Branch Executive Committee] also sit in all these other structures. You have to have an ANC membership card in order to attend the meetings and to change something. But at the same time, if you have a [ANC membership] card and sit in these meetings, if you *just speak*, and you speak about problems like these houses, then they will make you quiet afterwards.

Another man, known as John John quickly interjected the conversation. "It is not only that you have to have a card [ANC membership card] to *speak* but that you actually need to *know* when the meeting is taking place". He suggested that in the run up to the ANC's elective conference that had just occurred in December 2012, ward meetings had not taken place. In the township, local ANC branch meetings were however held regularly in the community hall adjacent to the councillor's office. When an ANC meeting was to take place, John John explained, some individuals were notified through cell phone messages. Other party members, in turn, were not notified, or alternatively, were told a different time and date. "This is to shut some people out, so some things are not spoken about, votes are made in a certain way, and so the attendance list is 'right'".

4. The funeral of Comrade John Mhlangu

In early February 2013 members from all sections of the township gathered at the community hall to attend the funeral of Comrade John Mhlangu, a member of *Umkhonto we Sizwe* Military Veterans' Association ('The spear of the nation'), who was the first to die in a series of hit-men murders that occurred in the township. During my remaining weeks, the final weeks of my field research in KwaNkilinda, a further six murders occurred. All were, in one way or another, tied to the conflicts around the housing projects in Nyala and in Molweni (discussed in Chapter 3).

Mhlangu had been allocated one of the new houses that had been built in Nyala as part of the controversial housing project. Rumours suggested that he had been 'deployed' to one of the houses by Cllr Khumalo so as to prevent the Abahlali protesters from doing harm to the new houses and to "provide protection" to the new residents that had moved in. In this section, I want to recount the event of the funeral in a chronological order. I begin with recounting a late breakfast that I had with Themba, the copy shop owner, before we headed over to the community hall. I then turn my attention to the event itself and individual speeches held by different actors, including municipality officials and representatives from the ANCs provincial leadership – who had come to pay their honours to Comrade Mhlangu as a member of *Umkhonto we Sizwe*. It was the funeral of a soldier.

Themba is an ANC Veteran in his mid fifties. On many occasions he related the stories of the wars he had fought in this township and how *now* "he was running on overtime". Due to 'struggle credentials' he suggests, he is in a privileged position to engage with different parties, to speak out in meetings about a lack of service delivery, perceived corruption and favouritism. If others did so, he says, they would quickly face accusations that they were "fuelling the flames". "I can talk to most people and get involved in these problems. I was almost killed three times and so everyone here knows that this for me is nothing but overtime". Themba largely attributes his good fortune to divine intervention. We frequently met in his copy shop to talk, or we sat in Mr Moyo's *shebeen* on the main road. In both locations, we were no doubt 'seen' if not deliberately 'observed'. Themba, somewhat counter intuitively, warned that during these meetings we however "should not be heard". During the past few weeks we had for this reason met in what was the 'entertainment' room of the *shebeen*. A small room that went off to the side, it had no windows, a plasma TV on the wall, two air-condition units, a large white round ten-person-table in the middle, two dimmed fluorescent tubes on the ceiling and a double bed with pink satin sheets in the corner. The television and the air condition were always 'on', greying out any noise for anyone who passed the room. We also met here the morning of the funeral. To me, it was one of the most bizarre locations to meet regularly, and Themba considered it to be one of the 'safest'. Meetings between Themba and I in this

room had no doubt also sparked some entertaining rumours – and yet his insistence to continue meeting here, seemed to confirm my interpretations about the anonymity and ubiquity of danger that was feared.

Our breakfast prior to the funeral took place on Themba's initiative. As he had remarked on the phone "You always like to discuss events with me afterwards, why don't we meet *before* this time?[6]" Themba seemed to await the event with eager anticipation. I, in contrast, upheld a more fearful note. We agreed that morning that this was no common funeral and could mark a critical turning point in the township's conflict. More than once, Themba said he was curious to see *who* would attend. To one such expression of anticipation, he added: "That poor man Dlamini, his job is not easy!" (Officer Dlamini was the station commander at KwaNkilinda' police station). Themba continued:

> *Themba*: I wanted to tell you. [PAUSE] Yesterday, they took the coffin from the morgue to Mhlangu's family home. That is the way they do it here, they take the body home before the funeral and then people go to pay their respects. We say '*Umlindelo*' in Zulu, 'the wake'. [PAUSE] Apparently, when it got dark, Khumalo [ward councillor], Cele, Bheka [CPF chairperson] and some others from the party [ANC] showed up, loaded with their guns and wanted to take the coffin outside and pay their respects. It is an *MK* [*Umkhonto we Sizwe*] tradition, to shoot [in the air]. Have you seen it? Apparently Dlamini had been watching them and quickly showed up with police officers and told them they couldn't do it. 'People are being killed by hit men and you want to start shooting around at night?!?' he said'

As other chit chats in the previous days had done, Themba's story formed part of the townships' collective effort to make sense of Mhlangu's death. Everyone, including me, was being urged to contribute fine snippets – people told each other a bewildering mixture of political and criminal motives. What side stood behind the hit-man murder? The residents from Nyala who had fought for their land and the houses? Cllr Khumalo and his crew who sought to make the protesters' liability absolute? Had competition over resources or personal feuds begun to brittle the councillor's fiefdom? Had Mhlangu's prestige of being a former *Umkhonto we Sizwe* fighter and his ties to the councillor given him freer rein to engage in criminal activities – making it, after all, no murder related to the houses?

Due to this incidence the night before, the police, Themba suggested, would be present in large numbers at the funeral, but members of Abahlali would no doubt stay far away. "I look forward to seeing whom they have sent from the

---

[6] With this, Themba made reference tot he fact that on numerous occasions, I had come to his copy shop to discuss particular events I had attended (meetings, gatherings, etc.) in order to hear his views, to make sense of particular statements together.

MK and the Municipality. These people must be aware of the problems we have been having here [in KwaNkilinda]". Above all, Themba seemed hopeful that the event would have profound implications of some sort – he nevertheless remained vague in what sense.

We headed over to the community hall. The walls of the community hall were hung with ANC and MK flags, the speakers' tables on stage were draped with 'Zuma' and 'Mandela' fabrics, the seats for the audience below had been given ANC coloured chair covers. The programme that was distributed on the chairs gave a small biography of Comrade John Mhlangu: He was born in 1973, and died at an age of 39. He grew up in a township that lay only 30 km West of KwaNkilinda, had finished matric close to Richards Bay. After completing matric he joined the African National Congress' *Umkhonto weSizwe*. Later, he was elected into the South African Communist Party (SACP) in KwaNkilinda. Here, he also opened a company – a trading enterprise – and became involved in a reintegration project for juvenile ex-offenders. He leaves his parents, brother, two sisters, seven nephews and nieces, his son, grandson and wife.

A hearse then drives up and parks in front of the community hall and the coffin is carried in (see Fig 16). The soldiers place it on a stand just below the stage and immediately the mourners tune in to a struggle song. Two men remain standing to the left and to the right of the coffin, holding high an ANC flag and an *Umkhonto weSizwe* flag, lowering them when in the performance of an interlude between speeches, MK members would dance and sing around the coffin. The hall was full, with almost two hundred people present. The police remained stationed outside.

The first speech was held by a representative of the municipality's 'Safer City' Department – a programme that operates under slogans of *'Fighting Crime through Community Participation'* and *'Community Action for Safer Neighbourhoods' (2009)*. The audience was told that Comrade Mhlangu had been part of the department's activities since December 2012, cooperating to map security problems in Nyala, to build neighbourhood associations and engage in an everyday policing of crime. There through the rumour that Mhlangu had been 'deployed to the new houses by the councillor' gained substance. As the Municipality was made aware of mounting protests in KwaNkilinda, 'Safer Cities' was called in. The department participated in the 'brokerage' of municipal resources to respond mounting tensions between Abahlali and other parties to the conflict. Mhlangu as an MK Veteran, who had worked with ex-offenders in the community, came with the perfect credentials to represent a 'community safety volunteer'.

A second speaker is introduced as "one of Comrade Mhlangu's closest friends" who had served together with Mhlangu in the MK and later both became active members in the SACP. The speaker, Mr Ndlovu starts by saying: "There

is so much history between me and this man that I cannot finish today". He then continues detailing to the audience his recollections of the day Mhlangu was killed:

> *Ndlovu*: It was very painful when I heard about Mhlangu, coming back from a meeting in Durban where I had been doing some stuff for the Military Veterans Association. He had left me at the meeting to travel to his in-laws to fetch his wife and his child. We were going to meet again on Friday to go to another meeting in Durban.
>
> Five minutes after the meeting, I got a call from Nomusa [Mhlangu's wife] crying and I asked her what had happened but she couldn't respond. So I told my wife that I was going to Nomusa to check up on her. [PAUSE] I left my car and started running. I am trained very well.
>
> It was very painful [LONG PAUSE] When I came, he was still there, lying on the ground. I told myself that he is just wounded and that he is still going to wake up. [PAUSE] When I came close there were still the bullets and so I saw that he was shot with a 9mm. This woman, Mama Councillor, she is a trained nurse, and she put the fingers on his nose to check if he is still alive and she confirmed that he was dead. It was all very painful.

Ndlovu continues with saying: "Mhlangu had committed himself to the struggle". He lists the names of MK soldiers whose funerals Mhlangu and him had attended in the course of only the past year. "He died defending the revolution and he died protecting the people who live in these government houses. Those houses that are built by the ANC! He was protecting them from those who want to take over those houses in a corrupted way".

Following Ndlovu's speech, the SACPs regional chairperson is called to the stage. He begins by outlining his commitment to the party and to the community. He adds words of caution: We want to make an appeal to this very community, because this community is facing a lot of problems. As the communist party, we are also responsible for what is happening in the community. There are a lot of structures in the community". His appeal is one of preventing the dominant party from suffocating multiplicity and diversity under a single name. Much like the speakers before him, he emphasises that the struggle has not been realised yet: "That is why I say: 'The struggle continues'. Now that we have achieved the struggle of apartheid and done away with apartheid, we need now to take a second step, a second struggle to defend the things we have".

The 'MC' (Master of Ceremony), who has introduced the previous speakers, then introduces the ward councillor, Cllr Khumalo. Themba, seated next to me, whispers, "This is the speech that everybody is waiting for". Laughter runs

through the rows as the MC introduces him by saying "The councillor is the one that is in charge. He is the councillor and he is the chairman of the ANC. Like the saying '*unogwaja osikhu nolakhundl*', meaning 'a rabbit which has a lot of holes to hide'. With this I mean, the councillor 'he is everywhere!' He pauses until the audience silences again. "The councillor knows everything, even when you are proposing to a woman and she says 'no'. First, he will know and second, you can go back to him and he will sort that out for you!"

Cllr Khumalo begins by praising Mhlangu's community engagement and his support for the ANC. "We are in this leadership because of people like Comrade Mhlangu!" He continues: "This comrade left us at a difficult time, when we are starting another one hundred years in the struggle. This comrade has left us in a difficult time, when we are about to take a second step". (On 8 January 2012, the ANC had celebrated its centenary). Cllr Khumalo continues:

> *Cllr Khumalo*: In this KwaNdengezi branch, even other comrades will testify, he is leaving at a difficult time.

> The way that he died is painful. It is not accepted! [LONG PAUSE] He passed at a time when the community is actually experiencing the delivery and he was supposed to benefit from that as well. […] He was also supposed to have an *umkhaso* (an RDP house) and getting that *umkhaso* was not enough.

Themba, again whispering in my ear, suggests the councillor meant it 'was not enough' for the 'sacrifices' he had made and the 'struggle' in which he fought. Khumalo adds:

> *Cllr Khumalo*: All this time, this comrade has been working and putting his life in danger and suddenly he gets an *umkhaso* and people are saying 'That's enough!'

> What is painful is that Comrade Mhlangu wasn't just going to sit around if he knew that there were people who were planning to kill him. They have killed him at a time when they need their comrade the most. It is painful that when we see the family has lost a member, and the ANC has too, that you see those people celebrating. You see them happy and laughing.

As I sat in the audience, I understood Cllr Khumalo indirectly implicating in Mhlangu's murder the group of residents that had stood behind the protests against the new houses. While he spoke, a few police officers casually moved to the main doors of the hall, at the same time giving the impression that the proceedings in the hall did not receive any newfound attention.

Cllr Khumalo: These people who are laughing, think that the MK comrades that are working hand in hand with the community are not supposed to be benefiting from delivery. They say it is the *community* that should be benefiting. They are not considering what *these people* [MK veterans] *did* for South Africa […] and that is painful!

Much like in the speech given on behalf of Mhlangu's friends, by Ndlovu, Cllr Khumalo goes on to detail his arrival at the crime scene on the day of the murder.

Cllr Khumalo: When I received a call that comrade Mhlangu was shot, I didn't believe the news. We called the police. [PAUSE] Because we trust the system of the law. [PAUSE] When we [Cllr Khumalo and Cllr Cele] arrived at the scene where the comrade was shot, the police weren't there yet. When we got there, we just stayed – not that we didn't have arms or the ability to fight back, but we were waiting for the police to do their job.

The police's attitude when they came was first to treat us like 'street kids'. So we went aside because we wanted to see them doing their job! We found out from neighbours that people had been shouting before Comrade Mhlangu was killed. They were shouting that they were going to break someone's skull. People were shouting everywhere. They were shouting from that side and shouting from that side [*gesturing*]

When we heard that, we thought that their job [the police's] would actually be easy – to arrest those people who were shouting.

This is day number [since the killing – *shows 8 fingers*] and it is still quiet. No arrests!

Condemning the local police station for not working effectively, their inability to provide immediate justice, Cllr Khumalo mentions the dispute that took place the night before, which Themba had already alerted me to.

Cllr Khumalo: We were here at *Umlindelo* [funeral wake] last night and the police were so angry. We felt that they were going to beat us up. They knew that there is an ANC ritual that needs to be done. To shoot. […] There was such a tension between the police and the members of the MK. You could feel that the war was going to start right there and then.

The family was asking the police: 'since you have come here, how many people have to actually be arrested for killing Mhlangu?'

> When they [the police] came, they had introduced themselves as people that have come to make sure that 'everything goes well'. But knowing deep down that the ANC still has to practice their rituals. There were tensions, I tell you! Like the war is about to start.

He gestures with his hand to the doors of the community hall, through which a few police officers could be seen standing outside. Many in the audience followed the gestures of his hand to look out.

> *Cllr Khumalo*: I have heard some policemen say today that they are going to shoot the dogs with tear gas. They [the police] have been busy concentrating on the people that didn't kill anybody. Today, because we have to respect in times like this the family, the community and the friends of the family, we have asked the chief [the police station commander] not to get involved. Because we know, as comrades, that we can handle the situation. That is why they are standing outside today and not interfering. [LONG PAUSE] What makes the situation so ugly is that those people that were shouting are still shouting even now!

The subtext of the expression 'shoot the dogs' has continued to remain unclear to me. By drawing the audiences' attention to the fact that the police remained stationed 'outside', Cllr Khumalo worked to determine a certain momentary hierarchy – a shift in relevant interaction between himself and the police. He speaks at once in his capacity as a 'state official' who has a relationship to the police and in his capacity as a party member, referring above all to himself as an ANC comrade. He goes on at length in addressing the regional representatives of the ANC present, and speaks about the ANCs elective conference. In a final remark, he then again turns attention to the tensions in KwaNkilinda, and appeals to those present "to come together to go forward" and "to work against the factions being built up". Not only does he imply those who have turned against the ruling party locally, he again also draws attention to the police and says: "Help us to work hand in hand, as we know that these police when they go out, they change their uniform. We know about this station, it is *old*!" With the 'station being old' Khumalo is suggestive of the station not having changed since the dark times of apartheid. The local police station, he suggests, has only undergone an 'incomplete transformation' since the end of apartheid. On the one hand, this was synonymous with a great deal of 'unpredictability' being ascribable to police intervention and on the other hand with a rejection of the public police. Before leaving the stage, he says to the audience: "There are times when we need to talk and there are times where we do not need to talk!" he concludes. "*Amandla! Awethu!*"

The regional chairperson of *Umkhonto weSizwe's* Military Veteran's Association, Commander Nchunu, held the final speech. He applauds Mhlangu's commitments in the community, as someone "who did his duty",

recounts his engagement in the ANC structures "as Cllr Khumalo has also just testified" and emphasises that Comrade Mhlangu had done his part in "taking the spear and carrying the struggle forth". As a previous speaker from the Veteran's Association had also done, he lists the names of fellow MK comrades, whose funerals needed to be attended in the past year.

> *Commander Nchunu*: We know we have learnt a lot about politics. We gave the gun 20% and politics 80%. [PAUSE] As you can see, some other African countries are free but there are so many civil wars that are still happening there. [PAUSE] Because they concentrated on 20% politics and 80% guns. We did it the other way round. 80% politics and 20% guns. And when our gun shoots, it sings '*Nkosi Sikelela*'[7]. [LONG PAUSE] Because we know when our gun shoots – *who* it shoots!

> You don't waive our guns to other comrades even if you see that there is something you don't like about that comrade. You need to sit down and talk about that particular problem. But that does not happen in this ANC now. […]

> When we left this land before, we actually thought that it would be the end of our lives and we actually thought that our families would be well taken care of. That they could go anywhere they wanted to without carrying IDs. And work wherever they wanted to work. And go to school and live happy ever after in the land of our ancestors. *Amandla! Awethu!* [Power! To us!][8]

5. The contestability of power

I end the account of the funeral with the final speech and return to the pragmatists and to the critique voiced against the pragmatists that I introduced in the first section of this chapter. That is to say, that to understand processes of 'issuefication' in relation to 'political power', the political philosophy of John Dewey and the pragmatists more generally, offers only questionable guidance. In the first section of this chapter, I turned to Rogers (2009) and Hildreth (2009), who in their careful reading of Dewey discourage readers from accepting this claim. Drawing connections between scientific inquiry (experimental inquiry) and democracy, Rogers emphasises that at the core of Dewey's understanding "is a preoccupation with power and domination". Dewey directs our attention to the lived experiences of actors, forms of critical reflection through which taken for granted aspects of their

---

[7] '*Nkosi Sikelel*' *iAfrika*' a pan-African liberation anthem, also forms part of South Africa's national anthem.
[8] *Amandla! Awethu!* [Power! To us!] was a popular rallying cry in the days of resistance against Apartheid.

lives, including relations of power, are disclosed, understood, and ultimately also contested through political action. Where elitist notions of politics have emphasised the dependency on *experts* to handle the complex political affairs of the industrial world, Dewey foregrounds the capacity of *ordinary citizens* to ascertain the unseen facts of political reality and to contribute pertinent opinions to matters of concern. In this reading, citizens work to manage power and prevent its use from becoming arbitrary, as Rogers (2009: 15) puts it, and central to Dewey's work becomes a concern for how power is 'kept in view'.

The argument of the previous chapters – developed by drawing on the works of Dewey, Lippmann and Marres – has been that issues are indispensable for understanding public involvement in politics, i.e. issues determine *who* participates in politics and *how*. The agenda theorists have understood issue politics as being driven by special interests, as a realm where experts decide where issues primarily serve as instruments in struggles for power. As Marres (2005a: 70) highlights, it is for these reasons that the agenda theorists largely considered issue politics to be "incompatible with ideals of strong democracy". As detailed in the beginning, it is important to consider these critiques (complications) that have been raised by the agenda theorists seriously. In the following section, I seek to once again return to their central propositions setting them alongside the Deweyan framework pursued so far. I draw on my account of events in KwaNkilinda. The argument is arranged as follows:

First, I pick up on the proposition of the agenda theorists that issue politics is the principal undermining force of *public involvement*. In turn, I elaborate on how from a pragmatist standpoint, publics and issues are seen as mutually constituted and illustrate how in the dispute around the housing project, Abahlali as an actor grouping came to *mediate* public involvement and processes of issue articulation. *Second,* I consider how Abahlali's notion of 'living politics' works to render public the discontinuity between the issues of politics and the *non-issues* of daily life. *Third,* I explore the manner in which threats, intimidation and violence work to *derail the articulation of matters* requiring public involvement. *Lastly,* I engage with the question whether dominant explanations for post apartheid (political) violence need to be re-assessed.

5.1 To reconsider: the involvement of the public

Schnattschneider's main argument was that the issues of politics are the principal organising force of governmental politics in liberal democracies. Since the 1970s, the agenda setting theorists have come to observe issue politics beyond the domains of national governmental institutions – including media agenda setting, policy agenda setting, in the field of science and with respect to social movements. What has remained somewhat underappreciated

however is the role of issues in *involving publics* in politics (Marres 2005a). As Marres (2005a: 83) suggests, established institutional arrangements continue to be seen as the main protagonists in enabling public participation, public involvement is defined foremost as an *ideal* and not as a *practice*. Issues defined by experts, government officials, politicians, are seen by the agenda theorists, as simply "a pretext for engagement". Dewey and Lippmann, in contrast, adopt a different logic and suggest that public involvement also takes place at a relative distance from institutional arrangements. When problems arise, it is the failure of existing institutions to provide a settlement that makes it necessary that a public adopts these issues to begin with. It is then, that ordinary citizens take affairs in their own hands. An issue brings about public involvement precisely when it is not being addressed. The Dewey-Lippmann framework underlines that it is the *issues* themselves that are indispensable to the involvement of publics in politics.

The engagement of Abahlali in the course of the three events discussed here makes explicit what Marres (2012a) has termed 'the public's problem of relevance', meaning in simple terms the problem of the public-in-the-making that issues need to be made to matter practically. The pragmatists emphasise that the problem of the public is not merely one of being 'affected' and being 'represented' – for a) it consists of 'concerned outsiders', meaning actors who are harmfully implicated but "who find themselves at a remove from the sites and networks where processes of issue formation take place" (ibid: 52) and for b) issues and publics mutually constitute each other. Rather than simply being 'affected', publics come to be defined by their relationship to an emerging issue, whereby they share a common affective space (Hawkins, 2014, e45). As Hawkins (2014: e40) puts it, the public is above all "a practical achievement", the result of "diverse processes of becoming affected, feeling implicated or sensing an emerging issue as having relevance". It is this notion of 'relevance' – what Marres terms the 'public's problem of relevance' – that I want to address further. It foregrounds that for instance the residents of Nyala do not have clear-cut interests that pre-exist the issue. Rather, their involvement is marked by multiple and shifting relations. Abahlali functioned to mediate this process, not simply for residents to 'become affected' but mediating the articulation of particular relevance relations, especially, between this emergent public and wider problems.

On the one hand, Abahlali sought to support community residents who wanted to bring a halt to construction on the houses, to ensure that the allocation of houses be re-evaluated and to launch investigations into allegations of local corruption. Beyond that, 'education' and a discussion of 'related problems' were repeatedly stressed. Recall S'bu Zikode's remark following the failed launch: "We took them through a slow process to better understand what the movement is for, other than dealing with issues of service delivery, or those houses. Their concern is with housing." He adds: "We said to them 'yes we will deal with that but it is not the root cause of such

exploitation and trial that we are facing'". It would be misleading to understand these meetings as efforts to subject the community to ends foreign to their needs, with the projection of a vocabulary divorced from their concerns.

Rather, the meetings were about mapping the relational complexity of people's concerns. Some residents readily spoke of the 'housing project gone wrong' as a symptom of the ANC's political ascendance, "since Mandela was released, the fight is for their own pockets". "From the very top to the very bottom there is no disciplinary action". Others framed their concerns as purely a problem of the township: "The problem is that this police station here is on one side. That lets people pursue such things". Again for others concerns lay with the municipality: "It is happening everywhere in Durban, there are so many stories about that housing department [eThekwini Municipality] making money with RDP houses". In one such a discussion, one speaker also quickly dropped his argument and responded: "*Yebo* [yes], you are right, that plays *more* of a role".

What unfolded was a form of coordination through ranking, i.e. "ranking of something as more general which then dominates what is less general" (Thévenot, 2011: 44). In Schutz's (1964: 126, 1944) vocabulary 'the cartographies' of relevance were readily movable, would transition, and were not closed off. These, I propose, are not so much different 'viewpoints' but rather particular 'problematisations' (see Marres, 2012a: 151). The 'houses' come to figure in relation to various social, economic, political problematics. The problems that people are personally affected are imagined with references to "causes and dynamics beyond their immediate situation" Birkbak (2016: 53). As I illustrated in the previous chapter, the houses opened up an expansive set of concerns about particular modes of living and what it meant to live "traditionally". A form of 'common interest' or 'shared interest' is, to borrow Dewey's terminology, defined through a process of reflection, trial and tests (Dewey, 1991 (1927): 13; see also Thévenot, 2011: 46).

Let us consider in relation to the notion of 'relevance', an argument put forth by Mosse (2010). In a paper on how poverty becomes (or fails to become) politicised, Mosse argues that the issue of poverty is one of *representation*. He writes:

> "Power effects here concern not only people's actions and relations, but also the *language, classifications and organisations through which they are represented* as interests and groups within political systems (Gledhill, 1994), and which provide a means to contend with, and deploy politically, the categorical aspects of exploitation and exclusion [...]" (ibid: 1166, emphasis added).

For Lukes (2005: 142), in political mobilisations "'what is at stake is power over the classificatory schemes and systems which are the basis of the representations of the groups and therefore of their mobilisation and

demobilisation'''. What is missing in these arguments (by Mosse and Lukes) is recognition of the fact that the problem of the public is not just one of 'affectedness', of 'interests' and efforts to gain 'representation'. Rather it is, according to the pragmatists, a particular *mode of being implicated* and 'what matters' still needs to be negotiated. What defined the residents of Nyala as part of a public-in-the-making was the recognition, to borrow a formulation from Oenen (2012: 99) that 'a particular division of the sensible' showed itself as 'being problematic' – 'it didn't seem to function right'. This however needed to still be defined. Let me address these two interrelated dimensions in more detail. Drawing on Mol and Law, Marres reminds us: "Any object, however 'objective' or 'natural' it may seem, is articulated in multiple ways in different settings". Securing 'mutual relevance', she argues, must be seen as an accomplishment of practice in concrete settings. Central thereto is the idea that as an issue is being defined, *what* is connected to *what*, is not yet established. As Thandisile for instance put it: "We were told again and again by Abahlali that we have to think beyond the houses and consider the root causes!" Herein, what was extended was the 'scope of relevance' – beyond the spatial and temporal boundaries of the present.

In this process of issue articulation in which Abahlali engaged, to assume that concerns – and in relation, a particular *language* and *classifications* – are simply projected, is to assume a fixed geometry of relevance. Marres (2012a: 147) makes this point clearer when she argues that by paying consideration to the particular mode in which publics are implicated in issues – namely sufficiently implicated so as to not be indifferent, yet at a distance from the sites and processes of issue formation. What becomes apparent are "the difficulties of rendering different issue articulations relevant *to one another"* (ibid, emphasis added*)*. The approach laid out by Dewey, and extended by Marres, in turn, "calls into question the wisdom of assuming a fixed geometry of relevance […]" (Marres, 2012a: 147). To return then to Mosse's quote (cited above), a pragmatist perspective would herein come to emphasise an inherent dynamism, in the sense that it is not merely about the 'means to contend with', to 'deploy politically' 'categorical aspects of exploitation and exclusion', but also about actor groups securing a form of *mutual relevance.* In this case, Abahlali *mediated* these processes.

Let us reconsider then concretely the agenda theorists' argument that issue politics is the principal undermining force of *public involvement*. *First* it must be noted that publics form around an issue in order to attend to its conditions and consequences. Public involvement is 'sparked' precisely when currently existing institutions are failing to address affairs in which actors have become implicated. *Issue specification* and the formation of a public are mutually constitutive. This is the process of making the entities, actors and relations of an issue known, and in a manner that then makes them coherent enough to act upon. As Marres (2005a; 2007) highlights – in a reformulation of Dewey's initial understanding – 'issues', their consequences and boundaries, need to be negotiated and defined, they are not simply 'givens'. *Second*, in contrast to the

agenda theorists (in particular Lukes, 1974 (2005)), we can also not uphold a distinction between issues 'out here' and issues 'in there', between 'real issues' and 'politicised issues'. Rather, things come to matter practically and politically in the very processes of public engagement. *Third*, the acceptance that issues and issue publics are not givens, opens an entirely different focus to that of the agenda theorists, namely raising the question of how the diverse processes of feeling implicated, of becoming affected and of articulating relevance relations are enacted in micro practices across different sites.

5.2 To reconsider: the politics of non-issues

Lukes' (2005 (1974) attention to the tragic fate of non-issues, led him to the diagnosis that existing democratic arrangements do not in fact guarantee public involvement in politics. Let me here consider a) the part that 'non issues' play in involving publics in politics – namely through the transformation of 'non issues' into 'issues' – and b) turn to the manner in which this re-definition may work to unsettle existing relations of power. Marres (2005a: 78) highlights that while Lukes sees 'non-issues' as illustrative of the very insufficiencies of existing arrangements of representative democracy, the pragmatists see the re- definition of matters that previously qualified as non-issues as new matters of public concern as their only chance to be addressed. It is precisely in the ability to pin point 'non issues', to question the discontinuity between the issue definitions of politics and the articulations of issues as they arise in daily life, that public involvement is *practically* achieved (Marres, 2005a: 85).

Again, precisely this idea helps to make sense of Abahlali's workings, and from a philosophical perspective sheds more light on Abahlali's notion of 'living politics'. Abahlali's notion of living politics (*ipolitiki ephilyao* in *isiZulu*) is also referred to as 'home politics' and is said to be deliberately situated beside nationalist party structures. It is taken up by those who, despite being formally included, feel alienated by the existing institutional arrangements. Thandisile explains the feeling of alienation as follows: "All local meetings in the townships are essentially ANC meetings. And you can go to them, if you hold that membership card. The irony is, in these meetings you cant be critical about anything, about a lack of delivery, because it is the ANC, the liberation movement". She adds, "the poor, the ordinary, like me, their problems are kept out of those meetings". As Chance (2015a: 400) puts it, living politics are both "eventful public dramas such as street protests and burning road blockades, as well as mundane domestic activities, including cooking with fire and reading by candlelight". In this manner, the practices transmute "the boundaries between the home and the streets to make the poor seen and heard in the city" (ibid). Significant, she adds, is that they do so "through means that they ground in their own communities and contrast to expert, elite or technical languages of formal state institutions" (ibid). Living politics aims

at expanding dominant conceptions of transitional social justice. As Robins (2014: 498) puts it, it aims to "create the conditions for the emergence of new understandings of what it means to be a citizen in a democratic state with much unfinished business".

For some of the residents in Nyala, the housing project represented "one step too far". For long, they felt Cllr. Khumalo had failed to address problems of adequate housing, work, and access to infrastructure. They emphasised a profound collective alienation from the structures and pieties of constituted power. As one member who joined Abahlali in the township explains his concerns about the abuse of power, politics of self-enrichment, and disregard for 'ordinary suffering': "What the councillor is doing at the moment you can understand when you think back to King Shaka. King Shaka, he would go through the villages and rob everything, live off everyone, he would get what he could get, as long as he could get it". Joining Abahlali, I suggest, can here be understood as an effort to establish a new platform for politics and to turn 'non issues' into 'issues'. Said differently, 'living politics' at large is about a) redefining political spaces and, b) reinventing forms of organising subjects and articulating problems. Latter, again, is in the case of 'living politics', achieved by using infrastructures and material forms of daily life as a staging ground for the articulation of affairs (see Chance's 2015 a contribution on 'fire') [9]. The aim is to challenge existing modes of democratic political organisation, to critique what the formal spaces of politics have become. The effect, if we follow Chalfin (2014) is that such practices "provide a basis for the poor to work their way into the public sphere and, in turn, override the failed solutions and non solutions of the state and elites" (Appadurai, 2002: 39-40 discussed in Chalfin, 2014: 103).

In what manner does the redefinition of non-issues to issues come to unsettle existing power relations? If we follow the argument by Dewey and Lippmann, namely that public involvement is brought about by existing institutional arrangements failing to effectively mediate public concern, then these circumstances, Marres (2005a: 92-3) makes clear "should be expected to bring with them an unsettling of relations of popular sovereignty". For those who joined Abahlali, their experience with the ward councillor, local government in general, are evaluated for the opportunities it opens or forecloses, for the ability to reach particular ends in view. What I want to capture here is that what accompanied the re-definition of non-issues to issues, was a dynamism (or an oscillating back and forth) that unfolded between *specific forms of critique* and the more *general concern* to unsettle the very exclusion from public debate. The articulation of affairs entailed both efforts to cast a dynamic field of

---

[9] Chance explains the significance of 'fire' in struggles of the poor as follows: "Unlike guns and other weapons that required a supply chain and orders from above, fire was always within the grasp of ordinary men and women, made from ordinary, on-hand materials found inside the home. The primary tools of its ignition, matches, are not only affordable and accessible to all, and in this sense highly democratized [...]."

relations and causalities into a concrete 'problem' (houses and land lost) while at the same time re-exposing the issue as a messy contested space (the consideration the root causes) (see also Lodato & DiSalvo: 8).

5.3 To reconsider: politicisation constrained

By drawing on Bachrach and Baratz's study of non-decisions, what became central to Lukes' notion of 'non issues' was the idea of the 'play of forces' – i.e. he drew attention to the social, environmental, economic and other problems that are kept from the political agenda by the interventions of political actors. In this final section, I want to consider the practical constraints placed on the articulation of public affairs, which in the controversy discussed here became most readily apparent through the deployment of intimidation, threats and violence. These, I consider to have been the most direct form of intervention aimed at preventing a public from being formed. The attention paid to forces that prevent matters from being politicised becomes one of the most valuable contributions that the agenda theorists make to our understanding of issue politics. While Dewey in his writings attempts to differentiate 'force' from related concepts of 'violence', and 'coercion', and comes to define violence "as the wasteful and destructive exercise of force'", he subsequently leaves these concepts largely under-theorised in his writings (Dewey, 1916: 246; see also Hildreth, 2009: 787). As Hildreth (ibid: 786) simply suggests, power for Dewey carried mainly a positive valence, "power to" rather than "power over". If we appreciate that matters that qualify as 'non-issues' are at times prevented from becoming new matters of public concern, as Lukes proposes, attention to the forms of intervention at play do however require more elaboration than Dewey had set out to provide.

Following the road blockade in October 2012, residents regularly reported outright, and at times also armed, threats and intimidations. Forms of violence unfolded which we may describe as "vigilantism cum mobsterism" (Landau & Misago, 2009: 103; Kynoch, 2005). We should 'keep quiet', 'not get loud', was commonly recounted. Those threatened feared for their life, unsure when the night would come, in which the councillor and his crew would not only drive around but would "come for them". It would be hit men that would come for them, most likely at night, and they would have no means to prevent it. "Hit men are cheap", I was frequently told. 'Cheap enough' so as to become a normative means of pursuing material interests, dealing with political adversaries and seeking 'justice'. In addition, as suggested above, the township police was ascribed possessive qualities akin to the "your police – my police" imaginary that Hornberger (2004) also discusses for the inner city police service of Johannesburg. An imaginary of the state police as private police, whereby different sides of the conflict believed that the police had been or could be informally privatised. The distinctions however were never clear-cut. Members of Abahlali spoke of their inability to gain protection from the

police "for it is their police" – suggesting that the local police station had developed alliances with the 'councillor and his crew' and that they had learned to expect little in the way of law and order from the state. In turn, the ward councillor, most explicitly in the context of the funeral, countered the perception that the police acted on 'his' behalf, and ascribed more ambiguity to the station's rationales. "We know about this station, it is *old*!" he had said in his funeral speech.

Residents saw threats and intimidations as efforts to deter them from organising around issues. Beyond these displays of power, were the frequent references that 'forces of the IFP' were at play. In particular, during the failed branch launch, these allegations worked to elicit fear. On the one hand, they had a similar effect to the outright threats and intimidations, for if they were portrayed as supporting the opposition, whose vigorous struggle against the ANC had caused years of political conflict in the province, they would also need to have "fear in their heart", as one man put it. Particularly, he then implied, in a time when the ANC was holding its elective conference and celebrating its centenary. On the other hand, the allegations that 'forces of the IFP' were at play also counter-intuitively worked to 'depoliticise' public involvement in politics – for now, their struggle was no longer about the houses, the land dispossession or corruption. In this sense, the interventions can be seen as undoing the work of specifying what exactly is at stake, to cause the publics that have organised to disintegrate, leaving behind, in Marres' words "a blur of inscrutable, un-dis- and misarticulated concerns". Situating the death of Comrade Mhlangu in the context of 'former MKs prone to criminality', as the speaker from the Veterans' League had done at the funeral, equally calls attention away from the tensions that had amounted between the ward councillor and the members of Abahlali around the houses in Nyala. It ascribes criminal dimensions to the 'political' conflict.

5.4 Reassessing violence

These insights are not only significant for our understanding of issue politics. Rather, they should also lead us to reassess one of the dominant explanations for post-apartheid political violence. Adopting an historical approach, Kynoch (2005) focuses on the criminal dimensions of the 'political' conflicts of the 1980s and 1990s and traces continuities (and changes) in the patterns of violence that have persisted since 1994. He (ibid: 495) cautions that transition-era conflicts "cannot be adequately explained as the exclusive preserve of the liberation struggle and/or political hostilities between rival organizations". Explanations that have centred on party political divides have largely prevented a deeper understanding of the more subtle shifts that have occurred in the patterns and character of violence (ibid: 496). Categorizing transition-era conflicts unquestioningly as political violence, he argues, "fails to consider pre-existing conflicts and divisions in township communities as well as the

extent to which various forms of violence overlapped with politicized hostilities" (ibid).

Violent conflicts "instigated by parochial power struggles" have acquired political dimensions on the basis that the state, ANC or the IFP became involved. Equally, "[c]riminal opportunists also capitalized on political rivalries to justify their actions on ideological grounds" (ibid). In my reading, Kynoch hereby points to one of the distinguishing characteristics of post-apartheid violence, namely the politically-easy-to-deploy explanations of crime – illuminating either the criminal dimensions of violence or categorizing conflicts as 'on-going' political violence. That is to say, it is a certain 'labelling' of political party rivalries as rogue and criminal, which is (as in the conflict in Nyala) injected to obscure deeper fissures within society. As other incidences in the township are analysed, not related to the housing project in Nyala, Kynoch's observation becomes meaningful, that in many cases, violence only has "the most tenuous connection with politics" (ibid: 501). He writes "[...] although conflicts almost always assumed a political dimension in the transition period, they were often rooted in gang disputes, taxi wars, competition for resources and even personal grudges" (ibid). In such cases, politicised violence gives new meaning to township violence. In many cases, it is at the same time however a un- dis-or mis-articulation of concerns, i.e. undoing or *derailing the articulation* of matters requiring public involvement.

6. Concluding remarks

Comrade Mhlangu's murder remained unresolved. In the coming months, additional hit men killings occurred which, it was rumoured, were in one way or another also linked to the housing project in Nyala. At this time, the local group of Abahlali members had won little concessions. In the week after the funeral, I met with Moyo, a man in his late sixties and a member of *Umkhonto we Sizwe'* Veterans' League. I had first met Moyo at a meeting of the Veterans' League in the city. He was not from KwaNkilinda, but had nevertheless come to attend the funeral of Comrade Mhlangu. We met a few days after the funeral and I mentioned the final speech, held by the regional chairperson of *Umkhonto weSizwe's* Military Veteran's Association, Commander Nchunu. In this speech, the commander had pointed out that in contrast to other African countries, in which civil wars continued to wreck havoc, South Africa had given "the gun 20% and politics 80%". In other countries, he suggested, it was "20% politics and 80% guns". He then remarked: "And when our gun shoots, it sings '*Nkosi Sikelela*'. [LONG PAUSE] Because we know when our gun shoots – *who* it shoots!"

When I finished recounting the speech, Moyo's response was quick. As if he could confirm with infallible certitude, he said: "The point there is simple! It is part of *the struggle*! By saying it is part of the struggle, it is part of the struggle

and it is no longer anything else. You see?" Moyo sought to suggest that in a context that was no doubt multi-layered and different motivations were exceedingly difficult to isolate and define – clearly a complex interplay between personal feuds, politics and crime had become apparent during the course of the funeral – Commander Nchunu's remark about 'the gun that sings', threw a blanket over attempts to scrutinise the ways in which politics and crime had interacted. Through reference to the struggle, neither crime nor local politics was to matter.

Issues occasion public involvement in politics and political practices are dedicated to their articulation. Adopting this proposal also has consequences for how we study those practices through which an unsettling of power relations is effectively brought about. As Marres (2007: 771) emphasises, the pragmatist inspired framework that is spun, "[i]n particular, [...] has consequences for the *kinds* of practice that now require scrutiny if we wish to account for democratic engagement with controversies". The "most drastic consequence", Marres (ibid) suggests, "is that a relatively broad range of practices must now be taken into consideration". Consideration must be paid not only to procedural or institutional settings. Issues often challenge the default arenas of proceduralist engagement and forms of institutionalized public debate (Birkbak et al., 2015: 271). Issue definitions are produced beyond these sites, precisely because they have received insufficient institutional support. In a similar fashion, I add, the focus on practices that contribute towards a un-dis- or mis-articulation of concerns must be broadened. In other words, the play of forces to which Lukes had drawn attention as the interventions that prevent non-issues from turning into issues, is a dimension that must be added to the accounts of Dewey and Lippmann. In its unquestionably most direct form, I have sought to argue, practical *achievements* of issue articulation are undone through violence.

Fig. 16

Funeral of Comrade John
Mhlangu. Coffin being
carried into the
community hall by fellow
Umkhonto weSizwe
soldiers (standing to the
left and right). (Picture:
Eva Riedke).

Prayer at the grave

A note on chapter 4

I n September 2014, the woman who I have here named Thandisile was assassinated in her home in Nyala. An optimistic, courageous, daring, strong-willed woman, who had vowed to fight against the housing project in Nyala. She came to mobilise for the politics of *Abahlali baseMjondolo*, elected in November 2012 as the chairperson of the Abahlali branch in KwaNkilinda.

Reporting on her assassination, newspapers wrote that armed men broke into her home in the early evening hours, numerous shots were fired and Thandisile died on the scene. Her two children and a neighbour's son were present the night of the shooting. One child was shot, but survived.

These were news I received after my fieldwork in Durban had ended. In February 2015, Cllr Khumalo (the ward councillor in KwaNkilinda) and the man I have always referred to as Cele (a councillor of a different ward, but one of the central figures in the local ANC branch), were both arrested in connection with the murder of Thandisile. A few weeks later they were later released on bail. While the provincial leadership of the ANC told journalists that on the basis of these charges, the two councillors were dispelled from the party, both men were said to have continued working in their position as councillors.

In the period in which I wrote these chapters, residents from KwaNkilinda asked whether Thandisile's death changed the role I would take in 'their struggle'. I was told of the case being prepared against Cllr Khumalo and Cele. Had I not done numerous interviews with both councillors? Had I not spoken to so many people involved in the controversy around the housing project in Nyala? Above all, what did my relationship to Thandisile now *mean*? In May 2016, I again received news that the trial against the two councillors had begun. Was I following the case from afar? I was asked. Was I going to do something?

The questions I was asked following Thandisile's death, made explicit a complex mix of hopes and expectations: namely, that I would somehow write 'for them'; the hope that my material (in particular my conversations with Thandisile, the councillors, police officers, the CPF chairperson) could be used in the trial; as well as in the most general terms, an optimism that my material on the conflict would be 'made public'. In my understanding it was their 'hope' that my work would in one way or another present itself as an extension of their struggle. I was hereby put in a dilemma.

Being critical, as a researcher, in the Latourian sense, one is ideally defined by an "attention to and fascination with ontological multiplication" (Ward & Wilkie, 2008). For the members of Abahlali, in contrast, the conflict has a clear

'right' and 'wrong', has 'winners' and 'losers'. For one side, critique was a matter of 'being partisan', of adopting an emancipatory standpoint epistemology. For me, on the other side, the dilemma presented itself as one of not being partisan, including a plurality of voices and eventually, to protect individuals I engaged with, also ascribing a form of anonymity to 'both' sides. All these considerations that were fuelled by the conflict in KwaNkilinda – concerning notions of engagement, partisanship, anonymity, critique – are not new concerns in the discipline, but they here came together to yet again prompt an uncomfortable re-evaluation of how the proposition not to critique, to maintain a critical distance and to rather 'help issues reach *criticity*' (Birkbak et al. 2015; Latour, 2005c) is in some instances to be achieved.

As I suggested in a previous chapter, '*The Field and I*', my decision to 'anonymise' this ethnography was primarily made in response to the incidences that I detailed in '*Chapter 4*', and the nature in which these tensions carried forth. Due to forms of anonymisation (also of the place), it has now become the story of individuals with different names that unfolded 'somewhere close to Durban'. As a researcher, I had become implicated in a conflict that was at the same time a process of issue articulation. My 'implication', in turn, raised the question – as friends from KwaNkilinda rightly reminded me – *whether* and *how* I would afford a 'critical treatment' of relations and their effects. Would an anonymised account still enable a form of meta-critique? And was a form of meta-critique the answer?

In brief, I want to return to Latour's (2004c; 2005c) notion of critique, elaborate on how it was taken up and discussed by Birkbak et al. (2015), and to point out again where the difference lies to the notion of social critique put forth by Boltanski (2011). Namely, to consider the manner in which the latter – in contrast to Latour – opens up the possibility of an 'overarching' or 'meta critique'. I want to consider in relation thereto how *anonymisatio*n – popular when it comes to matters of 'moral concern' – comes to define our intentions not to 'critique' a given phenomenon from one's position as a researcher but to rather make sure that the issues therein 'reach *criticity*'.

1. Helping issues reach 'criticity'

If the issues we concentrate on are not seldom of the kind that arouse a high level of 'moral concern' or 'moral investment' (see Fassin, 2008; Stoczkowski, 2008; Fassin & Stoczkowski, 2008), what does it mean for 'issuefication' research to be critical? The questions following Thandisile's death made clear again the manner in which I had become implicated in processes of issue formation, had been a witness to local critiques and was now in a position, in the words of Birkbak et al. (2015: 287) "to emphasize or supplement them". Despite introducing a somewhat new vocabulary, the implied difficulties have plagued the discipline for long (see Haraway, 1991; Rottenburg, 2013). In the ongoing debate on 'anthropology and critique' the contribution of Birkbak et

al. (2015) sought to pick up and specify Latour's (2005c) notion of 'critical proximity'. Latour (2005c) suggests "that to be critical does not necessarily imply a researcher critiquing a given phenomenon from an outside and distant position in an attempt to turn it into an issue that calls for public engagement" (discussed in Birkbak et al. 2015: 267). The critically minded researcher, Latour argues instead, should rather "make sure that issues reach *criticity*" (ibid) rendering visible day-to-day 'issuefications' rather than adding his/her own critiques[1]. Birkbak et al. (2015) respond by asking the question: But *how* do issues develop 'criticity' and what contribution can we as researchers make?

In pursuing the question they pose, Birkbak et al. (2015) consider in detail the arguments made by Latour, the debate between Dewey and Lippmann and the contributions by Marres (2005a, 2012a). They come to argue that "'doing' critical proximity" above all means paying recognition to the fact that critique is "always already present in the empirical cases we study" (Birkbak et al., 2015: 268). "The challenge" is "to find practical, methodological ways of latching onto and developing further such critiques" (ibid). That is to say, to 'enable issues to reach *criticity*', is to support the struggle of a diversity of actors to turn particular matters of concern into an issue. The *subjective definition* of critique is also replaced with its *objective one*. "It's the object itself, the issue at stake, that has to be rendered critical" (Latour, 2005c: 8). As highlighted previously in reference to my methodological considerations '*The Field and I*', Boltanski's (2011) notion of critique differs from that of Latour for it also envisions a form of overarching critique, a form of meta-critique (see also Slangen, 2013: 63; Rottenburg, 2013: 70-73). As Slangen (2013: 64) sums up Boltanski's notion of critical theory:

> "On the one hand, in order to avoid the charge of rootless utopianism it needs to present itself as an extension of the struggles which actors them-selves are engaged in. On the other hand, it needs to distance itself from these local forms of critique in order to avoid merely expressing a specific set of moral dispositions".

---

[1] Fassin (2008) and Stoczkowski (2008) in their respective discussions of 'whether anthropology should be moral' pursue a related argument: A moral anthropology, as they envision it "is not an anthropology which proposes its own morality – that of the anthropologist" (Fassin, 2008: 341). "[M]oral anthropology should no more promote values and do good than political anthropology should support parties or medical anthropology propose treatments" (Fassin and Stoczkowski, 2008: 331). Rather, they argue "[i]t should have the ambition of making explicit and intelligible the evaluative principles and practices in different societies and contexts, of analysing and interpreting the way social agents form, justify and apply their judgements on good and evil" (ibid).

1.1 Anonymisation

Anonymise one's material or not? The desirability of anonymisation and the conundrums it creates continue to divide the discipline. Anonymity is one of the core principles of research ethics and has long been seen as one of *the* mechanisms through which to protect participants from harm (see Vainio, 2012). Critics, in turn, believe that non-anonymity has the potential to empower participants (Baez, 2002). Not mentioning interlocutors by name and not making explicit where I conducted research, was for me an ethically justified decision. I had grappled with the moral and ethical dilemmas of a what Kovats-Bernat (2002) terms a 'dangerous field' – a fieldwork context in which processes of 'issueification' unfolded in a hostile setting, where ordinary interrelations were over-shadowed by unrest, instability, and fear. In many instances individuals deliberately wished to remain unnamed, fearing that my data could in one way or another cause them harm. Others however, preferred to be mentioned by name. "People should know what I fought for" I was for instance told.

In the first instance, the effect of anonymisation was that research participants and 'their struggle' became abstracted (Vainio, 2008: 687). In the words of Birkbak et al. (2015: 286), I 'latch onto and develop further critiques' – but of their *kind*, not explicitly *theirs*. Latour (2005c: 8) suggests that we should "make sure that issues reach criticity". Erasing the names from those who engage in the day-to-day 'issuefications', we however strip the issue of a layer. What is at stake when issues develop, are procedures of critique. The anonymised ethnography reproduces the critique that is already present in the empirical cases, i.e. reproduces the critiques made by the actors in the field, but strips them of their specificity. Are critiques not always located somewhere and never nowhere? I was told by a colleague with whom I discussed this dilemma at a conference: "Yes but no, Eva! The *issue* is still made to reach *criticity*, but in a different form. Perhaps not the issue per se but the *practices* of issue articulation around issue(s), which you detail, reveal forms of domination and power".

Later, the advice of the colleague prompted the following consideration: she seemed to suggest that through a fine grained, affectively realist account of specific practices of issue articulation, albeit anonymised, the reality of domination was still rendered visible – thus still fulfilling the proper social function of critique. In my reading of her advice however, she not only highlighted the possibility of a meta-critique, but emphasised a particular *form* of meta-critique. One, whose 'emancipatory intent' would stem from upholding, above all, an empirical issued-centeredness.

1.2 Multiple demands

Slangen (2013) makes explicit that for Boltanski, "any critical theory is subject to a *dual* demand". That is *first* the demand, the demand that has developed out of Latour's (2004c; 2005c) writings and elaborated by Birkbak et al. (2015). They write "The challenge for the […] researcher is to find practical, methodological ways of latching onto and developing further critiques" made by the actors-in-focus. The *second* demand that Boltanski (2011) then adds is the need to also "distance itself from these local forms of critique" (discussed in Slangen, 2013: 64). It is through a form of distancing that an 'overarching critique', or 'meta critique', is made possible. Central hereto is the establishment of a distance from the day-to-day critique, to take into focus the 'totality'. The questions I was asked following Thandisile's death and the conversation I had with the colleague quote above, emphasise another demand in relation to the previous to. That is, to stay true to a certain issue-centeredness. Lamla (2016: 57) also makes this clear when he underlines that it is to the '*what*' that forms of reflexive scrutiny afford their effectiveness:

> "Öffentliche Selbstreflexion und -entfremdung allein helfen überhaupt nicht weiter, wenn sie sich nicht an *issues* des gesellschaftlichen Zusammenlebens abarbeiten und deren Verunsicherungseffekte produktiv wenden, sondern über diesen frei schwebend institutionalisiert werden".

Reformulated with reference to the debate about critique, the point becomes that the 'issues' and the practices with which actors strive to articulate them that cannot be lost out of sight. Where we loose sight of the issues and the struggles of articulation that accompany them, a meta-critique may (again) become susceptible to what Haraway (1991, 189) critically termed the "god-trick of seeing everything from nowhere". It is not "the prerogative of the researcher to turn phenomena into issues", Birbak et al. (2015: 267) write. The objective is to care for the "day-to-day 'issuefications'", to help contribute to "the process by which issues reach 'criticity'" (ibid). In these quotes – and while quoted throughout this section, they may all read the same – lies a fine detail that in the end I conclude has not been underlined enough. Namely, the difficulty lies not with per se helping 'issues reach criticity' but rather the *processes* and *struggles* of their articulation.

As the court case carried on against the two councillors charged with the murder of Thandisile, the question of 'critique', the possibility of a so-called 'meta critique', continued to loom over the completion of the text. "We hope you will join the struggle", an Abahlali member from KwaNkilinda writes me. I respond to emails that I am following the media reports of the trial that I am grateful for the exchanges we are upholding. I look at the stack of material, scattered in different mediums and formats across my desk, in boxes, and on my laptop, and I question the worth of the individual conversations (taken on their own) and whether these could be of 'value' for the trial. The most

promising means to respond to the hopes, concerns and frustrations voiced about my role can only be, I come to conclude, to develop empirically assured descriptions of the *practices* by which actors and groups of actors sought to unhinge a certain reality around them and render it unacceptable. I come to adhere to the idea that the objective of the critically minded researcher lies with detailing the *processes* that unfold – in Birkbak et al.'s (2015: 271) words, detailing the "fragile and simultaneous formations of issues and publics". Put differently, providing a juxtaposition of a *plurality* of articulations and, in turn, as 'Chapter 4' ought to make explicit, also the efforts to *derail* them.

Conclusion
Why issues matter

Installing new statues and commemorative markers and taking down old ones, the participation in virginity testing ceremonies, a chief's claim of no longer having 'power through land' and, in addition, the struggles of Abahlali for political inclusion and economic redistribution in townships and shack lands across the country – these tug at a common thread. They impinge on our ideas about *where* we see politics unfold, *who* (or *what*) counts as a political actor and indeed *what* do we readily recognise as belonging to the political. Put differently, it prompts a reconsideration of *sites*, *subjects* and *forms* that define publics and their politics. In the introduction my objective was to prompt initial considerations about how 'politics' can be thought differently if we draw inspiration at a conceptual level and combine arguments from American pragmatism (in particular John Dewey) the French sociology of critical capacity (i.e. the works of Luc Boltanski and Laurent Thévenot), STS and the older and more recent traditions that have been combined in approaches such as that of Noortje Marres. In the chapters thereafter, the objective was to render this issue-centred perspective empirical.

With the title "*Concerning issues: making things political in Durban*", I deliberately intended for a few double meanings. 'Concerning issues' signals both an engagement with the existing theoretical scholarship on 'issues' and issue-centred notions of politics, as well as signalling a contribution towards understanding 'issues' in Durban, i.e. prominent 'matters of collective concern' which work to call publics into being (Marres, 2005a). With latter I mean the lived experience of issues – "the observable, the experienced, the tangible" (Gad & Ribes, 2014: 184). 'Things' in the title, again, has a double meaning. As I suggested in the Introduction, the term has come to be associated with 'objecthood' and 'materiality', however it is at the same time less concrete. This, some may argue, is a 'misfortune' of the term. We may also say however that it serves to capture precisely what stands at the heart of the perspective pursued here. In the chapters, I have engaged both with different strands of a materialist theory of politics – prompting the reader to recognise the processes by which the more-than-human things become political, force thought and catalyse political events (see on this point: Stengers, 2010; Bennett, 2010; Connolly, 2010; Whatmore & Braun, 2010). Material artefacts, such as for instance statues and sculptures, come to acquire 'political affordances' (Marres, 2012a). Second (and *thereby*) 'things' means more than material objects. Latour speaks of 'things' to mean the artefacts of science and technology that combine both facts and values. 'Things' for Latour, become both "objects out there" and "*issues* formed through the gathering of values and people" (Latour, 2005a, emphasis added). Taking both strands together, the reference to 'things' signals a concern not only for how mundane material things, such as statues in public spaces, come to *have a politics*, but also the manner in which 'things'

become the objects and materials of contemporary politics.

The title makes explicit both the theoretical and empirical objectives of this text. Its double-meaningness harks back to an important discussion I want to address here. It starts with the observation by Jensen (2014) who argues that the distinction between 'the conceptual' and 'the theoretical' is perhaps misleading. As Gad & Ribes (2014: 184) add, they should at least not be defined as *in contrast* to each other. Both Gad & Ribes and Jensen with their words of caution, draw attention to the difficulty of studies being both 'empirically rich' and able to challenge dominant theoretical constructions and idealizations – in this case, latter pertains primarily to understandings of the political and the public sphere. I provided a theoretical framing. The chapters that followed provided accounts of different cases. Gad & Ribes (2014: 186) note: "[o]f course there is nothing inherently wrong with the application of theories or methods derived from sound analytic work in one area to help understand another". They add: "More worrisome, perhaps, is the prospect of this becoming the dominant mode of analysis in STS. STS might have fallen into the trap of repeatedly demonstrating, or re-enacting, its findings through new case studies" (ibid). They add that with an institutionalization of so called 'analytical frameworks', have come detailed case studies, whereby the problem in their eyes lies with the choice not to engage with the *broader* conceptual and philosophical issues – to go beyond the analytical framework. "The challenge is therefore to keep alive the discussions about relations between the conceptual and the empirical, which means neither engaging in 'pure conceptual speculation' nor doing just 'another case study' (ibid: 187).

Drawing on a pre-existing theoretical framework and using it to help understand particular unfoldings in Durban, I am confident the cases discussed here, nevertheless escape the 'not another case study' syndrome that also Barry (2001) Beaulieu et al. (2007) and Wyatt and Balmer (2007) have pointed out. First, for the empirical case studies in themselves markedly differ from those that have featured prominently in the discussions around issue-centred politics so far (Reconsider here the reasonings outlined in '*The Field and I*'). Second, as Birkbak (2016: 21) fittingly highlights, new studies provide new vantage points on "*where* to empirically look for the kind of issue politics that Latour & Marres are after" (emphasis added). Third, due to the manner in which the four central chapters have here been written, they have not considered one and the same facet of 'issue-politics', or processes of issuefication, four times. In other words, they do not represent, what we could call, in Edmund Leach's famous words, "a butterfly collection" of different issues[1].

The objective in this final chapter is to return to the pragmatists' inspired notion of issues and their publics with which this thesis begun and alongside

---

[1] Malinowski Memorial Lecture delivered by Leach at the London School of Economics on 3 December 1959 – now in Leach (1961).

it to consider the multiplicity of accounts, dramatisations, debates and conflicts that I detailed as unfolding in Durban. *What*, when it comes do issue politics, do the controversies around statues and sculptures; virginity testing; land and housing; as well as political violence, exemplify or render particularly visible? I have drawn elaborately on the writings of Noortje Marres. Thus, I want to also return to the question: what does the particular 'framing' and 'conceptual vocabulary' as employed by her, and more generally the so-called 'issue-centred perspective', allow us to explore? And lastly, how are we prompted to reshape even broader conceptual and philosophical formulations? I will not pursue these questions one after the other, but rather draw considerations where the controversies, the so-called 'cases', prompt a specific answer.

1. The sites of the political

CHAPTER 1 '*A statue that provokes: the interpretation of the past*' details the stories, or the 'lives', of a series of statues and sculptures. First, the focus turns to three statues produced by the Durban-based artist, Andries Botha. Amongst them, his artwork of three life size elephant sculptures made out of wire frames filled with stones, emerging out of the pavement on a freeway island as one drives down into Durban. The elephants were due to be completed ahead of the 2010 FIFA World Cup. Much like other elephant sculptures for which the artist has become internationally acclaimed, the sculptures in Durban were meant to highlight environmental concerns – i.e. "the forgotten conversation between man and nature" (Van Wyck, 2010). Where the sculptures were due to stand, it was said, had been the last place where elephants had once been seen to roam freely. As Andries Botha put it: "It is a poignant metaphor, when you think about the size of this powerful animal, and the shrinking environment that surrounds it" (quoted by Van Wyck, 2010). The so-called 'Durban elephant saga' begins when the completion of the sculptures was brought to a halt from one moment to the next; the elephants were deemed to represent the symbol of the oppositional IFP. Until a compromise was reached between the artist and the municipality – namely a fourth elephant being added to the existing three – the elephants became embroiled in a controversy that span over six years. In this time, the elephants became 'many things for many people' (Law, 2002), and they occasioned the articulation of concerns that also went beyond the alleged similarity to the IFP logo. For some, concerns lay with the inscriptions of a 'white' artist in Durban's post-apartheid city text. Later in 2012, the elephants, for others, became symptomatic of a national controversy around artistic freedom of expression – at the time unfolding around Brett Murray's painting '*The Spear*'. When one of Durban's elephant statues was then vandalised with red paint, a few members of city's Indian community made explicit the spiritual signification that the for them now 'amputated' elephant acquired.

Further, I discuss the controversy that unfolded around the King Shaka statue at Durban's King Shaka International Airport. This was a statue that was installed and unveiled. An event during which President Jacob Zuma, the Zulu monarch, King Goodwill Zwelithini, and then Premier of KwaZulu-Natal, Zweli Mkhize (amongst other official dignitaries) had been present. Not long after the official unveiling, news reached the airport that the statue must immediately be removed. According to a spokesperson of the King, the features of the statue, and the fact that Shaka stood 'on the ground' (not elevated) amongst two Nguni cows, made the former Zulu King look more like a "herd boy" rather than the fierce hunter warrior of Zulu folklore (see again Khumalo, 2010; Mdletshe, 2010; Van Wyk, 2010). I argue that with the politicisation of the statue, what was sparked, were a multitude of accounts about what the statue *is* and what makes it *significant*. The statue acquired 'political affordances' in the sense that it provided a deliberate occasion for the enactment of concerns that went beyond the legacies of Shaka. That is, also beyond concerns about the inscription of particular histories into the public sphere, previously submerged by apartheid. I suggest that 'issues', which various actors and actor groupings in the midst of the statue elucidated or made explicit, pertained to the dominance of the ANC in the official memorialisation of the past; the present-day political legitimacy of the monarchy; the power to define 'Zuluness' past and present; and the popular resonance of Zulu nationalist discourse within the ANC since Jacob Zuma's rise to power. The statue hereby became a mediator of *existing* controversies and of which it can, at the same time, be seen to be a product of.

In somewhat briefer terms, attention then turns to a third statue by Andries Botha, the statue of John Langalibalele Dube, which was installed, unveiled, and provoked almost no form of contentiousness. The question that these three statues and their different fates raise is: Why can some statues or symbolic markers simply be ignored, while for others it is difficult to do so? Why are some politicised and others not? I argue that the politicisation of statues commonly leads to the assumption that the controversies that unfold in their midst, are also primarily about questioning or contesting a particular historical narrative that the statue is seen to represent – i.e. as Trotha (2004) would suggest, the inscription of a 'basic story' or a 'national basic narrative'. In other words, politicisations represent conflicting evaluations of the past and divergent visions of 'what' should be symbolically inscribed (Thotse, 2010: 174). Focusing on statues and sculptures that are not by first instance about 'commemoration' (such as the case of the elephants) illustrates that by foregrounding the inscription and contestation of *historical narratives*, we may be missing part of the story. The proposition, in turn, is that we also need to consider them through the 'art' lens and more importantly, to attend to the pragmatist credo of 'experience'. Latter emphasises that it is the *experience* of

an artwork that matters, i.e. not what it is 'meant to represent' but how actors become attached or detached based on their experiences of the evolving product (Strandvad, 2012: 163).

The answer I have sought to provide to the question as to why some are politicised others not, centres in simplified terms, around three interrelated points. *Firstly*, due to South Africa's negotiated transition of power and the idealism associated with the 'rainbow-nation' in the early years following the end of apartheid, the government has largely refrained from taking radical measures against existing monuments and statues (Marschall, 2009; 2010). The TRC, as Minty (2006) highlights, has had a significant influence on notions of 'symbolic restitution' and 'reparation'. Sine the end of apartheid, a primary concern has been with *balancing* symbolic markers. This is unlike the 'removal' of statues and their relocation to statue parks, the 'graveyards' for symbolic markers of the previous political order. (Recollect the account I gave of the King Dinuzulu, erected across from a statue of General Louis Botha in central Durban, but which was then deemed 'shorter' than that of Botha). *Secondly*, we need to recognise that a given statue or the artwork is open to multiple interpretations, its features and capacities are not fully determined by the piece itself, but rather are the result of specific practices and arrangements that unfold around it (Marres, 2013; Bijker and Law, 1992; Suchman, 2007). The notion of 'under-determinancy', in turn, allows a given statue, sculpture, or artwork more generally, to become a 'device' of issue-articulation. It becomes a device through which to make explicit and accentuate controversies and issues that transverse the setting (Marres, 2013: 9). Put differently, as material objects, statues, sculptures and objects acquire the means for rendering 'concerns' tangible, as well – for instance in the case of the Shaka statue and KwaZulu-Natal's ruling monarch – for rendering one's 'political say' tangible. *Thirdly*, – and this point I make with reference to the 2015 '*#Rhodesmustfall*' campaign at UCT – whether a statue has the capacity to 'provoke' or not, depends on the 'issues' in the here and now. The debacle around Cecil Rhodes, Mbembe (2015: 2) suggests, points to a moment when "new antagonisms emerge while old ones remain unresolved", "when multiple old and recent unresolved crises seem to be on the path towards a collision". Mbembe terms this a 'negative moment'.

In sum, it can be said that when statues become politicised, they become a device for the articulation and explication of issues and controversies *already on-going* and give way to the development of a critical arena of debate and discursive scrutiny. Here, as the examples vividly illustrate not only how the hierarchies of historical knowledge are drawn into question but also how the normally presumed conceptions of order are challenged. As Boltanski (2011: 150) would put it: a space to "engage with reality in order to alter its contours" is opened up. A form of public involvement in politics is rendered visible that *adds to* and comes to *intervene* in representative politics (Marres, 2005a; 2007). Further, and this notion I then explored in more detail in the

chapter thereafter, the politicisations and the modalities of action which it brought about, challenge the assumption that participation can in principle be contained within the sites which we readily consider as belonging to the political (Marres, 2012a). "Broadly speaking", an account of politics develops, as Birkbak (2016: 18) fittingly puts it, "that does not rely on the assumption of a public sphere, but also does not reduce the public to some sort of unruly mass".

2. Participation by other means

CHAPTER 2 '*A ceremony that cures – doing 'one's share' in times of HIV/AIDS*' is concerned with campaigns for male circumscision and female virginity testing in KwaZulu-Natal. Central to the public debate about the revival of virginity testing in South Africa, has been a clash of human rights vs. cultural rights (George, 2008), a spirited battle between 'a return to culture' vs. 'a liberation from culture' (Wickström, 2010: 534). Herein 'rights' are commonly positioned in opposition to (gender) 'traditions' (Decateau, 2013: 143; see also Hunter 2010). Once again, the lines of antagonism that have emerged with respect to virginity testing, were rendered visible in early 2016 when the uThukela District Municipality in the Province of KwaZulu-Natal institute a bursary scheme for young women, which has as its criteria that they be 'virgins'. (I provide an insight into this debate in the first section of the chapter). The introduction of this 'virginity scholarship' seemed to confirm the views of those critics who have located virginity testing within a 'gendered meaning-making process' premised on beliefs that "the epidemic is the result of women being sexually 'out of control'" (see Leclerc-Madlala, 2001) And it seemed to confirm the view of those who see the practice as placing an unproportional responsibility on women whereby the role of boys and young men is effectively silenced (see Dlamini, 2016). Initiating this scholarship scheme to encourage women to stay virgins seemed to again operate on the assumption that exerting greater control over women and their sexuality will inevitably alter patterns of behaviour in general – in an very abstract sense, 'do something' for the moral regeneration of the country.

The scholarly literature that has been published on the revival of virginity testing has, over the years, in part both mirrored and fuelled the public debate on the practice. I concentrate more at length on the proposition by Wickström (2010) that has in my eyes received less attention. Her argument centres on recognising 'local' perceptions of virginity testing as "a kind of local public health initiative and a collective ritual", as "a strategy that involves the deployment of collective pressure and symbolic means both to increase the individual's and the community's responsibility for sexual relations, and to strengthen girls' and women's positions at a time of chronic HIV/AIDS" (Wickström, 2010: 532-3). She adds, even though the individual girl remains the focus of such testings, the practice is primarily about "reinstating and reinforcing morality, not only in individual girls, but also in the community as a whole" (ibid: 535). Picking up Wickström's argument, I in

turn suggest, that is worth directing our attention to the *additional* normative capacities that virginity testing has acquired, how it is also *more* than a 'preventative public health ritual'. In other words, how it has come to represent a tangible means of engaging with particular issues and of doing one's share for the 'larger whole'. The question that then pops up is, along what span of registers does virginity testing come to be seen, in Verbeek's (2006: 361) words, as giving "material answers to the ethical question of how to act?"

In this chapter, I carry on with this notion of objects and settings mediating 'participation', which had featured in the previous chapter on statues, sculptures and artwork. More specifically, I consider how objects, devices and settings acquire 'normative capacities', and how they thereby become deployable by actors and facilitate a means 'to do good' or 'to do one's share' about particular issues in question (Marres, 2012a; 2012b; 2013). It seeks to explore even more explicitly than the previous chapter has done, how *material agencies* can come to feature in our understanding of political engagement with issues. Marres (2012a) carries forth a key argument made by Dewey, namely "that publics are problematically entangled with issues, and that the nature of this entanglement is necessarily socio-material" (Knox, 2015: 949). With the notion of material participation, Marres prompts a reconsideration *where* political action might be located – not just in 'sites' different to those readily assumed, but also in different 'forms'. Put differently, she makes us see how publics' efforts to directly tackle issues that affect them are distributed across assemblages of people, technologies, and systems (ibid).

Important for a focus on issues and issuefication, as I have highlighted before, is to recognise that Marres' concern for the roles of objects in politics differs markedly from dominant approaches adopted by STS and ANT scholars before her. There has been a lot of talk about 'non-humans' as political actors. There has been an increased recognition that objects or artefacts, as Oenen (2012: 98) puts it, "somehow become closely, and intricately, involved with what was traditionally conceived as the (exclusively) human sphere of action, speech and deliberation". The notion of 'material participation' that Marres offers, however provides again a very particular slant on the way in which objects come to play a role. In ANT speak, the object has not been 'scripted' so as to enable engagement with issues, but rather objects may become 'charged' with issues – what Marres also refers to as the 'issuefication' of things (Marres and Rogers 2005; Marres, 2014). A scripted object has normative effects in the sense that it projects a particular role onto subjects, while latter has normative effects for it is made to 'resonate' with a range of issues (Marres, 2012a; 2014).

Let me again, in brief consider this point with reference to the *Tara KLamp*, the male circumcision device, marketed also as enabling a form of 'home circumcision' or, as a representative from the Department of Health put it, in enabling circumscision in "any other 'non-medical places'". It follows that we can not only apprehend the *Tara KLamp* as a 'scripted object', in so far as we

can ascribe determinative effects to the object – becoming 'political' as it acts upon the subject (Akrich, 1992). Rather we can also see it as an 'issuefied object', proclaimed as enabling men not only to do 'their part' to slow the spread of the HIV/AIDS epidemic but also by undergoing circumcision "elsewhere", doing 'their share' to preserve 'traditional ways'/ to counteract a loss of culture. Marres (2012b: 35) adds, that the 'scripted' side of the object is only latently political, for "the object's political intervention here happens below the radar of what is generally assumed to be going on", while the issuefied side is, in contrast, explicitly political. Powers of engagement are explicitly ascribed.

I turn to Oenen (2012: 99) who captures the central tenet of material participation in short words:

> "The idea of material participation is to design objects, devices, or more generally material settings in such a way that publics can form, and act, without 'investing' – time, money, attention, or ideology – in the problem; 'they suggest a range of simple actions, rather than requiring citizens to grasp the complexity of [environmental] issues' (see Marres, 2012a)".

Engagement is enabled without actors needing to grasp the full-complexity of issues. For instance, someone who installs eco light bulbs, can show off a particular aspect of environmental awareness. Johnson (2013: 1013-14) refers to it as a 'change of no change' for it enables participation by minimum effort; in other words, participation is made 'doable' (Marres, 2012b: 67-68). What this notion of material participation generally prompts us to reconsider, is the relationship between the deeply rooted idea of the "informed citizen" who bases opinions and decisions primarily on knowledge, with citizens' engagement through specific material performances or normative practices. However, as Throndsen & Ryghaug (2015: 159) stress, that is *not* to say, that knowledge does not at all play a role in the latter. "Speaking plainly, citizens are expected to be able to express their material engagement discursively while being deliberately materially engaged".

Specific about Marres' notion of issuefied objects is further the emphasis that she places on forms of 'co-articulation' and the notion of participation made 'do-able'. As I suggest with reference to virginity testing – understood as a *setting* 'charged' with issues – moral and political action is here enabled in a number of different registers all at once. This is what is meant by 'co-articulation'. In the context of virginity testing, I argue that for young women it is being framed as enabling all at once a form of HIV/AIDS prevention; as providing a crucial step towards a 'positive lifestyle'; providing the resources for a being a 'responsibilised citizen' (Robins, 2006); as well as bringing about a return to 'African tradition' – primarily, the reinstalling of moral and cultural values, including the respect for elders. In the speeches that formed part of the annual virginity testing celebration, it became apparent how alignments are performatively constructed with the 'nation building project'.

The 'maidens' were repeatedly addressed as the "flowers of the nation".

3. Issues and publics: a practical accomplishment

CHAPTER 3 '*A chief that urbanises – houses on land contested*' somewhat departs from the focus on the affordances of objects, devices and settings for the articulation of specific issues and turns the focus to how an inchoate public of the affected comes to organise itself – i.e. how actors come together, "thematize, draw and operate upon 'attachments'" and engage in practices of issue-formation. Practices of *issue formation*, the processes of 'issue making', become the primary focus of the last two chapters on this text.

While the chapter details the engagements of numerous actors and actor groupings that come together to articulate the problems around land and development in which they are implicated, it particularly centre-stages the story of one chief, Inkosi Maphulo, who proclaims he is a 'chief who has no land' and thereby "no power through land" has he himself puts it. Let me recall here, the first time he sought to explain its significance to me. It was an afternoon when we were standing in front of his house, I was about to leave to drive back to Durban, and we stood outside for a while, talking, finishing the topic we had spoken about over lunch. His homestead is perched on the side of the hill, overlooking the neighbouring hills. In part, what one could see when standing here, belonged to his Traditional Authority, other areas formed part of the township and thereby fell under the authority of the local ward councillor, and yet another part of the area belonged to the Traditional Authority of another chief. As we stood on the hill, Inkosi Maphulo talked about different 'types' of houses dotting the landscape, explained that "there is no more land" and sought to explain to me (repeatedly pointing to places in the distance) 'divisions' that bisected the landscape, mainly between the township and his traditional authority and along the informal settlements on the township's fringes. Perhaps, in some sense, even more nuanced than that. I however could not 'see' what he meant, i.e. where one ended and another begun.

This chapter takes a chief's concerns over issues of 'housing', 'land' and 'development' as a starting point and explores therefrom a series of conflicts unfolding in and around the township, particularly on the border between his traditional authority and the township. What I argue can be traced through these conflicts – in which the chief, but also a series of other actors became implicated – are processes of *issue formation*. That is to say, efforts aimed at defining "what is at stake". Analysing them in detail, I draw on the conflicts to make two central points in this chapter: a) how practices of issue formation draw upon the semiotic and aesthetic qualities of *infrastructures* (houses, water, electricity, sanitation) and b) that the conflicts provide a vantage point from which to reconsider the assumptions about the status and role of *post-apartheid*

traditional leaders, i.e. the relationship between chiefs and office holders in elected local government. The question aligned to latter is what did Inkosi Maphulo mean when he emphasised he has "no land", he has "no power through land"? Let me briefly reconsider a) and b) here.

Two conflicts unfold around housing development projects - one in a section of the township known as Nyala and in another known as Molweni, an area that falls under the authority of Inkosi Maphulo's traditional authority but which borders the township. Township houses were to be built by the municipality in both sections of the township. In Nyala, tensions unfolded about where and how the new houses could be built – i.e. in existing compounds, what would happen to graves – and over the fact that the ensuing size of compounds was too small, no longer allowing for a particular "way of life". In Molweni, in turn, a local headman, Induna Ndlovu, had lobbied against the housing development scheme, however the community eventually voted for it – with the difference that it should take the form of *rural development* not *urban development*. Significant to these conflicts, I argue, was the manner in which infrastructure was brought to the fore. The provision of houses and the accompanying debates over what 'kind' of houses, also sewerage pipes or not, conditioned broader political sensibilities.

Anthropology's engagement with 'infrastructure', its significations and its political workings, has according to Larkin (2013) received a new 'dynamic'. He speaks of an engagement with 'the poetics and politics of infrastructure'. In this chapter, I engage with a very limited number of works that have pushed this direction. The argument I seek to make can in general terms be aligned with the arguments made by Anand (2012), Chalfin (2014), Chu (2014) Robins (2014) and Schnitzler (2008), namely that political struggles need to be rethought in terms of their attunements to infrastructures. As Rodgers & O'Neil (2012: 402) put it "infrastructure is by no means only a site where forms of social control and oppression can be observed, but also a potential place for imagining more positive politics". Mbembe (2004) for instance has demonstrated how racially driven distinctions and hierarchies continued to be reinforced through urban architecture and city planning (discussed in Rodgers & O'Neil, 2012). Mbembe's work shows, Rodgers & O'Neil (2012: 405) argue,

> "how the materiality of the city – the presence of barriers, fences, walls and monuments, as well as the planning and spatial relations between suburbs, city centres and squatter settlements – plays a concrete role in the sedimentation and workings of unjust social relations, conventions and practices".

Infrastructures are not just a material embodiment of social orders but also reinforce them, is the argument. The conflicts unfolding in the township of KwaNkilinda and the neighbouring traditional authority, I argue, serve to render visible another side to this argument. Namely, how infrastructures (in

part due to the workings identified by Mbembe and others) come to condition broader political sensibilities and become concrete "semiotic and aesthetic vehicles" in processes of issue articulation. They become the grounds "around which forms of citizenship are contested" (Larkin, 2013: 331; Schnitzler, 2008) and, we can add, new ones imagined.

The second central argument in this chapter, as suggested above, concerns the status and role of traditional leaders in post-apartheid South Africa. In the scholarly discussions around present-day chiefs in South Africa, authors almost unanimously agree on the significance of 'land' to explain the political legitimacy of present day chiefs and the manner in which the institution has managed to establish and maintain its authority in the midst of the political changes. This emphasis placed on 'land', I argue is reflective, of the ANC's policies of transformation and democratization that have been implemented and of the manner in which chiefs have been formally accommodated within local governance structures. A form of 'mutual dependency' has been brought about between chiefs and office holders in elected local government. Former have land, latter have access to municipal budgets to provide infrastructural development schemes such as houses, roads, schools, clinics, etc. Councillors, or the Municipality, have the right to take up issues of land usage in traditional authorities as part of their integrated development planning (IDP) and its implementation, but do not have direct influence over land ownership and tenure. There through tensions regularly amount when infrastructural services such as roads, electricity and water are to be extended across boundaries. Williams (2010: 29) puts it as follows

> "[…] one of the main areas of dispute between the chieftaincy and the state is the implementation of development projects in rural areas and the role of local government institutions in the delivery of these projects. Both the chieftaincy and the state wish to provide the development and receive credit for its effective implementation."

In sum, for both local government officials and traditional leaders, so-called 'performance legitimacy' is defined in very similar terms.

I suggest that in the existing literature (including in the case of KZN Khan et al., 2006a; Beall & Ngonyama, 2009; Krämer 2007; Williams, 2010) the manner in which 'land' serves as an intermediary has largely been taken at face value – the institutional, formal accommodation has been foregrounded. First, what is thereby somewhat neglected is that 'land' differs markedly from one chief to another. Inkosi Maphulo's traditional authority lies on the border of a rapidly expanding township. He is, in essence, a 'peri-urban chief' grappling with the expansion of the city, the mushrooming of informal settlements in his area; migrants moving to the fringes of the city in search of work; non-formalised renting and selling; and disputes over property claims that follow therefrom. The 'problems' he grapples with, in part differ markedly from those that *amakhosi* face whose lands lie on the rather rural outlays of the city.

Second, what has been paid inadequate attention to are actors' attachments', which "people mobilize (and that mobilize people) in the performance of their concern" (Marres, 2007: 659). The housing projects made explicit the *antagonistic attachments of* actors who were caught up in trying to uphold allegiance to the chieftaincy while living a life on the fringe of a rapidly expanding township. Promises of adequate housing, water, roads and service improvements where intimately caught up with a sense of progress, feelings of promise, but at the same time also generated complicated emotional investments. The housing project brought to the fore the continuous interplay and an inherent irreconcilability between maintaining 'rurality' and advancing 'development', between 'modernization' and securing an adherence to 'customary ways' – and thereby notions of 'adequate housing' in part ran contrary to aesthetic values that were also being upheld. When I had stood with Inkosi Maphulo in front of his house, it had similarly been antagonistic 'attachments' and the disjunctive feelings that development schemes brought about, which in part explained his frustration. He had stood there, overlooking the hills, concerned about what had become of 'his land'.

Marres (2007; 2012a) picks up the notion of 'attachment' from Gomart & Hennion (1999) and suggests that the concept allows us to better account for public involvement in politics. She emphasises that 'there is more to it' than 'frames' – which has so far been a dominant concept in accounting for actors' enactment of concern with particular issues (Marres, 2007). The notion of frames, defined in disparate ways across the social sciences (including prominenetly Goffman (1974) Entman (1993)), refers to 'ideas' and 'values' that "help to select aspects of a perceived reality" and provide actors with necessary considerations. Confirming Marres' argument that 'there is more to it', the accounts I provide of the conflicts unfolding in and around KwaNkilinda make clear that what lies behind so called 'processes of issue articulation' and indeed the formation of a public, are a complex muddle of *associations* that coalesce around particular issues. Actors "thematize, draw and operate upon" *attachments* and these become sources and resources in the performance of their concern (Marres, 2007: 775). The notion – as an addition, not replacement of frames – encourages a very fine-grained analysis of what it means to be 'implicated' in an issue. It encourages a socio- ontological sensibility. We are encouraged to focus on how actors are implicated in issues through socio-ontological associations. "[T]he enactment of public concern involves the articulation of threats to actors' livelihoods, in the broadest sense of that term", Marres (ibid: 774) argues (see for the older strands of the argument Latour & Woolgar, 1986 and Callon 1986).

Hennion (2012), in turn, adds that the concept of 'attachment' is carefully distinguished from "a binding or a fixture, because attachment must be made and it must be experienced". From this understanding, it also follows that the notion of attachments allows us to appreciate 'issues' far more explicitly not as 'problems' simply existing 'out there' – i.e. as public affairs not requiring articulation to qualify as such. Rather, the definition of 'what is at stake', and

the organization of affected publics seeking the accommodation of issues defined, is grounded in *experience* and *practice*. Publics are not composed of actors or 'stakeholders', whose interests pre-exist the issue that must be represented (Marres, 2012a; see also Hawkins, 2014). The chapter, in sum, empirically documents an account of issue formation, distributed across time and space.

4. Making 'non issues' into 'issues'

The final chapter, CHAPTER 4 '*A gun that sings – from dissatisfaction to unrest*', considers questions of 'power' in relation to processes of issuefication. It engages with the pluralists' argument that power is tied to issues. Issues, the argument goes, can be "fleeting or persistent, provoking coalitions among interested groups and citizens, ranging in their duration from momentary to semi-permanent" (Bachrach & Baratz, 1962: 947). Power relations, which exist in a given community are tied thereto, and are not "a timelessly stable aspect of social structure" (ibid; see also Polsby, 1960: 478-479). In more detail, the chapter is concerned with Lukes' (2005 (1974)) notion of 'non-issues' that draws on Bachrach & Baratz's (1970) concept of the 'non-decision'. These are the public affairs that are kept from being made into issues. The central point is well captured by Schattschneider (1960: 71) when he writes:

> "All forms of political organisation have a bias in favour of the exploitation of some kinds of conflict and the suppression of others because organisation is the mobilisation of bias. Some issues are organised into politics, while others are organised out".

The notion of 'non issues' draws our attention to matters of public concern that are not reputed to be issues. Under this approach, we would not begin with the question "Who rules?" or "Who has power?" but would rather investigate the particular "mobilization of bias", scrutinising the manner in which certain affairs are prevented from being articulated as political issues (Bachrach & Baratz (1962: 952)). From specific case studies, Bachrach & Baratz (ibid) suggest, "he [the researcher] would make a careful inquiry into which persons or groups, if any, gain from the existing bias and which, if any, are handicapped by it".

In this chapter, the conflict around a housing project in the section of the township known as Nyala is again explored and this time specific attention is paid to the shack dwellers' movement Abahlali baseMjondolo. I describe in detail three events; 1) when residents who aligned themselves to Abahlali took to the street and blockaded the road, 2) the launch of an Abahlali baseMjondolo branch in KwaNkilinda, and 3) the funeral of Comrade John Mhlangu, a member of Umkhonto we Sizwe Military Veterans' Association (MK) – a former soldier killed in the course of the housing conflict. With

respect to these three events, I raise the question: in what manner can we come to recognise a contestability of power relations playing itself out through particular 'issues', their articulation and the formation of publics around these affairs? From my discussion of these three events, two points merit reconsideration here, particularly, for they have broader implications for how we understand public participation in politics.

The *first* point pertains to Abhalali's notion of 'living politics', the *second* concerns the manner in which an issue-centred perspective allows us to make sense of intimidations, threats and (political) violence. The thick descriptions of the three events provide insights, from the perspective of multiple actors and actor groupings, into what stands behind Abahlali's notion of 'living politics'. The argument I pursue – and here I draw inspiration from the works by Chance (2015a; 2015b; 2015c) – is that 'living politics', or 'homemade politics' (Birkinshaw, 2009), is about rendering public the discontinuity between the issues of politics and the non-issues of daily life. The 'non issues' are what 'spark' public involvement in politics, whereby actors work to transform issues that previously qualified as non-issues into new matters of public concern. 'Living politics' is taken up by those who, despite being formally included, feel alienated by the existing institutional arrangements.

'Living politics' is said to be deliberately situated beside nationalist party structures. Its objective is to establish a new staging ground for the articulation of affairs, to redefine what presently counts as the spaces of politics, and to reinvent forms of organising subjects and articulating problems. "Residents make their material life and platform for politics by any means necessary" (Chance, 2015a: 400). It entails public dramas but also mundane everyday activities. The use of candles by those who have no electricity as well as the burning of tires in the street and the formation of a road blockade are, according to Chance, practices that define 'living politics'. As Chance (ibid) writes: "[i]n this way, living politics transmutes the boundaries between the home and the streets to make the poor seen and heard in the city through means that residents ground in their own communities and contrast to expert, elite, or technical languages of formal state institutions".

I suggest that the notion of 'living politics' intersects with a growing anthropological literature on infrastructures – i.e. infrastructures as a political staging ground for political mobilisation and claims of political inclusion. The political ascendance of infrastructures as Chalfin (2014: 93) defines it, is one from which "to wrest a space for urban existence outside the grasp of political institutions and elites". Infrastructures of bare life emerge as "formative arenas of public political life, practically and symbolically binding public space, collective experience, and communal interest" (ibid: 99; see also Huchzemeyer, 2011; Langford et al. 2013; Larkin, 2013; Robins, 2014; Schnitzler 2013; Ong 1999). In addition to making us look towards the

dynamic infrastructure debate, the notion of 'living politics' or 'homemade politics' also underlines a second argument, namely that we cannot rely on a distinction between the public and the private.

'Living politics' is a deliberate disruption of the distinction between the private and the public sphere. The home, the everyday, the mundane, becomes a site for the performance of political actions. The residents from KwaNkilinda that joined Abahlali, expressed a profound sense of collective alienation from the structures and pieties of constituted power. Abahlali's notion of 'living politics' is seen as an alternative staging ground for the articulation of affairs, i.e. to borrow Appadurai's words, "to override the failed solutions and non solutions of the state and elites" (2002: 39-40 discussed in Chalfin, 2014: 103. While public involvement takes place at a relative distance from institutional arrangements, it is precisely there through that a publicisation of a given affair is brought about. It is the *displacement* of issues among different locations that accounts for the specifics of the process by which non-issues are made into issues. Central to Dewey's understanding was already that the "sources of political change are not to be found in the realm of politics itself, but rather in the extra-political realm of voluntary association among human beings, where political problems are generated and become salient in the first place" (MacGilvroy, 2010: 32; Holden et al., 2013: 6).

The second central argument in this chapter concerns the 'play of forces' that prevent social, environmental and other problems from becoming issues on the political agenda. I consider practical constraints placed on preventing matters from being politicised to be the most valuable contributions that the agenda-setting theorists (the likes of Bachrach & Baratz, E. E. Schattschneider, and Lukes) make to our understanding of issue politics. Residents who had joined Abahlali, regularly faced threats and intimidations, and most of these were said to be traceable to the 'councillor and his crew'. Also following the events that I detail in this chapter – i.e. following the murder of Comrade John Mhlangu – further hit-men murders occurred in the township. All are said to be tied, in one way or another, to the housing project in Nyala.

Reports of 'political murders' in the province of KwaZulu-Natal – but also plaguing the post- post-apartheid nation at large – are frequently alarming. The 'violence monitor' in KwaZulu-Natal reports annually on the number of politically motivated killings and so called violence 'hot spots' (see www.violencemonitor.com; Sosibo, 2014). Within scholarly circles, explanations for the continuation of political violence vary, with emphasis placed on inter-party conflicts and serious ideological contestation, intra-ANC rivalries, as well as local struggles for resources and power - "ranging from land and housing to taxi routes" (Kelly, 2012). Similarly to Kelly (2012), Kynoch (2005, see also 2013) cautions that transition era conflict cannot exclusively be explained in terms of the continuation of party political divides. Further, he elaborates on the manner in which conflicts and divisions readily 'acquire' political dimensions. I argue with reference to the conflicts that

unfolded in the township section of Nyala, that the deliberate injecting of political party rivalries into lines of dispute, worked to effectively 'mask' underlying tensions and, more specifically, processes of issuefication at work. The proposition is hereby that precisely the labelling as 'political violence', works to obscure, or derail, the articulation of affairs that established institutional politics are failing to accommodate. Threats, intimidations and armed violence unfolding in Nyala were read as efforts to deter residents from organising around particular affairs, and in addition, the claims that these were 'political' (particularly as being symptomatic of old rivalries with the IFP) itself became a resource for reconfiguring processes of issueification. This notion, that acts of labelling violence as 'political' in part works to bring about an un-dis-or misarticulation of concerns, should, provides us with a new sensibility for claims of political violence in the very contexts in which they unfold.

5. Dewey on 'issues' and 'publics' – to apprehend anew

Elephants, virginity testing ceremonies, sewage pipes and guns – *how* are things made political and *what* is made political there through? Despite drawing on conversations between American pragmatism, STS, the sociology of critical capacity and a few other strands left and right, the core arguments pursued here were first laid out by John Dewey (2012 (1927)) in the '*Public and its Problems*' and in the conversation that ensued with Walter Lippmann (1997(1922); 2002 (1927)).

Dewey upheld that a public is sparked when we cannot see nor predict, when we face the unintended, unwanted, invisible consequences of our collective actions. Members of a given public are implicated but lack the ability to engage. They are at once 'affected', but at the same time at a distance from the institutions through which the affair in question could be dealt with. Marres (2012a: 50) comes to speak of 'concerned outsiders' to capture the dual character of being both 'inside' and 'outside' the issues that it seeks to address.

An object-oriented conception of politics, as spelled out by Dewey and carried forth with those who draw on him today, adheres to the idea that "those excluded, suppressed, and not accounted for by the dominant social order are central to challenging and reconfiguring that order" (Tsouvalis, 2016: 29). Put differently, the excluded or supressed, work to stage a claim in the dominant order of things through exposing a wrong (see also Rancière, 2007). A slogan by Tsouvalis (2016: 37) captures the tenet well: "Things call forth publics and gather assemblies; they constitute a political force to be reckoned with. [...] [C]hange does not come from no 'thing'."

Publics are a practical achievement that emerges in the process of defining

'what is at stake', i.e. in relation to *issues*. Publics are, in this understanding, an outcome of "diverse processes of becoming affected, feeling implicated or sensing an emerging issue as having relevance" (Hawkins, 2014: e40). The public then, is also not a given reality at any one time – the issue and the public are mutually constituted. The public is defined by its emerging relationship to an issue, and not just by a problem 'out there', but rather by a common *affective* space shared.

Important for Dewey is that controversies, disputes, agonism unfold on the plane of objects, an idea that Marres re-captures with the notion of 'material participation' (Marres, 2012a; see also Marres, 2012b). Participation becomes more than speech acts and comes to represent more than an abstract political ideal. It is above all a *practical achievement* and 'done with things'. Objects, devices and settings reconfigure political activities; they acquire political and ethical capacities. 'The political' becomes a through and through more than human event.

When re-visited today, Dewey challenges the limitations of existing political theory, re-awakens questions about the nature of politics and the political. *Where* do we see politics unfold, *who* (or *what*) is seen to represent a political actor and indeed *what* counts as politics? In the accounts here, elephants, virginity testing ceremonies, sewage pipes and guns featured in processes of issueification in Durban. These worked to reconfigure the conduct of politics – becoming constituent elements, devices of participation, or featuring as sites of enactment. With them, through them and around them, actors sought to define issues as stake, to reach agreement on 'what is' and 'what should be', to collectively pursue means of acting in uncertainty, and to seek new forms through which these issues can be addressed. 'At stake', after all, were problems that established institutions are unable to contain. Dewey allows us to apprehend experimentalisation in the realm of the political anew. As he himself (2012 (1927): 57) compellingly puts it in "*The Public and its Problems*": "[…] since conditions of action and of inquiry and knowledge are always changing, the experiment must always be retried. The state must always be rediscovered".

References

Akrich, Madeleine (1992) 'The de-scription of technical objects'. In: Wiebe E. Bijker & John Law (eds) *Shaping Technology/Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change.* Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, pp. 205–24.

Alderman, Derek H. (2000) 'A street fit for a kind: naming places and commemoration in the American South', *Professional Geographer, 52*, pp- 674-684.

Alderman, Derek H. (2008) "Place, naming and the interpretation of cultural landscapes", In: Brian Graham & Peter Howard (eds.) *The Ashgate Research Companion to Heritage and Identity.* Aldershot: Ashgate, pp 195–214.

Anand, Nikhil (2012) 'Municipal disconnect: on abject water and its urban infrastructures' *Ethnography,* 13(4), pp. 487–509.

Appadurai, Arjun   (2002) 'Deep Democracy', *Public Culture 14(1)*, pp. 21–47.

Asdal, Kristin (2008) 'Enacting things through numbers: Taking nature into accounting', *Geoforum, 39*, pp. 123-32.

Ashforth, Adam (1999) 'Weighing manhood in Soweto', *CODESRIA Bulletin, 3 / 4,* pp. 51–58.

Assmann, Aleida (2006) *Der lange Schatten der Vergangenheit: Erinnerungskultur und Geschichtspolitik,* München: C.H. Beck.

Assmann, Aleida & Frevert, Ute (1999) *Geschichtsvergessenheit, Geschichtsversessenheit. Vom Umgang mit deutschen Vergangenheiten nach 1945,* Stuttgart: Deutsche Verlags-Anstalt.

Azaryahu, Maoz (2011) 'The critical turn and beyond: the case of commemorative street renaming', *ACME: An International E-Journal for Critical Geographies, 10*, pp. 28-33.

Bachrach, Peter & Baratz, Morton (1963) 'Decisions and Non-decisions: An Analytical Framework', *American Political Science Review 57*, pp. 632-642.

Bachrach, Peter & Baratz, Morton (1970) *Power and Poverty.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Baez, Benjamin (2002) 'Confidentiality in qualitative research: reflections on secrets, power and agency', *Qualitative Research, 2(1)*, pp. 35–58.

Baines, Gary (2007) 'The politics of public history in post-apartheid South

Africa' in: Hans Erik Stolten (Ed.) *History Making and Present Day Politics: the Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa.* Stockholm: Eleanders Gotab AB, pp. 167-183.

Bank, Leslie & Southall, Roger (1996) ' Traditional Leaders in South Africa's New Democracy', *Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 37*, pp. 407-430.

Barry, Andrew (1999) 'Demonstrations: Sites and Sights of Direct Action', *Economy and Society 28(1),* pp. 75-94.

Barry, Andrew (2001) *Political Machines: Governing a Technological Society.* London: Athlone Press.

Barry, Andrew (2013) *Material Politics: Disputes Along the Pipeline.* West Sussex: Wiley-Blackwell.

Barthes, Roland (2010(1981)) *Camera lucida: Reflections on Photography.* Trans. R. Howard. New York: Hill and Wang.

Beall, Jo (2005) 'Decentralizing Government and De-centering Gender: Lessons from Local Government Reform in South Africa', *Politics and Society, 33(2),* pp. 253-276.

Beall, Jo (2006) 'Cultural Weapons: Traditions, Inventions and the Transition to Democratic Governance in Metropolitan Durban', *Urban Studies, 43(2),* pp. 457–473.

Beall, Jo & Ngonyama, Mduduzi (2009) 'Indigenous Institutions, Traditional Leaders and Elite Coalitions for Development: the case of Greater Durban, South Africa' *Working Paper No. 55, Crisis States Research Centre,* London School of Economics, pp. 1-33.

Beall, Jo; Mkhize, Sibongiseni & Vawda, Shahid (2005) 'Emergent Democracy and 'Resurgent' Tradition: Institutions, Chieftaincy and Transition in KwaZulu-Natal', *Journal of Southern African Studies, 31(4),* pp. 755-771.

Beaulieu, Anne; Andrea Scharnhorst & Paul Wouters (2007) 'Not Another Case Study: A Middle-range Interrogation of Ethnographic Case Studies in the Exploration of E-science', *Science, Technology, & Human Values, 32 (6),* pp. 672-92.

Beck, Ulrich (1992) *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity.* London: Sage Publications.

Becker, Howard S.; Faulkner, Robert R. & Kirshenblatt-Gimblett, Barbara (eds.) (2006) *Art from Start to Finish: Jazz, Painting, Writing, and Other*

Improvisations. Chicago, IL: University of Chicago Press.

Behrens, Kevin (2014) 'Virginity testing in South Africa: a cultural concession taken too far?', *South African Journal of Philosophy, 33(2)*, pp. 177-187.
Benit-Gbafou, Claire; Didier, Sophie & Morange, Marianne (2008) 'Communities, the Private Sector, and the State: Contested Forms of Security Governance in Cape Town and Johannesburg', *Urban Affairs Review, 43(5)*, pp. 691 – 717.

Bennett, Jane (2010) *Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things.* Durham and London: Duke University Press.

Berk, Richard A & Fovell, Robert G (1999) 'Public perceptions of climate change: A 'willingness to pay' assessment', *Climatic Change, 41*, pp. 413 - 46.

Bernstein, Richard J. (2010) 'John Dewey's vision of radical democracy'. In R. Bernstein, *The pragmatic turn.* Cambridge: Polity Press, pp. 70–88.

Bierschenk, Thomas (1988), 'Development Projects as Arenas of Negotiation for Strategic Groups: A case study from Bénin', *Sociologia Ruralis, 28*, pp. 146-160.

Bierschenk, Thomas; J.P. Chaveau, Jean- Pierre & Olivier de Sardan, Jean-Pierre (2002) '*Local development brokers in Africa: The rise of a new social category*'. Working Paper No. 13, Department of Anthropology and African Studies. Mainz, Germany: Johannes Gutenberg University.

Bijker, Wiebe E.; Hughes, Thomas & Pinch, Trevor J. (2012 (1987)) *The Social Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology.* MIT Press, Cambridge.

Bijker, Wiebe & John Law (1992) *Shaping Technology / Building Society: Studies in Sociotechnical Change.* Cambridge: MIT Press.

Bijker, Wiebe E. & Pinch, Trevor J. (2012 (1987)) '*The Social Construction of Facts and Artifacts: Or How the Sociology of Science and the Sociology of Technology Might Benefit of Each Other*'. In: Wiebe E. Bijker, Thomas P. Hughes, Trevor J. Pinch (eds.) *The Social Construction of Technological Systems. New Directions in the Sociology and History of Technology.* MIT Press, Cambridge MA, pp. 11-45.

Birkbak, Andreas; Petersen, Morten K. & Jensen, Torben E. (2015) Critical Proximity as a Methodological Move in Techno-Anthropology, *Techné: Research in Philosophy and Technology, 19(2)*, pp. 266–290.

Birkbak, Andreas (2016) *Caring for Publics: How Media Contribute to Issue Politics*, PhD Dissertation, Aalborg University, Denmark.

Birkinshaw, Matt (2009) 'Abahlali baseMjondolo: 'a homemade politics'', Paper presented, *Alternative Futures and Popular Protest*, Manchester Metropolitan University, 15-17 March 2009. Available online: http://libcom.org/library/abahlali-basemjondolo-%E2%80%98-homemade-politics%E2%80%99?quicktabs_1=1 (Accessed 1 March 2016).

Bloor (1992 (1976)) *Knowledge and Social Imagery*. Second Edition. Chicago/London: University of Chicago Press.

Bogusz, Tanja (2013) 'Was heißt Pragmatismus? Boltanski meets Dewey', *Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 23*, pp. 311–328.

Boissevain, Jeremy (1966) 'Patronage in Sicily', *Man (1)1*, pp. 18-33.

Boltanski, Luc (1990) *L'Amour et la justice comme compétences. Trois essais de sociologie de l'ac- tion.* Paris: Métailié.

Boltanski, Luc (2011) *On Critique. A Sociology of Emancipation*. Cambridge and Malden: PolityPress.

Boltanski, Luc (2012) *Love and Justice as Competences.* Cambridge and Malden: Polity Press.

Boltanski, Luc & Thévenot, Laurent (1999) 'The Sociology of Critical Capacity', *European Journal of Social Theory, 2(3),* pp. 359-377.

Boltanski, Luc & Thévenot, Laurent (2000) 'The reality of moral expectations: A sociology of situated judgement', *Philosophical Explorations, 3*, pp. 208-231.

Boltanski, Luc & Thévenot, Laurent (2006) *On Justification. The Economies of Worth.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Bonhomme, Julien (2012) 'The dangers of anonymity Witchcraft, rumor, and modernity in Africa', *Journal of Ethnographic Theory 2 (2),* pp. 205–33.

Boomgard, Jeroen & Doruff, Sher (2012) 'The Art of Publics: Fielding Misunderstanding', In: *Politics of Things: What Art & Design do in Democracy*, Open No. 24, pp. 8-18.

Bowman, Paul (2013) 'The Receptions of Post-Structuralism' In: Dillet, Benoit; Porter, Robert & Mackenzie, Iain (eds.) *The Edinburgh Companion to Poststructuralism*, Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, pp. 445-471.

Braun, Bruce & Whatmore, Sarah J. (2010) 'The Stuff of Politics: An Introduction', In: Bruce Braun & Sarah J. Whatmore (eds.), *Political matter: Technoscience, democracy and public life.* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota

Press pp. 3-34.

Brown, Bill (2001) 'Thing Theory', *Critical Inquiry, 28(1)*, pp. 1-22.

Bundy, Colin (2007) 'New nation, new history? Constructing the past in post-apartheid South Africa', In: Hans Erik Stolten (Ed.) *History Making and Present Day Politics: the Meaning of Collective Memory in South Africa.* Stockholm: Eleanders Gotab AB, pp. 73-98.

Bunnin, Nicholas & Yi, Jiyuan (2008) 'end-in-view', *The Blackwell Dictionary of Western Philosophy*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishing.

Burns, Michelle (2006) 'A Completion of Memory? Commemorating a decade of freedom in South Africa: 1994-2004', *Eras, Edition 8*, November 2006, pp. 1-15.

Cabrita, Joel (2010) 'Politics and Preaching: Chiefly Converts to the South African Nazaretha Church, Obedient Subjects and Sermon Performance', *Journal of African History, 51(1)*, pp. 21-40.

Calhoun, Craig (2013) 'The Problematic Public: Revisiting Dewey, Arendt, and Habermas', *The Tanner Lectures on Human Values*. Delivered at University of Michigan April 11, 2013, pp. 67-107.

Calkins, Sandra (2014) *Survival at the Margins: Processing Uncertainties in North-Eastern Sudan.* PhD dissertation. Leipzig: Universität Leipzig.

Callon, Michel (1986) 'Some elements of a sociology of translation: domestication oft he scallops and the fishermen of St Brieux Bay', In: John Law (ed.) *Power, Action and Belief: A New Sociology of Knowledge?* Keele: Sociological Review Monograph.

Callon, Michel (1998) 'An essay on framing and overflowing: Economic externalities revisited by sociology'. In: Michel Callon (ed.) *The laws of markets*. Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 244-69.

Callon, Michel (2009) 'Civilizing markets: Carbon trading between in vitro and in vivo experiments', *Accounting, Organizations and Society, 34*, pp. 535-48.

Carrithers, Michael; Candea, Matei; Sykes, Karen; Holbraad, Martin & Venkatesan, Soumhya (2010) 'Ontology is just another word for culture'. *Critique of Anthropolology, 30 (2)*, pp. 152–200.

Chalfin, Brenda (2014) 'Public things, excremental politics, and the infrastructure of bare life in Ghana's city of Tema', *American Ethnologist, 41(1)*, pp. 92-109.

Chance, Kerry (2015a) ''Where there is fire, there is politics': Ungovernability and Material Life in Urban South Africa', *Cultural Anthropology, 30(3)*, pp. 394–423.

Chance, Kerry (2015b) 'Sacrifice After Mandela: Liberalism and Liberation Among South Africa's First Post-apartheid Generation', *Anthropological Quarterly, 88(4)*, pp. 857–880.

Chance, Kerry (2015c) 'Transitory Citizens: Contentious Housing Practices in Contemporary South Africa, *Social Analysis, 59(3)*, pp. 62-84.

Chandler, David (2014) 'Democracy unbound? Non-linear politics and the politicization of everyday life', *European Journal of Social Theory, 17(1)*, pp. 42–59.

Chapman, Michael (1992) 'The Sculptur and the Citizen: Complimenting/Complementing Andries Botha', *Theoria: A Journal of Social and Political Theory, 80*, pp. 77-86.

Chu, Julie Y. (2014) 'When infrastructures attack: The workings of disrepair in China', *American Ethnologist, 41(2)*, pp. 351–367.

Clarke, Adele (1991) 'Social Worlds/Arenas Theory as Organization Theory', In: David Maines (ed.) *Social Organization and Social Process: Essays in Honor of Anselm Strauss*. Hawthorne, NY: Aldine de Gruyter, pp. 119-58.

Clarke, Adele (2003) 'Situational Analyses: Grounded Theory Mapping After the Postmodern Turn', *Symbolic Interaction 26(4)*, pp. 553-76.

Clarke, Adele (2005) *Situational Analyses: Grounded Theory Mapping After the Postmodern Turn*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.

Clarke, Adele (2006) 'Social Worlds', In: *The Blackwell Encyclopedia of Sociology*. Malden, MA: Blackwell, pp. 4547 – 49.

Clarke, Adele (2012) *Situationsanalyse: Grounded Theory nach dem Postmodern Turn*. Wiesbaden: VS-Verlag.

Clarke, Adele & Montini, Theresa (1993) 'The Many Faces of RU486: Tales of Situated Knowledges and Technological Contestations', *Science, Technology & Human Values, 18(1)*, pp. 42-78.

Clarke, Adele & Star, Susan Leigh (2008) 'The Social Worlds Framework: A Theory/Methods Package', In: Edward J. Hackett, Olga Amsterdamska, Michael Lynch & Judy Wajcman (eds.) *The Handbook of Science and Technology*

Studies (Third Edition). Cambridge: MIT Press, pp. 113-139.

Claassens, Aninka & Cousins, Ben (eds.) (2008) Land, Power and Custom: Controversies Generated by South Africa's Communal Land Rights Act. UCT Press: Cape Town and Ohio University Press: Athens OH.

Collins, Randall (1987) 'Interaction Ritual Chain, Power and Property: The Micro-Macro Connetion as an Empirically Based Theoretical Problem', In : Alexander, Jeffrey C.; Giesen, Bernhard; Münch, Richard & Neil .J. Smelser (eds.) The Micro-Macro Link. Berkeley, University of California Press, pp. 193-205.

Comaroff, Jean & Comaroff, John (1997) 'Occult economies and the violence of abstraction: notes from the South African postcolony', *American Ethnologist, 26*, pp. 279 – 303.

Comaroff, Jean & Comaroff, John (2000) 'Millennial Capitalism: First Thoughts on a Second Coming,' *Public Culture 2*, pp. 291–343.

Comaroff, Jean & Comaroff, John (eds.) (2006) *Law and Disorder in the Postcolony.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Comaroff, John & Comaroff, Jean (2009) *Ethnicity, Inc.*, Durban: University of KwaZulu Natal Press.

Connolly, William (1995), *The Ethos of Pluralization*. Minnesota University Press, Minneapolis, MN.

Connolly, William, E. (2010) *A World of Becoming*. Durham, NC: Duke University.

Cousins, Ben & Claassens, Aninka (2004) 'Communal land rights, democracy and traditional leaders', IN: Munyaradzi, Saruchera (ed) *Securing Land and Resource Rights in Africa: Pan-African Perspective*s. PLAAS: Cape Town, pp. 139–154.

Cousins, Ben & Hall, Ruth (2013) 'Rights without illusions: the potential and limits of rights-based approaches to securing land tenure in rural South Africa' In Malcolm Langford, Ben Cousins, Jackie Dugard and Tshepo Madlingozi (eds.). *Symbols or Substance? The role and impact of socio-economic rights strategies in South Africa.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Crais, Clifton (2006) 'Custom and the politics of sovereignty in South Africa', *Journal of Social History, 39(3)*, pp. 721-40.

Dantec, Christopher Le & DiSalvo, Carl (2013) 'Infrastructuring and the formation of publics in participatory design', *Social Studies of Science 43(2)*, pp.

241–264.

Deacon, Janette (1998) 'Remembering Tragedy, Constructing Modernity: Robben Island as a National Monument', In: Sarah Nuttal & Carli Coetzee (eds.) *Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press, pp. 161-79.

DeCesare, Tony (2012) 'The Lippman-Dewey "Debate" Revisited: The Problem of Knowledge and the Role of Experts in Modern Democratic Theory', *Philosophical Studies in Education, 43*, pp. 106-116.

Decoteau, Claire Laurier (2013a) 'The Crisis of Liberation: Masculinity, Neoliberalism, and HIV/ AIDS in Postapartheid South Africa', *Men and Masculinities, 16(2),* pp. 139-159.

Decoteau, Claire Laurier (2013b) 'The Politicisation of Sexuality', *Ancestors and Antiretrovirals: The Biopolitics of HIV/AIDS in Post-Apartheid South Africa.* Chicago: University of Chicago Press, pp. 163-199.

DeNora, Tia (2000) *Music in Everyday Life.* Cambridge/New York: Cambridge University Press.

DeNora, Tia (2003) *After Adorno: Rethinking Music Sociology.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Dequech, David (2008) 'Logics of Justification and Logics of Action', *Journal of Economic Issues, 42 (2),* pp. 527-535.

DeVries, Manfred F.R. Kets (2004) *Lessons on Leadership by Terror: Finding Shaka Zulu in the Attic.* Cheltenham: Edward Elgar.

DeVries, Gerard (2007) 'What is Political in Sub-politics? How Aristotle Might Help STS', *Social Science Studies, 37(5),* pp. 81–809.

Dewey, John (1908) 'Does reality possess practical character?' In: *Essays, Philosophical and Psychological, In Honour of William James, Professor in Harvard University from his Colleagues at Columbia University.* New York: Longmans, Green and Co. pp. 53-80.

Dewey, John (1916) *Democracy and Education: An introduction to the Philosophy of Education.* New York: Free Press.

Dewey, John (1991 (1927)) *The Public and Its problems.* Athens: Swallow Press and Ohio University Press.

Dewey, John (2005 (1934)) *Art as Experience.* New York, NY: Minton, Balch &

Company.

Dewey, John (2012 (1927)) *The Public and Its problems*. Edited and with an introduction by Melvin L. Rogers. Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University.

Diggins, John Patrick (1999) 'Pragmatism and Its Limits', In: Morris Dickstein (ed.) *The Revival of Pragmatism*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

DiSalvo, Carl (2009) 'Design and the Construction of Publics', *Design Issues, 25(1)*, pp. 48-63.

Dobson, Andrew (2003) *Citizenship and the environment*. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Du Gay, Paul & Glenn Morgan (2013) "Understanding Capitalism: crisis, Legitimacy, and Change Through the Prism of *The New Spirit of Capitalism*". In: Paul du Gay & Glenn Morgan (eds): *New Spirits of Capitalism – Crisis, Justifications, and Dynamics*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 1-42.

Duminy, James (2011) 'Street Renaming, Symbolic Capital and Symbolic Resistance: The Case of Durban, 2007 to 2008', *Paper presented at the South African Cities Conference,* African Centre for Cities, Cape Town, pp. 1-28.

Duminy, James (2014) 'Street Renaming, symbolic capital, and resistance in Durban, South Africa', *Environment and Planning D: Society and Space, 32,* pp. 310 – 328.

Dwyer, Owen & Alderman Derek (2008) 'Memorial landscapes: analytic questions and metaphors', *GeoJournal, 73*, pp. 165–178.

Entman, Robert (1993) 'Framing: Toward clarification of a fractured paradigm', *Journal of Communication, 43 (4)*, pp. 51-58.

Eriksen, Thomas H (2001) *Small Places, Large Issues: an Introduction to Social and Cultural Anthropology.* Sterling and others: Pluto Press.

Ezrahi, Yaron (1990) *The Descent of Icarus: Science and the Transformation of Contemporary Democracy*. Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press.

Fassin, Didier (2008) 'Beyond good and evil? Questioning the anthropological discomfort with morals', *Anthropological Theory, 8 (4)*, pp. 333-344.

Fassin, Didier; Le Marcis, Frédéric & Lethata, Todd (2008) 'Life & Times of Magda A: Telling a Story of Violence in South Africa, *Current Anthropology, 49(2)*, pp. 225-246.

Fassin, Didier & Stoczkowski, Wiktor (2008) 'Should anthropology be moral? A debate', *Anthropological Theory, 8(4)*, pp. 331–332.

Figlan, Lindela; Mavuso, Rev; Ngema, Busi; Nsibande, Zodwa; Sibisi, Sihle & Zikode S'bu (2009) *Living Learning*. Church Land Program: Pietermaritzburg.

Fossen, Thomas (2013) 'Taking Stances, Contesting Commitments: Political Legitimacy and the Pragmatic Turn', *The Journal of Political Philosophy, 21(4)*, pp. 426–450.

Fraser, Nancy (1990) 'Rethinking the Public Sphere: A Contribution to the Critique of Actually Existing Democracy', *Social Text, No. 25/26*, pp. 56-80.

Fuente, Eduardo de la (2007) 'The `New Sociology of Art': Putting Art Back into Social Science Approaches to the Arts', *Cultural Sociology, 1(3), pp.* 409–425.

Fuente, Eduardo de la (2010) In defence of theoretical and methodological pluralism in the sociology of art: A critique of Georgina Born's programmatic essay. *Cultural Sociology* 4(2), pp. 217–30.

Gad, Christopher & Ribes, David (2014) 'The Conceptual and the Empirical in Science and Technology Studies', *Science Technology Human Values 2014, 39(2)*, pp. 183-191.

Gaitskell, Deborah (1982) ,'Waiting for purity' prayer unions, African mothers and adolescent daughters 1912-1940. In: Marks, S. & Rathbone, R. (eds.) *Industrialisation and social change in South Africa: African class formation, culture and consciousness, 1870-1930*. London: Longman, pp. 338-357.

Garetty, Karin (1997) 'Social Worlds, Actor-Networks and Controversy: The Case of Cholesterol, Dietary Fat and Heart Disease', *Social Studies of Science, 27(5)*, pp. 727-73.

Garfinkel, Harold (1967) *Studies in Ethnomethodology*. Englewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice-Hall.

Gibson, Nigel (2010) 'What Happened to the "Promised Land"? A Fanonian Perspective on Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Antipode, 44(1)*, pp. 51–73.

Glassberg, David (1996) 'Public History and the Study of Memory', *The Public Historian* 18 (2), pp. 7-23.

George, Erika. R. (2008) 'Virginity Testing and South Africa's HIV / AIDS Crisis: Beyond Rights Universalism and Cultural Relativism toward Health

Capabilities', *California Law Review, 96(6)*, pp. 1447 – 1518.

Glazer; Myron (1970) Field Work in a Hostile Environment: A Chapter in the Sociology of Social Research in Chile. In: Frank Bonilla & Myron Glazer (eds.) *Student Politics in Chile*. New York: Basic Books, pp. 313-333.

Goffman, Alice (2014) *On the Run: Fugitive Life in an American City*. Chicaco: Chicago University Press.

Goffman, Erving (1974) *Frame Analysis*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Gomart, Emilie & Hajer, Maarten (2002), 'Is that politics? For an inquiry into forms in contemporary politics', In: Bernward Joerges & Helga Nowotny (eds.), *Looking Back Ahead: The 2002 Yearbook of the Sociology of the Sciences*. Kluwer Publishers, Dordrecht, pp. 33-63.

Gomart, Emilie & Hennion, Antoinne (1999) 'A Sociology of Attachment: Music Amateurs, Drug Users', In: John Law & John Hassard (eds), *Actor Network Theory and After*. Oxford: Blackwell Publishers / The Sociologial Review, pp. 220-248.

Gripsrud, Jostein, Moe Hallvard, Molander, Anders & Murdock, Graham (2010) *The Idea of the Public Sphere: A Reader*. Plymouth: Lexington Books.

Grobler, Jackie (2008) 'The Impact of Politics on Heritage and Cultural Tourism in South Africa', *South African Journal of Cultural History, 22(1)*, pp. 163-185.

Grundlingh, Albert (2001) 'A Cultural Conundrum? Old Monuments and new Regimes: The Voortrekker Monument as Symbol of Afrikaner Power in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *Radical History Review, 81*, pp. 94-112.

Guggenheim, Michael & Potthast, Jörg (2012) 'Symmetrical twins: On the relationship between Actor-Network theory and the sociology of critical capacities', *European Journal of Social Theory, 15(2)*, pp.157-178.

Guyot Silvain & Seethal Cecil (2007) 'Identity of place, places of identities: change of place names in post- apartheid South Africa', *South African Geographical Journal, 89*, pp. 55–63.

Habermas, Jürgen (1991 (1962)) *The Structural Transformation of the Public Sphere: An Inquiry into a category of Bourgeois Society* (trans. Thomas Burger & Frederick Lawrence), Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

Halbwachs, Maurice (1992) *On Collecitve Memory*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Handler, Richard (2012) 'What's up, Doctor Goffman? Tell us where the action is!', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, 18 (1),* pp. 179–90.

Handler, Richard & Linnekin, Jocelyn (1984) 'Tradition: Genuine or Spurious?', *The Journal of American Folklore, 97 (385)*, pp. 273-290.

Haraway, Donna J. (1991) 'Situated Knowledges: The Science Question in Feminism and the Privilege of Partial Perspective', In: Donna J. Haraway (ed.) *Simians, Cyborgs, and Women: The Reinvention of Nature*. New York: Routledge, pp. 183–201.

Harman, Graham (2014) *Bruno Latour: Reassembling the Political.* London: Pluto Press.

Harvey, Penny (2014) 'The material politics of solid waste: decentralization and integrated systems', In: Penny Harvey, Eleanor Conlin Casella, Gillian Evans, Hannah Knox, Christine McLean, Elizabeth B. Silva, Nicholas Thoburn, Kath Woodward (Eds) *Objects and Materials: A Routledge Companion*. London: Routledge, pp. 61-72.

Hauck, Gerhard (2004) 'Schwache Staaten? Überlegungen zu einer fragwürdigen entwicklungspolitischen Kategorie', *Peripherie, 96*, pp. 411-427.

Hawkins, Gay (2006) *The ethics of waste: How we relate to rubbish*. Lanham, MD: Rowman & Littlefield.

Hawkins, Gay (2011) 'The politics of bottled water: assembling bottled water as brand, waste and oil', in Tony Bennett & Chris Healy (eds.), *Assembling culture*. London: Routledge, pp. 177-189.

Hawkins, Gay (2014) 'Review of Noortje Marres, Material Participation – Technology, the Environment and Everyday Publics and Andrew Barry Material Politics – Disputes along the Pipeline', *Contemporary Political Theory*, 14, pp. e39–e49.

Heidegger, Martin (1971) 'The Thing', *Poetry, Language, Thought* (trans. By Albert Hofstadter). New York: HarperCollins Publishers, pp. 174-82.

Henare Amiria; Holbraad, Martin & Wastell, Sari (2007) *Thinking Through Things: Theorising Artefacts Ethnographically.* London: Routledge.

Hennion A (2001) 'Music lovers: Taste as performance'. *Theory, Culture & Society* 18(5), pp. 1–22.

Hennion, Antoine (2012) 'Attachments: A Pragmatist View Of What Holds

Us', Paper presented at the *First European Pragmatism Conference,* held 19-21 September 2012 in Rome.

Herndl, Carl G. & Graham, Scott (2015) 'Getting over Incommensurability: Latour, New Materialisms, and the Rhetoric of Diplomacy', In: Paul Lynch & Nathaniel Rivers (eds.) *Thinking with Bruno Latour: in Rhetoric and Composition.* Carbondale: Southern Illinois University Press, pp. 40-59.

Herz, Thomas & Schwab-Trapp, Michael (1997) *Umkämpfte Vergangenheit. Diskurse über den Nationalsozialismus seit 1945.* Opladen: Westdeutscher Verlag.

Herzfeld, Michael (1997) *Cultural Intimacy: social poetics in the nation-state.* New York and London: Routledge.

Hildreth, R. W. (2009) 'Reconstructing Dewey on Power', *Political Theory 37(6),* pp. 780–807.

Hinchliffe, Steve (1996) 'Helping the earth begins at home', *Global Environmental Change, 6,* pp. 53- 62.

Hobson, Kersty (2006) 'Bins, bulbs and shower timers: On the techno-ethics of sustainable living', *Ethics, Place and Environment, 9*, pp. 335-54.

Holbraad, Martin; Pedersen, Morten Axel & de Castro, Eduardo Viveiros (2014) 'The politics of ontology: anthropological positions. Theorizing the Contemporary', *Cultural Anthropology website,* January 13, 2014. Available online: http://culanth.org/fieldsights/462-the-politics-of-ontology-anthropological-positions (Accessed 15 January 2015).

Holden, Meg; Scerri, Andy & Owens, Cameron (2013) 'More Publics, More Problems: The Productive Interface between the Pragmatic Sociology of Critique and Deweyan Pragmatism', *Contemporary Pragmatism, 10(2),* pp. 1-25.

Holden, Meg & Scerri, Andy (2014) 'Justification, compromise and test: developing a pragmatic theory of critique to understand the outcomes of urban redevelopment', *Planning Theory*, pp. 1-24.

Honneth, Axel (2010) Dissolutions of the Social: On the Social Theory of LucBoltanski and Laurent Thévenot, *Constellations*, 17(3), pp. 376-389.

Hornberger, Julia (2004) "My police — your police": the informal privatisation of the police in the inner city of Johannesburg', *African Studies, 63(2)*, pp. 213-230.

Hornberger, Julia (2013) 'From General to Commissioner to General—On the Popular State of Policing in South Africa', *Law & Social Inquiry, 38(3),* pp. 598–

614.

HSRC (2014) 'South African National HIV Prevalence, Incidence and Behaviour Survey, 2012', Cape Town: Human Science Research Council.

Huchzemeyer, Marie (2011) *Cities With "Slums": From Slum Eradication to a Right to the City in Africa.* Cape Town: Juta/University of Cape Town Press.

Hunter, Mark (2002) 'The Materiality of Everyday Sex: thinking beyond 'prostitution'', *African Studies, 61(1)*, pp. 99 – 120.

Hunter, Mark (2004) 'Masculinities, Multiple-sexual-partners, and AIDS: The Making and Unmaking of Isoka in KwaZulu-Natal' *Transformation, 54*, pp. 123–53.

Hunter, Mark (2010) *Love in the time of AIDS: Inequality, Gender, and Rights in South Africa*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Ingold, Tim (2014) 'That's enough about ethnography!', *Journal of Ethnographic Theory*, 4 (1), pp. 383–395.

James, Deborah (2011) 'The return of the broker: consensus, hierarchy, and choice in South African land reform', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute 17(2)*, pp. 318-338.

Jensen, Casper Bruun (2014) 'Continuous Variations: The Conceptual and the Empirical in STS', *Science, Technology, & Human Values, 39(2)*, pp. 192-213.

Jensen, Casper Bruun & Morita, Atsuro (2015) 'Infrastructures as Ontological Experiments', *Engaging Science, Technology, and Society, 1*, pp. 81-87.

Jensen, Casper Bruun & Rödje, Kjetil (eds.) (2010) *Deleuzian Intersections: Science, Technology, Anthropology*. New York: Berghahn.

Joerges, Bernward (1999) 'Do Politics Have Artefacts?' *Social Studies of Science 29 (3)*, pp. 411-431.

Johnson, Nuala (1995) 'Cast in Stone: Monuments, Geography, and Nationalism'. *Environment and Planning, Society and Space, 13*, pp. 51–65.

Johnson, Mark R. (2013) 'Material Participation: Technology, the Environment and Everyday Publics', *Information, Communication & Society, 16(6)*, pp. 1012-1016.

Kaarsholm, Preben (2009) 'Culture as Cure: Civil Society and Moral Debates in KwaZulu-Natal after Apartheid' In: Preben Kaarsholm & Isabel Hofmeyr

(eds.). *The Popular and the Public: Cultural Debates and Struggles over Public Space in Modern India, Africa and Europe*, London: Seagull Books, pp. 141-158.

Kenneth, Allan (2006) 'Organizing Ordinary Life: Harold Garfinkel (1917-)' In: *Contemporary Social and Sociological Theory*. Thousand Oaks, CA: Pine Forge Press, pp. 49-71

Khan, Sultan; Lootvoet, Benoit & Vawda, Shahid (2006a) 'Transcending traditional forms of governance: prospects for co-operative governance and service delivery in Durban's tribal authority areas', *Transformation 62*, pp. 84-117.

Khan, Sultan; Lootvoet, Benoit & Mantzaris, Evangelos (2006b) 'The Clash between Traditional and Modern Systems of Governance in the Durban Metropolis – A Tale of two Adminsitrative Civilisations', *Alternation, 13(2)*, pp. 174-197.

Klute, Georg; Macamo, Elísio & Trotha, Trutz von (2010) *African Political Cultures: A Comparative Study in Guinea Bissau, Libya, South Africa and Zambia*, DFG Project Proposal.

Klute, Georg & Trotha, Trutz von (2004) 'Roads to Peace: From Small War to Parasovereign Peace in the North of Mali', In: Marie-Claire Foblets & Trutz von Trotha (eds.), *Healing the Wounds. Essays on the Reconstruction of Societies after War*. Oxford & Portland: Hart, pp. 109-143.

Knorr-Cetina, Karin D. (1993) 'Anthropologie und Ethnomethodologie: Eine theoretische und methodische Herausforderung'. In Wolfdietrich Schmied-Kowarzk & Justin Stagl (Hrsg.), *Grundfragen der Ethnologie: Beiträge zur gegenwärtigen Theorie-Diskussion*. Berlin: Reimer, pp.167–183.

Knox, Hannah (2015) 'Material Participation: Technology, The Environment and Everyday Publics Noortje Marres, Basingstoke, Palgrave Macmillan, 2nd Edition 2015, £29.99, 211pp.', *The Sociological Review, 63*, pp. 947–950.

Kohn, Eduardo (2015) 'Anthropology of Ontologies', *Annual Review of Anthropology,* 44, pp. 311–27.

Koopman, Adrian (2012) 'The Post-colonial Identity of Durban', In: Botolv Helleland; Christian-Emil Ore & Solveig Wikstrøm (eds.) *Names and Identities, Oslo Studies in Language 4(2)*, pp.133–159.

Kovats-Bernat, Christopher J., (2002) 'Negotiating Dangerous Fields: Pragmatic Strategies For Fieldwork Amid Violence And Terror', *American Anthropologist 104 (1)*, pp. 208-222.

Krämer, Mario (2016) 'Neither despotic nor civiil: the legitimacy of chieftaincy in its relationship with the ANC and the state in KwaZulu-Natal (South Africa)', *The Journal of Modern African Studies, 54(1)*, pp. 117 -143.

Krige, Eileen J. (1950 [1936]) *The social system of the Zulus*. Pietermaritzburg: Shuter & Shooter.

Kros, Cynthia (2015) 'Rhodes must fall: archives and counter archives', *Critical Arts, 29(1)*, pp. 150-165.

Kynoch, Gary (2005) 'Reassessing Trasition Violence: Voices From South Africa's Township Wars, 1990-4', *African Affairs, 112/447*, pp. 283–303.

Kynoch, Gary (2013) 'Reassessing Transition Violence: Voices from South Africa's Township Wars, 1990-4', *African Affairs, 112/447*, pp. 283–303.

Lagarde, Emmanuel; Taljaard, Dirk; Puren, Adrian & Auvert, Bertran (2009) 'High rate of adverse events following circumcision of young male adults with the Tara KLamp technique: a randomised trial in South Africa', *South African Medical Journal, 99(3)*, pp. 163-169.

Laidlaw, James (2012) 'Ontologically Challenged. Anthropology of This Century', Vol. 4, London, May 2012. Available online: http://aotcpress.com/articles/ontologically-challenged/(Accessed 1 January 2016).

Lamla, Jörn (2013) 'Arenen des demokratischen Experimentalismus. Zur Konvergenz von nordamerikanischem und französischem Pragmatismus', *Berliner Journal für Soziologie, 23*, pp. 345–365.

Lamla, Jörn (2016) 'Sammelbesprechung: Repression, Konstitution und Transformation: Das Politische als Neuversammlung gesellschaftlicher Macht', *Soziologische Revue 2016; 39(1),* pp. 41–59.

Landau, Loren B. & Misago, Jean Pierre (2009) 'Who to Blame and What's to Gain? Reflections on Space, State, and Violence in Kenya and South Africa', *Africa Spectrum, 44 (1),* pp. 99-110.

Langford, Malcolm, Ben Cousins, Jackie Dugard &Tshepo Madlingozi (eds.) (2013) *Socio-Economic Rights in South Africa: Symbols or Substance?* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Larkin, Brian (2008) *Signal and Noise: Media, Infrastructure, and Urban Culture in Nigeria.* Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Larkin, Brian (2013) 'The Politics and Poetics of Infrastructure', *Annual Review*

of Anthropology, 42, pp. 327–43.

Lash, Scott & Celia Lury (2007) *Global Culture Industry: The Mediation of Things.* London: Polity Press.

Latour, Bruno (1992) 'Where are the Missing Masses? The Sociology of a Few Mundane Artifacts', In: Wiebe. E Bijker & John Law. (eds.) *Shaping Technology/Building Society. Studies in Sociotechnical Change*, Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, pp. 225–58.

Latour, Bruno (1993) *We have never been modern* (Trans. Catherine Porter). Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press.

Latour, Bruno (1996) *Aramis, Or, The Love of Technology*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Latour, Bruno (1999a) *Pandora's Hope. Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Latour, Bruno (1999b), "Science's blood flow: an example from Joliot's scientific intelligence", In: Bruno Latour (Ed.), *Pandora's Hope: Essays on the Reality of Science Studies*. Cambridge, MA Harvard University Press.

Latour, Bruno (2000) 'Factures/fractures. De la notion de réseau à celle d'attachement. Ce qui nous relie', In: André Micoud and Michel Peroni (eds) *La Tour d'Aigues*, pp. 189–208.

Latour, Bruno (2004a) *Politics of Nature. How to Bring the Sciences into Democracy*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press.

Latour, Bruno (2004b) 'How to Talk About the Body? The Normative Dimension of Science Studies', *Body & Society 10 (2-3)*, pp. 205–229.

Latour, Bruno (2004c) 'Why has critique run out of steam? From Matters of Fact to Matters of Concern', *Critical Inquiry, 30(2)*, pp. 225-248.

Latour, Bruno (2004d) 'From 'matters of facts' to 'states of affairs'. Which protocol for the new collective experiments?' English version of: "Von 'Tatsachen' zu 'Sachverhalten': Wie sollen die neuen kollektiven Experimente protokolliert werden?' (transl. by Gustav Roßler) In: Henning Schmidgen, Peter Geimer and Sven Dierig (eds.), *Kultur im Experiment*, Berlin: Kadmos Verlag, 2004, pp.17- 36. (Page numbers cited refer to english version. Availble online: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/node/372).

Latour, Bruno (2005a) 'From realpolitik to dingpolitik or how to make things

public', In: Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel (eds.) *Making things public*. Cambridge. MA: MIT Press, pp. 14-43.

Latour, Bruno (2005b) *Reassembling the Social: An Introduction to Actor-Network-Theory.* Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Latour, Bruno (2005c) 'Critical Distance or Critical Proximity', Unpublished manuscript. Available at: http://www.bruno-latour.fr/sites/default/files/P-113-HARAWAY. pdf. (Accessed March 31, 2015).

Latour, Bruno (2007) 'Turning Around Politics. A Note on Gerard de Vries' Paper', *Social Studies of Science, 37(5)*, pp. 811-820.

Latour, Bruno & Weibel, Peter (eds.) *Making things public*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.

Latour, Bruno & Woolgar, Steve (1986) [1979] *Laboratory life: the construction of scientific facts*. Princeton, New Jersey: Princeton University Press.

Law, John (2002) *Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience, Durham: Duke University press.*

Leach, Edmund (1961) *Rethinking Anthropology*. London: Robert Cunningham and Sons Ltd.

Leclerc-Madlala, Suzanne (2001) 'Virginity testing: managing sexuality in a maturing HIV/aids epidemic', *Medical Anthropology Quarterly, 15(4)*, pp. 533 - 352.

Leggett, Ted (2006) 'The State of Crime and Policing'. In: Sakhela Buhlungu, John Daniel, Roger Southall, Jessica Lutchman (eds.) *State of the Nation: South Africa 2005–2006*. Pretoria: HSRC Press, pp. 144–76.

Lentz, Carola (1998) 'The Chief, the Mine Captain and the Politician: Legitimating Power in Northern Ghana', *Africa: Journal of the International African Institute, 68(1)*, pp. 46-67.

Lentz, Carola (2013) *Land, Mobility, and Belonging in West Africa: Natives and Strangers*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Lezaun, Javier (2011) 'Offshore democracy: launch and landfall of a socio-technical experiment', *Economy and Society, 40(4),* pp. 553-581

Lippmann, Walter (1997 (1922)) *Public Opinion*. New York: Free Press Paperbacks, Simon & Schuster.

Lippmann, Walter (2002 (1927)) *The Phantom Public*. New Brunswick and London: Transaction Publishers.

Lockhurst, Robert (2006) 'Bruno Latour's Scientifiction: Networks, Assemblages, and Tangled Objects', *Science Fiction Studies, 33(1)*, pp. 4-17.

Lodato, Thomas James & DiSalvo, Carl (2016) 'Issue-oriented hackathons as material participation', *New Media & Society*, pp. 1–19.

Low, Murray, Ballard, Richard and Maharaj, Brij (2007) 'Dilemmas of Representation in Post-Apartheid Durban', Urba*n Forum, 18*, pp. 247–264.

Lukes, Steven (2005 (1974)) *Power: A Radical View,* 2nd Edition. London: Palgrave Macmillan.

Lund, Christian (1998) 'Struggles for Land and Political Power: On the Politicization of Land Tenure and Disputes in Niger', *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 30(40)*, pp. 1-22.

Lury, Celia & Marres, Noortje (2015) 'Notes on Objectual Valuation', In: Martin Kornberger; Lise Justessen; Anders Koed Madsen & Jan Mouritsen (eds) *Making Things Valuable*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 232-257.

MacGilvroy, Eric (2010) 'Dewey's Public', *Contemporary Pragmatism, 7(1)*, pp. 31–47.

Mains, Daniel (2012) 'Blackouts and Progress: Privatization, Infrastructure, and a Developmentalist State in Jimma, Ethiopia', *Cultural Anthropology 27(1),* pp. 3–27.

Mamdani, Mahmood (1996) *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism*, Princeton Studies in Culture/Power/History. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Mamdani, Mahmood (1999) 'Commendaty. Mahmood Mamdani responds to Jean Copan's Review in Transformation 36', *Transformation 39 (2)*, pp. 173-96.

Marchart, Oliver (2007) *Post-Foundational Political Thought. Political Difference in Nancy, Lefort, Badiou and Laclau*. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press.

Marcus, George (2009) 'Introduction: Notes toward an ethnographic memoir of supervising graduate research through Anthropology's decades of transformation', In: Faubion, James D & George Marcus (Eds) *Fieldwork Is Not What It Used to Be: Learning Anthropology's Method in a Time of Transition*. Ithaka: Cornell University Press, pp. 1-32

Marcus, Tessa S. (2008) 'Virginity Testing: A Backward-looking Response to Sexual Regulation in the HIV/AIDS crisis' In: Benedict Carton; John Laband & Jabulani Sithole (eds.) *Zulu Identities: Being Zulu, Past and Present*. London: Hurst & Company.

Maré, Gerhard (1992) *Brothers Born of Warrior Blood: Politics and Ethnicity in South Africa Press*. London: Zed Press.

Maré, Gerhard & Hamilton, Georgina (1987) *An Appetite for Power: Buthelezi's Inkatha and South Africa*. Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Maré, Gerhard (2000) 'Race, Democracy and Opposition in South African Politics: As Other a Way as Possible', In: *Opposition in South Africa's New Democracy*. Johannesburg: Konrad Adenauer Stiftung, pp. 179-191.

Marais, Hein (2001) *South Africa Limits to Change: The Political Economy of Transition*, 2nd edition. London: Zed Books.

Marres, Noortje (2004) 'Tracing the trajectories of issues, and their democratic deficits, on the Web   The case of the Development Gateway and its doubles', *Information Technology & People, 17(2)*, pp. 124-149.

Marres, Noortje (2005a) *No issue, no public: Democratic deficits after the displacement of politics*. PhD diss., University of Amsterdam.

Marres, Noortje (2005b) 'Issues spark a public into being: A key but often forgotten point of the Lippmann-Dewey debate', In: Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel (eds.) *Making things public*. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 208-217.

Marres, Noortje (2006) 'Net-Work Is Format Work: Issue Networks and the Sites of Civil Society Politics', *Reformatting Politics: Networked Communications and Global Civil Society*, Jodi Dean, John Asherson, Geert Lovink (eds.), Routledge, 2006. Available online: http://govcom.org/publications/full_list/Marres_06_format_work.pdf (Accessed 1 Juni 2015) (Page numbers refer to online version).

Marres, Noortje (2007) 'The issues deserve more credit: Pragmatist contributions to the study of public involvement in controversy', *Social Studies of Science, 37/5*, pp. 759-780.

Marres, Noortje (2010a) 'Front-staging Nonhumans: Publicity as a Constraint on the Political Activity of Things', In: Bruce Braun & Sarah J. Whatmore (eds.), *Political matter: Technoscience, democracy and public life*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 177-211.

Marres, Noortje, (2010b) 'Front-staging Nonhumans: Publicity as a Constraint on the Political Activity of Things', *Goldsmiths Reseach Online*, pp. 1-40. Available online at: https://research.gold.ac.uk/6229/1/Marres_frontstaging_nonhumans.pdf (Accessed 10 Juni 2014). Later published In: Bruce Braun & Sarah J. Whatmore (eds.), *Political matter: Technoscience, democracy and public life*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 177-211.

Marres, Noortje (2012a) *Material participation: Technology, the Environment and Everyday Objects*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

Marres, Noortje (2012c) 'The Redistribution of Methods: On Intervention in Digital Social Research, Broadly Conceived', *The Sociological Review, 60 (S1),* pp. 139-65.

Marres, Noortje (2013) 'Why political ontology must be experimentalized: On eco-show homes as devices of participation, *Social Studies of Science, 43(3)*, pp. 417–443.

Marres, Noortje (2014) 'The Environmental Teapot and Other Loaded Household Objects: Re-connecting the Politics of Technology, Issues and Things', In: Penelope Harvey; Eleanor Casella; Gillian Evans; Hannah Knox; Christine McLean; Elizabeth Silva; Nick Thoburn & and Kath Woodward (eds.) *Objects and Materials: A Routledge Companion.* London: Routledge, pp. 260 – 272.

Marres, Noortje (2015) 'Why Map Issues? On Controversy Analysis as a Digital Method', *Science, Technology, & Human Values, 26*, pp. 1-32.

Marres, Noortje (2013) 'Who is afraid of the green cloud: on the environmental rendering of controversy', CSISP: Working Paper Nr. 2, Goldsmiths, University of London, pp. 1-25. Available online: http://www.gold.ac.uk/media/migrated/media/goldsmiths/departments/researchcentres/centreforthestudyofinventionandsocialprocesscsisp/pdf/workingpapers/Marres_NuageVert_Controversy_analysis-copy.pdf (Accessed 1 June 2014).

Marres, Noortje & Lezaun, Javier (2011) 'Materials and devices of the public: an introduction', *Economy and Society, 40(1)*, pp. 489-509.

Marres, Noortje & Rogers, Richard (2000) 'Depluralising the Web and Repluralising Public Debate: The Case of the GM Food Debate on the Web', In: Richard Rogers (Ed.) *Preferred Placement: Knowledge Politics on the Web*, Maastricht: Jan van Eyck Editions, pp. 113-35.

Marres, Noortje & Rogers, Richard (2005) 'Recipe for tracing the fate of issues

and theirpublics on the web'. In Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel (eds.) *Making things public.* Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, pp. 922-33.

Marres, Noortje & Rogers, Richard (2009) 'Subsuming the Ground: How Local Realities of the Fergana Valley, the Narmada Dams and the BTC Pipeline Are Put to Use on the Web', *Economy and Society 37 (2),* pp. 251-81.

Marschall, Sabine (2003) 'Gestures of Compensation: Post-Apartheid Monuments and Memorials', *Transformation, 55,* pp. 78-95.

Marschall, Sabine (2006) 'Commemorating 'Struggle Heroes': Constructing a Genealogy for the New South Africa', *International Journal of Heritage Studies, 12 (2),* pp. 176-193.

Marschall, Sabine (2009) *Landscape of Memory: Commemorative Monuments, Memorials and Public Statuary in Post-Apartheid South Africa.* Leiden: Brill.

Marschall, Sabine (2010) 'Articulating Cultural Pluralism through Public Art as Heritage in South Africa', *Visual Anthropology, 23,* pp. 77-97.

Marschall, Sabine (2012) 'Memory and Identity in South Africa: Contradictions and Ambiguities in the Process of Post-apartheid Memoralization', *Visual Anthropology, 25,* pp. 189- 204.

Mattern, Mark (1999) 'John Dewey, art and public life', *Journal of Politics, 61(1),* pp. 54-75.

Mbembe, Achille (2004) 'Aesthetics of superfluity', *Public Culture, 16(3),* pp. 373–405.

Mbembe, Achille (2015) 'Decolonizing knowledge and the question of the archive'. Available online: http://wiser.wits.ac.za/system/files/AchilleMbembe-DecolonizingKnowledgeandtheQuestionoftheArchive.pdf (Accessed 1 Januar 2016).

McGar, Paul (2015) 'The Viceroys are Disappearing from the Roundabouts in Delhi': British symbols of power in post-colonial India', *Modern Asian Studies, 49(3),* pp 787 – 831.

McInerney, Paul-Brian (2014) Review of 'Material Participation: Technology, the Envir- onment and Everyday Publics, by Noortje Marres', *Contemporary Sociology 43(5),* pp. 716-718.

Millard, Peter S. (2012) 'Circumcision – what's wrong with plastic rings?', *The South African Medical Journal, 102(3),* pp. 126-128.

Mills, C. Wright (1963) *Sociology and Pragmatism.* New York: Oxford University Press.

Minty, Zyad (2006) 'Post-apartheid Public Art in Cape Town: Symbolic Reparations and Public Space', *Urban Studies, 43(2),* pp. 421-440.

Moats, David (2014) 'The Issue of Politics: A Report on Bruno Latour's Politics Workshop'. Report published 13 February 2014. Available online at: http://modesofexistence.org/the-issue-of-politics-a-report-on-bruno-latour's-politics-workshop/(Accessed 10. August 2015).

Mody, Cyrus C. M. (2004) Reviewed work(s): Aircraft Stories: Decentering the Object in Technoscience by John Law, *Contemporary Sociology*, 33(1), pp. 116-117.

Mol, Annemarie (2002) *The Body Multiple: Ontology in Medical Practice*. Durham, NC: Duke University Press.

Mol, Annemarie & Messman, Jessica (1996) 'Neonatal Blood and the Politics fo Theory: Some Questions of Method', *Social Studies of Science, 26*, pp. 419-44.

Moletsane, Relebohile (2011) 'Culture, Nostalgia, and Sexuality Education' In Claudia Mitchell, Tersa Strong-Wilson, Kathleen Pithouse & Susann Allnutt (eds.) *Memory and Pedagogy*, New York: Routledge, pp. 193–208.

Molotch, Harvey L. (2003) *Where Stuff Comes From: How Toasters, Toilets, Computers, and Many Other Things Come to Be as They Are.* New York, NY: Routledge.

Mosse, George L. (1988) *Nationalism and Sexuality: middle-class morality and sexual norms in modern Europe.* Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.

Mosse, David (2010) 'A Relational Approach to Durable Poverty, Inequality and Power', *The Journal of Development Studies, 46(7),* pp. 1156-1178.

Mosse, David & Lewis, David (eds.) (2006) *Development brokers and translators*. Bloomfield: Kumarian.

Musil, Robert (1987) 'Monuments', In Peter Wortsman (translator) *Posthumous Papers of a Living Author*. Hygiene, Colorado: Eridanos Press.

Mutabazi, Vincent; Forrest, Jamie I.; Ford, Nathan & Mills, Edward J. (2014) 'How do you circumcise a nation? The Rwandan case study', *BMC Medicine*, 12, 184, pp. 1-4.

Nadkarni, Maya (2007) 'The death of socialism and the afterlife of its monuments: making and marketing the past in Budapest's Statue Park Museum', In: Katharine Hodgkin & Susannah Radstone (eds.) *Memory, History, Nation: Contested Pasts,* London: Transaction Publishers, pp. 193 -208.

Naidu, Ereshnee (2005) 'Memorialisation: a fractured opportunity'. Centre for the Study of Violence and Reconciliation, Johannesburg. Availble online: http:// www.csvr.org.za/papers/papnaid2.htm (Accessed 1 Juni 2012).

Noiriel, Gerard (1992) *La tyrannie du national. Le droit d'asile en Europe 1793-1993,* Paris: Calmann-Lévy.

Ntzebeza, Lungisile (2004) 'Democratic decentralisation and traditional authority: Dilemmas of land administration in rural South Africa', *The European Journal of Development Research, 16(1),* pp. 71-89.

Ntsebeza, Lungisile (2005) *Democracy Compromised: chiefs and the politics of the land in South Africa.* Leiden: Brill.

Ntzebeza, Lungisile & Hall, Ruth (eds.) (2007) *The Land Question in South Africa: The challenge of transformation and redistribution.* Cape Town: HSRC Press.

Nuttal, Sarah & Coetzee, Carli (1998) (eds.) *Negotiating the Past: The Making of Memory in South Africa.* Cape Town: Oxford University Press.

Oenen, Gijs van (2012) 'Participation as if things mattered, Review of Noortje Marres (2012) Material participation. Technology, the environment and everyday publics', *Krisis: Journal for contemporary philosophy, 3,* pp. 98-101.

- Offe, Claus (1977) 'Einleitung', In: Peter Bachrach & Morton S. Baratz, *Macht und Armut. Eine theoretisch-empirische Untersuchung.* (American Original 1970), pp. 7-34.

Ong, Aihwa (1999) *Flexible Citizenship: The Cultural Logics of Transnationality.* Durham, N.C.: Duke University Press.

Oomen, Barbara (2000) *Tradition on the Move: Chiefs, Democracy and Change in Rural South Africa.* Leiden: Netherlands Institute for Southern Africa.

Oomen, Barbara (2005) *Chiefs in South Africa: Law, Culture, and Power in the Post-apartheid era.* New York: Palgrave Macmillan Press.

Paleček, Martin & Risjord, Mark (2013) 'Relativism and the ontological turn within anthropology', *Philosophy of the Social Sciences, 43(1),* pp. 3-23.

Palonen, Emilia (2008) 'The city-text in post-communist Budapest: street

names, memorials, and the politics of commemoration', *GeoJournal, 73,* pp. 219-230.

Pieke, Frank (1995) 'Accidental Anthropology: Witnessing the 1989 Chinese People's Movement', In Robben, Antonius C. G. M. & Carolyn Nordstrom (eds.), *Fieldwork under Fire: Contemporary Studies of Violence and Survival.* Berkeley: University of California Press, pp. 62-79.

Pinch, Trevor J. (1981) 'The Sun-Set: The Presentation of Certainty in Scientific Life', *Social Studies of Science, 11(1),* pp. 131–58.

Piper, Laurence (2002) 'Nationalism without a nation: the rise and fall of Zulu nationalism in South Africa's transition to democracy', *Nations & Nationalism, 8(1),* pp. 73-94.

Poeck, Katrien Van; Goeminne, Gert & Vandenabeele, Joke (2014) 'Revisiting the democratic paradox of environmental and sustainability education: sustainability issues as matters of concern', *Environmental Education Research,* pp. 1-21.

Posel, Deborah (2005) 'Sex, Death and the Nation: Reflections on the Politicization of Sexuality in Post- Apartheid South, *Africa, 75(2),* pp. 125-153.

Prakash Gyan (1999) *Another reason: science and the imagina- tion of modern India.* Princeton: Princeton University Press.

Prasad, Amid (2008) 'Science in motion: what postcolonial science studies can offer', *Electric Journal of Communication, Information & Innovation in Health,* 2(2), pp. 35-47.

Rancière, Jacques (2006) *The Politics of Aesthetics: The Distribution of the Sensible.* London: Continuum.

Rancière, Jacques (2007) *On the Shores of Politics.* Translated by Liz Heron. London: Verso.

Rappaport, Roy A. (1993) 'Distinguished Lecture in General Anthropology: The Anthropology of Trouble', *American Anthropologist*, 95(2), pp. 295-303.

Rassool, Ciraj (2000) 'The rise of heritage and the reconstruction of history in South Africa', *Kronos, No. 26,* pp. 1-21

Riedke, Eva (2015) ''You shouldn't be seen talking to them!' - Accidental frontlines, building trust and coping with danger'', *Civilisations, 64(1&2),* pp. 115-125.

Ritzer, George (2000 (1983)) 'Ethnomethodology', In: *Sociological Theory*, 6th Edition. New York, NY: McGraw-Hill, pp. 371-400.

Robins, Steven (2006) 'From "Rights" to "Ritual": AIDS Activism in South Africa', *American Anthropologist, 108(2)*, pp. 312-323.

Robins, Steven (2008) *From Revolution to Rights in South Africa: Social Movements, NGOs & Popular Politics After Apartheid*. Rochester: Byodell & Brewer.

Robins, Steven (2014) 'The 2011 Toilet Wars in South Africa: Justice and Transition between the Exceptional and the Everyday after Apartheid', *Development and Change 45(3)*, pp. 479–501.

Rodgers, Dennis & O'Neill, Bruce (2012) 'Infrastructural violence: Introduction to the special issue', *Ethnography, 13(4)*, pp. 401–412.

Rogers, Melvin L. (2009) *The Undiscovered Dewey: Religion, Morality and the Ethos of Democracy*, New York: Columbia University Press.

Rogers, Melvin L. (2012) 'Introduction: Revisiting the Public and its Problems', In: Melvin L. Rogers (ed) *The Public and Its Problems: An Essay in Political Inquiry*, Pennsylvania: Pennsylvania State University Press, pp. 1-31.

Rose-Redwood, Reuben; Alderman, Derek & Azaryahu, Maoz (2010) 'Geographies of toponymic inscription: new directions in critical place-name studies', *Progress in Human Geography, 34*, pp. 453–470.

Rottenburg, Richard (2013) 'Ethnologie und Kritik', In: Thomas Bierschenk, Matthias Krings, M. & Carola Lentz (eds) E*thnologie im 21. Jahrhundert*. Berlin: Dietrich Reimer Verlag, pp. 55-77.

Rouveroy van Nieuwaal, E.A.B.v. (1999). 'Chieftaincy in Africa. Three facets of a hybrid role'. IN: Rijk van Dijk & Emile Adriaan Benvenuto van Rouveroy van Nieuwaal (eds.) *African Chieftaincy in a New Socio-political Landscape*. Hamburg: LIT, pp. 21-47

Ryan, Alan (1995) *Dewey and the High Tide of American Liberalism*. New York: W. W. Norton & Co.

Saar, Martin (2012) 'What is political ontology?' Review of: Oliver Marchart (2010) Die politische Differenz. Zum Denken des Politischen bei Nancy, Lefort, Badiou, Laclau und Agamben. Berlin: Suhrkamp, *Krisis: Journal for contemporary philosophy*, Issue 1, pp-79-83.

Saldanha, Arun (2003) 'Actor-Network Theory and Critical Sociology. Review Essay', *Critical Sociology, 29 (3)*, pp. 419 – 432.

Schareika, Nikolaus (2011) 'Subject, Leader, Chief, Commander. Wodaabe Politics between Clan and Communal Structure'. In: Eyolf Jul-Larsen, Pierre-Joseph Laurent, Pierre-Yves Le Meur & Eric Léonard (Eds), *Une anthropologie entre pouvoirs et histoire. Conversations autour de l'œuvre de Jean-Pierre Chauveau*. Paris: Karthala-IRD, pp. 477-508.

Schattscheider, Eric Elmer (1960) *The Semisovereign People: A Realist's View of Democracy in America*, Fort Worth: Harcourt Brace Jovanovich College Publishers.

Schärf, Wilfried (2001) 'Community Justice and Community Policing in Post-Apartheid South Africa', *IDS Bulletin, 32(1)*, pp. 74-82.

Schnitzler, Antina von (2008) 'Citizenship Prepaid: Water, Calculability and Techno-Politics in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies, 34(4)*, pp. 899–917.

Schnitzler, Antina von (2013) 'Traveling Technologies: Infrastructure, Ethical Regimes, and the Materiality of Politics in South Africa', *Cultural Anthropology, 28(4)*, pp. 670–693.

Schudson, Michael (2008) 'The "Lippmann-Dewey Debate" and the   Invention of Walter Lippmann as an Anti-Democrat 1986-1996', *International Journal of Communication, 2*, pp. 1-20.

Scorgie, Fiona (2002) 'Virginity testing and the politics of sexual responsibility: implications for AIDS intervention', *African Studies, 61(1)*, pp. 55-75.

Scorgie, Fiona (2006) 'A battle won? The prohibition of virginity testing in the Children's Bill', *Agenda: Empowering women for gender equity, 20 (68)*, pp. 19-28.

Scott, James C. (1990) *Domination and the Arts of Resistance: Hidden Transcripts*. New Haven, CT: Yale University Press.

Scott, Michael W. (2013) 'The anthropology of ontology (religious science?)', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institue, 19(4)*, pp. 859–72.

Scott, Pam; Richards, Evelleen & Martin, Brian (1990) 'Captives of Controversy: The Myth of the Neutral Social Researcher in Contemporary Scientific Controversies', *Science, Technology, & Human Values, 15 (4)*, pp. 474-494.

Selikow, Terry-Ann; Zulu, Bheki & Cedras, Eugene (2002) 'The ingagara, the

regte and the cherry: HIV / AIDS and youth culture in contemporary urban townships', *Agenda,* 53, pp. 22–32.

Sithole, Pearl & Mbele, Thamsanqa (2008) 'Fifteen Year Review on Traditional Leadership: A Research Paper', *Cato Manor: Democracy and Governance Programme,* Human Sciences Research Council.

Sontag, Susan (2001) *On photography.* New York: Picador.

Southall, Roger (2003) 'Between competing paradigms: post-colonial legitimacy in Lesotho', In: Henning Melber (Ed.) *Limits to Liberation in Southern Africa.* Cape Town: HSRC Press, pp. 115-134.

Slangen, Nathan (2013) 'Uncertainty and Emancipation: a Metacritique of Domination'. Review of: Boltanski, L. (2011) On Critique. A Sociology of Emancipation. Translated by Gregory Elliott. Cambridge: Polity Press, 191 pp., *Krisis: Journal for contemporary philosophy, 3*, pp. 63-66.

Stengers, Isabelle (2005a) 'The cosmopolitical Proposal', In: Bruno Latour & Peter Weibel (eds.) (2005) *Making Things Public*. MIT Press, pp. 994-1003.

Stengers, Isabelle (2005b) 'Deleuze and Guattari's last enigmatic message', *Angelaki 10*, pp. 151–68.

Stengers, Isabelle (2010) 'Including nonhumans in political theory: Opening Pandora's Box?' In: Bruce Braun & Sarah J. Whatmore (eds.) *Political matter: Technoscience, democracy and public life,* Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 3-34.

Stoczkowski, Wiktor (2008) 'The 'fourth aim' of anthropology: Between knowledge and ethics', *Anthropological Theory, 8 (4)*, pp. 345-356.

Stolle, Dietlind; Hooghe, Marc & Micheletti, Michele (2005) 'Politics in the Supermarket: Political Consumerism as a Form of Political Participation', *International Political Science Review, 26(3),* pp. 245-269.

Strandvad, Sara M. (2012) 'Attached by the Product: A Socio-Material Direction in the Sociology of Art', *Cultural Sociology, 6(2), pp.* 163–176.

Strathern, Marilyn   (1988) *The gender of the gift: problems with women and problems with society in Melanesia.* Berkeley: University of California Press.

Strathern, Marilyn (1991) *Partial Connections*. London: Rowan and Littlefield.

Strathern, Marilyn (2004) *Commons and Borderlands: Working Papers on Interdisciplinarity, Accountability and the Flow of Knowledge,* Wantage: Sean

Kingston.

Strauss, Anselm (1978) 'A Social World Perspective', In: Norman Denzin (ed.) *Studies in Symbolic Interaction 1*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 119-28.

Strauss, Anselm (1982) 'Social Worlds and Legitimation Processes', In: Norman Denzin (ed.) *Studies in Symbolic Interaction 4*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 171-90.

Strauss, Anselm (1984) 'Social Worlds and Their Segmentation Processes', In: Norman Denzin (ed.) *Studies in Symbolic Interaction 5*. Greenwich, CT: JAI Press, pp. 123-39.

Strauss, Anselm (1993) *Continual Permutations of Action*. New York: Aldine de Gruyter.

Suchman, Lucy (2007) *Human-Machine Reconfigurations: Plans and Situated Actions.* Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Susen, Simon (2014) 'Is There Such a Thing as a 'Pragmatic Sociology of Critique'? Reflections on Luc Boltanski's 'On Critique'', In: Simon Susen and Bryan S. Turner (eds*.) The Spirit of Luc Boltanski: Essays on the 'Pragmatic Sociology of Critique'*. London: Anthem Press, pp. 173- 211.

Sutherland, Catherine; Hordijk, Michaela; Lewis, Bonang; Meyer, Claudia & Buthelezi, Sibongile (2014) 'Water and sanitation provision in eThekwini Municipality: a spatially differentiated approach', *Environment and Urbanization, 26(2), pp.* 469–488.

Svanström, Yvonne (2006) 'Prostitution in Sweden: debates and policies 1980 – 2004', IN: Geetanjali Gangoli, Nicole Westmarland (Eds) *International approaches to Prostitution: Law and Policy in Europe and Asia*, Bristol: The Policy Press, pp. 67-91.

Tapscott, Chris (2008) 'Intergovernmental Relations in South Africa: The Challenges of Cooperative Government', *Public Administration and Development, 20*, pp. 119- 128.

Taussig, Michael (2004) *My Cocaine Museum*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.

Taylor, Myra; Dlamini, Siyabonga; Sathiparsad, Reshma; Jinabhai, Champaklal & de Vries, Hein (2007) 'Perceptions and attitudes of secondary school students in KwaZulu-Natal towards virginity testing', *Health SA Gesondheid, 12(2),* pp. 27–36.

Thévenot, Laurent (2002). 'Which road to follow? The moral complexity of an ''equipped'' humanity', in: John Law & Annemarie Mol (eds.) *Social Studies of Knowledge Practices.* Durham: Duke University Press, pp. 53–87.

Thévenot, Laurent (2006) *L'Action au pluriel. Sociologie des régines d'engagement.* Paris: La Découverte.

Thévenot, Laurent (2011) 'Power and oppression from the perspective of the sociology of engagements: a comparison with Bourdieu's and Dewey's critical approaches to practical activities', *Irish Journal of Sociology, 19(1),* pp. 35–67.

Thornberry, Elizabeth (2015) 'Virginity Testing, History, and the Nostalgia For Custom in Contemporary South Africa', *African Studies Review, 58 (3),* pp. 129-148.

Thotse, Mahunele (2010) 'Contesting Names and Statues: Battles over the Louis Trichardt/Makhado 'City-text' in Limpopo Province, South Africa', *KRONOS, 36,* pp. 173-183.

Throndsen, William & Ryghaug, Marianne (2015) 'Material participation and the smart grid: Exploring different modes of articulation', *Energy Research & Social Science, 9,* pp. 157-165.

Trotha, Trutz von, (1996) 'From Administrative to Civil Chieftaincy', *The Journal of Legal Pluralism and Unofficial Law, 28(37-38),* pp. 79-107.

Trotha, Trutz von (2000) 'Die Zukunft liegt in Afrika. Vom Zerfall des Staates, von der Vorherrschaft der konzentrischen Ordnung und vom Aufstieg der Parastaatlichkeit'. In: *Leviathan, 28(2),* pp. 253-279.

Trotha, Trutz von (2004) 'In Search of Peace. History, Basic Narrative, the Future of War, and the Rise of the Local. An Introduction with a Short Overview of the Contributions'. In: Marie-Claire Foblets & Trutz von Trotha (eds.) *Healing the Wounds. Essays on the Reconstruction of Societies after War.* Oxford & Portland: Hart Publishing, pp. 1-12.

Trotha, Trutz von (2006) 'History, the 'kalashnikov syndrome' and conflict resolution between the global and the local – some sociological remarks'. In: Hans-Jörg Albrecht; Jan-Michael Simon; Hassan Rezaei; Holger Rohne & Ernesto Kiza (eds.), *Conflicts and Conflict Resolution in Middle Eastern Societies – Between Tradition and Modernity.* Schriftenreihe des Max-Planck-Instituts für ausländisches und internationales Strafrecht, Interdisziplinäre Forschungen aus Strafrecht und Kriminologie, I, 13. Berlin (Duncker-Humblot), pp. 13-23.

Tsouvalis, Judith (2016) 'Latour's object-orientated politics for a post-political age', *Global Discourse, 6 (1-2),* pp. 26-39.

Vainio, Annukka (2012) 'Beyond research ethics: anonymity as 'ontology', 'analysis' and 'independence', *Qualitative Research*, 13(6), pp. 685-698.

Venturini, Tommaso (2010) 'Diving in magma: how to explore controversies with actor-network theory', *Public Understanding of Science, 19(3)*, pp. 258–273.

Verbeek, Peter-Paul (2006) 'Materializing Morality: Design Ethics and Technological Mediation', *Science Technology Human Values* 31(3), pp. 361-380.

Vincent, Louise (2006) 'Virginity testing in South Africa: re-traditioning the postcolony', *Culture, Health and Sexuality, 8(1)*, pp. 17-30.

Waetjen, Thembisa & Maré, Gerhard (2008) 'Tradition's desire: The politics of culture in the rape trial of Jacob Zuma', *Association Concerned Africa Scholars, Bulletin No. 84*, pp. 56-61.

Wagner, Peter (1994) 'Dispute, Uncertainty and Institution in Recent French Debates', *The Journal of Political Philosophy, 2(3)*, pp. 270-289.

Wagner, Peter (2001) *A History and Theory of the Social Sciences: Not All That Is Solid Melts*. London: Sage Publications.

Wakashe, Themba (1994) ‚South Africa's Heritage Needs to be Democratized', *Restorica, 28*, pp. 35–36.

Ward, Matt & Wilkie, Alex (2009) 'Made in Criticalland: Designing Matters of Concern', In: *Networks of design: Proceedings of the 2008 annual international conference of the design history society*, Cornwall, UK, 3–6 September 2008. Boca Raton, FL: Universal Publishers, pp. 118–123.

Whatmore, Sarah J. (2009) 'Mapping knowledge controversies: science, democracy and the redistribution of expertise', *Progress in Human Geography 33(5)*, pp. 587–598.

Whatmore, Sarah J. (2013) 'Political Ecology in a More-than-Human World: Rethinking 'Natural' Hazards' In: Kirsten Hastrup (ed.) *Anthropology and Nature*, New York: Routledge, pp. 79-96.

Whatmore, Sarah .J. & Landström, Catharina (2011) 'Flood apprentices: an exercise in making things public', *Economy and Society*, 40(4), pp. 582-610.

Whipple, Mark (2005) 'The Dewey-Lippmann Debate Today: Communication Distortions, Reflective Agency, and Participatory Democracy', *Sociological Theory 23(2)*, pp. 156-178.

White, Stephen K. (2004) 'The Very Idea of a Critical Social Science: A Pragmatist Turn', In: Fred Rush (Ed.) *Cambridge Companion to Critical Theory*, ed. Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, pp. 310-336.

Wickström, Anette (2010) 'Virginity testing as a local public health initiative: a 'preventive ritual' more than a 'diagnostic measure'', *Journal of the Royal Anthropological Institute, No. 16*, pp. 532-550.

Williams, Michael J. (2004) 'Leading from Behind: Democratic Consolidation and the Chieftaincy in South Africa', *Journal of Modern African Studies, 42(1)*, pp. 113-36.

Williams, Michael J. (2009) 'Legislating 'Tradition' in South Africa', *Journal of Southern African Studies, 35(1)*, pp. 191-209.

Williams, Michael J. (2010) *Chieftaincy, the state, and democracy: political legitimacy in post-apartheid South Africa*, Bloomington: Indiana University Press.

Winner, Langdon (1985) 'Do Artifacts Have Politics?' In: Donald MacKenzie & Judy Wacjman (eds), *The Social Shaping of Technology*. Philadelphia, PA: The Open University Press, pp. 26-38.

Witz, Leslie; Rassool, Ciraj & Minkley, Gary (2001) 'Repackaging the past for South African Tourism', *Daedalus, 130(1), pp.* 277-296.

Wolin, Sheldon (1996) 'Fugitive Democracy', In: S. Benhabib (Ed.) *Democracy and Difference: Contesting Boundaries of the Political*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, pp. 31–45.

Wolin, Sheldon (2004 [1960]). *Politics and vision: Continuity and innovation in Western political thought*. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Woolgar, Steve (1981) 'Interests and Explanation in the Social Study of Science', *Social Studies of Science, 11(3)*, pp. 365-94.

Woolgar, Steve & Geoff Cooper (1999) 'Do Artefacts Have Ambivalence? Moses' Bridges, Winner's Bridges and Other Urban Legends in STS', *Social Studies of Science, 29(3)*, pp. 433-449.

Woolgar, Steve & Lezaun, Javier (2013) 'The Wrong Bin Bag: A Turn to Ontology in Science and Technology Studies', *Social Studies of Science 43(3)*, pp. 321-40.

Wyatt, Sally, and Brian Balmer (2007) ''Home on the Range: What and Where Is the Middle in Science and Technology Studies?'', *Science, Technology, & Human Values 32 (6)*, pp. 619-26.

Wynne, Brian (1992) 'Misunderstood Misunderstanding: Social Identities and Public Uptake of Science', *Public Understanding of Science*, 1, pp. 281–304.
Wynne, Brian (2005) 'Risk as Globalizing 'Democratic' Discourse? Framing Subjects and Citizens', in: M. Leach, I. Scoones & B. Wynne (eds), *Science and Citizens: Globalization and the Challenge of Engagement*. London: Zed Books, pp. 66–82.

Yeoh, Brenda S. A. (1996) 'Street-naming and nation-building: toponymic inscriptions of nationhood in Singapore, *Area, 28,* pp. 298-307.

Press Statements/Newspaper Articles/Other

Aberdeen, Zainul (2013) 'Elephant waiting to rise again', <u>Daily News</u>, 24 May 2013. Available online: <u>http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/elephant-waiting-to-rise-again-1521637</u> (Accessed 24 Juni 2014).

ARCA Blog (2011) '"The Three Elephants" are Fighting For Survival in Court: Moral Rights Through the Prism of the South African Constitution', *Association for Research into Crimes Against Art (ARCA),* 27 September 2011. Available online: <u>http://art-crime.blogspot.de/2011/09/three-elephants-are-fighting-for.html</u> (Accessed 24 Juni 2015).

Ardé, Greg (2010a) 'Get rid of these elephants!', *The Sunday Tribune*, 14 February 2010. Available online: <u>http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/get-rid-of-these-elephants-473464</u> (Accessed 30 April 2015).

Ardé, Greg (2010b) 'Elephant whispering gets louder', *Sunday Tribune*. 21 February 2010.

Attwood, Vivian & Hlongwane, Agiza (2011) 'King Shaka statue controversy deepens', *The Sunday Tribune,* 4 September 2011. Available online: <u>http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/king-shaka-statue-controversy-deepens-1130887 </u>(Accessed 3 April 2015).

Bester, Junior (2015) 'Protesters throw poo on Rhodes statue', *Cape Argus*, 10 March 2015. Available online: <u>http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/western-cape/protesters-throw-poo-on-rhodes-statue-1829526</u> (Accessed 30 April 2015).

Broughton, Tania & Khumalo, Sipho (2010) 'Jumbo art a white elephant', *Mercury*, 15 February 2010. Available online: <u>http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/jumbo-art-a-white-elephant-473501</u> (Accessed 30 April 2015).

Buthelezi, Mangosuthu (2012) 'Address at the Freedom Day Celebrations 2012 by MP Prince Mangosuthu Buthelezi, Ladysmith; Settlers' Park Stadium', 27 April 2012. Available online: http://www.ifp.org.za/Speeches/270412sp.htm (Accessed 10 April 2015).

Casapietra, Tiziana (2016) Interview with Andries Botha 'Creativity is an integral part of democracy and must be protected' (Interview Transcript). *Radicate.eu*. Published online 19 February 2016. Available online: http://www.radicate.eu/andries-botha/ (Accessed 30 April 2016).

Catalogue (1991) '*Andries Botha', Standard Bank Young Artist Award*. Articles: Elizabeth Rankin 'Genesis Genesis'; Adam Small 'Between Bad and Happy Endings: A Quite Personal Impression of Andries Botha at Work'; Marilyn Martin 'Ons sit oorgehal in die geskiedenis'; Dr Carol Becker 'Imaginative Geography'. Grahamstown, National Festival of Arts.

Chapman, Samora (2010) 'Bloody Elephants', *Mahala*, 4 Juni 2012. Available online: http://www.mahala.co.za/art/bloody-elephants/(Accessed 30 April 2016).

Chaudhuri, Amit (2015) 'The real meaning of Rhodes Must Fall', *The Guardian*, 16 March 2016. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/uk-news/2016/mar/16/the-real-meaning-of-rhodes-must-fall (Accessed 16 April 2016).

Coppen, Neil (2010) 'The Great Elephant Debacle: A Hijacked Species', *DurbanLive*. Available online: http://www.durbanlive.com/live/kultcha_view.jsp?kultcha_id=17325 (Accessed 30 April 2016).

Corrigall, Mary (2016) Temporary monuments for a society in transition, *Mail & Guardian*, 20 January 2016. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2016-01-20-temporary-monuments-for-a-society-in-transition/ (Accessed 1 February 2016).

Davis, Rebecca (2011) 'Did the King get a car for choosing the Klamp?', *Daily Maverick*, 14 October 2011. Available online: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2011-10-14-did-the-king-get-a-car-for-choosing-the-klamp/#.V0dY8Nec7A0 (Accessed 10 May 2013).

Dawood, Zainul (2014) 'Durban gets it's jumbos - four years later', *Daily News*. Available online: ww.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/durban-gets-its-jumbos---four-years-later-1762923 (Accessed 1 October 2015).

Dhlomo, Sibongiseni (2012) '35 989 men circumcised with Tara Klamp', Statement by KZN Health MEC, Dr Sibongiseni Dhlomo, 29 August 2012. Available online: http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/35-989-men-circumcised-with-tara-klamp--dr-sibongi (Accessed 29 Juni 2014).

Diakanyo, Sentletse (2013) 'Deadly circumcision and initiation practices should be outlawed', *Mail & Guardian, Thought Leader,* 10 July 2013. Available online: http://thoughtleader.co.za/sentletsediakanyo/2013/07/10/outdated-circumcision-and-initiation-practices-should-be-outlawed/ (Accessed 10 December 2014).

Dlamini, Bathabile (2016) 'Forced virginity-testing is unlawful and offensive, and will not prevent HIV-AIDS', Opinion Piece, *Daily Maverick,* 2 February 2016. Available online: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-02-02-forced-virginity-testing-is-unlawful-and-offensive-and-will-not-prevent-hiv-aids/#.V0dbQNec7A0 (Accessed 10 March 2016).

Dugger, Celia, W. (2010) 'South Africa Redoubles Efforts Against AIDS', *The New York Times*, 25 April 2010. Available online: http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/26/health/policy/26safrica.html (Accessed 10 Mai 2014).

Ezempilo (2015) 'Over 500 000 circumcisions in KwaZulu-Natal: Not a single death'. *Department of Health, Province of KwaZulu-Natal.* January 2015. Available online: http://www.kznhealth.gov.za/ezempilo/January15-English.pdf (Accessed 10 January 2016).

Faull, Lionel (2010a) 'Confusion over the future of Tara KLamp, *Mail & Guardian*, 17 December 2010. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2010-12-17-confusion-over-the-future-of-tara-klamp (Accessed 10 January 2012).

Faull, Lionel (2010b) 'Tender details get the KLamp', *Mail & Guardian*, 3 September 2010. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2010-09-03-tender-details-get-the-klamp (Accessed 10 January 2012).

Faull, Lionel & Sole, Sam (2011) 'The well-connected Mr Clamp', *Mail & Guardian*, 21.10.2011. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2011-10-21-the-wellconnected-mr-klamp/ (Accessed 5 November 2011).

Hans, Bongani (2011) 'Traditional leaders' R1.5m Christmas gifts', *Mercury*, November 30. Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/traditional-leaders-r15m-christmas-gifts-1189160 (Accessed on 1 May 2015).

Hodes, Rebecca (2015) 'The Rhodes statue must fall': UCT's radical rebirth', *Daily Maverick*, 3 March 2015. Available online: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/article/2015-03-13-the-rhodes-statue-must-fall-ucts-radical-rebirth/#.V4IpnK6c7A0 (Accessed 1 Juni 2015).

Jansen, Leanne (2012) 'Traditional Leaders capped at UKZN', *Mercury*, January 30. Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/traditional-leaders-capped-at-ukzn-1222882 (Accessed on 1 May 2015).

Kelly, Jill (2012) 'The New York Times reports on political violence in South Africa', *Africa is a Country*, 7 December 2012. Available online: http://africasacountry.com/2012/12/the-new-york-times-reports-on-political-violence-in-south-africa/ (Accessed 1 June 2014).

Kessy, Shose & Boonzaier, Floretta (2015) 'All #Rhodes lead to transformation', *Mail & Guardian*, 21 May 2015. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2015-05-21-all-rhodes-lead-to-enlightenment (accessed 30 April 2016).

Khumalo, Sipho (2005) 'Ndebele spares Botha as Zulu statues go up', Mercury, 1 March 2005. Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/ndebele-spares-botha-as-zulu-statues-go-up-235182 (Accessed 10 May 2011).

Khumalo, Sipho (2010) 'Now Shaka statue must go', *Mercury*, 2 June 2010. Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/now-shaka-statue-must-go-485897 (Accessed 10 May 2011).

Khumalo, Sipho (2012) 'Zuma warns against foreign control of SA', *The Mercury*, 10 December 2012. Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/zuma-warns-against-foreign-control-of-sa-1437995 (Accessed 1 January 2015).

Mail & Guardian (2010) 'Nearly 40 killed in botched E Cape circumcisions', 28 Juni 2010. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2010-06-28-nearly-40-killed-in-botched-e-cape-circumcisions (Accessed 1 January 2014).

Makinana, Andisiwe (2013) 'Thirty circumcision deaths so far in Eastern Cape', *Mail & Guardian*, 24 December 2013. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2013-12-24-30-circumcision-deaths-so-far-in-eastern-cape (Accessed 1 January 2014).

Mbonambi, Gugu (2012) 'Sculptor denies Big Five contract', *The Post*, 17 February 2010. Available online:

http://www.iol.co.za/news/politics/sculptor-denies-big-five-contract-473714 (Accessed 10 May 2010).

Mdletshe, Canaan (2010) 'King Shaka's statue removed', *Sowetan Live*, 4 June 2010. Available online: http://www.sowetanlive.co.za/sowetan/archive/2010/06/04/king-shaka_s-statue-removed (Accessed 10 May 2010).

Mercury (2010) 'Zuma admits to getting the chop', 17 May 2010. Available online: http://citizen.co.za/307056/half-million-successful-traditional-circumcisions-kzn/ (Accessed 2 January 2016).

Mkamba, Lungelo (2012) 'More art gets the red-paint treatment', *Mercury*, 29 May 2012. Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/more-art-gets-the-red-paint-treatment-1306661 (Accessed 10 May 2013).

Mngoma, Nosipho (2016) 'Bursaries for virgins sparks debate', *Daily News*, 25 January 2016. Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/south-africa/kwazulu-natal/bursaries-for-virgins-sparks-debate-1975535 (Accessed 1 April 2016).

Molele, Charles; Letsoalo, Matuma & Mataboge, Mmanaledi (2012) Road to Mangaung: How Zuma won Mangaung votes, *Mail & Guardian*, 7 December 2012. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2012-12-28-00-road-to-mangaung-how-zuma-won-mangaung-votes (Accessed 1 January 2015).

Moya, Fikile-Ntsikelelo (2006) '100% Zuluboy', *Mail & Guardian*, 6 April, 2006. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2006-04-06-100-zuluboy (Accessed 10 May 2010).

MRM (2016) 'Moral Regeneration Movement', ww.mrm.org.za. (Accessed 10 January 2016).

Mthembu, Bongani (2010) 'KZN backs circumcision programme to combat HIV', *Mail & Guardian*, 19 January 2010. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2010-01-19-kzn-backs-circumcision-programme-to-combat-hiv (Accessed 1 April 2016).

Mthethwa, Bongani (2005) 'Male virgin testing now a royal decree', *Sunday Times,* 11 September 2005.

Ndaliso, Chris (2010) 'Sculptor complains of insult to intellectual property rights', *The Witness*, 23 August 2013. Available online: http://www.news24.com/archives/witness/sculptor-complains-of-insult-to-intellectual-property-rights-20150430y (Accessed 12 May 2011).

Ndaliso, Chris (2015) 'Amakhosi graduate in leadership', *Daily News*, April 13
Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/dailynews/news/amakhosi-graduate-in-leadership-1844331 (Accessed on 1 May 2015).

Nene, Nkululeko (2012) 'Township Residents in RDP Protest', *Daily News*.
Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/news/crime-courts/township-residents-in-rdp-protest-1409283 (Accessed 1 January 2015).

Nkosi, Mdu (2010) 'Give the elephant to us', *Media Statement by the Inkatha Freedom Party,* 9 November 2010. Available online:
http://www.politicsweb.co.za/documents/give-the-ethekwini-elephant-to-us--ifp. (Accessed 12 May 2011).

Obed, Mlaba (2007) 'Street Renaming March', *Press Release, eThekwini Municipality*, 1 May 2007. Available online:
http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Government/street_renaming/News_Articles/Pages/Street-Renaming-March---Press-Release-01-May-2007.aspx (Accessed 10 April 2014).

Rampedi, Piet (2012) ,'Zulufying' of ANC divides Zuma camp', *The Star*.
Available online: http://www.iol.co.za/the-star/zulufying-of-anc-divides-zuma-camp-1414489 (Accessed 1 January 2015).

Rawoot, Ilham (2010) 'The blunt truth about new circumcision device', *Mail & Guardian*, Thought Leader, 4 October 2010. Available online:
http://thoughtleader.co.za/amabhungane/2010/10/04/the-blunt-truth-about-new-circumcision-device/ (Accessed 10 December 2010).

Sanpath, Arthi (2010) 'Elephant sculptures are just part of a 'bigger picture'',
Daily News, 22 February 2010.

Smith, David (2012) 'South Africa urged to end silence on dangerous circumcision rituals', *The Guardian*. Available online:
http://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jul/27/south-africa-circumscision-danger (Accessed 1 March 2013).

Sudheim, Alex (2010) 'Elephantiasis Durbanitis', *Mahala*, 23 February 2010.
Available online: http://www.mahala.co.za/culture/elephantiasis-durbanitis/. (Accessed 12 May 2011).

Sutcliffe, Michael (2006) 'Name Changes', *City Managers Newsletter, eThekwini Municipality*, 25 January 2006. Available online:
http://www.durban.gov.za/City_Government/street_renaming/News_Articles/Pages/Name-Changes.aspx (Accessed 10 April 2014).

Sutcliffe, Michael (2007) *Newsletter of the City Manager*, 6 May 2007. Available online:
http://www1.durban.gov.za/durban/government/media/newsletters/cmn/cmnitem.2007-05-06.2303123121/view (Accessed 10 April 2014).

Swingler, Helen (2015) 'Cry for transformation rings out at packed assembly', *University of Cape Town, Online News*, 25 March 2015. Available online: http://www.uct.ac.za/dailynews/?id=9057 (Accessed 30 May 2011).

The Citizen (2015) 'Half a million successful traditional circumcisions in KZN', 14 January 2015. Available online: http://citizen.co.za/307056/half-million-successful-traditional-circumcisions-kzn/ (Accessed 28 January 2016).

The Independent (2010) 'Shaka statue too boy-ish for South Africa's Zulu king', *The Independent*, 5 Juni 2010. Available online: http://www.independent.co.uk/arts-entertainment/art/shaka-statue-too-boy-ish-for-south-africas-zulu-king-1992228.html. (Accessed 12 May 2011).

Times Live (2010) ‚King Goodwill not happy with Shaka statue', 2 Juni 2010. Available online: http://www.timeslive.co.za/local/2010/06/02/king-goodwill-not-happy-with-shaka-statue (Accessed 1 September 2013).

Tolsi, Niren (2012) 'Mkhize: 'Zuma is coming back'', *Mail & Guardian*. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2012-11-24-mkhize-zuma-is-coming-back (Accessed 1 January 2015).

Tshabalala, Sibusiso (2015) 'When Cecil Rhodes' statue fell it laid bare South Africa's transformation challenges', *QUARTZ*, 10 April 2015. Available online: http://qz.com/381152/when-cecil-rhodes-statue-fell-it-laid-bare-south-africas-transformation-challenges/. (Accessed 12 May 2016).

Tushini, Nandisa (2016) 'Virginity bursaries: Weighing the pros and cons', *Mail & Guardian*, Thought Leader, 19 February 2016. Available online: http://thoughtleader.co.za/psyssa/2016/02/19/virginity-bursaries-weighing-the-pros-and-cons/ (Accessed 10 December 2010).

UCT (2015) 'Announcing public consultation phase re: Rhodes statue', *University of Cape Town, Online News*, 16 April 2015. Available online: http://www.uct.ac.za/dailynews/?id=9104 (Accessed 10 May 2016).

Van Wyk, Lisa (2010) 'Art controversies of 2010', *Mail & Guardian*, 30 November 2010. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2010-11-30-art-controversies (Accessed 24 February 2015).

Van Wyk, Lisa (2013) Andries Botha's elephant sculptures to be completed at last, *Mail & Guardian*, 1 February 2013. Available online:

http://mg.co.za/article/2013-02-01-andries-bothas-elephant-sculptures-to-be-completed-at-last (Accessed 30 April 2013).

Van Wyk, Lisa & Pillay, Verashni (2010) 'The elephant that caused all the trouble', *Mail & Guardian*, 18 February 2010. Available online: http://mg.co.za/article/2010-02-18-the-elephant-that-caused-all-trouble (Accessed 10 May 2013).

Vos, Pierre de (2016) ,'Virginity testing' bursaries: Discriminatory and unlawful', *Daily Maverick, Opinion Piece*, 28 January 2016. Available online: http://www.dailymaverick.co.za/opinionista/2016-01-28-virginity-testing-bursaries-discriminatory-and-unlawful/#.V4JzIq6c5U4 (Accessed 10 March 2016).

West, Edward (2010) 'Statue of King Shaka pulled down after 'herd boy' image irks royals', *Business Day Live*, 2 Juni 2010. Available online: http://www.bdlive.co.za/articles/2010/06/03/statue-of-king-shaka-pulled-down-after-herd-boy-image-irks-royals (Accessed 2 August 2012).

Winsor, Morgan (2016) 'South Africa Scholarship For Virgins: Mayor Dudu Mazibuko Defends 'Maiden's Bursary Awards', *International Business Times*, 25 January 2016. Available online: http://www.ibtimes.com/south-africa-scholarship-virgins-mayor-dudu-mazibuko-defends-maidens-bursary-awards-2279249 (Accessed 28.1.2016).

Zikode, S'bu (2006) 'S'bu Zikode's Wolpe Lecture', July 2006, Durban. Available online: http://abahlali.org/node/323/ (Accessed 1 June 2015).

Zidoke, S'bu. (2013) 'Despite the State's Violence, Our Fight to Escape the Mud and Fire of South Africa's Slums Will Continue', *The Guardian*, November 11. Available online: http://www.theguardian.com/pro- file/sbu-zikode (Accessed on 1 May 2015).

Zondi, M. (2010) Address at the National Assembly Debate on the 2010 State of the Nation Address by MP Rev Musa Zondi; National Assembly, Cape Town on 15 February, Available online: http://www.ifp.org.za/Speeches/150210asp.htm. (Accessed 9 August 2013).

Zuma, Jacob (2010) 'State of the Nation Address', 11 February 2010. Available online: http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=11 (Accessed 9 August 2013).

Zuma, Jacob (2011) 'Address at the official launch of the Dube TradePort and King Shaka International Airport by President Jacob Zuma; Tongaat, KwaZulu-Natal', 8 May 2011. Available online: http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=288 (accessed 9 August

2013).

Zuma, Jacob (2012) Address by President JG Zuma at the launch of the Dube Trade Port in La Mercy, KZN, 8 March 2012. Available online: http://www.thepresidency.gov.za/pebble.asp?relid=5767 (Accessed 10 April 2012).