The Role of Indigenous People in National Development Processes:

Participation and Marginalisation of Indigenous Bedouin in South Sinai Tourism Development

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"The colony of a civilized nation which takes possession either of a waste country, or of one so thinly inhabited, that the natives easily give place to new settlers, advances more rapidly to wealth and greatness than any other human society." (Adam Smith)

Researcher:

"And you, are you Egyptian?"

Bedouin:

"What do you mean, inside, in my heart or on my ID? On the ID I am Egyptian, but inside I am a Bedouin. And what does the nationality mean anyway? We have already been Israelis, too. One has to have some nationality and one cannot have a Bedouin nationality. A Bedouin nationality does not exist, because we do not have a state." (Mzaina, Dahab, male, 24)

"Globalization is a fact; we must govern it to control its impact, first mitigating and then preventing any excesses. Let us not forget that the price is often paid by the weakest in our society, those excluded from globalization, those brutally marginalized by it, not those who are involved and enjoy its fruits." (Romano Prodi)

Preface

The idea for this dissertation was developed in 2001, when I was looking for a dissertation project in the Arab world that would be exciting intellectually as well as in other aspects and that would give me the opportunity to practice the Arab language that I had studied at university. After a respective Google-search, I called Prof. Dr. XXXXXXX from the Johannes Gutenberg-Universität Mainz and inquired whether there were any possibilities to do a Ph.D. research and thesis under his supervision. Prof. XXXXXX then presented three possible research topics to me: XXXXXXXXX, XXXXXXXXX and the conflicts between local Bedouin and migrants in tourism development in South Sinai. At the School of Oriental and African Studies (SOAS) in London, I had already written an essay on pastoralism and felt a great affinity to now do empirical research with a (previously) pastoralist people – the Bedouin. So my preference was clear. It took another two years during which I worked for a GTZ project in Sri Lanka and prepared the Ph.D. project proposal, before I started my fieldwork for this research in Sinai in May 2003.

This study could not have been completed without the help and support of many people to whom I express my sincere gratitude.

I am particularly grateful to the following people who supported me during my fieldwork in South Sinai:

- To all the respondents in Sinai who gave me their time, patience and trust and shared their knowledge and experiences with me.

- To the Bedouin families[1] who invited me to stay with them and participate in their lives in Wadi XXXI[2], Nuwaiba and Dahab. I express my deepest gratitude to these families for their warm hospitality.

- To the staff of XXX Camp in XXX for their friendship and support.

- To XXX, consultant, who contributed important data and insights.

For their support during the conceptual design and all the phases of drawing up this work, I would like to extend my thanks to the following people:

- To Prof. Dr. XXX who has known South Sinai for many years and suggested to me to do research on the tourism development in South Sinai and the involvement of the Bedouin as early as 2001, who offered to supervise this thesis and whose experienced advice was

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[1] The names of these families are withheld in order to protect them from possible consequences that could follow if their support of the researcher became known.

[2] The spelling of Arabic names and terms in this text is largely based on the common English transcription of standard Arabic.

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List of Abbreviations

GTZ	Gesellschaft für technische Zusammenarbeit
LE	Egyptian Pound (1 US-Dollar = approx. 6 LE in 2003)
LSA	Livelihood Systems Approach
PRA	Participatory Rural Appraisal
RRA	Rapid Rural Appraisal
TDA	Tourism Development Authority

1. Introduction

Many if not most of the ca. 350 million indigenous people worldwide are victims of exploitation, oppression and discrimination and are confronted with the threat of ecocide, ethnocide, and some even face genocide (Rathgeber 1998:7; Rathgeber 2004:n.p.). Indigenous people have often been disadvantaged in the development process during which their territories and resources have been exploited for projects in the agricultural, mining, industry and tourism sectors in order to advance national economies and increase the profit of companies and individual entrepreneurs.

Especially tourism, as one of the largest and fastest growing industries world-wide (Enriquez Savingnac 1994)[3], is often regarded as an ideal strategy for developing countries: it is expected to improve the balance of payments, to create employment and income and to reduce the regional disparities between the centre and the peripheries. According to the World Tourism Organization "tourism has a key role among the instruments to fight against poverty, thus becoming a primary tool for sustainable development." (ebid. 2007:n.p.)

However, tourism is also associated with negative environmental, social and cultural impacts thereby raising the question of its sustainability. Whether and how tourism can contribute to sustainable development of peripheral tourism destinations entails the issue of the conflicting development goals of economic growth and social justice (Hemmer 2002). In the case of peripheral regions inhabited by indigenous minorities that are much more vulnerable to powerful external forces and interests associated with international tourism in particular and globalisation in general, the problem of social justice in economic development is of special importance.

1.1 Problems and Objectives

Though politically part of Egypt, South Sinai with its inaccessible mountain areas and its indigenous Bedouin inhabitants remained largely outside the influence of Egypt until the 1950s when Egypt started developing the Sinai West coast (Marx 1984).

Egypt's development efforts in Sinai were interrupted in 1967 when Israel occupied the peninsula. During the 15-year-long Israeli occupation, the foundation of today's tourism industry was laid and developed further by Egypt from the 1980s until today. As a result, tourism in Sinai has been booming since the mid 1980s. The 2.6 million tourist arrivals in the year 2003 represented a 29-fold-increase compared to the 90,000 arrivals in 1990 (Sanmartin 1999; AmCham 2005). A major part of Egypt's domestic and foreign investment in the tourism industry is now concentrated in South Sinai where high budget hotels and resorts dominate (Shackley 1999).

Tourism for Egypt, like for many other developing countries, is an important economic sector and development option. In addition to the earning of much needed foreign currency,[4] tourism

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[3] International tourism has been growing at 4.5% in 2006 (UNWTO 2007:n.p.).

[4] Tourism's share in Egypt's total export earnings grew from about 11% in 1990 to about 25% in 2000 (EIU 2002).

in Sinai is of special importance to Egypt due to two reasons (Meyer 1996; Lavie 1991; The Economist, 16 April 2001):

- Creation of employment to attract migrants from the densely populated Nile Valley[5] where unemployment is high, thereby reducing the social and political pressure on the government.
- Development of Sinai, a peripheral desert region and its economic integration into the Egyptian economy – a strategic consideration after the repossession of Sinai from Israel in 1982.

Consequently, the Egyptian government has actively promoted tourism development in South Sinai.

But where in this development are the South Sinai Bedouin – the indigenous, previously nomadic inhabitants of South Sinai – a national minority whose people are still not accepted as Egyptian (Ibrahim 1996)? The tourism plans of the Egyptian government do not explicitly consider Bedouin participation. On the contrary, since Egypt regained control over Sinai from Israeli occupation in 1982, Bedouin customary territory including "miles of unspoiled beaches" (The Economist, 16 April 2001) of South Sinai has become the property of the Egyptian state (Meyer 1996).

Moreover, tourism development in Sinai during the last two decades and the systematic exclusion of the Bedouin has increasingly marginalized the Bedouin from the economic opportunities associated with the tourism industry (Behbehanian 2000). Dahab and Nuwaiba are the only coastal areas in Sinai, where, due to the traditional cultivation of date palms, Bedouin have been able to claim property rights over small stretches of beach and have subsequently taken the opportunity to establish small hostels, restaurants and shops for tourists (Meyer 1996). However, attempts to police the informal transactions between tourists and the small tourist businesses favor new and larger ventures against which the smaller ones might not be able to compete[6] (Behbehanian 2000).

Political exclusion of the Bedouin is not new and goes as far back as the times of the Ottoman Empire[7] (Rabinowitz 1985). During the Egyptian-Israeli conflict, with alternating control over Sinai, the Bedouin were affected by frequent changes in policies made by the external occupation forces[8,9] (Lavie 1991). A good example of the impact of these policies on the Bedouin is the employment of labour for the development projects in Sinai. While the Israeli employed

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[5] Due to the fact that 95% of Egypt's area is desert land, 97% of Egypt's population are concentrated in the narrow Nile Valley and the Nile Delta (EIU 2001).

[6] Due to higher standards that are very costly to achieve by the smaller businesses.

[7] Examples are the transfer of concession over transportation between Suez and Cairo from Sinai Bedouin to Nilotic tribes by the Pasha Muhammad Ali in 1823 (when Sinai was ruled by the Ottoman Empire) or the period of the First World War during which the Bedouin were isolated from the Egyptian market (Rabinowitz 1985).

[8] The policy changes were made without consultation of the Bedouin.

[9] The Bedouin also regarded the Egyptians as a foreign occupation force (Lavie 1989).

and even trained Bedouin to work for them[10] (Wickering 1991), under Egyptian rule preference was given to "Egyptian" and even Sudanese migrant workers[11] (Lavie 1991). Given the prolonged and alternating external rule and the lack of self-determination, it is not surprising that the Bedouin distinguish between themselves as the "People of the Land" and those representing the ruling government as the "People of Politics" (Lavie 1989, pp. 102-103).

This research intends to investigate the extent to which the Sinai Bedouin, an indigenous people and national minority, participate in the booming tourism industry – a development that is taking place on their traditional territory, a peripheral desert region of Egypt. In so doing, this research will place a national success story into the local context.

To this end this research explores in more detail the structure and the processes of the South Sinai tourism industry by answering the following questions:

- What is the significance of the booming tourism industry for the socio-economy of the Bedouin? To what extent do the Bedouin participate in the tourism industry in Southern Sinai and which factors determine their participation?
- Has the recent economic development led to further marginalization and discrimination or is there a trend towards increased participation?
- What are the Bedouin's individual and collective socio-economic strategies to cope with exclusion and marginalization as well as with market fluctuations that result from political conflicts?

1.2   Outline of the Study

This study is composed of nine main chapters. Following the introduction, the thesis is organized as follows:

Chapter 2: Indigenous People, Tourism Development and the Livelihood Systems Approach

This chapter provides a theoretical background to the study. First, it explains the term "indigenous people". Then it illustrates the conflicts between the livelihood concepts of indigenous people such as the South Sinai Bedouin on the one hand and the "Western concepts" of statehood and development on the other hand that are underlying the development policies of the Egyptian government. Moreover, the various ways of international support for indigenous people and the problem of defining the term "indigenous people" are investigated.

The difficulties in reconciling the interests of the Egyptian State on the one hand and those of the South Sinai Bedouin on the other hand become most obvious in the tourism industry.

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[10] Israel did not have a large low-skill labour force in Sinai. The Bedouin would for instance be employed in military construction or tourist services.

[11] Preference was given to these groups to avoid political unrest because of high unemployment rates in Upper Egypt. Moreover, it is likely that Egyptians are suspicious of the Bedouin who have a history of drug and arms smuggling (Ibrahim 1996) and worked for Israel.

Therefore, the significance of tourism development for the economies of developing countries is discussed. In addition, the major benefits and costs of tourism development as well as their distribution among the various groups of society in relation to the structures of power are evaluated.

Finally, the livelihood systems approach as the underlying theoretical framework of this research is introduced.

Chapter 3: South Sinai Bedouins: Arabs, Ethnic Minority and Indigenous People?

After presenting the main three different concepts of ethnicity – the primordial view, the situational perspective and self-identification –, these are applied to the South Sinai Bedouin. It is argued that the South Sinai Bedouin represent an individual ethnic group according to all three concepts in spite of being part of the broader regional "Arab" identity. Moreover, it is shown, that the South Sinai Bedouin can be considered an indigenous people, too.

Chapter 4: Methodology

This chapter discusses the methodological approach that was chosen for the study. The selection of the study area, the applied methods and the conduct of the study are described. The chapter concludes with an evaluation of the applied method of data collection.

Chapter 5: Context, Conditions and Trends[12]

This is an introduction to the study area. It provides a description of the physical geography of the peninsula, of Bedouin history and socio-economy as well as the relationships between the South Sinai Bedouin and external forces in the course of time. The latest developments since 1982 with a special focus on tourism development are delineated. Finally, the impact of violent political conflicts on tourism demand in South Sinai is illustrated.

Chapter 6: Livelihood Resources

The Bedouin's resource endowment regarding natural, physical, human, financial and social capital is illustrated.

Chapter 7: Institutional Processes and Organizational Structures

This chapter provides insights about the major marginalization processes Bedouin are facing in South Sinai: the loss of land, barriers to market entry and discrimination by the authorities. Social differentiation and Bedouin preferences are identified as further factors in Bedouin marginalization.

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[12] Chapters 5 to 9 are structured according to the key points of the livelihood systems approach as applied in this research. The results of the fieldwork and their analysis are presented in chapters 5 to 8, chapter 9 contains the conclusions.

Chapter 8: Livelihood Strategies

First, Bedouin income generation strategies as well as coping strategies vis a vis a drop in tourism demand and income are presented. Secondly, Bedouin coping strategies in response to the various types of marginalization and discrimination are examined.

Chapter 9: Conclusion and Recommendations.

Conclusions and recommendations are presented in this chapter. An evaluation and outlook regarding the sustainability of the Bedouin livelihoods is presented. Then, the recommendations address the general lack of civil rights, local participation and protection of minorities in Egypt and highlight the need for Bedouin community development and the consideration of Bedouin interests in tourism development. In addition, further research issues are indicated.

2. Indigenous People, Tourism Development and the Livelihood Systems Approach

This chapter describes the situation of indigenous and tribal people in today's world and how modernization in general and development projects on their land in particular have affected them. Then, the ILO Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention 1989 (No. 169) and its implication for the indigenous peoples' struggle for self-determination and special support and protection is presented. The question of who should be protected by this convention also raises the question of a definition of indigenous people. Next, special attention is given to the significance of tourism for development and its impact on local populations and indigenous people. Finally, the livelihood systems approach as the underlying theoretical framework of this research will be introduced.

2.1 The Indigenous Peoples' Plight: Second Class Citizens of Nation States

According to the UN and representatives of indigenous people there are about 300 to 400 million people worldwide who belong to indigenous and tribal peoples, nations and communities and represent 4-5 % of the global population (Rathgeber 2004:n.p.). Indigenous people live in more than 70 countries, have 5,000 different cultures (Fortwangler 2003:29) and thereby contribute 70-80 % to the cultural diversity of our world (GfbV 2004:n.p.).

Indigenous have in common to be nondominant tribal or kin-based societies rooted in oral traditions and upholding loyalty to family and community. Another common feature is the attachment to a subsistence economy on their ancestral land, which also is the most important source of autonomy and power. Land is therefore also the most contested issue in their struggle against hegemonic nation states or resource-extracting corporations (c.f. McIntosh, 2000, Niezen 2003).

Indigenous people have often been disadvantaged in the development process,

> "in many cases, their resources have been exploited for the benefit of other groups in society and, in many countries they are the poorest of the poor. Often, they experience political and economic discrimination and are perceived as backward or primitive." (World Bank 1995:1)

The problems of indigenous people are closely linked to the history of colonialization and the resulting creation of modern nation states that often pursue a Western or capitalist concept of development. The advent of these central powers together with modernization has had a direct impact on indigenous people who in the consequence lost their sovereignty and in many cases the control over their territories and own development (e.g. American Indians, Australian Aborigines).

A significant, if not the most important reason why it is so difficult to consolidate the needs of indigenous people with those of the nation state, the ruling elite or the majority population is the clash between two opposing philosophies of life. On the one hand, modern individualist, materialist and capitalist norms such as individual utility and profit maximization dominate the political, public and private realms. On the other hand, indigenous people' norms are based on collective survival, risk minimization and solidarity. In this conflict, where power is unevenly distributed between the state, the majority population or powerful companies on the one hand and indigenous people on the other hand, there seems to be no space or right of existence for these alternative "life systems" [13] or development paradigms. In most cases, indigenous people are overrun by the speed and conditions of the developments that they have had neither time nor opportunity to understand and adapt to according to their own ideals and ideas. As a result, most indigenous people today are victims of exploitation, oppression and discrimination and are confronted with the threat of ecocide, ethnocide and/or genocide (Rathgeber 1998, Rathgeber 2004).

Ecocide refers to the destruction of indigenous peoples' territory by either the nation states in which they live, or by powerful (multinational) companies or by individuals. Examples for the causes of such destruction are the construction of hydropower dams, agricultural, mining and industrial projects or tourism development, the focus of this research. In the course of these projects and developments, indigenous peoples' traditional land rights are disrespected and their economies based on natural resources are disrupted. Most often this results in impoverishment and sometimes displacement.

Ethnocide is the extinction of indigenous peoples' way of living. It results from forced assimilation and integration as well as discrimination regarding the use of indigenous languages, the traditional economic systems and the access to spiritual places. Moreover, marginalization is often taking place in the areas of education and health care or the access to markets (Rathgeber 1998).

Genocide denotes any acts commited with the intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.[14] The Yanomami in the Brasilian Amazonas are an example of an indigenous people that has been threatened with genocide.

Nomads, a special category of indigenous people who are dependent on the shifting of pastures between the rainy and the dry season (e.g. Fulani in West Afrika) or between summer and winter (e.g. Saami in Finland) are also confronted with these threats. They have always had conflicts over land with their sedentary neighbors. In modern times, however, they have been particularly confronted with the creation of nation states and "artificial" state boundaries that cut through their territories thereby limiting their migratory patterns. Moreover, new technologies such as cars and planes have made their transport services with caravans obsolete and population increase coupled with environmental degradation has rendered their traditional

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[13] The author uses the term "life systems" to point out that these systems are holistic and extend beyond the economic sphere.

[14] See Article 2 of the UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide 1948 (UN 1948:n.p.).

pastoralist systems unprofitable or even unsustainable. All in all, their cultural and sometimes even physical survival is threatened with many nomads declining into poverty in the outskirts of urban centres where they try to make a living as low skilled laborers or petty traders (c.f. Bourgeot 1994).

2.2 International Support for Indigenous Peoples

Over the last fifty years, indigenous people have progressively gained international support as people and institutions all over the world became aware of their marginalization and discrimination. The first international body that addressed the discrimination and marginalization of indigenous people comprehensively was the International Labor Organization (ILO). After protecting and promoting the rights of indigenous and tribal peoples since the early 1920s, the ILO Convention No. 107 "Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries" was a break-through (UN/OHCHR n.d.(a)). Based on the state of thinking and discussion at that time, this convention promoted the integration and assimilation of the indigenous people into the dominant societies of the nation states they were living in (Speiser n.d.; UN/OHCHR n.d.(a)). The convention No. 107 was ratified by 27 states including four Arab states: Syria, Iraq, Egypt, Tunisia, as well as several Subsahara African and Southasian states.

In 1971, the UN Sub-Commission on the Prevention of Discrimination and the Protection of Minorities appointed Mr. Martinez Cobo as Special Rapporteur. His comprehensive study on discrimination against indigenous populations asked for governments to formulate guidelines for their activities concerning indigenous peoples on the basis of respect for the ethnic identity, rights and freedoms of indigenous peoples (UN/OHCHR n.d.(b))

In 1982, the Working Group on Indigenous Populations (WGIP) was established by the United Nations Economic and Social Council. It consists of five independent experts who are members of the UN Sub-Commission on the Promotion and Protection of Human Rights. Representatives of all indigenous peoples, their communities and their organizations can attend the meetings of the WGIP and indigenous people from all over the globe have come to the meetings including for instance Saami from Northern Europe and Ainu from Japan. The meetings have become some of the largest human rights meetings held by the UN and made indigenous peoples recognize that they share a common experience and a common cause (ibid.).

With these developments, the limitations of the ILO convention No. 107 became apparent and indigenous groups, too, were asking for a revision of the convention and new international standards (ibid.). The convention was revised and replaced in 1989 by the ILO Convention No. 169, "The Indigenous and Tribal Peoples Convention". Instead of taking the integrationist approach of No.107, Convention No. 169 states that

> "the cultures and institutions of indigenous and tribal peoples must be respected, and presumes their right to continued existence within their national societies, to establish their own institutions and to determine the path of

their own development. ILO Convention No. 169 also calls for governments to consult with the peoples concerned with regard to legislative or administrative measures that may directly affect them, and establishes the right of these peoples to participate in decision-making processes regarding policies and programmes that concern them." (UN/OHCHR n.d.(a):2-3)[15]

The convention No. 169 has been ratified by 18 states including 13 Latinamerican, 1 Southpacific and 4 European states. So far, no Middle Eastern State has ratified the convention.

Further initiatives promoting the rights of indigenous peoples at the UN are the elaboration of a draft United Nations declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples, which still remains unratified, the Decade of Indigenous People 1995-2004, the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues (an advisory body to the UN Economic and Social Council that is composed of 16 experts, eight of whom are proposed by indigenous peoples). Moreover, there are 16 organizations of indigenous people that have a consultative status with the UN Economic and Social Council. Consequently, these organizations can attend and contribute to a wide range of international and intergovernmental conferences. Moreover, indigenous peoples have also participated in major world conferences, such as the UN Conference on Environment and Development (Earth Summit), held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, the Second World Conference on Human Rights in Vienna in 1993, the World Conference on Women, held in Beijing in 1995, the 1996 Social Summit and the 2001 World Conference against Racism in Durban (ibid.).

Parallel to the developments at the UN, indigenous people have become increasingly organized at the regional, national and international level. While the first meetings of indigenous people were mostly organized by NGOs from North America, the South Pacific (mainly Australia and New Zealand) as well was from Northern Europe, Latinamerican indigenous organizations later also joined the international forums. Finally, in the 1990s, indigenous peoples from the former Soviet Union, Africa and Asia also came to the meetings. As a result, a truly global indigenous movement has developed (c.f. Niezen 2003).

Whereas a lot of progress has been made in terms of conventions, forums and other bureaucratic institutions, the situation on the ground is still far from optimum. While the number of states (27 states) that ratified the ILO Convention No. 107 was already low, only 18 states have ratified the ILO Convention No.169. Moreover, the convention leaves much flexibility by using words such as "the extent possible" (e.g. Art. 7.1), "wherever possible" (e.g. Art. 15.2), "adequate" (e.g. Art. 14.3) even for those governments who have ratified it.

Basically, conflict between nation states and indigenous peoples arises around the terms "peoples" and "self-determination". While the ILO Convention No. 169 uses the term indigenous "peoples" and grants them the right to their own land, culture and language, it explicitly excludes all claims that could be made if the term was used the way it is used in international

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[15] The full text of the ILO Convention No. 169 can be found on the ILO web site: http://www.ilo.org/public/english/standards/ norm/egalite/itpp/convention/manual.pdf. Some of its most important provisions are summarized in Annex II.

law. Here, 'self-determination' has exclusively been exercised in terms of autonomous state-hood (c.f. Niezen 2003).

National governments fear secession and loss of control over valuable land and natural resources, the latter fear most likely being more prominent (McIntosh, 2000). The continued resistance by some states to self-determination for entities other than states is reflected in disagreement of wording (the term 'peoples' is replaced by 'people', 'populations' or 'issues') and in the little progress on the approval of the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, which has been formulated at the outset of the International Decade[16] of the World's Indigenous People in 1994 (Rathgeber 2004).

However, most indigenous peoples' aim is to be acknowledged as nations within nations rather than achieving independent statehood. Institutional reform and negotiated peace based on treaties and agreements with state governments are seen as the preferred outcome of self-determination. Indigenous peoples consider self-determination as the only way to ensure their survival as distinct peoples, which heavily depends on the ability to maintain and develop culturally distinct forms of education, spirituality, economic development, justice, and governance (ibid.).

Another conflict among states and indigenous peoples arises over the question which peoples are indigenous and are consequently entitled to the rights of the ILO Convention No. 169. Therefore, the issue of a definition of the term "indigenous people" is discussed in the next section.

2.3 Approaches to a Definition of "Indigenous People"

When thinking about indigenous peoples, at first the many Indian peoples or nations that have inhabited the American continent before the European colonialization as well as the Aborigines and Maori of Australia and New Zealand come to mind. However, today, the term is used for many other peoples like the San in Namibia/Botswana, the Saami of Finland, the Touareg of North Africa or the Hill Tribes of Thailand and other South East Asian countries. While in the Americas it is quite clear who is indigenous, this is less obvious in the case of Africa or the Middle East. The Khoi-San-groups of Southern Africa, for instance, if compared to Bantu-speaking peoples are with no doubt indigenous. But when both groups are compared to the European and Asian settlers, are the Khoi-San more indigenous than the Bantu? Similarly, the question arises, whether the Turk people of Central Asia are indigenous if compared to Russians, Krimtartars or Chinese although they themselves have migrated to their present areas of settlement in the first millennium a.d. (GfbV 2004:n.p.).

From the cases presented above the question arises how to decide whether an ethnic group should be considered indigenous. The World Alliance of Mobile Indigenous People has publis-

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[16] Many indigenous representatives complain that the UN Decade has not achieved its goals (c.f. Rathgeber 2004; Speiser n.d.).

hed the following definitions on their website (WAMIP n.d.:n.p., browsed 16.5.2007), which comprehend most of the important characteristics:

> "**Indigenous Peoples** are "Peoples in independent countries who are regarded as indigenous on account of their descent from the populations which inhabited the country, or a geographical region to which the country belongs, at the time of conquest or colonization or the establishment of present state boundaries and who, irrespective of their legal status, retain some or all of their own social, economic, cultural and political institutions"."

> "The term **mobile peoples** (i.e. pastoralists, hunter-gatherers, shifting agriculturalists and other peoples with dynamic regular changing patterns of land use) refers to a subset of indigenous and traditional peoples whose livelihoods depend on extensive common property use of natural resources over an area, who use mobility as a management strategy for dealing with sustainable use and conservation, and who possess a distinctive cultural identity and natural resource management system."

However, so far, there is no single and commonly accepted definition of indigenous peoples, because

- indigenous peoples represent an extremely diverse array of societies[17], which makes it very difficult to formulate a single definition that does justice to all of the estimated 300 to 635 million members of at least five thousands distinct cultures (Fortwangler 2003:37).

- any definition would have political implications. Given the International Labour Organisation (ILO) Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples (No. 169) and ongoing discussions about the UN Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, a definition of indigenous peoples will be decisive in who will be granted these rights. In these discussions governments of states such as the USA, India, Sweden or Burma on the one hand attempt to formulate a restrictive definition of indigenous people that only applies to very few peoples. The indigenous peoples, on the other hand, are very anxious to agree on any fixed definition that might be used to exclude some of the indigenous peoples. They therefore try to establish a set of criteria in order to enable the identification of legal subjects that could demand their rights (Rathgeber 1998).[18]

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[17] Peoples as distinct as the Maori (New Zealand), the Sami (Scandinavia and Russia), the San (Kalahari) or the less known Ainu (Japan) and Mapuche (Argentina) (Niezen, 2003).

[18] Rathgeber (1998) warns of the detrimental effect the various approaches to defining indigenous people could have on their goals:

Within the social sciences, there are constructivists who argue that individuals or groups opportunistically choose their indigenous or ethnic identity in order to profit from granted advantages. As a consequence, the identity does not really exist but is created according to the circumstances. Rathgeber (ibid.) contests that nevertheless any ethnic construct needs to be based on specific grounds. He rises the question how else the different approach of Afroamericans demanding equal civil rights and the American Indians claiming sovereignty as independent nations could be explained.

Another approach is the primordialism. It sees indigenity as a state of untouched traditional communities whose identity is based on a static concept of family bonds, language, religion and culture. Since in today's world except for a few cases all

Given these problems regarding the definition of indigenous people, international institutions have compiled more or less "similar checklists" to identify indigenous people.

The chairperson of the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, Irene Daes, has extracted the most important points from the existing attempts of defining indigenous people that can be used as a working formula:

a) "Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory;

b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include the aspects of language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions;

c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by state authorities, as a distinct collectivity; and

d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination, whether or not these conditions persist." (Daes 1996: 22)

The following points can complement the list above:

e) Close attachment to ancestral territories and to natural resources in these areas.

f) Presence of customary social and political institutions; long-term experience of self-governance.

g) Primarily subsistence oriented production (cf. Chatty & Colchester 2002:14).

As Daes points out, these critieria should be understood as guidelines. Depending on different contexts, they might be present to a greater or lesser degree (Daes 1996) and not all of the criteria have to apply in order for a people to identify as indigenous (Rathgeber 1998).[19] Moreover, today, it is widely agreed that the main criterion is self-identification (McIntosh 2000) complemented with the recognition by other indigenous people. The latter ensures that no group can by itself claim indigenity, such as the South African Boers who appeared at the forum of indigenous peoples in Geneva and claimed to be indigenous (Rathgeber 1998).

Originally, the economic system of indigenous people is closely linked to their land and usually their traditional livelihood is based on one of the following economic activities:

- Gathering and hunting

- (Semi-)nomadic pastoralism

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human communities have been affected to a greater or lesser degree by modernization there would be no indigenous people. It is therefore of utmost importance that any definition should acknowledge the actual process of self-finding of indigenous people, where on the one hand indigenous identity is revived in an environment of assimilation and on the other hand indigenous people are increasingly active in the modern world as teachers, lawyers etc. while still presenting indigenous values and symbols (ibid.).

[19] Another term that is closely related to that of "indigenous people" is "tribal people", which also appears in the title of the ILO Convention 169. Whereas the term "tribal people" refers only to the social organization of a people in a tribal system, the two terms are often used as synonyms (e.g. Davis 1993). In the author's view, this decision is problematic, since there are many tribal peoples who are not marginalized, but are dominant or at least well represented groups, especially in many Sub Sahara African states.

- Shifting cultivation

- Permanent cultivation

And in the literature, various nomadic people appear among the examples of indigenous people, such as the Touareg of the Sahara or the Saami of Finland. However, one nomadic group that the author has never come across in these examples are the Bedouin, the Arab nomads.

2.4 Tourism as a Chance for Development and its Impact on Indigenous People

The majority of the indigenous peoples live in developing countries with severe economic problems. Here, there is not just simply a clash of cultures between the indigenous people and the state, but rather the state is forced to adopt certain measures in order to catch up with global economic development. Governments of these countries face the problem of how to promote economic growth and reduce their international debts. In this endeavour, in many cases the governments and Western educated elites follow the "globalized path of development" without sufficiently acknowledging cultural specifics. Moreover, social development is often ranked of secondary importance. Consequently, participatory rights of the indigenous populations are reduced while neoliberal measures for structural adjustment are taken to liberalize the markets (Rathgeber 2004).

Whereas for a long time, the economy of developing countries has largely been based on agriculture and the exploitation of natural resources (oil, minerals, etc.), international tourism has been "discovered" as an engine of development and has been promoted by many deve-loping countries for the last two to three decades. At the same time, there has been a lot of controversial discussion about international tourism and its positive and negative effects on tourist destinations (Aderhold et al. 2000). As a consequence, there exists a wealth of tourism literature from various social sciences, such as economics, social anthropology or human geography. Since this dissertation focuses on the prospects and problems that tourism deve-lopment has brought for the South Sinai Bedouin, this section will give a short overview of the general discussion on tourism and development in general and then shed more light on the topic of tourism and indigenous people in particular. Tourism development in Egypt and South Sinai, specifically, is discussed in chapter 5.

2.4.1 Benefits of Tourism Development

The tourism industry is often regarded as an ideal leading sector for economic development and many developing countries consequently try to promote tourism development and attract increasing numbers of investors as well as tourists. One reason is the expected economic benefits such as the earning of foreign currency,[20] creation of employment and income as well as overall economic growth through forward and backward linkages and multiplier effects

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[20] Tourism is the main source of foreign exchange for one third of the developing countries (Aderhold et al. 2000). However, this can be problematic if demand fluctuates and the country depends too much on the earnings from tourism alone.

(Hemmer 2002; Aderhold et al. 2000; Sinclair 1998; Gormsen 1996; Vorlaufer 1996; Lanfant 1995; Archer & Cooper 1994).

In addition, the developing countries can compete in the international tourism market much more than in other markets: They have a comparative advantage due to the sector's relatively high labour intensity and they do not face barriers to trade that are imposed by the developed economies on most other export goods[21] (Hemmer 2002).

Moreover, it is argued that in countries with huge regional disparities, tourism as a sectoral and regional pole of growth can integrate peripheral regions into the national economy and form a basis for their overall development. While these peripheral regions usually lack the resources for profitable agricultural or industrial production they are often rich in at least one of the immobile resources that tourists are looking for, such as beaches, sunshine, jungle, desert and "exotic cultures" (Vorlaufer 1996). In addition to economic reasons, strategic considerations to secure national territory can play a role in the promotion of tourism in peripheral areas, too (Michaud 1995).[22]

2.4.2 Costs of Tourism Development

While tourism provides a lot of potential for economic development, it has also been heavily criticised for its negative environmental, social and cultural impacts on the host regions. Environmental problems that are created or intensified by tourism[23] include the disruption of sensitive ecosystems through tourist activities, the overexploitation of natural resources or the contamination of the environment with waste and sewage. Commercialisation of culture, onesided acculturation, negative effects on the social structure and value system of the host society, appropriation of land or even displacement of people and the consequent loss of their livelihoods are some of the social and cultural problems associated with international tourism[24] (Aderhold et al. 2000; Gormsen 1996; Vorlaufer 1996).

Today, it is argued that in some cases the negative environmental, social and cultural effects outweigh the economic benefits of tourism in the host regions (Aderhold et al. 2000; Archer & Cooper 1994). Notwithstanding, this should not lead to generalisation since both, the positive and negative impacts of tourism development result from a variety of interdependent economic, social, cultural, political and environmental factors in the host destination as well as from the type and amount of tourism and tourists. Only a case-by-case analysis can determine the effects of tourism on the host destination and whether it contributes to a sustainable overall development (Aderhold et al. 2000; Vorlaufer 1996).

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[21] Tourism is a service that is exported, since it is consumed by inhabitants of other countries.

[22] Geographic peripheries often coincide with economic and political peripheries and are often inhabited by national minorities.

[23] It is important to differentiate between the extent to which problems originate directly from tourism and the extent to which these problems are a result of modernization or industrialization in general.

[24] Notwithstanding, the opposite can be the case as well, such as the revival of culture or environmental protection through tourism development. An example is the establishment of national parks in connection with tourism development.

2.4.3 Structures of Power and the Distribution of Benefits from Tourism

Whatever the costs and benefits of tourism are (economic, ecological, socio-cultural, etc.), their distribution usually correlates with the distribution of power.[25] Whereas Mowforth and Munt (1989) argue that this is the case between the first and the third world, power relations can also play a role within a state, i.e. between regions and/or between social or ethnic groups.[26] As a consequence,

> "the interests of the local population, […] [especially in the case of an indig-
> enous people (comment of the author)], might not be adequately considered
> by developers […] [and] may be overruled by powerful groups outside the
> region once development has taken place." (Hohl and Tisdell 1995:519)

Whether an integrated and balanced tourism development with broad participation can be achieved therefore depends on the economic and political structure of power in both the tourism destinations as well as the areas of origin (Gormsen 1996). Often, the local population of tourist destinations participates underproportionally in the benefits from tourism development and overproportionally in its negative effects. Moreover, ethnic identity is a significant determinant in the various power relationships that determine the direction and outcomes of tourism development.

The case of the South Sinai Bedouin is special in the sense that they do not only constitute the "local population" but moreover an ethnic minority within Egypt and an indigenous people. This will become evident in the course of this thesis.

In order to investigate the issues discussed above for the case of South Sinai and its indigenous Bedouin the Livelihood Systems Approach (LSA) is best suited as a theoretical framework for this research and will therefore be introduced in the next section.

2.5 The Livelihood Systems Approach (LSA)

The concept of "Sustainable Livelihood" has been introduced to the development political discourse in the 1980s by Richard Chambers in view of the dissatisfactory success of conventional top-down development projects.[27] The Livelihood Systems Approach (LSA) focuses on human beings as they try to secure a livelihood in a context of vulnerability. Its overarching goal is to reduce poverty by placing the poor in the centre of attention, and help them improve

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[25] The question of power in general and its distribution in particular and consequently the question of losers and winners is not only manifesting itself in the tourism sector, but is also one of the biggest problems associated with globalisation. At the same time, the tourism industry reflects many features of globalisation such as a significant involvement of transnational companies, a large increase of foreign direct investment and a fast growing number of international tourists over the last few decades (Mowforth & Munt 1989; Lanfant 1995).

[26] These intranational power relations can of course be regarded as an extension of the global distribution of power where national elites form a centre of power.

[27] Today, the concept of sustainable livelihood is well accepted and widely used and the British DFID (Department of International Development) has integrated sustainable livelihood as a central goal of development politics and has further developed the LSA (Chambers & Conway 1992:25).

their situation after analyzing and understanding their livelihood system. Chambers defines a livelihood as follows:

> "a livelihood comprises the capabilities, assets and activities required for a means of living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses and shocks and maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets both now and in the future, while not undermining the natural resource base." (Chambers & Conway, 1992:9)

In order to determine whether a livelihood is sustainable, the following basic questions need to be answered:

> "Given a particular **context** (of policy setting, politics, history, agro-ecology and socio-economic conditions), what combination of **livelihood resources** (different types of 'capital') result in the ability to follow what combination of **livelihood strategies** (agricultural intensification/ extensification, livelihood diversification and migration) with what outcomes? Of particular interest in this framework are the **institutional processes** (embedded in a matrix of formal and informal institutions and organizations) which mediate the ability to carry out such strategies and achieve (or not) such outcomes."[28] (Scoones 1998:3)

In other words, in order to analyse and understand how (sustainable) livelihoods are achieved five key issues have to be taken into account (see Figure 1). The LSA analysis does not require a specific sequence, but can be started at any of the five points and should be reiterated in order to approach reality as much as possible. The analysis also comprises the detection of the interdependencies between the five points. For the sake of clarity and understanding, however, the five points will now be discussed consecutively.

2.5.1 Context, Conditions and Trends

This first point comprises a contextual analysis of conditions and trends regarding history, politics, macro-economic conditions, climate, agro-ecology, demography and social differentiation. This context has a direct influence on people's livelihood in general and on their livelihood resources in particular, but especially poor people have only limited control over these external conditions and are therefore exposed to this "vulnerability context". Nonetheless, the context is also influenced from within the system. The main issues regarding the vulnerability context are (see Kollmair & Gamper 2002:5):

- trends (regarding demography, economic development, resource use, etc.)
- economic, political or ecological shocks (e.g. civil wars, natural disasters, diseases, etc.)

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[28] In other words: Which strategies for securing a livelihood can be applied with which available resources and under which specific conditions and what is the result? Which institutional processes and structures influence the capacity to apply such strategies?

- seasonality (i.e. seasonal variations of demand, of prices, of rainfall, etc.)

All these factors have a positive or negative influence on the access that individuals and groups have to different kinds of assets that constitute their livelihood resources.

The Livelihood Systems Approach

Figure 1: The Livelihood Systems Approach (Scoones 1998:4, modified by author)

Figure 2: The five types of capital of the LSA (Kollmair & Gamper 2002:6, modified by author)

2.5.2 Livelihood Resources

As shown in Figure 2 the livelihood resources comprise five kinds of capital (Kollmair & Gamper 2002:6-7).

Natural capital refers to the natural resources such as land, water, pastures, forests, bio-diversity, etc., their quality and accessibility being crucial. Natural resources are important for the livelihoods of people either as private or common goods, especially for people whose economy is based on natural resources and who are especially vulnerable to shocks such as natural disasters.

There is no commonly accepted definition of **social capital.** In the LSA context, social capital refers to all social resources on which people can fall back in order to achieve their livelihood, namely informal networks of cooperation or support as well as the membership in more formal groups such as political parties, labour unions, etc. The access to social capital differs according to age, gender and social rank. According to Helmore & Singh (2001:xi) social capital includes governance structures, decision-making power, community institutions, culture and participatory processes.

Physical Capital stands for the infrastructure and means of production such as machines, equipment, information and communication technology, supply of water, electricity, means of transport, etc. When analysing the availability of physical capital, private as well as public goods have to be considered. Regarding the latter, access and cost are significant factors in securing a livelihood.

Financial capital includes disposable wealth such as savings and cash but also wealth stored in livestock or jewellery as well as regular income (from employment or self-employment, government transfers, gifts, etc.) and access to credit. Financial capital can be used widely and can easily be converted into other types of capital. Usually, poor people lack financial capital and have to rely more heavily on other types of capital.

Human capital comprises the knowledge and skills that are "owned" by individuals, which are also related to the state of health of the individual. Human capital, often expressed as the level of formal education also has an influence on the access to the other types of livelihood resources. However, human capital is difficult to measure exactly and comparative analysis between different groups is much more useful.

2.5.3 Institutional Processes and Organizational Structures

Institutional processes and organizational structures stand for policy programs, for governmental administrative systems, laws, rules and regulations as well as for informal institutions and forms of organization. They determine how the various actors interact and what choices they have. An analysis of processes and structures sheds light on relations of power and establishes the link between the micro and the macro level. The institutional and organizational environment is of crucial significance because of its direct positive or negative impact on the

other four points: the context and trends, the availability of and the access to livelihood resources, on the choice of the respective livelihood strategies and consequently on the livelihood outcome (Kollmair & Gamper 2002:8). A family planning program might for instance have an effect on demographic trends, banking regulations might make access to credit impossible for poor people, and business and investment laws might impede poor people of creating their own business.

2.5.4 Livelihood Strategies

The range and combination of activities and choices that people undertake in order to achieve their livelihood goals are the livelihood strategies. The use of assets and the combination of activities are a function of the available assets, the prevailing context and conditions as well as the institutional and organizational framework. The choice of assets and activities is dynamically adapted to changing conditions, i.e. to the location, the level of income or time. While individuals usually compete in their livelihood strategies they can also opt to unite in collective action.

2.5.5 Sustainable or Unsustainable Livelihood?

Given a specific context, the available resources and the underlying processes and structures, the livelihood strategies result in a livelihood outcome. This outcome can deteriorate or improve over time, can be sustainable or unsustainable. Important aspects to consider are the level of income, the level of well-being,[29] the vulnerability[30] and the sustainable use of resources (Kollmair & Gamper 2002:9). An improved livelihood has a direct impact on the available livelihood resources and can also influence the context and conditions or the institutional framework thereby creating opportunities for new strategies and outcomes.

As has become clear the LSA framework is a very appropriate theoretical model in order to structure the research on Bedouin participation and marginalization in the South Sinai tourism development and the significance of tourism for the livelihoods of the Bedouin today and in the future:

-   The LSA can be applied dynamically and flexibly in response to changes over time and different local settings.

-   The approach is people-centred: the Bedouin's situation, their problems as well as their solutions are the focus.

-   With its holistic approach it does justice to the complexity of social life and human action in a specific socio-economic and ecological system as well as to the fact that development problems more often than not result from adverse institutional structures rather than from a simple lack of resources (Chambers & Conway, 1992:25).

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[29] This refers to both, objective well-being (e.g. access to health services, clean water, etc.) as well as well-being in people's perception.

[30] i.e. the capacity to cope with shocks either through an increase and/or diversification in asset status or diversification of activities.

Especially the institutional processes and organizational structures are crucial in order to understand Bedouin involvement in and marginalization from the tourism development in South Sinai (see chapter 7). In addition, the cultural dimension gains special importance in the context of indigenous people who are competing with the interests of powerful national and global actors in conflicts over land and resources. Not only the physical livelihood but the cultural survival of the Bedouins, too, is at stake. This aspect can also be considered in the LSA due to the flexibility of the approach.

The following chapter argues that despite representing a special case, Bedouin can also be considered indigenous, especially when living in a state with a majority population different from their own. The acknowledgement of the South Sinai Bedouin's status as an indigenous people at the regional, national and international level would be a valuable support in their struggle for a sustainable livelihood and a development on their own terms.

3. South Sinai Bedouin: Arabs, Ethnic Minority and Indigenous People?

The objective of this research is to investigate the impact of tourism development in South Sinai on the indigenous Bedouin.[31] On the one hand, the study propounds the hypothesis that the ethnic identity of the Bedouin weakens their position vis-à-vis the Egyptian government and their voice in the process of tourism development. On the other hand, it argues, that because the Bedouin constitute an ethnic minority and an indigenous people they deserve special protection and support.

However, when designating the South Sinai Bedouin as a distinct ethnic group one will often be confronted with the objection that they are Arabs, just as their fellow Egyptian citizens from the Nile Valley or citizens from other Middle Eastern countries are Arabs, too.[32] Moreover, they would share the same language, religion and even culture. The argument proceeds that the Bedouin are just one of many other socio-economic groups that happens to be backward and consequently disadvantaged. While the Bedouin should (supposedly) be supported in order to remedy their underdevelopment, they should not be granted any special rights or preferential treatment. Rather their tribal territories are regarded as a national resource on which Bedouin can settle and engage in economic activities just like any other Egyptian citizen can do, provided he is following the laws and regulations of the central government.[33]

The argument that Bedouin are just Arabs like their fellow Nile Valley citizens is also manifest in official population statistics about Egypt. Unlike Copts as a religious minority or Sudanese as a national or ethnic minority, the Bedouin are not mentioned in population statistics for Egypt from all kinds of sources.[34] This leads to the conclusion, that they are not regarded as a separate ethnic group.

And although there is a significant number of anthropological studies on the Bedouin that implicitly assume that the Bedouin constitute a separate ethnic group different from the Nile Valley population, these studies do not openly address this question (e.g. Lavie & Young 1984; Marx 1984; Rabinowitz 1985; Lavie 1991; Gardener & Marx 2000). In order to do so the remainder of this chapter will contest the objections and show that Arab identity can manifest itself at various levels and therefore does not contradict the notion of the South Sinai Bedouin representing one or even several ethnic groups who can moreover be designated as indigenous people[35]. To this end, the three main anthropological concepts of ethnicity – the primordial concept, the situational concept and the concept of self-identification – will first be discussed. In a next step, the author explores how the Sinai Bedouin fit these concepts and represent a distinct ethnic group within Egyptian society. Finally, the chapter will show how the

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[31] In this research, the term „Egyptian" refers to Nile Valley Egyptians, the term „Bedouin" refers to South Sinai Bedouin.

[32] During discussions the author had with colleagues, the argument was brought up, that Bedouin are just Arabs, like all the other Arabic speaking people of the Middle East and therefore do not constitute a separate ethnic group or indigenous people in Egypt but just a socio-economic group within Egyptian society.

[33] As will be shown in the course of this research, even this apparent equality does not exist.

[34] Such as Egyptian government statistics or the CIA factbook.

[35] But do really all Arabic speaking people belong to one people or one ethnic group?

South Sinai Bedouin do fit the characteristics of an indigenous people and consequently deserve special rights and support.

3.1 Concepts of Ethnicity

There are three main concepts of ethnicity: the primordial view, situational perspectives and self-identification. These will now be explained in detail.

3.1.1 The Primordial View

According to the primordialist approach, ethnic identity is based on genealogy and "is derived from being born into a particular community, by adopting its values (e.g. religion) and speaking its specific language or even a dialect of a language, and following a set of cultural practices that are associated with the community." (Geertz 1963:109). As Gordon (Gordon 1978:71 in Hitchcock 1999:20) points out, the relationship between kinsmen is not merely based on personal attraction, common interests, moral obligations or tactical necessity, but also on *"the significance accorded to the bond itself"*. Gordon argues that social mobility does not affect this sense of ethnicity, unlike for instance the sense of belonging to a social class, *"… since society insists on its inalienable ascription from cradle to grave"* (ibid.), in other words, ethnicity cross-cuts class or political phenomena and has its own dynamics (see Hitchcock 1999:20).

3.1.2 Situational or Instrumental Perspectives

The situational or instrumental approach is more dynamic than the primordial one and emphasizes the role of processes and social relations that form ethnic identities, which may be invoked according to circumstances. The first and most important proponent of this approach is Barth (1969) who rejects the notion that culture is a fixed and monolithic entity and poses the question where the boundaries between different groups might lie (Hitchcock 1999:21). Barth makes a distinction between the ethnic organization of a group and the ethnic identification of individuals on the one hand and the allegedly objective culture that anthropological science until the late 1960s thought could be perceived and investigated and that served to conceptually define ethnic groups (Barth 1969 in Roosens 1989:12). According to Eriksen (1991 in Hitchcock 1999:21) ethnic identity has to be continuously and intentionally created and recreated, essentially through the communication and maintenance of cultural differences. And depending on the context, the signifiers of identity can change, but there must be shared agreement among the members of the group concerning that which is significant.

3.1.3 Self-identification

As argued by Barth (1969) and the majority of today's anthropologists, the identification of an individual or a group as belonging to a specific ethnic or cultural group is based on self-identification. This self-identification relies on a combination of characteristics that the actors ascribe to themselves and consider relevant but never comprises the totality of the observable

culture. It is sufficient for an ethnic group to vindicate itself by drawing a social border between itself and similar groups using a few cultural symbols and values that make it distinct in its own eyes and in the eyes of others (Roosens 1989). Over time and depending on the context, these characteristics can be replaced by others, as discussed in the previous section. The intensity with which an ethnic group and its individuals emphasize their ethnicity is positively linked to the intensity of spatial and social contact between the group and other groups when there is a perceived need for delimitation (see Barth in Roosens 1989:12). Using the example of the Hurons of Quebec Roosens (1989) argues that the cultural signifiers of ethnic identity are derived from the respective group's past, which might or might not be historically confir-mable. It can even be the case that a group attributes cultural traits such as external emblems (e.g. language, clothing, etc.) or fundamental values (e.g. hospitality, faithfulness in friendship) to itself that it has newly created or taken from other people's tradition.

3.2 South Sinai Bedouin – Arabs or Arabs?

In sum, there are three important aspects of ethnic identity:
  1. genealogy,
  2. dynamic and contextualized creation and recreation of ethnic identity based on cultural difference,
  3. self-identification (this can be complemented with identification by others).

Coming back to the dispute whether the South Sinai Bedouin are an ethnic group of their own, this section examines how the manifestation of these three aspects in South Sinai Bedouin identity supports the author's argument, that this is the case.

3.2.1 Genealogy

Bedouin history and culture will be discussed in chapter 5 about the context, conditions and trends, but two important issues are anticipated at this point to clarify the genealogical difference between the Bedouin and the Nile Valley Egyptians. While the latter are at large an amalgamation of people from the ancient Egyptians, Arabs, Greek and Turks the South Sinai Bedouin[36] are the descendants of Bedouin from Saudi Arabia who migrated to Sinai over the centuries[37] (see chapter 5). And since the Bedouin who organize themselves in a patriarchal lineage system are endogamous and even intertribal marriages are seldom they have not mixed with the Nile Valley population and do therefore form a genealogically distinct group.

3.2.2 Arabhood and the Dynamic Concept of Ethnic Identity

After having shown in section 3.1. that the ethnic identity is a dynamic concept and is constructed depending on context, the notion of Arabhood will now be examined in this light in

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[36] With the exception of the Jabaliya Bedouin in St. Catherine.
[37] Bedouin from Saudi Arabia also settled in the Nile Valley and the Eastern and Western Desert.

order to challenge the argument that all Arabic speaking people belong to one people or one ethnic group called "the Arabs". It will be exposed that rather the term Arab is 1) a collective designation and 2) has different connotations at different levels. Consequently there is no contradiction in saying that the South Sinai Bedouin are Arabs **and** a distinct ethnic group.

So who are the Arabs? Going back in history to pre-Islamic times, the Arabs were the peoples who inhabited the Arabian Peninsula and spoke different Arabic dialects. At that time, North Africa and the Middle East were inhabited by numerous peoples who spoke various languages. It was the Arab and Islamic expansion during the 7th and 8th century that brought Arab language and culture to these peoples. And while some of these peoples have maintained their language and/or culture to a lesser or greater degree, such as the Berber in Morocco and Algeria, most of the other autochthonous populations have been arabized; Zimpel & Pietrusky (2001) speak of the Northafricans as an arabized autochthonous population. But despite this arabization, a large part of the people today is conscious of their collective pre-Islamic past that still lingers into the present, such as many Moroccans have not forgotten their Berber origins, Lebanese trace their origins back to the Phoenicians and Egyptians to the Pharaohs and ancient Egyptians without of course denying the influence of Arab or other invaders and conquerors.

Despite these significant regional differences, in the 1950s and 1960s the idea of Panarabism and Arab socialism that was advocated/proposed by people such as Michel Aflaq from the Syrian Baath party or the former Egyptian president Nasser met with great support by the mas-ses (Hourani 1992). The evolvement of these ideologies has to be understood in the historical context of intellectual and political resistance movements that developed in many parts of the third world as a response to the legacies of European colonialism and the persistent global imbalance of power between the so called 1st and 3rd world.

Given this historical background an analysis of the meaning and usage of the term *Arab* reveals that the connotation of it referring to one single people is a gross simplification and refers to just one aspect of being Arab: i.e. the criterion of Arabic being the Arabic mother tongue.[38] A differentiated definition of the term *Arabs* such as by Zimpel & Pietrusky (2001:67) reveals a more complex meaning that considers the historical background:

> "Arabs: the entirety of the peoples and tribes of Arabic language, predominantly inhabiting the Arabian Peninsula, who partly migrated from there to the East, but mostly to the West and South. In contrast to the unity of the Islamic Umma, geographical conditions and historical developments have only enabled the formation of regional peoples."[39]

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[38] The argument of a common language has to be critically re-examined considering that most Arabs from the Levante will have difficulties understanding a Moroccan. And while an Egyptian or a Lebanese might identify himself as Arab when residing in Europe or the US, they might very well insist on their nationality rather than their Arab background when in contact with Arabs from other countries.

[39] Translated by the author, original German text: „Gesamtheit der überwiegend auf der Arabischen Halbinsel lebenden und z.T. von dort nach O. mehrheitlich aber nach S. und W. abgewanderten Völker und Stämme arabischer Sprache. Geographische Lagebedingungen und historische Entwicklungen haben im Gegensatz zur islamisch religiös verwirklichten Einheit der Umma lediglich regionale Volksbildungen ermöglicht."

Similarly, Albert Hourani (1991), by using the plural "peoples" in the title of his book "A History of the Arab Peoples" indicates that *Arabs* is a collective term for a set of different peoples with the classical Arab language as a unifying bond.

While it is in no way argued here that today's Arab nations from Morocco to Iraq are not Arab, it should have become clear from the preceding explanations that the term *Arab* can have different meanings in different contexts, at different levels and at different points in time as well as from individual to individual.

And despite the similarities and commonalities due to common religious and cultural developments there are regional differences[40] that can be exemplified for the case of Egypt and the United Arab Emirats (UAE) in order to show how little Bedouin and their culture form part of Egyptian identity. In the construction of their national identity, both countries of course emphasize their Arab-Islamic foundations.

However, in addition to this, Egypt as a nation is proud of its Pharaonic past, but Bedouin heritage or culture does not feature in the Egyptian self-image and national pride. In a way, the view of the famous Egyptian writer Taha Husain can be regarded as representative.[41] He saw three fundamental columns of Egyptian culture (literary spirit) that he would have liked to be considered in a balanced way in Egyptian education[42] (Husain 1933:8-9, in Hourani 1992:415):

1. the purely Egyptian element inherited from the ancient Egyptians,
2. the Arab element that came through its language, religion and civilization,
3. the foreign element that has and will always influence Egyptian life.

Although there is a consciousness and even pride regarding the Arab influence in Egyptian society and culture and the Arabic language has become part of the Egyptian identity[43], this should always be understood in the context of Islamic civilization and/or modern Arabhood, rather than it being a sign of identification with Bedouin society.

In the UAE, on the other hand, Bedouin heritage is the foundation of the nation, as can be seen from the purposes of a conference on "Bedouin Society in the Emirates. The Reliability of Documents versus Accuracy of Narration" organized by the UAE Centre for Documentation and Research in Abu Dhabi from 26 February to 2 March 2005 (DAVO 2004:46):

- "Promoting research on Bedouin society as one of the cultural pillars
  of the Emirates.

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[40] Although Egypt calls itself an Arab Republic there can be no doubt that the Egyptian people are thereby forming a separate ethnic group as much as the Moroccans are a mix of indigenous Berber and the descendants of Arab invaders. And some Moroccans identify themselves more with the Berber and others more with the Arabs.

[41] With exception of the third point on foreign influence that might not be supported by the majority of Egptians.

[42] With the beginning of nationalism, came the attempt of creating a national identity in the respective Arab countries.

[43] Taha Husain did not consider the Arabic influence to be a foreign element or Arabic a foreign language, but thousand times closer to Egyptians than the ancient Egyptian language (Taha Husain 1933: 8-9, in Hourani 1992:4 15).

- Identify the role of Bedouin society in the preservation of the UAE's national identity.

- Identify development and modernization issues affecting Bedouin society.

- Seek out ways to preserve and integrate Bedouin heritage within a contemporary context.

- Preserve social and cultural values which stem from the hardships of life in the desert."

While in the UAE a modern development is therefore founded on the values of its Bedouin society that is in the process of transforming itself, in Egypt, there is no pride for the Bedouin, but rather they are seen as underdeveloped and in need of being developed by following the Egyptian way which is largely the way of the urban and in some sense Westernized elite as well as the Nile Valley fellahin.

As should have become evident, Arab is not just Arab, but each region in the Arab world has its own ethnic identity based on its specific history. Similarly, not all Latin-Americans are just Latinos (or worse Spanish) only because they all speak Spanish and are all Christians. Does an assimilated Aymara from Bolivia belong to the same ethnic group as a Mapuche from Chile or as the Venezuelan president Hugo Chavez?

The dynamic concept of ethnic identity is also reflected in the ethnonyms[44] that Bedouin and other Eygptians use to refer to themselves[45]. While the Bedouin collectively call themselves Arab and then with the name of their tribe and lineage and refer to the Egyptians as Egyptian (*misry*), the Egyptians call themselves Egyptian and then refer to the area of their origin (i.e. Cairean) and only refer to themselves as Arabs in relation to the outside world. But Hitchcock (1999) has already pointed out that "ethnonyms" can also become separated from their place of origin as a result of national boundary changes and disputes over the ownership of cultural property, in which two or more nations attempt to copyright contested names, national emblems and famous ancestors are not uncommon.[46]

3.2.3 Self-definition as the Decisive Argument

As argued by Barth (1969:14) and the majority of today's anthropologists, the identification of an individual or a group as belonging to a specific ethnic or cultural group is based on self-identification. As will be shown in section 3.3.3 the South Sinai Bedouin clearly identify themselves as completely different from the Egyptians and feel strongly attached to Bedouin from

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[44] No matter how a group is defined, it must be aware of its own identity and have a name for itself, an ethnonym.

[45] It seems a bit absurd that centuries after the Islamic expansion, when constellations of power have changed and the invaded adopted so much of the culture and in particular the language of the invaders that the Bedouin of South Sinai are regarded as the same people so that one could speak of an appropriation of the identity of the conquerors, whose kin, today, finds itself at the lowest level in society.

[46] E.g. Greece against the name of Macedonia (former Yugoslavian Republic), since the name is Greek.

the Arabian Peninsula, Israel and Jordan. Some even still have relatives across the border and, if the borders did not exist, these bonds would be much more intense. In the views of the Bedouin the only aspects that unite them with the Egyptians is a common nationality, a common religion and to a certain degree a common language. However, the societal organization, the socio-economic systems as well as the values and traditions, which developed over the centuries of life in the desert, all differ greately from those of the Egyptians.

After concluding that the South Sinai Bedouin should be regarded as a distinct ethnic group with a different identity than that of the majority of Nile Valley Egyptians the next section will explore whether the South Sinai Bedouin should moreover be considered an indigenous people who consequently would be entitled to special support and protection.

3.3 South Sinai Bedouin – an Indigenous People?

In order to establish whether the South Sinai Bedouin constitute an indigenous people one can draw upon the characteristics of indigenous people listed in section 2.4 and analyze in how far they apply in the case of the South Sinai Bedouin. Most of these characteristics will be explained in more detail in the course of this book, but for the sake of the argument a short overview is given here.

a) Priority in time, with respect to the occupation and use of a specific territory

The South Sinai Bedouin migrated from Saudi Arabia and have inhabited the area for several centuries (see chapter 5). Egypt and Egyptians had never really populated South Sinai, but have had interest in the exploitation of its resources. In ancient times, the Pharaos used to send expeditions to South Sinai to exploit its turquoise and copper deposits. Under British colonial rule and after independence South Sinai has been of economic significance because of the newly discovered oil fields and manganese deposits. But while Egyptian interest in South Sinai was always restricted to these isolated points, the South Sinai Bedouin have actually inhabited South Sinai and control over its territory and its resources have been divided among the South Sinai Bedouin tribes. Only with the 15 years of Israeli occupation from 1967 to 1982 did Sinai and its newly developing tourism industry become of Egyptian national interest, both economically as well as strategically (militarily). As a consequence, until 2009 about 100,000 individuals[47] have migrated from the Nile Valley to South Sinai[48] and have outnumbered the Bedouin.

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[47] Author's estimates based on 1986 and 1996 population census (GoE 1986, 1996) and rural and urban population growth rates for this period.

[48] Most of them only temporarily.

b) The voluntary perpetuation of cultural distinctiveness, which may include the aspects of language, social organization, religion and spiritual values, modes of production, laws and institutions

While the Bedouin and the Egyptians do of course share the common religion of Islam[49] and consequently also share some cultural traits, there are many differences, too.

The most obvious difference between the Bedouin and the Egyptian majority society is the social organization of the Bedouin in a tribal and lineage system and the existence of a traditional legal system, the urf with its own judges where matters of dispute among members of the various tribes are settled. In addition, the Arabic dialect[50] of the Bedouin is so different from the "Egyptian" dialect that Bedouin children at school do sometimes have difficulties understanding their Egyptian teachers. Similarly, Egyptian migrants have problems comprehending Bedouin conversations or songs. Even though many Bedouin have now settled in towns they still regard the freedom to move from place to place, to (know how to) live in and with nature as a privilege and part of their identity (see chapter 8.1). And although today few Bedouin can live from their livestock, goats and sheep are still kept out of nostalgic reasons. Camels are still of economic significance since they are used for tourist safaris.

c) Self-identification, as well as recognition by other groups, or by state authorities, as a distinct collectivity

The Bedouin certainly identify themselves as a distinct collectivity and are defined so by the Egyptian state and its citizens, too, though usually they are not referred to as a distinct ethnic group or even indigenous people. For the Bedouin it is clear that they are Egyptians only on paper (their ID) because they happen to live on Egyptian national territory, but that in their hearts they are Bedouin.[51] The following two statements reflect this attitude:

> "Of course the Bedouin are a different people than the Egyptians. We already differ in the language, and in our views and ways of life. We identify with the life in the desert, we are from the desert. May be our children will say we are from the town, but we, we still are from the desert." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 55)

> "We, the Bedu are not like the Egyptian people at all! Our customs and traditions are completely different and our way to deal with each other and with other people is also very different." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 32)

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[49] With exception of the Copts.

[50] Although there are even significant differences in the dialects of the various South Sinai tribes, their language is much closer to Arabic dialects from Saudi Arabia than from Egypt.

[51] In fact, during her interviews the author has repeatedly encountered Bedouin who consider themselves as Arabs while calling the Egyptians "Pharaos".

Since the South Sinai Bedouin have not yet heard about the international movement of indigenous people, at this point in time, no statement can be made regarding their self-identi-fication with the movement and with other indigenous people.

d) An experience of subjugation, marginalization, dispossession, exclusion or discrimination

As will be discussed in detail in chapter 7, the Bedouin are marginalized, excluded and discriminated against in many ways ranging from hassling at checkpoints, exclusion from beaches, restaurants and offices, loss of their land to the state or to individuals through dubious contracts.

The preceding explanations clearly show that the Bedouin display all the important characteristics of an indigenous people. Concluding it can be said that although there is no commonly accepted definition of the concepts (terms) "indigenous people" or "ethnic group" it is widely accepted among anthropologists that self-identification is the crucial factor for an individual's or group's identification with a certain ethnic group. Moreover, other arguments, such as the application of many of the criteria of indigenous people and the dynamic concept of ethnicity underpin this position. Most importantly, though, we should realize that although definitions shape our thoughts and arguments, support or undermine political positions and are necessary in order to ease communication and to apply laws and regulations they should not blind our eyes and deter our view from the essential: if we care about the individual and collective fates of the South Sinai Bedouin in the first place and cultural diversity in the second place, it does not matter how we label the Bedouin. What matters is how the dominant parts of global as well as Egyptian society can help the Bedouin to develop in a self-determined way rather than being overrun by the developments. The aim of this research is to make a contribution to this objective.

4. Methods of Data Collection and Analysis

As introduced in chapter 2, the livelihood systems approach serves best as a theoretical framework for this study. However, its strengths are also the reason for its weaknesses. A holistic and differentiated LSA analysis requires enormous financial, time and personal resources and leads to the consideration of many different aspects. When they are all integrated in the data collection the result is a flood of information that is hard to cope with and prioritizing entails a normative dilemma. Since this research was carried out on a relatively small scale with limited resources, it does not claim to be a complete LSA study as it should be carried out for the preparation of a development project.

The methods applied in this research such as the selection of the study area, the choice of an appropriate data collection method and the actual fieldwork and data analysis will be discussed in this chapter. Finally a thorough evaluation of the applied methods will be provided.

4.1 The Selection of the Study Area

As will be described in detail in chapter 5, the international tourism industry of South Sinai is concentrated around four locations: the towns of Sharm al-Shaikh, Dahab, Nuwaiba and St. Catherine (see Map 1) but developments are also taking place in the desert as well as along the coast between Nuwaiba and Taba. Prior to the beginning of the research, Sharm al-Shaikh, Dahab and St. Catherine were chosen as study areas due to their specific characteristics that were expected to influence Bedouin participation in the tourism industry in different ways:

Sharm al-Shaikh

This is the tourism centre of Sinai with the regional airport and many large, high budget hotels. Here, the Bedouin do not own any land.

Dahab

Besides the large scale, high-end hotels that predominate the tourism industry of South Sinai, Mzaina Bedouins have opened small hotels, restaurants and shops and have rented them to Egyptian migrants. This was only possible because the Mzaina were able to claim property rights to a small stretch of beach due to their traditional date palm cultivation (Meyer 1996:587).

St. Catherine

In this mountain town and the nearby monastery of St. Catharine, which is the most important cultural highlight in South Sinai, the Jabaliya Bedouin have a long history of providing services to pilgrims and other visitors and have always had a close relationship with the monastery (Hobbs 1996).

Map 1: Sinai and the study locations

The success of the fieldwork, as it became clear after the first field work, was very much dependent on the contacts the researcher could establish with the Bedouin and the ease with which she could move freely and without becoming suspicious in the eyes of the Egyptian authorities. Good contacts with Bedouin could be established in St. Catherine, Dahab and Nuwaiba and in the consequence with their relatives and friends in the desert. With the help of these Bedouin, the researcher could also visit remote desert areas to where necessary transport could be organized relatively easily.[52] Consequently the researcher concentrated her study on these places.

The situation in Sharm al-Shaikh was much more difficult, since the Bedouin live in villages outside the town and only go to Sharm al-Shaikh for work – if at all. In order to establish closer contacts with the Bedouin, the researcher would have had to stay with a family in one of the villages. However, no opportunity in this direction emerged. And while in Dahab and St. Catherine the presence of individual tourists does not arise any suspicion, this would have been different if the researcher had stayed in a Bedouin village near Sharm al-Shaikh that is frequented by package tourists who stay in large hotels. Unfortunately, due to these difficulties and restrictions only relatively little information could be collected about the situation in Sharm al-Shaikh, which should hopefully be studied in the near future.

4.2 Material

Statistics and secondary sources were examined and consulted to prepare and complement the fieldwork. In addition to the academic literature, this includes statistics on the tourism industry, information on the physical and human geography of the area, reports and development plans of the Egyptian government and international organizations on regional and tourism development in Sinai and in Egypt as well as any other information of relevance to the research topic. These sources were consulted in an iterative process constantly feeding into the design of the research as well as the analysis and interpretation of the results.

It should be noted that in Egypt, it is very difficult to obtain official reports, statistics or documents.[53] Fortunately, the researcher had access to many official documents regarding tourism and general development of South Sinai through personal contacts with two development consultants.[54] Steiner (2002:5) reports similar experiences and speaks of the Egyptian authority's attempts of intentionally deceiving the researcher and hiding information out of a pronounced mistrust towards foreign observers or researchers.

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[52] When one of these Bedouin would go to a desert place they would ask the researcher whether she wanted to join.

[53] In an attempt to obtain information about regulations regarding tourism companies at the Investment Authority in Cairo, after having presented her request the researcher was kept waiting for three hours just to be told that the information was only available in a certain department at the Ministry of Tourism (MoT). But once the researcher arrived at that department, she was told that the person was not responsible but that she should go to another person on a different floor. From there she was sent to the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) where after another long waiting time she was received by some officer only to be told, that the information was available with the person at the Investment Authority with whom she has spoken in the first place – a hopeless undertaking.

[54] The names of these consultants and the organizations they were working for are withheld for reasons of confidentiality.

4.3 Choice of Data Collection Method

The choice of the appropriate data collection method had to consider the situation in the field as well as the state of research regarding Bedouin involvement in tourism development in South Sinai. Three points were crucial in the decision to take a qualitative research approach and will be explained below:

-   limited existing knowledge about the situation,

-   suspicion of the Egyptian regime regarding social research activities,

-   Bedouin culture and mentality.

4.3.1 Limited Existing Knowledge about the Situation in Sinai

Although some ethnographic research – mostly from the 1980s and early 1990s – on the South Sinai Bedouins already exists (see for instance Lavie & Young 1984; Marx 1984; Lavie 1989, 1991; Rabinowitz 1985; Hobbs 1995; Wickering 1991, 1996), it could only give a limited idea about the present situation on the ground, especially regarding Bedouin participation in tourism. This issue has only been addressed in relatively short research papers[55] that give a good overview of tourism development and/or the Bedouin's situation in South Sinai (see Meyer 1996; Sanmartin 1999; Aziz 2000; Behbehanian 2000; Gardener 2000, 2002; Ballestad 2001). However, no previous research could be relied on regarding a detailed analysis of the structure and organization of the tourism industry and the strategies of its actors.

In such a case, where the object of the study still has to be explored in its foundation, it is important to understand the factors of individual decision making and the interdependencies between the various actors and processes that characterize the tourism industry. This can be achieved through intensive qualitative research rather than through the collection of quantitative data about a complex situation that has not yet been understood sufficiently (cf. Braukmeier 1992).

4.3.2 An Autocratic Regime and its Suspicion towards any Kind of Investigation, Especially in Sinai

The Egyptian regime is all but democratic[56] and therefore fears any investigation that could turn out to be critical of the regime and its politics. After the Israeli occupation of Sinai 1967-1982, the peninsula has become strategically important to Egypt. Bedouins are often considered to be collaborators due to their "co-operation" with the Israeli occupation forces: while Egyptians fled to the Egyptian mainland, most Bedouins remained in South Sinai during the war and the occupation. They are still looked at with suspicion and so are foreigners who are digging too deeply into politically sensitive issues. During her stay in Sinai the researcher wit-

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[55] The papers comprise 2-15 pages.

[56] Cf. Harders 2005, International Crisis Group 2005, Wurzel 2003, Kienle 2000.

nessed how the secret service was making investigations about a young Israeli for unknown reasons and heard about a French researcher who was held in police custody in St. Catherine for several days. Consequently, this research could not be done openly and a standardized survey on a random sample had to be precluded from the beginning, but informal interviews could be conducted to collect qualitative information.[57]

4.3.3 Bedouin Culture and Mentality as well as Lack of Formal Education and High Illiteracy Rate

How could one obtain information from the Bedouin who until recently have had no formal education, many of whom are illiterate and who in many aspects live, act and think in completely different concepts than the European researcher does. The Bedouin have an understanding of e.g. money, time, hospitality, men and women or family that is very different from that of the researcher. Their communication culture with a strong oral bias, too, is dissimilar to the European one that relies very much on the written document. Bedouin contracts used to be closed by oral and not by written agreement. Part of the marginalization of the Bedouins is taking place on these grounds given the inability to read and verify contracts or government rules and regulations (see chapter 7). In this context, some Bedouin are suspicious of anybody writing down what they say, since it is so far from their own understanding and experience. Also, leading a conversation following the key questions is still a very awkward style of conversation for the Bedouin who were and still are used to leasurely exchanging news and ideas when sitting around the fire (or stove) and drinking tea. Given this cultural context, the collection of more than preconceived, standardized information is a must[58].

In the light of these issues the collection of qualitative data was clearly the most appropriate approach.[59] Since this research

- is theory driven,

- wants to answer specific questions and

- targets a large sample in order to achieve a greater validity/accuracy (and make up for the absence of purely quantitative data)

semi-structured interviews are best suited[60] and were chosen as the main method of data collection. Observation complemented the fieldwork and helped to increase the quality of the data

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[57] The researcher considered trying to obtain a research permit but was warned by several other researchers that this was an impossible undertaking that would either yield no or only negative results. It is often argued that research should only be done with official authorization in order to respect the laws of the host country and not to endanger the informants. However, there are issues that governments would prefer to hide and would not allow to be studied, but where one should not be afraid to take a stand and look behind the curtains.

[58] Lavie (1989:103) in her anthropological field study collected data in the most informal way possible by talking with men while they were engaged together in everyday activities such as fishing, sitting in cafes, visiting households or traveling by camel.

[59] Even though quantitative data can be very useful in validating the results of qualitative research and giving a better idea of absolute and relative numbers, a last round of data collection with a standardized survey had to be excluded from the very beginning due to the three reasons mentioned above.

by adding breadth and depth. Before the implementation of this research will be discussed, the following section gives an overview of the key concepts of qualitative research in general and of semi-structured interviews in particular.

4.4 Qualitative Research through Semi-structured Interviews

4.4.1 Foundations of Qualitative Research[61]

In his textbook on qualitative social research, Mayring (1993) points out, that in human science the object of a study are always human beings, i.e. *subjects*. They have to be the foundation and the goal of the research. The focus on the subjects entails a holistic approach, a consideration of the historical context of the subject and a problem orientation, which are all essential features of the Livelihood Systems Approach, too, i.e.:

The starting point of the research should be a social problem of which the researcher has become aware. The practical problem should be targeted and the results of the research should be pointing to a solution.

The understanding of the object of study has to be historical, because the objects of science always have a historical background that can always change thereby influencing the object.

The approach is holistic, because the objects should be studied in their totality. This requires that the analytical dissection of the object into human areas of functions and life has to be synthesized again and be interpreted and corrected in a holistic approach.

Mayring stresses that the research process has to remain open for the unexpected and allow revision, complementation and even renewal of the research design, the theoretical structuralizations, the hypothesis as well as the methods if required by the object of the study. Despite this openness, actually even more so because of this openness, the course of the research has to be controlled and each step has to be documented and justified.

Since in the human sciences the object of research never lies completely open it has to be revealed through interpretation. But interpretation requires pre-understanding on the part of the researcher that has to be made transparent and needs to be continuously developed in interaction with the object. In this respect, the subjective experience of the researcher is accepted as a legitimate means of knowledge. But this introspective data, too, has to be labeled, justified and verified. During the process of interaction between the researcher and the object both of them change and subjective meaning originates and changes so that the research is not just a simple registration of apparently objective characteristics or attributes.

The generalization of the results has to be justified by reasoning, step by step and for each case (considering situation, area, time, etc.) and is not automatically the result of certain

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[60] Rather than narrative interviews or observation.

[61] Qualitative analysis can lay the foundations for further quantitative research to generalize and validate the results.

methods (Mayring 1993). Consequently, uniformities should be translated into context dependent rules rather than laws of general validity.

4.4.2 The Semi-structured or Problem-centered Interview

The semi-structured interview is a commonly applied method for the collection of qualitative data and is especially useful for theory driven research with specific questions or for larger samples (ibid.). In the semi-structured interview[62] – although it is problem centered – the respondents should be able to speak relatively freely in order to approach the situation of an open conversation. Nonetheless, the conversation is centered on the problem that the interviewer introduces and comes back to again and again. To this end he follows a framework of a set of key questions that are the result of an analysis of the problem prior to the interview phase and cover the main topics and questions (cf. Chambers 1997; Mayring 1993). The interview should be open-ended and follow up on unexpected information. Consequently, the majority of the questions arise during the course of the interview leaving room for discussion or probing for details. Semi-structured interviews thereby often go beyond answers and also give reasons for answers (Davis Case 1990). On the other hand, it may often be difficult to make comparisons between the respondents due to variations in the questions from one interview to the next.

The semi-structured interview has become an important tool for rapid rural appraisal (RRA) and participatory rural appraisal (PRA) as well as for the Livelihood Systems Approach (LSA) used in this research. These techniques were developed in the 1980s as a result of criticism towards the traditional questionnaire survey methods that reflected the ideas of urban-educated researchers who could not adequately conceptualize the realities of poor people (Brace 1995).[63] They are very important approaches in the context of rural development because they take account of "the complex, diverse, dynamic and unpredictable realities of people" (Chambers 1997:41) by emphasizing comparison and judgement rather than precise measurement. Unlike questionnaire surveys that "select and simplify reality, often mislead, and reconfirm the realities of uppers missing local complexity and diversity, PRA [and RRA] methods usually engage the commitment and analysis of local people, enable the expression and sharing of their diverse and complex realities [and] give insights into their values, needs and priorities […]" (ibid.:123). [64,65,66] Since this research was not part of a project but carried out independently, the RRA methods used in this study are limited to semi-structured interviews, discussion with experts and direct observation. Most other PRA tools would have required even more time and commitment from the subjects of the study without resulting in any advantages for them.

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[62] Non-structured interviews would have been too flexible and schedule-structured interviews would have been too rigid for the purpose of this study.

[63] While RRA is mainly a data-collecting activity PRA is geared to an on-going empowering process. However, PRA methods can be used in RRA and vice versa.

[64] Using standardized questionnaires one also risks that the respondent replies without really having understood the question.

[65] With the term "uppers" Chambers refers to the urban-educated researchers.

[66] In addition to semi-structured interviews, other common tools of PRA and RRA are direct observation, transect walks, drawing and discussion, murals and posters, flannel boards, historical mapping, ranking, rating and sorting to name a few (Chambers 1997, Davis Case 1990).

4.4.3 Development of Key Questions for the Interviews in this Research

Before the first field phase a catalogue with preliminary key questions for the semi-structured interviews was designed based on the five main questions this research wants to answer (see Annex I). During the first field phase these key questions were already modified according to the needs and new insights that arose during the fieldwork in order to accommodate newly discovered information. After the first fieldphase the data was transcribed from the field notes into a computer database (see section 4.7). During this process new questions arose that were later on incorporated into the question catalogue for the second field phase. In the same way, further adaptions were made between the second and the third fieldphase and new questions that arose from more literature research were included, too.

4.5 Data Collection in Three Field Phases

According to Mayring (1993) the question of how the researcher, who usually is a stranger, can get contact to the field, gain trust and become accepted is one of the main problems during field research. For this research, a total of 162 semi-structured interviews were conducted during eight months spread over three separate field phases in May/June and September/October 2003 as well as March – June 2004. Among the respondents were 128 Bedouin, 28 Egyptian migrants and 6 European migrants. This section describes which strategies were used to find these respondents and how the interview scheme developed in the course of the fieldwork.

4.5.1 First and Second Field Phase

In May and June 2003, the researcher spent six weeks in the study area in order to get acquainted with and gain a deeper understanding of the small scale informal tourism and the Bedouin and migrant communities. The fieldwork was started at St. Catherine where initial contacts could be established through the project leader of the EU-funded St. Catherine Protectorate Development Project who was introduced to the researcher by a consultant of the German Technical Cooperation (GTZ). In the following days, contacts were made at the camp[67] where the researcher was accommodated and where many Bedouin came to spend some time in the *"maqad"*[68] or to visit their friends working at the camp. The owner of the camp also helped the researcher by taking her on his tourist safaris whereby the researcher could get an insight into the safari business and get acquainted with Bedouin in the desert. After two weeks, the second location, Dahab, was visited for a period of three weeks. Again, contacts were made in the camps where Bedouin came to visit, as well as at the beach and on the street where Bedouin offered their services as taxi drivers or for a camel ride. The last week of the first field phase was spent in Nuwaiba: Here, the researcher was accommodated at a camp whose owner was a friend of one of the Bedouin in St. Catherine. The owner introduced the researcher to other Bedouin who run camps along the coast North of Nuwaiba and

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[67] Simple hostels are called "camps" in South Sinai in imitation of the Bedouin encampments.

[68] The maqad is a semi-public space where guests are received and men meet to drink tea and discuss their issues.

helped with transport to cover the long distances between the various locations along the coastal stretch North of Nuwaiba. During this first visit to the field in the spring of 2003 most interviews were carried out in English since the researcher was not yet familiar with the Egyptian and Bedouin Arabic dialects.

During the second field phase in autumn 2003 the researcher proceeded in the same way. In addition she could also rely on meeting people through friends and acquaintances from the first field phase. This also included interviews in the desert where she was taken by friends from St. Catherine. Increasingly, interviews were held in Arabic.

During the first and second field phase, Egyptian migrants and foreigners were interviewed, too, in order to get a more objective and complete picture of the tourism industry. Contacts with both investors as well as workers from this group were established during visits in restaurants, bazaars or shops. While the foreigners were openly told about the purpose of the research, migrants were often interviewed in a covert way in order to avoid problems with the authorities.

4.5.2 Third Field Phase

The third field phase from March to June 2004 was very different from the first two phases, because the researcher was invited to stay with a Mzaina Bedouin family in Wadi Saal in the desert. When after a week the researcher moved to Nuwaiba and later to Dahab, the Bedouin family insisted that the researcher should stay with relatives of the family in both coastal towns. This was the breakthrough in getting a more personal access to the Bedouin and consequently the quality of the relationships, the researcher's general understanding of present day Bedouin life as well as of their Arabic dialect and the interviews changed completely. Through the help of a Swiss student and her Bedouin boyfriend a similarly close relationship could be established with the Tarabin of Nuwaiba where the researcher stayed at a young couple's house. Staying with a Bedouin family clearly had the advantage of being much closer to the Bedouin, establish deeper and longer lasting relationships and pick up a lot of information through everyday life and conversations. At the same time, it also required certain adjustments, much more time had to be spent at the home, with the children etc. in order to socia-lize. Furthermore, a balance between Bedouin social norms and acceptable exceptions for a foreigner had to be found, i.e. although men used to come and visit the house and would have been ideal interview partners, this occasion could not be used, since they had come together to discuss men's issues. However, sometimes the men invited the researcher to join them and those occasions yielded a lot of information. Living with a Bedouin family also meant a more restricted movement especially at night and in the tourism areas that were located at a dis- tance (especially in the case of Nuwaiba) and where other Bedouin who do not belong to the family could be met. Except for very old women or for young girls these tourist areas were a tabu for the Bedouin women.

In addition to the direct contact with the families and their relatives and friends, coming into contact with other Bedouin also became easier: when those Bedouin heard that the resear-

cher was staying with a Bedouin family they quickly became much more open and trustful than when they thought the researcher was just some kind of curious tourist who stayed in a camp.

While during the first two phases no group interviews were held, because the researcher was not yet acquainted sufficiently with the Bedouin, their language and culture as well as the structure and problems of the tourism industry to be able to control group discussions, during the third phase a number of group discussions arose naturally in the homes of the family and their relatives. As Mayring (1993:45) describes, the advantage of group discussions lies in the breaking of psychological barriers and the identification of collective attitudes and ideologies. Often, true feelings and opinions can be found by making provocative arguments that lead to a more emotional and less controlled expression in a group but that might be ignored in an individual interview. The researcher obtained valuable insights with this approach.

During the third field phase, interviews were often less structured but more focussed than in the first two phases. Due to the large volume of questions a trade off had to be made between quality and quantity, i.e. if a respondent was very willing to talk about sensitive issues or give extra and lengthy information about other specific issues this was preferred over asking him the entire range of questions about his person as well as his household. Of course some key information such as his age, position, etc. were recorded, too. Some informants were so knowledgeable, so critical, so engaged and so helpful, that interviews with them were carried out in several sessions each a few hours long.

4.5.3 Interview Strategy – Establishing Trust

For each interview the researcher had to find the appropriate way to start the conversation, build up trust and eventually ask the questions she was really interested in. It was important to be aware of the differences between the Bedouin/Arab and the German/European culture of communication. Traditionally, the Bedouin would even host a stranger for three days without questioning him about his intentions. Only if he wanted to stay longer, he had to explain what the purpose of his visit was. At the same time, it would also have been very impolite for a person to come to a Bedouin's home and immediately introduce one's matter. The unwritten law of letting a warm-up phase precede the discussion of important issues is still valid today.

In the beginning of an "interview opportunity"[69] the researcher would therefore often just sit and listen to those present, showing respect and not intruding immediately into men's talk. After a while she would ask if she could do the interview with one of those present (or a specific person) and sit a bit apart. Once the researcher sat alone with the respondent she would still make some general conversation and then finally introduce her study and request. During the interview she would also comment on some of the statements, show her understanding or compassion and sometimes tell the respondent about similar issues in her home country. In some cases, the respondents were actually very self-confident and demanded that, if they were asked, they also wanted to ask the researcher questions. These questions would either

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[69] This refers to both scheduled as well as spontaneous interviews.

dig further into the purpose and background of the research, ask about life in Europe or ask the researcher about her opinion about the situation in Sinai. The key questions were embedded in this informal conversation and complemented by ad-hoc questions in the case of new aspects that were of significance for the research topic. Some statements also had to be verified through further inquiries either during interviews, informal conversations or through observation. The latter two also yielded valuable insights that supplemented the information gained through the interviews.

Various styles of questioning were applied ranging from closed to open and from non-directive to directive questions depending on the situation and the function of the questioning. This flexibility is very useful and a typical characteristic of ethnographic research as which this research can be considered (Cohen 1984:226 in Palmer 2001:304). Open questions were asked to understand the respondent's opinion on certain issues and his reasoning behind it as well as to find out how he would act in certain situations. If possible, a topic would be introduced by making a statement such as "There are many cars of the big tourist companies passing by here," rather than immediately asking the respondent the daily number of cars passing by or his opinion about them. This way, the conversation would be more natural and more honest opinions could be obtained.

More directive questions were often used to probe what the researcher had read, heard or seen from other sources or to provoke the respondent and find out about his deeper thoughts: for instance, if a respondent talked about newly introduced regulations by the government regarding the land, the researcher would ask: "But isn't this Bedouin land?" Of course, in all cases, the answers were critically evaluated regarding their credibility as much as possible. This was the easier the more knowledge the researcher already had about a specific issue.

4.5.4 Recording the Data

Linked to the question of how to gain access to and the trust of the respondents is the issue of how to record the collected data during the interviews: Should the interview be recorded on tape? Should the researcher take notes? Or should she memorize the statements and write them down after the interview? Again, due to the sensitivity of the research as well as due to the fact that Bedouin have only recently started to be exposed to modern technology[70] recording the interviews on tape was excluded as a possible option: in most cases it would have made the respondents feel uncomfortable, especially when talking about sensitive political or personal issues. Moreover, any recorded interviews could have implicated the respondents as well as the researcher in case of investigations through the state authorities. A few respondents asked the researcher why she did not record the interviews on tape. These individuals, however, were already willing to share their ideas and seemed to be much more aware of the situation in Sinai as well as in the world. When the researcher explained her reasons to them, they immediately agreed that most Bedouin would rather not be recorded or if so would not speak openly and honestly.

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[70] Of course, there also is a large number of Bedouin, especially among the younger generation, who quickly adapt new technologies. A good example is the popularity of mobile phones.

Consequently, the researcher resorted to taking notes during the interview when possible. However, some respondents were suspicious about taking notes, too.

Of course, interviews could not be recorded one to one, but abbreviations, generalisations and summaries were being made, important statements where the way they were expressed also had specific meaning were recorded in their completeness. If the attitudes or reactions of the respondents indicated a deeper meaning of a statement, they were noted down, too.

In some occasions, when the interview was held in a public place or if not enough trust had been established yet the statements were memorized as well as possible and written down after the interview.[71]

The researcher is aware, that some people might argue that covert research is ethically not acceptable[72]. However, the researcher often started a conversation without revealing her own intentions or role. Depending on how the situation and the relationship between the researcher and the respondent developed in the course of the conversation the researcher would then explain her purpose in order to obtain more private or sensitive information or just record the general information collected during the casual conversation.

4.6   Data Processing

In order to analyze the large amount of data it had to be processed and ordered. The interviews were not conducted in a linear way since some new aspects would be followed up leading to many "branches" of the interview. To this end a descriptive system was constructed and implemented in a MS Access database that the researcher had specifically designed for this purpose. First of all, based on the key questions and the research questions categories were defined and each category was assigned a field in the database. The interview data was then entered into the respective fields of the database. During the data entry the theoretical classification was developed dynamically when new categories evolved from the actual data. The database was adapted in its structure accordingly. Some of the initial categories proved to be inappropriate and remained as empty fields in the database. In order to avoid too many structural changes to the database an important element for the dynamic categorisation was a table for additional comments that did not fit in any of the previously defined classes. Each comment was assigned a category and, if for a new comment non of the existing categories was appropriate, a new category was created. The additional comments table contains a lot of detailed qualitative information including long passages of interviews that helped to maintain the context and the individual character of the respondent. There were some pieces of information that could not clearly be assigned to only one category. In this case the data would be stored under all relevant categories. In the end, the interview data was available on paper in its original version as well as in an organized and classified format in the database.

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[71] This was also necessary for those interviews that were held at night in places without electricity.

[72] There are also proponents of cover research. Denzin (1970), for instance, argues, that covert research is actually necessary, because "if we are not permitted to study things that people wish hidden then sociology will remain a science of public conduct based on evidence and data given to us by volunteers." (Denzin 1970:111 in Palmer 2001:308)

The storage of the data in this database facilitated the further analysis in many ways (cf. Mayring 1993:103-104). The most important advantages were:

- The possibility to order and interpret the data according to topics, locations, type of respondent, etc.

- The possibility to run (even complex) search and query functions: e.g. search for a specific key word, but also queries combining several criteria such as age, location and occupation.

- The possibility to change codes and categories during the analysis process.

- Preparation of quantitative analysis provided a large enough sample.

4.7   Data Analysis and Interpretation

The first structuring of the data was already performed during the data entry into the database when the data was classified and standardized (where possible) according to different aspects of the tourism industry, of Bedouin life, etc. and new categories were adapted. Once the data was stored in the database, it could be analyzed further. For each point of the livelihood systems analysis the relevant data was extracted, standardized further (if required) and summarized. Exceptions to the norm were recorded, too. In a next step, all facts were described and the underlying reasons, possible explanations, relationships and interdependencies were analyzed.

The data analysis approach applied in this research also has similarities with the grounded theory that was first developed by by B.G. Glaser and A.L. Strauss in the 1950s and 1960s (cf. Mayring1993:77). In grounded theory, concept and theory formation already start during data collection and are mostly inductive. Unlike in standardized surveys, where analysis only starts after the data collection has been completed, in grounded theory, the researcher is already thinking about the analysis during the open field research and is constantly interpreting the data so that existing concepts are refined, new concepts are developed, concepts are linked and enter the further data collection. Data collection and analysis therefore take place simultaneously and a theoretical frame becomes clear that is modified and completed stepwise. In research like the present one, where the research topic is still new and unresearched, this iterative process that moves back and forth between data collection and analysis is necessary and useful.

4.8   Evaluation of the Applied Methods

The previous sections have already given some first insights regarding the conduct of the fieldwork. In this section the problems that arose during the fieldwork will be discussed in more detail in order to put this research in its context. As the sociologist Norman Denzin phrased it, sociological enterprise of theory and research is far from an idealized process, immaculately

conceived and elegantly executed: "This is not the way research gets done. What typically occurs is a complex form of interaction between the demands subjects place upon observers and the actual research carried out." (Denzin 1970:315 in Palmer 2001:306). Similarly, in his discussion about methodological problems of empirical social research in developing countries Braukmeier (1992) acknowledges the strong influence methodological problems have on the success of the research. He stresses the importance of a thorough documentation of data collection and analysis as a decisive part of research where the experiences, problems and problem solving strategies are discussed:

> "It is exactly during this phase, when it is decided whether the collected data
> – given a respective research concept – allow relevant and realistic state-
> ments about the issue under question or whether they become contentless,
> dead numbers that can at most fill publications." (Braukmeier 1992:14)

Braukmeier (ibid.) sees a need for self-criticism of the researcher, i.e. for the capacity to admit mistakes and translate negative experiences into a productive outcome. For Braukmeier, the realization that the chosen path was not the optimal one is scientifically equally valuable as the compilation of comprehensive data collections that even might remain without meaningful content. In agreement with these views, the problems of this research will now be critically evaluated.

4.8.1 Finding Respondents

During the entire research it was a difficult task to find respondents. They could not be found according to a specific sampling strategy nor according to the researcher's objective to find respondents under consideration of different occupations and functions, different social and ethnic backgrounds, different age, etc. Rather, the choice of respondents was based on an increasing number of personal contacts as well as spontaneous situations that offered the opportunity for a new contact or an immediate interview. Nevertheless, this approach still yielded in a wide variety of respondents who differed in age, occupation, education and tribe. Since many contacts were established by chance, even a certain randomness could be assured. Nevertheless, access to individuals who operate in the background such as investors, land owners or Bedouin who are involved in other occupations could only be established in some cases. Consequently, there is a bias in the data towards those Bedouin who are engaged in activities that the researcher had easier access to, such as safari, transport or restaurant and accommodation services.

Once a person who agreed to an interview was found, often further difficulties arose. In many cases, an appointment was made for an interview, but the person came much later or did not show up at all. Sometimes, this could be repeated several times, so that the researcher would go all the way to the location of the interview just to be put off till a few hours later. The meantime could not be used for interviews since most people were not available at short notice. But a few hours later the researcher would be put off again. One might think that this was a sign of disinterest, but usually this was not the case. Often the reason was an unexpected business

opportunity that obviously was much more important than the inteview or a spontaneous change in plans due to other reasons. Generally these persons would offer to make another appointment. However, for the researcher valuable time was lost and planning became more difficult. Sometimes, the researcher had also not immediately stated her matter and would accept an invitation to somebody's home with the hope of getting a chance to do an interview. But then – against the researcher's expectations – the host would not be there and some other (often female) members of the family would attend to the researcher. Of course the researcher tried to use the opportunity to collect more information through informal conversation, but in most cases the women did not understand the researcher's interest and replied in a very general way.[73]

4.8.2 The Interview Situation

Another problem was to find a suitable environment for the interview that would guarantee privacy and quietness without inspiring suspicion in other people or the secret police.[74] In the beginning, interviews were held at the camps where the researcher was staying or at other camps. In Dahab, however, where the tourism police and the secret police are almost omnipresent, it was difficult to talk undisturbed and freely in camps or restaurants. Apparently, the Bedouin respondents there, did not feel comfortable to talk in the camps or in their busy homes either and often invited the researcher to hold the interview in the hills just outside Dahab. This again, was always a tricky situation, since going to the hill was also a popular method among Bedouin men to get more intimate with female tourists. However, after one bad experience, the researcher quickly learnt to clearly state her objective and exclude all other potential interpretations. Then the interviews at the hill were very successful because the Bedouin felt at ease and would freely talk about all issues.[75]

Later, when the researcher got more acquainted with the Bedouin, she would be invited to people's homes. Then, there was often no other possibility than to sit in a public space where several adults were present, children would play and visitors would drop in. Since the relationship between the respondent and the other adults that were present could not always be established by the researcher, all questions regarding very personal or sensitive issues could not be asked in this kind of situation. Moreover, there were a lot of interruptions and distractions when people came to ask for a favor, to greet the respondent, etc. These circumstan-ces prolonged the interview and could strain the patience of the respondent.

In those cases where the interview partner had designated time and found a quiet place the interview could be held without interruptions and could even last several hours if the respondents were very willing or even keen to speak about the situation of the Bedouin in Sinai.

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[73] While the researcher had no problems disscussing issues in Arabic with Bedouin men, this was much more difficult with the women. One reason might be that they were less used to talking to foreigners and to understanding the standard Arabic that the researcher spoke. In turn, the researcher often had difficulties to understand the dialect the Bedouin women spoke. Probably the men tried to adjust their Arabic so that the researcher would understand them.

[74] Regarding people's ideas of moral behaviour and the suspicion and mistrust of the police towards investigative foreigners.

[75] Sometimes, Bedouin do not feel free to talk when other Bedouin are around, since the Egyptian secret police also recruits informers among the Bedouin so that sometimes Bedouin cannot always trust each other.

However, if the interview was held in a public space and/or the respondent was not so interested, the interview could abruptly be interrupted for good. One reason could be an unexpected visitor to whom respect had to be paid, especially if he was an elder or more influential person. Another reason could be that the respondent felt that he had talked enough for the day and wanted to move or might have had other things to do. The researcher observed that generally the Bedouin men never sat in one place for a long time, they were always on the move. Typically, they would drink tea at one friend's place and then collectively move to drink tea at another friend's place. In such cases of interruption the respondent would tell the researcher that he would come back later and that the interview could be continued then or another day, but he would not let the researcher fix an appointment. Again, often this second meeting would not take place, since many of the respondents would spontaneously go and visit relatives in the desert or the next town and only return after a few days or even weeks. Sometimes the researcher would not see them again and later coincidentally meet them at a completely different location, even in the middle of the desert. It took a lot of patience and energy to get a second chance to complete such interviews. And then it was difficult to recreate the dynamics of the first interview and fill the gaps. Some interviews could never be finished because the researcher did not get hold of the respondent again.

4.8.3 Sensitive Issues

Regarding field research, Joseph Hobbs, who studied Bedouin life and culture for many years noted: "The Bedouin of South Sinai are generally very sensitive about the scrutiny of actual or perceived government representatives (…). As a rule, [they] do not readily share views with itinerant visitors, with those with whom they have not had time to establish trust, or with anyone they suspect of acting on behalf of potentially hostile authorities" (Hobbs 1996:8). The author of this study, too, noticed a strong unwillingness to talk about or even touch upon political issues among the majority of the respondents.[76] Only a few exceptions were willing to talk very freely, because they either knew the researcher well and/or hoped that they could thereby reach an international public and achieve an improvement for the Bedouin.

This fear and suspicion is understandable given the oppression Bedouin have experienced from the Egyptian government (see chapter 7). Several respondents expressed fear for their personal safety as is reflected in the following statement:

> "I hope I do not end up in a hole with what I tell you and with what you write down. The problem is that there is no freedom of speech and opinion. If there was freedom of speech and press, then Mubarak would not last five hours in power." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 45)

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[76] In the beginning, the researcher had planned to also interview Egyptian migrants regarding their engagement in tourism and their relationship with the Bedouin. But then the researcher realized that, if she had too much contact with Egyptians, the Bedouin would not trust her anymore. Moreover, the researcher also could not trust the Egyptians or at least not be at ease, because they could be friends with the police. For a short study this would not have been a problem, because one can find a pretext and then disappear. However, in case of a long study, such as the present one, this could have jeopardized the entire study and brought the informants into trouble. Consequently, after an initial 30 interviews with Egyptians the researcher only conducted interviews with Bedouin.

A number of Bedouin some of whom were known for their knowledge and engagement[77] refused to talk about any issues that would be slightly political and avoided all critical issues and problems that the researcher addressed. Instead they would try to talk about Bedouin culture and Bedouin past. For instance, one respondent when asked about the registration of his land, suddenly said:

> "You came to talk about tourism, not about the government. Let's leave the government outside. We are inside and the government is outside. We go to the mountain with a safari group and come back and are happy." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 55)

Shortly after the researcher had to end the interview because the respondent had completely closed up after this sensitive question.[78]

In addition to the conflicts with the Egyptian government, other sensitive or private issues that respondents avoided to talk about were conflicts among the Bedouin or the role of the shaikh. In general, respondents would not want to talk badly about other members of the community or the shaikh or would only do so very indirectly. Moreover, in many cases questions regarding income and assets did understandably cause discomfort and were not always answered correctly.

The suspicion could be reduced somewhat if the researcher was introduced by other Bedouin and by dedicating enough time to a warm-up phase that was crucial for the success of an interview. Even better results could be obtained if the researcher had a chance to visit and meet the respondent several times and establish trust before doing the actual interview.[79] The best way to really get to know the opinions of the respondents was to start informal conversations during car drives or camel rides where there were no disturbances and a feeling of safety on both sides.

4.8.4 Understanding of Language and Culture

Issues related to language and culture were another area where problems could arise during the fieldwork and where the quality of the collected data could become affected. At first, the researcher had to get acquainted with the Arabic dialects of the Bedouin and improve her communication skills in the foreign language. Although during the course of the research a very good level of understanding could be achieved, it would be presumptuous to say that the researcher did not encounter difficulties comprehending everything that was said or perfectly expressing her own questions and thoughts in Arabic. Consequently, some information must

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[77] One of them had been in jail for 3 months when after a clash between a Bedouin youth gang and the police a large number of male Bedouin were arrested without any charge, most of them being innocent.

[78] The researcher had been told by other villagers that this respondent had had a house which had been destroyed by the government because he had no building license. As will be discussed in chapter 6 it is basically impossible to obtain such a permission.

[79] It should be noted that field research that is to yield quality data in such an environment is very time consuming. Again, there is a trade-off between getting opinions from a wide range of people with whom one could only establish limited trust or a smaller number of people with whom one entertains a much closer relationship.

have been misinterpreted, distorted or lost. This was also true for the cases where Bedouin spoke in English but had a limited vocabulary.

Moreover, since categories of speech are always categories of thought, too, the concepts of one's own language are not always adequate when translated into another language and vice versa (Braukmeier 1992). It took some time, for instance, until the researcher understood that "two or three" means a few, that *"min zamaan"* which usually refers to a long time ago could be as short as a year and that *"dausha"* did not only refer to acoustic noise but also to all kinds of trouble and stress.

The different meanings of statements did not only result from semantics but also from attitudes that were based on personal or cultural characteristics. The researcher had to identify these foreign patterns of thought and behavior and understand and interpret them. Politeness, pride or the unwillingness to name (and possibly also face) problems[80] were important factors that would influence the way a statement was made and the meaning was often conveyed indirectly or was weakened by stating the opposite. For instance, when asked about the relationship between Egyptians and Bedouin, one respondent said:

> "There is respect between Egyptians and Bedouin, but both think of each other that the other one is stupid." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 55)

Similarly, the existence of problems was often neglected but then actual problems were brought into the discussion without calling them problems. This kind of expression might also be connected to the political or private sensitivity of many issues (see section 4.8.3).

Although sensitivity and discomfort might sometimes have been the cause, it was not always easy to understand, why certain things were said to explain an action or a situation. In one interview, for instance, the respondent first explained that he lived in the desert because there was more work there than in town. Later, he said that he lived in the desert because of the freedom and quietness. In many cases like this, it was hard to establish, what the respondent's true motivation for his opinions, decisions or actions was, whether all factors were mentioned, and whether those mentioned all applied or if some were made up for the researcher.[81] In some cases, the respondents seemed to try and answer in the way they expected the researcher would like to hear or seemed to have adopted a representation of themselves according to the way tourists would (like to) see them. Related to this was also some respondents' misconception of the researcher's interest in them. They could not understand that the researcher was interested in the organization and structure of the tourism industry and were convinced the researcher wanted to find out about the *"real"* Bedouin life. They wanted to take the researcher to the Bedouin who still lived a traditional life in the desert and tell her about how the Bedouin lived in the past.

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[80] At least in the presence of or as response to the researcher.

[81] There are other examples of respondents who gave explanations that would sound more romantic or more interesting than their actual reason (see section 4.8.6 on the problem of validation).

4.8.5 Quantification

Although the focus of this research is on qualitative data, some quantitative data can be useful in order to understand the extent of a phenomenon or to be able to compare facts. However, significant difficulties were encountered when, for instance, trying to quantify the effect of the intifada or other policital crises on tourism demand and income in the various touristic sectors. This had two reasons:

First, most Bedouin did not give exact or approximate figures but would use terms such as "a few", "a lot" or "two or three" (see section 4.8.4) that have a wide and subjective range of interpretation. If the researcher insisted on a number, the answer would often be a (an almost) random figure. Establishing relative figures, too, could be problematic. For instance, when trying to estimate the significance of various types of safari clients (individual tourists, big safari agency, etc.) in percent, the answer could be 100% from a Cairo agency, 20% from an agency in Sharm al-Shaikh, 100% from a Bedouin shaikh and 5% from European friends, summing up to 225%. Still, this statement gives an idea about the importance of each client. A few respondents also found this interest in numbers strange or even reacted with indignation. In those cases, the researcher had to quickly let go off the question and re-establish harmony. A Be-douin, when asked about the cost of water, for instance, replied:

> "I do not know what water or food or a donkey costs. It is not important. You
> have to bring it." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 52)

The second difficulty was that many issues were too complex and depended on too many variables to be easily quantified. For instance, the impact of a crisis such as 9/11 on the tou-ristic demand could only be estimated very roughly, since tourist numbers already vary according to their origin, according to the season, the type of activity the tourists would undertake, the strength of the Euro, etc.. While it is already difficult to single out any of these factors, it was even more difficult to distinguish the effect of a political crisis and almost impossible if the effect of two or more crises overlapped.

Due to these difficulties, it is therefore only possible to show tendencies and give examples. All attempts of general quantification in this study are consequently based on reasonable estimates.

4.8.6 Validation

A critical point of empirical research is the validation of the collected data, i.e. how can the researcher be sure, that the data she collected is a true representation of reality. Two main problems arise:

1) Did the respondents actually speak the truth?

2) How representative was their personal truth?

The first problem was that some respondents did not give correct information to the researcher out of various reasons. It was common for individuals to be reluctant to reveal any information about their income and wealth but rather make understatements. This is often difficult to establish, however, in some cases observation could help: in one case, for instance, a respondent had reported that he owned 5 goats but when the researcher by chance passed the coral she could count 13 goats that clearly belonged to the respondent's household.[82] Overstatements were common too, when the informants wanted to impress the researcher. One interviewee actually claimed that he owned several pieces of land and various businesses. As on several other occasions, it was only by chance that in conversations with other people the researcher found out that the respondent had included the family property and his many brothers' private property when reporting his personal wealth. In other cases, problems of validation were revealed when informants contradicted themselves within the course of an interview or from one encounter to the next.[83] This did not only happen regarding the quantification of income and wealth but also regarding the explanations the respondents had for certain developments or their own actions. For instance, one respondent reported that many people were moving from the towns back to the desert, but when at a later stage the researcher raised the topic again he said that only very few people had returned. It seems, that in most such cases the respondents first tried to give an explanation which they thought the researcher might like because it sounded more interesting or romantic. But if the researcher digged deeper, they would reveal the actual and stronger reasons. One respondent, for instance, listed the advantages of fresh air, the absence of mosquitoes and the clarity of the night sky which made him want to live in the desert. Later in the interview the main reason seemed to be the better income chances he had in the desert compared to the town of St. Catherine. Similarly a taxi driver claimed he would prefer to transport sand in a lorry within his town council in order to avoid the annoying controls at the checkpoints outside the towns, but then it turned out that he expected a higher profit from owning and driving a lorry. Another reason for misinformation were conflicts and envy between respondents. No matter what the reason for misinformation was, the researcher could obviously only detect some cases while others might not have been discovered.

The second problem regarding validation of the data lay in establishing the representativeness of the respondents' statements. Since the researcher collected qualitative data through semi-structured interviews this proved to be difficult even though a large number of people were interviewed. However, due to the many different locations, economic activities and personal situations and histories it was sometimes difficult to collect the information relevant to one question again, especially if the first piece of information was collected in a very remote place or from a person with a very specific experience. Also, any statements vis-à-vis sensitive to-pics such as the relationship with the Egyptian government, illegal activites or cases of forgery, cli-

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[82] It is unlikely that the respondent would own five goats and the other seven goats belonged to his wife or other members of the household.

[83] E.g. one respondent first claimed that LE 1000 per month were not enough for a living but later he claimed that two safaris a year that would bring him LE 10,000 were completely sufficient. Similarly, another informant reported that he would make US$ 360 per day on his safari jeep tours but a few weeks later he told the researcher that he earned LE 250/day from a safari agency that employed him and that he never worked on his own account (the only possible explanation for a daily income of US$ 360).

entelism, patronage and corruption among Bedouin leaders or within the Egyptian administration could not be verified easily, since only few Bedouin were willing to talk completely open about these issues and not without first becoming acquainted with the researcher and gaining trust.

In some cases a more objective picture could be obtained by asking disinterested third parties or outsiders who have been living in the area for a long time and have had close contact with the Bedouin. A Bedouin from Western Sinai, for instance, had observed how the Mzaina Bedouin in Dahab sold more and more of their land to outsiders during times of financial hardship such as during the Gulf War in 1991. After relating the developments, the respondent said:

> "May be the Mzaina give you a different story, because this is a bad story and they are embarrassed. If the same happened to me, I cannot tell you the story. I would have to give you a different story. But I have seen it." (Dahab, Tarabin from Ras Sudr, 32)

Consequently, this research is based on many individual statements that together form the picture that is presented in this study. Some of them could be backed up by several respondents, others stand alone, but were of course critically examined by the researcher.

4.9   Conclusion

This research was carried out under very difficult circumstances that set limits to the data collection.

In many aspects it would have been good to have quantitative data, e.g. to know the ratio between Bedouin living in the desert versus the Bedouin living in town, employment in the various sectors or income distribution. But while given the difficulties described above, it is almost impossible to get this data, it would also only reflect a momentary situation in a fast changing environment.

Instead, by adopting the interview questions to the newly gained insights and by having better contacts and relationships with the Bedouin, the researcher could get deeper and deeper into the subject. However, this was at the cost of comparability and validation. The trade-off between depth and breadth could not really be solved in the socio-cultural context, the available time and with the available resources: More time and consequently a closer contact with the respondents and less structured interviews would have further revealed hidden structures and opinions. More focus on quantity, both regarding the number of respondents as well as the data, would have resulted in a seemingly more objective picture. Very likely though, this picture would have contained a lot of misinformation and misconceptions since it would not have taken into account the soft factors of social research in South Sinai. Therefore, each time, the researcher adopted her methods to the respondent and the situation. This way a wealth of valuable information was collected that led to a good understanding of the complexity and the various interrelated factors characterizing the tourism industry and Bedouin participation.

The subsequent chapters are a presentation of the results and are structured following the five points of the LSA analysis. The reader might be surprised about the unusually frequent and numerous quotes in chapter 7 on the marginalization processes and chapter 8 on Bedouin's livelihood strategies. However, the researcher's intention is to let the Bedouin also be subjects rather than just objects of this research and thereby give them a voice and platform for expression to the outside world they seldom have. As a result, the reader will also get a more direct and authentic impression of the Bedouin's point of view, their way of thinking and evaluating the situation as well as of their emotional involvement. Moreover, the quotes usually contain much more information than just a straight forward answer to the researcher's questions thereby reflecting the complex realities of Bedouin in South Sinai. Textboxes have been used to portray longer reports by respondents with whom the researcher had several long interviews and therefore reached a much deeper level of trust as well as information.

5. Context, Conditions and Trends

In this chapter the first of the five points of the LSA will be discussed – the context, conditions and trends that characterize the situation in South Sinai. Here, only those aspects will be presented that are of relevance in understanding the livelihood of the Bedouins:[84] i.e. the natural environment, the history of South Sinai from ancient times to present, Bedouin history and culture, todays administration and political situation and the economic significance of tourism for Sinai as well as for Egypt. The information in this chapter is taken from various literature sources as well as the data collected by the author during her field research.

5.1 Location and Physical Geography

Foto 1: Rock formation in Wadi Arada

Foto 2: Wadi Al Makhrum

The Sinai Peninsula is the land bridge between Africa and Eurasia. It is made up of plains in the North, a plateau (the Tih-Plateau) in the centre and bare, rugged mountains reaching a height of 2,600 meters in the South. The southern half of the peninsula extends over an area of 17,000 square kilometers[85] within well defined natural boundaries: the Tih Plateau on the North, the Gulf of Suez to the West and the Gulf of Aqaba to the East, both merging into the Red Sea at the Southern tip of the peninsula. Due to its latitudinal position between 28° and 31° North, the climate of Sinai with exception of the Mediterranean coast is arid. The average annual rainfall in the lowlands is around 10 mm and reaches about 60 mm in the high mountains. Except for rare rainstorms in early summer, precipitation is restricted to the cooler season from November to March. However, because of the high variability of rainfall in arid regions, there might be no rainfall for two or three consecutive years – especially in the lower regions. In other years most of the annual

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[84] As discussed in section 4.1, the context, conditions and trends have an impact on the other four points of the LSA, i.e. on the availability of resources, on the institutional processes and organizational structures, on the livelihood strategies as well as on the final livelihood outcome.

[85] This size is comparable to that of the German Federal States Schleswig-Holstein (16,000 km^2) or Rheinland-Pfalz (20,000 km^2).

rainfall occurs as one single torrential rain, the resulting floods causing much damage. In the summer, temperatures often reach over 40° C in the lowlands and 30° C in the mountains, where winter temperatures can occasionally fall to minus 10° C. Fauna and flora are adapted to the arid climate (cf. Semsek 1997; Lavie & Young 1984; Marx 1984). Despite its arid climate, South Sinai is very attractive for tourism due to its many beaches, coral reefs and beautiful desert scenery (Foto 1 & 2, also see section 5.5).

5.2 Historical Overview

Bedouin have the longest history of settlement in Sinai. Their migration from the Arabian Peninsula to Sinai started in pre-islamic times and continued over the centuries (see section 5.3.). External powers only gained control over the region during the 19th and 20th century. However, the interest of external powers in Sinai goes back to as far as ca. 2900 B.D. when Pharao Snofru (4th dynasty) was the first Egyptian ruler to "conquer" Sinai (Jahn 1994). The relationship of the semi-nomadic inhabitants of South Sinai with these external powers in the course of history will be described in this section. This will reveal that the Bedouin can be considered the indigenous inhabitants of Sinai due to priority in time,[86] with respect to their occupation and use of the territory[87] (see chapter 2 and 3).

There are archeological discoveries of human presence in Sinai in the stoneage. The first independent civilization in Sinai was the Elat-culture from about 4500-3800 B.D. The people of this civilization had probably migrated from the Arabian Peninsula and lived as semi-nomads but did already practice some agriculture. From approximately 3800-2650 B.D. was the era of the Timna civilization that was characterized by a particular ceramic, copper mining and the use of copper tools as well as a specific architecture with large settlements.[88] Between ca. 1785-1580 B.D. Israelite tribes came to Sinai in several migration waves and lived as semi-nomads in Western Sinai and at the edge of Lower Egypt. After a long interruption in settlement the Nabateans settled in Sinai from ca. 4th century B.D. (Jahn 1994).[89]

It is difficult to establish when the first groups of Bedouin came from the Arabian Peninsula to Sinai, since there are few written records. All studies about the Bedouins of South Sinai only specify very broad periods of time, such as Al-Hilw & Darwish (1989) who mention migrations before and after the spread of Islam, or Homa (2002) who dates the main migrations to the late 14th and 15th century A.D. Considering that in the 6th century A.D. Emperor Justinian sent slaves from the Balkan to Sinai to protect the monks of St. Catherine from the attacks of

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[86] As discussed in chapter 2, the term indigenous does not mean that a people has to have settled in an area since time immemorial, but that it has settled there prior to other groups.

[87] The Bedouin have inhabited the entire area of Sinai, while other peoples only settled in isolated points, especially in towns along the Mediterranean coast such as Al-Arish.

[88] Today, well preserved graves of this period can still be found in Nawamis, near the Ain Khudra oasis (among Egyptians and foreigners this oasis is commonly called Ain Khudra (Green well); however, among the Bedouin it is called Ain Hudra (the well of gathering/get together)).

[89] Greek geographers of the 1st century B.D. reported that the Nabateans lived in and around Sinai that at the time was part of the Ptolomaeic Empire. Proofs of a significant Nabatean presence are a temple and pilgrimage center at Jabal Monaga and Jabal Sarbal as well as thousands of inscriptions and graffiti along the routes from Aila (Eilat) to the mining centres, especially in Wadi Mukattab and Wadi Fairan (Jahn 1994).

maroding Bedouin (Hobbs 1996), the Bedouin have a much longer history in Sinai that might possibly be traced back to the Nabateans and even Timnaites. New Bedouin groups kept migrating to Sinai, such as the Mzaina who only arrived from Saudi Arabia in the 17th century or the Huwaitat who had fled from a blood feud in Northwestern Saudi Arabia in the 1930 (Lavie 1991). If not for the boundaries of modern nation states these migrations would probably have continued and in spite of the now restricted movement, Bedouin still have family and tribal ties across the border in Israel, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

At the time of the first Egyptian incursion under Pharao Snofru ca. 2900 B.D., Sinai was inhabited by the Timnaites.[90] For Pharaonic Egypt the significance of Sinai was not the expansion of settlement but lay in

- the important trade and military route along the Mediterranean coast to Palestine that the Pharaonic armies used during their conquests in the East,[91]

- the copper and turquoise mines in Southern Sinai (Sarabit al Khadim) that were exploited by the Egyptians using the labour of the inhabitants of South Sinai at the time, the Timnaites. (Jahn 1994).

After Pharao Ramses III (ca. 1200-1168 B.D.), the Egyptian influence on Sinai decreased steadily and ended completely with the Persian conquest of the Pharaonic Empire in 526 B.D. (ibid.). Later, Sinai became part of the various empires in the region such as the Ptolomaeic, the Nabatean, the Byzantine, the Abbasidic and the Ottoman empires. However, until the modern times, borders were not drawn clearly and precisely. Moreover, political and military power did not extend uniformly over a geographically well defined and generally accepted empire. Rather, power was concentrated in urban centers and diminished with increasing distance as well as in confrontation with natural or human barriers. Especially many desert and mountain regions were not worth conquering due to their poverty, remoteness or inaccessibility and a ruler's only effort concerning these territories would be to control important trade routes and to prevent rebellions (Hourani 1992).[92]

Until the 19th century, Sinai, too, was beyond the control of the various empires and Bedouin engaged in robbery and extortion of protection money. Burckhardt reports how, in the decades before his visit to Sinai in 1816, the Bedouin had almost unrestricted control over travellers in Sinai[93] as well as over the inhabitants of towns in its vicinity. Each townsman of Suez, for instance, had to regularly pay a personal guard among the Bedouin and still, Bedouin from as far as Aqaba would at times menace the town. Before the 19th century, the monastery of St.

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[90] Jahn (1994) reports that the Timnaites had strong trade ties with Egypt. These might have developed in the aftermath of Pharaonic incursions.

[91] In the oppositve direction several Asian armies (e.g. Amorites, Hyskos) came to Egypt and caused the collapse of first the Old and later the Middle Empire.

[92] The tribes inhabiting these territories could not have been subjugated and forced to deliver any agricultural surpluses to the regime. Only territories that were in proximity to the cities or trade routes were under some influence of the empire through indirect rule with the help of the local tribal chiefs. Direct control was only exercised in the river valleys, river plains and other fertile regions that were crucial for the supply of agricultural produce to the cities (Hourani 1992).

[93] Mainly pilgrims to Mekka and the monastery of St. Catherine.

Catherine, too, had to pay protection money to many different Bedouin tribes whose territories were as far as Gaza, the Negev or Sharqiya in Egypt (Burckhardt 1822 in Rabinowitz 1985).

The situation drastically changed in the 1810 when the Ottoman ruler of Egypt, Muhammad Ali, started to pacify Sinai. One of Muhammad Ali's measures (in 1823) was to transfer the concession over transportation between Suez and Cairo to Nilotic tribes in order to restrain the Sinai Bedouin's monopoly. The Bedouin, hence having lossed an important source of income, retaliated by robbing a large coffee caravan on its way to Cairo. As a response, Muhammad Ali sent a cavalry brigade of 3,000 men to Sinai and forced the Bedouin to sign a pledge of loyalty to him and pay a heavy penalty. Nevertheless, the Bedouin remained a challenge to the government's capability of maintaining law and order (Rabinowitz 1985).

Unlike North Sinai that due to the trade route along the Mediterranean coast has always been of strategic importance, South Sinai with its inaccessible mountain areas actually remained largely outside the influence of the various powers ruling Egypt until the 1950s.[94] Up to that time, there were only two significant permanent settlements in South Sinai: the port of Al-Tur[95] with a quarantine station for pilgrims returning from Mekka and the 6th-century monastery of St. Catherine that usually hosted about 12 Greek monks (Hobbs 1996; Marx 1984).

In the 1950s, Egypt established army camps and an airfield in South Sinai and built roads along the western coast. Egyptian and foreign companies started to exploit the oilfields in the Gulf of Suez as well as South Sinai's gypsum and manganese deposits on a commercial scale[96] (Marx 1984).

Egypt's efforts were interrupted in 1967 when Israel occupied Sinai.[97] During the 15-year-long occupation, Israel's aim was to develop Sinai for Zionist settlers. Developments were now concentrated on the East coast with the construction of a road between Eilat and Sharm al-Shaikh and the establishment of a town (Ofira, today Sharm al-Shaikh) and two agricultural co-operatives in the Bedouin coastal oases of Dahab and Nuwaiba. Developments in St. Catherine were initiated by Israeli enviromentalists, nature fans and academics and not by the Israeli government (cf. Lavie 1991). During this time, the foundation of today's tourism industry was laid: the co-operatives' income was based on agriculture and tourism.

After the Camp David Accord in 1979, Israel withdrew from Sinai in several stages and in 1982 Sinai had been completely returned to Egypt with the exception of Taba that was handed back in 1989. For the first time, Egypt's interest in Sinai extended beyond the Peninsula's significance for the exploitation of natural resources and as a buffer against Israel. Comprehensive plans were formulated for the development of agriculture, industry and tourism as well as the

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[94] Namely the Ottoman Empire and Britain. Egypt gained independence in 1922 as a kingdom, the republic was proclaimed in 1953.

[95] Its inhabitants were mostly sailors and fishermen.

[96] Mining had actually started 1918, but in 1956 the operation was nationalized in the course of President Nasser's Arab socialism (Marx 1984).

[97] Backed by Britain and France, Israel had already occupied Sinai for a short time during the Suez crisis in 1956 (Hourani 1992).

settlement of millions of Egyptians (see section 5.4.4). At the same time, the South Sinai Bedouin became Egyptian nationals, were registered and given ID-cards and the young men are conscripted by the Egyptian army.

As has become clear, the South Sinai Bedouin have lived largely independently of external forces for centuries. Since their pacification and integration into the wider political units, they have been excluded from power and decision-making: Policies were formulated without their consultation: Although some policies were to their advantage (e.g. provision of employment and medical services during the Israeli occupation) the policies were always aimed at securing the interests of the respective external power.[98] A good example of the impact of these policies on the Bedouin is the employment of labour for the development projects in Sinai. While the Israeli employed and even trained Bedouin to work for them[99] (Wickering 1991), under Egyptian rule preference was given to "Egyptian" and even Sudanese migrant workers[100] (Lavie 1991). Given the prolonged and alternating external rule[101] and the lack of self-determination, it is not surprising, that the Bedouin distinguish between themselves as the *"People of the Land"* and those representing the ruling government as the *"People of Politics"* (Lavie 1989:102-103).

5.3 The Bedouin of South Sinai

The Bedouin of South Sinai today number about 30,000. Since they are not registered separately in the National Census their number can only be estimated. Lavie (1991:55) mentions an approximate number of 13,000 Bedouin. Another estimate of 7,000 Bedouin is given by Marx (1984:177).[102] Assuming 13,000 was the Bedouin population in 1976 when Lavie did her field research and an annual population growth rate of 2.5 %, the population in 2009 would be ca. 29,400 Bedouin.[103] (see Table 1, column 1).

Another way to estimate today's Bedouin population has been applied by a consultant of the South Sinai Environmental Action Plan Project by DFID and EEAA. He uses the official census data (see Annex III) and assumes that the rural population of South Sinai is almost exclusively[104] Bedouin. It could therefore be taken as an estimate for the Bedouin population that con-

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[98] The Bedouin also regarded the Egyptians as a foreign occupation force (Lavie 1989).

[99] Israel did not have a large low-skill labour force in Sinai. The Bedouin would for instance be employed in military construction or tourist services.

[100] Preference was given to these groups to avoid political unrest because of high unemployment rates in Upper Egypt. Moreover, it is likely that Egyptians are suspicious of the Bedouin who have a history of drug and arms smuggling (Ibrahim 1996) and worked for Israel.

[101] Probably most Egyptians would feel insulted when being designated as an external power in Sinai since this contradicts their understanding of the Egyptian State and its – to them – legitimate territorial claims. However, in using this term the author adapts the terminology of previous anthropological studies on the Sinai Bedouin, not forgetting, that these are all written by Non-Egyptian researchers.

[102] No sources are specified by either author.

[103] Based on the same assumptions, the Bedouin population would be 16,641 in 1986 and 21,300 in 1996.

[104] Sims argues that there are also areas that administratively are considered rural, but which are more properly parts of an adjacent city and therefore show high concentrations of Egyptians. On the other hand there are important shares of Bedouin inhabitants in "cities". While the two factors probably don't cancel out completely, the rural population figures still give some indication of the number of Bedouin population. If extrapolating the rural population of 1986 of 17,153 individuals (GoE 1986) with an assumed annual population growth rate of 2.5 % again one gets a population of 30,300 for 2009,

sequently numbered 30,300 in 2009, i.e. more than double the Bedouin population of 1976 (GoE 1996, personal information from D. Sims, June 2003).[105]

However, when these estimates of the Bedouin population are compared with the total population,[106] a drastic decrease of the Bedouin share in the total population from ca. 60 % in 1986 to only 40 % in 1996 and 22 % (27 %) in 2009 can be noticed (see Table 1, column 4). This decrease reflects the high influx of migrant labour from Egypt (see section 5.4.4)

Table 1: The Bedouin share in the total population of South Sinai

Year	Bedouin population extrapolated from Lavie's estimate	Bedouin population extrapolated from rural population in government census (Sims' method)	Total population according to government census 1986, 1996 and author's extrapolation for 2009	Calculated Bedouin share in total population
1986	16,600	17,153	29,000	ca. 60 %
1996	21,300	21,957	55,000	ca. 40 %
2009	29,400	30,300[107], (37,800[108])	136,000	ca. 22 % (ca. 27 %)

Own source based on Lavie 1991, Sims 2003, GoE 1986 and GoE 1996

5.3.1 Bedouin Social Organization

The Bedouin of South Sinai belong to a tribal alliance of seven tribes that is called Tawaara and is divided into two groups (see Table 2 and Map 2).

Two other tribes do not belong to the alliance:

- The Jabaliya (ca. 1,450 people in the 1970s) are the descendants of servants that were sent from the Balkans by the Byzantine Emperor Justinian to protect the monks of the Greek orthodox monastery of St. Catherine.[109] The servants intermarried with the

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a number very close to the one derived from Lavie's estimate. An extrapolation of the 1996 population figure of 27,400 inhabitants (GoE 1996) would result in ca. 37,800 individuals in 2009.

[105] Due to the population increase, per capita resources, expecially land have decreased. See chapter 6 on livelihood resources and chapter 7.1 on the land issue.

[106] The population of South Sinai was 29,000 in 1986 and 55,000 in 1996 (GoE 1986, 1996). If 1996 population figures by district (categorised further into urban and rural) are extrapolated with the average rural and urban annual growth rates from 1986 – 1996, the population would have reached an estimate of 136,000 in 2009 (unpublished analysis and prognosis of population figures (GoE 1996) by D. Sims 2003).

[107] Extrapolated from the rural population of the 1986 census assuming 2.5 % population growth.

[108] Extrapolated from the 1996 rural population of 27,400 assuming 2.5 % population growth.

[109] The monastery was built at the foot of Mount Sinai in the 6th century.

local Bedouin and eventually converted to Islam but always kept an amicable and close relationship with the monastery (Hobbs 1996).

- The Huwaitat (ca. 450 people in the 1970s) have only recently come from Saudi Arabia where they fled a feud in the 1930s.

Nevertheless, both tribes are accepted in everyday life and as marriage partners by the members of the alliance (Lavie 1991).

The territory of South Sinai is divided among the tribes each of which claims a relatively small but exclusive core territory and marginal areas shared with the neighboring tribes (Marx 1977 & Nir 1988 in Lavie 1991). A tribe's dominance over a territory would entail the exclusive right of its members to use mountain passes, to own date palms in oases, to build permanent structures and to use other's water sources without asking for permission (Lavie & Young 1984). The Mzaina are an exception, because they do not have any core area and therefore regard the whole of South Sinai as their tribal territory with exception of the area around St. Catharine monastery (Lavie 1991). Save the Jabaliya, the majority of the Bedouin lived within 40 km from the coast (Lavie & Young 1984).[110] The Egyptian government recognizes the tribal territories as long as they do not conflict with the greater good of Egypt as a whole (Homa 2002). In her research on the Mzaina, Lavie (1991:56-57) could establish three forms of organization of the Bedouin that also holds for the other South Sinai tribes:

Like other Bedouin throughout the Middle East, the South Sinai Bedouin tribes are organized in a segmentary lineage system where each tribal segment is represented by a judge in the tribe's "supreme court".

Since the Ottoman Empire, external regimes have appointed respected leaders to the post of "shaikh" for administrative purposes. However, the shaikhs were not recognized or respected as societal leaders but acted as mediators between the Bedouin and the respective regime (see section 5.3.2 for a more detailed description of the role of the shaikhs).

Table 2: The tribes of the Tawara Alliance

Name of the tribe of the Tawara Alliance (Number of tribe members in the 1970s)				
Group 1	Mzaina (5,000)	Group 2	Awlad Said (1,000)
	Alaigat (2,100)		Gararsha (1,250)
	Hamada (550)		Sawalha (500)
	Bani Wasel (80)		

Own source based on figures from Lavie 1991:55

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[110] Due to the locations where this research was conducted, most information in this book concerns the Mzaina, Jabaliya and Tarabin.

Map 2: The Bedouin tribes of Sinai (Source: de Jong (n.d.,n.p.))

The customary law, the urf, plays a very important role in social cohesion among the Bedouin. Disputes among the Bedouin are resolved under the urf, and the decision of the judge is respected by all individuals of the tribe regardless of their age, sex or class and carried out no matter how stiff the penalty might be. Even if these disputes get to the police station or court, they still have to be settled under customary law.

According to the author's respondents, as opposed to the Egyptian law, the urf grants real justice, its superiority lies – if not in its code then definitely – in its implementation. This judgement is indirectly supported by the former governor of North Sinai, Munir Ahmad Muhammad Shash who wrote the following in the foreword of Al-Hilw's and Darwish's book on North Sinai customary law:

> "These customs effectively regulate and organize the way the sons of the province deal with one another with a fairness which protects all individuals and groups of the society, protecting a woman before a man and the weak before the strong. They also define the rights and responsibilities of individuals to an extent the like of which I have never seen, even at the highest levels of jurisprudence and positive law." (Al-Hilw & Darwish 1989:ix)

The urf is one of the most distinctive features of Sinai's cultural legacy (cf. Al-Hilw & Darwish 1989) and one of the informal institutions that are used to distinguish between the majority society and an indigenous pmargeople (see chapter 2 on the definition of indigenous people).

5.3.2 The Role of the Bedouin Shaikhs in the Rule of Sinai

One important aspect of Bedouin social organization are the shaikhs as representatives of the interests of the tribe towards the outside as well as mediators for conflicts within the tribe. However, the original role of the shaikh was manipulated by the ruling powers. As Lavie (1991:47) illustrates very well, Egypt's and Israel's strategy in ruling Sinai, was to combine force and negotiation to control and at the same time use the Bedouin for their political interests. To this end, respected Bedouin leaders were appointed to the post of "shaikh" for administrative purposes, a strategy that had already been applied during the Ottoman Empire. But while in pre-colonial times, the shaikhs of Arab Bedouin derived their authority from

- their military strength and shrewdness,

- their mediation capacity in conflict situations,

- the size and distinction of their lineage,

- their hospitality and the support of their kinsmen (cf. Antoun 1972:157 in Lavie 1989:101),

the shaikhs of the South Sinai lacked any such basis. They did not resolve disputes or hold traditional feasts, had not united their tribes to resist the external occupation and did not en-

gage in protecting the tribe's independence and hence were not respected as shaikhs by their fellow tribesmen. Still, the Bedouin were dependent on these shaikhs in order to communicate with the state authorities or get whatever permission (Lavie 1989). One of the Mzaina shaikhs recorded by Lavie when philosophizing about the role of the shaikhs brings this paradoxical situation to the point:

> "For every government the shaikh is a Bedouin, and for every Bedouin, the shaikh is the government. These two will never meet." (Lavie 1989:123)

Under Egyptian rule before the Israeli occupation the shaikhs were endowed with a relatively high degree of power but then measures by the Israeli and later by the Egyptian government decreased the shaikhs' influence: In the 1950s the Egyptian government tried to employ the Bedouin shaikhs in its struggle against the smuggling of narcotics. To this end, the shaikhs were given the responsibility to distribute bi-monthly food rations from the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA)[111] so that they would act as intermediaries between the government and the Bedouin[112]. As a result, except for the shaikhs, individual Bedouin did not have any contact with the Egyptian authorities or firms and just saw them as *'al-hukuma' (the government*) (Lavie 1991).

At the beginning of the Israeli occupation, the Israeli government investigated the social organization of the Bedouin and realised that appointing suitable leaders for each genealogical group[113] would best suit its administrative goals. Some of the appointed shaikhs had already held the office under Egyptian rule; others had had relationships with the Israeli security services before the occupation. The appointment of about 30 shaikhs also meant, that there were more posts than during the Egyptian rule and that each shaikh held less power (Lavie 1991). Moreover, the Israelis were interested in direct contact with all Bedouin and therefore started to personally distribute food rations (this time provided by the American agency CARE) to each household thereby cutting out the shaikhs's role as intermediaries. The establishment of clinics for the Bedouin and the transport of serious cases by helicopter for treatment in Israeli hospitals was another measure that contributed to a good relationship between the Bedouin and the occupiers (ibid.).

Lavie (ibid.) estimates that when Egypt regained control over Sinai it appointed at least 50 shaikhs for South Sinai, thereby almost doubling the number of shaikhs under Israeli occupation and further diminishing their individual power. Moreover, ten of the shaikhs of the Israeli time were replaced by loyal clients of the Egyptian administration.[114]

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[111] Today it is the World Food Program (WFP).

[112] But actually the shaikhs sold the food supplies in the area of Abu Rudais where they had picked them up.

[113] Since legal rights and obligations are ascribed to them.

[114] Some of them were former shaikhs who had been exiled by Israel, some had fled to Egypt during the 1967 war.

5.3.3 Bedouin Socio-economy in the Past

While the present Bedouin socio-economy will be explained in detail throughout this book, this section gives a short overview of the Bedouin economy in the past. Three phases can be distinguished:

-   the time before the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956,

-   the time from 1956 to the Arab-Israeli War in 1967 and

-   the time of the Israeli occupation of Sinai from 1967 to 1982.

The Time before the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956

The Bedouin of South Sinai are considered to have been (and some still are) semi-nomadic and until 1956 followed an annual pastoral migratory cycle throughout the peninsula (cf. Lavie & Young 1984). But the sparse vegetation could not support an exclusive pastoral economy and the average family only owned 4-6 goats, 2-3 sheep and sometimes one camel (Glassner 1974 in Lavie & Young 1984). Therefore, like all Bedouin,[115] the South Sinai tribes have engaged in a 'multi-resource economy'[116] combining pastoralism with various other economic activities (Gardener & Marx 2000).

For subsistence purposes the Bedouin have cultivated date palms and small vegetable gardens in oasis in the wadis where they could access the groundwater by digging wells. The Jabaliya have laid out orchards with a variety of fruit and nut trees in the mountain wadis around St. Catherine. With the money they made from selling the surplus in Al-Tur they could stock grain enough for a whole year (Marx 1984). Some tribes like the Mzaina or Tarabin would spend part of the year in the oases in the higher wadis and part of the year at the coast where they have planted date palms on the alluvial plains. At the coast they also fished for daily consumption. Moreover, they dried the fish for sale[117] or for their own use during their seasonal stay further inland. Wild animals were hunted to complement the diet. While women were responsible for the household activites and the small livestock, men were in charge of animals of burden (camels), tending the gardens and earning a monetary income (cf. Rabinowitz 1985).[118] Fotos 3-7 of present Bedouin desert life may give an impression of the Bedouin socio-economy in the past.

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[115] With the exception of a few highly specialized camel-breeding groups.

[116] This term has been introduced by Salzman (Salzman 1972 in Gardener & Marx 2000).

[117] Or barter with other goods such as wheat from Wadi Fairan for instance.

[118] This division of labor still applies today.

Foto 3: Semi-nomadic Mzaina Bedouin in Wadi Disco

Foto 6 and 7: Bedouin men resting after a camel trip in the desert

Foto 4: Ain Khudra Oasis

Foto 5: Apricots drying on rocks in an orchard near St. Catherine

In order to earn a monetary income for the purchase of goods they did not produce by themselves, the Bedouin of South Sinai have always engaged in additional economic activities. However, since the 19th century significant changes have taken place regarding monetary income opportunities:

Using the reports of 19th century travelers to Sinai and other historical documentation, Rabinowitz shows that already in the 19th century South Sinai Bedouin's main occupations and sources of income were the trade with charcoal (that was exchanged for grain in Cairo) as well as transportation and protection services to Sinai travelers and pilgrims.[119] He argues that given the unfavorable environment and climatic conditions of South Sinai and the scarcity of male labour in the households, these activities were more profitable than herding and horticulture[120] and goes as far as saying that

> "rather than treating herding as an obligatory occupation for all Bedouin and desert dwellers at all times […], we can see it, in the case of the Sinai Bedouin, as an occupation turned to as a last resort in times of hardship." (Rabinowitz 1985:223-224)

However, these sources of income ran dry during World War I when European travelers and pilgrims ceased coming to Sinai and the Egyptian market was closed for Sinai Bedouin after the Turkish invasion of Sinai in 1915. After World War I, technological innovations such as motor cars and gas and oil stoves slowly rendered the Bedouin services obsolete so that they had to increasingly fall back on their subsistence activities or engage in smuggling drugs into Egypt – a growing business in the 1920s (Rabinowitz 1985). During and after the British mandate of Egypt and Palestine, another option for Bedouin men was to go to places such as Jaffa (until the border with Palestine was closed due to the formation of the state of Israel), Suez or even to the Nile Valley and the Delta in search for employment and not return home to their families for months or even years (Lavie 1991). Nevertheless, up to 1956, Bedouin life in Sinai was hardly influenced by the "outside world" and many Bedouin still continued their traditional pastoral migration throughout the peninsula. Contact with Egypt only resulted out of the initiative of the Bedouin in search for employment (Lavie & Young 1984).

The Time from 1956 to the Arab-Israeli War in 1967

After the proclamation of the Egyptian Republic in 1953 and the Suez Canal Crisis in 1956, Egypt under President Abd Al-Nasser (1956-1970) (cf. Hourani 1992) started to develop the western coast of Sinai by building an asphalt road along the Gulf of Suez to Sharm al-Shaikh and engaging in the exploitation of oil and manganese. But only about 300 Bedouin found employment in the newly constructed oil installations of Abu Rudais, the manganese mines of Um Bogmah or the gypsum factory at Ras Malab because priority was given to ca. 4,000

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[119] Although, so far, there exists no scientific analysis of the South Sinai Bedouin economy prior to the 19th century, one can assume that pilgrims to Mount Sinai and the monastery as well as to Mekka have always needed Bedouin transport or at least protection services.

[120] As opposed to Central and North Sinai where herding is more profitable due to good pastures and large herds of sheep and cattle are kept.

Egyptian workers (Marx 1984: 177-178).[121] Lavie & Young (1984) explain that while the better-paying skilled jobs were taken by Egyptians, Sudanese were employed for heavy manual labour. According to Lavie & Young the Bedouin did not take these jobs because they were low-paying and did not help the Bedouin to build social networks within Sinai.

Since there were not enough employment opportunities for Bedouin in Sinai, they continued to rely on their subsistence activities. However, with the development of the western coast, new centers of settlement emerged where the Jabaliya could now market the fruits and nuts from their gardens to which they consequently tended more intensily (Rabinowitz 1985). During that time, many young Bedouin migrated to Egyptian cities in search for employment as unskilled labourers or menials[122] and would not return to Sinai for months or even years and some even settled permanently with their families in Egypt.

Smuggling of hashish and opium from Jordan and Saudi-Arabia into Egypt, an activity that was part of the Bedouin economy for generations, became even more important in the early 1950s. It led to a polarization of Bedouin society into a new elite of a few wealthy entrepreneurs on the one hand and less fortunate fellow tribesmen. Some were engaged as traffiquers and an increasing number went to seek employment in Egyptian cities, since the money influx from the narcotics business had raised the general expectations for a higher level of consumption (Lavie & Young 1984; Marx 1984).

The Time of the Israeli Occupation of Sinai from 1967 to 1982

During the Israeli occupation (1967-1982), the tendency among the Bedouin to look for employment increased further for three reasons (Marx 1984):

- Smuggling declined because it became too risky as a result of drastic Israeli measures to end the traffic of narcotics (cf. Lavie & Young 1984).

- More jobs were available to Bedouin, both in the industrial plants where Egyptian laborers had been employed with priority as well as in new Israeli infrastructure, military and tourism projects in Sinai and even the Israeli town of Eilat.

- The market for garden products vanished due to the availability of fresh and canned food from Israel (this reasons holds for the Jabaliya in particular).[123]

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[121] These figures were mentioned to Marx (1984) by Bedouin. In any case, these state enterprises employed few Bedouin compared to Egyptian: e.g. the gypsum factory employed 2000 Egyptian and 65 Bedouin. Abu Rudeis oil installations and Umm Bogmah manganese mine together employed only 150 bedouin, a few in government offices and the monastery of St. Catherine. Some Bedouin found employment with other Bedouin for construction or well digging. Every year, during the 4-8 week pilgrimage season about 500-600 Bedouin found work at the quarantine station in Al-Tur (Marx 1984: 177-178). During the Israeli occupation prior to the 1973 war with Egypt up to 500 Bedouin found employment in the oil installations (Marx 1984:180).

[122] The question arises whether these jobs were better paid than those in the oil installations and mining projects. Lavie & Young's (1984) interpretation that the Bedouin voluntarily declined to work in the installations would need to be checked in this context.

[123] Marx uses the example of the Jabaliya to make his point; however, his findings largely apply to the other tribes, too.

Although many Bedouin found manual employment with Israeli firms or governmental agencies,[124] this employment was very insecure, because the Bedouin could be dismissed at any time or Israel could completely close its civilian installations in Sinai such as during the war with Egypt in 1973. Even government employment that had been relatively stable during all the upheavals and had increased steadily was not really secure: a change in the political regime would result in the Bedouin's loss of these jobs (Marx 1984).

Marx (1984) demonstrates that in view of these contingencies,[125] the Bedouin – despite the increased employment opportunities and wage labour being their main source of income – continued to invest in their herds and gardens as well as in kinship relationships. Rabinowitz (1985) shows that this risk minimization strategy where subsistence activities would be kept at a minimum level during times of better opportunities but intensified during times of crisis has already characterized the Bedouin economy in the 19th century. He links this attempt to achieve long-term economic security to a resulting lack of specialization and full professional differentiation. This has limited the Bedouin's integration into the wider economies on which they are dependent. And rather than being able to influence the wider system in their interest, they just continue to be a pool of unskilled laborers. Rabinowitz comes to the conclusion, that

> "the only feasible initiative on their [the Bedouin's, author's explanation] part
> is to make use of openings created by the system whenever they arise,
> maximizing short-term gains without compromising existing occupations."
> Rabinowitz (1985:225)

In section 5.4.4 it will be shown, how the tourism industry that developed in South Sinai during the last 30 years has become such an "opening" for the Bedouin and the remainder of this study discusses whether this "opening" continues to represent a viable opportunity.

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[124] During the Israeli occupation, there were significant fluctuations in total employment due to the 1973 war with Egypt as well as changing administrative measures. Until the war, Israeli authorities saw the Bedouin as self-sufficient pastoralists and horticulturalists and tried to reduce their migration to places of employment by introducing maximum wages. They also attempted to improve livestock and introduced advanced farming techniques, dug wells to increase water supply and open up new grazing areas. After the war, the Israeli government had understood that the Bedouin were not merely herders and employed an increasing number of them, in order to retain their friendship. With many jobs becoming available to Bedouin in Eilat and Sharm al-Shaikh (then Ofira) that by 1974 had grown to be the largest employment center in Sinai. Development after the war of 1973 focused on the East coast and only 75 Bedouin found employment in the oil installation compared to almost 500 before the war (Marx 1984:180-181).

[125] i.e. especially the risk of further political upheavals and losing one's employment at any time.

5.4 Development of South Sinai since 1982 and Plans for the Future

In this section the developments since 1982 when Egypt regained control over Sinai will be discussed. First a short overview of the present administrative and political system will be given. Then the economic and political significance of Sinai for Egypt will be presented with a focus on tourism, the most important economic sector in South Sinai. Egyptian government plans for future developments in Sinai will also be considered. After a description of the various international tourist locations in South Sinai the chapter concludes with a discussion about the impact of violent conflicts on tourism and Bedouin livelihoods.

5.4.1 Present Administration and Political System

Today, the Sinai Peninsula is divided into two governorates: North Sinai Governorate (NSG) and South Sinai Governorate (SSG) created in 1988.[126] SSG occupies the area between the Gulf of Suez and the Gulf of Aqaba and consists of eight cities and districts. The governor, residing in the governorate's capital Al-Tur, is appointed by the president and is the chief executive officer of the governorate and appoints an executive council that includes heads of each district in addition to the heads of the utility sections (many of which correspond to central sectoral ministries). The governorate is served by an elected popular council responsible for economic, social and physical planning, budgeting and accounting and policy and planning, while the executive council is responsible for implementation of policy and collection of taxes (cf. Chemonics 2003).

The administration of each district is located in one municipality, the mayor of that town being in charge of the district, too. The mayor is appointed by and subordinate to the governor and is served by an elected Popular and an appointed executive local council similarly to the administrative and political setup of the governorate. Smaller villages are organized in an analogous, smaller structure[127] (cf. ibid.). The participation of the Bedouin in these political structures is described in chapter 6.5 on social capital.

The existence of elected popular councils down to the village level, though, should not blind the reader to the fact that Egypt is an authoritarian state. The declaration of a state of emergency and the related laws have been used by the regime to keep the opposition in check, oppress its critics and thereby to expand and consolidate its power. Clientelism and patronage are widespread and a small elite enriches itself at the cost of the Egyptian people. According to Wurzel (2003:121-122) this

> "promote[s] social disintegration and fragmentation. The result is a "feudalisation" of the state and its organizations by privileged groups of actors,"

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[126] There are 26 governorates in Egypt.

[127] The central government and the governorate determine the municipal budgets and the accounting procedures do not provide for cost center accounting, match costs with associated revenues or enable effective accountability of the different service sections.

which is also reflected in the Sinai Development Plan 2017 (see GoE 1994) that is discussed in the next two sections.

Kienle (2000) argues that even the steps towards economic liberalization appear to be biased towards those parts of the private sector that are close to the regime and involve only superficial or fictious redistribution of the ownership and control of economic resources.[128] This also seems to be the case for South Sinai, where there is much talk about relatives and friends of the president owning huge properties.

5.4.2 The Significance of South Sinai for Egypt and the "National Project for the Development of Sinai 1994-2017"

As illustrated in section 5.2, until the middle of the 20th century Sinai has been of little interest to Egypt and – quoting the Egyptian government –

> "the Sinai Peninsula was to most Egyptians almost a far away land." (GoE 1994:n.p.[129])

Lavie's comparison expresses the relationship between Egyptians and Sinai even more clearly:

> "Many Egyptians still think of the Sinai much as Muscovites think of Siberia."
> (Lavie 1991:78)

Only when Sinai was lossed to Israel in 1967, the peninsula then became a focus of Egyptian national interest, first out of military strategical reasons and national pride and later because of economic and demographic considerations, too. Consequently, the overarching aim of the Egyptian government since the repossession of Sinai in 1982,[130] has been to permanently end the isolation of Sinai from the Nile Valley (cf. GoE & GoSS 2001; GoE 1994) and thereby achieve the following objectives:

- Creation of new areas of settlement and cultivation outside the Nile Valley;[131]

- Creation of employment in view of high unemployment rates;

- Earning of foreign exchange to improve the balance of payments;

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[128] Kienle (2000) with his thorough analysis of the political developments in Egypt since the end of the 1980s sheds light on how the regime of Mubarak has strengthened its power through a reduction in liberties, increased repression and the exclusion of those (allegedly) not faithful to the regime. While the regime sells its policies as steps in a transition to democracy, Kienle concludes that there is actually regression.

[129] Introduction of internet document.

[130] Sharm al-Shaikh was returned in 1982, Taba as late as 1989. See Lavie & Young (1984) and Lavie (1991) for a detailed description of the various phases of handing over Sinai back to Egyptian control.

[131] Due to the fact that 95 % of Egypt's area is desert land, 97 % of Egypt's population are concentrated in the narrow Nile Valley (EIU 2001:n.p. (internet document)). This population grows at an annual rate of 2.1 % resulting in an annual population increase of ca. 1.3 million, further straining infrastructure, utilities and education and health systems that already suffer from overuse and underfunding (cf. GoE,GoSS 2001:7). By including the country's peripheries it is hoped to divert economic development from the centre and achieve a more balanced development.

- Securing Sinai once and for all from military invasion and annexion through Israel.

For this purpose the long-term policy plan for the "National Project for the Development of Sinai 1994-2017" was initiated, based on which 5-year plans are formulated. The new policy is expected to result in "the complete overhauling of the social, economic, political and culture structure of Sinai" (GoE 1994: introduction, n.p.) and has the following main objectives:

- to exploit water resources to the fullest,

- to discover untapped sources of ores,

- to build industries near the sources of raw materials and

- to develop tourism (GoE 1994:n.p.[132]).

The plan sets for the settlement of 3.2 million people and the creation of 800,000 jobs in Sinai until 2017 (GoE 1994:n.p.[133]). It assigns 50 % of the land for investors (no matter whether individuals or societies), 15 % for youth, 28 % for small beneficiaries and 7 % for Sinai inhabitants (GoE 2001:n.p.[134]). *Youth* refers to university and college graduates and *Sinai inhabitants* would probably be mostly Bedouin. Although it is not explicitly stated in the plan, the author assumes that this division applies to land that is earmarked for development rather than the total area of Sinai.[135]

5.4.3 Consideration of Bedouin Interests in the "National Project for the Development of Sinai 1994-2017" and other Government Development Plans

Only 7 % of the land are allocated for the Sinai Bedouin, the original inhabitants. This is not surprising given the fact that from the very beginning the development plans for Sinai have been heavily influenced by various political and economic interest groups such as the military, Egyptian industrialist families and high government officials. As early as 1975, these groups already made claims on property or other interests in Sinai to such an extent, that the governor of Sinai at that time had to ask for moderation. Notwithstanding, the interests of the various influential groups were considered in the planning which otherwise involved no public debate or consultation (Lavie 1991). Up to day this mode of planning and implementation has hardly changed and the interests of powerful people still seem to drive the entire development process (see section 5.4.1).

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[132] Introduction of internet document

[133] Chapter 1 of internet document

[134] Chapter 2 of internet document

[135] This seems logical, since there are also areas under different use such as nature reserves or military zones.

In general, the Bedouin only occupy a marginal place in the development plans for Sinai. In the "National Project for the Development of Sinai 1994-2017", only the minor point[136] of pastoral and fodder development specifically targets the Bedouin population. The plan foresees Bedouin's support and settlement in central and southern Sinai, an increase in livestock in order to expand exports to the Arabian Peninsula and the establishment of related industries for the production of dairy products, wool or the like (GoE 1994). In the concept for the "South Sinai Regional Development Programme (SSRDP)", the main issue is the unsustainable development of South Sinai due to environmental degradation and the unbalanced economic development with a high dependence on tourism. The Bedouin's lack of integration in the economic development and the resulting low standard of living is acknowledged in the plan's problem analysis (GoE, GoSS 2001). Although according to the plan Bedouin participation in the development progress should be encouraged and although two out of eleven project ideas[137] directly target the Bedouin[138] (ibid.), the reality looks quite different as will be shown in this study.

5.4.4 Tourism Development in Sinai

While in North Sinai the focus has been on the development of the agricultural and industrial sectors, in South Sinai all hopes concentrate on the development of tourism, the foundation of which had been laid during the Israeli occupation (see section 5.3.3.). However, tourism development in Sinai is not only part of a strategy to end the isolation of the peninsula but has to be seen in a broader context of desert land reclamation efforts on the one hand and tourism development on the other hand, both being interrelated. Whereas reclamation of desert land is considered a necessity in order to solve the problem of overpopulation of the Nile Valley (cf. GoE, GoSS 2001; GoE, TDA 2001; Ibrahim 1996), tourism development is pursued to foster economic development and hence increase foreign exchange earnings, tax revenues and create employment opportunities. Consequently, since the introduction of the consecutive 5-year-plans for economic and social development in 1982, the government has successfully promoted the expansion and diversification of the tourism industry from the traditional archeological tourism to Pharaonic sites – "a once in a lifetime experience" – to other forms of tour-ism such as religious, therapeutic, desert, ecological, conference and most importantly leisure and beach tourism (cf. GoE, TDA 2001; Sanmartin 1999; Meyer 1996). The Red Sea coast of mainland Egypt and South Sinai with miles of void coastal desertland, "beautiful" beaches,[139] coral reefs and year-round sun were predestined for the development of beach and diving tourism. Investors were attracted with privileges such as preferential taxation or extremely low costs of land (Steiner 2002, Cole & Altorki 1998). As a result, within only twenty years, the Egyptian tourism industry grew immensely.

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[136] Pastoral development is only one out of six issues for the development of the agricultural sector. And the agricultural sector is only one of 13 sectors for which development plans are made.

[137] At a high level policy conference regarding the regional development of South Sinai held in Sharm al-Shaikh on 5th May 2000 a list of 11 priority projects emerged and was presented by the Governor of South Sinai (GoE 2001:32).

[138] The provision of infrastructure to Bedouin settlements and employment generation for Bedouins.

[139] If required, artificial beaches were created.

Since 1982

- annual tourist numbers rose from 1 million to 5 million in 2000,

- the capacity increased from 8,900 rooms to 117,000 rooms in 2001,

- tourism revenue grew from US$ 304 million to US$ 4,500 million in 2000 (GoE,TDA 2001:8-11).

By the beginning of the 21st millennium, tourism had become the most important export Indus-try[140] and hence the primary source of foreign currency (US$ 4.5 billion in 2000), it employed 2.2 million people (directly and indirectly), contributed about 11 % to GDP and earned ca. US$ 466[141] million from taxes and fees imposed on tourist expenditure (GoE,TDA 2001:11).

The two new poles of tourism development, South Sinai and the Red Sea coast, are the lead-ing contributors to the increasing importance of tourism for the Egyptian economy: in 2000 they accounted for 52 % and in 2002 already for 61 % of Egypt's hotel capacity[142] (MoT 2001 in Steiner 2001:92; GoE, MoT 2002:62).[143]

At the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba, the number of hotel beds increased from 1,200 in 1992 to 73,400 in 2002 with an additional capacity of 89,000 beds under construction (GoE, MoT 2002:66). International tourist arrivals at the airport of Sharm al-Shaikh grew 28-fold from 60,000 in 1990 to 1.7 million arrivals in 2000 (Sanmartin 1999; The Economist, 16 April 2001).

In the course of tourism development, thousands of mainly male migrants have come to Sinai in search for jobs (see Figure 3). This is reflected in a population increase in the touristic cen-ters that is far above the natural population growth rate.[144] The great majority of them has not given up their homes in Egypt. Due to the lack of good education and health services, the high cost of living and the distance to family and friends, most of the married migrants keep their families in Egypt: Their hope is to earn enough money in Sinai which will allow them to build up their future in Egypt.

Tourism development has not only attracted migrants from the Nile Valley to the touristic cen-ters in Sinai, but also Bedouin from the rural areas of South Sinai and Bedouin from North Si-nai. Government services such as clinics and schools were further incentives for many Bedou-in to settle in or around urban centres.[145] Another consequence of the rapid tourism deve-

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[140] Tourism's share in Egypt's total export earnings grew from for ca. 11 % in 1990 to ca. 25 % in 2000 (EIU 2002).

[141] i.e. LE 2.8 billion, exchange rate 1$ = 6LE.

[142] In 2000, the Red Sea Governorate accounted for 28 % (30.6 % in 2002) and South Sinai for 24 % (30.7 % in 2002) of Egypt's hotel capacity.

[143] See section 5.4.5. for a detailed description of South Sinai tourist locations.

[144] The population of St. Catherine did not register such a phenomenal growth, since the growth of the tourism sector has been limited to Mount Sinai and the St. Catherine's monastery with few jobs being created in the accommodation sector.

[145] Dahab, Nuwaiba, Sharm al-Shaikh on the East coast and Al-Tur, Abu Rudais and Ras Sudr on the West coast of Sinai.

lopment is environmental degradation and pollution both at land and in the sea[146], thereby jeopardizing the future of the tourism industry. In order to restrain tourism development and limit its negative effects, three national parks[147] along the coast of the Gulf of Aqaba and the St. Catherine's Protectorate in the high mountains of South Sinai were established by the government of Egypt with financial support by the European Union.

Figure 3: Demographic development in four districts of South Sinai under the impact of migration (Own source based on census 1986 and 1996 figures)

5.4.5   Characteristics and Locations of South Sinai Tourism Development

The international tourism boom since 1982 developed in the tourism centres that were established during the Israeli occupation on the east coast[148] of Sinai (Meyer 1996). The major centre is Sharm al-Shaikh (60 % of Sinai hotel capacity) followed by Nuwaiba and the coast up to Taba (23 %), Dahab (3.6 %) and finally St. Catherine (1.2 %) (GoE, MoT 2002:65, Map 3). The main type of tourism in South Sinai is beach tourism organized as a package holiday by large tour operators such as TUI. Once in Sinai, the tourist can choose to book a day trip to Mount Sinai and the St. Catherine monastery, a one-day desert safari in a landcruiser or a trip to one of the national parks, for instance. There are also organized specialized holidays such as diving, safari or trekking holidays or a combination of these activities. These tours are usually offered by specialized agents in Europe and their partners in Egypt or Sinai. Often, one week in Sinai is combined with one week archaeological tourism in the Nile Valley.

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[146] The latter resulting in the destruction of the coral reefs that constitute one of the major attractions of South Sinai, especially for divers and snorklers.

[147] Ras Muhammad National Park, Nabq National Park and Ras Abu Galum National Park.

[148] The coast of the Gulf of Suez in the West has been dominated by the development of domestic tourism which has not been analyzed in this research. It is concentrated around the town of Ras Sudr.

Map 3: International tourism locations in South Sinai

Finally, individual tourists come to Sinai, too, for any of the types of tourism mentioned above. The majority of international tourists come from Europe, increasingly so from Eastern Europe and from Italy, especially in the package tourism sector. Israeli tourists dominate in the area from Taba to Nuwaiba and do also visit St. Catherine and Dahab. There are also a few tourists from Asia, Africa and Latin America and North America.

Generally, the high season is during European and Israeli holidays, thereby differing according to location. Moreover, the favorite season for beach tourism is from spring to autumn, since the winter months are characterized by strong, cold winds. safari tourism, on the other hand, is mostly confined to spring and autum and to some extent to the winter months,[149] the summer being too hot for long desert trips. Violent political conflicts or terror attacks have also had an impact on touristic demand. A more detailed analysis of the impact of violent conflicts will follow the description of the major tourist locations that will be introduced first (see Map 3).

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[149] In the higher elevated regions, the winters can be quite cold for safaris during which one has to sleep in the open.

Sharm al-Shaikh

Sharm al-Shaikh together with neighboring Naama Bay is the growth pole of South Sinai's tourism industry. Its tourism industry is dominated by large, high budget hotels (3-5 stars) and package tourists who come for a week or two.

Sharm al-Shaikh and Naama Bay have grown so much that some of the latest hotels are now located so far from the beach that they offer shuttle services for their guest. Consequently and as a result of government planning, new hotels are mushrooming at the coast North of Sharm al-Shaikh up to the border of Nabq National Park. At the beginning of the 21st century, these new hotels in Nabq already make up for 10 % of Sinai's hotel capacity (GoE, MoT 2002:65).

A Bedouin reported that due to the absence of natural sources of sweet water, there have been no Bedouin "settlements" in Sharm al-Shaikh prior to the Israeli occupation. And although during the early days of the tourism boom, some Bedouin came to Sharm al-Shaikh and owned property and small hotels, today there are only one or two Bedouin owned hotels.

Bedouin do not feature in Sharm's tourism industry except for a few taxi drivers. Tourists will usually not see or hear of the Bedouin anywhere, with the exception of Bedouin tea, handicrafts or dinners as well as desert safaris. In some cases, "real Bedouin" will be hired to supply these services, in other cases handicrafts or tea will be labelled Bedouin and an Egyptian tour guide might even disguise as a Bedouin.

Foto 8: High budget hotel in Sharm al-Shaikh

Mzaina Bedouin settle in the outskirts of Sharm al-Shaikh (Rwaisat)[150] and in small villages in Wadi Mandar, Wadi Kid or Khraiza just before the entrance to Nabq National Park. These Bedouin used to offer Bedouin dinners, camel rides or safaris to tourists from Sharm al-Shaikh. However, since the three terror attacks in South Sinai between 2004 and 2006, these activities have been prohibited (International Crisis Group 2007).[151]

Nuwaiba and Taba

Nuwaiba with its date palm oasis and the coast between Nuwaiba and Taba at the Israeli border have been a favorite destination for Israeli tourists, even after 1982. The tourism industry

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[150] Due to the proximity to Sharm al-Shaikh there are also Bedouin from other tribes and regions in Rwaisat.

[151] As explained in chapter 4, Sharm al-Shaikh was not a focus of this research, so that no detailed and first hand information is available for this location.

is much more differentiated than in Sharm al-Shaikh with accommodation ranging from simple bamboo huts called *"khushas"* (Foto 11) to luxury hotels. Increasingly, there are also European tourists coming to the more luxurious hotels. The government's plan is to develop the entire stretch of coast in a similar style as Sharm al-Shaikh and where necessary replace the existing simple accommodation that is often still in Bedouin ownership. The entire coast has already been sold to investors. However, until 2004 there were only a few operating hotels, many more are still under construction or have been left half-finished.[152] The resulting conflicts over land between the Bedouin and other small entrepreneurs on the one hand and big investors and the government on the other hand will be discussed in detail in chapter 7.1.

Bedouin settlements can be found in Nuwaiba Tarabin and Nuwaiba Mzaina (Foto 9 & 10), named after the two tribes who settled there. Nuwaiba Mzaina is located next to Nuwaiba port from where one can cross to Aqaba in Jordan by boat. Another Mzaina settlement is Al-Wasat, located between the port and the administrative town of Nuwaiba where the government offices and tourist shops are located. Just north of this administrative centre the village of Nuwaiba Tarabin is located.

Dahab

Dahab, like Nuwaiba, is situated on an alluvial plain where Mzaina Bedouin have laid out date palm oasis for generations. What used to be a backpacker and hippie destination during Israeli times and until the mid-1990s is continuously being upgraded and more and more becoming a destination for the usual tourist. This process and other issues that have marginalized the Bedouin will be discussed in chapter 7. Although Dahab is still mainly a destination for individual tourists, those who found a heaven for undisturbed drug consumption in Dahab had to succumb to the strict measures taken by the authorities since the mid 1990s against the trade and consumption of drugs like Hashish, Marihuana or Opium.

Increasingly, Dahab attracts divers and wind surfers. The divers come not only because of beautiful diving grounds but also because of the low prices that have resulted from the competition among the mushrooming diving centers. The surfers find uncomparable conditions of strong and reliable winds in combination with calm waters of the Gulf of Aqaba.

Like in all places of Sinai, the government's vision for Dahab's touristic development is inspired by that of Sharm al-Shaikh. While the development of the original touristic center Al-Masbat around the bay (Foto 12 & 13, Map 4) is proceeding at a fast rate it is still confined by the overall structure of buildings and roads that have developed organically over the years.

Developments further North and South of Al-Masbat, however, are taking place on areas that were not previously used touristically and some larger complexes can already be found. Even

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[152] There is talk about investors who borrowed money from government banks at very good conditions, invested a bit and took off with the larger share. A more likely explanation for most cases though, is that these investors got caught in the "gold rush" and had to realise that except for central locations such as Sharm al-Shaikh or Dahab, international tourism had not yet expanded to these coastal areas North of Nuwaiba. The traditional visitors from Israel often prefer the more simple kinds of accommodation. Moreover, their number declined dramatically after the second Intifada in 2000.

Foto 9: View on Nuwaiba Tarabin

Foto 12: Beach promenade in Dahab

Foto 10: Nuwaiba Mzaina – Duna Beach

Foto 13: Dahab Bay

Foto 11: Tourist camp in Bir Suwair between Taba and Nuwaiba

Foto 14: Bedouin village in Dahab

further North and South, at about 5 km distance, larger hotels are being built at the foot of the mountains that reach into the sea. The aim is to completely develop these coastal stretches up to the borders of Ras Abu Galum National Park in the North and Nabq National Park in the South.

Like in Nuwaiba, settlements are divided into the administrative town Madinat Dahab (including a few luxury hotels nearby) on the one hand and the Bedouin village Al-Asala (Foto 14, Map 4) on the other hand. The touristic beach area Al-Masbat and the Bedouin village are progressively merging together. Moreover, an increasing number of Egyptians and foreigners is living in the Bedouin village. The majority of the Bedouin in Dahab are members of the Mzaina tribe. While some of them belong to an original group that owned date palms and used to fish in Dahab even before the Israeli occupation, others have settled in Dahab in the course of the tourism development. In addition, there are a few Bedouin of other South Sinai tribes.

St. Catherine

St. Catherine (Foto 17 & 18) is the only inland tourism location in South Sinai.[153] Its

Map 4: Dahab

attractions are Mount Sinai (Foto 15),[154] the monastery of St. Catherine (Foto 16) and the mountains of the area with its endemic fauna and flora. However, only comparatively few tourists come for a trekking holiday in the mountains. The large majority of tourists come on organized tours, either as a daytrip from the coastal tourism centers (most of them from Sharm al-Shaikh) or from Cairo. While in the past tourists would spend a night or two in the hotels in St. Catherine, today, most of them just have dinner in the hotel and climb the mountain during the night in order to watch the sunrise from the top. After a breakfast back in the hotel they visit the monastery and are then taken straight back to the beach. The original inhabitants of the village of St. Catherine are the Jabaliya Bedouin. In addition, there is a significant number of

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[153] There are a few points of attraction such as beautiful canyons or oasis, but they are just single points of interest and not touristic villages or towns.

[154] Here Moses is said to have received the Ten Commandments.

Egyptians who are mainly government employees. As in the other locations, there are increasing conflicts over land (see chapter 7.1).

Foto 15: Chapel on Mount Sinai

Foto 16: Monastery of St. Catherine

Foto 17: View on St. Catherine

Foto 18: Orchard in St. Catherine

5.4.6 The Impact of Violent Conflicts on the Tourism Industry

The tourism industry of South Sinai has been affected by several violent conflicts that have led to a repeated temporary decrease in touristic demand (see Meyer 1996 and Steiner 2002). In the context of the livelihood systems approach, the respondents of this study were asked about the effects of violent political conflicts on their businesses. Thus, information was gathered on the impact of

- the second Intifada that started in September 2000[155],

- the terror attacks of 11th September 2001 in the USA and

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[155] The beginning of the Intifada was set off by Isreali Prime Minister Sharon's visit of the Temple Mountain.

- the war against Iraq in 2003.

The Gulf War in 1991 and the terror attacks in Luxor in 1997 lay too far in the past and many of the younger respondents[156] could not remember their impact so that the effect of these conflicts was not investigated. The three terror attacks in Sinai between October 2004 and April 2006[157] took place after the fieldwork for this research had been completed so that no data could be collected.

The effects of the other three conflicts, especially the resulting decrease in tourists, could not be quantified properly due to the problems discussed in chapter 4.9. Consequently, the following figures are rough indications or trends based on the subjective evaluation of the respondents rather than precise statistics.

In general, the second Intifada was considered to have caused the biggest problems, because of its 3-year-long duration during which the number of tourists from Israel and consequently income decreased to 30-50 % of the pre-Intifada level. A recovery could be noticed in April 2003 after the signing of the Road Map for Peace. The events of 11 September 2001 led to a further decrease down to 10-30 % of the pre-Intifada level and a recovery set in after ca. 6 months. For the war against Iraq 2003, reports range from a complete stillstand to 30 % of the pre-Intifada level. Tourists started coming again shortly after the official end of the "fightings" in April 2003. However, due to the time overlap of the conflicts and/or their impacts it is not really possible to completely single out the impact of one conflict. But it becomes clear that further conflicts led to more deterioration.

In addition to these very general statements of respondents regarding the impact of the crises, one can notice regional and sectoral variations, as well as differences from individual to individual:

The second Intifada affected Nuwaiba and the coast from Nuwaiba to Taba disproportionately negatively due to the region's strong dependence on tourists from Israel (they account for ca. 75-90 % of the tourists, especially in the low budget sector that is served by the Bedouin). As a consequence, many businesses had to close down completely. Dahab lost almost all its Israeli tourists that used to make up at least 50 % of its clientele. Due to anti-Israeli sentiments that grew among the Egyptians in Dahab during the Intifada, the number of Israeli tourists did not reach its previous level again. Tourism in St. Catherine, too, was affected by the Intifada. Especially those Bedouin who were involved in mountain trekking were hit the hardes, because their main clientele from Israel stopped coming. And the large number of religious/cultural tourists from the entire world who would visit Israel and end their tour with a visit to St. Catherine Monastery and a hike up Mount Sinai would stay away, too. However, in Dahab and St. Catherine, the decrease in Israeli tourists could somewhat be compensated by an

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[156] This study is biased towards younger respondents, since it was easier to get in contact with them, because many of the older people do not actually work in tourism anymore but are involved as entrepreneurs (see chapter 4 on the methodology).

[157] Bomb attacks in Taba, Ras al-Shaitan and Nuwaiba in October 2004, in Sharm al-Shaikh in July 2005 and in Dahab in April 2006 and two attacks on MFO forces in North Sinai in August 2005 and April 2006.

increasing number of European tourists. In Dahab, there has also been a noticeable increase in Eastern European tourists in recent years. During the tourism depression in St. Catherine, there were still tourists coming from Sharm al-Shaikh to visit the monastery and to climb Mount Sinai.

It is noteworthy, that firms with close ties to travel agencies in Europe have been affected much less during the Intifada. This was reported by diving centers in Dahab who did not depend on walk-in tourists but had fixed bookings from Europe as well as by some of the trekking guides among the Jabaliya who have specialized on European tourists.

The following quotes have been chosen to illustrate how the impact of the various crises has been perceived by different individuals from different locations and engaged in different sectors of the tourism industry.

Most respondents noted a significant decrease in touristic demand and income as a result from violent conflicts, independent of their occupation or location:

> "The Intifada was a big problem. Before it started I could earn LE 1,000-2,000 (ca. US$ 150-300) a month with safaris, but after it started I could not even make LE 300 (US$ 50). There was no work, may be two or three[158] men still had work." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 48)

> "Before one minibus could make LE 7,000 per month, but due to the intifada only LE 1,000-1,500 per month." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

> "Since 1999 the number of tourists to Mount Sinai has gone down to 50 - 40 % of the previous level. Four years ago I could sometimes do four trips to the mountain per day, even if that meant that I would not sleep for three days. Now I go at most two times a day, but on some days I don't. Actually three years before the Intifada, there were so many tourists that they sometimes did not find a guide." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 24)

> "Before the Intifada I had tourists every day, sometimes I did 2-3 camel trips a day from the road to Ain Khudra, now there are only 2-3 trips a week." (Desert settlement near Ain Khudra, Mzaina, male, 25)

Some felt an impact but found it hard to differentiate between the various crises and separately quantify their effects as expressed in the following quote:

> "9/11 was also a problem, but it is difficult to say how big its impact was. For three years all problems have come together, there was the Intifada, the war in Iraq, terror attacks in America." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, male, 35)

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[158] The Bedouin like to say „two or three" when they mean very few or a small number.

However, a few individuals who live in the desert did not attach too much importance to fluctuations in the touristic demand reflecting a different attitude and philosophy of life, but possibly also a higher degree of autarchy:

> "The Intifada and all the other crises did not affect me. The people in Dahab or Nuwaiba who complain are just hungry for money, not for food. That is their problem. I never have a problem and the tourists always come, two or three. This week many will come because of the Jewish feast." (Desert settlement Shigarat on the St. Catherine-Nuwaiba Road, Mzaina, male, 70)

> „You know, we cannot write or read. If something happened, we do not know, we just wait for the tourists. And sometimes there are more and sometimes there are fewer."[159] (Desert settlement Wadi Disco, Mzaina, male, 52)

And as mentioned above, the origin of the tourists would also matter and close business contacts with small specialized agencies from Europe could help as in the following case:

> „The Intifada is no problem. We are in Egypt, there are no problems here, and Israel is Israel.[160] May be those who bring work [=tourists] from Israel have problems. But for those who bring them from Sharm or Cairo there is no problem. All my safari tourists are from Europe." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 52)

Concluding, while the impact of crises such as the terror attacks of 9/11 or the war in Iraq was of a limited duration, tourism from neighboring Israel never really recovered completely due to the ongoing Intifada and political problems between Israel and the Palestinians. Moreover, according to information the researcher received from Europeans who travel to Sinai regularly, the three terror attacks in Sinai between October 2004 and April 2006[161] have almost caused a standstill of tourism in and around Nuwaiba and have had a negative impact on tourism in Dahab and St. Catherine, as well. Future tourism development could be jeopardized by further terrorist activities in the short and medium term, thereby resulting in an economic depression affecting both the indigenous Bedouin as well as the Egyptian migrant population.

In this chapter, the context, conditions and trends in Sinai that are relevant to the research question have been presented. It has been shown that the Bedouin are Sinai's indigenous inhabitants with a distinct social organization and socio-economy. Although the various external powers have always had an interest in Sinai, their influence was small until the middle of the 20th century. Since Egypt regained control over Sinai in 1982, the Egyptian government has

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[159] This was the response to the question about the effect of 9/11.

[160] As discussed in chapter 4.9. some respondents were unwilling to talk about problems.

[161] Bomb attacks in Taba, Ras al-Shaitan and Nuwaiba in October 2004, in Sharm al-Shaikh in July 2005 and in Dahab in April 2006 and two attacks on MFO forces in North Sinai in August 2005 and April 2006. These attacks took place after the fieldwork for this research had been completed and no data could be collected.

promoted policy measures in order to integrate Sinai politically as well as economicly into the nation state so that Sinai would contribute to the solution of Egypt's most serious problems:

- overpopulation in the Nile Valley,

- high unemployment,

- deficit of the balance of payments.

In this process the Bedouin and their needs and interests have been almost completely neglected. Nevertheless, the Bedouin have managed to engage in informal and semi-formal tourism in the four main centers of international tourism in Sinai: Sharm al-Shaikh, Dahab, Nuwaiba and St. Catherine. The tourism sector in general and Bedouin livelihoods in particular have been hit by repeated decreases in touristic demand due to violent political conflicts.

The following chapter will give an overview of the Bedouin's endowment with livelihood resources.

6. Livelihood Resources

The second point of analysis in the livelihood systems approach are the livelihood resources that can be categorised into five types of assets: natural capital, physical capital, human capital, financial capital and social capital (see chapter 4.1).

Due to the focus of this study on the institutional processes and organizational structures that determine the degree of Bedouin participation in the tourism industry and the limitations regarding the collection of representative quantitative data discussed in chapter 4.9, this chapter is confined to a general description of the livelihood resources that are available to the Bedouin. Any figures in this chapter should be understood as general estimates that are derived from the information gathered from observation and qualitative interviews. While differences according to social status, age, location, etc. will be considered as much as possible, this is a generalized resource inventory that refers to the Bedouin community as one entity.

6.1 Natural Capital

In the past, the Bedouin like most other indigenous people had collective rights over the natural resources of their entire territory with a few exceptions of resources that were individually owned, such as date palms, wells or gardens. But with its growing interest in Sinai, the Egyptian government has only respected property owned individually where ownership could be claimed due to physical development such as construction or cultivation.[162] All collectively owned resources, i.e. the land and sea and whatever resources exist under, on or in it, have become state property.

The government's claim on these resources has been implemented in almost all areas or cases where these resources are of direct economic interest, such as coastal land for tourism development or quarries of granite. Land in and around urban centres, too, is under Egyptian government ownership and control since 1982.[163] Moreover, the government is increasingly extending its reach and control over land, as for instance along the main roads and in and around the major desert settlements (e.g. by requiring land titles and building permits, see chapter 7.1 on land issues).

However, due to the vastness and inaccessibility of the territory, Bedouin have still been able to freely dispose of some of the resources, such as land in the more remote desert areas for grazing and building, quarries for the collection of crystal druses, firewood, wild animals or medicinal herbs. This also includes scenic desert sites, some canyons and oasis as well as arqueological sites where Bedouin can still take tourists without restrictions specific to these sites.

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[162] This policy applies to all desert regions of Egypt.
[163] This has already been the case since 1952/58 for desert land destined to be reclaimed for agrarian use.

Although some Bedouin have been lucky in being able to claim property at sites of touristic interest, especially coastal land, they are a minority. And many of this fortunate minority have sold their land or lost it in other ways (see chapter 7.1). Moreover, due to the population growth which is reflected in large families, the individual share in these properties quickly diminishes from one generation to the next. This is also the case with the gardens around St. Catherine and the various date palm oases.

As a consequence of the population growth and the restricted access to land, the per capita share over the collective resources, especially water and pastures has also diminished, thereby rendering the alternative and complementary economic activity of livestock keeping and horticulture less reliable and less viable. According to elder Bedouin respondents, rainfalls have decreased both in frequency as well as duration which aggravates the situation. In a group discussion in Samghi, a desert village near Nuwaiba, the elders agreed that the last good year with plenty of rain was 1977.[164]

6.2 Physical Capital

Physical capital comprises infrastructure and means of production. It can be categorized into physical capital provided by the state or by private companies for use by the public and physical capital privately owned by households. Access to and costs of physical capital (or fees for its use) are significant determinants of livelihood outcomes.

6.2.1 Physical Capital Available for Use by the Public

Roads and Public Transport

Today, the main settlements of South Sinai are well connected by asphalt roads. In addition to the two North-South roads along the coast, there are two major East-West connections. One between Taba and Ras Sudr/Suez via Nakhil and the other between Dahab/Nuwaiba and Abu Rudais/Al-Tur via St. Catherine and Wadi Fairan (see Map 3). Most of the smaller desert settlements are only accessible by four-wheel drive or by experienced drivers. There are a few places that can only be accessed by foot.

A bus and minibus service exists between the major settlements as well as to Suez and Cairo. However, there is no guarantee that the bus will stop to take passengers from smaller settlements along the road.

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[164] One of them explained: "The last time that it really rained was in 1977. It rained for an entire week. The rain would cease for a little while but then it would continue raining. Afterwards it was green everywhere and the goats were eating and the camels were eating. Three years it was green everywhere from this rain. But after that it has never rained again." (group discussion, Samghi)

Water supply

The urban coastal centres of Dahab, Nuwaiba and Sharm al-Shaikh are supplied with piped desalinated water. St. Catherine has a small water supply network that is fed from one private and two public groundwater wells. The outskirts of the towns and smaller settlements along the roads depend on water delivery by tank trucks. Some desert villages like Bir Saghair or Wadi Saal (see Map 3) have their own wells with motor pumps. Businessmen, mostly from North Sinai but also some from South Sinai, take this water in tank cars or filled in large jerri-cans loaded onto pickup trucks to the urban centers where private households and tourist businesses buy it for cooking and drinking[165].

Although municipalities are required to charge for water according to national consumption tariffs, which are determined according to consumption brackets, starting at 18 piastres per m^3, the "market value" of water in Aqaba Gulf towns can be as high as LE 10-12 per m^3, and even more if delivered by truck. In Sharm al-Shaikh, too, the municipality sells at least some of the water at LE 6 per m^3. Consequently, some of the market prices are currently as much as 70 times the official price (Sims 2003:2),[166,167] contributing significantly to monthly household expenditure.

Electricity and Communications

All the major settlements are supplied with electricity 24h per day. However, smaller settlements only have electricity from diesel generators that are operated not more than a few hours per day and some do not have electricity at all.

The main settlements are all connected to the telephone net. There are two mobile phone companies in Egypt whose networks cover the main settlements and one of them also extends into remote areas in the desert and is therefore preferred by most Bedouin (see section 6.2.2).

6.2.2 Physical Capital Privately Owned by Households

Rural Households

The term 'rural' refers to desert villages as well as smaller settlements of in some cases just one or two families. Today, only a minority of approximately 10 % to 20 % of the Bedouin still live in these rural desert regions. And only very few rural households still live in goat hair tents. Most have built little huts out of wooden boards or metal sheets or, if they could afford it,

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[165] These businessmen pay the owner of the well or the caretaker of the pump ca. 3 piasters per 60-l-jerrican. Private individuals can take water free of charge. In the case of Sharm al-Shaikh, Sims (2003:3) in a one-hour period, from 7:00 to 8:00 AM, counted 37 tankers bringing sweet water from the area of Al-Tur which has rich groundwater resources.

[166] The actual water prices should be considered in tourism and regional development planning, since neglecting them would lead to distorted results of calculations, i.e. in the case of feasibility studies for settling thousands of Egyptian migrants.

[167] In addition to the public water supply, there are some private households that have dug their own wells, especially for the irrigation of their gardens in and around St. Catherine or in the oases.

houses of cement blocks or natural stones.[168] In the short time from one field visit to the next (spring 2003 to autumn 2003 and then spring 2004) the researcher observed many new houses built in places along the Nuwaiba-St.Catherine road that were previously used as temporary encampments.[169] A similar development is taking place in the more remote wadis and desert villages. However, many Bedouin choose to continue living in their tent during part of the year (especially during the hot season) where they can relocate the tent to the optimal place for each season (e.g. a windy place during the hot months, a sheltered place during winter). The Egyptian government with the aid of the World Food Programme (WFP) has built houses in most of the major desert villages. Although the Bedouin reported that these houses were meant for them, they have not moved into these houses because of various reasons. The most important reason seems to be mistrust towards the government and a preference for one's own house in a location that one chose by oneself. In Samghi, Bedouin reported that the houses were too far from where other people were staying.[170] In Wadi Saal, Bedouin were not sure whether the government might not kick them out of the houses and they would loose all their belongings. A Bedouin who lives 3 km from St. Catherine commented that the government houses had only two rooms and cost LE 40,000 (ca. 5,700 Euros) whereas he built his larger house for LE 25,000 (ca. 3,500 Euros).

Rural households usually own between 10 and 20 goats, some chicken and sometimes doves. In places near the road between St. Catherine and Dahab and Nuwaiba that are frequented by safari tourists, such as Wadi Arada or Wadi Ghazala (see Map 3) or villages located close to these "safari starting points" (e.g. Wadi Saal) many of the adult men own at least one camel, but often two or three. Some wealthier and often elder men might own up to six camels. In more remote areas such as Wadi Nasb, which are not frequented by tourists very much, the researcher did not see many camels. There could be two possible explanations. Either keeping camels in these places is not profitable enough to keep camels or people might have sent their camels to tourist regions like the Blue Hole near Dahab, where a relative or friend would use the camel for tourist trips.[171]

A minority of approximately one third of the households owns a jeep or a pickup. Noteworthy is the increasing number of Bedouin in the desert who own mobile phones which they charge with their car batteries. The mobile phone has become an important tool in the safari business (see chapter 8.2).[172]

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[168] Using natural stone is more expensive due to the material as well as due to the more difficult construction job.

[169] Often locations at the foot of a hillside are chosen.

[170] Moreover, Bedouin respondents criticized the government for building a big school in Samghi but no well. As a consequence, people are dependent on the water deliveries by truck. According to the respondents the lack of a well was the reason why only about 15-20 families had settled in Samghi – regardless the availability of a school for their children. In the past many people used to live in Samghi and go to Bir Saghair by camel to fetch water. They would also walk to Suez to take charcoal using camels as animals of burden and come back with flour. But now most of them have moved to Nuwaiba.

[171] Due to the remoteness of these places the researcher did not have the opportunity to spend enough time in these areas to get a more precise knowledge of people's assets.

[172] Noteworthy is also that quite a few households even have washing machines which they operate during the limited hours of electricity supply.

Urban Households

The majority of the Bedouin today live in or around urban[173] centers such as Dahab, Nuwaiba and St. Catherine that were the main study locations of this research.[174] Most of the elder Bedouin own a house, a minority also owns two ore more houses, which they let to foreigners. There are a few families who could not afford to build a house and still live in simple huts made of wooden boards or metal sheets, especially at the edge of Nuwaiba Tarabin. Due to increasing land shortage (see chapter 7.1.), young men are forced to construct their houses within the compound of their father's house. Others, who do not have this option, try to buy an apartment in 3-story-buildings (Dahab) or small 2-party-houses (Nuwaiba) that were set up by the government.

In Dahab, due to the advanced tourism development, the government's efforts to "upgrade" the Bedouin village Al-Asala and land shortage, there are ever fewer people keeping goats. Those who do have goats, only have two to four. In Nuwaiba Tarabin and Nuwaiba Mzaina many people still keep goats and often also a larger number of 10-15 goats. This could be due to the more straggling characteristic of the villages, especially Nuwaiba Mzaina and Al-Wasat that extend over a vast territory, the availability of fodder in government olive plantations and from army food leftovers as well as the more irregular touristic demand. In St. Catherine, many families still keep goats, but often their number does not exceed two or three. This is probably a result of the land shortage around the village and regulations of the St. Catherine protectorate regarding grazing which forces people to buy extra feed for their animals. According to a Jabaliya respondent, there are 200-300 Jabaliya families in St. Catherine and 500-600 camels, so that on average every family owns 2-3 camels. However, younger and poorer families might not own a camel at all. The same is true for wealthier families whose household income stems from other sources, such as taxi driving or shop keeping. Since they do not depend on the camel for a livelihood, the required effort in time and money for keeping a camel is not worth it except for nostalgic reasons. Acknowledging that these figures are a rough estimate and even considering that some people own 3 to 4 camels, the author supposes that there is a significant number of households who do not own a camel. In Nuwaiba, mostly those who are still involved in the safari business own one or two but seldom more camels. As in St. Catherine, only few of those who own camps, restaurants or cars, also own camels. In Dahab, the share of people owning camels seems to be even smaller – as in the case of goat keeping this can be attributed to the more advanced tourism development.[175]

A small minority of the Bedouin in Dahab own camps over which they still have control. In Nuwaiba Mzaina and Tarabin, there is still a number of Bedouin owned camps, but they are often rented to outsiders, usually Bedouin from North Sinai who have more experience in manage-

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[173] "Urban" is only meaningful in contrast to the desert and the smaller settlements, since these "urban centers" have much more in common with a village than with a town or even city.

[174] Other urban centers where Bedouin live are Al-Tur, Abu Rudais, Abu Zunaima, Ras Sudr, and the outskirts of Sharm al-Shaikh.

[175] Although no data could be obtained in this respect, it is very likely that some of the Bedouin from Dahab keep camels at nearby Ras Abu Galum National Park where tourists take a camel ride to the Blue Hole located between Dahab and the National Park. This camel ride is often part of one-day safaris offered in the hotels in Sharm al-Shaikh.

ment and in dealing with the Egyptian authorities (see chapter 7.2. and 7.3.). In St. Catherine, there are three Bedouin owned camps. In Dahab, a handful of very wealthy and influential Bedouin or Bedouin families own larger hotels (e.g. Coral Coast, Happy Beach and Moham-med Ali in Dahab). These families are so affluent that they usually own various properties and businesses.[176]

A minority of the Bedouin in all three towns own cars, be it normal cars, taxis, pickup trucks, jeeps or minibuses. And again, only a handful of rich Bedouin own large expensive tipping trucks, tank trucks or construction machinery.

Many urban Bedouin households own a fridge, a TV often with a satellite dish and a washing machine and electrical fans are no rarity. Telephone landlines are common, too, but even more popular are mobile phones, preferably the latest model. Increasingly, women, too, are given mobile phones by their husbands.

Both, in urban and rural areas, there is a relatively small number of Bedouin who own goat hair tents that they set up somewhere in the desert in order to offer Bedouin lunch or dinner parties to tourists.

6.3 Financial Capital

Financial capital can be used for consumption or for investment in the four other types of capi-tal. The most important source of financial capital among the Bedouin is their regular income from self-employment, employment[177] or rent. Outsiders, especially employers, often report, that many Bedouin's attitude is to go and look for work, when in need of money, and not to work, when the money still lasts. However, when taking a closer look, a more differentiated picture emerges. While it is true that there are Bedouin who live hand to mouth, most of them have no other choice. Their daily income is just enough to feed the family for a day.

But it also became clear from the collected data that, if there is surplus income, Bedouin, too, as most other people, save some of their money. One way of saving is the investment in lives-tock or property, but surplus is also saved in cash or in bank accounts. The large majority of self-employed Bedouin had financed their initial business investment either from savings they made from their previous economic activities or from selling assets such as camels, cars or land. Young men often start accumulating capital by working with their fathers' assets, e.g. a camel or a taxi.

Another form of financial capital is credit. While Bedouin rarely have access to formal bank credits (due to lacking financial guarantees or missing papers such as the army certificate) and are also weary of entering a financial obligation with a bank, there are other possible sour-

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[176] In St. Catherine, there are no hotels in Bedouin ownership. The author did not find any South Sinai Bedouin who owned a hotel in Nuwaiba. In Sharm al-Shaikh, there are reportedly two or three hotels (Bait al-Hamam and Shark Bay) that are owned by very rich and influential Bedouin.

[177] Employment and self-employment are often in the informal or semi-formal sector.

ces of credit. Often, a larger investment, such as a taxi or a tank lorry, can be done by paying ca. 10 % of the cost to the owner in advance and paying off the rest over a period of two to four years. According to one Bedouin respondent this kind of deal was preferred, since one could negotiate with the owner in the case of payment difficulties while this was impossible with the bank. Another source of credit are family members and friends. Poor people sometimes need to rely on credit from shops to finance daily consumption.

A special case of a financial source are European and Northamerican women. A number of Bedouin men in Dahab and Nuwaiba have established a business (e.g. a camp) with the financial aid of their foreign wives. A very successful example is the Desert Divers diving center in Dahab that belongs to a Bedouin from Al-Tur and his Canadian wife.

While no statistics on income and income distribution are available, it seems that – although a significant number of Bedouin find themselves in a daily struggle to make a living – the majority can satisfy their basic needs but are vulnerable to shocks since they do not have large savings or accumulated wealth. A few are so wealthy (from business in tourism or the drug trade, see chapter 8) that they do not ever have to worry about money.[178]

6.4 Human Capital

6.4.1 Formal Education

Human capital can be acquired through informal or formal education, the latter being more marketable in the modern world. However, in the past, Bedouin have had limited access to formal education. The first schools in South Sinai were built during the Israeli occupation, but they were limited to the primary school level. Since 1982, the Egyptian government has built many additional schools, including secondary schools.

While almost all of the Bedouin aged over 35 have never gone to school and are more or less illiterate[179], the majority of the younger male Bedouin (35 years or younger) have gone to school. Out of 65 adult male Bedouin aged 35 years or below 77 % had completed primary school and 25 % of them had even graduated from secondary school (see Table 3). It is noteworthy that half of those who have never gone to school live in the desert. However, not all children from the desert are deprived of a basic education, because many parents send their children to stay with relatives in the urban centers or the next larger settlement so that they can go to school. So far there are only a handful of university graduates among the Bedouin in the study area.[180] Increasingly, girls are sent to school, as well. And some respondents even wanted their daughters to become doctors or lawyers.

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[178] There are some Bedouin who have become so rich that they can easily afford to take the plane from Sharm al-Shaikh to Cairo for a short trip.

[179] There are some alphabetization campaigns carried out by local NGOs in the towns but also in the desert villages.

[180] Probably, in Al-Tur, the capital of the governorate, there might be a higher number of Bedouin university graduates. Among the respondents of this study there were no university graduates.

Table 3: Level of education among Bedouin aged 35 or younger (in 2004)

Level of education	Number of respondents and percentage of total (65 respondents)	Number of respondents living in the desert
No school at all	8 (12 %)	4
Some years of primary	7 (11 %)	1
Completed primary	7 (11 %)	1
Some years of preparatory school	13 (20 %)	3
Completed preparatory school	13 (20 %)	1
Secondary school and diploma	17 (26 %)	1

Own source

Clearly, when compared to the past, education facilities and the level of education have improved substantially. However, according to many respondents, there still are a number of problems. Most of the teachers are Egyptian and speak Egyptian dialect which the Bedouin children do not understand at first. Bedouin parents reported that as a consequence the children fail to answer correctly, which the teacher attributes to the students being lazy or stupid. It was also reported that it is common among teachers to beat the children who in turn are scared of going to school, lose all motivation and leave school completely. Moreover, apparently many of the teachers were transferred to Sinai for disciplinary reasons rather than being there by their own decision.[181] Due to this or other reasons, some teachers are also prejudiced or racist against the Bedouin children and degrade them instead of encouraging them in class.[182]

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[181] Working in Sinai if not chosen voluntarily would be considered a real punishment by most Egyptians, since it is far from the Nile valley, it is difficult to bring one's family and the cost of living is much higher than in Egypt, especially in the tourist centers.

[182] A 33-year old Bedouin from Ras Sudr who had gone through this experience himself when he had been at school told the author about an encounter he had recently had with a 15-year old boy who accompanied a safari group. When questioned why he was not attending school, the boy said that he had always had problems with the teachers and that they

Furthermore, some teachers do not teach as much as they are supposed to, because they often work in a second job to complement the meager teacher's salary (LE 250-300/month, ~ Euro 40). Another problem is that the subjects are not explained well and the individual student is not taken care of so that the children have no idea what they are supposed to do or what they are learning. The situation is even worse, because most Bedouin parents have not gone to school and do not know how to guide their children in studying and concentrating on their homework. Usually, children are trying to do their homework in the middle of other children romping around, while the TV is playing or other distractions around.

In addition to these problems, there are some parents who still do not understand the importance of school education for their children and do not send them to school. Especially in remote desert areas, many children do not go to school but grow up in the traditional way. Other parents do not want to force their children to go to school and subject them to the Egyptian teachers and their teaching methods. One respondent, for instance, reported that his children were going to school, except for two who were not taught well and were beaten and consequently ran away from school. Another reason why many children do not go to school or invest enough time in their education is the quick money that can be made from selling bracelets, icecream, cigarettes or the like to tourists at the beach.

Nevertheless, the majority of the Bedouin stress the importance of knowledge and education saying that "knowledge is light" or that there is nothing better in this world than education. Those who have not had the chance to become literate do feel how in the modern world this signifies their exclusion, as stated by a 55-year-old Bedouin man in Nuwaiba Tarabin:

> "Education is good. Who does not write does not know anything. If you are educated you can become a lawyer, a judge or a chief of police. Knowledge is good. The one who is not educated goes with the camel, because the camel, too, cannot read. About camels, goats and sheep, that is all we have learnt. But in that we are experts." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 55)

Other respondents emphasized how important education was for the Bedouin in order to represent their interest vis-à-vis the government and demand their rights as is reflected in this statement:

> "Education will help the Bedouin to understand the government and the government to understand the people. With education the Bedouin will get to know their righs and will be able to fight for them, but now they do not know their rights." (Samghi desert village, Mzaina, male, 46)

Most Bedouin would prefer if there were Bedouin teachers at school who speak Bedouin Arabic, understand the background of the children and incorporate Bedouin culture in their teaching. However, so far there are no Bedouin teachers because of the lack of education among

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had told him to take his camel and go to the desert. He was told that the desert was his place, where he fitted and that here (in school or town) he would not achieve anything anyway.

the elders and the preference among those younger Bedouin who opt for higher education for courses that promise a better income such as a diploma in commerce or a degree in law.

6.4.2 Informal Education

In the realm of informal education there are two important aspects: the traditional knowledge and skills that are passed on from the elder to the younger generation and the knowledge that is imported by the media as well as from tourists and migrants.

Traditional knowledge comprises a unique understanding of the desert, its (medicinal) plants and animals as well as information about water wells, best desert tracks or beautiful scenery as well as Bedouin customs and history. Traditional skills include typical Bedouin activities such as baking bread in or on a fire, embroidering, spinning and weaving, herding goats or keeping camels. Many of these skills are getting lost, because the traditional hand-made products cannot compete with modern industrial products. The weaving of tents from goat hair, for instance, is now only practiced by a small minority. However, the knowledge and skills that are marketable in tourism are kept alive and sometimes developed further by those whose income earning is dependant on these skills: e.g. embroidery, baking bread or surviving in the desert (see chapters 8 for a discussion of Bedouin livelihood strategies). Skills such as house building or repairing a car or electronic equipment are also passed on informally from father to son, uncle to nephew, for instance.

Much knowledge is imported by the media and by the tourists. Through the interaction with the tourists many Bedouin have learnt English and/or Hebrew. Out of 87 respondents[183] only nine did not know any foreign language at all (four of the nine respondents live in the desert). Among the elder Bedouin only few speak English but many know some Hebrew. Younger Bedouin in Dahab tend to speak more English than Hebrew, but in St. Catherine and Nuwaiba the young Bedouin can often communicate in both languages. Of course there are significant variations in each individual's proficiency and some Bedouin have also picked up quite a few words from other languages such as German or French. From the tourists, the Bedouin also learn about life, culture and customs or politics in the tourists' home countries and hear the tourists' views and thoughts about the situation in Egypt and Sinai.

Another source of information are the TV programmes. Today, most urban Bedouin households have a TV and a large part of them also have a satellite dish. Sources for political news are not restricted to the Egyptian state channels, but extend from Al Jazeera and Al Arabiya to the BBC and CNN. A multitude of other channels with many different topics such as nature, movies or Islam bring the world into the Bedouins' living rooms. Especially the women benefit from this, since they have otherwise limited possibilities of acquiring new knowledge. But now, they can, for instance, learn about the discourse on women's rights in the Arab world.

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[183] Data about knowledge of foreign languages was collected from 87 out of 117 respondents.

6.5 Social Capital

Social capital refers to all social resources on which people can fall back in order to secure their livelihoods, such as family or tribal networks, business networks or political representation. As in the case of human and financial capital formal and informal types of social capital can be differentiated.

6.5.1 Formal Types of Social Capital

Bedouin interests are formally represented at all administrative levels from the village over the district to the governorate and the republic (see chapter 5.4.1. for a description of the political and administrative system).

The following figures about Bedouin political representation in 2003/2004 could be obtained from statements from single Bedouin individuals:[184] Out of the 24 members that constitute the local council of each district, there were more Bedouin than Egyptians: in Nuwaiba there were 19 Bedouin and 5 Egyptians, in St. Catherine the ratio was 15 Bedouin to 9 Egyptians.[185] A similar ratio was reported for Dahab. The president of the local council in Nuwaiba was a Bedouin, too. However, the mayor who holds the executive power was an Egyptian.[186] Each district designates 14 representatives to the governorate parliament in Al-Tur. In the case of Nuwaiba district there were 8 Bedouin and 6 Egyptian delegates in Al-Tur. And out of the 120 members of the council at the governorate level, there were more than 70 % Bedouin.[187]

In the national parliament in Cairo, there were two South Sinai Bedouin in the Advisory Council (Maglis al-Shura) and four South Sinai Bedouin in the People's Assembly (Maglis al-Shaab).[188]

From these figures one would think that the Bedouin have a strong political representation. However, there was no respondent except for those who were politicians who felt that Bedouin interests were represented by the Bedouin politicians.

According to one Mzaina respondent, the Bedouin members of the local council only did five percent of what they could do for the Bedouin due to three reasons:

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[184] Since these figures could not be verified with other respondens, they can only give an indication but should not be taken as absolute facts.

[185] In the beginning of the Egyptian administration, there were hardly any Bedouin representatives in the local councils. The author was told that in the past in St Catherine there were only 2 Bedouin in the local council.

[186] There were only 3 Bedouin employees in the town's administration: a driver, a mechanic and a helper in the plantation. In terms of social capital this means that when Bedouin have some official affairs like registering their land or getting a building permission they cannot rely on Bedouin social networks but have to deal with Egyptian civil servants.

[187] After having given the estimate of 70 % Bedouin, the respondent – a member of the local council of St. Catherine- counted 15 Egyptians in a list of the 120 members of the council at the governorate level, which would mean nearly 90 % Bedouin representation.

[188] There was one Mzaina and one Alaigat in the Advisory Council and two Mzaina, one Gararsha or Awlad Said and one Huwaitat in the Popular Council.

- they do not have the education to understand what is going on and what they can do about it,

- they fear the government,

- they have limited financial resources and consequently cannot build up any network based on patronage and clientelism (*"wasta"*)

This pessimist view that Bedouin politicians do nothing for the Bedouin is shared by most people, who say that what is happening at the councils is all "empty talk." Most respondents believe that Bedouin politicians do not stand up for Bedouin interests because they are not educated enough and because they are scared of the mayor. Other respondents explained that the fear of the mayor or the governor was connected to selfish interests. According to them, the Bedouin politicians care more about their good relationship with the Egyptian   mayors or the governor in order to receive special advantages and help. Other respondents explained that in case a Bedouin politician tried to speak up he would quickly be given a stretch of 200-300 meters land at the beach, a license for some business or money by the governor in order to silence him.

When asked why the Bedouin vote for these men, a respondent told the author that before the elections everybody trusts these men because of their good behaviour with people. However, after the elections people are disappointed. The respondent continued saying that in the Popular Council in Cairo these Bedouin politicians cared even less for the people but only looked after their own business affairs:

> "And when they are in "maglis al shaab", they do not only forget the life here
> in Sinai, but even their own father. Only business counts for them." (St.
> Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 22)

A similar view was expressed by a Mzaina Bedouin from Dahab when he was asked whether the Bedouin in the "maglis al-mahaly" did not help their people:

> "The Bedouin are sleeping: they are stupid and don't understand anything.
> People vote for these Bedouin politicians, because before the elections they
> say that they will do this and that. But once they are elected they just wait
> for their parlamentarian ID-card,[189] put it in their pocket and then they go
> and sleep...and that's it." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

A Bedouin from North Sinai who has a more distant view regretted the situation. In his view, the Bedouin could achieve so much through the local council, if they only were aware of the power they have; then, they could, for instance, decide how to spend the government budget for Dahab. But according to him, the main problem is that the Bedouin only vote for analphabet candidates. A possible reason might be that social status based on financial power is a

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[189] A person who holds such an ID cannot be searched by the police. According to one informand, many politicians are therefore involved in the drug business.

stronger argument than clever thinking by someone who has no stand with the Egyptian government and administration.

6.5.2 Informal Types of Social Capital

The family and tribal networks of the Bedouin are the most important social capital at the informal level. According to the level of kinship relation, there are moral obligations of differing extent between individuals and groups. These reciprocal obligations and claims are dealt with flexibly, since in tribal law blood relationship is not the only factor that is considered, but relations of choice, origin, faith, language, profession, friendship, age group, behaviour and reputation etc. can play a significant role, too (Sorg n.d:n.p.). No member of one interest group views himself as exclusively belonging to that particular group, but rather decides about the affiliation with one group according to the circumstances. Nevertheless, each individual is loyal to his tribe and intratribal conflicts are solved by discussing and appealing to the degree of kinship relation according to the principle

> "I against my brother, I and my brother against my cousin, I, my brother and
> my cousin against the world." (Sorg n.d.:n.p.190)

The Bedouin in the study area still rely on the strong support between the members of one family, clan or tribe, for instance, when they are in financial need or when a child has to stay with his relatives in town in order to go to school. However, social cohesion and collective action[191] – as perceived by the respondents – are diminishing, which is reflected in the following statement:

> "In the past, the Bedouin were in agreement and united, but today they are
> not united enough, because there are much more people [Bedouin]: it is dif-
> ficult to find an agreement. Everybody lives in a different place and there is
> a differentiation between the rich and the poor." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, male,
> 30)

Table 4 summarizes the Bedouin's endowment with the various types of capital that are useful for an engagement in the tourism industry as well as the points where Bedouin are disadvantaged. Since the situation in Sinai is very dynamic and very diverse the table only gives a general picture cross-cutting different individuals, gender, age and location. When taking a more differentiated look, there is an increasing number of young urban Bedouin who complete primary and secondary school, some even get diplomas. And of course there is a wide range of different levels of resource endowment where a few Bedouin have accumulated a lot of capital while others have not succeeded to do so.

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[190] Internet document
[191] See chapter 8 regarding problems of collective action.

Table 4: Advantages and disadvantages of Bedouin resource endowment for an engagement in tourism

	Advantages for an engagement in tourism	Disadvantages for an engagement in tourism
Natural capital	Strategically located land (oasis, beach/coast)	Lack of legal title to land, lack of construction permit, loss of land, no land available for younger generation
Physical capital	(Old) vehicles (jeeps, pickup trucks, landcruisers, minibusses, taxis), camels, camps, cafeterias, tents	Lack of modern, comfortable vehicles, accommodation and catering equipment that fulfil the government regulations and international tourism standards
Financial capital	Savings, credit from relatives and friends	No formal bank loan for larger investments
Human capital	Unique knowledge of the desert (places of interest like beautiful rock formations, canyons, dunes, wells, tracks, plants, animals, camel riding, driving off track)	Little knowledge of the global and national tourism markets
Social capital	Tribal and family network, longterm relationships with European tourists and small travel agencies	Few or no connections to the Egyptian decision makers, administration and political clique nor to the big global and national tourism players
Other	Embodiment of the romantic image of Bedouin culture and life in the desert	Stigmatized as backward and uncivilized

Own source

Concluding, the Bedouin as a community[192] are endowed with many resources that allow them to participate in tourism, especially in the informal segment of tourism. In fact, they have some unique selling propositions that distinguish them from all other actors on the supply side of the tourism sector: their unique knowledge of the desert and the embodiment of the romantic image of Bedouin culture and life in the desert. However, they lack many resources that are required to fulfil the government regulations and to participate in the formal tourism sector. This issue will be discussed in the next chapter on the institutional setup that determines how Bedouin resources can be used. The chapter analyzes in detail the processes of marginalization that result from the Egyptian government's planning for Sinai and its tourism policy as well as from deficits in Bedouin resource endowment.

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[192] Of course, within this community there are great differences in resource endowment. Where possible, these have been addressed in the follwing chapters. Nevertheless, the focus is on the Bedouin as a group whose resource endowment differs from that of other groups (e.g. Egyptian migrants).

7. Institutional Processes and Organizational Structures

The previous chapter has shown that for an engagement in tourism the Bedouin are disadvantaged in many aspects: the majority lacks the capital for an investment in tourism, the general formal education as well as specific knowledge about the international tourism market. Nevertheless, the Bedouin have been very active in the tourism business during the Israeli occupation, which allowed them to work in their own land and to earn a good income. Most Bedouin will agree that all of them profited during the Israeli occupation, although a few were especially shrewd and consequently profited disproportionately. However, since the Egyptian administration returned, and increasingly so since the mid 1990s, the Bedouin have become marginalized rather than supported. This process is aggravated by the decay of Bedouin society and a small minority of Bedouin individuals who profit a lot from the present system.

In this chapter, the institutional processes and organizational structures that determine the degree of Bedouin participation in the tourism industry will be discussed. Institutions comprise all commonly accepted structures and mechanisms that regulate social interaction. One can differentiate between formal institutions such as laws, organizations of government and public service on the one hand and informal institutions such as customs and behaviour patterns on the other hand both being interrelated. An organization is a group of people that formally organized itself in order to achieve its shared goal(s). Here we can distinguish between private and public as well as profit and non-profit organizations.

Out of the multitude of institutions and organizations that can be found in Sinai, this chapter will concentrate only on those that have a direct impact on Bedouin participation in the tourism industry.[193] The focus will be on formal, i.e. governmental and informal institutions and the resulting processes of marginalization. The latter can be categorized into institutions regulating Bedouin-Bedouin and Bedouin-Outsider interactions or the interactions between entrepreneurs and laborers. Organizations will only be mentioned in connection with these institutions. The main institutional processes that play a significant role in Bedouin marginalization and that will now be discussed in more detail are:

- the loss of control over land,

- the barriers to market entry both due to government regulations as well as uneven competition,

- the discrimination by the police,

- the increasing social stratification.

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[193] Some aspects that could also be discussed from an institutional perspective such as the educational and the financial system have already been explained in chapter 6 where some light was shed on Bedouins's endowment with financial and human capital and their access to education and credit. In this respect, however, it should be noted that the institutional setting determines the accumulation of all five types of capital.

7.1 The Loss of Control over Land

As discussed in the previous chapter, the Bedouin have lost control over most of their tribal and much of their private land. This section will further elucidate the land issue. First, the situation in the past and the government's land policy since 1982 will be explained. Then, the transfer of land from Bedouin to Egyptian and foreign ownership will be examined.

7.1.1 Bedouin and their Land in the Past

In order to properly understand the conflicts over land, one has to know the situation of the past and understand how the perception of the land and its value has changed with the ongoing developments in South Sinai. Therefore, the description of the past as it has been given by several respondents will now complement the picture given in chapter 5.4. on the government development plans for Sinai and chapter 6.1 on natural resource endowment of the Bedouin.

A Mzaini respondent reported, that before the Israeli time, i.e. in the 1950s and 1960s, six families[194] were permanently staying in Dahab and living from fishing. Their relatives used to come only during the date harvest, collect their dates and return to the desert mountains in the areas of Mugrih, Samghi, Saffa and Ain Khudra.[195] Another Mzaini confirmed that in those days, Dahab and other oasis such as Bir Saghair were not inhabited but just tended by few men, whereas their families would stay in the desert with the livestock. With the development of tourism under the Israeli occupation and increasingly so under Egyptian rule, ever more Bedouin started to settle in Dahab. According to a respondent, during that time they would live in simple palm huts located directly at the beach but would also seasonally move a little further inland (Assala village) or up to the mountains and then come back to the coast:

> "In the past, there were only few Bedu in Dahab and they all lived directly at the beach. […] But those who used to live at the beach would also always move to the mountains and back to the coast. We would stay 2-3 years in Al Assala, then 2-3 years in Wadi Saal in the mountains, then 2-3 years in Melil.[196] People used to come and go, as they liked, they would settle where they wished: the land had no [monetary] value for the Bedouin." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 34)

Another Bedouin from Dahab reported:

> "In the beginning there were only 20 huts at the Al-Asala beach. They were made of palm leaves because they only served as accommodation during the summer. In the winter we would build a hut a little more land inwards where there is less wind. The sea flushed away our hut at the beach and so we stayed in the winter place. In those times we did not think of selling or

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[194] These families were Al-Tawiriyin, Al-Aghsin, Al-Dararama, Al-Hagasig, Al-Gananuk, Al-Similah.

[195] The respondent insisted that these families had no links to Bedouin from Wadi Nasb or Wadi Saal.

[196] Beach area in Dahab, North of the bay.

> renting the land. We just wanted to live there. My father and his family later took all the land around here – it was empty during the Israeli time. And then I got married and built two houses. But I have never had land for sale or rent." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 45)

A German who has come to live in Dahab as early as in 1967, reported that in those days Dahab was at "the end of the world" and could only be reached by camel or by small boats.[197] According to this respondent, the Bedouin used to live from hand to mouth, they literally only fed from milk, fish and dates and had a hard life. He described how in 1971 the asphalt road from Eilat to Dahab and Sharm al-Shaikh was completed by the Israelis and that at the end of the 1970s there were only a few scattered Bedouin huts at the beach.[198]

According to another Bedouin respondent the Bedouin used to live directly at the beach and only moved land inwards when the tourism started and they consequently rented or sold the land at the beach. The man described that Dahab was so void of buildings that the wind would blow a mattress from the beach one kilometre inland without it being stopped by any hindrance. A Bedouin woman narrated how in the past they used to live directly at the beach: They felt that there was security and trust, they could sleep at the beach and a group of girls and women could even go to the Laguna (see Map 3) and stay there overnight. According to the German respondent, even in 1994, Dahab was still a very isolated place where telephone calls could only be made from the telephone central and one would have to wait for hours to receive a call. He also reported that during that time one could still move freely and the wadis were not yet closed with concrete barrier walls as they are today.

Nuwaiba, too, was scarcely inhabited by Bedouin and few tourism establishments existed. In 1988, there were reportedly three camps,[199] by 1993 their number had risen to five and it doubled again until 1996. There were no fences or demarcation lines between the plots. North of Nuwaiba Tarabin up to Taba, the coast was completely empty, except for one camp each at Ras Al-Shaitan and at Al-Maagana and three hotels on the stretch between Al-Maagana to Taba.[200] Even in 1996 the coast between Nuwaiba and Taba was still untouched and – according to a German migrant – it had something magical. The coast between Nuwaiba Town and Nuwaiba Port was all free land, except for three hotels: the Hilton, the Helnan and the City Beach Village.[201]

But the development suddenly started in January 1997 when Nuwaiba and Taba were connected to the new electricity line[202] from Sharm al-Shaikh and more roads were built. In Bir

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[197] There was no possibility for large ships to land.

[198] He counted about 5 Bedouin huts in the bay, 4-5 huts at Eel Garden (the area North of the bay) and 30-40 Bedouin huts in Al-Asala village.

[199] A camp consists of a small restaurant with a number of Bamboo huts (Khushas). At the time there were three camps in Nuwaiba Tarabin: Palm Beach, Guma Café, Suhailim Café.

[200] These were Aqua Sun, Sallyland, Bawagi in Bir Suwair.

[201] 2-star Egyptian hotel.

[202] Until then, people had only been using candle lights.

Suwair alone, the number of camps rose from one in 1996, to five in 1997[203] and 20 in 1998. Today, there are 25 camps. If not restricted by lack of suitable space, their number would increase further. In 1996 the Tourism Development Authority (TDA) was founded and in 1998 a 40 km long barbed wire fence was put up along the road up to Taba: the land had been sold by the TDA and the owners had already marked their claims.

The developments that started with the early days of tourism have accelerated immensely since the mid-1990s and are continuing. In Sharm al-Shaikh and Dahab new hotels and restaurants are mushrooming and extending further and further along the coast until reaching the borders of the protected areas Nabq and Ras Abu Galum. In Nuwaiba and along the coast to Taba, traditionally dominated by Israeli tourists the development takes place at a slower rate due to a lack of demand in the high-end tourism sector as a consequence of the Intifada in Israel.

Due to the tourism boom, the previously abundant land has become a scarce commodity with prices on the free market rising steeply. In Dahab, for instance, the square meter at the beach cost between LE 10 and 70 in the 1980s and rose to LE 1,000-2,000 in 2004. A respondent reported that he bought a piece of land for LE 70,000 in 1993 and sold half of it for the same price only the next year. Land prices off the beach have increased, too, albeit not as drastically: while by 1999 the price per square meter had already risen to LE 70 it almost doubled to LE 120 in 2003, a year when prices were low due to the US war against Iraq.

7.1.2 Government Land Policy

The Egyptian Government has realized both the high potential of the land for tourism as well as the danger of uncontrolled development and has taken measures to administer the land. The respective municipal councils are in charge of the urban areas of Dahab, Nuwaiba, Sharm al-Shaikh and St. Catherine as well as the desert settlements in the respective districts. The municipal councils also implement decisions taken at the level of the governorate.

The Tourism Development Authority (TDA) founded in 1996 is responsible for the coastal areas that do not fall into the municipal boundaries and the Egyptian Environmental Affairs Agency supervises all protected areas.[204] Bedouin have conflicts over land with all three institutions; however, in this research only those with the TDA as well as the municipal councils will be examined more closely.[205]

The main conflicts with both, the municipal councils and the TDA, are the lack of legal title to the land and a building permission as well as the factual impossibility for the majority of the Bedouin to purchase new, empty land for settlement or a business engagement in tourism.

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[203] Three camps alone were built in one month from April to May 1997.

[204] These are Nabq, Ras Abu Galum, Taba, St. Catherine, Ras Mohammad.

[205] See Eid (2006) for a study of the St. Catherine National Park and an evaluation of the community guard management system.

Land under the Municipal Council

Registration of land in the 1980s and during the beginning of the 1990s

In the towns and villages the authority over state land lies with the municipal council and the governorate of South Sinai. After the Egyptian government took over control over Sinai in 1982 there was a limited period of time during which the Bedouin could register their land. However, only land within certain areas could be registered such as in Dahab the area between the Gulf Hotel near the Laguna in the South and Al-Zarnuq which is located just 100 m after the police checkpoint to the Blue Hole (see Map 3). Bedouin reported, that in the beginning of the Egyptian administration, they would have to pay a small price of LE 0,5/m^2 to the government. Later, the price increased to LE 1-5/m^2 and later to LE 10-20/m^2 depending on the location. After registering their land, the Bedouin would have a claim on the land for 10 years before officially owning it. Only after that period of time Bedouin could officially own and/or sell the land to a third person.

However, in the beginning, many of the Bedouin did not understand the value of the land and did not even bother to go through the process of registration. Others did register their land and in some cases even claimed quite a big area, but usually just for their own and their children's use, since they did not foresee the rising value of the land as reflected in the following quote.[206]

> "In the beginning, when the Egyptians came, it was easy to register the land, no matter how large it was. You had to pay 75 piaster for the square metre. But the Bedu did not think. They did not think that the government would introduce a system, so they did not register the land. Today, the square metre costs LE 25, so for 100 square metres that makes LE 2,500 and another LE 2,500 for the lawyer and each time you have to pay bakshish and money for the trip to Al-Tur. Bakshish is a must. You cannot smoke without a match stick." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 42)

And another Bedouin who was present added:

> "The land has belonged to the Bedu for a long time. But the Bedu did not understand the meaning of the land."

Land Registration in the 1990s and onwards

Before 1990 it was relatively easy to register the land and get a title. The government would not even check the plots. But for those, who did not register their land in the first years after Egypt regained power over Sinai, this became problematic: According to many respondents

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[206] In the meantime, the children have grown up and founded their own families for whom they build houses on the land of their fathers. The result is a densely build-up area which has an effect on air circulation and the micro climate: whereas in the past a fresh breeze would bring some cooling, today the air heats up. Moreover, the next generation already faces a future without their own land and will probably have to live in the flats built by the government or move back to the desert.

from Dahab and Nuwaiba, since around 1990 no more land titles were issued because the government has plans to develop the towns into modern tourist centers.[207]

In Nuwaiba Mzaina, Bedouin who have been living outside the central area have not succeeded in legalizing their houses although they reportedly have papers from the governorate confirming that they own the land. However, without a building permit they have no access to the public water and electricity utilities and must constantly fear that their houses might be torn down.

Foto 19: Tourist camp at Duna Beach, Nuwaiba, destroyed by the government in 2003

This is also true for large parts of Dahab-Al-Asala and Nuwaiba Tarabin where Bedouin have repeatedly tried in vain to obtain land titles as well as to legalize their houses (many of which were built before a construction permission had to be sought).

All informants who talked about this issue reported that they were repeatedly told by the authorities to wait and come again at a later point in time. Some were told by the civil servants that the government wanted to make a town plan and build streets and that only after that could the houses be registered. In the meantime, houses as well as commercial buildings that are newly built are being torn down by the government, even if they are built on what Bedouin consider their private land.

A 60 year old Bedouin from Nuwaiba Tarabin described his plight over the title as follows:

> "I do not have a paper for my house. I have been here for 15 years already, but the government always says 'next year, last year', and I don't know what. One of us knows how to read and write and goes to the government again and again. For the last 4-5 years we have been trying to get our houses registered and get papers for them. But it is always 'next year' and each year the price for the land is rising and we still have to buy it from the government in order to get the papers. And we have been living here for a long time; our forefathers have been living here, so why can't we get the paper for our house? Why does the government not help us? We are the citizens, aren't we? The Bedouin should live here." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 48)

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[207] Apparently, in the 1990s the government still registered all Bedouin land that was built upon but did not issue any titles. Rather each plot was registered with a number, the name of its owner, the size of the plot and the name of the four neighbours. This system created a lot of confusion and towards the end of the 1990s the government is reported to have started registering the land on a map.

It has been reported that after these rulings it was still possible to get a legal title to land or a construction permit if one had connections and paid high bribes. However, this option does not apply to the majority of the Bedouin. Consequently, a large number of the Bedouin do not have papers to prove their ownership of the land and, if they do, they lack a building permission.

While it is understandable that the government wants to direct the developments, its incapability to design and implement a plan within a reasonable time frame has resulted in a situation of insecurity among the Bedouin. Especially the younger men who would like to build a house and start a family are suffering from this situation.

Lack of free land for young Bedouin

While the registration of existing houses and the corresponding land is already difficult, acquiring new land is even harder. Especially in the case of young, unmarried men, the problem is often not only how to register a piece of land but how to get a piece of land at all. Land within the settled areas has become scarce and only a few are so lucky that their fathers have claimed large enough plots that their sons could also build upon. All other land has been declared state land that the Bedouin have no access to or have to pay for heavily. For Dahab, Nuwaiba and increasingly so for St. Catherine, the Bedouin reported that due to the government's town planning there are basically no more areas where the Bedouin could purchase land and build their own house.[208]

In the case of the Bedouin village Al-Asala in Dahab, the government is not selling empty land to private individuals for private living. Instead, the government is erecting social housing or is selling land to the hotels that are expected to build accommodation[209] for their staff.

In St. Catherine no more building is allowed within the old village. While ownership of existing buildings will be registered for LE 1 per square meter, new houses can now only be built in the "outskirts" such as Al-Sibaaya or Al-Zaituna.[210] At these places, LE 100 per square meter will be charged for the land.[211] In Nuwaiba, prices for government land have also increased to LE 100 per square meter.

Regarding this regulation a young Jabaliya complained to the researcher:

> "Now you can only build a house at certain places. In the balad [center of St. Catherine] it is completely forbidden since 1994/95. And in the outskirts like Al-Sibaaya or Al-Zaituna, the square meter costs LE 100. But the Hotel Plaza was built in the balad….HOW?.. But we have to live outside, far away.

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[208] This could be confirmed on a government planning map of Dahab.

[209] Certain building regulations will have to be followed so that the staff housing of the different hotels will all be in the same style.

[210] The Bedouin are used to have a lot of space and their plots of land measure at least 100 and often 200-300 m^2. For a minimum of 100 m^2 this would mean LE 10,000 to buy the land plus LE 25,000 for the building, i.e. a huge sum in times of increasing population and insecure income from tourism and given the lack of bank credits.

[211] This was reportedly decided by the town council of St. Catherine in April 2004.

We do not want to live so far, and there is not even public transport." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 24)

And another young man who was present added:

„It is not just. We [the Bedu] have been living here for a very long time. We should not have to buy the land. But it is the law in the state and we now belong to the state. In Egypt it is like that." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 21)

And an elder, unmarried man who needed to build a house in order to get married summarized and explained the problem as follows:

"In the past the land used to belong to the one who was present on it. But now the Egyptians claim it is theirs saying that they have fought for it but you (the Bedu) have not fought for it. Before, anybody who lived at a place would also own it. But now, if he wants to buy land to build a house, he will all the time be sent from one place to the next, to Tur, to Maglis al-Madina, and then he has to bribe them and might still not succeed in the end. A rich Egyptian can easily buy land here. But me, how shall I pay LE 10,000 for 100 square meters of land? Not forgetting the costs for the long process from authority to authority and all the days lost during which I cannot work." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 33)

The problem of not finding land to build on is not restricted to the young men who grew up in town, but also applies to Bedouin who are still living in the desert but would like to move to town and have no means to do so. A Bedouin from the desert told the researcher:

"If I now wanted to move from the desert to the town [Nuwaiba or Dahab], it would be very difficult, because it is forbidden to build. The land now belongs to the government or to other Bedouin and costs at least LE 100, at the beach much more. The children of those Bedouin who have claimed large pieces of land can build there. In Mzaina Al-Wasat[212] the houses do not have a license. But they have been here for ages, it is known, that they belong to the Bedouin. Old houses can only be destroyed if a new road is built. Otherwise only new houses are destroyed." (Desert settlement Samghi, Mzaina, male, 45)

<u>Increasing government control of desert land outside the urban centers by the Municipal Councils</u>

The government's reach is increasingly extending to the desert, too. Along the main roads, several Bedouin cafeterias, where tourists would stop for a drink or even start a safari, have been demolished. One of the owners reported that he was told that the reason for destroying

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[212] Area between Nuwaiba Mzaina and the Town of Nuwaiba.

his cafeteria was that he had built on government land without having permission. His perspective on the conflict is portrayed in Textbox 1.

And while the further villages that have not yet been reached by the tourism development seem to be less interesting to the local governments, places of touristic significance draw the authorities' attention. An example for such a place is Bir Saghair, where tens of tourist jeeps from Sharm al-Shaikh stop for tea in Bedouin gardens every day. The village has already been visited several times by the mayor of Nuwaiba for unknown reasons. Despite these visits, so far no land had to be registered or paid for but it is likely that future developments will head in that direction.[213]

Textbox 1: A Bedouin's perspective on his protracted conflict over land with the government

"My cafeteria has been there for a bit more than 10 years but it used to be a Bedouin tent. About two years ago, around 2002, I started building it in concrete. It was all done except for the roof for which I did not have money at the time.
A bit more than a year ago[214] it was for the first time that I was told to remove the cafeteria. Then about a year ago, one day around 8 p.m., the Mayor of Nuwaiba came with some people and a loader from a construction site that was 6 km away. When we saw the Mayor and the loader, I and three friends hid behind the cafeteria and started throwing stones at the loader and the Mayor and his car. The women, too, were throwing stones and they were not hiding. Then a Bedouin car came and out of fear the Egyptians drove behind it and were expecting help from those Bedouin. But the Bedouin just raised a lot of dust and did tricks with the car and the Egyptian civil servants got scared and drove off to Nuwaiba in their Ford.
However, the Mayor in his Shuruki car stayed and went to the house and asked for Shaikh Guma, the shaikh of this region. Only the shaikh's brother was present and he was told that the cafeteria had to be removed or that the Mayor would bring the police. But the shaikh's brother said that he did not know anything in this matter and the women came and shouted at the Mayor: "You are not a mayor, one who comes in the evening, when the women are alone, go away, leave us alone". The Mayor replied that he would bring the police and the women shouted: "Yes, bring the police, with them we can talk, but not with a crook like you."
The Mayor went to the police check point nearby [at about 6 km distance] and checked if everything was ok. At 10 p.m. he called Shaikh Guma and told him to come to the Town Council where the Mayor then complained to him that the women threw stones at him. But Shaikh Guma told the Mayor: "I am not the owner of the cafeteria and anyway you are not right, you just come without an official order to destroy the cafeteria, without anything, in the evening when there are only women.[215] Actually you should be tried according to the urf. Then the Mayor also gave the shaikh a police report. But the shaikh told the police that the Mayor does not like him and that all these allegations were not true and then the problem was solved.
After that I started to build the roof of the cafeteria and another problem started or may be the old one continued. It was about 6 months ago [November 2003] that I borrowed money for the roof and was working on it when the Mayor of Nuwaiba came with his driver and said that it had to be taken down. I said: "No." And the Mayor said: "Yes, you have to take it down because it is new [a new construction]. It is the order from the governor." I told him: "No, the cafeteria has been there for a long time already, I only did not have money for the roof. And before you there were already four other mayors and none of them has made any problems. I will not destroy the cafeteria, not in a 100 years, I want to eat from it and feed my children from it. What else could I do?" The Mayor re-

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[213] Possibly, the mayor might even have other plans for the village such as building a luxury hotel. Such kind of plans have already existed for other oasis such as Ain Khudra.

[214] i.e. at the beginning of 2003, at the end of 2002.

[215] Since the men had been hiding behind the cafeteria, they later pretended that only women had been around.

plied: "But I am your great father and you are my children." And so I asked him: "If I was your son and was trying to build my future and you were my father, would you then destroy the cafeteria?" The Mayor responded: "Yes, but, the governor…." Then he took my ID and that of my two Saidi workers. I asked him to return my ID, but the Mayor said: "I will teach you manners. You are building on state land. I will give you a fine of LE 80,000." I told him: "This is not state land and it is 40 km from the town limits of Nuwaiba. I do not even have 80 Piasters now, so how do you expect me to pay LE 80,000 Then I will go to the mountains, too."[216] The Mayor said angrily: "That is not my problem. Go, go, so that I will teach you manners."

Then he kept my ID for 4 months. I sent other people to get it for me, because otherwise the mayor would have made more problems for me again because of the cafeteria or other things. In the end I got my ID back from a Bedouin member of the local council who had been running from this one to that one to that one in order to get it. One of the two Saidis went to the Mayor a few days after the problem and got his ID back immediately, but the ID of the other guy has not yet appeared again.

I contested the police report and the fine of LE 80,000 and sent the contest to the chief of the head of the police in Al-Tur. I wrote: "This was the land of my grandfather, I have been living here for a long time and I also have to build a house for my children or are they supposed to die of cold?" They told me that in order to cancel the police report and the fine I had to destroy the cafeteria. So I had to go to the court in Al-Tur and find a lawyer for this. I just went two days ago. I found a Mzaini lawyer. There are many of them, they sort out your problem and they do it well, but today everything only goes with money. In the beginning one pays only LE 150, 300, 500, as much as one can, but later one pays more.

My lawyers' strategy is not to show up for the first session in court and await the judgement and then appeal. The aim is to delay the trial up to 2-3 years. During this time I can save money and build a beautiful cafeteria. Then they will most likely send an evaluator whom I will have to bribe so that he writes that the cafeteria has been there for long and is built according to the regulations and so on. But you have to give him money. The Egyptians sin with the money. They have to eat [money]. With money you can get a license for anything, without, you can't."

(Desert Settlement, Mzaina, male, 24)

Land under the TDA

The TDA manages the land North of Nuwaiba and to the East and West of Sharm al-Shaikh and is responsible to find investors and to provide land for tourism projects.

To this end, the land is sold at the nominal price of US$ 1 per square meter, far below market price. However, in order to purchase the land, certain requirements have to be fulfilled: the land can only be bought by a company, not by individuals. In order to form a company, high guarantees[217] of ca. US$ 17,000 have to be presented to the government and a minimum of 5,000 square meters of land has to be purchased and developed.

For the Bedouin it is almost impossible to fulfil these regulations. Consequently they have no access to this land. Although there were no larger Bedouin settlements or date palm oasis on these coastal lands, the Bedouin still consider this land to be part of their tribal land which in the past they could dispose of freely, e.g. to go fishing. This view is also reflected in the following statement of an elder men of the Tarabin tribe:

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[216] Like other Bedouin before him who have left to the mountains after conflicts with the authorities and make a living from growing marihuana or opium.

[217] Most informants mentioned the sum of LE 100,000, although some informants claimed that it could be done with less.

> „They have taken all our land. But what should we do? The Israeli govern-
> ment told us to build huts everywhere, because the Egyptians would take
> away everything but then at least we would get money for it. But I did not
> believe it. I had no brain. […] then the Egyptians came and step by step
> they have taken everything. The land from here to Taba has all gone, step
> by step. But what shall we do? The government took the land, and they
> have arms and can put you in prison. With land or without land, there is no
> problem." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 60)

Most of the coastal land has already been sold to large investors who reportedly often belong
to the ruling elite. Bedouin who had informally/illegally established a camp or cafeteria on the
land were evicted and their buildings destroyed. A handful of Bedouin have been trying to es-
tablish a company and officially buy land but have not yet succeeded due to lack of capital and
bureaucratic hurdles (see section 7.2 on barriers to market entry).

A Turbani Bedouin whose camp was destroyed by the government told the researcher about
the problem:

> "I used to have a camp of 200 m length and 300 m width at the beach site
> on my grandfather's land who had built a well there.[218] One day bulldozers
> came and destroyed everything. The government claimed that the land had
> belonged to the state and that it had now been sold to a company. A jour-
> nalist of an Egyptian magazine asked the company why they let destroy the
> Bedouin camp. The company's representative replied: the police just de-
> stroyed the Bedouin tent that was put there to claim the land. The journalists
> also questioned the TDA who said that they had not sold Bedouin land. The
> story was in the newspapers, in the Cairo Times, Egypt Today, the Sinai
> Newspaper.[219] Then the owner of the company died. The TDA said that if
> the company did not build in the given time – and they do not seem to have
> money to do so – the land would become state property again and would
> then be given back to me. In addition to my camp, they destroyed four other
> camps. Those people went back to the land and built again, but they still
> have no papers, basically any day they could be evicted again. And they
> want to destroy more camps. But now they are scared that the Bedouin will
> make problems. Before, the Bedouin used to be quiet, but now there are
> around 20 armed Bedouin in Nuwaiba. They had been detained and put in
> prison. In the whole of Sinai there are may be about 2,000 Bedouin who
> were detained, often without a reason. After that their lives are fucked and
> they do not care anymore, they just save themselves." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin,
> male, 32)

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[218] Often, respondents made such claims in order to stress their rights, since any developments on land would prove their
case. It could not be established whether this claim was true.

[219] This magazine is published by a Bedouin who lives in Greece.

In conclusion, it is almost impossible for Bedouin to purchase or even claim property of land that falls under the responsibility of the TDA due to three reasons:

-   loss of traditional rights over tribal lands to the government/state,

-   lack of capital to form a company (not to pay for the land),

-   lack of connections and insufficient liquidity to get the deal done especially when competing with financially strong investors.[220]

7.1.3   Land under Bedouin Ownership

Even in the cases where Bedouin managed to initially claim ownership for their land, they have often lost it again. Especially at the earlier stages of the tourism development under the Egyptian administration, the Bedouin were still not acquainted with the modern use of the land for tourism projects and could therefore easily be persuaded to sell or rent their land.

The completely different attitude towards the land becomes apparent in the following experience a European investor had in Dahab: The investor had bought a piece of land with 6 palms on it from a Bedouin. About 2 or 3 years later, this Bedouin's brothers came and claimed that 3 of these 6 palms belonged to them and wanted to pollinate and harvest them. While the investor refused to discuss with them, they even offered him the usufruct rights over 5 (rather than 3) other palms in a different place in exchange, because the three palms in question had such outstandingly good dates.

In addition, to having entered contracts of sale or rent without really being aware of the implications nor of the value of the land, the Bedouin were often cheated when they rented or sold their land or they felt forced to do so for different reasons. The problems regarding loss of control over land through "bad" rental contracts and sale will now be discussed in more detail.

Loss of Control over Land through "Bad" Rental Contracts

With the tourism boom Egyptian migrants started coming to the tourism centres of South Sinai. Some of these migrants came with the capital to start their own projects and others would seek employment envisaging their own business once they had saved enough money. In Dahab, the migrants would therefore rent or buy land from the Bedouin who entered these contracts for the following reasons (as mentioned by the Bedouin informants):

-   Lack of knowledge and/or capital to develop their own tourism project.

-   Incapacity or unwillingness to deal with the state bureaucracy regarding the investment as well as the running of a tourism establishment (where knowledge of English is required).

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[220] Some informants also suggested that large investors have a much stronger bargaining power due to their liquidity which they can use to influence the decisions of civil servants in their favour.

-     Preference for rent income and a leisurely life.

However, in the time after the Israeli occupation until the beginning or mid 1990s, i.e. at the time when many of these rental contracts were made, most Bedouin were still very trustful,[221] many of them could neither read nor write. None of them actually thought about what would happen to his land, once somebody else had invested on it and build a camp or hotels, etc. neither did most of them expect tourism to develop the way it did.

As a result, these contracts were made for a period of 99 years (by law after 99 years the land would become property of the tenant) at a fixed rent without adjustments for inflation or in-crease in value. Often, these contracts entailed the proviso clause that rent would only be paid if profit was generated. As a result, there are cases where Bedouin were hardly ever paid rent and instead were told that no profit was made.[222] But even in the cases, in which Bedouin did receive the monthly rent of a few hundred pounds they used it for their daily needs rather than save it. As a result, if a Bedouin now wants to have his land back and wants to end the con-tract, he can only do this by paying the leaseholder the estimated value of the buildings etc. that have been constructed on the land. Even if the Bedouin had saved the monthly rent of lets say LE 500 over 10 years, the resulting LE 60,000 (without interest rate) will not be sufficient to pay out the tenant. Some informants claimed that the Egyptian migrants did actually not pay rent on purpose and were already planning to appropriate the land in this way. It has also been reported, that a second market developed, where the initial tenants continue paying the fixed low rent to the Bedouin landlord and make a considerable monthly profit by letting the land for a much higher amount.

The situation changed from the mid-1990s when the Bedouin had become aware of the value of the land and of how they had been cheated. In addition, from 1995 lawyers started their practices in Dahab and could be consulted by the Bedouin before making any new contracts.

These issues are reflected in the following statements:

> "We did not know any written contracts and it was all based on trust; that is how we used to make contracts. There were also written contracts, but they were made by the tenants, not by the landlords, they were made by the Egyptians and we trusted them, because we did not know how to read and we were used to trust. But now we have learnt how the Egyptians are, also that they do not stick to their word. And the problem is that the rental con-tracts were open, unlimited. And it is only since 1995-1998 that there are lawyers in Dahab that one can consult before making a contract." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

> "I am not letting any land in Dahab, but many people do. And they prefer to live from the rent than to work. If the Bedu had known that Dahab would de-

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[221] i.e. they were still used to making oral contracts where they would rely on the fulfilment under the traditional law.

[222] Due to the problems described in chapter 4.9 on the methodology it was not possible to establish their relative quantity.

velop in this way, they would never have sold their land and they would not have rented it out either, or at least most of them wouldn't have done so. Or they would have asked for a higher rent. Most contracts are for 99 years, those are the ones that were made 10-15 years ago, i.e. 1988 - 1993. Only 7-8 years ago (1995/96) were contracts introduced that were limited to a specific period of time. Then the land was empty, but now that restaurants etc. have been built the owners cannot just kick the tenants out. But there are attempts to get the land back. But then the Bedouin has to buy all that has been built on the land. If they do not find an agreement in the price, a third party is asked or it goes to court." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 25)

"I own a camp and a cafeteria and rent them out. I have a rental contract over two years, not longer. There are people [Bedu] who have not understood anything and they have been cheated. For example, one has empty land and makes a rental contract with an Egyptian. But the Egyptian never pays the rent, claims that he is not earning any money, that he has not recovered his investment. When the Bedouin wants to take his land back, the Egyptian says: "Yes, but we have already invested so much, you will have to pay us the cost before we give you back the land." And then one has lost his land. The best is, you only make a contract for one year and of course in writing." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, ca. 70)

While poorer Bedouin can sometimes hardly live of the rent they get for their land,[223, 224] there are also examples of very rich Bedouin who have rented their land under the old law and still make large profits due to the many land parcels they own. An example are two Bedouin who each own one side of the street that connects the beach promenade at the Southern end of Dahab bay with the road that runs parallel to the shore. On both sides there is a row of about 8 to 10 small shops rented out to Egyptian migrants who sell items such as souvenirs, jewellery, music disks and tapes. According to a respondent the two owners get about LE 460/month for each shop under old rental contracts and LE 700-900/month under new contracts. Given that they own about ten shops each in that street alone, they have a very good income in absolute terms. Nevertheless, regarding the increase in value of the land, these sums seem to be "peanuts": according to a respondent, the land of Tuta Restaurant in the central Dahab bay was once bought from a Bedouin for LE 10,000 and was estimated to be worth four million Egyptian pounds in 2004.

Loss of Control over Land through Sale

Usually, selling one's land would not be considered as losing one's land, since one gets something in return. However, given that the tourism boom, the expansion and consolidation of the Egyptian government in South Sinai and the migration of Egyptians from the Nile Valley into

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[223] Or for their share of the land, since in many cases all brothers of one family share one piece of land.

[224] The rent income of "old contracts" usually lies between LE 50-700, depending on the size of the plot.

traditional Bedouin territory led to a sort of "clash of cultures" between the previously nomadic or semi-nomadic Bedouin and the sedentary Egyptians it is important to look at the circumstances under which Bedouin have sold their land.

There are several reasons why Bedouin sold or sell their land:

- prospect of making a large amount of money,

- lack of capital,

- lack of legal title,

- incapacity or unwillingness to deal with the state bureaucracy regarding the investment as well as the running of a tourism establishment,

- coercion by other Bedouin.

These reasons will now be looked at in detail:

1. Probably the most common and obvious reason among Bedouin for selling the land is the prospect of making a large amount of money and reinvest it or live a comfortable life ever after. However, in the beginning of the eighties only few people foresaw the developments and the rising land prices. As a consequence, the money that could be made by selling one's land during the 1980s and early 1990s seemed huge to the Bedouin who were not used to such large amounts of money. However, in retrospective and considering the 100- to sometimes 1,000-fold increase in land prices as well as a continuously rising cost of living, these sums now seem like peanuts (land prices increased at least ten-fold from the beginning of the 1990s to 2004, for land at the beach the increase was even higher). Today, a Bedouin who sells his land can expect to fetch a fair price for it, since a proper land market has developed. The following quote and Textbox 2 at the end of this subsection reflect the situation as well as the common Bedouin view on this issue:

> "An Egyptian comes and wants to buy land, and when the Bedouin sees money, he sells his land for 2,000, 3,000, 5,000. And that is a problem. The people sell the land, because they do not have money and want to have a jeep, or a camel or a wife, the land is not important to them. If they were intelligent, they would make a cafeteria or a camp on the land, that brings more money than a jeep. But they have no brain. The land brings money easily. The land was given to us from God, and in the past there was no money and nobody who wanted to buy the land. Now there are many Egyptians who want to buy land." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 60)

And the respondent's sister contributed:

> "In the past, the whole Sinai belonged to us and now it is all gone, like in Palestine."

Notwithstanding, there are additional factors that made and still make seem the sale of land the best option:

2. According to several respondents a widespread reason among Bedouin for selling their land is the lack of capital that prevents them from investing in their land by building a hotel or camp for instance. Due to this handicap the land remains useless and the owner prefers to sell it, in order to buy a jeep or taxi or something else to earn his livelihood. If the land is large enough, most Bedouin will prefer to only sell part of the land and invest the money they get for it into a project on the other half of the land.

    > "Our family has also sold land. But the best is to make your own project on your land. Sometimes one has a big plot of land. If one sells half of it, then one can invest on the other half […]. But the greatest problems for us Bedouin are the lack of capital and the laws and regulations of the government, the insurances and taxes." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 30)

3. Financial distress is another common motive among Bedouin for selling their land. Several respondents reported that they or their relatives had to sell their land when someone in the family fell sick and they needed money to finance the medical treatment and/or the loss of income. In addition to individual problems, protracted conflicts like the second Intifada or the Gulf War in 1991 caused or aggravated the distress of a significant number of the Bedouin and forced them to sell their land. This has been reported for Dahab in connection with the Gulf War (see Textbox 2) and for Nuwaiba in connection with the Intifada. In the latter case, a respondent actually noted that before the protracted conflict other Bedouin would buy the land from the Bedouin who was selling the land so that it would not fall into Egyptian ownership. However, due to the conflict, even more well off Bedouin were unable to buy the land in order to prevent outsiders from buying it.

    > "In the past, when an Egyptian wanted to buy land another Bedouin would offer to buy the land, so that it would not go to the Egyptian. But then with the Intifada people did not have money and nobody had money and so the land would just be sold. […] But now nobody is selling land because there is no other land where one can go to. For the children it will become very expensive." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, female, 27)

4. One respondent who had sold his land at the Duna Beach in Nuwaiba Mzaina reported that he feared to lose his land to the government since he had no legal title to it. Therefore he preferred to sell it to an investor by lifting his hand[225] and let the investor deal with the government, following the motto: "a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush". Although this reason was not mentioned by any other respondent it is quite likely that other Bedouin sold their land for the same or similar reasons such as the fear or unwillingness to subject

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[225] According to the traditional Bedouin law (Urf) one claims ownership of land by "laying one's hand on it" and cultivating it or building something on it. When the land is sold, the seller lifts his hand in exchange for payment. Today, it is often the case, that when land is purchased, first a Bedouin who claims ownership of the piece of land but does not yet have government papers for it will be paid to lift his hand and after that the land will be officially bought from the government.

oneself to the Egyptian state bureaucracy and corruption when starting and running a business.

> "I had land at the beach but I sold it 7 years ago. During that time the tourism had stopped and one was only loosing. Many people have sold their land, because the other difficulty is, that there are only problems, that you do not get a license to run a business nor the papers for the land and then you lose everything. Then it is better to sell and not have any problems."
> (Desert Settlement Bir Saghair, Mzaina, male, 50)

5. A few respondents mentioned that influential Bedouin did force other, poorer Bedouin into selling their land. Allegedly, if the poorer Bedouin is not willing to sell his land, the influential Bedouin creates a problem for the first, e.g. by accusing him at the police (and probably bribing the police). As a result the poorer Bedouin sees himself involved in a law suit that costs him several tens of thousands of pounds. As a consequence he is forced to sell his land under value. The influential Bedouin will then either invest on the land or sell it at a much higher price to Egyptian or foreign buyers (see section 7.4 on social differentiation).

Finally, Textbox 2 contains an analysis of the loss of control over land due to sale as seen by two Bedouin from the Western Coast of Sinai who have been living in Dahab for many years and witnessed the developments regarding land while still having an outsider's perspective and some critical distance.

Concluding, the problem of land can be differentiated into two categories: land for private use and land for commercial use, especially for tourism projects. While in most cases legal ownership of existing plots and houses for private use is not secured for the Bedouin owners, new land for private use is scarce. This presents a problem for younger Bedouin who need to establish their own place before being able to marry and start a family. This problem is likely to get worse due to a growing population and more land areas being designated for tourism development.

Regarding land for commercial use, the South Sinai Bedouin as a social group have lost most of their private and tribal land. For all tribal land that had not been developed when the Egyptian administration started to become active in Sinai no ownership could be claimed.[226] And much of the land that could be claimed and had not been in private use, has been lost due to disadvantageous rental contracts and sale. According to a Bedouin respondent an estimated 80 % of the land in Dahab had therefore been lost to outsiders.

It should be noted that although the majority of the Bedouin are affected by these problems in one way or another, there are a few Bedouin individuals and families who over the last 2-3 decades have become very rich from claiming and selling or renting substantial areas of land.

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[226] There were some ways to get around this regulation, such as building a wall around a plot and then claiming ownership.

Textbox 2: How the Bedouin lost their land – a Bedouin view from the outside

"At the beginning of the 1980s the Bedu claimed land. Either there really were palms on the land or they just built a wall around it. Some were clever and claimed a lot, others thought: "What is the meaning of land? There is enough of it." Later, many sold the land just to drive a Toyota or some other car. But, now they learn from each other. They used to own lots of land and now they find themselves have nothing although they would have been rich. But now the people woke up, may be 3-4 years ago, but it is a bit late. I tell you a story: In 1995 a Bedouin sold the land where Western Union is located today for LE 15,000. A week later he parked his car on the land to go and buy something next-door. But the new Egyptian owner came and told him to immediately drive away his car. The Bedouin said, "Yes, just a minute, I just want to quickly buy something.", and went on walking. So the Egyptian pulled him from his Galabiya and forced him to drive the car off the land. So you see, you have to wake up. Even a donkey would wake up. If the man had not sold his land, he could never been treated like this and thrown out like that. And the Bedouin now all see the restaurants and diving centres where the Egyptians make tons and tons of money, and they — they are just taxi drivers. And a good restaurant at the beach can make LE 70,000 sales/month during the good season, may be LE 20,000 cost and LE 50,000 profit, but the Bedu who rented the place might only get a few hundred a month." (Dahab, tribe unknown, male, 28)

"How it started that the Egyptian have land and take all the Bedouin places in Dahab is like this: In 1990/91 may be 5 % of the people in Dahab were Egyptian who worked in the camps and restaurants of the Bedouin. They worked hard and saved money. During the Iraq war (1991) they went home and sold a cow or a car or other assets. When they came back to Sinai they used the return and their savings to buy the places from the Bedouin. Due to the war, the Bedouin needed money and they thought the tourists would never come back. So the businesses were sold very cheaply. May be the Mzaina give you a different story, because this is a bad story and they are embarrassed. If the same happened to me, I could not tell you the story. I would have to give you a different story. But I have seen it. The Egyptians were not like the Bedouin who were making [=having] fun, getting married, buying a car, building a house, you know, like you see now, most of the Bedouin have an expensive car, they make fun with the money more than they keep it: because, if they kept the money, they would be the richest people in Sinai, because every day they have a lot of money. If you see Egypt and if you see here. Now everybody is working with the car and there are only few people who did not sell the land. Today the few people who still have the land are the only rich people.

The other half who did not sell the land let the land, but wrong [= theft, bad things] happened with this. The Bedouin did not know about the Egyptian law, how to keep your place, how to make the percentage go up. Because we later found out there is a lot of laws about renting places, but we did not know this. So the Egyptian rented the land for an unlimited period of time. So the Bedouin made the paper and thought they would earn good money. So now the land is gone. In 1990/91 you could rent a huge place for may be 300, 200, 100 pounds per month. But the Egyptians now make contracts among themselves and rent the places on for 5,000-10,000 a month or so, but we have to go by the law. As long as the rent is paid, the contracts are valid. It was in 1995/96 that the Bedouin started to try and get the land back and failed. Then they started to understand and to make different contracts and also then many lawyers started to have offices in Dahab and the Bedouin started using them. Regarding the old contracts, some Bedouin now do not even want to collect their rent anymore, because it is almost like begging. Only few went to court to get their land back and since they were not successful, others did not even try. But everything is still open at the court: Everything stays as it is. Only if you keep on pushing and if you pay the lawyer, the case will be pursued, but the Egyptian entrepreneurs have more money, of course. And the Bedouin do not like the Egyptians and the police and the judge. If after one year they still see no result, they give up and hope that the Egyptians will go away. Most of the Bedouin have a problem with the Egyptian, may be 90 %. All of them hope that the Egyptian go away, that a war happens and that the Egyptians run away or a flood comes and the Egyptians run away. Because during the English time nobody makes anthing bad for the Bedouin, nobody touch them, nobody controls them, asks them where they go, they just help the Bedouin because they are poor, have no water. During the Turkish time nobody touch them, the French time, the Israeli time, nobody touch them, only help. Only

after the Israeli time it is getting bad and they make a problem for the Bedouin and the help is only coming from outside. But the government is taking the money." (Dahab, tribe unknown, male, 32)[227]

7.2 Barriers to Market Entry

Next to the land issue, barriers to market entry are another factor that contributes to Bedouin marginalization. These barriers consist in government regulations on the one hand and competition from migrants on the other hand. Both factors will now be explained in more detail.

7.2.1 Government Regulations

With directing tourism development towards a modern and luxurious kind of tourism (see chapter 5.4.), the Egyptian government is continuously introducing new rules and regulations at all levels in order to dry out the informal tourism sector and promote formal tourism development. These regulations entail legal and/or financial hurdles. In many cases, a sound knowledge of the regulations as well as connections to influential people are required, in order to find ways to comply with the regulations. Subsequently, this will be illustrated using three examples of areas or activities where Bedouin engagement in tourism is becoming increasingly difficult due to government regulations:

- the touristic establishments such as camps, hotels and restaurants,

- the desert safari business and

- the taxi business.

Regulations Regarding Touristic Establishments such as Camps, Hotels and Restaurants

The difficulties that arise when establishing a tourism company have already been explained briefly in the previous section on land issues. There are two types of licenses for hotels and pensions: those that can be obtained from the town council and those that have to be obtained from the TDA. Getting a license from the respective town council is much easier than getting one from the TDA. However, a business owner who only has a town council license has limited possibilities (e.g. a town council travel agency cannot register cars for the transport of tourists, a town council restaurant cannot sell alcohol, etc.) and less security: the license has to be renewed every few years. If in the meantime new regulations (e.g. regarding hygiene, safety or a more modern appearance) have been introduced they have to be complied with otherwise the license will not be extended. According to several respondents, a TDA-license would buy its owner some independence, but the solicitation is coupled with the following problems that are explained below:

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[227] Without the author asking in this direction, a Bedouin from West Sinai brought up the question of how the Bedouin in Dahab lost their land and explained his analysis.

i) capital for minimum investment standards,

ii) bureaucratic hurdles,

iii) connections and good relationships with decision-makers.

i) A lot of capital is required in order to fulfil the minimum investment standards such as a specific number of hotel rooms per area or a minimum number of air-conditioned seats in jeeps or busses for a travel company.[228] In addition, a guarantee of LE 100,000 or more depending on the category of the company have to be paid onto an account, in order to obtain a license.[229]

ii) There are huge bureaucratic hurdles an individual is confronted with when trying to establish a company. One has to get the approval of many different government agencies and present many papers. Often the responsible government officer is absent so that the solicitator has to come again. An example for such a bureaucratic process is that of registering a piece of land in the land title register. As part of the process the land purchase contract has to be registered with the responsible government authority in Al-Tur. But for the land title to be registered, the signatures of the buyer and the seller have to first be authenticated by another authority. This step alone can take months and an investor reported that he had already been in the process of registering his land for three years. Another example that gives an impression of the bureaucratic hurdles is the attempt of an interviewee from Dahab to obtain a technical safety certificate for his car: He had to travel three times to Al-Tur (a total of 600 km drive) and two times to Nuwaiba (a total of 300 km drive), i.e. a total of 900 kilometers and the respective time and costs.

A European investor described his experience in getting a license for his tourism establishment as follows:

> "There is no basic structure or process that you can follow, no clearly defined path how often and in which sequence you have to go to the capital of the governorate Al-Tur and to Cairo. You have to do many visits to the authorities many of which are completely in vain, others you have to repeat 3-4

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[228] The exact numbers could not be established during this research. While one Bedouin reported that 250 seats were required, another talked about 50 seats and another about 150 seats. The researcher made an attempt to obtain information about these requirements from the TDA and as a result was confronted with the same problem as those who would like to invest: she was sent from one office to the next and in the end she was told to go to the office where she had first started her enquiry. The endeavour brought many insights but not the data. As a result, the information and figures regarding rules and regulations in this chapter are only indicative.

[229] A rich Bedouin from North Sinai explained the requirements he had to fulfil in order to establish a transport company: First, he needed to open an office in Cairo with at least 160 sqm airconditioned office space, after that he could open a branch in South Sinai which would require even more papers and verifications, since Sinai was a border governorate. His company would have to own 150 airconditioned seats (in the form of buses, minibuses, jeeps, landcruisers, etc.). The respondent calculated that 150 seats would cost LE 3.5 million, 1 jeep alone costing US$ 27,000. The capital owned by the company needed to be at least one and at most ten million Egyptian pounds: The interviewee explained that with less than one million the company could not be opened and if more capital was owned a different category of license would apply. The manager of the company had to have a university degree and at least 10 years working experience during which he had been registered with the tourism ministry (or 15 years work experience and an institute diploma), the secretary needed to speak English, all this had to be proved to the ministry. Moreover, a guarantee of LE 200,000 had to be on a bank account, this would also allow the license to be renewed automatically every year. To succeed, the respondent explained, one needed people who had connections to the ministry of tourism because their agreement was the most important thing. However, one first had to get papers from several other government authorities.

times to get what you want. I never knew what would be the next step at the authorities, what the requirements were. They will always promise that if you bring this, you will also get that, but instead they will then ask for something else again. Moreover, the laws and regulations are all the time changing and sometimes even conflicting between the various government agencies: e.g. in the case of a tourist camp north of Nuwaiba, the TDA had ordered a big restaurant to be built that would be appropriate for the required minimum number of rooms. However, the Protected Areas Authority and the EEAA ordered that the big restaurant should not be built." (European Investor, Dahab)

iii) It is significantly easier to overcome the bureaucratic hurdles and even the capital requirements if one has the necessary connections to influential people.[230]

When Bedouin were asked regarding the requirements, rules and regulations they would usually not give a very detailed description of what exactly was necessary to establish a tourism company. However, they would report that the high guarantee, the large capital investment required and the immense bureaucratic hurdles would basically make it impossible for them to estabilsh such a firm. It seems that most Bedouin did not even see the benefit of enquiring the process in more detail, since it was clear to them that they would not succeed. It might also be that some of the respondents were informed much better, but disliked talking about that topic in detail.[231]

Regulations Regarding the Safari Business

While the land issue has already been a problem for many years, two more issues arose during the time of the fieldwork: the regulation of the safari and the taxi business, i.e. the transport of tourists.

The safari business has been increasingly controlled. A knowledgable Bedouin from Nuwaiba explained how until the late 1980s it was enough to have an identity card stating that one was working in tourism, no other permit was needed to take tourists on safari. But while before the card had no limit, from 1989 onwards it had to be renewed at the tourism police every year. Until 1993/1994 this was possible at the tourism police in Nuwaiba, but from that time one had to renew it in Sharm al-Shaikh. From 1998 these permits were not renewed and the Bedouin were told that a tourism transport agency was mandatory in order to get a permanent permit. However, at that time, it was still possible to get a permit for each safari trip individually. The safaris were not yet restricted and could also extend over several days. However, from 2002/2003 permits have only been issued for 1-day-trips and longer safaris and overnight camps in the desert were no longer authorized.

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[230] One example for this is the experience of an investor who reported that a government authority came to stop his construction work at the beach because he had violated the regulations. However, when he pulled out a business card of the head of the authority with the sentence "help holder since relative" and the head's signature on the back, the government officials excused themselves and left.

[231] Possibly they only disliked talking about the issue with the researcher.

Moreover, in 2004, the privately owned jeeps in Nuwaiba were stopped from taking tourists even on day trips. According to the Bedouin respondent, there is a general law in Egypt regulating that only registered transport agencies but no privately owned cars are authorized to transport tourists. However, in the early 1990s, the local Bedouin were excempted from this law by a decree of the governor of South Sinai that was issued after the Bedouin shaikhs had discussed the problem with the authorities. All the following governors did not change this decree until the newly elected governor abolished it in 2002/2003 without giving a specific reason. The reports of other Bedouin coincide with these reports, although for Dahab it was reported that permits were not issued anymore from the year 2000.

Except for one, all respondents affected by the problem thought that the reason for the restrictions were the large companies that invested big sums of money in the establishment of their companies, in new, comfortable landcruisers and paid high taxes and consequently had a vital interest in getting rid of any competition.

Moreover, some thought that many of the companies were owned by rich Egyptian who were friends of the Egyptian president and could therefore influence the decisions of the government. One respondent, however, reported in April 2004, that the tour operators and travel companies, too, had not been given licenses for some months. He therefore thought that there had to be another reason. Another interviewee was told by the authorities that the smuggling of Russian prostitues from Sharm al-Shaikh to Israel was the reason for this restrictive measure. However, he wondered why they would suspect those who apply for a permit and register each tourist with the tourism police.

The establishment of the tourism transport agency in order to get a permit for transporting tourists is equally difficult for the Bedouin as establishing a hotel company due to the same reasons: large investments to fulfil the requirements (a certain number of airconditioned seats,[232] a bank deposit of at least LE 50,000, etc.) as well as huge bureaucratic hurdles. In reality, there are hardly any Bedouin who could afford such an investment.

Consequently, the prohibitions of over-night jeep or camel safaris and of day trips to the desert in private jeeps seriously curtail Bedouin income opportunities. Especially Bedouin from Nuwaiba have been affected by these new rules, since Nuwaiba has been hit much harder by the second Intifada and profits much less from the flourishing tourism in Sharm al-Shaikh than Dahab. There, the effect of the restrictions was not felt as much, since the flourishing diving tourism and the fast-growing business of one-day safaris from Sharm al-Shaikh have opened up new income opportunities.[233] In St. Catherine, the "Shaikh-Musa-system"[234] had already been established much earlier, whereby all trekking tourists have to register at the "Shaikh

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[232] One respondent reported that 250 air-conditioned seats in either busses or landcruisers were required. This number could not be verified. In any case, even the investment into one new air-conditioned vehicle is impossible for most Bedouin who usually own jeeps of 15 to 30 or more years of age.

[233] Such as driving service for the diving centers and camel rides from Blue Hole to Ras Abu Galum for the "super safaris" organised by larger travel agencies from Sharm al-Shaikh.

[234] See section 7.4. for a detailed description.

Musa tourism agency". This allows the Jabaliya Bedouin to legally go on safari albeit Shaikh Musa and his family earning a monopoly rent.[235]

In addition to these regulations that have probably been introduced with the aim of promoting a modern, professional, well-organized and controllable tourism, other measures to modernize the tourism industry and improve its quality have also affected the Bedouin and their income earning opportunities adversely. In Dahab, for instance, the fortification of the beach through the construction of a promenade and the asphalting of the mouth of Wadi Dahab in 2004 has had a negative impact on Bedouin who used to make their contacts with the tourist at the beach and offer a camel ride at the beach or their services as safari guides.[236] Since the promenade was built, the Bedouin are factually excluded from the centre of touristic activity: The tourists wander along the beach, eat in the restaurants and shop in the bazaars but they hardly ever walk along the inner road where one old Bedouin man is still sitting with his camels and waiting for tourists. During the first phase of fieldwork in the spring of 2003 the researcher was still asked by Bedouin boys who were riding their camels along the beach if she wanted a camel ride. In the autumn of 2003 Bedouin and their camels would still gather on the parking in the mouth of Wadi Dahab and be prepared to take tourists for a short camel ride. In the spring and summer of 2004 the researcher did not see anybody try and offer camel rides, except for the old man who was waiting on the inland side of the road that is not yet paved with tarmac. A Mzaina told the researcher how he perceived these changes:

> "When I was around 16 I started offering camel trips at the beach or to the laguna. Sometimes I would do it for free, but this would be the opportunity to get into business for longer trips of 1- 3 days. Those days were great and I always went for nice safaris. But now it is not possible anymore. Since the mashaya [beach promenade] the young boys cannot do this anymore. They can only go from Blue Hole to Ras Abu Galum. Actually we do not profit from the tourism, because the Italians come from the airport to the hotels and then they go in cars to Ras Abu Galum, but they do not come to the Bedouin to drink and eat or buy something." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 32)

Regulations Regarding the Taxi Service

The other issue, that many Bedouin but also small scale Egyptian taxi entrepreneurs are affected by, is the regulations regarding the taxi business. The taxi service is well regulated by the state. Taxis have to be registered in the governor's office and the total number of taxis in South Sinai is limited.[237] The taxi license is limited to certain connections between towns, e.g. Dahab to other South Sinai towns, but not to Cairo. In Taba, Nuwaiba, Dahab and Sharm al-

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[235] See section 7.4 on social differentiation.

[236] The simplest way for Bedouin to earn money with their camel is to go to the beach and offer short camel rides of ca. five minutes or a picture of the tourist on the camel. While this economic activity is still possible in Nuwaiba, it no longer exists in Dahab.

[237] Every few years (respondents' information ranged from 6 to 9 years) the government issues a few new licenses, which is announced in the newspapers. In the meantime, a market for taxis with licenses is flourishing where used cars do actually get more expensive with the years only because they have a license since otherwise individuals cannot enter this market.

Shaikh there are official taxi stops from where the taxis leave. Before leaving the town a fee of LE 5-10 has to be paid in return for a receipt that has to be shown to the police.

In April 2004 the researcher heard from several respondents that the governor's office had new plans on how to organize the taxi services in South Sinai: All taxis should be painted in blue and white and instead of the previously LE 100 annual fee, owners of taxis should now pay LE 720. But for the Bedouin and other small scale taxi drivers worse than these extra costs, was the government's plan that the private taxis should now wait at the police check-points outside the towns where no customers were to be expected. The plan was that autho-rized companies would take the tourists to those taxi stands. However, the affected Bedouin clearly understood that it was unlikely that the tourists once comfortably seated would want to swap cars at the checkpoints. They interpreted this planned measure as a government trick to drive them out of the business. It was mentioned by a respondent that the large transport companies might have bribed the responsible government officials to exclude the taxis and thereby leave more business opportunities to the large companies who would then completely control the transport business from the towns and especially from the hotels and camps. As a response, the affected Bedouin from Dahab collectively wrote a petition to the governor de-manding that the taxis would continue to start from Dahab directly. As a consequence they were all asked to present themselves at the police who had not been amused about this rebel-lious action. A year later the researcher was informed that so far the Bedouin had been able to avert the government's plan.

A well informed Bedouin from North Sinai told the researcher about what he thought the back-ground of these developments was: According to him, the ministry of tourism plans that only company cars and busses can take tourists, but not private minibusses and taxis that are not allowed to register with the ministry of tourism. He thinks that it is only a matter of time and that in the future, when more transport companies exist and the supply is ensured, the gov-ernment will not renew the taxi licenses or minibus licenses. Otherwise, the travel companies would definitely complain why privately owned cars are allowed to transport tourists, while the companies pay lots of taxes and other fees.

Regulations Regarding the Army Service

One more issue regarding marginalization as a result of regulations is the army service. In most cases, one needs to present an army certificate in order to get a government permit, a license or a job from the government. However, many Bedouin have escaped the conscription by the army and fled to the mountains, since for most Bedouin the idea of spending three years in the army under the command of Egyptian superiors is unbearable and completely op-posed to their ideas of freedom and sovereignty (see chapter 8.1.). Once somebody has been able to hide until the age of thirty, certain possibilities exist to take a lawyer and pay a fine and settle the issue. However, this can take a long time, costs a lot of money and the outcome is uncertain. Consequently, many Bedouin only have limited opportunities to participate in the formal tourism market. One could argue that the Bedouin should fulfil their obligations as Egyptian citizens and serve the army like all the other young men and that the army service

would foster their integration/assimilation into Egyptian society. However, given the cultural background of the Bedouin one could also argue that they should have the free choice of joining the army or not.

Concluding it can be said that government regulations hinder rather than promote Bedouin engagement in tourism. The measures are introduced to promote a modern, high quality tourism and apply to all citizens, migrants and Bedouin alike. However, for rich or well connected citizens including a small minority of rich Bedouin it seems to be relatively easy to find a way through or around these regulations. As one Bedouin put it:

> „If you have money, you can do anything, then there is no law or regulation,
> but without money you cannot do anything." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 32)

While for those of the poorer and less educated migrants the chances of "dreaming the Sinai dream" are reduced and those who cannot adapt to the new developments and regulations might be forced to return to their home regions, the Bedouin are increasingly marginalized on their own land where they once used to live freely and decide relatively sovereignly about their movements and activities.

7.2.2 Competition and Uneven Bargaining Power

In the past, the Bedouin were engaged in informal tourism that used to play a more important role in South Sinai than it does today. The Bedouin could satisfy the backpackers' desire for adventure, for an experience in nature and of Bedouin culture. And the backpackers did not have high demands regarding comfort and hygienic standards. Moreover, many of the tourists came from Israel and the Bedouin could communicate with them relatively easily given the semitic origin of both Hebrew and Arabic as well as the years of Israeli occupation of Sinai.

Today, the main share of tourists comes on organized tours and the Bedouin have little chance to get in direct contact with these tourists but rather often depend on middlemen due to the following reasons:

- Their limited knowledge about the structure of the international and Egyptian tourism market,

- the lack of financial capital and insufficient experience with modern, professional business processes to provide quality standards required by mainstream tourists,

- communication difficulties due to insufficient language skills and communications equipment (fax, internet),

- the lack of integration in a wider business network that extends beyond the Bedouin tribal network and especially the lack of contacts with the "big players" in order to join the market chain at a much higher level.

The Bedouin have limited knowledge about the structure of the international and Egyptian tourism market and do not have contacts to the big players in order to join the market chain at a much higher level. Even within Egypt, their radius of activity is limited to Sinai, while Egyptian tourist companies and their guides cover the whole of Egypt. And within Sinai, too, the Bedouin have a limited scope of action. The large majority is not integrated in a wider business network that extends beyond the Bedouin tribal network. Moreover, the experience with modern, professionel business processes is also still insufficient and hampers Bedouin participation.

Lack of capital is a further hindrance to direct Bedouin participation in the modern, high-end tourism, since the Bedouin cannot offer the quality standards required by the mainstream tourists who have no or little information about the local culture. Therefore, a Bedouin only appears at the end of the market chain, for instance, when Egyptian companies offer a Bedouin dinner or a camel ride as exotic experiences and a change from the days at the beach. However, these events are just punctual contacts with the Bedouin and are kept very short.[238]

Communication is another barrier due to language and technical problems. Many Bedouin only speak a few words of English and none of the languages that are becoming increasingly important for South Sinai tourism: Italian, Russian, Hungarian, Korean or Japanese. The majority of the Bedouin therefore cannot communicate with foreign tourist companies or tourists very easily and therefore often have to rely on Egyptian companies or guides[239] as intermediates and are dependent on their good will. In addition to the language problem, most Bedouin lack a fax machine or internet connection for easier communication with customers. However, the mobile phones have spread very fast, and many Bedouin can be accessed on their mobiles.

Due to unsufficient knowledge and experience, the lack of contacts, the prejudice on the Egyptian side, the lack of quality standards and probably due to the Bedouin's own reservations, too, the Bedouin cannot offer their services to the tourists directly (e.g. with an advert for safari in the hotel lobbies). Instead, tour agencies bring the tourists to the Bedouin and thereby dictate the conditions. The following statements illustrate the situation:

> "The tourist cars stop here for a break in my garden [in a desert oasis]. I serve them tea and offer them beadwork, stones, desert herbs and other items. When the tourists ask how much it costs, I tell the Egyptian guide and he adds to it what he wants for himself. I cannot help it because I depend on the good relationship with the guide, that he comes again and that he persuades the tourists to buy and explains to them. I know a little English, but the groups are often from Russia, Italy, Hungary…." (Desert Settlement Bir Saghair, Mzaina, male, 29)

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[238] There are several possible explanations for the short duration of the visits such as efficiency and tight schedule, preventing the tourists from feeling bored or uncomfortable in the simple conditions or even avoiding too close a contact between the Bedouin and the tourists which might result in the guide's loss of some control of the situation.

[239] These guides, in many cases, have studied the language of the tourists at university or at least at a language institute and are usually very proficient in their customers' languages.

And a neighbor of this owner of the garden commented in a separate conversation:

> "Many tourists come to Bir Saghair every day, but it is worth nothing, be-
> cause the Egyptian guides want tea for free for the whole group in ex-
> change for their efforts to persuade the tourists into buying something. And
> then they keep 50 % of the sales. They are all like this. Some Bedu do not
> like this kind of business and prefer not to sell anything." (Desert Settlement
> Bir Saghair, Mzaina, male, 45)

Moreover, the Bedouin have slowly lost their comparative advantage, i.e. their unique knowledge of the desert. Today, the ways to the significant places of touristic interest in the desert such as the oases or canyons are well known by the Egyptian drivers and guides who no longer need the services of the Bedouin. Reportedly, there are even Egyptian guides who disguise themselves and pretend to be Bedouin in order to be more fascinating to their tourists.

A Bedouin from Nuwaiba expressed the following thoughts about this development:

> "Until 3 or 4 years ago, the companies needed the Bedouin, because they
> knew the desert, the places, the ways, but now they got rid of the Bedouin
> because the Egyptian guides have learnt where the places are. But all the
> companies just go to three places: to Coloured Canyon, Ain Umm Ahmed
> and Ain Khudra, that is all that is known to them and also to the tourists.
> Thanks god, because otherwise the other nice places would also be full of
> rubbish and the rocks full of Russian names..." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 32)

A Mzaina who lives in the desert explained that because the Egyptian guides had gotten to know all the routes the price companys paid for renting a camel had also deteriorated in real terms and at LE 40 per day was too low. He explained that while before 1995 the price for a camel would be LE 25 per day and an additional LE 10 per day for the guide, now the Egyptian guides did not need a Bedouin guide any longer so that the boys who walk with the camels were not paid at all and had to participate in the money that was paid for renting the camel.[240] When comparing the increase in prices for renting a camel and for camel food, the factual reduction in real income becomes evident: In the mid 1990s 50 kg of maize cost LE 23 and camel and guide together would earn LE 35-40 per day. In 2003, the price for 50 kg maize had almost tripled to LE 70, while the income from renting a camel had remained the same.

Another example of Egyptian companies forcing Bedouin out of the market are the camel rides to or from the oasis of Ain Khudra (see Map 3). This oasis can only be reached by foot if one starts from the road to St. Catherine, because after about one third of the distance from the road one has to descend a steep slope. For those (groups of) tourists who have limited time, many of whose main aim is to visit the monastery of St. Catherine and climb Jabal Musa, an

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[240] A clear differentiation is made between the different factors of production / service. A camel has to earn its income as much as the guide in order to be profitable to the owner who bought it and has to pay for its food.

alternative to visiting the oasis is to just have a look and take a picture from the top of the slope into the Wadi Khudra and onto the oasis. A Bedouin from the area reported, that in the past, the tourists would rent a camel to take them from the road to the viewpoint. However, at some point the agencies started to bring the tourists by bus but also bring a jeep that would take the tourists to the viewpoint in alternating groups: while one was enjoying the view, the next one would be brought. While this information could not be certified, a Bedouin from the oases of Ain Khudra reported a similar development:

> "We used to do camel rides for the tourists from the road to the oasis and safaris[241] from the oasis. But now most tourists come with tour operators in a jeep through Wadi Ghazala to the oasis. Then they drink tea and eat bread but do not stay overnight. And the guide from the tour operator just gives us LE10 or 20 for tea and 5 libba [Bedouin bread that is baked in the ground under the charcoal of a fire] for 10 people. He just gives us the money without asking us how much we charge. It does barely cover our costs and definitely not the effort. The Bedouin felt very disillusioned about this, that basically they were not involved anymore (no more camel walks) and moreover got so little pay that they felt it did barely cover their expenses and definitely not the effort, one needs to get firewood, flour, sugar, tea and then prepare the bread and the tea. But if we ask for more, he might get annoyed and not come back." (Desert settlement Ain Khudra, Mzaina, male, 62)

The respondent said that they had no idea about how much the tour operators charge the tourists and explained that their problem was that they were poor and humble.

A Mzaini from Dahab summarized the situation with the following words:

> "In the past the Bedouin had everything under controll, the prices for safari were much better, the cook and the food would be paid in addition to the guide, now everything is together in one price. I may be get 10 % of what the tourists pay for their safari and then have to pay the food for the tourists and the rent for the camels with that money." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 21)

7.3 Discrimination by Government Authorities and Egyptian Migrants

Discrimination is a phenomenon that is difficult to grasp, even more so when no objective data is available. This chapter portrays the feeling of discrimination that prevails among the Bedouin of South Sinai. No survey could be carried out among Egyptians regarding their perspective on the Bedouin. And while some outsiders can confirm the tendencies of discrimination, it will be difficult to prove and to quantify them, for instance by saying "x percent of gov-

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[241] LE 25 for the trip to the oasis and for safaris LE 40 per day and camel (incl. guide) from the tour operator and some tourists would also give extra tip, often even more than the LE 40.

ernment officials actively and repeatedly discriminate against Bedouin" or "measure x has been introduced in order to reduce Bedouin participation". Many Egyptians and Egyptian state officials will decline that there is discrimination and justify their opinions by saying that the Bedouin are drug dealers or smugglers, dirty and backward. This is also the image that is portrayed in the Egyptian media. In an Egyptian TV-movie,[242] for instance, a group of drug dealers was represented by exceptionally stupid Bedouin who were easily defeated by a superior group of Egyptian police or soldiers. Egyptian prejudice towards Bedouin also became apparent during conversations the author had with Egyptians who thought that the Bedouin were dirty or stupid. There were also reports by Bedouin of Egyptian guides communicating these prejudices and stereotypes to the tourists, such as the following incidence:

> "The Egyptians tell the tourists strange things about the Bedouin. One time, for example, when I was on safari and staying in Ain Khudra oasis I heard an Egyptian guide tell his tourists, that if a Bedouin could not find water in the desert but would find a camel, then he would slaughter the camel and drink from the camel's stomach. So when I heard this, I told the tourists that this was wrong and that in such a case the Bedouin would instead take the camel to ride to a well and drink…They tell tourists many such stories." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 24)

Discrimination of South Sinai Bedouin has many facettes, the main ones being bad treatment by Egyptian private individuals, the treatment by the police, especially at checkpoints, actual police raids of private homes and reportedly discrimination by teachers at schools and doctors at hospitals. The following reports of discrimination can only hint at the actual situation.

A European investor narrated how in 1996 he and his Bedouin business partner wanted to fly from Sharm al-Shaikh to Cairo. They had already booked the tickets, but when they wanted to pick them up at the Egypt Air office, the employee refused to hand out the ticket to his Bedouin partner. Consequently, they decided to return home but first have a good breakfast in a good hotel. But his Bedouin partner was not served any breakfast. Only when the European accompanied him to the buffet was he served. A German tourist who has spent many holidays in Sinai told the researcher about a similar situation she had experienced when she and a Bedouin friend of hers wanted to enter an Egyptian hotel where her mother was staying. The Bedouin was not allowed to enter the hotel ground. A long argument arose with various members of staff up to the manager. Finally, the manager allowed the Bedouin to enter the hotel. The researcher has not heard many complaints of this kind, which might be explained by two reasons: Generally, most Bedouin try to avoid such situations and only intermingle with Egyptians when necessary or with a few Egyptian friends, so that these kind of situations do not occur too often. Moreover, in the course of time, the Bedouin and Egyptian migrants might have gotten used to each other so that today this kind of disrespectful treatment is not very common among private citizens. Nevertheless, most Bedouin will prefer to wear Western clothes rather than the traditional jalabiya in order to avoid any hassle and discomfort when moving in Egyp-

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[242] That was playing in one of the Egyptian souvenir shops in Dahab where the researcher was conducting an interview.

tian spheres. A Bedouin respondent explained why he would not wear a traditional jalabiya in a "modern" town like Sharm al-Shaikh as follows:

> "I wear the jalabiya at home, on weddings and things like that, but not in a modern town like Sharm al-Shaikh, there you have to wear "work clothes", because otherwise you will be treated as a stupid inhabitant of the desert who knows nothing and then you feel bad. And in order to avoid this you dress with trousers and shirt. In the bar or so there are the rich Arabs from the Gulf who wear jalabiyas, but they are tourists and customers. But I go there to work." (St. Catherine, Alaiqaat, male, 28)

A different situation can be observed regarding the relationship between the Bedouin and the police where conflicts occur all the time.

At the road checkpoints[243] Bedouin are often held up, questioned or even searched. In some cases, their ID is kept and the Bedouin have to go to the police station of their town council or even to the capital of the governorate Al-Tur and endure more chicanery in order to get back their ID. Several Bedouin respondents told the researcher about their problems at the checkpoints and the researcher, herself, witnessed how policemen at the checkpoints would not only question the Bedouin but also demand all sorts of favors: a package of cigarettes, a newspaper, lunch, etc.

Two foreigners with long experience in South Sinai, too, reported about this problem independently of each other. The first said that, if he went for a diving safari with his Egyptian and Bedouin drivers, he personally never had problems passing a checkpoint, but that the Egyptian driver might be stopped and the Bedouin driver would always be stopped and questioned at the checkpoint. The second foreigner explained that before going on a car trip with his Bedouin friend he would wash the car so that the police at the checkpoints would not immediately identify his friend as a Bedouin. If they did get to know that his friend was a Bedouin they would ask his friend many questions and that would take a long time.

More serious than the hassling at the checkpoints are the raids police have conducted in private homes in Dahab and Nuwaiba as well as the arrest of Bedouin for alleged or actual consumption or dealing of drugs. Several Bedouin as well as a European tourist who spends many of her holidays with a Bedouin familiy have reported how the police would come in the middle of the night, search the home as well as its inhabitants including the women which is a gross disrespect of Bedouin culture, sometimes even beat the people. The European tourist once witnessed such a situation and intervened. When she asked the police on which grounds they entered the house, the police had not explanation nor a search warrant and eventually left. In many other cases, however, the police was not confronted with foreigners and would arrest people in their houses. A Bedouin respondent interpreted that the police would come

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[243] At all strategic road crossings in Sinai the Egyptian government has erected checkpoints in order to control the movements of people.

late at night or very early in the morning to search houses and arrest people so that the neighbors would not notice and come for help.

It has been reported by many Bedouin that the Egyptian police even set somebody up and hide drugs in his compound or car in order to arrest him and report a success to their superiors. Severel respondents told the researcher that the police would arrest Bedouin and then release them in exchange for drugs, which the police would use to accuse and arrest other Bedouin. The researcher has also heard stories about Bedouin who were arrested instead of their relatives who could not be caught by the police, such as the following case reported by a Bedouin from Nuwaiba:

> "My cousin has been in jail for three years now. He went to the mountain to get firewood and coal but never came home. He was arrested and the police said that the reason was his brother who was dealing with drugs. If his brother came, then he would go free. Eventually, he got a verdict from the court that he was free, but then the police got a paper from the ministry of the interior that he was to be left in jail. He's been transferred from the prison in Al Arish to Cairo, to Alexandria and back again. He has 2 wives and 15 children, who looks after them now? During the Israeli time it was different, then I did not know the fear from the police. One could be stopped and controlled, but if there was nothing one could just continue. But now, under the Egyptians, they can just keep your ID and take you to the police station."
> (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 45)

Several respondents reported that the repression got very bad in the years from 1998 to 2001 because of a new head of the police department of South Sinai.[244] The respondents also thought that the repression, especially the raids of homes, had reduced over the last years, because the government got worried about potentially violent reaction from the Bedouin, as is reflected in the following quote:

> "The government and especially the police treat us very badly. But for the last two years they have cooled down a bit, because now they are afraid of the Bedu, because the Bedu have had enough of all of this, they do not accept the oppression any longer and they have many guns. And if necessary they pull out the guns and shoot at the police. For ten years they have treated us very badly, it was terrible. The police searched houses, scared the women and children and if they did not find drugs they would hide drugs in the houses and arrest people. Many of my friends were arrested. But now they have understood that they cannot treat us like that. And they are afraid that the Bedu could make real problems. " (Dahab, tribe unknown, male, 28)

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[244] One Bedouin reported that apparently the military police was not involved in the repression, but only the "dakhiliya", i.e. the civil police was very tough on the Bedouin. While this information could not be verified, an explanation could be that the civil police is in charge of fighting the drug business and other smuggling activities and is therefore taking these stern measures.

Moreover, one interviewee considered that the government wanted to have the Bedouin in the towns where they could be controlled and therefore reduced the repression that was driving the Bedouin into the mountains.

Those Bedouin who had been imprisoned reported about very bad conditions in prison and the following testimony by a respondent (who was actually caught with 6 g of marihuana) is not a singular case.

> "I was in jail from 1996 to 1999 for the possession of 6 g marihuana. Other Egyptian may get six months for a similar offense. But the judge said: "You are a Bedouin from Sinai you are not just smoking but also growing and selling." When my lawyer asked how he could know that I was growing, the reply was: "Because he is a Bedouin from Sinai and knows how and where to grow, but nobody else in Egypt knows." In prison I had no matress and just a right to 35 cm width on the ground for sleeping: I had to buy my own blanket but had to pay baksheesh in order to be able to buy it. I got bad food, no tea and dirty water for drinking. From 2 p.m. to 9 a.m. we were not allowed to go outside the room. We had no toilet in our cell, only a bucket. The size of the cell is 3 m x 4 m and 12 people are in it. I shared my sleeping place with three others: Two would be sleeping, two would be awake and like that we would alternate in order to have more space. Then I was wrongly accused by an inmate and got one week of solitary confinement. There I had to stay in a cell of 1 m x 1 m and 2 m height, there was no window and the food was   given to me through an opening at the bottom of the door. While I was in prison my friends helped me and my family financially. But when I came out of jail I had to pay everything back and I had already spent all my savings for the lawyer. I was ruined." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 34)

Regarding these sensitive issues, it is very difficult to establish the truth or in other words one can never be sure: One might have found the truth but have no proof for it or what one might consider the truth could also turn out to just be made up. It could even be that some of the respondents are involved in the drug business and hand used the research interviews for some sort of "lobbying". However, this would only put into doubt singular statements but not the situation as a whole. Moreover, given the reports about human rights violations in Egypt the reports do not seem far fetched and are likely to represent the actual situation.

A very disturbing thought was expressed by a respondent who, out of his experience, his observation and from the reports of his fellow inmates about their fate (see Textbox 3), came to the conclusion that the arrests had a system. He was convinced that the underlying aim was to keep Bedouin out of positions of power. The respondent explained that since the era of Sadat a law existed stating that one could not get a government job if any family member was in jail. While this law had probably been introduced to prevent Islamists from committing acts of terror, according to him it was now used to exclude the Bedouin from positions of political power. He said:

"They do this to the Bedouin to control them and not put them in the sensitive places. Before you get a high position such as head of police or judge they look at your family and follow three names [family links], for instance up to your cousin: Father (1), Uncle (2), Cousin (3). If any of them has been in jail then that is it. But one does not even have to go so far now, because since Israel returned Sinai, so many have been in jail that it is not necessary to look up to the third link. When I was in prison for the first time, I was innocent, too. I think the policy of the police is to pick the intelligent and clever ones from each family. All the people with whom I was in jail were clever people and had good business running. And we, the Bedouin, we know who grows and deals with drugs, but most of them are not in prison, because they are the sons of the shaikh or have a deal with the police.[245] But there are also people who grow drugs because they do not have a job and have nothing. Everywhere you look, in every Bedouin family, almost in every house there is somebody who has been to jail. And then you have to ask yourself why. They want to keep us small. They are scared that we become educated and strong and want an independent Sinai." (Dahab, Tarabin, male, 32)

Due to the sensitivity of this accusation the researcher could not talk openly about it with just anybody. However, one other Bedouin respondent, whom she told this view, immediately agreed. He said, that he had never thought about it that way, but that in each and every family there was at least one member who had been in jail. To him it seemed obvious, why the government would want to keep the Bedouin out of positions of power:

"If a Bedouin was head of the police or mayor of the town, then the Bedu would be comfortable. And if money or foreign aid came to Sinai it would go to the Bedu. But the Egyptians do not want that. They want all for themselves." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, male, 45)

And his wife added:

"Yes, the Egyptians want all the business for themselves, they do not like the Bedouin. They do not want the Bedu to do any projects or have any business."[246]

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[245] Many Bedouin think that the Egyptian government receives money from the USA for drug control. The kind of deal that is referred to here is a co-operation with the police who can destroy part of a drug field to take pictures and film it and show their success on Egyptian TV and get more money from the USA. The officers are said to get a share of the profit from the remaining fields.

[246] To the Bedouin this is the only explanation for the destruction of camps, cafeterias and homes without a license by the government.

Textbox 3: Stories from prison

"When I was in prison I met many people who were innocently jailed. The stories are very sad. One of them was an old Jibaly man, may be 60 or 70 years old. He used to go to his garden in Wadi Fairan every day. One day the police came looking for his neighbor, but he was not there. So instead they took the old men with them and he was in prison for 18 months. Finally the judge believed him, so he was released. But when they arrested him, he had signed, that they found him in his *"mazraa"*. *"Mazraa"* means garden but it could also mean a drug field. And then the judges asked the man where the police had found him. And he said in his mazraa. And that was taken as a proof that he was guilty. But his laywer proved that the *"mazraa"* was only an orchard that was located very close to the road. Now the old man has aged a lot because of this and he was sick in prison. And since he is free again, he does not trust anybody. He is always panicking and only goes to his garden after 14 h although all his life he had gone there in the morning. And he spent LE 30,000 for the lawyer and LE 35,000 of his savings that he had hidden in the ground disappeared from his garden. The police dug around there. The police likes to arrest the 40-60-year-olds because they are clueless, because they cannot defend themselves with arguments, because they do not expect to be arrested. Or they arrest the 18-30-year-olds because they are intelligent young men. Their main argument against them is: "Where did you get your money from?"

They also arrested a 90-year old men. His charge was that he had threatened the police with a machine gun.[247] But he cannot even see and even less carry the gun, because he is too weak. When he was in prison with us he was so old, he was like a child, he shat himself and we had to clean him.

Most of the people are innocent, may be 3 % are guilty because of drugs, but the rest not. I wanted to go to Human Rights Watch to tell them about these things. The problem is that many Bedouin just live in one place and do not see what is happening, but I move around and hear the stories of the people and see what is happening. There are so many cases. For instance that of Mohammed, he is may be 50 years old, and his brother from North Sinai. They were on the road from Suez to Taba in the Nakhal area and were getting gas for their Toyota. At the gas station, there were two policemen and they were joking among each other. One said: "So what shall we do with these Bedu here? Shall we take them with us?" The other one replied: "No, in Nuwaiba there are more Bedouin." But the first one said: "Yes, but those might run away, let's better take these two." So they arrested them and took them to Nuwaiba to the office of the drug police and they were jailed because of alleged drug cultivation in the hinterland of Nuwaiba. It took two years for them to get out again. But the man swore to me that in his entire life he had not been to South Sinai.

I only talk about the people whom I know and whom I met in prison. So imagine, how many others were there before and after me, and then there are two more prisons and they also keep Bedouin there. I tell you about another case: a Bedouin judge, was in the "*Maqad*" [=social gathering place of the Bedouin] trying to solve a problem between two families. There were many people around him. Then the drug police came during the meeting. And the police accused him of holding a meeting about the drugs in order to sell them. They did this because they saw a Mercedes standing in front of the Maqad. They asked to whom the Mercedes belonged. So they arrested the Bedouin judge and then placed opium under the number plate of his car: this way he lost his mercedes and spent one year in prison. And the two families are still fighting.

The Egyptian judges often judge rightly and say that the accused Bedouin is innocent. The judges are free, nobody can tell them what to do. So after one year the Bedouin judge was released. But the police often arrest the ones who have just been given freedom. So the Bedouin judge was arrested again and to spend another year in prison and became very sick during that time and is still sick until now.

When I was arrested and taken from Nuwaiba to Al-Tur to be presented to the judge, there was no police report nor a warrant of arrest. So the order was given via the mobile that first I should be

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[247] The story of this old man was also reported by another respondent independently. He explained that there had been a shooting of two young Bedouin in the old man's garden. When the police came the two young men run away, the police asked the old man whether the gun was his and he replied "yes". So they arrested him and most likely they accused him of attacking the police.

taken to the police station in Al-Tur. There they made a police report and forged the signature of the police officer from Nuwaiba. I had two lawyers who did not believe me when I told them this story. Then, after 6 months I found a Bedouin lawyer who finally believed me when I showed him the police report of another prisoner that was signed by the police officer from Nuwaiba. Then the documents were sent to Cairo for examination and comparison of the signatures and were only sent back after six months. I had to pay LE 500 for that. And in total, the prison cost me LE 55,000, LE 10,000 for the Bedouin lawyer, LE 5,000 for an Egyptian lawyer whom I did not contract any longer and LE 10,000 for an Egyptian lawyer who disappeared with the money that I paid him to get me free. Then I needed LE 30,000 for food, for bakshish (for a clean room, for medicine, clothes, LE 500 for the taxi to bring visitors, LE 400 for food for 14 days for all the inmates, bakshish for better treatment. My wife collected all the receipts so I know the costs exactly. Each visit would be around LE 1,000." (Dahab, Tarabin, male, 32)

A European researcher who has spent a long time in Sinai, was convinced that the discrimination was not just coincidental but systematic. In the respondent's view, the reason for the behaviour of the Egyptian police was that they hated the Bedouin and liked to frustrate them, that they did not want them "to be around", since they were only a disturbance, because the Egyptians wanted the whole land for themselves. The man was convinced that this was not only true for a few individual Egyptians but applied to the great majority and was part of a system. To him, another proof of this was the Al-Salam Channel Irrigation Project in North Sinai where half a million Egyptians are to be resettled. He reported that according to the Sinai Development Plan, each settler could get 10 Feddan of land. But only 5 Feddan are given to a Bedouin solicitor. The European's Bedouin friend commented that in reality they could hand in one solicitation after the other but would still not get the 5 Feddan. The European researcher could not say whether there was an actual order from high level government officials to mistreat the Bedouin but he was sure that it was a conscious policy to be "tough" with the Bedouin. He also thought, that moreover due to the fact that the large majority of the government officials in Sinai hated to be there, they released their frustration on the Bedouin. This opinion was also widespread among the Bedouin, especially regarding Egyptian teachers and their motivation to teach Bedouin children.

Another indication that the discrimination was systematic could be seen in the following statement of an old Bedouin man in Dahab:

> "If a rais al-madina [mayor] is good with the Bedouin, he will be transferred,
> but the other ones stay for a long time." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 54)

Even those Bedouin who did not tell the researcher these very extreme stories had the opinion that the Egyptians and the Egyptian state disliked the Bedouin and did not want them to be successful. Again, the following quotes speak for themselves:

 "The government alleges every Bedouin of being a drug dealer or drug cultivator. If a Bedouin wants to study at the police academy he will not be accepted because of being Bedouin, but the government would never admit that. It is especially a problem with the Bedu in Sinai because of the Israeli occupation, but with the Bedu in the West it is similar. The Egyptians have

hatred in the blood against the Bedu. In Jordan there is no racism, there the Bedu are honored and respected, but in Egypt they are not respected." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, male, 30)

> "There is discrimination against all the Bedu of Egypt. But in South Sinai it is even worse, because here the Bedu are the "Jahud Sina" [the Sinai Jews], because during the war they did not flee to Egypt." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 28)

> "The Egyptian government would not allow that a Bedouin climbs up and gets rich, that he grows long feathers. If a Bedouin is rich, then they check his file, his background to find something against him. They have already kicked out Bedouin from parliament in this way. Because they mistrust us because they dislike us, because of no reason." (Dahab, Bedouin from North Sinai, male, 32)

This section has given an impression of the discrimination the Bedouin are experiencing. While there were also some individuals who said there was no discrimination but that the Bedu and Egyptian were very different of each other and did not mingle or that if one followed the law one would have no problems, the large majority of the Bedouin feel that the Egyptian police as well as other government officials dislike the Bedouin, ignore their needs and even mistreat them. It cannot be neglected that some Bedouin engage in the drug or smuggling business (see chapter 8.2.2.), however, the activities of the police are not focussed on a few individuals but target the entire Bedouin population. In most cases they are arbitrary and excessive with the apperent goal of intimidating the Bedouin and deriving satisfaction from the execution of power.

In addition to the psychical effects of this repeated degradation and humiliation, there are other implications that have a direct effect on the Bedouin livelihoods. From the reports of discrimination one can deduce how difficult it must be for a Bedouin to obtain any government documents, any licenses or permits and consequently how difficult it must be to fulfil the government regulations and participate in the formal tourism industry. And one can imagine how much time, money and how many business opportunities are lost for those Bedouin who have to wait at the checkpoint for several hours, who have to recover their ID from the authorities or who are arrested without a verdict for an unpredictable amount of time. Those who have been in jail for several months or years are usually completely ruined financially and their criminal record will make any major involvement in tourism impossible, since no licenses will be given for most projects. It was reported, that even to get a fishing license the personal and family records were checked. The same applies to government jobs. Consequently, those Bedouin are increasingly excluded and in some cases eventually become real criminals as some sad examples[248] have already shown.

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[248] It has been reported by several respondents that there is an increasing number of young men whose lives have been destroyed by the police and terms in jail, who have gone to the mountains and make a living from illegal activities. Some of them have formed gangs, they are armed and do not submit to any law but their own.

7.4 Social Differentiation

Not all Bedouin are equally affected by the problems discussed in the previous sections. Some were clever or lucky and managed to get into a comfortable position within the tourism industry, others are left behind. No official statistics are available to analyse the income or wealth distribution among the Bedouin, however the classifications[249] and estimates of distribution that were given independently by three Bedouin can be used to get an idea about the distribution of wealth among the Bedouin in Dahab and Nuwaiba (see Table 5):[250]

The respondent from Nuwaiba Mzaina added that the people in the desert were much poorer than those in Dahab or Nuwaiba, that most of them only had 1 or 2 camels and some goats and sheep.[251] Many respondents reported that in the past there was more equality among the people and that only recently had their society been divided into poor and rich. When asked about this, the respondent from Dahab explained:

> "During the Israeli time all the people were more or less on the same level, all were working. But then some people claimed land and sold it and invested the money and earned more money that they invested in the next project. And if they have a camp [as a guarantee], they can get a credit from the bank and invest even more. And when you have moneyyou can arrange things with the town council. Not anybody can finish his papers. People like me, we don't have land, because we did not think properly. We thought we were the first, because we were working with the cars in the mountains [safari] and that brought more money then and now we are the last. Most of the people who claimed land are not from Dahab, they are from the wadis. There are people whose mind is open and there are people whose mind is closed[252]. In Dahab, there are may be 20 % rich people, businessmen with projects, camps, vehicles for the transport of tourists or goods, 70 % might have a car, but not for business, just a pickup for their own use. But a taxi or a minibus is a good project. There are may be 20-30 people who own a taxi or a minibus, some of them own 2 or 3. But there are many poor people, who have hardly enough to eat, they have to buy on credit in the shop. And the rich take the land from the poor. If you have money or if you are the shaikh, you can do anything. For instance, if you own a hotel and the police eats for free and their relatives come and sleep for free at your hotel, then you can easily create a problem for a poor guy and take his land away. You

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[249] The Turbani respondent from Nuwaiba described these four categories, the researcher named each class.

[250] After one respondent from Nuwaiba Tarabin spontaneously developed his categorization during an interview, the researcher had the opportunity to ask two other respondents how they would set up such a categorization. The results are presented here. Although three opinions are usually not representative, the relative similarity among the three and the researcher's own judgement allow to use this categorization as a rough indication where no more precise data is available.

[251] Later on he said, that there were no desperate people among the Bedouin, but that not everybody would find work every day. The Bedouin, as semi-nomads are used to a life that is limited to the basic needs. This was not considered as poverty in the past. Only somebody who did not have enough to eat was really poor. This attitude is now changing, especially in the towns.

[252] In the sense that there are clever and stupid people.

create a problem for him with the police so that he needs a lawyer or has to pay a fine and needs a lot of money for that, may be LE 50,000 and so that he is forced to sell his land, and for too little, may be he will get LE 5,000. The shaikh does not help the people, only his relatives. Because there are ever more people and because of that the character of the people has changed. There is no more love between the people, in the past there was love. Now the people do not love each other. The change started around 1987. The people now also talk badly about each other." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 49)

Table 5: Estimated income stratification of Bedouin society

	Nuwaiba, Mzaina, male, 35 years	Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 48 years	Dahab, Mzaina, male, 49 years
1) The poor Live of fishing and tourism and have just enough to eat, no savings	35 %	50 %	30 %
2) The "lower middle-class" Income from tourism and fishing, in addition they have goats (up to 30) and camels (up to 5) and additional income from their live-stock	35 %	30 %	50 %
3) The "upper middle-class" Own a Jeep or a Toyota or a cafeteria or a camp from which they earn income	20 %	10 %	20 %
4) The rich Own several camps (2-5), or two large cars (minibus) or transporters for sand or water	10 %	10 %	

* For Dahab, the information was that 20 % were rich and had a camp or cars for tourism transport, that many were poor and that around 70 % owned a pickup for their own use, but could not earn money from it. Part of these 70 % (may be 50 % of the total) can probably be classified as category 2. Moreover, in Dahab, fewer people than in Nuwaiba, own live-stock, probably due to the denser settlement and more advanced tourism development. Consequently, people of catego-ry two might not own livestock but earn a higher income from tourism than people of category one.

Own source

Among the "higher middle class" and the rich, there is a majority who is relatively wealthy for Sinai conditions, but is not extraordinarily rich. Most of this group either established good con-tacts with Egyptian and foreign companies that allow them to make a good living from safari trips or they claimed some land and were clever to let it under a profitable contract or to sell it for a good price and invest the money profitably.

However, there is also a minority who has become extremely rich. There are speculations that some of these very rich initially had money from the drug business which they could invest in projects in tourism or even other sectors such as transport and sale of potable water or con-

struction machines. Some of them own many properties at strategic locations in Dahab, from which they earn rent income. According to one respondent they were EURO-millionaires already. Another small group of the very rich belongs to the families of some shaikhs who allegedly abused their positions to enrich themselves. Due to the sensitivity of this issue, the researcher could not establish which shaikhs were involved, whether all shaikhs were involved and how much of the allegations was true. However, since this information was given by several respondents including one European who has been living in Dahab for more than 25 years, the possibility of a drastic misreporting due to envy or other personal conflicts can be excluded. The following two statements by a Bedouin and a European who has been living in Dahab for more than 20 years give some idea about the sometimes dubious role of the shaikhs. Textbox 4 contains a respondent's explanation of the ways in which some of the Bedouin shaikhs enrich themselves.

> "The shaikh is rich because he is a crook. He is the one who forged the signature of another man and sold me that man's land. The shaikh has always taken his share, before all of them had nothing. Most of the Bedouin in Asala are poor. They do not know what they will eat tomorrow." (European investor, in Dahab since 1979)

> "If you want to get your house licensed, they say "tomorrow". Only the shaikh and three others were clever enough and got titles for their land and houses. The shaikh always sat together with Abbas [apparently the mayor or another high government official around 1987] and knew what was going on." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 70)

In the safari and camel renting business, there are also a few Bedouin who have profited overproportionally, because they have direct and regular contact with European and Egyptian agencies or private tourist groups and earn income from the organization of safaris. In the desert, there are so called "camel shaikhs" for each region, who function like contact persons and organise the camels for a safari in exchange for a commission. Their advantage lies in their fame, that they have become well known among the safari organisers. However, they have no exclusive authority as camel shaikhs and anybody can organise the camels for a group of tourists provided. While those who provide their camels get LE 40/day, the one who organises the camels for an Egyptian agency charges the agency an additional LE 10 or more per camel and day: i.e. he will earn LE 50 for his own camels and LE 10 for each additional camel he organises. Those lucky ones who have established direct contact with tourists or European agencies can charge LE 90 to LE 150 per day and camel.[253]

Textbox 4: A Bedouin's opinion on the shaikhs' secret economic activities

"The shaikhs got rich because they sold the land of their family, of their brothers, cousins and uncles. And because they are dealing with the government. For example, the shaikh takes aid money.

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[253] For jeeps safaris different prices and rules apply. A new landcruiser from an agency will cost LE 600/day, an old jeep from a Bedouin might be available for LE 300 or less. The size of the tourist group will affect the price for each individual.

The shaikh can make a list of poor people that are supposed to receive aid from the government. But he puts down names from people in the desert, may be half of the names and these people do not know and the government does not know and the shaikh keeps quiet and does not tell these people and keeps the money or sells their rations of oil and sugar, he steals it from the poor people. The people are quiet people, they don't want to make a problem. Some people understand, others don't. They don't know what is going on.

Also, the drug dealing is mostly from the sons of the shaikhs, because they will never be checked by the police or if they are in prison their father can get them out, because he also helps the police. The shaikh is also in charge of security of government installations like pipes and mobile phone poles. For instance, he gets LE 1,000 for guarding the installation and employs somebody for LE 500 or less, the difference is for him. The shaikh is rich because he gets a lot of jobs, all the security, this is a big thing, anything in the desert, for example, if they try to dig a well or build a factory, for example a cement factory. The shaikh will be in charge of the security, because the shaikh can look after this with his group.

Or for example, if the government is widening the streets and destroying houses, the government should compensate the people but the shaikh takes this money. It is in the law. The Egyptian businessmen who have lost land at the beach when the promenade was built were given big pieces of land near the Blue Hole as compensation. The [Bedouin] people don't know about the compensation, but the shaikh knows. And if he does not keep the people's compensation, then at least he receives money from the government to keep the people happy and quiet. That is easy for him, because the people are always quiet. This is normal that the Bedouin are quiet with the government and the police. Because every day there is a new problem. They start to feel that it is normal that they break the houses. That every day there is a new law, but there is no new law, the law only changes every few years. But only the intelligent people like me who listen to the news and care, know when there is a new law. But there are people who do not care or know. So, if there is a new government measure, the people think there is a new law." (Dahab, Tarabin, male, 32)

Unlike the Mzaina or Tarabin, the Jabaliya Bedouin in St. Catherine have developed a complex rotational system that regulates the organization of the approximately 500-600 camels for the entire tribe in order to achieve a just distribution of the work among the camel owners of the four clans and the respective extended families. The reason for this difference is probably the concentration of the Jabaliya settlements around the monastery of St. Catherine and Mount Sinai (Jabal Musa) which have been a destination for pilgrims for centuries. Consequently, the letting of camels and guide service have had a long history among the Jabaliya in the course of which this system developed.

In contrast to the Jabaliya, the other tribes were widely spread and therefore never forced to organize themselves in a similar way. Today, with the development of modern tourism, settlements of the Mzaina and Tarabin also concentrate around urban centers and the demand for camels focuses on certain locations, such as the Blue Hole near Dahab from where the camels take the tourists to Ras Abu Galum. However, no system of camel organization has developed that would consider the issue of justice, but rather are the camels hired by those Bedouin who acquired the job from the tour agencies, at their own discretion.

The camel organization in St. Catherine aims to assign a fair number of camel tours to each clan and each family of the respective clan.[254] It can be divided into two forms: that for rides to

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[254] The rotational system of the Jabaliya is based on the 4 clans each of which is composed by 200 to 300 families. Every clan is divided into subclans and these again into extended families. Depending on its size, a clan might get more or less turns in the rotational system, e.g some smaller subclans share a turn, i.e. they only get this turn every second time (i.e. if they share the 4th turn they only get it every 8 times: A, B, C, D, A, B, C, E). In addition, there are strict rules, which sub-

Jabal Musa and that for trekking tours.[255] While the first relies on self regulation, the good will of each individual and collective control the latter is organised by the widely known Shaikh Musa[256] and his son who – as will be shown below – are an outstanding example of Bedouin individuals who successfully adapted to the new systems and regulations that were introduced by the Egyptian government.

According to several respondents, in the past, the job of organising the camels and guides for trekking tours also rotated from clan to clan and family to family and would be assigned for a limited duration of 1-3 months. The person in charge would earn LE 1 for each camel he organised.

According to a Jibaly respondent, Shaikh Musa managed to gain control over this business in the mid-1980s in the following way: During that time the government demanded from the Jabaliya that one person should represent the tribe regarding the mountain trekking so that the government would have a contact person who would also be responsible. So Shaikh Musa, who at that time was the shaikh of the Jabaliya, told the Jabaliya men to sign a paper stating that he was going to run the office for the Jabaliya. The respondent remarked that there were Jabaliya who could not even read this paper and just signed it with their fingerprints. He also claimed that others were paid money in order to persuade them to sign the paper. In the end, the paper stated that the office belonged to Shaikh Musa, in other words Shaikh Musa had obtained a government license to control the mountain trekking business in the mountainous region located on Jabaliya tribal land. While in the beginning, the system was still a little flexible, around the mid 1990s even those who had acquired their own tourists had to register them at the Shaikh Musa Office and pay the respective fee. Today, anybody, Bedouin, Egyptian or foreigner who wants to do a mountain trekking has to proceed through Shaikh Musa office located in Shaikh Musa Camp in one way or another. Shaikh Musa, respectively his son, will then register the tourists with the police. Each group of tourists is charged a fee that consists of three equal shares each for the guide, the camel and the "Shaikh Musa Office."[257] Consequently, one third of all the money that is made with trekking tours in St Catherine goes to Shaikh Musa who has monopolized this business.[258]

Except for those who profit with Shaikh Musa (e.g. members of his family and clan) or those who are powerful enough and have a special arrangement with Shaikh Musa and the authori-

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clan can take another subclan's turn should that other subclan not be able or willing to provide the camels. These rules also regulate how a lost turn will be compensated for and how breakers of the rule are punished. This applies to Jabal Musa camel organisation in particular, since, here, there is no central control over the system. If somebody takes a tour without it being his turn he has to compensate the person whose turn he took. While the respondents stressed the rules of this system, the answers to further questions indicated that the system did not work as well as in the past and that people were disrespecting the rules.

[255] During trekking tours, camels are not used for riding but for transporting food, water and other trekking equipment to the camp site of the next night on a suitable treck, while the tourists walk on more "attractive" paths.

[256] His name can even be found in many guide books on Sinai.

[257] In 2004, the charge per day for a camel and a guide was LE 45 for the camel, LE 45 for the guide and LE 45 for the office of Shaikh Musa.

[258] Moreover, it has been reported that Shaikh Musa sometimes charges the tourist per person rather than per group which makes him profit even more: the guide and the camel for one tourist group are each paid LE 45, but Shaikh Musa charges LE 45 for each tourist in the group and keeps the extra profit for himself.

ties to do their own business,[259] most Jabaliya are very unhappy about this system. A respondent reported that due to the "Shaikh Musa system" it had become more difficult to convince tourists to do mountain trekking because of the extra charge for the agency. He thought that tourists from Nuwaiba and Dahab would prefer to stay there and do a desert safari instead. According to him, many guides from St. Catherine rather than taking tourists to the mountains would avoid all the hassle with the "Shaikh Musa Office" and the secret police and just take the tourists to the desert. This way they could also freely decide when to go (without waiting for one's turn) and how much they would charge the tourists. When asked why people accepted the system and did not try to change it, the respondents replied that Shaikh Musa had gotten so rich and powerful, that he did easily bribe the authorities as well as fellow tribesmen to stop any opposition or competitors. The following two quotes reflect most Jabaliya Be-douin's opinion on Shaikh Musa:

> "Now, Shaikh Musa has become so rich, that when anybody tries to make an office for trekking tours to the mountains, Shaikh Musa will talk to the tourism police and the other authorities and bribe them so that under all sorts of pretexts they would not allow the new office to be established. But actually it should be an office for the Jabaliya and the money earned should be for the Jabaliya in need, for those who are sick, in jail, widowed or of old age." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 30)

> "Since about 7-8 years ago, guides need to pay the camel shaikh, especially Shaikh Musa. Musa would make a huge problem if somebody else tried to open an office. The people cannot find a solution because he works with the secret police and the tourists have to show their passports. Shaikh Musa is really a problem; there are always problems with him. With other camel shaikhs there are no problems, it is enough to take a guide from their tribe." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 29)

This section has shown that a minority of the Bedouin has profited overproportionally from the developments of the last 20 years and suffers much less from marginalization than the great majority. Within this minority there are a few individuals who have become outstandingly rich and powerful. This minority to a lesser and these few individuals to a higher degree are characterized by one or more of the following points:

- A general shrewdness combined with a talent to discover and realize business opportunities, quickly understand and adapt to new developments as well as to work around the Egyptian bureaucracy,

- a position of power, particularly the position of the shaikh,

- land ownership,

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[259] Such as the biggest competitor of Shaikh Musa in St. Catherine, a very shrewed businessman who knows how to deal with people and find his way through the system of power, clientalism and patronage.

-   a good knowledge of English and possibly other foreign languages and consequently direct contact with tourists and foreign travel agencies,

-   close contact with Egyptian agencies,

-   income from the drug business or sale of land to invest in other projects.[260]

In the future, these successful individuals will probably be able to use their wealth in order to strengthen their position in society as well as vis-à-vis the Egyptian authorities. This in turn will help them to be even more successful in their businesses and consequently become much richer and more powerful. Especially those who still own land and have titles to it, will profit from an advancing tourism development and increase in land prices. However, while there might be some trickle down effect especially within the family networks, the majority of the Bedouin who own very little will be increasingly excluded due to a lack of resources as well as due to active hindrances such as the government regulations described above.

This chapter was a discussion of the main processes of marginalization of the Bedouin: the loss of control over land, the barriers to market entry, the discrimination by the government. The following chapter will analyse which livelihood strategies the Bedouin have developed and how they cope with the ongoing marginalization.

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[260] This is an allegation that is difficult to prove but very likely in some cases.

8. Livelihood Strategies

After having presented the general context, the available livelihood resources and the institutional processes and conflicts, this chapter is an examination of the livelihood strategies the Bedouin have developed in order to make a living given the prevailing situation.

First, Bedouin lifestyle and preferences that form the foundation for the development of livelihood strategies will be presented.

Second, Bedouin areas of economic engagement and Bedouin strategies of combining several income generating activities or of flexibly moving between and from one activity to the next will be explained. This also includes activities outside the tourism sector such as general trading or selling, construction work, livestock raising, fishing or the cultivation and trade of narcotics.

Third, Bedouin individual and collective coping strategies in response to variations in tourism demand that result from external conflicts as well as in response to marginalization will be analyzed. Finally, the hindrances to collective action will be discussed.

8.1 Bedouin Lifestyle and Preferences

The Bedouin have a set of preferences and values that is quite different from that of the Egyptian fellahin or other sedentarized peoples. The preferences and values that will now be presented have been repeatedly mentioned in the interviews without the researcher having specifically asked for this information:[261] These ideas are held by a majority of the Bedouin albeit in varying degrees. Nevertheless, the statements might also reflect idealization

The majority of the Bedouin dislike being tied up in one place, having to work under a boss and with fixed working hours and will avoid this kind of situation if possible. This becomes clear from the following statements:

> "I love my freedom. Even for LE 10,000 I would not work under a boss and from 8 a.m. to 4 p.m." (Desert settlement Ras Abu Galum, Mzaina, male, 37)

> "Bedouin do not work in the hotels, only Egyptians. Although Egyptians and Bedouin might not like each other, most importantly the Bedouin do not want to be imprisoned in one location but want to be free. Freedom is more important than money." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 34)

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[261] In discussions with colleagues, the researcher has been accused of romanticizing the Bedouin in their love for nature and freedom and the relatively little importance they attach to monetary income. However, while on the one hand, life is quickly changing and money is gaining significance and on the other hand, the possibility exists that the Bedouin in connection with and response to the tourists have developed and are holding up a romanticized image of themselves, the researcher herself remained as objective as possible. The points mentioned as part of "Bedouin lifestyle and preferences" have all been repeatedly stated by Bedouin from the entire study area and of all ages. Lancaster (1997) has reported similar findings regarding the Rwala Bedouin's attitude towards money and goods, for instance: "A herding family once asked me to a lunch that consisted of coffee and camel's milk. They had nothing else and hadn't had anything else for over three months. They did not feel hard-done-by or poor, nor were they particularly short of cash. They could quite easily have gone to the nearest market (about two hours' drive) and bought food and new clothes, but they didn't. This wasn't meanness or laziness or apathy, they found camel's milk and coffee quite adequate for the time being and that was all." (Lancaster 1997:99)

> "For us, the Bedu there is no being settled in one place, we do not like that, we rather love to constantly change our location and our work, too, and to be free." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin from North Sinai, male, 24)

It has been reported by several entrepreneurs that Bedouin would often just work until having earned enough money to survive for some time, only if that money was used up, would they return to work. A European owner of a diving centre, for instance, reported how a Bedouin who had worked for him as a driver in the morning and had received his pay of LE 40 refused to work again in the afternoon, since he preferred to sleep. And another European owner of a diving centre has repeatedly had Bedouin staff that would not show up for two week after having received their monthly salary. Most Bedouin entrepreneurs, too, have Egyptian rather than Bedouin staff, because most Bedouin were not interested in such jobs due to the fixed working hours, the working under a boss and the low salary.

Moreover, Bedouin give much importance to having a good relationship with the people they work with. All Bedouin feel strongly attached to the desert, where they experience freedom and tranquility and the beauty of the night sky. This feeling is expressed in the following statements:

> "I moved back to the desert, because I did not like Nuwaiba, too crowded, to much noise. Here it is better, there is complete freedom. One time, you can have your place here and the next time there. During winter you can have your place near the rocks, because there it is not so cold. And you have tranquility, not so many people, the stars … the Egyptians live locked in their apartments, they die in them. But we are free, one time here, one time there." (Desert Settlement, Wadi Disco, Mzaina, 30)

> "There will always be Bedouin in the desert. And I and many others have to go to the desert at least once a year for a period of time, because there you can find tranquility and concentration. All of us still have relatives in the desert." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

> "In the town you need electricity, because there is so much light in the town that you cannot see the stars anymore. And every Bedouin likes to see the stars and the moon. And therefore you need electricity, to do other things, watch TV, …" (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 26)

> "We are used to this life, the stars, the mountains, the calmness. The town is something new for us, a different world. When there is noise it is difficult for us, maybe we won't even be able to sleep. But some people cannot leave the town again, because of the school for their children. And some because of the TV, the women and children want the TV. And because of the sea. And when they got used to the place, then that is it." (Desert settlement Samghi, Mzaina, male, 45)

> "I would never leave the desert, because in the desert it is better. And I have my job with the mahmiya [protectorate], I am in nature and I can look after

> the environmental centre. But I hope that we will get a teacher so that life
> will get better." (Desert settlement Wadi Nasb, Jabaliya, male, 43)

The Bedouin's love for the desert and their traditional life has also been reported by a European who has been living in Sinai for almost 30 years. He believes:

> "The Bedouin prefer their freedom over a permanent job. […] They do not
> depend on tourism and can reduce back to self-sufficiency. Tourism just
> means more monetary income. When the Bedouin become really rich they
> continue to live their traditional way and do not suddenly start to buy all
> sorts of luxuries. Some have become Euro-Millionaires from the sale of
> land, but they still do not live in villas and drive a Mercedes. I even know
> Bedouin who have moved from Dahab back to the desert, just because it
> got too crowded for their taste." (Dahab, migrant from Europe, male, 43)

While money is obviously important it can be foregone in order to follow these preferences.[262] In addition to the love for independence, many Bedouin focus on today while neglecting the planning and working for the future, such as this respondent from St. Catherine:

> "I do only think of today, not of tomorrow. I do not have any plans for the future. I just love the desert and the tranquility. I also do not go to the desert
> with Fulan [name changed, Bedouin safari organizer from St. Catherine] because of the money, but to have fun and because he is my friend, without
> taking anything in return for it." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 47)

Several Bedouin respondents have identified this as one of the biggest problems of the Bedouin:

> "Another problem of the Bedu is that there is no concentration [thinking].
> When one has surplus money, one does not plan properly, but buys a car,
> even for LE 100,000 and after that has to borrow money for the gasoline.
> But we do not think of long-term projects that bring money." (St. Catherine,
> Jabaliya, male, 21)

On the other hand, some respondents stated that the Bedouin could easily live of very little or even autarkic if they needed to. And some, especially elder Bedouin consciously choose to live that way, such as an old man from Nuwaiba Tarabin who told the researcher:

> "I have a camel. If the camel earns lots of money, that's good. If the camel
> earns little money, that's good. It is better than a jeep: one can enjoy, can
> stop at any time … Now I have a house and electricity. But I don't want electricity, I don't want a TV, I don't want a phone. And I prefer to sleep outside
> the house in the court where I can see the stars and the moon. When I am
> inside I cannot sleep." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 55)

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[262] Sometimes, the choice a Bedouin had made was better both in terms of money and his other preferences. However, money would often not be mentioned as a reason.

One important factor in Bedouin's choices of livelihood strategies is their relationship with the Egyptians.[263] Many Bedouin feel a big mistrust towards Egyptians and therefore avoid any close contact including business contacts.

> "I would never work with an Egyptian, because the Egyptians are not like the Bedu. They can shout at you and insult you, and that is a big thing for us, very bad. But for the Egyptians it is normal." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 28)

> "The Egyptians talk a lot, but they are not honest and do not respect the people." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 24)

> "There is respect[264], but the Egyptians think that the Bedouin are stupid and don't understand anything and the Bedouin think the same of the Egyptian. They have a different mind. It does not go together." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 55)

In summary, all Bedouin would state that they prefer to live freely and independently. However, the question arises whether traditional Bedouin life was really so ideal or whether the freedom and independence were at the same time restricted by poverty and economic hardship. In the author's view it is likely that the Bedouin idealize their past in order to escape from the challenges of their rapidly changing environment. Moreover, with modernization, needs and desires have been created that are often in opposition to the Bedouin's ideals. While all Bedouin try to find a balance between the modern and the traditional life, each individual takes his own decision between the traditional values and preferences and the desire for having one's place in the newly developing society, sending one's children to school and enjoying the comforts of modernization. Given the fact that the majority of the Bedouin now live in the urban centers one can conclude that the new needs often outweigh the ideals of freedom and independence.

Consequently, no generalizations can be made in how far these preferences influence Bedouin economic activities. The possible outcomes range from individuals who are very ambitious and have great goals to those who prefer to live a calm life in the desert and are satisfied with the little they have. And of course, individual differences in capabilities also play a role.

8.2 Bedouin Income Generation Strategies

Chapter 6 gave an overview of the Bedouin's livelihood resources. Which of these resources can be employed for an activity in tourism, which resources are lacking and how can the existing resources be employed given the problems and restrictions discussed in chapter 7?

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[263] No opinions of Egyptians about the Bedouin were systematically collected during this research. However, a widespread prejudice among the Egyptian about the Bedouin is, that the Bedouin are all drug dealers and that the Bedouin of South Sinai are collaborators with Israel.

[264] This introduction can be interpreted as a first, polite part of the answer to the researcher's question whether the Egyptians respected the Bedouin.

8.2.1 Engagement in Tourism and Other Income Generation Activities

Chapter 6 on the livelihood resources has revealed that the general endowment with capital among the Bedouin is clearly suitable for an engagement in the low budget tourism segment and especially so in safari tourism, simple accommodation and catering as well as transport services. Moreover, the Bedouin have a unique selling proposition: their "simple, romantic life under the desert sky"[265] of which they let their tourist guests have a taste and which many of them know to market very well. So it is not surprising that most Bedouin are engaged in the informal or semi-formal tourism sector. In most cases they are self-employed, albeit with varying levels of dependence and networking, or earn rent income in the following areas:

- safari (guide, camel owner, camel "shaikh"),

- taxi and transport service (especially for diving centers),

- ownership of land, tents, camps, bazaars, (mobile) coffee-shops and kiosks, supermarkets,

- fishing,

- sweet water supply,

- production and/or sale of artisanal souvenirs and typical products of Sinai.

A few Bedouin also find employment in their fellow tribesmen's businesses, as drivers for diving centers or the large safari agencies, and especially in St. Catherine as employees of the monastery or the government. Only very rarely are Bedouin employed in Egyptian businesses because of their reservations regarding Egyptians in combination with and a dislike for the combination of low income, fixed working hours and the need of being subservient to somebody where mutual respect is lacking. Moreover, Egyptian businessmen are also often reluctant to employ Bedouin mostly due to their prejudices rather than bad experiences with Bedouin employees in the past.

Typically, the Bedouin boys start becoming active in tourism between the age of 8 and 15. Often they go to school and spend their free time and the holidays either selling souvenirs, as camel guides or fishermen. When they have gained a little more experience or have grown older, these boys might take up other work, such as helping out in camps, shops and kiosks, driving a relative's jeep or taxi or walking as a desert or mountain guide. Often the father or an uncle will provide a young man with a camel or a car or let him work in his tourism establishment, where the young men will earn 30-50 percent of the profit. In Dahab, the diving centers offer good opportunities to young Bedouin who find employment as helpers or "compressor boys".[266] Over time, many get the chance to learn how to dive and to take the dive master exam, which allows them better job and income opportunities. Eventually most young Bedouin will have saved enough money with their activities that they can make their first investment, for instance in a camel, a car, a small and simple camp or a Bedouin tent. Some of them were more clever and successful than the average and overtime managed to invest in ever larger

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[265] Not everybody views Bedouin life as romantic so that this factor won't attract all tourists. But it attracts tourists who look for one of the following: adventure and nature tourism, spiritual or esoteric desert experiences, "ethnic" tourism, etc.

[266] Compressor boys take care of the diving equipment and especially refilling the diving tanks with oxygen.

projects even building hotels or owning several tank lorries or heavy construction machines. Others always remained contractual laborers (see chapter 7.4 on social differentiation).

Girls and women of all ages and in all locations often produce beadwork handicrafts such as little bracelets, key holders, embroided scarves or bags which they sell to tourists visiting their homes or going on safari with their male relatives. Young girls and elder women also actively offer their produce to tourists at the beach or other main points of touristic interest such as the viewpoint onto Wadi Ghazala on the road from the Eastern coast to St. Catherine (see Map 3) as well as at their homes to visiting tourists. However, any general description as above will be very limited, because

- there are local variations,

- most Bedouin have no fixed career development,

- most Bedouin do very flexibly change between jobs and business opportunities,

- Bedouin often carry out several jobs or businesses at the same time.

Consequently, for the reader to get a better idea of Bedouin's economic activities and "career development", some employment and entrepreneur histories will be sketched below to show the wide range of possible income situations that result from varying living conditions as well as personal choices and capabilities. In addition Pictures 21-26 will give a visual impression.

Young man who found a compromise between making an income from tourism business and living a tranquil life in the desert

> "During the summer holidays of 1994 my family spent three months in the laguna to fish and have fun. We used to go there from Bir Saghair every summer. My uncle and my grandfather used to live in the laguna and their houses are still there.[267]

> We lived in our Bedouin tent. A few Israeli tourists came and ate with us. The tourists paid for the food. And that gave me the idea to open a cafeteria. After I finished school in 1996 I worked as compressor boy in one of the diving centers in Dahab for one year. But I only worked for money, I did not like it, there were too many people. After that I spent two years at the lagoon with my family. Then my family left to Ras Abu Galum because there were other families and shops, etc. When they left I started to build up everything, that was in 1999 – one year before the Intifada. With the help of my brother I built three khushas and the cafeteria, slowly, slowly, shwiya, shwiya." (Desert settlement, Laguna North of Ras Abu Galum, Mzaina, male, 23)

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[267] Bedouin often make reference to their forefathers who used to stay at a certain place in order to stress their claim for the land. However, it is hard to prove whether this is really true. Nevertheless, these areas obviously belonged to the tribal land.

Foto 20: Safari business

Foto 23: Cafeteria and camp

Foto 21: Selling souvenirs and camel rides at the edge of a hotel ground

Foto 24: Bedouin drivers and children selling beadwork at Blue Hole diving site

Foto 22: Kiosk on Mount Sinai

Foto 25: Women selling beadwork

Steady development and increase of assets and income

"When I was a boy, my uncle had had three female and two male camels. He would give me one to work with and I could keep 50 % of the profit. I would do 2-3 day safaris in the mountains with tourists that I met at the beach or over a friend. When I was 15 [1985], I bought a camel and worked with it, after some time I bought a second one. Around 1988 I sold both camels and bought a jeep and started jeep safaris. That was very good business, I could earn LE 1,000-3,000 for a 5-day safari. Then I sold the jeep and bought a better jeep. In 1996 I bought two taxis, it is better business and makes more money and I meet Bedu at all places. My friend now works with my jeep and gives me 50 % of the income." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

Co-operation with a European investor

"I was a fisherman in Dahab and in Sharm: I sold the fish to fishmongers who then sold it to the hotels. Then two brothers and I opened a shop to rent out snorkeling equipment. We would make LE 50-100 profit per day, that is LE 1,500-3,000 per month. My brothers owned the land where we built the shop. And we started small with five masks, and then the business grew slowly. We did this for five years. Then we met two German men who wanted to open a diving centre. So we came to an agreement: We provided the land and they made the project. My two brothers and I get 60 % of the profits[268] according to our share of the land." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

A divorced women's daily struggle and livelihood development

"My husband divorced me. He is not liked by the people and lives all by himself in Sharm with his new wife. After that I had to see how I could live. I had my goats. I also go and sell bracelets at the beach. One summer I worked in the olive yard but the Egyptians cheated us Bedouin women and we were paid much less than the Egyptian workers, so I did not work there anymore. Step by step I built my house here in Mzaina. I want to improve it further. My sons also help me." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, female, 55)

A livelihood development interrupted by a prison sentence

"When I was a boy I went to school and did small jobs that came up. Just like today. The six years from 1991 to 1997 I spent either in the army or in prison. In 1991 when I was in the army in Suez I had an accident with an army car. Then I had to go to prison for 6 months because I was guilty and had no money to repair that army car. I never tried to get a lawyer because I had no money. In prison I took drugs with my friends. 10 days after I was re-

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[268] The German partner told the researcher that the Bedouin brothers were given 30 % of the profit which was around LE 4000 / month in 2004.

leased I took some drugs to my ex-inmates. Then they caught me and put me in prison again for another year. When I got out of the prison I had to start the army from scratch so that in total I spent 6 years and 4 months. During this time my parents helped me financially, but basically I lost 6 important years to build a future. Now I do various jobs, whatever I can get: two times per week I work as cook and guide for a Bedouin safari business owner in Ain Khudra and get LE 120 per trip. Else I work as a camel guide with somebody's camel to Jabal Musa or Wadi Al-Jibaal and keep 50 % of the profit. Sometimes, if there is work, I construct houses for the Bedu, then I get LE 20 per day." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 35)

A very successful business man

"My first job was with an Israeli company in a petroleum factory. Later I bought a taxi and drove between Al-Tur and Suez. In 1986 I sold the taxi and bought a truck to transport sand, and stones, etc… I sold the truck in 1991. In 1990 I bought a cafeteria in St. Catherine which I am now renting to somebody. Then, in 1993, I bought one third of the land where you find Fayrouz camp today from two Mzaini brothers and I built the camp. The two brothers own two thirds of it and we employ two Egyptians to run it. In 1994 I rented NUR supermarket from a Mzaini Bedu with a 99 year contract at a fixed rent of LE 500 per month. But I sold it to my brother in 2000 or 2001. In 1996 I bought Caravan camp together with a partner from Port Said, but later bought his share, too. The ground of the camp belongs to a Mzaini who rented it out for LE 300 per month for 99 years. In 2000 I sold the Caravan camp to my son. From the money I got from selling the supermarket and the camp, I bought land behind the police checkpoint on the way to the Blue Hole and together with my partner, I started building Happy Beach Hotel." (Dahab, Awlad Said from Al-Tur, male, 45)

Changing jobs in Dahab

"At the age of 8 we left our place in the mountains located about 4 km from Dahab to live in Dahab. From my childhood I used to go and fish in Nabq. I would sell the big fish to the tourist restaurants at the beach in Dahab and the small fish to the supermarkets in Al-Asala. Later I would go with a fridge in my car and would bring 50-60 kg fish after four or five days, sometimes he would also catch 150 kg fish in the same period of time. In the past I have also gone on 1-2 day safaris with the camel of my Dad. And I have worked at various camps. Before the Iraq war I worked in Nesima for 6 months and now I work in Dahab Divers Lodge." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

From selling stones to owning a shop

"When I was 7 [1978] I started to live in the monastery with my father who had been working there since 1952. In would only spend one day a week at

home. When I was 9 years old, I started to sell apples and almonds from our family garden and crystal druses to the tourists who visited the monastery. When I was thirteen I met a guide from the German company STUDIOSUS who spoke very good Arabic. He gave me the advice that it would be better to sell camera films and batteries, so I did that. And it was really better, especially because there was nobody else selling films. Later, when I was 15 or 16, I built a little box and sold biscuits and drinks in front of the monastery during the day. At night I would go up the mountain as a guide. In 1995 I started with my shop in the bazaar at the monastery. The government built the bazaars and said that it would look better. They did not want any street sellers. I have to pay the government LE 150 per month for 15 years, after that the shop belongs to me." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 36)

Slowly building a transport enterprise

"From the age of 15 I accompanied my Dad with his gravel lorry and went up to Al-Arish. Those days everything was different. One could drive to North Sinai without passing a single checkpoint. I actually drove without a license and any papers. But since 1987 or 1989 there are checkpoints everywhere. One cannot enjoy it anymore. In 1989 I bought a jeep, but I also organized bigger tours, for example for an Italian company, there were 2 groups each week with 10 jeeps. But from 1994 onwards the number of safari agencies increased more and more and the Italian company started to make business with agencies in Sharm. So I bought a Taxi and worked with that. And when I had earned more money, around 1995, I bought a minibus and then another minibus in 1999. But I still had to buy them on credit. I have two drivers working with them. It is much better now than the safari, because I am not separated from my family for days. And it also brings more money." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 38)

Living an easy life in Dahab

"First I worked as compressor boy assistant in Club Red. That is owned by a Mzaini. Then I worked as compressor boy for two years, then at the counter for another two years. After that I took the Nissan pickup of my father and started taking the divers from Club Red to Qabr Al Bint from where they would go 5-8 km by camel to reach the diving site. I used to go every day and get LE 100 for the drive and LE 40 for preparing the lunch [4,200 LE/month]. Then in 1999 there was a problem in Club Red and I started working with my father's uncle who owns Kleopatra Camp. I take the guests to the Blue Hole for snorkeling. There I earn LE 70-100 per day, depending on how many people go. Or I take the guests for a Bedouin dinner to the mountains and charge them LE 30 per person. Sometimes I also go on safari with the guests of a French friend who lives here in Dahab. I go about once every 6 weeks. The tourists come in groups of 4 or 5. A safari of 6

days for 4 persons costs LE 4,000. I get 1,000-1,500, the rest is for the jeep, the camels, the food, etc. I organize the whole trip and also go with them as a guide." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 28)

An "old" man who has seen it all

"In 1969 I worked in the petrol factory in Abu Rudais and got 4 Lira per day. But it was ok, because those days the life was not so expensive. I also worked in road construction and flood damage repairs. After that I took jobs in Eilat in restaurants and construction, but that was nothing permanent. Then I became a driver for an Israeli company for the stretch between Nuwaiba and Eilat. In 1982 I worked as a driver for an agency that did landcruiser safaris into the wadis. Those days there were only two agencies in Nuwaiba: Santa Misr and Janub Sina. And the road to St. Catherine had no asphalt. In 1984 a third agency came, Karmina, and bought Janub Sina. And then there were more and more agencies and I would work where the conditions were best. In 1996 Mina Tours owed me LE 1,650, because the manager of the agency office kept the wages and disappeared. This used to happen a lot in those days. But not so today, the people complain and there is the government. Those days I would get LE 300 per month, but the additional tips were more important. Today you earn LE 700-1,000 per month from the transport company that owns the car plus LE 40-50 per day from the agency that rents the car for safaris that are nor organized by the transport company." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 52)

An old, well-connected Bedouin in the middle of the desert

"Before 1967 I worked as trader to Cairo for camel and goat food. During the Israeli occupation I worked in factories in Eilat and north of Eilat. After 1982 I was unemployed, but in 1987 I met two French men in Cairo when we were all just resting somewhere. The French men went with me to Sinai the next day and since then we do business together [apparently the two French men work for a big travel agency in Paris]. Then I got very known, also in guidebooks. I also work with other agencies, for instance a German Caravan agency. I do safaris all over Egypt and even to Northern Sudan with camels and jeep. I have even gone to Paris to pick up a group of tourists because there was no guide to go with them at the time." (Desert settlement, Shigarat, Mzaina, male, 70)

Owner of a beautiful green garden in a desert settlement where tourists can rest

"I used to make safaris, but then there were more and more guides I stopped and worked in my garden and now I am offering bread and tea in my garden to the tourists who pass with the agency cars." (Desert settlement, Bir Saghair, Mzaina, male, 50)

Is he making a livelihood from the drug business?

> "I was born in St. Catherine. I came to Nasb at the age of 6 because my
> mother is from here. My father worked with the Israelis in 1973. Those days
> there were many Israelis, also in Nasb and they made Jeep tours from St.
> Catherine to Sharm, Dahab or Eilat. In 1980 there were no more tourists,
> only the military. Then after that, tourism slowly increased again, they came
> from Israel and Europe. 3 km from my place there was the Israeli-Egyptian
> border, so from 1985 to 1990 no tourists were allowed, but since 1990 it has
> been good again, they come here and go to Um Shuma mountain, to
> Sharm, etc. I also used to work as a carpenter in Israel and St. Catherine.
> From 1994 to 1996 I would work for 2 weeks in St. Catherine as a guide to
> Jabal Musa and then come back to Nasb." (Desert settlement, Wadi Nasb,
> male, 42)[269]

As these examples show very clearly, there is a wide range of activities, there are many differ-
ent ways of slowly building up one's economic existence and different economic activities are
often combined. Most Bedouin have a strong love for freedom and independence, rather than
taking on an employment, they will look for occasional jobs and ideally get a rent income from
a camel, a car or a tourism establishment – permanent employment is a rare exception. Many
Bedouin's strategy is to accumulate enough capital over time to improve one's income, i.e. by
going on safari with a jeep rather than a camel, by buying a minibus rather than a taxi, by buy-
ing a Bedouin tent and taking tourists to the mountains for Bedouin dinner rather than working
as a guide for somebody else. However, while having this aim in mind, most Bedouin will be
very relaxed about achieving it and their business or work decisions are influenced by other
factors that can be summarized as "Bedouin lifestyle and preferences" that have been dis-
cussed in section 8.1.

8.2.2 Income from the Drug Business

One source of income that, except by two respondents, was never mentioned as one's own
source of income is the cultivation of or the dealing with drugs. The drug issue plays an im-
portant role regarding the Egyptian public's and the Egyptian government's opinion of the
Bedouin and consequently in their marginalization (see chapter 7.3). Due to the issue's signifi-
cance an extra section is dedicated to shed more light on the problem and the role of the drug
business in Bedouin livelihood strategies.

Although reports of the Egyptian government about the extent of drug cultivation by Bedouin in
Sinai is greatly exaggerated (see Hobbs, 1998), it cannot be denied, that Marihuana and Opi-
um are being grown in South Sinai. In fact, the cultivation and trafficking of drugs seems to be
an important source of income, especially for the desert population. Of those respondents who
willingly gave an estimate about the percentage of Bedouin who cultivate drugs, the following

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[269] Another Bedouin who accompanied the researcher on her trip to Nasb reported that this respondent was actually growing
drugs. Given that he did not report any actual source of income except for occasional safaris, this is likely to be true.

general figures were obtained: Between 25-40 % of those living in towns and 60-90 % of those living in the desert are involved in the drug business.

In Dahab, respondents estimated that only 3-10 % of the Bedouin were involved in the drug business. Bedouin in other locations thought that as much as 50-75 % may sporadically be involved in drug dealing as a complementary source of income. In the past, the percentage of those involved in the drug business used to be much higher and drugs were available in every camp. However, since about 1998 the government is destroying marihuana and opium fields by helicopter and has taken strict measures against drug dealers and consumers, especially in Dahab that is developing into a mainstream tourism destination.

The main reason for an engagement in the drug business is reportedly a lack of alternative sources of income. The respondents further reasoned that given the hard work in solitary conditions as well as the harsh punishment of 3-10 years in prison for being caught with drugs and the relatively average income if compared to other economic activities, only somebody in need would engage in the drug business. This view is reflected in the following quotes:

> "People only grow drugs since Israel left, because before that there was good income and low prices, now it is the contrary. Also, before drugs were not forbidden and were available everywhere. But only poor people do this who have no other income, because who else would sit alone in the mountain for six months?" (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 34)

> „Of course drugs are cultivated in the mountains/desert. From what else should people live? During the Israeli time there was no drug cultivation, because there was lots of work: safaris, cleaning the beach, construction in Eilat, etc. Before Israel, there was also no drug cultivation. Only a few smugglers, who smuggled hashish from Jordan. The people in the mountains used to grow tomatoes, melons, figs, dates, eggplants, zucchini. The drug cultivation has only started with the Egyptians, because since then there has been no more work. In Sharm there are all the agencies who do safaris for the tourists and they have Egyptian drivers and guides and only very few Bedouin drivers. Now, may be only 2-3 % of the tourists go on safari with the Bedouin and there is only little work for the camels and the jeeps." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 45)

The majority of those Bedouin who talked about the issue, claimed that drug cultivation in South Sinai had only started after Egypt regained power, as a result of a lack of alternative sources of income for those who could not engage in tourism. One respondent explained, that another reason was, that many young Bedouin fled from the conscription by the army to the mountains where the only way to survive was to cultivate drugs. This argument, that drug cultivation in South Sinai as a relatively widespread economic activity is a relatively young phenomenon, was supported by a European who has been living in South Sinai for more than 25 years. He explained that marihuana grown in South Sinai could never have competed with the cheap Lebanese hashish that was smuggled into Sinai during the civil war in Lebanon. And although according to the literature (Marx 1984) the smuggling (but not the cultivation) of

drugs through Sinai had existed even before the Israeli occupation, this was restricted to a small elite.

While the majority thought that poverty and a lack of alternatives forced people to engage in the drug business, some respondents also considered the desire for quick money[270] as a motive. A Bedouin from Northern Sinai claimed that the really rich Bedouin in Dahab had earned their money from drugs rather than from tourism. It has also been reported that there are some rich Bedouin investors who either employ others to grow and harvest the drugs on their fields or provide the tubes, pumps and other equipment in exchange for 30 % of the profit. The actual trafficking seems to be in the hands of only a few individuals, who are not necessarily from South Sinai. Several respondents have also accused the police of playing some role in the drug business. Rumors make the round that the police would destroy one field and photograph it in order to present a success to the government which in turn can present better figures to the UNDP drug control programme and receive more funds for the equipment and training of the police and then leave the neighboring fields untouched in exchange for a proper bribe.

One important aspect of the drug business is that apparently a significant share[271] of the male Bedouin population take marihuana and/or opium, some are even addicted. As a result, these individual's level of engagement and activity that would be required for a competitive participation in the tourism industry is reduced.[272]

8.2.3 Bedouin Coping Strategies in Response to a Decrease in Touristic Demand

As described in chapter 5.4.6, conflicts such as the Intifada, the war against Iraq or terrorist attacks in South Sinai have led to a sharp decline in tourists and subsequently in income. As a result, many tourism businesses and households were under severe strain. The question arises how this affected the Bedouin livelihoods and which strategies were applied to cope with the situation both at the business as well as the household level.

At the business level, establishments, both Bedouin and Egyptian, such as camps, restaurants or diving centers had to dismiss workers or shut down completely and any planned investements such as repairs, improvements or expansions to the buildings or equipment had to be postponed. Some establishments tried to find a new clientele, such as a 3*-hotel that aimed to gain more Egyptian guest by marketing in Cairo. During and after political conflicts such as the terror attacks of 11th September 2001 or the American war against Iraq in 2003, the large tourism companies offered very cheap package holidays to Sinai to increase demand and new markets were opened in Eastern Europe, too. This brought a new kind of clientele to South Sinai who according to the respondents was much less willing to consume anything that was

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[270] This might at first be considered a contradiction to the statement that Bedouin do not give as much importance to money as to other values. However, growing drugs is not opposed to the values of living in the desert, in freedom and far from the noise and problems of life in town.

[271] No figures are available, however, several Bedouin as well as European migrant respondents mentioned this as serious problem.

[272] A European migrant, for instance, reported how his Bedouin friends who own a camp were too stoned to clean up their part of the beach and make it comfortable when the first Israeli tourists arrived in spring 2003 after three years of still stand due to the Intifada.

not included in their package. Souvenir bazaars, shops and kiosks reacted by including cheaper products in their supply, offering reductions and sometimes the opposite: by charging higher prices in order to compensate the reduced sales.

However, since most Bedouin are either self-employed or run very small businesses and usually find themselves at the bottom of the market chain, there was very little scope to react to the situation at the business level but the effects would be felt directly in the households. Consequently, strategies had to be employed at the household level, these were:

Postponing of planned investment and large consumption

The first response to reduced income was that no new savings could be made. Consequently, mostly younger Bedouin who had not yet established themselves and still lived with their parents would postpone any planned investments such as building or completing a house and getting married.

Reducing the expenditure on daily consumption

Reducing the expenditure on daily consumption is a very common strategy especially among the Bedouin with lower income. The purchase of goods such as new clothes, shoes, etc. is restricted. Also, the consumption of more expensive food such as meat or canned food are reduced. As one respondent put it:

> "Pull your legs according to the size of your blanket." (St. Catherine, Jabaliya, male, 44)

A Turbani from Ras Sudr who lived in Dahab before and partly during the Gulf War 1991 reported how the Bedouin lived during that time when tourism had come to a standstill:

> "All the Egyptians left to Egypt and the Bedouin started to live the natural way, no money, only fishing. But in 1990 the rain was good and the land was getting healthy and the camels and goats were eating and there was lots of milk and cheese. And people in the mountains, like in Wadi Feiran, were even growing wheat and exchanged it for dried fish from the coast. God helped us because there was no tourism but there were good rains. During that time the people here at the coast were eating fish and rice every day. The rice was very cheap then: LE 50 for 100 kg, that means 1 kg cost 50-75 piasters. But now it costs LE 2.5. The Bedouin bought the rice from their savings. They had saved a lot of money, because before the war, there were a lot of Israeli tourists and everybody was making money. Even the women were making Bedouin bread for sale and the children were selling bracelets." (Dahab, Tarabin, male, 32)

Using up savings

When the income had decreased so much, that the reduction could not be compensated by cutback of expenditure, those lucky ones who had savings had to start using them up. No information about the actual sums of savings or spent savings could be obtained.

Taking up credit from relatives, friends or shops

Further deterioration forced many of the poorer Bedouin to ask their relatives or friends for credit to cover their daily needs or any unforeseen expenditure such as a medical bill. Another common way out, was to buy food and other items on credit in the shops (this was reported about shops owned by Bedouin).

Sale of assets

The sale of assets, such as goats or even land, in order to obtain financial resources was another form of dis-saving and usually a last resort for those who owned any assets. However, during times of crisis, it could prove difficult to find a buyer. One respondent from Nuwaiba Tarabin, for instance, reported that because of the Intifada he had to sell 10 goats for half the price he would usually get. Moreover, if not in a crisis, he would only sell some of the young goats if at all. Another respondent from St. Catherine said that at the beginning of the Intifada in 2000 the situation was so bad that they did not even find anybody to buy their goat. Because of the consequences of the Gulf War in 1991 many Bedouin in Dahab were forced to sell their land (7.1 on the loss of land). And a Bedouin woman from Nuwaiba Tarabin told the researcher that prior to the Intifada the Bedouin would try to keep the land in Bedouin hands by buying Bedouin land that was for sale before outsiders could buy it. However, because of the Second Intifada, people were so short of resources that nobody could buy the land and it would be sold to Egyptian migrants.

Looking for alternative sources of income outside the tourism sector (investment or employment)

As a result of the ongoing Intifada, some Bedouin looked for alternatives. An employment with the government was regarded as a good insurance and complementary income by Bedouin in St. Catherine. However, only few were lucky to get such a job.

Some clever Bedouin reacted by pulling out their capital from tourism and investing it in other projects. A Turbani from Nuwaiba, for instance, sold his jeep in 2001 because there were too few tourists due to the Intifada. Instead he opened a little shop for the Bedouin in the village. When in May 2003 tourists started coming again, he bought a camel to start safaris again. If even more tourists came, he planned to buy another camel and then a jeep. Another example is a Mzaini from Nuwaiba who bought two tank lorries to transport sweet water from wells in the mountains to large hotels at the coast that according to him always demanded water even in times of crisis.[273]

For quite a few Bedouin, living from the natural resources that South Sinai can provide, either for subsistence or to earn income, is the only economic alternative during times of crisis. In Dahab and Nuwaiba, especially fishing, which requires no time for the cultivation of plants or

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[273] The respondent reported that although the cost of investment for a tank lorry was 3-4 times that of a taxi it was much better business, because water was always needed, not only from tourism. Moreover, hotel package tourism was doing better than Israeli individual tourism. And while taxis in Nuwaiba were only there for the Israelis and consequently earned no money, hotel tourism needed huge amounts of water. The other disadvantage of a taxi was that it needed a license that was only valid for a certain area while the tank lorry could work anywhere.

the raising of animals, is an activity carried out more frequently and intensively during times of crisis.

One 55-year old man in Nuwaiba reported that when there were no tourists he would go to the desert with his camel for 7-10 days to produce 5-6 sacks of charcoal that he would then sell. He said that there were only few trees left and that one had to go further and further because when there were no tourists many people would go to make charcoal. However, when tourism was going well, then they would leave the trees and only take dead wood. Since the production of charcoal was one of the main sources of income in the past and no other respondent reported this income substitution, one can assume that only the elders might resort to this strategy of earning a livelihood.

The cultivation and the trade in drugs, especially marihuana and opium, also seems to be an alternative or at least a complementary source of income during times of crisis in the tourism industry, when more individuals seem to consider or decide to engage in the drug business.[274] One respondent told the researcher in spring 2003 that he estimated that 30 % of the Jabaliya were growing drugs in the high gardens and that if tourism continued to be so bad it would soon increase to 50 % or even more. He added that it was fast money and one could get a nice house or a car in six months. A Bedouin from the desert who made his living from drug cultivation reported that after the Intifada more people in the desert had started growing drugs. He estimated that before the Intifada 70 % but after the Intifada 90 % of the desert population were engaged in drug cultivation. He added, though, that there was a problem due to drought and lack of water: while in rainy years of the past one could earn LE 10,000 from a harvest, one could now only expect LE 2,000 – a sum on which he commented:

> "It is not enough for anything. And somebody who took a credit from some-
> body to invest in tubes and pumps and the like to grow drugs cannot pay it
> back." (Desert settlement, Awlad Said, male, 24)

Migration

Some Bedouin migrated to places where the tourism industry was not hit as badly as in their home areas. Some Bedouin from St. Catherine or Nuwaiba, for instance, went to Sharm al-Shaikh to look for work. However, this required either good skills and/or good contacts: one of the respondents had become a very good dive master and knew the owner of a dive centre in Sharm al-Shaikh where he found work. Nonetheless, while most Bedouin are very flexible within the area of their tribal and family networks, the majority does not seem to move outside this setting.

From the above strategies, all but the last two are short-term coping strategies where people react to the situation and try to survive. However, should another problem of the same kind arise again, they will not be prepared any better to deal with it. Only the last two points, i.e. migration or looking for alternative sources of income can be considered adaptive strategies. In this case, the affected individual is actively trying to adapt to the new situation by finding

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[274] The same is likely to be true for all other smuggling activities, such as the smuggling of Russian prostitutes into Israel. However, this research did not attempt to investigate these clandestine activities due to obvious difficulties.

alternative ways of making a livelihood and thereby improving his future livelihood in case of repeated economic shocks. However, only a minority of the respondents had chosen this option. The researcher identified several reasons for this. First, there are very few alternatives due to the monostructure of the economy in South Sinai. Even the non-touristic sectors such as construction or retail trade are largely dependent on the tourism industry, since about 90 % of the people, i.e. the potential demand for other goods and services, earn their income from tourism. And due to a lack of rainfall, population growth, urbanization and government policy keeping significant numbers of livestock as part of a risk minimizing strategy is not viable for most people anymore, either. Second, many alternative projects require a lot of initial capital, such as the tank lorries that cost at least LE 280,000[275] each. Third, most Bedouin are still used to survive with very little as much as they are used to endure times of crisis and wait for the improvement of the situation. Fourth, migration in these modern times, too, has become much more difficult and almost impossible without the necessary contacts and support, which the majority of the Bedouin lack.

Obviously, the poorer an individual or household was, the more vulnerable it would be. Poor people were hit much harder by the crisis, because any reduction in income had direct consequences on their livelihood whereas the few rich Bedouin would only be affected by a reduction in profits. On the other hand, those Bedouin who are more remote from the busy tourism centers, who still live a very simple life and have relatively few expenses such as those living in the desert, the felt effect might have been much less.

8.3 Coping Strategies vis-à-vis Marginalization

Chapter 7 has identified three main marginalization processes: the loss of land, the barriers to market entry and the discrimination by the police. This section presents the various strategies, Bedouin have devised to cope with and adapt to their ongoing marginalization.

8.3.1 Coping with the Loss of Control over Land

Regarding the loss of control over their land, the Bedouin are coping in one or several of the following ways, depending on their individual situation:

- trying to keep land in one's ownership,

- minimizing financial losses as a result of potential expropriation of land,

- trying to get lost private land back,

- trying to acquire new private land from what used to be tribal land,

- young generation finding alternative places to live instead of expanding family land.

The various strategies for each of these ways will now be explained.

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[275] Ca. US $ 50,000

Trying to keep land in one's ownership

The Bedouin have learnt from their experiences in the past. If they still have the option, most Bedouin now will be careful to keep the land they still own as long as possible.

<u>Avoiding sale of land</u>

One attempt by some Bedouin to at least keep the land in Bedouin hands was to offer to buy the land from Bedouin who had to sell the land because they were in need. This was especially reported for Nuwaiba and St. Catherine, not for Dahab. However, due to the ongoing crisis because of the Intifada and other conflicts fewer and fewer Bedouin were in the position to do so. Consequently, more and more land was sold to outsiders, especially in Nuwaiba, where the effects of the Intifada were felt most. However, this trend is slowly reversing, because the Bedouin have realized the importance of keeping their existing land in the face of increasing difficulties in obtaining new land.

<u>Enter fair rental contracts</u>

From the mid 1990s Bedouin started to understand that with the existing rental contracts for unlimited periods of time their rent income would not be adjusted to inflation and tourism development and that they would eventually lose their land. So those who still had land to rent out, started to make contracts that were limited to a few years and provisions for an increase in rent. The Bedouin could then also consult lawyers who had opened offices in Dahab from the mid 1990s.

<u>Obtaining a legal title</u>

Regarding land Bedouin consider their property but have no legal title to, there have been many attempts by the Bedouin to obtain such documents from the authorities. While some are still trying, most have given up or reduced their efforts. The latter two keep living in their houses (all locations) or running their businesses (Nuwaiba to Taba)[276] in the hope that the government will not cause them any problems. Some also invest money and develop their places nicely so that the government would not notice the building or would have a hard case to prove that the building should be torn down.

Minimizing financial losses as a result of potential expropriation of land

Some of those who have not tried to obtain a legal title for their land or have not succeeded to do so invest as little as possible in any development of the land in order to minimize losses in case the government should destroy the building. In some cases in Nuwaiba, the government has actually destroyed unregistered houses or camps, which the Bedouin then re-erected shortly after in order to secure their land and livelihoods.

One Bedouin reported that his family had sold their land to migrants, because they felt they were going to lose their land anyway.[277] It was therefore safer to "lift the hand"[278] from the land

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[276] While tourism establishments in Dahab and St. Catherine are usually licensed, most camps from Nuwaiba to Taba are run without a license on land without a title.

[277] The respondent thought that the new migrant owner would usually also have more bargaining power with the Egyptian authorities to get a legal title for the land.

[278] Bedouin give up a claim on the land by "lifting their hand".

and at least get good money for it rather than nothing at all. Although this strategy was only reported once, it is very possible that others have applied a similar approach.

Getting lost private land back

Only a very small minority of those Bedouin who had lost their land due to unfair rental contracts has tried to recover their land. As a solution, the tenants – if at all – would suggest that the Bedouin could get his land back if he compensated the tenant for all the expenses he had incurred for investments into the tourist establishment. However, due to the fixed and low rents that the Bedouin owners of the land collected from their tenants, they could never have accumulated enough money to pay off their tenants. Therefore, a handful of Bedouin have engaged a lawyer and went to court to recover their land. Yet, so far none of the cases has been decided upon. A respondent reported that only if the petitioner kept pushing his lawyer and the court and paid enough money, the case was being pursued. However, the tenants usually had more capital to endure the process and to influence the decision of the court in their favor. He added that another reason why the Bedouin were not successful in recovering their land was their dislike for the Egyptians, the police and the judge. Consequently, if after one year they still had no positive result, they would give up and hope that the Egyptians would one day leave again, that there would be another war or anything that would make them leave. Seeing that their fellow Bedouin had no success with their law suit, other Bedouin did not even make the attempt of going to court.

Obtaining new private land from what used to be tribal land

New land can be obtained legally or illegally. Since it is very difficult to obtain land legally due to the high costs as well as bureaucratic hurdles, only a handful of Bedouin have been trying to establish a company and officially obtain land for commercial use on the stretch between Nuwaiba and Taba.[279] They had not yet succeeded when they spoke to the researcher in 2003 and 2004.

Just before the end of the last phase of field research the government of South Sinai introduced a uniform land price of LE 100/m^2 for privately used land even in the remote areas around St. Catherine. The first reaction of the Bedouin was disbelief, shock and opposition. Several respondents said that they would just build their house without purchasing the land and therefore becoming squatters. Unfortunately, the field research period was coming to an end, just when this new policy was introduced so that the further developments could not be researched. The question arises whether Bedouin accepted the regulation or built keep building without buying the land.

This has been the common strategy: building on the land and hoping that by being there one would have enough weight vis-à-vis the government to be allowed to stay there and hopefully obtain the papers. This applies for privately used land in all locations. For commercially used land, this strategy is mostly found from Nuwaiba to Taba, where the government does not yet have as strong a control as in Dahab or St. Catherine.

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[279] The conflict over previously tribal land that is earmarked for tourism development and sold to investors exists in the entire area, but has manifested itself more strikingly at this stretch of coast which is a favorite destination for Israeli tourists.

As already mentioned there are two strategies to occupy the land:

<u>Risk averse squatter</u>

Some people are too risk averse to invest large sums into a building that might be destroyed by the government. They therefore prefer to live in preliminary constructions of iron sheets and wooden boards or build simple tourist huts. An example for this strategy that is most likely also influenced by a lack of sufficient funds can be found at the northern edge of Nuwaiba Tarabin where people live in simple huts. Over time, they might possibly try to establish themselves more firmly by building more permanent constructions.

<u>Optimistic squatter</u>

Others believe that by improving their building and making it look permanent (thereby stressing their claim) as well as nice and modern they will be able to get the authority's consent. With this purpose in mind, a woman in Nuwaiba Mzaina, for instance, decided to build a wall to enclose her compound and replace the fence for the goats with a proper stable.

Squatters do not only occupy land for private but also for commercial use, for instance by establishing camps and cafeterias on government land. This strategy is mostly applied on the stretch of land from Nuwaiba to Taba, where many Bedouin have established camps on land that the government has offered to large tourism companies for investment. They have several reasons for this: One reason is to claim ownership and hope to be able to get a legal land title and a business license later on. In any case, an income can be earned as long as the businesses are running whether legalized or not. Moreover, the buildings on the land prevent investors from buying the land because they fear problems with the Bedouin. This way, the Bedouin can prevent irreversible developments regarding the official land ownership. When passing a camp at the beach[280] between Nuwaiba Town and Nuwaiba Mzaina that had been destroyed by the government a few days earlier, the researcher asked a Bedouin who was with her why people kept re-building the camps although they were destroyed again and again. The Bedouin explained:

> „It is necessary, because when there is nothing on the land, the government
> will sell it to an investor. But when there is something on it, then no investor
> wants to buy the land, because he is afraid that there will be problems with
> the Bedouin." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, male, 34)

A special constellation were two cases, where Bedouin tried to build small restaurants and bazaars on land that seemed deserted again by its investors due to the depression in tourism in the hope that the investor would not come back. In 2004 one respondent, for instance, had started to build a simple cafeteria and bazaar just next to a 4(or 5)-star hotel at the coast between Taba and Nuwaiba. Just behind the little wooden construction he had put up at the beach, one could see the excavation for a big hotel including the first steel bars and concrete blocks. This Bedouin's aim was to attract the hotel customers with much lower prices than inside the hotel. A few weeks later he told the researcher that his newly built place had been destroyed by the government, something which he had probably expected sooner or later.

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[280] This stretch of the beach is called Duna due to the nice sand dunes in the area.

A last reason for occupying government land does not really aim at obtaining land, but at getting financial compensation from the investing companies. Several respondents reported that when Bedouin realized how their tribal lands were sold and investors started building on it, Bedouin would quickly put up simple structures on the land in order to claim property over it and receive some sort of monetary compensation from the investor before he could start construction.

Threatening with or using violence to keep existing or get new land

As already described, Bedouin try to build camps on the land between Nuwaiba and Taba without the permission of the government. While the government claims, that the land earmarked for development was not used by the Bedouin, some Bedouin claim the opposite saying that they had always been using this land to go fishing and had already established tourism businesses before the land was sold by the TDA. Other Bedouin respondents stated that some Bedouin claimed ownership of the land after they heard it had been sold. Due to the reluctance of some informants and the potential bias of others, the researcher could not establish which of the two versions was closer to the truth. However, most likely, both cases happened. Either ways this has led to conflict between the government and the investors on the one hand and the Bedouin on the other hand, that has been carried out with the threat of violence from the Bedouin.

Some Bedouin reportedly resorted to threatening the government and the investors with the destruction of any future hotels and the like in order to fight for either compensation or staying on their land depending on the situation. According to a respondent, one day the police arrived on a beach between Taba and Nuwaiba, and told the Bedouin that they had to leave the land and that their camps were going to be destroyed. But then a large group of Bedouin gathered and started shouting at and intimidating the police who left and never came back. The respondent interpreted this reaction as follows: The police officers had called a high ranking officer who must have understood, that if the police was going to evict the Bedouin from the land and destroy the camps, the Bedouin would surely make trouble if they lost their livelihoods. But then the respondent added that actually the situation was still completely open, the problem not yet solved and that the government could return and take the land. And even if the Bedouin concerned had money and established a company to buy the land, the government might not agree.

There are rumors that another Bedouin whose camp had been destroyed and who had fled to the mountains because of other problems with the police had threatened the company who was going to invest on the land where he had his camp. He is reported to have called the company by telephone and to have told them that if they constructed anything on his land he would destroy it.

Other Bedouin, too, have considered violence a strategy of last resort if their rights and needs were not respected, as becomes evident from the following quotes:

> "The land on which I built my cafeteria belongs to the Natural Protectorates.
> But they can never take this land and the cafeteria from me, because I am
> from the desert, I can just close the way. And there are many Bedouin in the

> Protectorate, and all together, there is nothing they can do. Then we will make war." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 37)

> "Nobody can kick you out of your land, because if a company pushes the Bedouin out, it will have to be afraid, because the Bedouin are there and they are in the mountains. They can burn the place down." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 30)

And a respondent from St. Catherine reported that after the government destroyed newly erected houses in town, the Bedu in response destroyed the trees and flowers along the main road in St. Catherine.

Similar ideas have been expressed in connection with other problems with the government (see section 8.3.2. and 8.3.4.). It should be noted, however, that it is hard to judge how serious the Bedouin take these ideas, how realistic these ideas are or how much the ideas are an attempt to compensate a feeling of inferiority, lack of power and hopelessness. So far, there have been several occasions when tourist camps were destroyed both within the area of the town council of Nuwaiba as well as in TDA areas. In most cases, the Bedouin could do nothing, but accept the situation and in some cases to build a new camp.

Young generation finding alternative places to live instead of claiming new land

The land issue is especially a problem for the younger generation. If they have no chance or money to purchase new land, they basically have no other option than to build on their father's land or move to one of the flats constructed by the government:

The children of those Bedouin who claimed land when Egypt regained control over Sinai often build on the land of their fathers with the consequence of ever denser building and smaller individual plots with less room for animals or other uses. During the hot season the densely built houses block the refreshing winds so that staying in the houses and even in the compounds can become almost unbearable.[281]

The grand children of the first "settlers" often have no alternative[282] but move into one of the flats provided by the government. This equals a forced assimilation, since these flats are completely opposed to the traditional Bedouin lifestyle as becomes clear from the following statement:

> "The government wants us to live in a very small house in Nuwaiba Mzaina or in a flat in one of the blocks. But have you seen how they live there, all squeezed up? All in one room, how can that work? And where should the goats be and the garden? We cannot live like that." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, female, 50)

The real scope of the problem of lacking space, however, will only become obvious in the next few years, when another generation of young Bedouin will need to find housing.

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[281] As a result ceiling fans are becoming increasingly common among the Bedouin.

[282] Unless their fathers have also still been able to claim land in the past or their grandfathers have claimed enough land to not only accommodate their sons but also their grandsons and their families.

8.3.2 Coping with Government Regulations

Regarding government regulations Bedouin have developed individual as well as collective strategies, many of which have already been discussed under the previous section on land issues. Nonetheless, they shall be explained again in this context with an example for each of the strategies listed below. At the individual level, Bedouin

- ignore the regulations,

- circumvent the regulations,

- find opportunities in newly developing markets,

- passively keep good relationships with the authorities by giving in to their demands,

- actively keep good relationships with the authorities by inviting and bribing them,

- co-operate with large, registered companies,

- establish their own registered companies.

At the collective level, groups of Bedouin

- have joined in writing petitions to the government,

- have pushed Bedouin politicians to represent their interests (regarding specific issues),

- have resorted to violent action.

As long as possible, a common strategy to deal with newly introduced or enforced regulations is to avoid and circumvent them. In the context of camps and restaurants this refers to the strategy described in the previous section of going ahead with the project and hoping that the authorities will not make any hassle.

Regarding overnight safaris for which no more permits could be obtained in Nuwaiba and Dahab, Bedouin take their tourists on routes through the desert where they will not pass a police or army checkpoint. Another option is to legally transport the tourists by taxi to some location in the desert from where the actual camel or jeep safari would start.

When this becomes too difficult or impossible, people are forced to give up this activity and look for alternatives. The camel tours from Dahab Blue Hole to Ras Abu Galum nowadays represent a good alternative for Bedouin from Dahab as well as from Nuwaiba. This market has been booming for a few years, since tens of landcruisers filled with tourists from Sharm al-Shaikh have started coming to Dahab and drop the tourists for a ride to Ras Abu Galum where they will be picked up again. The 30 minutes camel trip from the Blue Hole to Ras Abu Galum has also become an alternative for those boys and elder men who have been offering camel rides in Dahab at the beach, an activity which has been prohibited with the construction of the promenade and the covering of the wadi mouth with asphalt.

Many Bedouin also try to keep good relationships with the authorities in order to avoid any potential problems in the future or to solve an actual dispute. One way to do so is passively giving in to the impertinent and extortive demands (e.g. dining for free in camps, demanding

goods to be purchased and delivered by Bedouin who pass the checkpoints, etc.) of the tourism police, the secret service and other types of police.

Another strategy of individual Bedouin is to legalize their safari or transport business by registering with a larger agency. A very successful safari guide and agent in St. Catherine, for instance, co-operated with an Egyptian travel agency through which he could also get permissions for all his other safaris. An even closer co-operation is entered by Bedouin who rent a landcruiser from the Egyptian agency, but work on their own account. While these kind of partnerships are only just starting they will probably increase in number the more rigid the regulations and their enforcement get. Surely this will also happen in the transport sector of taxis and minibuses that could so far operate individually but will need to operate under large companies.

Some outstandingly shrewd and successful businessmen actively invite officials or government staff on a regular basis to be sure of their support when they might need it. They belong to a small group of rich and influential individuals who have built up enough financial and social resources over the years to be able to a) conform with the government regulations and b) find their way through the Egyptian bureaucracy and get the necessary support. Some of them have built and own hotels (rather than camps) in Dahab. A very clever Bedouin from North Sinai had foreseen the development in the transport sector and had accumulated enough capital to establish and register such a transport company. To complete the required number of air-conditioned seats he planned to have other Bedouin register their cars under his company's name.

When no way out could be found, groups of 10-30 Bedouin resorted in some cases to writing collective letters to politicians and state officials as high as the governor and/or demand meetings with the town parliament to find a solution. This happened in Nuwaiba, where for jeeps older than 1991 the licenses were not renewed and in Dahab, when the government wanted the taxis and minibuses to stay outside the towns and only operate over land between the checkpoints located at the entrance of the town areas. These two examples of collective action were at least temporarily successful.

Regarding the increasingly tight regulations in all aspects of the tourism industry, several Bedouin respondents stated, that they might need to resort to violent means. However, as already mentioned in the previous section it is not clear how serious they might get about this. Notwithstanding, as will be shown in the section regarding discrimination by the police, some potential for violent action does already exist. Moreover, as was predicted by some of the respondents, the strict regulations and diminishing opportunities for Bedouin could lead to a further increase of those earning their income from an engagement in the drug business.

Textbox 5: Increasingly strict regulations for safari business, a Bedouin perspective

"The safari permit for private jeeps is not issued anymore since 2000. It started in 1998 when the permit was only given sometimes, and in 2000 no more permits were issued at all. Before the checkpoints were built, one could go on safari as long as one wished, but then in 1989/1990 the checkpoint near St. Catherine was built, around 1992 the checkpoint at Dahab and Nuwaiba followed. After that safaris were still possible for some time, but from about 1994 one could only get a

day permit. But that was enough to get out to the desert with the tourists. And when one would come back after 10 days it was no problem. It would be enough to say that one was returning from a day trip. The police did not get it. But since 2000, ten of my friends who own a jeep have given up the safari business and are now only doing diving safaris within the Dahab town council area (to Blue Hole in the North and Wadi Gnai in the South. That also brings good money. But in the past there was no business in that, because there were not many divers. Diving only really started about 8 years ago [1996], because it is very profitable and so more and more diving centres were being established. That is also the reason, why the number of jeeps increased so much. Eight years ago, there were about 20 jeeps in Dahab, now there are about 40 to 50 Bedouin jeeps and the same number again owned by Egyptians and still that is sometimes not enough.[283]
I still go on safari with tourists. I rent a taxi to take the tourists across the checkpoint and then meet them in the desert with the jeep. And after the safari they return to Dahab by taxi. But if the tourists pay good money, I prefer to rent a landcruiser with a Bedouin driver from a registered agency. There you do not risk a breakdown and it is more spacious and one can easily take the food and camping utensils. Why not? And at the moment I do not have a jeep, anyway." (Dahab, Tarabin, male, 32)

8.3.3 Coping with Competition from Migrants and Large Companies

Most Bedouin when compared with the large companies and those migrants with higher education lack knowledge, capital and access to customers and Egyptian decision makers. These negative factors represent barriers to market entry. The Bedouin's advantages are the knowledge of the area and its environment, the representation of the exotic Bedouin culture and in some cases the ownership of resources such as land or camels. So what options do Bedouin have to maintain their position in the market? At the coast, as well as inland, Bedouin try to find European partners to circumvent the Egyptian agencies which bring the tourists or to help them develop their land.

In Dahab, for instance, three Bedouin brothers cooperate with a European investor: They provided the land and the investor built a diving centre with the entire equipment. In addition to the capital, the Europeans bring the necessary know-how in diving and management, as well as the guests who come via a diving centre and advertising in European diving journals and the internet.

In the safari sector the co-operation with foreigners is even more common. Bedouin try to develop long-lasting friendship with tourists or foreign tour guides in the hope of getting more and more customers directly from Europe by word of mouth. And usually this proves a successful strategy, especially considering that one can charge much lower prices than the agencies charge and still earn more than if one is paid by an Egyptian agency or by other Bedouin: i.e. a Bedouin who only provides a camel to an agency or to another Bedouin who brings the tourists only gets LE 40-50 per day. However, if he can get tourists directly he can charge at least LE 60-70 per day for the camel and another LE 50-70 per person for food and service. In case he does not own enough camels he can rent some from his relatives and neighbors and still earn LE 70-90 per person and day. The owner of two camels could therefore earn LE 2,750

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[283] The respondent explained that during a good season, there were about 100 divers in the large diving centers, since about 7 people fit into a jeep about 14 jeeps would be required for each of these large diving centers. In total there are more than 50 diving centers in Dahab.

for a 5-day safari with 5 tourists.[284] If he rented his two camels to a safari agency he would only get LE 400, i.e. only about one fifth (see Table 6)

Table 6: Comparison of income from camel renting and safari organization

	Rent camels to agency	Organize one's own safari trip
No. of own camels	2	2
No. of camels from friends and relatives	0	3
Charge for a camel per day[285]	LE 50 (paid by the agency)	LE 70 (paid by the tourist)
Charge for guide service, preparation and provision of food, drink and sleeping mattress per tourist per day	--	LE 70
Total earning per day per camel (and tourist)	LE 50 (paid by the agency)	LE 140 (paid by the tourist)
Cost for renting camels from other Bedouin per day	--	LE 50
Total profit per day	LE 100	LE 550 (2x140+3x90)
Total profit for a 5-day safari with 5 camels	LE 500	LE 2750

Own source

Knowing these figures, it is not surprising, to hear statements like the following:

> "If you can find the tourists and do your own safari, two 2-week safaris a
> year are enough, then you have a good life." (Desert settlement Wadi Disco,
> Mzaina, male, 52)

This snowball strategy of meeting foreigners who would send their friends and those friends would send their friends, has become even more successful with the advent of mobile phones in Sinai through which Bedouin can receive calls from all over the world and arrange the desired safari tours. Even Bedouin in the desert often have a mobile which they charge in their

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[284] He would charge LE 3,500 and pay LE 750 to the owners of the remaining three camels.
[285] The Bedouin differentiate between money they earn for their camels' work and money they earn for their own work.

cars and which helps them to be less dependent on other Bedouin or Egyptian agencies bringing tourists from the main tourism centers. One of the most surprising images the researcher recalls is probably that of a mobile phone hanging on one of the poles of a goat hair tent in the middle of the desert. Needless to say that the mobile also facilitates the organization of safaris with the agencies or Bedouin middleman and even the managing of emergencies: When the researcher participated in a safari and one of the camels suddenly died, another camel was brought to a meeting point within 3 hours after the guide made a call with his mobile phone.

While Bedouin have been very successful in acquiring work by building up a network of foreign friends and customers, they also feel some anger towards the Egyptian companies. Some Bedouin have even thought about charging the Egyptian companies for making tourism business on Bedouin land as reflected in the statement below. However, in reality, the Bedouin so far have no chance to do so and the statement is more an expression of emotions, wishes and visions rather than reality:

> "The Egyptian companies take the large share of the tourism. They take whole jeep-loads of tourists and do a huge programme in one day. But the Bedouin make a really good trip, there you really see the nice places and can take enjoy and take your time, not like with the Egyptians where you get 10 minutes to take a picture of the canyon and then you go on. The Egyptians also sell postcards and then claim that they will take the tourists to these places, but they never do. They make the big money. But we also want to get something from the business the companies make. So they have to pay the people [Bedouin] when they enter the canyons. [Researcher asks: "How much?"] It does not matter, but at least they have to pay something. We also want to live. 10 pounds, 20 pounds. But not every canyon has people that collect the money and there is no real system for who collects the money. Basically, if a Bedouin sees a company car, he will stop them and ask for some payment. The guide is forced to pay, because otherwise they would beat him. And what can the police or the company do? Nothing, we also have to live." (Desert settlement Saal, Mzaina, male, 30)

8.3.4 Coping with Discrimination by the Police

There is very little the Bedouin can do against the discrimination by the police. Concerning annoying questions, impertinent demands or even worse discrimination at the checkpoints, such as taking the ID or driving license away, there are basically two strategies: endure or avoid the discrimination. In most cases the Bedouin will just endure this treatment and try to appease the police officers and keep a good relationship by bringing them the items they demand[286] or offering other little services, such as giving them a lift, etc. Some Bedouin, especially those who live in the desert and have a car that is not licensed or one that is so new that it will rise – not always unjustified – suspicion among the police about the source of funding,

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[286] The Bedouin try and please them with little gifts and services such as bringing cigarettes, a newspaper or the like.

leave the main road and take other routes through the desert where they can avoid the check-point.[287]

As has been explained in chapter 7.3 many Bedouin have had trouble with the police because of alleged or actual drug cultivation or trafficking. Those who had been arrested usually try to get free as quickly as possible. Commonly, the family of the arrested person will engage a lawyer to try and get him free (in case of innocence) or reduce the punishment. The associated financial strain for the family has been explained in 7.3. Respondents reported that in some cases the police would release a Bedouin from custody in exchange for a gun or some drugs that his relatives would have to bring. There are also reports about isolated cases of attacks on the transports of detainees or other attempts to free Bedouin who have been arrested. Similarly, there are reports about Bedouin who have resisted arrest and have fled into the desert.

8.3.5 Fatalism, Avoiding Egyptians and the Self-enforcement of Marginalization

The previous sections have shown the range of strategies Bedouin employ to deal with the various kinds of marginalization. Generally, however, the majority of the Bedouin feel that they cannot influence their situation, because of the power of the Egyptian state and the lack of unity among themselves and therefore accept the situation as it is. Moreover, as long as new opportunities arise,[288] most Bedouin find it easier to just take these new opportunities rather than trying to resolve the problem of increased restrictions on previous activities such as the safari business for instance.

To make the situation bearable, most Bedouin try to avoid problems with the authorities through correct and inconspicuous behavior. At checkpoints (as already described) or in other situations when Bedouin find themselves at the Egyptian authorities' mercy, most Bedouin will usually patiently let the Egyptian authorities deal with them. If possible, however, most Bedouin will try to avoid the Egyptians completely, both in their work as well as in their private lives.

For instance, the researcher witnessed several instants, where Bedouin declined to go on safari with Egyptians or offer their services as guides up to Mount Sinai. One of them said that the Egyptians walked too slowly and talked too much. In addition, to the general discomfort Bedouin feel towards Egyptians, another reason which was not openly stated could be that Egyptians might pay lower tips than Western tourists. One respondent who plays the traditional musical instrument *"simsimiya"* on safaris and Bedouin dinners or lunches said that he would only seek employment with other Bedouin, since Egyptians would pay him very little

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[287] According to a Swiss lady who has been travelling to South Sinai since 2000 and is married to a Bedouin, another strategy in dealing with the authorities (as well as private individual Egyptians) of most Bedouin is to play the power game, i.e. who will back off first, with the authorities as long as they feel relatively safe, i.e. as long as they are in their home region, where they know the civil servants and can moreover be sure of the backing of their tribe. However, as soon as they leave this comfort zone, e.g. when travelling in the bus to Cairo or Suez, most Bedouin will try not to stand out, but in spite of this often become the victims of arbitrary civil servants: at checkpoints, for instance, they are quite often stopped, asked for their ID or even kept in police custody for several hours if not days without any obvious reasons. For this reason, many Bedouin prefer not to travel at all and only go to the capital of the governorate Al-Tur or to Suez and Cairo when it is absolutely necessary.

[288] Such as driving for diving centers or offering camel rides from the Blue Hole to Ras Abu Galum instead of jeep or camel safaris.

despite them making a high profit. This on the other hand also shows that if the Egyptian paid him better and valued him, this respondent might feel and decide differently.

In all four study locations one can establish a segregated settlement pattern, where Bedouin live in different locations than the Egyptian migrants (see map). Although this spatial segregation can be attributed to the historical development of the settlement in a tribal context, land ownership patterns as well as government intervention such as town planning or the provision of social housing, Bedouin prefer in most cases to live apart from the Egyptians due to the reservations they have towards them as the following quotes show:

> "No, I do not want to live with the fallahin, because they are not good and might make trouble if they were neighbors. They do not know how to deal with other people, how to bring each other food, it is better to have only Bedouin neighbors." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 55)

The extreme of this strategy can be seen in Bedouin who decide to live in the desert, not only to enjoy the traditional life in the desert, but also, in order to live far from the harassment by the Egyptian authorities and the Egyptians with their different lifestyle (see chapter 8.1.).

> "I want to live in Muqrih [small settlement near the road between Nuwaiba and Dahab] because it is quiet and far away from the Egyptians and from the problems and I have my cafeteria here. And the children can go to school in Samghi or Bir Saghair." (Desert settlement Muqrih, Mzaina, male, 24)

By avoiding and distancing themselves from Egyptians and the Egyptian authorities, the Bedouin can protect their tribal community, a sense of belonging and their culture. But at the same time they marginalize themselves further, because they do not establish enough necessary contacts and do not obtain enough information to fully participate.

Moreover, the marginalization the Bedouin are subjected to is in many cases enforced by what could be summarized as the Bedouin's culture, lifestyle and preferences. The majority of the Bedouin, although mostly sedentarized and exposed to or even immersed in modern life, still feel a strong identity as a desert and nomadic people, are still attached to a lifestyle that is closely linked to nature and still consider themselves bound to their tribal moral and behavioural codex where mutual support, honesty and honor are of great significance (see section 8.1). These often conflict with the tourism development based on capitalistic and materialistic principles that is promoted by the Egyptian government. As a result, many Bedouin just do not act in a way that would fully integrate them in the tourism industry, but rather get involved and withdraw again. At first sight, one might think that there is no problem if many Bedouin have other priorities than just money and material wealth and decide to live a very simple life. However, by not accumulating financial wealth, they will not only have fewer and fewer income opportunities, but also limited financial resources and consequently no power to influence the developments and actively contribute to the making of their environments.[289] The longer it

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[289] Those who in the past have preferred to stay in the desert and live from little have already been excluded from the possibilities of urban life, since today they will face great difficulties in finding a plot of land in town where they could live.

takes them to realize this fact, the fewer chances they will have to shape their lives according to their own will.

8.3.6 Collective Action

The previous sections have shown that the Bedouin have developed individual as well as collective coping strategies that are summarized in Table 7.

Table 7: Bedouin individual and collective coping strategies in response to marginalization

Individual Responses	Collective Responses
Fatalistic acceptance of the status quo	Negotiation with the authorities (petitions, etc.)
Avoiding Egyptians and the Egyptian Authorities	Representation through Bedouin shaikhs and politicians
Maintaining of good relationships through bribes and other presents	Threatening with (and applying) violence
Evading laws and regulations	
Direct contact with foreigners	
Law suit	

Own source

Although there are shaikhs and Bedouin politicians that could and should represent Bedouin interests as well as lead and organize their people, there have only been a few cases of concerted action. Overall Bedouin organization and collective action in order to stand up for their interests is very limited due to

- the prevailing hopelessness and fatalism,
- the decay of the communities,
- the profit seeking of individuals,
- the fear of repression by the government and
- the nostalgia for the good old days.

In the interviews, the Bedouin were asked why they did not take collective action to improve their situation. The usual reply would be that the Bedouin were not educated and did not understand that everybody was just looking after himself and that due to population increase it was difficult to achieve unity. Another reason was the fear from government repression against

those who called for or participated in any political activities.[290] Bedouin opinions in this respect are reflected in the following quotes:

> "In the past the Bedouin were united, but today they are not united enough, because today there are many more people (Bedouin). It is difficult to come to an agreement. Now everybody lives in a different place and there are differences between rich and poor." (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 32)

> "Actually we have a right to the entire coastal land. But is forbidden to take the land and we would end up in prison. And if we united, we would all end up in prison." (Nuwaiba, Mzaina, male, 48)

In response to the question whether the Bedouin politicians helped the Bedouin, the unanimous opinion was that these politicians only act in their own selfish interest. The majority of the respondents, except for those in a political position and a few other exceptions, thought that in cases of conflict the Bedouin politicians would not speak up for Bedouin interests, because they did not want to lose the governor's or the mayor's support for their own issues. And if they tried to push for the Bedouin issues, they would be silenced with a generous gift such as a big piece of land at the beach.[291] The following quotes illustrate the problem:

> "There are more Bedouin than Egyptians in the governorate parliament in Al-Tur. But when the Bedouin politicians stand up for Bedouin interests, the governor gives them 200 or 300 meters of land at the beach so that they shut up. There are also three Bedouin in the parliament in Cairo. But they don't do anything. It is all empty talk." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 45)

> "The Bedouin are sleeping, they do not understand anything. And the people vote for the politicians, because before the elections they say, they will do this and that. But when they have been elected, they just wait for their membership card and put it in their chest pocket and then they lie down and sleep and that's it. And there is lots of benefit in such a membership card … land, money, …" (Dahab, Mzaina, male, 35)

Similarly the trust in the shaikhs and their ability to solve the problems, is very low, either because they are also thought to take advantage of their position or because they do not have the power to change anything:

> "The government took the land from the Bedouin, because the government does not want to give the Bedouin any rights. And the Bedouin do not fight together, because everybody thinks of his own interest, his money, and because there are some who did get papers for their land have no problem. The government does not want us to do tourism projects here. But then how should we live and eat? I do not want to go to the mountains and grow ma-

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[290] This view was also shared by foreigners who have been in close contact with the Bedouin for many years. One European lady also thought that not only was everybody looking after himself, but that a lot of competition existed between the families and clans.

[291] This was confirmed by a Bedouin who had been in the town parliament for four years and finally resigned out of frustration.

> rihuana. I want to work legally. But the shaikhs are useless and a lawyer wouldn't help either. Here in Egypt there are no human rights. That is the problem." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 45)

Only one respondent defended the shaikhs, saying that they could do nothing without the support of the people. He told the following story:

> "The shaikh is just one person, not the entire town. His power is limited. Six years ago, for example, Shaikh Salim tried to find a solution regarding the numerous Egyptians who compete with the Bedouin in the transport service for the diving centers. They also destroy the prices, because they take ten people for a total of 10 LE to the laguna. Shaikh Salim suggested, that half of the Bedouin should install themselves at the way to the Blue Hole and the other half on the way to Wadi Gnai/Qabr al-Bint[292] and if an Egyptian driver came, the tourists should shift to the Bedouin cars, otherwise the Bedouin would destroy the Egyptian's car. Because this is our place. We live here and have to survive here and feed our kids. If not here, then where? And if we have enough work, then you (Egyptians) can work, too. But the Bedouin said that they were scared of the police and gave this or that pretext, although Shaikh Salim said that he would stand behind all of them and that nobody would go to jail. That they should just start. But nothing happened. And what can a shaikh do, but have ideas, give advice, organize and so on? He is just one, he cannot fight alone. I am a Bedouin myself, but it is not the fault of the Egyptians but of the Bedouin, that the Egyptians settle here and become strong. I don't know how much longer they will wait and say ,The Egyptians, the Egyptians' and not do anything. I cannot do anything here, because this is not my town. But I swear by God, if this was my town, where I could get my friends and relatives together and if I had a car, I would not let a single Egyptian drive here. And it is not true that when you organize this you end up in jail. Why should they tell the police that X has done it? Why don't they confuse them and stick together? The police does not need to know, how the resistance started. But everybody has a stupid reason why he cannot start a resistance." (Dahab, tribe unknown, male, 28)

8.3.7 Non Governmental Organizations – Hope for the Future?

NGOs play an important role for the development of civil society. If Bedouin could organize themselves in NGOs with various agendas (e.g. Bedouin women association, Bedouin business association, etc.) they could participate more in the development process, for instance when international donor projects collect opinions from the various stakeholders.

Despite the general tendency of the Bedouin of not joining in collective action to promote their interests vis-à-vis the Egyptian government, there have already been some attempts to estab-

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[292] These are two favorite diving and snorkeling sites to the North and South of Dahab that can only be accessed via the one road that leads along the coast.

lish NGOs. One successful case is the *jamaiya ziraaiya mahalliya mutaadida al-arad bi nuwaiba*, a sort of agricultural co-operative with a revolving loan fund, provision of seeds and equipment on a credit basis, a kindergarten for Bedouin children and alphabetization courses in the desert and a medical doctor. The NGO was apparently founded by Bedouin in Nuwaiba, is registered in Egypt and is supported by a Swiss organization. It has more than 100 members.

Another NGO was founded in connection with the EU funded St. Catherine Protectorate Project that ended in 2004 and its Bedouin support programme: Bedouin women of St. Catherine and the surrounding villages have been organized to produce embroided articles such as bags, cushions and the like, which are sold in the NGO's centre *Fan Sina*. The centre provides the women with the necessary materials and pays them for their produce. However, there seem to be conflicts between the Bedouin woman who runs the centre and the women who actually do the work.

During her fieldwork, the researcher met two Bedouin who were actually thinking about founding an organization. One had thought about organizing camel races. He got his idea from the yearly camel race between the Mzaina and the Tarabin where many tourists come to watch but do not pay anything to the Bedouin while paying high charges to the travel agencies that bring them to the event. So his idea was that the members of the co-operative would do camel races at a smaller scale but on a more regular basis and charge an entrance fee from the tourists. And as the man concluded:

> "Who wants to see, pays. And who does not pay, does not see." (Desert settlement, Samghi, male, 45)

The other respondent and his friends had already gone beyond the planning stages to found a co-operative of camp-owners in Nuwaiba. However, they failed to establish a legal body due to hindrances by the government (see Textbox 6).

Textbox 6: Bedouin attempts to found a co-operative

"I and my neighbors, about 40 people, founded a cooperative to develop 8 km of beach that belong to us. We still have to buy the land from the government again, because we want to buy the land as a legal person and develop it in a similar way. Each one would pay his share for his share of land, but we would be one legal entity. We face a lot of problems regarding licenses, etc. The cooperative exists for 4 years now. But we are still working to get the papers right to be an acknowledged cooperative. We are trying to become a registered cooperative but I am sure that the government does not want the co-operative because they want the land. Why do we still not have our cooperative certificate? Each time we complete what we were asked for we are asked to bring another thing. Last time, 6 months ago, [i.e. beginning of 2003] we were told that the government had changed the cooperative law. We had had everything ready and had money in the bank and a European organization wanted to help us financially. But the Egyptian South Sinai governorate government wanted that the money goes through them and then the organization refused to finance. After that the government withdrew its decision that it was ok and said that the cooperative law had changed. And they told us to go to an office in Cairo, then in Al-Tur, then in Nuwaiba, then back to Cairo, etc. By now, we might have spent LE 60,000 for papers, trips, etc., also for bakshish, because that has to be paid everywhere, otherwise nothing works. Baksheesh destroys Egypt.
We want to buy the land together to develop the place in a Bedouin style to show the culture as it is and also have a museum and a market to sell Bedouin crafts. I have also tried to organize people

from all tribes to discuss and solve problems. But the people do not understand and those who do not understand also say No most of the times. After my brother was a shaikh and even went to jail for one week because of that, I had no more desire to become a shaikh although I was asked. I don't want to engage myself for people, risk my head and then pay for it without any support. I hope that it will now get better with the support of the USA. I hope that may be later the young generation will get together and change things." (Nuwaiba, Tarabin, male, 45)

This chapter has given insights into the Bedouin's livelihood strategies. A very important factor directly or indirectly affecting all strategies are the Bedouin's lifestyle and preferences. These preferences in combination with the prevailing context, conditions and trends, resource endowment and institutional processes have resulted in the development of the strategies described in this chapter: the various income generation strategies, coping strategies in response to a decrease in tourism demand as well as in response to marginalization. The following chapter will analyze the results of the first four points of the livelihood systems approach that have been discussed in chapters five to eight with a focus on the question of the sustainability of the Bedouin livelihoods.

9. Conclusion and Recommendations

9.1 Evaluation and Outlook: are the Bedouin Livelihoods Sustainable?

The Bedouin of South Sinai have been significantly affected by the politics of external powers for a long time. However, never had the interest of external powers in Sinai been so strong as since the Israeli-Egyptian wars in the second half of the 20th century. It is since then, that Bedouin every-day reality is shaped by non-Bedouin decision-makers much more deeply than ever before. The South Sinai Bedouin are now part of larger Egypt and consequently a minority in a nation state: unlike in the Gulf countries where Bedouin represent the majority of the population and certain Bedouin groups hold the political power, Egypt's Bedouin only make up one percent of Egypt's population[293] (Gardener & Marx 2000:21), a number so small that they are not even mentioned as a minority in any Egyptian government or academic publications.

And in fact, the Bedouin are only a nuisance to Egypt (also see Lavie 1989), where they are suspected of being collaborators with Israel, smugglers and lately terrorists. Moreover, Bedouin interests[294] collide with Egypt's plans for a development of luxury tourism in South Sinai. While the Bedouin very positively remember the time of Israeli occupation during which they had jobs and a good health care, they mostly despise the Egyptian rule for its neglect of Bedouin interests, its discriminatory treatment and its corrupt bureaucracy.

Nevertheless, the tourism boom that has started in the 1980s and has been promoted and directed by the Egyptian state to fulfil its own goals and needs, has also brought many chances and improvements to the Bedouin. They now have access to schools, health clinics, piped water and electricity and enjoy a good supply of all sorts of goods. Economicly it has been a big progress. For the first time, Bedouin men could earn monetary income in their homeland and could stay with their families[295] rather than having to search for work in Israel or Cairo and be away from their families for weeks and months.

Tourism has become the most important source of income for the Bedouin, with an estimated 90 % of the population depending on income from an engagement in tourism. Many are self-employed and enjoy the combination of a relatively high income and much freedom and flexibility.

However, while the absolute increase of tourists to Sinai has trickled down to the Bedouin to some extent (e.g. large number of tourists who come with agency cars to oasis and drink tea), the participation of Bedouin in the overall tourism development is under-proportionate. Moreover, the Bedouin have become increasingly dependent on monetary income and consequently

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[293] In Palestine and Israel Bedouin make up 4 %, in Jordan 20 % of the population.

[294] Bedouin profit from individual tourists or tourists who come on organized special desert holidays who do not mind simple accommodation and logistics.

[295] To be with one's family has been mentioned by several respondents as an important reason for certain job preferences.

from tourism as the only significant (legal) source of income while at the same time they have lost much of their land as well as their self-determination.

In this context, the Bedouin livelihoods have become very vulnerable due to the following risks and processes:

- Repeated depressions in the tourism industry due to global and regional violent political conflicts resulting in a reduction of income felt at the household level.

- Increasingly strict regulations and their implementation reducing Bedouin opportunities for an engagement in tourism and consequently resulting in a reduction of income.

- An increase of prices for land but also other goods such as water, vegetables, etc. as a result of the tourism development,[296] leading to a further reduction of real income.

- A lack of land available to the Bedouin, the real scope of the problem only becoming obvious in the next few years, when another generation of young Bedouin will need to find housing.

- South Sinai developing further towards a more expensive destination and thereby potentially losing attractiveness for backpackers and other individual tourists, who have been the main Bedouin clients, thereby resulting in further loss of income unless compensated by an integration of Bedouin services in the mainstream tourism.

- Risk minimization strategy when monetary income is combined with subsistence horticulture and livestock keeping becoming difficult to impossible due to: scarce rainfall over years, overexploitation of the water resources by increasing migrant, tourists and Bedouin populations, insufficient pastures, increasing fodder prices and government restrictions on livestock keeping in town, a return to near autarchy therefore being no longer realistic either.

- Discrimination, danger of arrest and jail.

And while the Egyptian government claims that it wants to foster Bedouin development as well as the integration of the Bedouin into the Egyptian society and economy, it is doing the opposite. Rather than generating employment opportunities for the Bedouin, opportunities are being cut down in the course of tourism development. Bedouin participation in development planning and the development process, too, is only a slogan that is used in order to pay lip service to the international donors and secure project funding. The lack of honest interest in broad participation on the side of the government is no secret but was also confirmed by a development consultant who told the author that the governor of South Sinai did not see any need for the consultation of the Bedouin in the development process, since he and his staff already knew very well what the Bedouin needed.

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[296] And the resulting high demand and land speculation.

The strategies Bedouin have developed in response to all these problems are coping strategies, that try to deal with the present problem at the individual level. A few exceptions exist of individuals who have developed adaptive strategies that improve their position in the long-term by completely integrating themselves in the "new system", which will probably ensure their future success in spite of the marginalization.

Basically no strategies have been developed at the collective level that would aim to actively shape the Bedouin's present and future. Collective action has mainly been hampered by:

- the speed of the developments,

- the distribution of power with the state and powerful firms on the one and the Bedouin on the other side,

- the decay of tribal structures and profit seeking of individuals,

- the heterogeneous population in the urban centres (Egyptian, foreigners and Bedouin, making it difficult for Bedouin to organize themselves),

- the repressions by the state,

- lack of alternative sources of income,

- drug abuse,

- Bedouin "lifestyle and preferences".

If one recalls how life in South Sinai looked like thirty or fifty years ago, it becomes clear that the Bedouin have been overrun by the developments that have occurred at a fast rate. The Bedouin basically experienced and are still experiencing a culture shock, in the beginning they did not understand the way Egyptians and Westerners looked at life and business and where the developments would leave them. By now, the majority of the Bedouin has realized the deterioration of their situation but is not aware of the long-term implications or represses thoughts in that direction. And rather than taking active initiative to influence their situation, the Bedouin have avoided the problems and have taken consolation in the idea that after all they were Bedouin from the desert who could always return to a semi-autarchic life in the desert where they would be far from the government and the connected problems. However, the more the Bedouin population is growing, the more it is adapting a modern life and leaving the traditional life behind, the harder will the Bedouin be hit by further marginalization and crisis. Whether they would then still be as relaxed as they are now, after having achieved a certain standard of living and in the face of increasing costs of living even for basic goods such as for water, land or fodder as well as new needs such as schooling or electricity remains questionable.

Yet, there is much reason to believe that the situation will deteriorate: while many income opportunities especially in the accommodation and catering sectors have already been lost, the

few activities, namely safari and bedouin dinner, that could still be done by any Bedouin even without much capital, are increasingly organized by Egyptian companies, that fulfil the requirements of the government. And after the terrorist attacks in Sharm al-Shaikh, Bedouin Dinners organized by Bedouin have been completely prohibited (International Crisis Group 2007).

While some Bedouin might be able to continue to circumvent the government, a large number of informal jobs will not be feasible anymore thereby robbing the younger Bedouin of the chance to build up an existence.

In the best case, some Bedouin will be able to adapt to the new situation by

>   1) Legalizing their activities by co-operating with the larger agencies (e.g. by register-
>   ing their safari cars with such an agency).

>   in combination with

>   2) the existing strategy of establishing direct contact with the tourists and small scale
>   foreign tour agencies in order to have direct access to the customers.

However, such a solution will reduce the Bedouin's share of the profit and will make them dependant of the agencies and vulnerable. Moreover, the majority will probably not have the necessary knowledge and skills to realize such a strategy.

In the worst case, which will probably be a reality for the majority, Bedouin will be forced to work as day-laborers who will have lost much of their pride, dignity, sovereignty and freedom. Their fate will probably be similar to that of the Bedouin in Israel (cf. Abu-Saad & Lithwick 2000), they will be forced to assimilate even more than today in order to avoid discrimination and their culture will slowly be lost.

Moreover, with a return to subsistence being impossible for the majority of the Bedouin, it is likely that an increasing number of marginalized Bedouin will turn to other income generating activities such as the cultivation and trading of drugs as well as smuggling of other goods. This in turn will lead to further repression and discrimination and could escalate in a serious violent conflict between the Bedouin and the government.[297]

Concluding, the prospects for sustainable Bedouin livelihoods are rather grim in economic terms. Moreover, there is a danger of a growing loss of Bedouin identity and culture. The only realm where improvement is to be expected in the future is education. However, this will not necessarily compensate the reduction of other resource endowment, as can be seen with thousands of unemployed educated Egyptians. Nevertheless, improved education might help

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[297] Aziz (1995) has analysed the terrorist attacks on tourists in Luxor in the early 1990s. She argues that the dissatisfaction among the population with the government could increase due to the lack of participation of the local population in the tourism industry and its benefits. This in turn might lead to more violent attacks.

the Bedouin to organize themselves, get support from foreign or even Egyptian development or human rights organizations[298] and fight for their interests.

The reader will now ask himself whether there is any hope at all for the future of the Bedouin. In the end, it all comes back to the question whether the Bedouin will be able to at least maintain or ideally to increase their resources and create a socio-political context where they can employ them. However, as long as the Bedouin do not develop collective strategies to tackle the actual problem, i.e. the structure of power and the policy basis of decision making regarding the tourism development in South Sinai, the Bedouin will be continuously marginalized and face increasing difficulties in increasing their resource endowment and developing sustainable livelihood strategies. At present, such collective action is very unlikely. It might form, however, if the situation of the Bedouin deteriorates too much and/or if collective action is supported by serious pressure from the international community, foreign donors as well as tourist companies and tourists.

As has been argued in chapters two and three, the Sinai Bedouin are an indigenous people and consequently are entitled to specific collective rights and support. Of course, there are rich and influential Bedouin who are not affected as negatively as the majority or have even profited immensely. And surely, the majority of the Egyptian population has also been excluded from the tourism development in Sinai and is similarly underprivileged (cf. Steiner 2002:92). However, while these issues need to be addressed, this should not stop the Bedouin and their supporters from demanding the rights that indigenous people are entitled to and that go well beyond the rights of the individual but extend to the entire people.

And what really matters is how the dominant parts of global as well as Egyptian society can help the Bedouin to develop in a self-determined way rather than being overrun by the developments. How this can be achieved will be explained in the next section.

9.2 Policy Recommendations

Without internal pressure from the Bedouin or external pressure from the international community, the Egyptian government and the big tourism agents in South Sinai will not change their policies and actions regarding the tourism industry and the Bedouin. Until the Bedouin have become aware, organized and strong enough, the international organizations, donors and public should therefore pressure the Egyptian government to translate the recommendations that will be given in this section into action and should provide the necessary support.

Action should be taken at the level of the Egyptian government and administration as well as at the level of the Bedouin communities. This should be supported by an education of the Egyptian public and the international tourists regarding the Bedouin, their culture and their present situation and needs.

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[298] Governmental or non-governmental

9.2.1 Recommendations Focusing on the Egyptian Government and Administration

A necessary (albeit utopian from today's perspective) precondition for an improvement of the situation in South Sinai is a commitment of the Egyptian government to ensuring

- rule of law,

- political freedom,

- responsible government action,

- protection of human rights,

- protection of religious and ethnic minorities,

- comprehensive social participation.

Given that presently all of these have great deficits (cf. Harders 2005; International Crisis Group 2005; Wurzel 2003; Kienle 2000; Zaki 1994), more pressure should be exercised on the Egyptian government by the international donors, namely the USA and the EU. However, significant change towards good governance or real democracy will – if at all – only take place in the medium or long term.[299] And even in a democracy, the question of ethnic minorities and indigenous people will need special attention. Once there is a serious commitment of the Egyptian government towards democracy and support of the Bedouin, the following recommendations should be implemented, if possible also at an earlier stage:

- End the general and unfocussed repression and discrimination of the Bedouin population by Egyptian police and administration.

- Prepare a new comprehensive social and economic development plan for Sinai based on consultation with genuine community leaders, the private sector and donors (cf. International Crisis Group 2007:ii).

- Encourage participation of the Bedouin and their legitimate representatives in development decision-making (cf. International Crisis Group 2007:ii). According to Ibrahim (1996:195) participatory political systems are an effective basis for peaceful resolution of social unrest and ethnic conflicts.[300]

- "Facilitate and encourage the building of local capacities (e.g. local associations) by simplifying political and administrative rules" and supporting such associations financially (c.f. International Crisis Group 2007: ii).

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[299] A possible first sign for such a change might be new kinds of protest movements such as the *"kifaya"* movement that was established in 2004 (see International Crisis Group 2005:i,29, 2007:21).

[300] Until a democracy with special consideration of the needs of minorities will be developed, participation can be ensured in other ways that also allow all members of society to take part in the decision making process regarding their livelihoods.

- Projects funded (and managed) by international donors should have a focus on Bedouin community interests and develop the necessary tools to research them (i.e. these projects should go beyond asking a corrupt sheikh for the needs of his community).

- Projects that provide support to the Bedouin population should ensure that they are adapted to Bedouin needs, i.e. ideally all Bedouin should be informed about such a project directly (rather than through corrupt Bedouin representatives) and their opinions and needs should be collected and considered in the project planning, implementation and consolidation phase. The process of solicitation of support should be adapted to the Bedouin needs, rather than excluding the Bedouin by insisting on complicated project or fund application forms that most Bedouin will not be able to fill in correctly.

- Respect and acceptance regarding Bedouin, their lifestyle and culture should be taught in Egyptian schools and should be enforced among the public service staff. In addition to the consideration of Bedouin culture in the school syllabus (especially so for Sinai schools), student exchanges could be organized to foster mutual understanding. Discriminatory representation of the Bedouin in the Egyptian media should be prohibited.

- More Bedouin should be trained and employed in public service positions, especially in positions as policemen or teachers and in the administration in order to improve Bedouin identification with and representation in the system.[301]

Ideally, the following two points should be achieved, as well:

Sinai should get a special administrative and political status as part of a federal state, that will ensure Bedouin self-governance and participation in the tourism development. As argued by Ibrahim (1996:195), "federalism would reconcile the legitimate impulse of Arab states to preserve their territorial integrity with the legitimate right of ethnic groups to preserve their culture, human dignity, and political autonomy."

While it is utopian to return all land to the Bedouin, more land, including valuable land for tourism development should be allocated to the Bedouin. This could definitely be done with land that has been sold to investors who have not fulfilled the government requirements and whose land has therefore gone back into state ownership. For a just distribution of the land among the Bedouin, Bedouin community development will be a precondition (see below). Communal land ownership might be a solution. Sale of Bedouin land to non-Bedouin should not be allowed.

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[301] Lancaster (1991:78) reports how conflicts between the Rawala Bedouin of Saudi Arabia and the state could usually be solved tactfully and smoothly due to the fact that many of the police staff were Bedouin, too.

9.2.2 Bedouin Community Development

Development projects with Bedouin as a focus group should target the following issues:

Most importantly, there is a need for Bedouin community development to enable the Bedouin to formulate a collective opinion, to identify collective interests and take the respective actions to prevail, e.g. by influencing government decisions. This should also include the development of legitimate and accountable leadership. While the community development should start at the level of the lineages or tribes, in the long run an intertribal Bedouin organization of Sinai should represent Bedouin interests at the national and international level.

Eco-tourism projects with a strong cultural component should be initiated and/or supported including the provision of training, help in the acquisition of partner agencies abroad, access to credit, the conceptualisation of how Bedouin traditional knowledge and culture could be integrated in this kind of tourism as well as specific regulations applying to Bedouin tourism entrepreneurs (i.e. exceptions to the general government rules and regulations regarding the tourism industry that represent a barrier to market entry for most Bedouin).

Development and support of other projects for the conservation of Bedouin skills and knowledge possibly combined with income generation activities (e.g. production of traditional medicine from desert herbs, embroidery, camel riding courses, etc.).

9.2.3 Recommendations for Future Research

This research was carried out with limited time and financial resources. Moreover, the sensitive research topic and difficult conditions in the field, made it difficult to get both information from the government as well as from the Bedouin without jeopardizing the respondent's safety.

The following issues that have been addressed generally in this research should be investigated in more depth by future research:

- the administrative processes and interaction between the Bedouin and the authorities,

- the situation of the various groups of Bedouin society vis-à-vis the tourism development and their interdependence: young and old, men and women, rich and poor, desert and town, mountain and coast as well as differences among the various tribes regarding their involvement in tourism and their interaction with the government.

Although it would be useful to have more figures for statistics, they would be difficult to collect. Even when better equipped with time, money and transport, the "soft factors" of social research in Sinai will probably inhibit the collection of useful statistical data. The researcher recommends even more intensive qualitative field research with more time and focus on a smaller geographical unit in order to establish a relationship of mutual trust with the informants that will yield very valuable data. A prerequisite will be a well defined research question since otherwise the result will be a general narration about Bedouin life.

While future research could add some more detail to existing knowledge, the actual problems are well known. More important than further research is an active engagement to support the South Sinai Bedouin in developing in a self-determined way and protect them from increasing marginalization and repression.

Concluding, this research should not be understood as a romantization or stereotyping of indigenous people. The author insists that she does not argue from a primordialist standpoint that indigenous people should remain untouched. Of course, given the exposure to the modern world, indigenous people, too, develop new ideas, aspirations and forms of living that are influenced by the modern world. But she demands that indigenous people in general and the South Sinai Bedouin specifically should be given the space and time to adapt to and adopt modernity at their own terms. Development cannot be understood independently of culture, its values and norms. To be meaningful, development has to embody the aspirations of the people rather than pursue global homogenizing standards. As has been said in chapter two, the structures of power determine who benefits from tourism development and who does not. It is the structures of power that need to be addressed if meaningful change shall be achieved. In this sense the last word shall be given to a Bedouin from South Sinai:

> "More important than tourism is freedom. Without freedom, life is no life. The Egyptians have freedom, but we don't." (Mzaina, Nuwaiba, male, 32)

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Annex 1: ILO Convention No. 169

The full text of the ILO Convention No. 169 can be found on the ILO web site: http://www.ilo.org/ilolex/cgi-lex/ratifce.pl?C169. Some of its most important provisions are summarized here:

"Article 4: requires ratifying States to adopt special measures for safeguarding the persons, institutions, property, labour, cultures and environment of indigenous and tribal peoples

Article 5: establishes that, in applying the Convention, ratifying States must recognize and protect the social, cultural, religious and spiritual values of indigenous and tribal peoples, and respect the integrity of their values, practices and institutions

Article 6: requires, among other things, that ratifying States consult indigenous and tribal peoples through appropriate procedures, particularly through their representative institutions when legislative or administrative measures that may directly affect them are being considered, and provides that States should establish means for the peoples concerned to develop their own institutions

Article 7: establishes, among other things, the right of indigenous and tribal peoples to decide their own priorities for the process of development and to exercise control over their own economic, social and cultural development, and establishes the obligation of ratifying States to take measures to protect and preserve the environment of the territories inhabited by these peoples

Article 8: requires States to take indigenous and tribal custom and customary law into account when applying national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned

Article 13: requires governments to respect the special importance to the cultures and spiritual values of indigenous and tribal peoples of their relationship with the lands or territories that they occupy

Article 14: establishes that ratifying States shall recognize the rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned over the lands that they traditionally occupy, and that States shall establish adequate procedures within the national legal system to resolve land claims brought by indigenous and tribal peoples" (UN/OHCHR n.d.(a):3)

Annex 2: Key Questions for Semi-structured Interviews

Note: Very detailed key questions regarding the respondents, their household and/or the tourism establishment in question were prepared and developed further from fieldphase to fieldphase. These lists of questions covered all possible issues and interview situations.

In the actual interviews only a small part of the entire question set was asked, because priority was given to the actual interaction between the researcher and her respondents. Since it soon became clear that higher quality information could be obtained in very informal and open conversations, the interviews became increasingly unstructured in the course of the research. Notwithstanding, the questions of interest were kept in mind and addressed where possible (see chapter 4 for a detailed discussion of the methods.)

In this annex, the general interview topics as well as the comprehensive list of questions for the first and third fieldphase are presented (except for a few points, the questions of the second field phase were almost identical to the third fieldphase).

Annex 2a: Overview of Interview Topics

BUSINESS SURVEY

- Type, location, capacity, type of tourists, acquisition of customers, owner/employees, origin, relationship
- Business development
- Foundation (when, process, regulations, initial investment (amount, source of capital), land ownership, business development, future plans)
- Effects of crises such as the Intifada, terror attacks of 11th September 2001, war against Iraq
- Decrease in tourist demand and income

- Effect of decrease in demand on business strategy (investment, marketing, prices, customers, etc.)

RESPONDENT PERSONAL AND HOUSEHOLD DATA

- Name, sex, age, marital status, children, place of origin, tribe,

- Education foreign languages

- Jobs/businesses at present and in the past

- Role in household, number of household members, sources of income, assets, land ownership, loss of land

- Experience of crises such as sickness, no job, no tourists and response strategies

- Personal opinion regarding various issues

  - Education

  - Bedouin identity

  - Bedouin future (society, economy)

  - Bedouin-Egyptian relationships

  - Government policies

Annex 2b: Key Questions First Phase

A: BUSINESS SURVEY

SECTION 1: Personal Information about Respondent

- Date of interview
- Location of interview
- Sex of respondent
- What is your name?
- What is your age?
- Are you married?
- How many children do you have?
- Are you originally from this place?
    - IF NOT:
    - Where are you originally from?
    - When did you come here and why?
- Type of ownership (international chain, franchise, family, individual, etc)
- Are you the owner of this business?
    - IF NOT:
    - Who is the owner ?
    - Where is he from and where is he now?
    - Are you the manager of this business?
- Which level of studies have you completed?
- Have you received any specific training?
    - IF YES:
    - In which profession
    - By who
    - Where and when
    - How was the training financed?

SECTION 2: Characteristics of the Business

- Type of the business (hotel, restaurant, shop, camel renting, jeep renting, etc.) sub categories for each business type yet to be defined further (e.g. class of the hotel (1-5 star), further differences: Bedouin camp, resort lodges, etc.)

- Capacity (no of rooms and beds, no of camels, no of jeeps, etc.)

- No of fulltime, part time, occasional (on demand) employees (what is their level of education or training and what is their respective salary?

- Where are the employees from?

- How do you find and choose your employees?

- Do you provide training to employees? What kind?

SECTION 3: Customers, variability and consequences

- Who are your customers (young-old, rich-budget, family-individuals) and where do they come from?

- What is the no of customers/guests (tourists) per day/ night (or camel trip (then also trips per day, etc.) (and on average how long do they stay/tour, etc.)

  - On average

  - Maximum

  - Minimum

- Does the no of your customers change a lot?

- What are the reasons for these changes?

  - Do the seasons have an effect on the no of tourists?

  - Have you noticed a change in the no of tourists before, during or after the

    o Gulf War 1991

    o 2nd Intifada

    o Terrorist attacks in Luxor 1997

    o 11th September

    o War against Iraq?

- Has the type of tourists who come to your business changed after these events (nationality, age, etc)?

- Are there any Arab tourists or has their number increases?

- How does their demand and behaviour differ from Western tourists?

- Do you try to satisfy their demand?

- Have you noticed any other changes during or after these conflicts and crisis? What are these changes?

- How do you get your guests/customers? Did you have to change your strategy to get guests/customers because of the political crisis or other reasons? (what are those reasons?)

- How do the changes in no of guest due to the seasons or political conflicts and crisis affect your returns and profits? (What was your daily or monthly return/profit before and after or in good and bad times?)

- What are the consequences of the change in returns/profits on your

  - Investment to expand or improve your business

  - On maintenance

  - On the no of employees or type of agreement with employees

  - If small scale business: on your household economy and livelihood?

- How do you respond to these changes and the resulting problems?

SECTION 4: Business History and Investment Decisions

- Since when does the business exist and how did it start?

- Have you had any previous experience in tourism and what kind?

- What was the reason/hope to invest in this business (area)?

- Were the expectations met?

- Are there any problems you do/did face?

- Did you need a permit to start your business?

- Did you have to comply to any rules and regulations such as sanitation standards to start your business?

- How did you finance the initial investment (savings, sale of assets, help from friends, bank, etc.)

- Has the business undergone any transformations since its foundation (growth, improved quality)

- Did you ask for credit at a bank in order to start or improve the business?

- Did you receive the credit you asked for and under which conditions?

- Do you plan any expansions or improvements?

- Do you plan to make other investments in the tourism sector in Sinai?

- Do you own any other businesses or do you carry out any other economic activity, etc.?

SECTION 5: Respondent's Opinion on the Tourism in Sinai

- What do you think about the future of tourism in Sinai (5 years, 20 years from now)

- Is their need for change or improvement in the tourism industry?

- How do you see the government's involvement and the support as well as regulations concerning the tourism development?

- Do you think the tourism industry is good or bad for the environment? Why?

B: EMPLOYEE SURVEY

- Date of interview

- Location of interview

- Firm data if not collected from owner or manager, find out at least origin of owner, characteristics of the firm as in firm survey

- Sex of respondent

- What is your name?

- What is your age?

- Are you married?

- How many children do you have?

- Are you originally from this place?

  - IF NOT:

  - Where are you originally from (place of birth)?

  - When did you come here and what was your motivation?

- Which level of studies have you completed?

- Have you received any specific training?

  - IF YES:

  - In which profession

  - By who

  - Where and when

  - How was the training financed?

- What is your job here/now?

- How long have you been working here?

- How did you get this job?

- What did you do before starting this job?

- What was your first job after school?

- Have you had any (other) previous experience in the tourism industry?

- What is your work schedule (h/d, d/week)

- Do you get a holiday?

- What happens if you fall sick? How many days sick leave paid/unpaid can you take?

- What happens if the business is going badly because of lack of tourists?

- Do you have a job contract?

- Do you have a fixed salary or are you paid according to business returns?

- How much is your salary?

- What are the 5 most important expenses you use your income for?

- Do you feel you have a safe income?

- Do you save any money at the end of the month?

- What are you planning to do with your savings?

- Do you have any other sources of income? (if yes, what? How does that income compare in percentage to income from this job)

- Would you like to work in the big hotels in Sharm?

- How much longer do you plan to follow this occupation?

- Do you envisage to start your own business? What kind?

C: HOUSEHOLD SURVEY

IF NOT ASKED IN BUSINESS OR EMPLOYEE SURVEY:

- Date of interview, Location of interview
- Sex of respondent
- What is your name?
- What is your age?
- Are you married?
- How many children do you have?
- Are you originally from this place?

    IF NOT:

    - Where are you originally from (place of birth)?
    - When did you come here and what was your motivation?
    - What are you working?
    - Do you have any business?

THEN

- Are there any other people living in your household? Who? How many?
- How many household members are working? What kind of work are they doing?
- How many household members are employed or otherwise engaged in the tourism sector? What kind of work/activity are they doing?
- Do you own land or livestock?
- Are there any other sources of income for the household?
- What is the share of income from tourism in total household income (also individual level) and what are the shares of other income sources?
- What are your most important expenditure items in a month/ in a year and how much do you spend?
- Could income from tourism alone cover all your expenditure?
- Can you make any savings at the end of the month or year?
- How do you evaluate the various jobs in general (hard work, tiring, fun, etc) and what are the reasons for taking each of them?
- Are you sending your children to school?
- What level of education would you like your children to achieve?
- What do you think are the benefits from education for your children?

Respondents' Evaluation of the Tourism

- What do you think about the developments in the tourism industry?

- What are the major changes (positive and negative) that were caused by the tourism development?

- What do you think about these changes?

- IF still not clear: What has it brought to you? To your family? To your people?

- Do you feel that there is need for change or improvement in the tourism industry? How?

- Could you influence the further developments?

- Who makes the decisions and according to your judgment who influences the decision making?

- How do you see the government's involvement and the support as well as regulations concerning the tourism development?

- Do you think the tourism industry is good or bad for the environment? Why?

- Have you heard about any organizations representing the interests of xxxxx?

- What do you think about the future of tourism in Sinai (5 years, 20 years from now)

- What are your hopes/fears for the future?

Annex 2c: Key Questions Third Phase

A: BUSINESS SURVEY

- Date, Interview Location, Name of business, business type, business location

- No. of owners, who is the owner? Are there several business partners? Who are they?, type of ownership

- Where is / are the owner from, where does the owner reside?

Customers, Crisis, Effects of Crisis

- What does your business offer and how do you get your customers?

- What is the capacity of the business?

- Who are your customers? Package, Individual, Young, old, Nationality

- How much do you charge per trip, night, etc?

- Does the number of your customers fluctuate a lot over the year and from one year to the next? How?

- When is the bad season?

- When is the good season?

- If during the good season you have 100 customers in a month, how many do you have during the bad season?

- Has the intifada affected your business? How many tourists a day/ week, etc did you have before and after the beginning of the Intifada in high and low season?

- If before intifada you had 100 tourists, to how much did the no of tourists drop after the intifada?

- When did the tourist numbers rise again? Did they rise to the pre-intifada level?

- 11 september

- Recovery 11 september

- War Iraq 03

- Recovery Iraq 03

- Has the type of tourists changed after these crisis? Do they come from different countries? Do they spend more/less money?

- Do you have Egyptian tourists? When did they start coming? Has their number increased after 11/9?

- Do you have other Arab tourists? Where from? When did they start coming? Has their number increased after 11/9

- Do the Egyptian and Arab tourists like different things than the Western and Israeli tourists? How?

- Have you noticed any other change as a result of the various crisis?

- Is the increasing competition a bigger problem than the political conflicts? Why?

Response to Crisis and Changes

- Did you have to change your business strategy?

- What effect did the crisis have on your returns and profits?

- How did the drop in profits affect any plans to improve or expand the business?

- How did the drop in profits affect any maintenance required for the business?

- How did the drop in profits affect your employment decisions?

- How do you respond the different tastes and demands of the Arab tourists?

Employment and Business Relationships

- Are there any relatives of yours working for you? How many? Which relatives are working for you?

- How many employees do you have? In which positions?

- Where are your employees from?

- How do you find people to employ?

- Have any Bedouin applied here?

- What is the salary for the employees (in the different positions?)

- What kind of contract do the employees have?(seasonal employment, duration/period of emploment, wage + accommodation + food Difference in labour conditions for different labourers.)

- Are there any people or companies whose services you need to run your business? Who are they?

- Are there any people or companies to whom you provide services? Who are they?

Business History and Regulations

- What year did this business start?

- How was this business started?

- Has the owner had previous experience in tourism? What?

- How long did you expect it would take to break even?

- Were your expectations met? Did you recover the investment?

- Which kind of problems have you faced during the start period and after that?

- Did you need a license to start your business?

- How long did it take to get the license and how much did it cost? (How many visits to authorities?)

- Did you have to give any presents to the authorities?

- What are the license requirements and other regulations?

- Do you own the land where this business is located? (Who owns it?)

- Do you own the building? Who owns it? How much is the rent?

- Do you pay taxes? What kind of taxes? To whom? How much?

- How did you finance the initial investment? (Labour emigration, private savings, loans from relatives, silent partners?)

- Have you asked for a bank credit to finance the business or something else?

- Have you received the credit and under which conditions?

- What do you do with your profits?

- Has your business undergone any transformations since its foundation?

- Do you plan any expansions or improvements?

- Do you plan any other investments? What kind?

- Were there any changes regarding tourism businesses introduced by TDA (when they came) or by the municipality? Did they affect you? How?

- Does the owner have other businesses or jobs?

B: RESPONDENT PERSONAL DATA

- Date, Interview location, Name, Sex, Age, Married, Children

Origin and Migration

- Where were you born? In which District? Which tribe do you belong to?

- Where do you live? Have you always lived there? How did the place look like in the past? How was the life in the past?

- What is the best place to live? (why don't live there?)

- In your youth, did you still live in the desert and move from place to place? Until when? Why did you settle? Do you still spend some months a year in the desert? Where? What do you do during this time?

- Do you still have close relatives who live in the desert? Who?

- Would like to go back to desert? Why not? Or why not go there then?

- Will there soon be no Bedu left who live in the desert? Estimate % of Bedu who still live in the desert?

- Do you have a relative who left to work elsewhere in Sinai or outside Sinai? Who? Where?

- Does he send money to you or sb else in the family?

Education and Training

- How many years did you go to school?

- What is the highest level you completed?

- Did you get any specific training?

- By whom?

- Where, when

- How financed?

- Which foreign languages do you speak?

Economic Activities

- What is your job/ responsibility in this business?

- How long have you been in this business?

- Did you have previous experience in tourism?

Subjective Evaluation of Tourism

- How many % of the Bedu depend on tourism? What do the others work or live of? Are there many Bedouin without work?

- Can you name 3 positive changes in the last 10-20 years? Reason?

- Can you name 3 negative changes in the last 10-20 years? Reason?

- Do you feel that the tourists and the migrants from Egypt who work in the tourism respect the Bedouin?

- Does tourism help to keep the Bedouin culture and lifestyle or does it destroy it? (How?)

- Are the Bedouin more or less secure and independent because of tourism than in the past?

- People say that now people are not the same anymore, that there are rich and poor. How did this happen? How can the poor help themselves? Cooperatives? Do the rich help the poor? Do people help within their family? Within their clan?

- Can the Bedouin still go to the beach? What about women and children?

- What effects does the growing tourism industry have on the environment?

- Do you think that too much water is used for tourism?

- Do you think there will be enough land, water, opportunities and jobs for your children and grand children in the future? What if the plans of the government to develop the coast like Sharm El Sheikh and settle millions of people in Sinai will become true? Will the Bedouin be affected? Will they still get people for Safari? Will the fishermen be affected? The Bedouin camps? What will you do if more and more regulations make it difficult for the Bedouin to work, e.g. take tourists to the desert in the jeep?

- If there was no more tourism for several years, what could you work? How would you survive? Would you have to go and find work far from your family? Could this happen?

- Are you happy that there is tourism in Sinai and so you do not have to go and work far away?

- Do you sometimes wish tourism had never come?

- Do you wish the Bedu had more influence on how the tourism developments in S. Sinai, e.g where and how many hotels are built, which land should be protected, etc? How would you try and influence the planning and development?

- Do your children know how to live from the desert?

- Do you think that the Bedouin children should be selling bracelets, etc. to the tourists?

- what is more important in Sinai: drugs or tourism? Differences between town and desert, Gabaliya, Mzeina, Awlad Sa'id and Tarabeen? Estimate in %.

- Do you personally know anybody who cultivates or plants drugs?

- Do you think (taking) drugs are a problem for the young generation and for the development of the Bedouin?

Participation

- If you had a serious problem with a neighbour, would you try to solve it with the traditional 'Urf right or go to the police? Why?

- If you had a problem with the government or the police, could the 'Urf help you?

- What are the most common problems people have with the government? How could they be avoided or solved?

- Would you like to be a member of the town council for some time?

- What would you try to change / What would you like to achieve if you were in the town council?

- Do you have any close friend or relative who is in the town council or has a gvmt job? Who? What kind?

- Do you have a close friend or relative who has been in jail or has had other problems with the police? Do you think he was guilty? How could they solve the problem?

- Have you at any time had a problem with the police or been in jail? How could (would) you solve the problem?

- Do you have an ID?

- If an NGO offered you a credit of 50,000LE to start a business, what kind of business would you start? Why?

- Would you start the business with sb from Egypt? If not, why? Would you prefer to start the business with a Bedouin?

- If you were offered a job in a hotel, in a restaurant, in a Camp, in a diving center or in a safari agency, which one would be your first, second, third choice? Why? What would be your job? But what if last choice was paid double the money of first choice? If you wanted a job in a big hotel, would you get it? (Why (not)?

- Do you think it is important that young Bedouin go to the army? Why? Have you been to the army? Do many people (%?) manage to avoid the army?

- During the Israeli time many Bedouin worked in the factories, construction, in the big hotels, why now so few?

- Do you know any Bedouin co-operative? Get rid of: Are you a member of a co-operative or are you trying to found a co-operative together with others?, i.e of a business association or group with business/commercial interests?

- Have you ever applied for a job with a foreign or an Egyptian company? Get rid of: Get Have you actively sought work in the last 12 months? Where? Were you successful?

- What are your plans for the future?

C: HOUSEHOLD Data

- Respondent's role in household

- How many members live in your household?

- Who?

- Are there any other relatives who live with you?

- Do you support any relative or friend who does not live with you?

- Do you have any other jobs or businesses?

- Share of each economic activity in total personal income

- Are there any other household member who are working? What?

- Does any other household member own any other business? What?

- Does your family have any other sources of income?

- Are your brothers and fathers all working in tourism? Employed or selfemployed? Is any of them employed at an Egyptian or foreigner. Where, what?

- What is the share of each economic activity to total household income?

- Could you/ your household live from income from tourism alone?

- How much money do you need a month for your family? How much can you make?

- Do you prefer to have enough to feed and clothe your family and work only sometimes or work hard every day and make a lot of money? Could you find a job or business where you could get rich? Through working hard?

Household Assets

- How many camels do you own?

- How many goats do you or your wife own?

- How many sheep do or you your wife own?

- Do you own any other animals?

- What do you keep the animals for?

- Do you have a garden?

- Can the animals and the garden help you when you have no work? How, enough?

- Do you live in your own house now? Do you own any other houses? Is having a house better than living in a tent? Why? Do you think there is enough space in Dahab, etc.? Do you like the walls around the houses? Why are they there?

- Do you own any land? Where is it located? Do you have a title for it? When did you get the title and what did you have to do to get the title? Why do some people have lots of land and others very little? Did you buy it from sb? From a Bedouin? Did he have a title to it or "lifted his hand" Conditions?

- Do you own any land at the beach or in town other than where you live?

- Have you rented or sold any land or houses? To whom? When? For what period? Would you like to get it back?

- Do you know any Bedouin who lost his land because he did not have papers for it or for some other reason?

- Do you think that the Bedu are the true owners of the land?

- Do you think Bedouin should not be allowed to sell their land to foreigners (i.e. Europeans and Egyptians?) Are there many Bedouin who do sell to outsiders?

- Should the gvmt regulate the land ownership (if not what about migrants)? Should the BEdu have a special right to the land because of their ancestors and history?

- Do you own a car?

- Do you own a motorbike?

- Do you own a TV, Dish, Fridge, washing machine?

- Do you own a telephone (landline)?

- Do you own a mobile?

- In the last five years, did you buy any big assets, such as livestock, camel, car, house, etc.? When? For how much?

- In the last five years, did you lend money to anybody? When? To whom? How much?

Crisis and Risk Management

- Have you ever been sick or unable to work or earn money for a long time? Why and how long? What did you do to make ends meet during this time?

- How has the reduction in tourist numbers affected your household?

- What did you do to cope with this problem?

- Can you make any savings now? Do you take them to the bank? Do you keep foreign currency? Do you invest your savings in animals or land or some business?

- Could you make savings in the past?

- Do you have any savings from earlier times?

- What do you plan to do with your savings?

- In the last 5 years, did you have to sell one or more animals or any other assets? When? How much did you get and how long did it last? (How many animals (or assets) were you left with?

- Did you have to change what you buy or how much you buy for daily consumption, other expenditure? Year 2000 = 100, then now?

- Did you have to borrow money or were you given money from a relative or friend? From who, how much, how long? Have you helped this person before?

- Did you try to get another or an additional job or business? Which one?

- Have you thought about working outside Sinai or Egypt?

- Do you have any plans in order to be well prepared for these kind of problems in the future?

Education and Bedouin Future

- Do you send your daughters and sons to school?

- Which level would you like them to achieve? Same for daughters and sons?

- Why do you think education is important / not so important?

- Do you think that the children learn everything they need at school? Should they have Bedouin teachers? Why? Should they be taught about Bedouin culture and history, about the desert plants and animals? Or should they learn this with their families?

- How will education for the children change the life of the Bedu and their involvement in tourism?

- If Bedouin get good education at university, do you think they come back to help the Bedouin?

- Is it good for the Bedouin to have many kids? How many kids do you think one should have?

- Meaning of Bedu? Shaghaliin or rahalin?

- Bedouin: just like any other Egyptian or a different people? How are they different? How are they the same?

- Do you think the Egyptians or government treat the Bedu differently than they treat Egyptians?, e.g. in maglis, in hospital, at lawyer, in school, in bank, at police, water and sewage systems for the village?

- Why do some people say that the Bedouin are unreliable and that they cannot work fixed hours and refuse to be managed by non-bedouin?

- Should the Bedouin get a share of the income from entry fees for the national parks?

- In the future, will the Bedouin be like the Egyptians? Are you worried about this? Should the Bedouin become teachers, doctors, lawyers, etc? For whom should they work? Will they get jobs?

- Should the Bedouin live among themselves or mix with Egyptians? Inter-Marriage?

- Do some Bedu live in gvmt housing?

- What is the most important to help the Bedouin for the future. What do the Bedouin need to survive as a people? Should there be more Bedouin civil servants and politicians? Where and how?

- Bedouin organize to defend interests? Why not within tribe and with other tribes? Could Sheikh or traditional judge not mobilize the people?

- How would Sinai be if the Israeli had never been here? Better or worse or same? Did the Israeli law that no building of stone was allowed for the Bedouin mean that Bedouin could not claim land when they should have, i.e. that today the Bedouin would have more land

Annex 3: 1986 and 1996 Census Data for South Sinai

Summary South Sinai Demographic Profile

	1986			1996			Intercensal Change	Annual Change
	Total Pop.	Total Male	M/F ratio	Total Pop.	Total Male	M/F ratio	Total Pop. (%)	Total Pop. (%)
TOTAL GOVERNORATE	**28576**	**17414**	**1,56**	**54826**	**33894**	**1,62**	**91,9**	**6,73**
TOTAL URBAN	11423	8258	2,61	27400	18377	2,04	139,9	9,14
TOTAL RURAL	17153	9156	1,14	27426	15517	1,30	59,9	4,81
Qism Al-Tur	**6323**	**3918**	**1,63**	**14148**	**8003**	**1,30**	**123,8**	**8,39**
Al-Tur City	4338	2851	1,92	10563	6020	1,33	143,5	9,31
Al-Tur Villages	1985	1067	1,16	3585	1983	1,24	80,6	6,09
Qism Abu Zanima	**3023**	**1788**	**1,45**	**5607**	**3212**	**1,34**	**85,5**	**6,37**
Abu Zanima City	883	574	1,86	2680	1609	1,50	203,5	11,74
Abu Zanima Villages	2140	1214	1,31	2927	1603	1,21	36,8	3,18
Qism Ras Sudr	**5392**	**2795**	**1,08**	**6585**	**3635**	**1,23**	**22,1**	**2,02**
Ras Sudr City	1329	795	1,49	1423	856	1,51	7,1	0,69
Ras Sudr Villages	4063	2000	0,97	5162	2779	1,17	27	2,42
Qism Abu Rudais	**5129**	**3486**	**2,12**	**7434**	**5016**	**2,07**	**44,9**	**3,78**
Abu Rudais City	2515	2093	4,96	4152	3162	3,19	65,1	5,14
Abu Rudais Villages	2614	1393	1,14	3282	1854	1,30	25,6	2,30
Qism Saint Catherine	**3363**	**1830**	**1,19**	**4219**	**2365**	**1,28**	**25,5**	**2,29**
Saint Catherine City	347	216	1,65	754	554	2,77	117,3	8,07
Saint Catherine Villages	3016	1614	1,15	3465	1811	1,09	14,9	1,40
Sharm al-Shaikh Qism	**1556**	**1102**	**2,43**	**7419**	**5295**	**2,49**	**376,8**	**16,91**
Sharm al-Shaikh City	869	699	4,11	4306	3476	4,19	395,5	17,36
Sharm al-Shaikh Villages	687	403	1,42	3113	1819	1,41	353,1	16,31
Qism Dahab	**1584**	**937**	**1,45**	**3703**	**2456**	**1,97**	**133,8**	**8,86**
Dahab City	281	228	4,30	1079	860	3,93	284	14,40
Dahab Villages	1303	709	1,19	2624	1596	1,55	101,4	7,25
Qism Nuwaiba	**2206**	**1558**	**2,40**	**5711**	**3912**	**2,17**	**158,9**	**9,98**
Nuwaiba City	861	802	13,59	2443	1840	3,05	183,7	10,99
Nuwaiba Villages	1345	756	1,28	3268	2072	1,73	143,0	9,28

Source: GoE 1986, GoE 1996, calculations by D. Sims

**Distribution of South Sinai Population by
Qism, City and Village**

	1986 % of Total	1996 % of total
TOTAL GOVERNORATE	100,0	100,0
TOTAL URBAN	100,0	100,0
TOTAL RURAL	100,0	100,0
Qism Al-Tur	**22,1**	**25,8**
Al-Tur City	38,0	38,6
Al-Tur Villages	11,6	13,1
Qism Abu Zanima	**10,6**	**10,2**
Abu Zanima City	7,7	9,8
Abu Zanima Villages	12,5	10,7
Qism Ras Sudr	**18,9**	**12,0**
Ras Sudr City	11,6	5,2
Ras Sudr Villages	23,7	18,8
Qism Abu Rudais	**17,9**	**13,6**
Abu Rudais City	22,0	15,2
Abu Rudais Villages	15,2	12,0
Qism Saint Catherine	**11,8**	**7,7**
Saint Catherine City	3,0	2,8
Saint Catherine Villages	17,6	12,6
Sharm al-Shaikh Qism	**5,4**	**13,5**
Sharm al-Shaikh City	7,6	15,7
Sharm al-Shaikh Villages	4,0	11,4
Qism Dahab	**5,5**	**6,8**
Dahab City	2,5	3,9
Dahab Villages	7,6	9,6
Qism Nuwaiba	**7,7**	**10,4**
Nuwaiba City	7,5	8,9
Nuwaiba Villages	7,8	11,9

Source: GoE 1986, GoE 1996, calculations by D. Sims

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München, den 12. August 2010

Andrea von Sarnowski

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Abstract

The Bedouin of South Sinai have been significantly affected by the politics of external powers for a long time. However, never had the interest of external powers in Sinai been so strong as since the Israeli-Egyptian wars in the second half of the 20th century when Bedouin interests started to collide with Egypt's plans for a development of luxury tourism in South Sinai.

The tourism boom that has started in the 1980s has brought economic and infrastructure development to the Bedouin and tourism has become the most important source of income for the Bedouin. However, while the absolute increase of tourists to Sinai has trickled down to the Bedouin to some extent, the participation of Bedouin in the overall tourism development is under-proportionate. Moreover, the Bedouin have become increasingly dependent on monetary income and consequently from tourism as the only significant source of income while at the same time they have lost much of their land as well as their self-determination.

In this context, the Bedouin livelihoods have become very vulnerable due to repeated depressions in the tourism industry as well as marginalization. Major marginalization processes the Bedouin are facing are the loss of land, barriers to market entry, especially increasingly strict rules and regulations in the tourism industry, as well as discrimination by the authorities. Social differentiation and Bedouin preferences are identified as further factors in Bedouin marginalization.

The strategies Bedouin have developed in response to all these problems are coping strategies, which try to deal with the present problem at the individual level. Basically no strategies have been developed at the collective level that would aim to actively shape the Bedouin's present and future. Collective action has been hampered by a variety of factors, such as the speed of the developments, the distribution of power or the decay of tribal structures.

While some Bedouin might be able to continue their tourism activities, a large number of informal jobs will not be feasible anymore. The majority of the previously mostly self-employed Bedouin will probably be forced to work as day-laborers who will have lost much of their pride, dignity, sovereignty and freedom. Moreover, with a return to subsistence being impossible for the majority of the Bedouin, it is likely that an increasing number of marginalized Bedouin will turn to illegal income generating activities such as smuggling or drug cultivation. This in turn will lead to further repression and discrimination and could escalate in a serious violent conflict between the Bedouin and the government.

Development plans and projects should address the general lack of civil rights, local participation and protection of minorities in Egypt and promote Bedouin community development and the consideration of Bedouin interests in tourism development.

Wether the political upheavals and the resignation of president Mubarak at the beginning of 2011 will have a positive effect on the situation of the Bedouin remains to be seen.